

INSTANTIAE AND 12TH CENTURY "SCHOOLS"

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Whereas it is unclear what sort(s) of social institution 12th century schools of thought correspond to,¹ it is clear that there were groups of people who in their own eyes as well as in the eyes of others were bound together by allegiance to a common doctrine, a common body of philosophical tenets. Not only are certain opinions ascribed to "nominales", "Melidunenses" or others, but some writers also contrast "nostri" and "nostra doctrina" with others and their doctrine. Thus an anonymous *Compendium Logicae*,² whose author adheres to the views of Gilbert the Porretan, starts "Quoniam nostrae integritas doctrinae in duobus consistit ... de his compendiose ac diligenter dicere temptemus".³ Then follow lists of theses (*positiones*) and reasons for holding each of these. Occasionally dissent within the group of "nostri" is said to exist. Thesis III.6 is presented in the words, "Omnis homo est et corpus et spiritus secundum quosdam nostrum", and the author explains the reason for the rift in the group, being rather scornful of those people who have timidly yielded to common usage rather than uphold the pure doctrine.

Thesis III.12 is 'omne totum contiguum est plura (scilicet suae partes), sed nullum continuum'. Ending the discussion of this thesis the author distinguished between his own group and several others: "At cum fere ab omnibus totum disgregativum dicatur plura, et [quod tamen a Montanis negatur ac raris] totum contiguum dicatur esse plura <-quod tamen a Montanis negatur ac a raris conceditur> nisi a *Nominalibus* et *Coppausis*,⁴ qui de omni fere toto concedunt quod sit suae partes. Sed haec positio non ab *omnibus nostrae doctrinae professoribus*⁵ recipitur, a quibus ratio veritatis non investigatur."

1. Cf. R.W.Southern, 'The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres' in R.L. Benson & G. Constable (eds.), *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, Oxford 1982, pp.113ff.

2. Ms. Oxf.Bodl. Corpus Christi 250: 18rA-24r. Edition due to appear in this journal (Number 45 or 46)

3. Cf. The beginning of *Ars Meliduna*: "Propositum quidem negotii est circa opinionis nostrae positiones singula inquirere, ut sic et nobis ipsis iucundum comparemus exercitium et sociis progressum" (Digby 174:211rA)

4. or: *Coppansis*; unidentified school.

5. For the expression, cf. "Meludinae professionis ... perfecta et integra in huius operis volumine consummatur cognitio" (*Secta Meliduna*, Ms. London BL Royal 2.D.XXX quoted by De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* II.1: 283 (Assen 1967)).

As *Compendium* was meant to serve the Porretan cause by listing and arguing for the school's theses, so *Secta Meliduna*⁶ was meant to serve the cause of the "Melidunenses". But people with other allegiances could turn information about a school's theses into a weapon against its members. In a disputation it may be extremely valuable to know which tenets your "enemy" will feel obliged to defend. This is explicitly recognized in some texts which, dealing with *instantiae*, point out that certain such arguments are efficient weapons against adherents of a particular school only, other people feeling no obligation to concede the premisses or be embarrassed by the conclusion. Here, then, are two relevant extracts:

I

From a fragment of a 12th century treatise on logical questions contained in Ms. München, BSB, clm 29520/2 (cf. p.61 above):

"... Specialiter de singulis, considerato ex qua secta respondens fuerit, facile poterit quis instare. Generaliter contra omnes fere caute<la> ex inmodali inferendo modalem et <e>converso, vel <ex> explicita inferendo¹ implicitam vel econverso. Contra *nominales* autem caute<la> ex affirmativa inferendo² negativam. Contra *Melidunenses* autem ex vero inferendo falsum vel econverso quocumque modo. Praeterea sumpto hac particula 'impossibile' vel hoc adverbium quando `cum`que pro³ <hac> coniunctione 'si' generaliter poterit quis instare contra omnes."

II

From Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos, [on this work, see CIMAGL 34 (1979) XXIV sqq.] ms. Cambridge, St. John's D.12: 110rB-v, on SE c. 18:

Ad maiorem igitur evidentiam solutionum dicendum est de instantia ad argumentationem, de qua ipse¹ non dicit. Instantia ad argumentationem tripliciter fit: vel in particulari, vel in simili, vel in contrario. Ad quod melius intelligendum sciendum est quod omnis (?) argumentatio vim suam contrahit ex `aliqua` universalis propositione - universalis dico vel in argumentatione posita vel extra argumentationem concepta. In argumen-

⁶. For this work, see the preceding note.

¹inferens *ms.*

²inferens *ms.*

³pro *ms.a.c.* cum *ms. p.c.*

¹*sc.* Aristoteles.

tatione posita, ut in syllogisticis. Extra argumentationem concepta, ut in enthymematicis. Quando universalis ponitur in argumentatione, tantum solvendum est per interemptionem; sed quando concipitur extra argumentationem, tunc solvitur tripliciter: vel in particulari vel in simili vel in contrario. In particulari ut si fiat talis argumentatio: 'ista sunt contraria, ergo eorum est eadem disciplina': propositio universalis extra concepta est ista 'omnium contrariorum eadem disciplina' et potest ita dari (??) instantiam: 'notum et ignotum sunt contraria, ergo noti et ignoti est eadem disciplina'. Sed notandum est quod numquam poterit dari instantia in particulari nisi propositio extra concepta talis sit quae habeat instantiam secundum opinionem interrogantis. Sed si talis sit² propositio extra concepta quae non habeat instantiam secundum eius opinionem, tunc quaerenda erit instantia in simili vel in contrario. Ut si fiat talis argumentatio: 'istud est individuum, ergo praedicatur de uno solo' - propositio universalis extra concepta est ista 'omne individuum praedicatur de uno solo' et haec non habet instantiam secundum opinionem interrogantis: concederet enim de quolibet individuo quod praedicetur de uno solo; quare non potest dari instantia et in particulari; quaerenda est ergo propositio similis propositioni extra conceptae per simplicem collationem. Similis illi est ista 'omne nomen proprium convenit uni soli' et ita poterit dari instantia: 'hoc nomen Aiax est nomen proprium, ergo convenit uni soli.' Quando vero non poterimus habere instantiam in simili per simplicem collationem, tunc recedendum erit ad propositionem /110vA/ similem universali extra conceptae per contrarium, ut in hac argumentatione 'hoc est individuum, ergo praedicatur de uno solo'. Propositio extra concepta est haec 'omne individuum praedicatur de uno solo'; huic similis est ista per contrarium 'omne nomen appellativum pluribus convenit', nam individuum et nomen appellativum similia sunt contrario, et similiter praedicari de uno solo et convenire pluribus similia sunt in contrario. Iccirco sic[ut] poterit dari instantia in contrario: "hoc nomen 'phoenix' est appellativum, ergo convenit pluribus". Omnis ergo instantia infertur vel in universali vel in particulari vel in simili vel in contrario; nam si sit instantia ad propositionem, fit in universali vel in particulari, sicut docetur in Topicis(?); si vero sit instantia ad argumentationem, fit vel in particulari vel in simili vel in contrario.

Iterum notandum est alia diviso instantiarum quod instantiarum alia est secundum veritatem, alia est secundum opinionem, alia est secundum

²fit *ms.*

apparentiam, et quaelibet illarum vel fit in universali vel in particulari vel in simili vel in contrario. Instantia est secundum veritatem quae potest fieri <ad> quemlibet³ interrogante<m> de qua sunt superiora exempla. Instantia secundum opinionem est quae potest fieri ad unum interrogantem et non ad quemlibet; ut si aliquis *Melidunensis* utatur tali argumentatione 'Si id⁴ quod currit movetur, aliquid movetur; ergo si nihil movetur nec id quod currit movetur', poterit dari instantia in universali, quoniam ex falso nihil sequitur, et falsum est nihil moveri. Poterit etiam dari instantia in particulari, hoc modo: 'Si Socrates non est lapis, Socrates non est margarita; ergo si Socrates est margarita, Socrates est lapis'. Sed dabitur instantia in simili secundum opinionem, ut si quis *Adamita* utatur tali argumentatione 'hoc genus animal est genus huic speciei homo, ergo omnis homo est animal': 'hoc genus animalia est genus huic speciei <homo>, ergo omnis homo est animalia'. Item dabitur instantia in contrario secundum opinionem, si quis *Melidunensis* faciat talem argumentationem: 'ista sunt opposita, ergo de quocumque praedicatur unum, ab eodem removetur reliquum': 'haec species homo et hoc proprium risibile sunt paria, ergo de quocumque haec species et hoc proprium'. Instantia secundum apparentiam est sophistica instantia. Instantiarum vero secundum apparentiam alia fit⁵ in universali, alia in particulari, alia in simili, alia in contrario. In universali, ut 'istud est album, ergo est coloratum': 'illud non fit⁶ coloratum, ergo non fit album'. In particulari ut 'illud⁷ fit album, ergo fit coloratum'. In simili datur instantia secundum apparentiam, ut 'istud fecit⁸, ergo necesse est hoc fecisse'; instantia: 'istud est, ergo necesse est noc esse'; sed non est vera instantia, quoniam non eodem modo se habet in praeteritis et praesentibus⁹; concedimus enim quod quicquid fuit necesse est fuisse, non tamen quicquid est necesse est esse. Instantia secundum apparentiam fit in contrario ut hic: 'ista sunt paria, ergo de quocumque praedicatur unum, de eodem praedicatur reliquum': 'ista sunt opposita, ergo a quocumque removetur unum et reliquum'.

It is reasonably clear that text I considers 'ex affirmativa non sequitur negativa' a thesis of the *Nominales*. We thus get a label for the "quidam" in *Tractatus de locis argumentationum*, CIMAGL 38 (1981) 30: "quidam ... dicunt ... quod ex affirmativa non sequitur negativa" and the "alii" of *Ars Meliduna* (quoted in De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* II.1: 387):

³quemlibet: qualibet *ms.* ⁴rō *ms.* ⁵habet *ms.* ⁶sit *ms.*
⁷aliud *ms.* ⁸faciat *ms.* ⁹praecedentibus *ms.*

"Alii ... pronuntiaverunt ex nulla affirmative sequi negativam". It is equally clear that both I and II refer to the well-known Melun thesis 'ex falso nihil sequitur' (cf. De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* II.1: 281sq.). It is less obvious what the other Melun thesis alluded to in II is. As for the Adamitae (=Parvipontani) of II, the allusion must be to a thesis about universals which permitted such locutions as 'hoc genus animalia'. A connection may have existed between that thesis and the one alluded to by Grosseteste and Kilwardby [see P.O. Lewry, O.P., 'Robert Grosseteste's Question on Subsistence: An Echo of the Adamites', *Mediaeval Studies* 45 (1983) 1-21, at pp. 6-13].

DAS GEWISSE WORT

Johann Georg Hamanns Sprachtheorie zwischen
Tradition und Vernunftkritik
(Für Jan Pinborg)

Christian Knudsen

Zwischen einer Idée unserer Seele
und einem Schall, der durch den
Mund hervorgebracht wird, ist eben
die Entfernung als zwischen Geist
und Leib, Himmel und Erde.

Hamann

"Ein grosser Philosoph hat behauptet, das allgemeine u. abstracte Ideen nichts als besondere sind, aber an ein gewisses Wort gebunden, welches ihrer Bedeutung mehr Umfang oder Ausdehnung giebt, und zugl. uns jener bey einzelnen Dingen erinnert' Diese Behauptung des eleatischen, mystischen und schwärmenden Bischoffs von Cloyne, Georg Berkeley, erklärt Hume für eine der grössten und schätzbarsten Entdeckungen, welche zu unserer Zeit in der gelehrten Republick gemacht worden."¹

Dies ist das Exordium der "Metakritik über den Purismus der Vernunft", die Johann Georg Hamann im Jahre 1784 gegen Immanuel Kants "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (1781) verfasste. Hamann konterkariert in seiner "Metakritik" die Grundvoraussetzungen der Kantischen Transzendentalphilosophie durch eine Reflexion auf die Sprache, durch eine Reflexion auf das Wort. Der Anfang der Hamannschrift deutet das bereits an. Ihr erster Satz enthält eine sprachtheoretische These. Er ist aus einem Text gebildet, der dem ersten Buch von David Humes "Treatise of Human Nature" (1739)

1. Johann Georg Hamann, Briefwechsel, Bd.V, hg. v. Arthur Henkel, Frankfurt 1965, 210, 19-25. - Hamann sandte am 15. September 1784 eine eigenhändig gefertigte Abschrift seiner "Metakritik über den Purismus der Vernunft" an Johann Gottfried Herder. Dieser Text, den Arthur Henkel in seiner oben angeführten Briefausgabe (V, 210-216) in fehlerloser Transkription der Handschrift abdruckt, wird von mir benutzt und primär zitiert. Er verdient den Vorzug vor dem Text nach der Abschrift von Johann Michael Hamann, der in fehlerhafter Transkription abgedruckt ist in: Johann Georg Hamann, Sämtliche Werke, Historisch-kritische Ausgabe von Josef Nadler, Bd. III, Wien 1951, 283-289. Für den Text nach der Briefausgabe Henkels verwende ich die Sigle H V, für den Text nach Nadlers Ausgabe die Sigle N III. Die Entsprechung des soeben zitierten Textes bei Nadler: N III, 283, 1-8.