Suspicio
A Key Word to the Significance of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Thirteenth Century Scholasticism

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Introduction

This paper is the first result of a project of studying the commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric written by Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus) between 1271 and 1274 (perhaps in 1272-73). When Giles wrote his commentary, which is one of his early works (cf. Donati 1990), the decadence of the traditional teaching of rhetoric at Paris, mainly based on Cicero’s De inventione, the Rhetorica ad Herennium, and (in the curriculum of dialectic) the fourth book of Boethius’ De topicis differentiis, was a simple matter of fact: around the middle of the century, only the Ad Herennium was taught (cf. Lafleur 1988: 149-51), and in 1255 the lectures on the last section of Boethius’ Topics were explicitly excluded by the statute of the faculty of arts. Giles’ commentary is probably one the first effects of the new translation from the Greek text of Aristotle by William of Moerbeke. In his dedicatory epistle, the addressee of whom is unknown, Giles stresses the difficulties of the requested commentary: not only is the text itself hard to understand because of its conciseness and the many examples, but what is more important - understanding it is complicated by an almost complete lack of sources of aid, i.e. previous commentaries (Sup. Rhet.: f.1ra).

1. Cf. Donati 1990; and forthcoming. This paper would not have been written without the help of a number of persons. First of all, I wish to thank Sten Ebbesen, as Director of the IGLM (Institute of Greek and Latin Medieval Philology), University of Copenhagen, who put at my disposal all the materials conserved in the IGLM library (including his own microfilms and transcriptions); then, again, Sten Ebbesen and Karin Margareta Fredborg, who as medieval scholars gave me precious advices and discussed my interpretations, and as friends helped me to give an English expression to my thought and made me highly appreciate the Danish sense of hospitality. Many other scholars contributed with their criticisms and advices to improve my text and to avoid mistakes; in particular, I wish to thank Irène Rosier, Alfonso Maietti, Claude Lafleur, P. René-Antoine Gauthier, Roberto Lamberti, Andrea Tabarroni, Niels J. Green-Pedersen and Fritz Saaby Pedersen. I am also indebted to Francesco del Punta, Umberto Eco and, last but not least, Roberta Magagnotto for their encouragement.


3. This translation, made probably a little before 1269 (cf. Schneider 1978: xxviii) followed the so-called Vetus, about which very little is known (Schneider 1978: xiii). The Arabic translation, made by Hermannus Alemannus probably a short time before 1256 (cf. Boggess 1971: 247-49, who argues for the 1256, and is followed by Ferreiro Alemparte 1983: 21-22, n.6; and Gauthier 1961: 52 and n.124, who cautiously indicates the period between 1246-47 and 1256), had a wider diffusion and was employed by Roger Bacon, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.
Even if Giles’ commentary on *Rhetoric* was not the first, it is the first extant and its inclusion in the stationers’ taxation list of 1304 indicates at least some success (Lewry 1983: 46).

But the interest of Giles’ commentary on *Rhetoric* lies also in its contribution to the development of the medieval philosophy of language. In the 1270s the classification of logic underwent a subtle modification which made rhetoric shift from its traditional place beside logic and grammar in the *trivium* to a position subordinate to logic, viz. as a part of Aristotle’s *Organon*, or, in some cases, as a part of dialectic together with poetics. At the same time, the definition of the subject matter of logic was changing: what has been called *’Logik der Modistae*” (Pinborg 1975b), or *’Avicennianism’* (Kretzmann 1967: 371), or *’intentionalistic logic’* (Knudsen 1982: 480; Maierù 1987: 248), as opposed to *’sermocinalism’* or *’terminism’*, began to develop. Also the logical works of Giles of Rome (including the non authentic commentaries on the *Ars vetus*, now known to be by Guillelmus Arnaldi: cf. Gauthier 1989a: 69*.-72*) were indicated by Pinborg (1975b: 41) as witnesses of this development in the understanding of logic. As we will see, these two changes were connected as features of the same new paradigm of *’intentionalism’* in the last decades of the thirteenth century. This paper would like to try to answer at least three questions:

1) How was rhetoric classified at Giles’ time? The answer to this question is intended to give a reconstruction of the general theoretical framework of Giles’ enterprise. It implies a re-examination of the fate of the *’enlarged’* conception of Aristotle’s *Organon*. New texts will show that more masters than one would expect embraced this new conception of logic, and not only in Paris, but also in the new-born Faculty of Arts of Bologna.

2) What was the theoretical import of the new classification of logic? That is: Was the new conception of logic the heir of the *trivium*, and did it offer a unified approach to language, inclusive also of a theory of communication and of manipulation through language? Or, had it an other meaning?

3) What was Giles’ attitude towards this new arrangement of the field of logic? That is: Had the enlarged understanding of logic any influence on Giles’ commentary?

In order to achieve this aim, first of all I will try to show how rhetoric and the

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4. Albert the Great, probably, and Boethius of Dacia commented on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* before Giles, but their works are lost (cf. Fredborg 1976: 50).

5. It is true that already in the twelfth century it is possible to find rhetoric subordinate to *logica*, as in Hugh of St. Victor’s *Didascalicon* (III, 1, PL 176: 765B; cf. Dahan 1990: 14) or, more frequently, to *eloquentia* (as in Gundissalinus, or in other treatises: for ex. that published in Dahan 1982: 163-65, 181-82; or the *Divisio scientiarum*, partially edited in De Rijk 1967, II.1: 77). But in all these cases, logic is taken in a general sense and is not identical with Aristotle’s *Organon* or, at least, with the *logica vetus*.

6. In the next issue of CimagoL, two of these texts will be edited: an anonymous introduction to a commentary on Porphyry (incipit: *Sicut dictur ab Aristotheli*); the prologue and the first five general questions of an anonymous commentary on the first book of *Posterior Analytics* (= Anonymus Cordubensis).

7. This question relies upon W.Grimaldi’s interpretation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* as a theory of communication (see Grimaldi 1972).
other arts of the *trivium* were included in the classification of the sciences around the middle of the century at Paris University. Then, the change in the division of the *Organon* will be examined, tracing briefly its roots back to the neo-platonic commentators on Aristotle’s logical works. Finally, Thomas’ arrangement will be expounded and its influence up to the end the century will be shown.

1. Trivium and the classification of the sciences: the Parisian masters of arts about the middle of the thirteenth century

1.1. *Cui parti philosophiae supponatur?*

Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on Boethius’ *De trinitate* (written between 1252 and 1259), pointed out the inadequacy of the seven liberal arts in dividing the theoretical sciences.\(^8\) Reference to this passage has become a *topos* in many studies about the arts curriculum in the thirteenth century.\(^9\) Even if some scholars keep on thinking that the inclusion of *trivium* and *quadrivium* in a more complex system of sciences, viz. the breakdown of the scheme of the seven liberal arts as the image of all the branches of knowledge, was a direct consequence of the translation of new Aristotelian texts,\(^10\) at least after Weisheipl’s study on the development of the classification of the sciences (1965) Thomas’ position appears rather traditional: the subordination of the *quadrivium* to *mathematica*, conceived as a part of the theoretical philosophy along with *theologia* and *physica*, was merely a commonplace in the thirteenth century as well as in the twelfth century.\(^11\) In fact: the tripartition of speculative sciences, together with the subordination of the *quadrivium* to mathematics, appears to have been a standard feature in the classification of the

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8. "Septem liberales artes non sufficienter dividunt philosophiam theoreticam" (*Exp. sup. De trin.*, q.5, a.1, ed. B.Decker, Leiden: Brill, 1959: 167 (commenting on Boethius, *De trin.*, 2, PL 64: 1250A-B). In what follows, the quotations from edited texts will keep the orthography chosen by their editors, the citations from mss. will try to stick to their own orthography.


sciences at least until the end of the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{12}

As for the trivium, we will examine how the relationship between the sciences of language and the whole system of the sciences was dealt with by the Parisian masters Artium in their introductions to philosophy, a literary genre which flourished about the middle of the thirteenth century. As Claude LaFleur (1988: 132-41) has shown, the Parisian masters share a common background of philosophical literature and have tight mutual relationships: they agree on a common theoretical paradigm, which they articulate differently. The differences between them appear to be in many cases a mere matter of terminology; nevertheless also the choice of a term was meaningful.

These introductions to philosophy follow a common pattern: a commendation of philosophy with a wide range of citations from classical sources precedes the classification proper of the sciences. In these introductions (and other analogous works that will be taken into account), there are at least four alternative general divisions of the sciences. We will start with the least common of these classifications.

1 - It has been pointed out by Lewry (1975: 15\textsuperscript{+}) that pseudo-Kilwardby "founds his classification of the sciences on the triad, *natura communiter dicta*, *voluntas cum eligentia, ratio*". On this threefold basis he divides the whole of science into *philosophia naturalis, moralis, and rationalis*.\textsuperscript{13} A similar arrangement, which revives the Stoic division of philosophy which was also given by Isidore,\textsuperscript{14} is presented by Nicholas of Paris in both versions of his prologue to Porphyry, by Adenulfus Anagninus in the prologue to his commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*, and by Albert the Great.\textsuperscript{15}

2 - The second classification first separates divine and human sciences, and then divides human sciences into practical and speculative. This division can be found in the treatise entitled *Philosophica disciplina* (in LaFleur 1988: 260), which primarily depends on Gundissalinus' *De divisione philosophiae* (pp.5 and 11-12). A similar main

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *De part. phil.*: f.a.i.v (who added to the quadrivium the sciences of *perspectiva* and *steriometria* "que est de mensura edificiorum". Both of them were considered subordinated to geometry); Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Soph. EL*, Pro.: 285-87; *Quaest. sup. Artem Vet.*, Pro.: 293-97; *Quaest. sup. Post.*, Pro.: f.372vb.

\textsuperscript{13} *Sup. Prisc. Mai.*, 1.0.: 1-2. This classification is presented by him as an other way to settle the same division. The first one is based on two couples of differences: "scientia omnis aut est de signis aut de rebus significatis... Res autem significatae dupliciter accipientur, uno modo ratione veri speculabilis tantum, et sic sunt subiectum philosophiae naturalis communiter dictae... Alio modo est considerare res significatae sub ratione boni operabilis, et sic sunt subiectum philosophiae moralis... Scientia vero quae est de signis dicitur rationalis" (ibid.: 1).

\textsuperscript{14} *Etym.* II, xxiv (cf. Weisheipl 1965: 63-63; Dahan 1980: 176-77).

\textsuperscript{15} Nicolaus Parisiensis, *Phil.*: f.150va; Id., *Not. sup. Porph.*: f.1rb; Adenulfus Anagninus, *Not. Top.*, Pro.: f.177va (this work, probably written at Paris around 1250, occurs in at least seven mss. - cf. Green-Pedersen 1984: 387. I could see Cambridge, Peterhouse 205: ff.177va-178va); Albertus, *De antec.*, 2, in Blarer 1954: 200 (= ed. Borgnet, I: 3-4). Cf. also Simon de Faverisham, *Quaest. sup. Pr.*, Pro.: "<T>ría sunt generae causarum in entibus, scilicet natura, voluntas et intellectus... De entibus primo modo est scientia naturalis; de entibus secundo modo scientia moralis; sed de entibus terto modo logica, que rationalis dicitur. Et propter hoc vera est sententia antiquorum qui negotium philosophicum in tres partes distinguunt, videlicet in naturale, morale et logicum" (f.111ra).
articulation of the sciences can be read in Kilwardby's *De ortu scientiarum* and in Arnulfus' *De divisione scientiarum* (in Lafleur 1988: 295-355). Kilwardby states that "ut dicit Aristoteles in III *De anima*, *scientia secatur in res*, id est dividii debet secundum divisionem rerum de quibus est. Quare cum philosophia sit de rebus divinis et humanis, ut iam dictum est [ch.I, n.1: 9], omnis pars eius aut est de rebus divinis aut de humanis. Prima nomen habet in genere. Dicitur enim speculativa. Secunda non habet unum nomen in genere cum continet ethicam, mechanicam et sermocinalem".\(^{16}\) It is obvious that Kilwardby means by 'scientia divina' something different from what the author of *Philosophica disciplina* intends: according to the former, it is equivalent to "speculative science", which was traditionally divided into natural, mathematical and metaphysical sciences.\(^{17}\) On this point, Arnulfus Provincialis appears to be very close to Kilwardby, when he declares that "modus proprius diuidendi philosophiam secundum Aristotilem sexto *Metaphysice* est iste: modorum philosophie, unus essentialis, alius accidentalis. Modi philosophie essentiales sunt tres: naturalis, mathematicus et diuinus. Accidentalis uero modus philosophie est omnis qui est de rebus humanis, ut sunt sermones, uirtutes et uitia" (p.315). Unlike Kilwardby's division, that of Arnulfus gives the name of *accidentalis* to the non-speculative sciences, viz. moral and rational, as one can see in the following diagram:

3 - In the anonymous *Accessus philosophorum* a third model finds its application. Its author divides philosophy into two main branches, *mechanica* and *liberalis*, and the latter again into *activa* and *speculativa* (p.182). This classification of the sciences is concisely presented by Arnulfus in these terms: "aliter autem a parte rerum de quibus est solet diuido philosophia accepta large ad omnem scientiam per quam remouetur indigentia uel defectus creature humane, et isto modo diuiditur in mecanicam et liberalem... Philosophie autem liberalis quedam est speculatius... quedam practica".\(^{18}\) Arnulfus does not appear satisfied with the inclusion of 'mechanical' arts in the field of the sciences and contrasts this classification with the

\(^{16}\) Ch.III, n.5: 10. He refers to Aristotle, *De anima*, III, 8 431b 24-26, a passage often cited by the Parisian masters. Cf. also ch.II, n.3: 10, where Kilwardby quotes a classical definition of philosophy from Isidore: "divinarum frumentarum rerum... probabilis scientia" (*Etym. II*, xxiv).


allegedly Aristotelian *modus proprius diuidendi philosophiam*. Nevertheless, he writes his treatise following the former scheme. Besides Arnulfus, at least four other introductions to philosophy (all written between 1250 and 1265) adopt this model of classification: the anonymous *Vt ait Tullius* (f.12rb-va),19 *Sicut dicit Ysaac* (f.167va),20 *Vt testatur Aristotiles* (f.153ra-b), and Oliverus Brito's *Philosophia* (f.151va).21 See the following diagram:

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    mechanism
   / \         \     \       
Philosophia speculativa de signis de rebus
   \       \     \       
   liberalis practica
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4 - Arnulfus Provincialis relates the different ways in which philosophy was divided in his days. Besides the two last mentioned, he reports a third classification of the sciences which he qualifies as commonly adopted: "communiter autem diuiditur [sc. philosophia] in speculativam et practicam" (p.314). Against it, Arnulfus objects with Avicenna22 that "quodammodo omnis scientia potest dici speculativam et practicam" (p.315). This classification appears to be equivalent to that which he ascribes to Aristotle. Nevertheless, Arnulfus' emphasis on their opposition invites us to pay attention even to what could seem a 'mere' terminological discrepancy. At least three introductions to philosophy testify to the use of this classification: the anonymous author of the treatise entitled *Cum scientia duplicem* (f.32rb),23 Henricus Brito in his *Philosophia* (f.147rb), and Aubricus Remensis' *Philosophia* (in Gauthier 1984: 43-44). In the first treatise, the mentioned classification is listed together with two

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20. This opuscule was ascribed to Nicholas of Paris by Grabmann 1926: 230. But recently this attribution has been contested (cf. Lafleur 1988: 391, n.12).
21. According to Gauthier (1963: 143), Oliverus Brito was probably a colleague of Arnulfus and Nicholas, around 1250. Lafleur (1988: 138) suggests to date this treatise *ante* 1265.
22. See the references to and the quotations from his *Canon medicinae* (I, fen 1, doctr.1, c.1) and his poem on medicine in Lafleur 1988: 314, app.
23. This introduction to philosophy was ascribed to Nicholas of Paris by Grabmann (1926: 230), but this hypothesis has been contested (cf. Lafleur 1988: 390. n.10).
others, and it is not further elaborated. 24 Aubricus does not appear to be consistent: only the practical branch of his philosophical tree is developed. Practica philosophia is first divided into liberalis and mechanica; then liberal sciences are distinguished in sapiencia (i.e., real sciences: natural, mathematical, and divine) and eloquencia (i.e., sciences of language) (pp.43-46). On the other hand, Henricus Brito consistently puts under practical philosophy both the ‘mechanical’ and the liberal sciences, by which he really means “moral philosophy”; furthermore, he appears to merge Arnulfus’ modus proprius (essential vs. accidental) in the common way of classifying sciences (speculative vs. practical): speculative sciences are in fact divided into principales (natural, mathematical, and metaphysical) and adminiculativa (the trivium), as the following figure shows: 25

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To sum up, at least four descriptions of the arts of the trivium were proposed by the Parisian masters we have been considering. The first one conceives of them as rational sciences: as one will see, Albert’s adherence to this view acquired a polemical character against those who considered the general logic (which included also rhetoric and poetic) as a scientia sermocinalis (2.2.). The second view suggests

24. The second division of the sciences is drawn from Avicenna (cf. Lib. de phil. prima, I, 1, ed. S.Van Riet, Louvain-Leiden: Peeters-Brill, 1977: 1) and Algazel (cf. Tractatus de logica, 1, in Lohr 1965: 239), and opposes the imaginativa to the creditiva (per comparatione <m> sua <m> tam ad scibile quam ad scientem); the third model divides philosophy into natural and rational sciences (in comparatione ad scibile... Species ergo intelligibilis aut intelligitur per aspectum rectum intellectus cadentis super illam aut per aspectum reflexum). The latter, in spite of its perspicuity, does not find any correspondence in other treatises.

25. Henricus Brito, Philosophia: "Hoc habito, accedendum est ad divisionem. Philosophia prima sui divisione diuiditur in theoretam et practicam, id est in actuam et speculativam. Et hic diuisio datur ab Aucicenna dicente quod omnis intentio philosophie est speculatio veritatis. Vnde philosophia nihil aliud est quam aggregatio plurim uiarum per quas acquiruntur scientie et virtutes: et scientia quidem <per> speculationem veri, virtutes autem per operationem boni. Postea danda est diuisio practice que prima sui diuisione diuiditur in liberalam et <anima>... Nunc accedendum est ad divisionem practice liberalis que est moralis... Hoc habito accedendum est ad divisionem theoric, que speculativia dicitur a 'theores' grece, quod est 'speculo' latine. Hec enim diuiditur prima divisione in principalem et adminiculativam; et est principalis de rebus, adminiculativa de sermone et ista diuisio datur ab Averroy. Scientia de sermone utilis est et adminiculativia ad scientias reales" (f.147rb, va and vb).
that there exist a high degree of affinity between the disciplines of language and the practical and moral sciences: a decisive accent put on the practical import of the arts of language will be found in Roger Bacon, as in the "second courant" in grammatical thought (Rosiér 1988 and forthcoming). The third classification considers the trivium as a branch of speculative science which deals with signs or with sermo and, with the exception of Henricus Brito, they distinguish the trivium from the other speculative sciences on the basis of their respective objects: sermones (or signa) vs. res (or signata). The fourth view describes the arts of trivium as scientie speculatiae adminiculatiue and it is proper to Henricus Brito. Henricus' choice of describing scientie sermocinales as adminiculativa is not without importance: it stresses the role of instrument that these disciplines play in the system of the sciences. This view was obviously not new: in his second commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge, Boethius discussed the role of logic as both part and instrument (instrumentum or suppeller) of philosophy. In the thirteenth century both Kilwardby and pseudo-Kilwardby describe logic or scientia de sermone as adminiculans or adminiculativa. Also Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on Boethius' De trinitate, defines logic as "adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias". Henricus Brito, in what is probably the last fragment of his Philosophia, interprets the traditional source for the threefold

26. One can see the opposition naturalis vs. rationalis as a simple variation of the mentioned one: it considers the causes of speculative sciences' objects. Oliverus Brito, for instance, explains that different qualifications can be applied to the same science in accordance to distinct bases: "Hec scientia sermocinalis, de lingua, rationalis, de signis nuncupatur. Sermocinalis dicitur ratione subjecti de quo est; de signis ratione proprietatis: sermo enim est per quem affectum mentis exprimitus; rationalis ratione cause dicitur: est enim ratio causa efficiens sermonis. Dicitur etiam de lingua ratione instrumenti: nam ad istam scientiam est necessaria quam plurimum lingue bona dispositio" (Philosophia: f.152r). 27. In Isag., ed. secunda, ed. S.Brandt, CSEL 48: "Hanc litem uero tali ratione discriminmus. nihil quippe dicimus impedire, ut eadem logica partis uice simul instrumentique fungatur officio, quoniam enim ipsa suum retinet finem isque finis a sola philosophia, consideratur, pars philosophiae esse ponenda est, quoniam uero finis ille logicae quem sola spectatur philosophia, ad alias eius partes suam operam pollicitur, instrumentum esse philosophiae non negamus; est autem finis logice inventio judiciumque rationum. quod scilicet non esse mirum videbitur, quod eadem pars, eadem quodam ponitur instrumentum... ita quoque logica disciplina pars quidam philosophiae est, quoniam eius philosophia sola magistra est, suppellex vero, quod per eam inquisita philosophiae ueritas uestigatur" (p.142, 16-25 and 143, 4-7). This passage does not fit with Weisheipl's interpretation of it: "In his second commentary on Porphyry Boethius judiciously remarks of logic that it is not a part of philosophy, but rather an instrument of philosophy" (1965: 60). 28. Cf. Kilwardby, De ortu scient., ch.XLVIII, nn.447-61: 154-58; ch. XLIX, n.469: 161; ch.LVII, n.565: 194; n.572: 197. 29. Cf. ps.-Kilwardby, Sup. Prisc. Mai., 1.2.2: 13. Cf. also Vi ai Vitctorinus: f.152va-b. 30. Cf. In De trin., q.5, a.1, ed. Decker: 167. Cf. Schmidt 1965: 5 and 27. 31. The text offered by the ms. Oxford, Corpus Christi College 283 (described by Lafleur 1988: 46-58), ff.146ra-149ra is probably the result of a compilation. After the first part (ff.146ra-148ra), which ends with the division of natural philosophy, one finds a division of logic which is probably foreign to Henricus' Philosophia and appears to be an other version of the division which forms the prologue to a commentary on Porphyry contained in the ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., Nouv. acq. lat. 1374: f.1ra-b. After the division of logic, a portion of text comes that could have been at the beginning of Henry's classification of the trivial arts: here, as well as in the first portion of text, one can find the description of the trivial
division of real sciences (*Metaph.* VI, 1 1026a 18-19) as an allusion to the trivial sciences, which are called *admiriculativa*. It is interesting to point out that classifications of the sciences rather similar to Henricus' occurs in the anonymous *Sicut dictur ab Aristoteles*, in the prologue to the commentary on *Posterior Analytics* ascribed to Gerardus de Nogento (ms. Paris, Bibl.Naz., Lat. 16170: f.113rb), and in Radulphus Brito's prologues to some of his commentaries on Aristotel's *Organon*.32

1.2. Three methods to handle a traditional distinction: the arts of the trivium

Unfortunately, Henricus Brito's *Philosophia* is incomplete and ends abruptly before the classification of the *scientie admiriculativa*.33 His division probably was not far from that of all the other masters of arts we have been examining: they agree that

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sciencies as *admiriculativa*. The last words of this short fragment are followed by a quotation from Boethius' *Philosophiae consolatio*: "Felix minimus prior actas / contenta fidelibus aruis / nec ini[d]erti perdita luxu" (II, 5, V, ed. L.Bieler, CC, ser. lat., 94: 28). This appears to be a fresh start of an other *Philosophia*, missing probably a preliminary formula such as: "Vt ait Boetius". The text which comes after, even if incomplete, shows the distinctive structure of this literary genre: a commendation of philosophy constitutes the prologue to the *divisio scientiarum*. A part of the first section of this work bears a high resemblance to the introductory part of the treatise known as *Ut testatur Aristoiiles* (f.153ra). Furthermore, the main classification of the sciences in this fragment is the same as in *Ut testatur Aristoiiles*, and in the treatise *Vt ait Tullius*: first, it is divided into mechanical and liberal sciences; then, among liberal sciences, speculative is distinguished from practical philosophy. As one can see, this division does not correspond to Henricus'. Claude Lefleur, who is editing this text in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age* (1992), confirmed my impressions in a letter of August 1990, 14th.


33.  "<Hoc habito accedendum est ad divisionem scientie admiriculativa.> Sicut recitat Avcenna, Plato dicit quod gramaica est omnium aliarum scientiarum lingua et quia secundum Aristotilem in secundo *De anima* lingua congruit in duo opera nature, in gustom scilicet et loquitionem, ideo gramatica similiter cum sit lingua aliarum, congruit in heo duo, scilicet in loquitionem et gustom: est enim loquio aliarum, quia sine ista in alis loqui non possimus. Eam etiam et gustus, cum det f.148va/ saporem alii, quod inquit Priscianus in principio *Minor* dicens "quemadmodum necessarium ad auctorum expositionem diligentissime debemus inquirere", per hoc innuenus quod alie sines hac exponi non possunt et ita sine ipsa non possunt saporem habere; quia qui hanc ignorat, necesse est per consequens alias ignorare cum lingua deficiente necesse sit deficere illud per quod linguam debemus exprimere; et ideo non immorieti antiqui patres primo instruxerunt pueros in grammatica. Ideoque recte dicit ipsam Plato esse linguam etc., quia sicut per linguam omnes intentiones mentis exprimuntur, ita per grammaticam omnes alie scientie alii exponuntur et sine ea exponi non possunt, sicut nec sine lingua aliquid dici <possit>. Et ideo sibi caequat qui loci volunt antequam linguam habeant, sicut illi qui querunt alias scientias ante istam. Cum enim dicat Aristotiles tres essensiales modos sciendi (natualem scilicet, mathematicum et diuinum), in hoc inquit tres esse alios accidentales (scilicet grammaticam, logicum et teoreticum). Iste enim tres scientie admiriculativae dicuntur et maxime grammatica, eo quod non solum modum sciendi prebeat tribus essentialibus modis philosophie, set etiam omnibus alis scientiis et accidentalibus alis duabus. <***"* (f.148rb-va; the last reference to Aristotle is to the Arabic translation included in Averroes' commentary: VI, 1, ed. Venetis 1562, VIII: f.145L-M). As I argued above, the division of logic which precedes this passage and appears where one would expect the classification of the trivial arts is probably an addition.
the arts of the *trivium* have speech or language (*sermo*), as their subject-matter, and describe them generally as *sermocinales* or *rationales scientiae*. These two adjectives are interchangeable (i.e., have the same reference), even if they are not synonymous: as the anonymous author of the *Accessus philosophorum* explains, "est ratio pricipium et forma entis quod sermo dicitur, de quo sermocinalis philosophia siue rationalis" (p.182). As for the number of these sciences, only the treatise *Philosophica disciplina* deviates in a rather odd way from tradition: following Gundissalinus' division, its author lists four *artes sermocinales* (grammar, poetics, dialectic and rhetoric). By adopting Gundissalinus' classification, he is consciously trying both to introduce a novelty and to keep the traditional number of the liberal arts: since there are only three speculative sciences (*naturalis philosophia, mathematica, and methaphisica*), he declares that "tres scientiae speculativae rerum... quidem cum .III. sermocinalibus, que sunt gramatica, poetica, dyaletica et rectorica, possunt facere septem artes liberales" (p.261). Despite the influence of this treatise on Arnulfus' *Divisio scientiarum*, which was a source for many of the following treatises (cf. Lafluer 1988: 132-41), no one followed its views about liberal arts.

In his work, Arnulfus Provincialis reports three methods used in justifying the traditional distinction between the trivial arts. The first method originated from what seems to be an adage: "sermo ab intellectu incipit, per fidem transit, ad persuasionem uenit". The functions of the three arts of language correspond to the threefold action of *sermo*: "secundum que tria, tres sunt de eo constitute scientiae: prima, grammatica sicut fundamentum; secunda, logica sicut firmamentum; tertia, rethorica sicut ornamentum" (p.337). This description resembles to that employed in a twelfth century *Divisio scientiarum* to distinguish the three parts of *eloquencia*: "gramatica est scientia loquendi, retorica vero est ornamentum loquendi, logica est argumentum loquendi. Docet namque gramatica recte loqui, rethorica ornate loqui, logica vero discernere verum a falso et falsum a vero" (De Rijk 1967, II.1: 78).

The second method is derived from the use of language: "aliter tamen quidam dicunt quod, cum sapiens debat uti sermone uelut instrumento non quocumque modo set ordinato, item utendo ipso non debat mentiri de quibus nouit, iterum quandoque per eum rudes brutaliter uiuentes reuocare ad statum meliori modo uiuendi oporteat, convenit habere scientiam de ordinatione sermonis, que est gramatica; et de ueri tate dicenda, que est logica; et de ornatu uerborum, que est rethorica" (p.337). As Lafluer (1988: 337, app.) indicates, the quoted text is rather similar to a passage in Nicolaus Parisiensis' *Philosophia* (f.151ra), a prologue to a

34. Phil. disc.: 261 (cf. Gundissalinus, De div.phil.: 81). It also adds as fifth the *scientia lingue* indicated by al-Fārābī: "modus accidentalis philosophie, qui est sermocinalis scientia, diuidit in tres secundum aliquos: in grammaticam, rectoricam et logicam; secundum alios, in .III.or: in tribus dictis et poetica. Secundum uero Alfarabium additum quinta que est scientia lingue, que est de impositione nominum" (p.274; cf. al-Fārābī, De ortu scient., 2, in Baeumker 1916: 22).

35. But cf. pp.274-75, where he appears to adopt al-Fārābī's fivefold division (see previous footnote).

commentary on Porphyry written during the same period as Arnulfus'. Other mid-century logical works distinguish the three arts by relating them to correctness, truth and embellishment: the anonymous *Vt ait Tullius* (f.12vb: where two alternative ways to ground the distinction are presented); Robert Kilwardby's prologue to his commentary on Porphyry; the so-called 'Peterhouse-Canonici Isagoge'; and Adenulfus Anagninus' prologue to his commentary on Aristotle's *Topics* (f.178va).

The third method (*penes finem*) is the most widely used one around the middle of the century: "aliter diuidit Ysaac, dicens quod sermo aut ordinatur ad signicandum tantum, et sic de ipso est gramatica, aut ad mouendum, et hoc dupliciter: aut enim ad mouendum uirtutes apprehensiuas, ut rationem et intellectum, et sic de ipso est logica; aut uirtutes motiuas, ut irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et sic de ipso est retorica" (pp.337-38). Since Isaac Israeli in his *Liber de definitionibus* does not give any distinction of this sort, scholars are still wondering about the real source of this *dictum*. This method of distinguishing the arts of the *trivium* is used (for the first time?) in the *Notulae super Priscianum minorem magistri Jordani* (in Sirridge 1980: 1), probably composed in Paris between 1240 and 1250. Many other masters adopted the distinction *penes finem*: pseudo-Kilwardby, Robert Kilwardby in his grammatical work, Oliverus Brito, and other anonymous masters.

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41. Cf. Gauthier 1982: 367-373 (esp. 372). It should be noticed that an additional division of the trivial arts is presented by Jordanus: "sermocinalis scientia cum sit de sermone diversificatur sicut et sermo... aut enim est contractus ad personam et eius attributa, aut non contractus. Si non contractus aut consideratur in ratione rei, aut ratione modorum significandi. De sermone contracto quoad personam et eius attributa est retorica. De sermone non contracto quoad modum significandi est gramatica. De sermone non contracto quoad rem significatam est logica" (p.1).
42. Cf. In *Prisc. Mai.*, 1.2.5., in Fredborg et al. 1975: 21; 1.4.5.: 40. This author refers to Isaac, "in libro De divisione scienarium". Because of the uncertainty about its date (between 1230 and 1265/70; cf. Pinborg 1975a: 5⁺) it is not possible to determine whether it could have been the source of Arnulfus. In my opinion, a reasonable hypothesis could be the opposite dependence: ps.-Kilwardby might refer not to Isaac, but to Isaac as reported in a book on the division of sciences, and Arnulfus' *Divisio scienarium* is perhaps the best candidate for this role.
44. *Philosophia*: f.152ra.
Furthermore, segments of this argument were also used in order to explain the difference between dialectic and rhetoric by authors such as Nicolaus Parisiensis,\(^{46}\) and the anonymous author of a commentary on Boethius' *De differentiis topicis*,\(^{47}\) as well as, at the end of the century, Radulfus Brito.\(^{48}\)

2. The seventh (and eighth) part(s) of logic

2.1. A traditional division of logic in the first half of the century

The so-called "Guide for the student" (or *Barcelona Compendium*)\(^{49}\) devotes its largest section to logic (Lafleur 1989: 4). The exposition of logic starts with a discussion about its subject-matter and branches. As for the former, the *Compendium* explains that logic, as well as other sciences, receives its division from its subject: the parts of the latter constitute the subjects of the branches of logic (f.144ra; cit. in Lafleur 1989: 6, n.9). The first step of every division of logic is therefore to settle the question of its subject-matter. The *Barcelona Compendium* argues that logic considers syllogism, since the necessary connection between premisses and conclusion corresponds to that between cause and effect in nature, and this necessity is the truth.\(^{50}\) Since there exist two kinds of part, viz. integral (fraction) and subjective (species), two main parts of logic must be distinguished: the first one dealing with terms (*pars integralis remota: Categories*) and propositions (*pars int. proxima: De interpretatione*); the second branch discussing the different kinds of syllogism. If *Prior Analytics* consider the universal form of syllogistic argumentation, the three other parts of Aristotle's *Organon* explain the application of this form to different matters: "de suis uero partibus subiectui siue speciebus agitur in diversis libris secundum diuersitatem materiarum et principiorum ex quibus sunt, quia uel de materia necessaria, et sic est liber *Posteriorum*, uel de materia probabili contingenti ut frequentius, et sic est liber *Topicorum*, uel de contingenti rarò, et sic est liber *Elenchorum*" (f.144ra; Lafleur 1989: 6, n.9).

The anonymous author of the *Compendium* gives three other divisions of logic.
The first is deduced from the types of truth. As the anonymous makes clear, it is usually adopted by logicians who describe logic as dealing with truth (de uero). Nevertheless, it is equivalent to the previous one.\textsuperscript{51} A second division is taken directly from al-Fārābī's \textit{De scientiis}, and is based on the ways in which the intellect may err (Lafleur 1989: 8-9). As third, the \textit{Barcelona Compendium} mentions Cicero' division of logic in \textit{ars inueniens} and \textit{ars iudicandi} (Top. II, 6, but drawn from Boethius) and applies it only to the books of the \textit{Logica nova} (Lafleur 1989: 11-12).

With some exceptions,\textsuperscript{52} three of these classifications of logic (and their respective descriptions of logic and of its functions) are widely adopted by the logicians about the middle of the century. Adenulfus Anagninus in his commentary on Aristotle's \textit{Topics} (f.178vb) adheres to the second: he interprets logic as discussing \textit{de uero} and divides it \textit{penes diviisionem ueri}. In comparison to the \textit{Barcelona Compendium}, Adenulfus not only proposes dissimilar \textit{differentiae specificae}, but also a divergent division of the books of the \textit{Organon}. He collects together with the \textit{Categories} also Porphyry and the \textit{Liber sex principiorum}; and he divides \textit{Prior Analytics} into two parts: a) I, 1-26, which is concerned with \textit{sillogismus inferens}; b) I, 27-II, which regards \textit{sillogismus inferens et notum faciens a parte rei cognit}e (f.178vb). The Ciceronian bipartition of logic is adopted by Nicolaus Parisiensis in his \textit{Philosophia} and subsumed under the \textit{ars colligendi} (Pr. and Post. An., Top. and Soph. El.), while both \textit{ars invenieniendi} and \textit{iudicandi} are opposed to the \textit{ars demonstrandi}, which encompasses \textit{ars dividendi} and \textit{diffiniendi}, dealt with in \textit{Posterior Analytics}. In this case the \textit{Categories} and \textit{De interpretatione} are ruled out of the classification: "\textit{scientia autem Predicamentorum et Peryarmeihas non continetur sub arte inuentiuia, nec iudicatiuia, quia in illis libris non traditur ars inueniuenia nec iudicatiuia (siue ars colligendi), sed preparat materiam complexam et incomplexam communiter arti inueniuenia et iudicatiuia}" (f.151rb-va).\textsuperscript{53}

The description of the subject-matter of logic and the classification of its branches \textit{penes partes sillogismi} appears to be widely adopted by the Parisian masters of arts about the middle of the century.\textsuperscript{54} In his \textit{Philosophia} Nicolaus Parisiensis for

\textsuperscript{51} "Ad idem reedit diuisio, que solet fieri, quod cum logica intendet de uero" (f.144ra; in Lafleur 1989: 7, n.10; and the scheme at p.8).

\textsuperscript{52} Cf., for example, Johannes Pagus, \textit{Rationes super Predicamenta Aristotelis}, ms. Padova, Bibl. Universitaria, 1589: f.24ra, where he divides logic following a parallel with nature: "\textit{ars imitatur naturam in quantum potest... secundum igitur tripticem unitatem in rebus repertam, triplex est unitas in sermone [forma m.\textsuperscript{.}], that is \textit{per indiuisio} (ex.: angels), \textit{ex unitate materie et forme} (ex.: the four elements), \textit{penes ordinem et causali\textsuperscript{.}} (ex.: the parts of the world). The three objects of the parts of logic correspond to these three kinds of real unities: terms (Categ.), propositions (\textit{De int.}) and syllogism (\textit{Log. nova})."\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{53} Cf. \textit{Not. sup. Porph.}: f. 2na-3ra.

\textsuperscript{54} Cf. \textit{Phil. disc.}, in Lafleur 1988: 282-83; Nicolaus Par., \textit{Phil.}: f.151va; Arnulfus Prov., \textit{Div. scient.}, in Lafleur 1988: 343-44; \textit{Silut dict. Ysaec}: f.166ra-va, which were probably followed by the other masters of arts whose works are only partially preserved (such as Aubricus Remensis, Oliverus Brito and Henricus Brito). Every master, however, reported this division adding his distinctive variants. The anonymous author of \textit{Cum scientia duplicem} (f.33va) distinguishes the parts of syllogism into \textit{piores} and \textit{postiores}: only the
example, besides the classification seen above, takes up also a division of logic secundum sillogismorum diversitatem. Again, the Categories and De interpretatione are excepted and the division of the Logica nova is rather similar to that proposed by Adenulfus: "est autem quidam sillogismus inferens tantum, quidam inferens et probans uel notum faciens, <***>sed notitia potest comparari ad rem notam et ad cognoscentem. Ideo quidam est sillogismus faciens notum a parte rei note tantum, scilicet ille qui dicitur ad propositum in libro Priorum: fit enim in materia cognoscibili, sed non generat in cognoscente habitum, neque opinionem, neque scientiam, quia neque est dyaletics, neque demonstrativus. Quidam autem facit notum et a parte rei note et <a parte> cognoscentis; et horum quidam generat completam [[scientiam]] notitiam, scilicet scientiam per causam, et hic est demonstrativus; quidam autem incompletam notitiam, scilicet opinionem per signa probabilia, et hic est dyaleticus, aut fantasiam per apparentia probabilia, et est sophisticus peccans in materia" (f.151va).57

Arnulfus Provincialis, having defined logic as scientia disserendi diligens,58 reports al-Fārābī’s list of the books (or parts) of logic: "diudit autem eam in partes octo que sunt hee: Cathegorie Aristotilis, liber Interpretationis, id est Pervarminias, liber Toporum, liber Sophisticorum sillogismorum, liber Priorum analyticon sillogismorum, liber Posteriorum analeticorum, poetrica et rethorica". Arnulfus finally adds a few words of comment: "has duas ultimas partes non reponit Aristotiles sub logica nec communis usus" (p.342). This short remark is representative of the reception of the Arabic division of logic at the University of Paris at the middle of the century: in the second half this classification of the books of logic was opposed to the traditional one, and somehow paved the way to the so-called Logik der Modistae (Pinborg 1975b). Of the three methods of dividing logic listed above only the distinction between ars inveniendi and iudicandi survived the revision of the classification of the books of Aristotle’s Organon: the division penes divisionem veri does not seem to have had a wide adoption; the division penes divisionem syllogismi was used only rarely in order to give account of the new conception of the Organon,

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55. There should be lacuna here since the text does not explain which book of the Organon is concerned with the sillogismus inferens tantum.

56. This addition is in Nicolaus, Not. sup. Porph.: f.2vb.

57. Cf. Arnulfus Prov., Div. scient.: 343-44: "si autem [seil. logica] sit de partibus subjectuius: aut est de illis in quibus salutari uirtus inferendae tantum; aut in quibus est uirtus inferendi et notum faciendo siue probandi. De primis non est scientia distincta nisi forte quo ad aliquam partem libri Elenchorum in qua dicunt quidam quod determinatur de peccante in materia, set alii sillogismi falsorum cum uerorum sillogismis - sicut pruiations cum suis habitibus - <de>terminatur, ut ignorantie syllogismus et falsigraphicus cum demonstrativus, in libro Posteriorum; peccans in materia dialectici, in octauo Toporum cum dialectico." There should have been a debate on this classification about the middle of the century, since the views of Adenulfus and Nicholas are not the same as that reported by Arnulfus.

58. Lafleur 1988: 342, app., points out that this definition is present both in Boethius (In Cic. Top. I, PL 64: 1045A) and in Gundissalinus (De div. phil. 69). Arnulfus depends on the latter, but ascribes this definition to al-Fārābī, who is Gundissalinus’ source for the division of logic.
probably because it was not suited for that purpose.

2.2. A neo-platonic legacy: from Greek commentators to Alberti the Great

The recognition of *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* as the seventh and the eighth parts of the *Organon* dates back at least to the neo-platonic commentaries on Aristotle.59 If Simplicius simply lists *Rhetoric* as one of the *organíka*,60 Ammonius tries to justify the inclusion of *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* arguing that they constitute a part of logic which does not make use of syllogism (*asyllógiaston mérios*).61 Ammonius' pupils did not follow him in distinguishing these two parts of logic (namely, the non-syllogistic and the syllogistic part), but ascribed to all the disciplines concerned with the use of language a higher degree of unity. Olympiodorus, for example, described all the logical treatises as contributing, each in its own way, to the acquisition of the method: so he separated *Posterior Analytics*, which deal with the method, from the books which are of help (*Cat.*, *Peri herm.*, and *Pr. An.*) and those which purify it (*Soph. El.*, *Top.*, *Rhet.*, and *Poet.*).62 His pupil, Elias, giving his classification of the sciences, distinguished between the part of logic that which precedes the method, that which deals with it and that which 'slips into the garb of it' (*hypodyómena*).63 Furthermore, he taught a fivefold division of syllogisms (demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, sophistical, and poetical) differentiated by the truth-value of their premisses, the highest degree of truth being in demonstrative and the lowest in poetical syllogisms.64

For our purposes, the more interesting division of logic worked out by neo-platonic commentator is certainly that of Philoponus. His argument for the distinction of three kinds of syllogism is rather original. It links the 'principles' of each type of syllogism to three different mental faculties, which are their respective source. In this way, immagination (*phasisia*) supplies the principles of sophistical syllogisms, which are always false; opinion (*dóxa*) those of dialectical syllogisms, which are sometimes true and sometimes false; and, finally, intellect (*noús*) produces the principles of demonstrative syllogisms, which are always true.65 As Ebbesen (1981a, I: 102 and 264) has shown, the same scheme enlarged to include also *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* is found in the so-called Anonymus Heiberg, a compendium on logic.

63. *In Cat.*, ed. A.Busse, CAG XVIII: 115-16
(written probably in 1007)66 consisting mainly of excerpts from the commentaries of the Alexandrian school. As seen above, the idea of connecting the different kinds of syllogism, or of argument, to the faculties of the soul or, better, to the degree of certainty that they can provide, in order to classify the parts of logic, was not unknown to the masters of arts about the middle of the thirteenth century (cf. Adenulfus Anagninus, for example). It was further worked out in the second half of the century when the extended model of Aristotelian logic began to be adopted.

Directly dependent upon Greek commentaries on Aristotle is the conception of logic expounded by Arabic philosophers.67 Certainly al-Fārābī had under his eyes one of those works when he wrote (I will quote from the Latin translation by Gerardus Cremonensis of his Liber de scientiis) that: "pars quarta (scil. liber demonstrationis) est vehementior et antecessoris(!) earum in sublimitate et dignitate. Et per dialecticam quidem non queritur secundum intentionem primam nisi pars quarta. Et relique partes non sunt facte nisi propter quartam; et tres antecedunt eam in ordine doctrine cum sint preparamenta et introductiones et uie ad ipsam. Et relique quatuor que eam sequuntur, sunt propter duas. Quaram una est quia in unaque earum est sustentamentum aliquid et adiutorium... Et secunda est secundum modum cautele" (ch.2, 143). But his list of the eight parts of logic, even if known,68 did not play an incontestable authoritative role before other Arabic texts were translated into Latin after the middle of the thirteenth century.

A text of Avicenna shows his critical attitude towards the Greek commentators. After a fivefold classification of the types of syllogism with respect to their premisses, Avicenna says: "do not pay attention to what has been said, namely that the demonstrative syllogisms are necessary, that the dialectical ones are possible in the majority of cases, that the rhetorical ones are possible in equal cases, that they involve neither inclination nor rarity, and that the poetical ones are false and impossible. This is not the <proper> consideration: nor did the father of logic indicate it".69 Avicenna's criticism can be easily referred to "the quantitative description of the truth and falsity possessed by the several types of premisses and arguments" (Ebbesen 1981a, I: 102) which is found in Anonymus Heiberg, but, as Avicenna's text confirms, was worked out earlier than 1007. The Latins, however, did not directly know this text, but they could read in Algazel's Logic a report of the list

of the different kinds of premisses that can enter a syllogism as their matter.70 When Albert the Great, after having compiled a rather similar list of possible premisses, says that "haec quae dicta sunt, de scientia Arabum sunt excerpta" is probably referring to Algaazel’s Logic: the entire chapter of his Analytica Posteriora (I, 1, 2: 4b-7a) to which Albert is referring is in fact a long excerpt from Algaazel’s capitulum de materia syllogismi.71

Frequently described as a philosopher who played a decisive role in the process of assimilation of Arabic thought (cf. Ebbesen 1981b: 99), Albert once more proves to be the mouth-piece of Arabic views: he is the first thirteen-century philosopher to give rhetoric and poetics a place within the field of logic and not beside it. In the introduction to his Logica, however, his position does not appear consistently held. Following Arabic tracks, Albert is here consciously introducing novelties about logic and its subject-matter, and this is underscored by his frequent criticism of some unspecified nonnulli or alii quidam. The first innovation concerns the definition of the subject-matter of logic (cf. Washell 1973). Since logic teaches how to get from the known to the unknown, it must be about the instrument which permits such an increase of knowledge: "haec autem est argumentatio".72 He criticizes those who say that "logica tota est de syllogismo et de partibus syllogismi", since they do not indicate what is the principal object of logic.73 As Albert explains, there are

70. As one can see, Algaazel’s inventory of the thirteen types of proposition matches very well with Avicenna’s (the Latin translation drawn from Algaazel’s Logica, in Lohr 1965: 273-78, is followed by the English one taken from Avicenna’s Treatise on Logic: 119-28): 1) primae = first principles (premisses); 2) sensibles = perceptual; 3) experimentales = experimental; 4) famosae = testimonial; 5) prop. quae secum habent probationes = prop. which contain syllogisms; 6) maximae = known by custom; 7) opinables = derived from imagination; 8) receptibles = known by authority; 9) concessae = implicative; 10) simulatones = dubious; 11) maximae in apparentia = prop. which appear to be accepted by custom; 12) putables = raised by our suspicions and fears; 13) imaginativa vel transformativa = raised by emotions. On the reception of Algaazel’s thought in Western philosophy, see Salmon 1935-36.

71. Logica: 273-80. The reference to an Arabic commentary on Post. An. appears to be a further piece of information, not the indication of his source, as Ebbesen (1981b: 98) thought. Let me quote the whole sentence: “Et haec quae dicta sunt, de scientiis Arabum sunt excerpta, quorum commentum super hunc Posteriorum librum ex sententia Alfarabii Arabis ad nos pervenit” (ed. Borgnet, I: 7). The order and the names of the propositions are slightly different: 1) primae; 2) sensibles; 3) experimentales; 4) famosae; 5) mediatae (Albert gives them this name since they are not known nisi per terminum medium - Algaazel, Logica: 275); 6) aestimativae or opinabilia; 7) maximae; 8) syllogizatoriae (which are only mentioned, but not discussed - unless in the list at p.5 there is a fault: syllogizatoriae instead of simulatones); 9) receptibles; 10) quae videntur esse maximae or concessae; 11) putables; 12) imitatoriae or imaginativa. Since Albert conflated Algaazel’s concessae and maximae in apparentia, he has to add a thirteenth category in order to square accounts: "Et tredecimo <dividitur> in aperte falsas". Nevertheless, he does not discuss them.


73. It would be of interest to investigate how happened that the neo-platonic fivefold division of syllogism (which appears to be still adopted by Avicenna, see quotation above) was transformed into a fivefold division of arguments. Algaazel carefully distinguishes between the two, describing syllogism as a kind of argument (Logica: 241). Furthermore, he applies the list of thirteen types of premisses to the five
philosophical matters where it is not possible to apply perfectly the syllogism, such as in rhetoricas or in experimentalibus (ibid.). Thanks to his broader definition of logic, he is able to give a sixfold division of logic which follows the six types of argument: "in logicis sive rationalibus secundum variationem ratiocinationis variatur scientia. Si enim ratio procedit ex signis facientibus praeemptionem, erit logicae generalis pars una, quae rhetorica vocatur. Si autem procedit ex fictis facientibus delectionem vel abominationem, erit alia pars logicae, quae vocatur poesis vel poetica. Si autem procedit ex probabilibus communibus, quae in pluribus inventuntur, erit pars alia, quae proprie vocatur dialectica. Si autem procedit ex causis essentialibus et propriis, erit pars alia, quae vocatur demonstrativa. Si autem procedit ex his, quae videntur et non sunt, erit pars alia logicae, quae vocatur sophistica. Si autem ex cautelis provocantibus respondentem doceat procedere, erit alia pars logicae generalis, quae vocatur tentativa."  

First of all, it must be observed, that the classification of the parts of logic is not complete, since it lacks the Categories and De interpretatione; second, that Albert employs two criteria of division: 1) the source of the argument (signs, fictions, causes, etc.); and 2) the psychological or cognitive effects. Both of them were already used to separate the parts of logic or dialectic from rhetoric: Albert’s innovation, therefore, consists only in following his Arabic sources which subsume rhetoric and poetics under the general logic. The latter criterion will dominate in the second half of the century.

However, Albert does not seem consistent in claiming that rhetoric and poetics are parts of logic which deals with arguments. Following Avicenna, he rebukes the view of those who identify the general logic with scientia sermocinalis, and consider sermo as its subject. As a matter of fact, what could appear a criticism of the traditional trivium is the partial rejection of a different version of it which was held by Gundissalinus and, in thirteenth century, by the anonymous author of the treatise Philosophica disciplina (see above, 1.2.): "sunt autem, qui logicam interpretantur idem quod sermocinalem, dicentes logicam generalem idem esse quod sermocinalem scientiam, sub qua dicunt contineri grammaticam, poeticae, rhetoricae et eam, quae vocant dialecticam. Et ideo dicunt logicae generalis subjectum esse sermonem." After a rather long discussion, Albert concludes that argumentatio is the subject-matter of logica generalis, and then goes back to the scientiae sermocinales. He appears to contrast rhetoric and poetics to logic because of their essential use of

argumentationes, and not to syllogisms (pp.278-80). But this investigation requires a linguistic competence that the author does not possess.


75. De anec., 4: 209 (= ed. Borgnet, I: 7); cf. Gundissalinus, De div. phil.: 81; Phil. disc.: 274: the order is the same, but they do not mention dialectic. At the end of his discussion, however, Albert refers to it as "ea, quae vocatur logica" (p.211 = p.8).
sermo: "Poetica autem utitur eo, prout modlus pronuntiatus delectatione vel abominatione provocat auditentem ad aliquid faciendum vel fugiendum... Rhetorica autem sermone utitur, prout est designativus eius, per quod persuadere intendit. Solus autem logicum sermone utitur, prout est pars instrumenti illius, per quod solum fides fit de ignoto... Propter alterum ergo sermone utitur et non propter se ipsum".76 The logician is not concerned with language (or, better, with the expressive level of language), but only with thought (or, with the level of content). As a matter of fact, rhetoric and poetics are not listed as parts of the Organon in the seventh chapter, which Albert devotes to the explanation of that part of logic "qua certificatur quaestio de complexo" (viz. argument), and at the end of his introduction he again states the opposition between them, as sermonicæ, and logic, considered as a rational science. In his attitude towards rhetoric and poetics, Albert agrees with Gundissalinus in trying to keep together Arabic and traditional views. Like Gundissalinus in De divisione philosophiae, Albert in his introduction to logic describes rhetoric and poetics twice: once as far as they are embodied in logic, and once qua autonomous parts of scientiae sermonicæ, and as such sharply distinguished from logic.

3. The new paradigm of logic

3.1. Roger Bacon and the force of language

As seen above, Albert’s attitude towards rhetoric and poetics was just a replica of Gundissalinus’ views: both of them tried to reconcile Arabic theories and the Latin tradition of sermonicæ scientiae, without getting a satisfying result. Even after Albert became acquainted with the newly translated Averroes’ Expositio in Poetram,77 his position did not change: poetics is partly under grammar, as far as it makes use of verses (and it is then concerned with the level of expression), and partly under logic, since "poesis modum dat philosophandi sicut aliae scientiae logices". But

76. De antec. 4: 211-12 (= ed. Borgnet, I: 8).
77. This translation was finished by Hermannus Alemannus in 1256, march 17th (cf. Averroes, Exp. Poet., AL XXXIII: 74), and Albert does not mention it in his De antec. On Hermannus, see Boggess 1971, and Ferreiro Alemparte 1983.
78. Commenting on Metaph., I, 2, 982b 18-19 (transl. Media, AL XXV.2: 10, 24-25: "quare philomythos ipse philosophus est; fabula namque ex mirandis constituitur"), Albert makes use of the previous translations in order to explain what a philomythos is (transl. lac., AL XXV.1: 9, 17-18; transl. Comp., AL XXV.1a: 93, 4, both of them have "fabularum amator" either as a gloss or as direct translation of the Greek word) and refers to Aristotle’s Poetics: "Sicut enim in ea parte logicae quae poetica est, ostendit Aristoteles, poeta fingit fabulum, ut excitet ad inquirendum et sic constet philosophia" (Metaph., I, 2, 6, ed. Colonensis, XVI.1: 23). If Weisheipl’s views about the chronology of Albert’s paraphrases of Aristotle’s works are correct (1980: 27 and 40: all of them were written probably between 1250 and 1271, the logical treatises before his Metaphysica which was probably began around 1264), Albert is here referring to Hermannus’ translation of Averroes’ Expositio (AL XXXIII: 68: ‘et cum voluerit [scil. poeta] affectre aliquid admirandum et delectabile, inducit nomina illius alterius speciei [scil. transumptivis, extraneis, et
together with Averroes' *Expositio* other works of Aristotle and of Arabic commentators were translated by Hermannus Alemannus: Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and al-Farabi's *Didascalia in Rethoricam* (in Grignaschi & Langhade 1972). Both of them, as one will see, had some influence on Bacon's views about language.79

Bacon refuses to credit Hermannus' translations from Arabic with any value. According to him, both because Hermannus did not know logic (as he himself confessed to Bacon), and because he did not translate Aristotle's works from Greek, scholars can not fully enjoy Aristotle's mind, but only smell it from far off: "vinum, enim, quod de tercio vase transfusum est, virtutem non retinet in vigore".80 Nevertheless, Bacon assigns to Aristotle's and his commentators' writings on rhetoric and poetics a major role in his reform project, because of the emphasis he puts on their practical import. "Practica sunt longe meliora et magis difficilia et minus delectabilia et minus operabilia in hac mortali corrupcione, ideo forciortibus remediis et inductivis indigemus in quan in speculativis" (*Mor. phil.*, V, 2, 1: 250). The two kinds of argument which are known from Aristotle's books, i.e. *dialecticum* and *demonstrativum*, have no relevance for practical purposes, since they make appeal to the speculative intellect: "non possunt igitur hac duo argumenta flectere animum ad bonum, set ad cognicionem veri tantum".81 Understanding what is good and what is the right way to act, in Bacon's views, is much less difficult than performing it (*Mor. phil.*, V, 2, 4: 254). That is why men need to be compelled by a stronger power: viz., by arguments that persuade practical intellect to operate. This is the aim of rhetorical arguments: "hoc tamen argumentum non est notum vulgo artistarum apud Latinos, quoniam libri Aristotilis et suorum expositorum nuper translati sunt et nondum sunt in usu studencium".82 For such a broader view on rhetoric, Bacon thinks that Ciceroian rhetoric is not complete, since it deals only with forensic oratory: "et ideo hoc argumentum, ut Tullius docet, non sufficit, set indigemus completa doctrina Aristotilis et commentatorum eius" (*Mor. phil.*, V, 2, 7: 251).

Even though Bacon invites his colleagues to read Aristotle's books and his commentators', he does not himself use them much. Thus he does not cite Aristotle but Cicero and Augustine to support a parallelization of the three styles (*humilis, mediocris, and grandis*) with the three requirements for an efficacious speech: *docere, delectare*, and *flectere*.83 Furthermore, his terminology by no way reflects that

79. On Bacon, see Maierù 1987, and Fredborg 1989.
81. *Mor. phil.*, V, 2, 4: 251. Bacon's position might be a further elaboration of the traditional distinction between dialectic and rhetoric, exemplified in ps.-Kilwardby' work: he could have replaced the *virtus appetitiva* with practical intellect, giving rhetoric a higher philosophical standing.
employed in the newly translated books. For instance: Bacon talks about *sermones affectuosi* where Hermannus introduces the technical phrase *sermones* or *orationes passionales.* The pragmatic direction of his philosophy of language, as it appears from the recent studies of Irène Rosier (1988 and forthcoming), is representative of a line of thought particularly lively in the field of grammatical theories, and does not primarily depend upon Arabic influences. Bacon certainly derives from the Arabs the subsumption of rhetoric and poetics under logic, and also what could seem an odd classification of the parts of logic: only *rhetorica* and *poetica docens* are conceived as parts of logic; their *uten* counterparts are branches of ethics. Interestingly, Bacon maintains that poetics is a part of rhetoric, indeed the most important part of it, viz. that which makes our speeches efficacious. One wonders whether Bacon actually read the new texts, or whether his aversion to their translators was strong enough to prevent him from making use of them. At any rate, he considered the Arabic views as conflicting with the traditional one: *ex quibus patet quod rhetorica non est scientia principalis per se divisa contra logicam et grammaticam, ut vulgus assignat partes Trivii* (Opus tertium, 75, in Brewer 1859: 308).

3.2. Thomas Aquinas: the most influential division of logic

The Neo-platonic wave peaked in Thomas Aquinas' division of logic. In his logical commentaries Thomas shows clearly that he had not only read, but also assimilated both Arabic and Greek texts available in translation at his time: besides the ones previously mentioned, he knew Ammonius on *De interpretatione,* Simplicius on the *Categories,* Averroes on *Posterior Analytics* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric,* newly translated by William of Moerbeke. His commentary on *Posterior Analytics* contains some novelties with respect to Albert's paraphrases, both about the subject-matter of logic and about the place of rhetoric (and poetics).

As seen above, Albert ignored the *Categories* and *De interpretatione* in his

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84. Cf. *Mor. phil.,* V, 2, 17: 253; 4, 11: 261; Averroes, *Exp. Poet.,* AL XXXIII: 64; al-Fārābī, *Did. in Rhet.,* in Grignaschi & Langhade 1972: 183, 185, 190, 191, 215 (orationes passionales). This phrase was adopted and extensively used by Giles of Rome in his commentary on *Rhetoric,* and, later on, in his *De regimine principum.*

85. Since Bacon was not only a grammarian, his pragmatic approach to language and semiotics must be viewed in the light of his reform project. On Bacon's semiotics and semantics, see also Fredborg et al. 1978; Maloney 1983.


87. This fits with al-Fārābī's description of the use of rhetorical argument: "rhetorica... est instrumentum eximium pertinens ad regimina civitatum et necessarium in legum directione" (*Didasc.,* 1: 150; cf. 31: 201; referred to by Maierà 1987: 256); but also with Algazel, *Logica,* in Lohr 1965: 279, where he connects rhetorical and forensic arguments, resuming what Avicenna said: "premises known by authority, and those which appear to be known by custom, and those based on our fears and suspicions, are employed in the science of rhetoric. This science is used both by politicians and theologians" (*Treatise on Logic:* 42).

88. On the sources of Thomas' commentary on *Post. An.* and its probable datation, see Gauthier 1989b: 55*-59* and 73*-77* (composed in 1271-72, but maybe published only around 1275).
classification, because he selected *ratio cinatio* as the object of logic. In Thomas' view, logic demands a more universal subject so that those two works may be encompassed into its field. Thomas, therefore, argues that since men can direct not only their practical actions, but also their way of thinking by reasoning, an *ars* is necessary in order to avoid wrong trains of thought. This discipline is logic which is named *rationalis scientia* both because it makes use of rational arguments (as well as the other arts), and because it works upon the very acts of reasoning, though according to him these operations are not the subject of logic: they are properly the matter upon which logic acts as art. As Schmidt (1966: 49-57; 89-93; 119) has demonstrated, its subject is what Thomas calls "ens rationis" and is instantiated by *syllogismus, enuntiatio, praedicatum*, and so on. A further elaboration of this view in the following years led to the second intentions-theory of the *Modistae*.

Thomas' move probably would not have had any effect on the classification of logic if he had not changed also the criteria for the division. Since for him the object of logic is an *ens rationis*, Thomas is able to abandon the usual way of picking out the parts of syllogism: along with predicates and propositions, the syllogism is a product of the intellect's cognitive activity, and ontologically dependent upon the intellect. This is why Thomas implicitly dismisses the normally accepted theory that acts and habits of the soul have to be distinguished on the basis of their respective objects: "intento generis, speciei et similib... non adinveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis sequuntur". 89 He perfects Albert's division on three points: 1) recognizing with his teacher that it is proper to reason "discurrere ab uno in aliud, ut per id quod est notum deueniat in cognitionem ignoti" (*Exp. l. Post., I, 1, ed. Leonina, I*-2: 4-5), Thomas puts it as a third act of the intellect along with the two operations indicated by Aristotle: *intelligentia indiuisibilium*, and *compositio uel divisio intellectuum*; 90 2) he further works out the articulation of the new logic,


90. *De an.* III, 6 430a 26-28. Gauthier (1989b: 5, app.) extensively demonstrated that Aquinas derived from ps.-Dionysius and Isaac Israeli his description of the proper character of human reason, and that these two authors have been at the origin of the famous *tertia operatio*. However, there is something which still remains obscure. There are at least two texts, written by Thomas before his logical commentaries, which allow one to doubt that Thomas, at that time, considered the property of *discurrere ab uno in aliud* to be the third operation of the reason. The first passage is taken from the *Summa contra gentiles* (III, 108, ed. Leonina, XIV: 339). Thomas is explaining why also in the first operation of the reason there could be falsity. In this text only two operations are clearly mentioned: the first one, which leads men to know the *quiditas rei* (simple apprehension); and the second one, which is once ascribed to the *intellectus componentis et dividendis*, and at the end to the *intellectus... discurrentis de uno ad aliud*. Furthermore, these two operations are intrinsically mixed, so that also the first operation can not be described as a pure "knowledge by acquaintance" or as a simple knowledge. But the latter is only a secondary feature. Two operations are certainly distinguished, at least *secundum ratione*. The second passage is drawn from Thomas' commentary on *De anima* III, 6 430a 26-431a4 (*Sent. l. De an.* III, 5, ed. Leonina, XLV.1: 224-28). It is surprising to find that Thomas did not take the opportunity to expound a new interpretation of the Aristotelian text, or to add the third operation to the two mentioned by Aristotle. As a matter of fact, there is no mention of any third operation of the reason before the logical commentaries, as far as I can
adapting Cicero's distinction between *ars iudicandi* (Pr. and *Post. An.*) and *inveniendi*, plus the *sophistica* which is not included in any one of them (no mention of the *tentativa*); 3) he places dialectic, rhetoric and poetics on the same level under *pars inventiva* (*Exp. l. Post.*, I, 1: 6-7). His articulation of the field of logic can be summarized in the following schema:

\[
\text{(actus rationis)}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{I Predicamenta (*intelligentia indiuisibilium*)} \\
\text{Logica} \\
\text{II Peryremenias (*compositio uel diuisio intellectus*)} \\
\text{pars iudicativa} \\
\text{Analytica Priora (*ex forma sillogismi*)} \\
\text{(cum certitudine)} \\
\text{Analytica Posteriorda (*ex materia*)} \\
\text{pars inventiva} \\
\text{Topica (*fides uel opinio*)} \\
\text{Rethorica (*suspicio quedam*)} \\
\text{(ex gradu certitudinis)} \\
\text{Poetica (*estimatio*)} \\
\text{sophistica} \\
\text{Sophistici Elenchi}
\end{array}
\]

For our purpose, what really makes the difference between Albert’s and Thomas’ classifications is the last point: logic is no more one of the trivial arts, but is a general *discipline of thought* including rhetoric and poetics, both conceived as minor sisters of dialectic. The inclusion of the two new arts of reasoning may perhaps explain why Thomas introduces the evaluation of the cognitive effects as a general

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*see. And this is a fact that must be explained. In his prologue to the commentary on the *Peri hermeneias*, Thomas explicitly says that Aristotle in *De anima* III, 6 430a 26-28 distinguished only two *operationes intellectus*, and that a third one has been added to them: "additur autem et tercia operatio ratiocinandi, secundum quod ratio procedit a notis ad inquisitionem ignorantum" (*Sen. l. Peryerm. I, 1, ed. Leonina, I*.*1: u.6-8, p.5). The problem is not only that of discovering the remote sources of this third operation, but also that of finding which authority induced Thomas to add this operation. If we exclude Albert (who did not mention any third operation, but was nevertheless the first to put *ratiocinatio* as the subject-matter of logic and therefore could have somehow inspired Thomas), another authority known to Thomas after his commentary on the *De anima* remains a candidate: Johannes Philoponus whose commentary on *De an.* III was translated in 1268 by William of Moerbeke (cf. lat. tr. in Verbeke 1966: 4, 63-65; 19, 51-53; 91-92). Gentilis de Cingulo (quoted below, 4.1.2.f) and Sigerus de Cortraco (*Ars Priorum*, referred to below, 4.1.2.e) ascribe to Philoponus the addition of the third operation. Both of them were probably influenced by Simon of Faversham, who reported at the outset of his commentary on Petrus Hispanus the allegedly definition of 'rational discourse' by Philoponus (cf. ms. Padova, Bibl. Antoniana 429: f.1ra). But I could not find this definition in Philoponus' commentary on *De anima*.**
criterion for the distinction between the three parts of the *nova logica.* He parallels the acts of reason to the acts of nature (since "ars imitatur naturam quantum potest" - u.53, p.5). Nature, as well as reason, can perform a triple action: sometimes it proceeds necessarily; sometimes it reaches its goals with a certain degree of probability (ut frequentius); and sometimes it completely fails ("cum ex semine generatur aliquod monstrum, propter corruptionem alicuius principii" - u.62-64, p.5). In the first case, reasoning yields the absolute certainty of science; in the third one, reasoning is fallacious and must be corrected; in the second case, there is a graded scale of certainty. Thomas’ text merits full quotation: "per huiusmodi enim processum quandoque quidem, etsi non fiat scientia, fit tamen *fides uel opinio*, propter probabilitatem propositionum ex quibus proceditur, quia ratio totaliter declinat in unam partem contradictionis, licet cum formidine alterius; et ad hoc ordinatur topica siue dyaletica, de quo agit Aristotiles in libro Topicorum. - Quandoque uero non fit complete *fides uel opinio*, set *suspicio* quedam, quia non totaliter declinatur ad unam partem contradictionis, licet magis inclinetur in hanc quam in illam; et ad hoc ordinatur rethorica. - Quandoque uero sola *estimatio* declinat in aliquam partem contradictionis propter aliquam representationem, ad modum quo fit homini abominatio alicuius cibi si representetur ei sub similitudine alicuius abominabilis; et ad hoc ordinatur poetica, nam poete est inducere ad aliquid uirtuosum per aliquam decentem representationem" (u.99-118, p.6-7 - ital. mine). Comparing this passage with Albert’s text quoted above one is struck by a difference not only in arrangement, but also in terminology. Where Albert spoke of *praesumptio*, Thomas has *suspicio*; whereas the former had *delectatio* (or *abominatio*), the latter speaks of *estimatio*. In the last case, it should be noted also that Thomas describes the performance of a poetical argument in terms of like/dislike, but in the division he prefers to stick to cognitive categories leaving out the emotional ones. Is it possible to say whence Thomas borrowed these terms? Or did he simply invent them?

Gauthier (1989b), in his precious apparatus to the edition of Thomas’ text, explains these two terms as loans from Grosseteste’s translation of the *Ethics* (VI, 3 1139b 17-18, text. rec., AL XXVI.1-3: 255, 15-16): "suspicione enim et opinione, contingit falsum dicere", a text which Thomas knew and sometimes quoted changing the term *suspicio* with *estimatio*. But these references, as Gauthier is well aware, do not explain why *both* terms occur at the same time in Thomas’ text. That is why he refers to another Aristotelian text (*Rhet.* III, 16, AL XXXI.2: 315) in which the term *estimatio* is used to indicate a weak form of knowledge. Even if this text might be the right reference to explain the source for *estimatio*, for the other term the darkness would remain. In another passage, dating more or less back to the same period and dealing with the problem of belief, Thomas appears to repeat partially the

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91. Cf. Albert’s text quoted above (2.2.).
scale of certainty employing both the verb suspicari and the verb opinari, but the passage does not reveal his source.

The term suspicio is used, as a matter of fact, by Robert Kilwardby in a chapter of his De ortu scientiarum devoted to the comparison between rhetoric and dialectic: while the dialectician is able to demonstrate producing a certain cognition (scientia) in the hearer, the rhetor can not achieve the same result "quia non potest facere nisi quandam fidem vel suspicionem" (ch.LXI, n.614: 209). But the context of Kilwardby's discussion is rather far from Thomas': if the latter profits from Arabic and Greek sources, the former is still inspired by the Boethian texts (cf. Fredborg 1987: 96-97). It is probably in Albert, with whom Thomas shares the same neo-platonic influence, that an answer can be found.

Arguing for the utility and the necessity of logic, in chapter three of his De antecedentibus, Albert says: "per hoc quod inveniendi quodlibet scitum scientia est per habitudines unius ad alterum, quae topicae sive locales vocantur, quibus intellectus unius vel opinio vel fides vel existimatio vel suspicio locatur in alio, quod iam intus habetur in animo quarentis, sine logica hoc docente nec ad inquirendum nec ad inveniendum aliquid procedi potest...". The resemblances between this passage and Thomas' division of inventiva are too striking to be due to chance. It is probably interpreting as different degrees of assent the three terms which Albert used interchangeably in his passage that enabled Thomas to provide a wholly new framework for rhetoric and poetics. But one question remains: how did Thomas interpret the relationship between logic and rhetoric? In his view, were they subalternate, or simply distinct disciplines under the same genus? Neither Thomas's texts, nor his eventual sources can be of help in finding an answer: the theory was perhaps too fresh to be worked out in all its details. Commenting on Rhetoric in 1272-73, Giles of Rome was ready to face the problem.

4. Fortune and disgrace of a paradigm

Summing up the results of the previous paragraphs, one can describe the new arrangement of logic as a paradigm with (at least) three main tenets: 1) logic is a rationalis scientia, and sometimes it is explicitly opposed to sermocinalis (grammar); it is also a modus sciendi giving a method both to other sciences, and to itself; 2) it has as subject-matter ens rationis or, according to a further elaboration, secunda intentio (also the syllogism finds a place as subject matter of logic per attributionem, along with ens rationis which is described as subject per predicationem); 3) it includes

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93. "Quidam vero actus intellectus habent quidem cogitationem informem absque firma assensione: sive in neutram partem declinent, sicut accidit dubitanti; sive in unam partem magis declinent sed tenetur aliquo levi signo, sicut accidit suspicanti; sive uni parti adhaeret tamen cum formidine alterius, quod accidit opinanti" (S.Th., Ila-IIae, q.2, a.1, ed. Leonina, VIII: 26-27); cf. also Ila-IIae, q.48, a.un., ed. Leonina, IX: 366.

as its parts both rhetoric and poetics. In the last three decades of thirteenth and at the beginning of the following century the third tenet found many adherents and a few opponents.\textsuperscript{95} Since the subsumption of rhetoric under logic was stated only on a pure theoretical level, however, it was little by little dismissed: as a matter of fact, only a few copies of commentaries on \textit{Rhetoric} are conserved in collections of logical works,\textsuperscript{96} and no copy of Moerbeke's translation of Aristotle's \textit{Rhetorica} is in manuscripts containing dialectical works - it is usually accompanied by texts and commentaries on \textit{Ethics} or \textit{Politics}.\textsuperscript{97} In what follows, the review of the authors who were apparently influenced by the new paradigm of logic is articulated in three sections: first, a small group of scholars who mixed Albert's and Thomas' approaches: Simon of Faversham, ps.-Boethius of Dacia on \textit{Pr. An.}, and Bartholomew of Bruges; second, those who were more faithful to their model (sometimes, perhaps, without knowing it directly): Iacobus de Duaco, the Anonymus Cordubensis, ps.-Boethius of Dacia on the \textit{Post. An.}, the anonymous prologue \textit{Sicut dicitur ab Aristotile}, Sigerus de Contraco, Gentilis de Cingulo and Angelus de Areto; third, the only one who could have been influenced by Roger Bacon: the anonymous author of a question on \textit{Poetics}.

4.1. \textit{Many adherents}

4.1.1. \textit{Albert and Thomas in competition}

a) Simon of Faversham

The decision to start with Simon of Faversham has two main grounds: first, his logical writings contain (not always explicitly) all the three mentioned tenets of the paradigm; second, as far as the last one is concerned, they show his evolution from Albert's to Thomas' division of logic. Albert's influence on Simon is well known (cf. Ebbesen 1984: 11), so that no one will be surprised to find his classification of the parts of logic almost transcribed in Simon's prologue to his \textit{Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii}:

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\textsuperscript{95} Joannes de Ganduno will not be numbered here among the opponents, even though he considered rhetoric both as a part of political science and as a part of dialectic (cf. Korolec 1981: 622-27; Maierè 1987: 259-60).

\textsuperscript{96} See, for instance, the ms. Firenze, Bibl. Medicea-Laurenziana, Plut. XVI sin. 8, where a copy of Giles' commentary is contained along with Kilwardby's \textit{Nonulæ libri Priorum} (cf. Del Punta & Luna 1989: 15-18); or, Venezia, Bibl. Marciana, Lat XI, 1 (= 2989), with some logical works by Burleigh and Paul of Pergula (cf. Del Punta & Luna 1989: 228-230).

\textsuperscript{97} Cf. Murphy 1969: 840; Fredborg 1985: 108, n.1. Fredborg rightly call attention to the double paradox of the teaching of rhetoric in the Middle Ages: while in the twelfth century the main source was Cicero, who viewed rhetoric as a part of civil science, and rhetoric was taught within the \textit{Trivium} as a discipline concerned with language, in the thirteenth century the paradox is turned upside down: "contrary to the opening words of his [i.e., Aristotle's] \textit{Rhetoric}, the subject is handled as a species of civil science" (1989: 2).
Cum autem logica sit rationalis scientia, quia est de ipso actu rationis secundum quod ratio diversisimude procedit ab uno discurrendo in aliud ex aliquidus signis facientibus presumptionem vel suspicionem aliquam, sic est una pars logice, quo vocatur rethorica, pura (pro: puta) si argutur sic: 'Qui egreditur de lupanari adulter est, iste egreditur de lupanari, Ergo etc.' Si vero ratio procedat ex aliquidus fictis facientibus abominacionem vel delectionem in suo discursu, sic est una pars logice quo vocatur poetica; puta si arguat sic: 'Iste potus est similis veneno, Ergo est evitandus'. Si autem ratio procedat ex probabilitibus, sic est tertia pars logice, quo vocatur dyalectica, et hec traditur in libro topicorum. Si autem ex causis essencialibus et propriis, sic est alia pars logice, quo vocatur demonstrativa et traditur in libro posteriorum. Si vero ex hiis, que videntur et non sunt, sic est sophistica, quo traditur in libro elenchorum. (p.19 - ital. mine)\(^98\)

Simon completes Albert's division by taking into account also the other books of Aristotle:

Et quia quando aliquid est commune pluribus, necesse est seorsum considerare illud commune, ne contingat idem multociens repetere, ideo preter partes logice, que sunt de syllogismis specialibus, est alia pars logice que est de syllogismo in communi, et hec traditur in libro priorum. Quandoque autem ratio non procedit discurrendo ab uno in aliud, sed absolute accurat simplicem quidbitatem rei, considerando ipsam ut est ordinabilis in genere secundum sub et supra, et de tali actu rationis est liber predicamentorum. Quandoque autem ratio simplicia comprehensa ad invicum componit vel dividit, et de tali actu rationis est liber peryhermeneias, cuius subjectum est enunciacio affirmativa vel negativa. Sic ergo secundum tradicionem Aristotelis septem sunt partes logice: scientia predicamentorum, scientia peryhermeneias, scientia priorum, scientia posteriorum, scientia rethoricorum, scientia poeticorum, scientia elenchorum. (pp.14-15)

Simon is apparently influenced by Thomas' (or of his followers') division in two features: 1) he says that logic considers the operations of reason, and after quoting Albert's division of syllogistic inferences he applies the three-acts scheme;\(^99\) 2) he uses the term suspicion as alternative or synonym to presumptio in order to describe

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98. Cf. Albert's text quoted above. The example of the brothel is taken from Boethius, De diff. top., IV, PL 64: 1211A.

99. It must be said that Simon makes use of the same argument employed by Thomas to separate logic as rational science from other sciences: "huius autem intencio universalitatis est intencio generis et speciei, et sic de aliis, de quibus intencionibus dictur esse logica. Propter hoc enim dictur esse rationalis scientia: unde non dictur esse rationalis scientia quia per rationem procedat, quia sic omnis scientia esset rationalis; sed dictur rationalis, que est de hiis que sunt causata ab intellectu" (q.2: 19). Cf. Thomas, Exp. l Post., 1, 1, ed. Leonina, 1*: 2: 3-4. But the same passage is echoed in earlier works, such as Giles' commentary on Rhet.: f.1vb, and other texts that will be quoted below (also the term suspicion could be derived from these sources). Also Simon's double description of the subject of logic appears to be widely adopted in other writings of the same period. It probably depends on an erroneous reading of Thomas' text, which is far from clear and intrigued also modern scholars (cf. Schmidt 1966: 49-51). In his following writings, Simon appears to maintain that the subject of logic is either ens rationis/secunda intenio, or syllogism (cf. Quaest. sup. Post., q.46: f.152va; Sent. Top. Ar., ms. Leipzig, Universitätsbibl. 1359: f.24ra; Quaest. novae sup. El., Pro.: 101 - but cf. Veteres: 28, where an ambiguous formula occurs: "tota logica est de actu rationis").
the act of assent yielded by rhetorical arguments (see the first passage quoted above).

In later writings of Simon, Thomas' influence is stronger. In his *Questiones super lib. Priorum*, he employs the analogy between reason and nature in order to distinguish the parts of logic:

Cum autem logica doceat sillogizare secundum quod ratio diuersimode procedit in sillogizando, diuersitate actus sillogistici diuersi sunt partes logice. Est autem aduertendum quod ratio in sillogizando procedit ad modum nature. Natura autem in aliqubus product effectum necessario et infallibiliter ita quod <non> potest impediiri, et talis est natura corporum superiorum a qua procedit motus sempiternus, continus et uniformis. In aliqubus natura non semper product effectum, nec operatur eodem modo, sed tamen hoc facit ut frequenter, sicut contingit in actione naturalium. In aliqubus vero deficit a fine intento propter corruptionem alieius principii, sicut contingit cum generantur monstruosa et peccata in natura. Consimiliter ratio procedit in sillogizando. (f.111ra)

In this work, Simon does not give a complete division of logic, and so it can not be compared with the two he expounds in his *Quaestionem super libro Elenchorum*. In the *Veteres*, he simply divides logic according to the three acts of reason, then lists the respective works of Aristotle. Oddly enough, among the books of the new logic (dichotomized in *inventiva* and *indicativa*) he omits *Topics* (just as he did before) and put *sophistica* under *inventiva* (p.28). In the *Novae*, on the contrary, he displays a sound Thomistic division (three acts; three parts of new logic; and three kinds of assent: *fides vel opinio, suspicio*, and *aestimatio*), but disregards *Prior Analytics* (pp.102-103).

b) ps.-Boethius of Dacia, *Quest. sup. Pr.*

The anonymous author of the questions on *Prior Analytics*, once attributed to Boethius of Dacia offers a division of logic which, following Albert, is deduced from a typology of syllogistic reasoning and is mixed with the Thomistic scale of the acts of assent:

*de sillogismo ergo est tota logica ut de subjecto cum omnia, que in tota logica determinatur ipsi sillogismo attribuuntur, siue ad ipsum sillogismum reducuntur. Inter species sillogismi quidam est qui ordinatur ad generandum opinionem, de quo ut de subjecto est dialetica, quidam autem sillogismus est qui ordinatur ad generandum suspicacionem, que minor quam opinio, maior quam existimatio, de quo ut de subjecto est rhetorica: est enim rethoricus sillogismus ex signis tantum suspicacionem inducentibus. Quod*

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100. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. l. Post.*, 1, 1, ed.Leonina, 1*:2: 5. The same simile is used by the Anonymus Cordubensis on *Post. An.*: f.80vb. This text, or its cognate text witnessed by the ms. Firenze, Bibl. Medicea Laurenziana, plut.XII sin., 3 (F), can be the direct source of Simon as well as of Sigerus de Corraco (see below): the reference to the superior bodies' movement, and the expression 'deficit a fine intento', which are absent from 'Thomas' text, seem to be characteristic of that prologue.

autem rhetorica sit pars logices testatur Aristotiles in principio Rethorice sue, sicut patet quia ipsa assecutiva est dialetice; unde et utraque est circa omnia quodammodo. Quidam autem sillogismus ordinatur ad generandum exstimationem, nec ex causis, nec ex signis (figuris?, ms.), nec ex aliquo fidem faciendo procedens, set ex simil<utudini>bus(?) multum a ueritate remotis et quandoque ex fabulis que ad ueritatem aliquando reducuntur. Huiusmodi enim sillogismus est poeticus (politicus, ms.) de quo determinat Aristotiles in sua Poetica (Politica, ms.). Quidam autem sillogismus ordinatur ad generandum firmum habi
tum et necessarium, ut sillogismus demonstratius, de quo est liber Posteriorum ut de subiecor. Ratio autem sillogismi in quolibet istorum ut vere uel apparenter salutatur sicut ratio prioris in quolibet inferiori. Aliqua enim sunt que competunt sillogismo unde sillogismos, et non competunt ei unde talis uel talis, ut esse in tribus terminis et duabus propositionibus et regula
eri per dici de omni uel de nullo et ordinari in modo et in figura. Hee enim competunt sillogismo unde sillogismos; et cum ratio sillogismi simpliciter saluatur in quolibet specialii sillogismo et hec omnia predicta necesse est reperiri in quolibet specialii sillogismo, et ideo necesse fuit premittere scientiam unam de his que competunt sillogismo inquantum sillogismos, ne oporteret ea multiotiens repetere seorsum determinando de speciebus sillogismi. (f.31rb) 102

c) Bartholomaeus de Brugis, Soph. de subiecto logicae

This works deserves a place by itself, since from several points of view it is representative of a line of thought opposite to the paradigm. For instance, about the subject of logic Bartholomew rebukes all the previous characterizations and puts forward an unusual theory claiming, however, that it is actually just an articulation of a traditional one: "et fuit opinio antiquorum ponentium modum sciendi esse subiectum in logica" (p.44). In positing the instrumentum deveniendi a cognito ad ignoti notitiam secundum quod huiusmodi as subject of logic, Bartholomew claims to be offering the correct interpretation of Albert's theory (even more correct than Albert's own). 105 The influence form Albert, but also from such masters as

102. The second question is devoted to the subject of logic: Utrum logica sit de ente. The solution is that logic considers being "secundum quod cadit sub intentione sibi ab anima attributa. Hinc est quod dicit Avicenna quod logica est de secundis intentionis adiunctis primis" (f.31vb). The reference to Aristotle's Poetica does not help to date this work, since it could be a reference to Averroes' Expositio in Poetiam. From a doctrinal point of view, it could have been written in the 80's, and then be more or less contemporary to Simon's commentaries. I could use the transcription made by Jan Pinborg which is conserved at the IGLM (Univ. of Copenhagen).

103. This work is in Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981b: 1-80. Bartholomew criticizes two versions of 'srmocinalism': sermo significativus rerum intellectum (pp.25-28); the traditional view: syllogismus (pp.28-30); Albert's own: argumentatio (pp.28-30); Avicenna's: intellecta seco
duo (pp.33-34); and all of the possible sorts of 'intentionalism': ens rationis (pp.35), intento secunda (pp.35-36), ens rationis ut dirigre intellectum in suis actibus (pp.36-7), ens (pp.37-39), ens rationis et syllogismus (Radulphus Brito's version, pp.39-40).

104. "Cum dicitur: Scientia dividitur penes divisionem sui subjicii etc., sine dubio illud est difficile, forte quia inconsuetum" (p.62).

105. "Idem sentit Albertus in multis locis commenti sui supra Porphyrium... Et mirum fuit de isto homine, cum intentionem nostram, ut apparebat resipienti illud caputitum, per rationem praretac
tum concludat, quod postea immediate dicit: Hoc autem est argumentatio. Unde credo, licet non explicit, quod accepit argumentationem non proprii prout complectitur 4 species... sed pro instrumento deveniendi a
Nicolaus Parisiensis, 106 is apparent in his divisions of logic. The main branches of logic, according to him, are *divisiva, definitiva* and *argumentativa* (p.24). All the three divisions of logic he proposes take it as a starting point. As a matter of fact, the first one is not a real division, but the illustration of the Greek commentators' view that demonstration is the central part of logic: Bartholomew shows therefore that not only *divisiva* and *definitiva* find their completion in *argumentatio*, 107 but also that all the types of argument (syllogism, enthymeme, induction and example) and all the types of syllogism (sophistical, dialectical, simple and demonstrative) have demonstration as their end (p.61). As one can see, there is no mention of rhetorical and poetical syllogisms. This fact might mean that Bartholomew is well aware that they are not syllogistic arguments: as one will see, many masters of arts of the previous generation, such as ps.-Boethius of Dacia, were not cautious enough to make this distinction clear. 108

Bartholomew's division of logic is delivered as solution of the fifth *dubium*. Apart from the introduction of *divisiva* and *definitiva*, 109 his classification of the arguments can be interpreted as a reorganization of Albert's. He gives a binarily structured framework to the six parts of Albert's logic, adding as seventh (but first in his exposition) the *scientia libri Priorum*. As commentator of Averroes' *Poetria*, Bartholomew devotes some space to poetics, specifying that its instrument is *exemplum*: it is a part of logic and, as well as rhetoric, is best suited for moral or political matters. As for the cognitive habits which poetics and rhetoric generate,

106. See below, footnotes 107 and 109.
108. In his second division, he assigns to rhetoric enthymeme and to poetics a kind of example as subject (p.64).
109. They consider the instrument through which one acquires a simple knowledge (*notitia incompleta*). Bartholomew criticizes, following Albert, the opinion of someone who saw in *Post. An.* the books in which division and definition are expounded by Aristotle: "et has duas partes logicae secundum Albertum non habemus translatas ex libris Aristotelis, sed Boethius scientiam divisionum composit et Albertus scientiam de definitione in commento supra Porphyrum quodammodo tradit; vel, ut dicunt alii, utramque tradidit Philosophus breviter et succinte in libro Posteriorum propter affinitatem earum ad demonstrationem: est enim definitio eius medium et divisio vel est via vel pars viae investigandi definitionem -- primum tamen credo esse verius, quoniam ibidem Philosophus non explicit principia, partes et proprietates secundum se horum instrumentorum, sed quasi ista supponit ab alia scientia" (p.62). As a matter of fact, Albert (*De antec.*, 5: 214 = ed. Borgnet, l: 9) argues against someone who locates *ars definendi* in the sixth book of Aristotle's *Topics* (see the prologue to an anonymous commentary on Porphyry in the ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., Nov. acqu. lat. 1374, f.1ra; and the division of logic contained in the *Philosophia* attributed to Henricus Brito, in the ms. Oxford, Corpus Christi College 283, f.148rb): Albert, then, can not be Bartholomew's source for the criticized opinion, which is the same as that of Nicolaus Par., *Phil.*: f.151rb: "secundum hoc diuiditur loyca in arte diuidendi, diiffiniendi, colligendi siue argumentandi. Sed quia diuizio est uia in diiffinitionem (est enim medium diiffinitioni in demonstratione et causa), et per demonstrationem completissimus et certissimus habitus generatur, ideo non separatur ab Aristotile ars diuidendi et diiffiniendi ab arte demonstrandi, sed simul traditur in secundo libro *Posteriorum*." Nicolaus might be a direct source of Bartholomew's division of logic.
4.1.2. Variations on Thomas’ theme

Since the differences between the following divisions of logic are very subtle, a short comment will precede or follow the transcriptions of the texts (if they are not yet edited), or will summarize them.

a) Iacobus de Duaco, *Quest. sup. Post*  

Iacobus’ division appears to merge the traditional criteria of dividing inferences (according to their *materia*) with Thomas’ three-acts framework. The usual description (*ens* or *actus rationis*) of the subject of logic occurs without mention of *secundae intentiones*, and the underlying tripartite analogy between reason and nature is transformed into a dichotomy. The inclusion of rhetoric and poetics is added at the end as something noticeable, but of minor importance:

Sicut enim *ensi* non consideratur a phisico nisi secundum quod mobile, nec cadit sub eius consideratione \*ensi\* secundum quod mobile, similiter nec ens cadit sub consideratione logice nisi secundum quod est sub alicu actu rationis. Et propter hoc logica uersatur circa actus rationis. Et ideo diuisio logice debet attendi penes divisionem actus rationis. Est autem triplex actus rationis, scilicet apprehensio, compositio et diuisio, et collatio unius ad aliud. Ad primum actum ordinatur liber *Predicamentorum*, in quo consideratur de entibus simplicibus unde cadunt sub consideratione logica, prout apprehens[i]a sunt, et determinantur proprietates eorum apprehensorum. Iuxta secundum actum ordinatur liber *Peryermenias*, unde et in illo libro determinatur de entibus simplicibus apprehensionis secundum quod componuntur vel diuiduntur ad inuicem. Iuxta tertium actum, ordinantur alii libri noue logices, qui actus est conferre unum ad aliud, uel procedere ab uno in aliud. Vnde dicitur iste actus decursus rationis. Et ideo aduerendum quod processus ab uno in aliud potest esse dupliciter: uno modo in quo ratio non deficit in ratiocinando, alius in quo ratio deficit in ratiocinando, scilicet propter defectum alicuius [alicuius] principi, quod debet obsenari \*<in>\* ratiocinando, et ad istum processum uel actum ordinatur liber *Elencorum*. Processus autem in quo ratio non deficit in ratiocinando potest esse dupliciter: uel in genere, siue in communi, et sic ad talem actum rationis ordinatur liber *Priorum*, qui docet modum procedendi in quo ratio non deficit in communi. Licet enim in re genus non sit aliud a suis speciebus, est tamen aliud in ratione, ita quod alicu sunt que conveniunt generi secundum quod genus, que non conveniunt speciei secundum quod species, et ideo potest esse scientia de actu rationis in communi non descending ad aliquam speciem. Secundo potest iste processus rationis considerari non in communi, set in speciali secundum quod in diversa materia consideratur iste processus unius propositionis ad aliud. Modo potest ista ratio esse uel in materia probabili, et ordinatur

110. The *Categories* and *De interpretatione* are added employing the *partes integrales* device (pp.65-66). A third division of logic is given as solution of the sixth *dubium*, but it is just a slightly different version of the second (p.66).

111. According to Gauthier (1989b: 59*-60*), they were probably written between 1275 and 1280.
tunc ad eum scientia libri *Topicorum*; uel secundum quod est in materia necessaria, et ordinatur ad eum scientiam *Posteriorum*, + in qua secundum Auerroem patet + qui dicit quod liber *Posteriorum* est tota necessitas librorum naturalium, et Alexander dicit quod est finis librorum logicalium.\textsuperscript{112} Vnde illa que magis proficit[ur] ad scientiam aliorum est scientia *Posteriorum*. Cuius probatio est per demonstrationem, eo quod scientia est habitus conclusionis syllogismi demonstrativi, et tales scientiam non contingit habere nisi sciatur modus demonstrandi. Iste autem modus docetur in libro *Posteriorum*, ideo etc. Est tamen notandum quod retherica et poetria continetur sub logica, et non tantum sunt partes in communi, set ipsius dyaletic, unde dicitur in principio Rethoric Aristotilitis quo est assecutiu (consuetiu, ms.) dyaletic, uel pars eius. Est enim intelligendum quo actus rationis ad quem ordinatur dyaletica gradus habet. Sicut enim uidentus in uirtutibus moralibus quod una potentia <potest> impediri a sua actione, et fortius minus impeditur quam debilior - est enim quidam (quidem, ms.) actus rationis mediante quo generatur opinio, set alius est actus mediante quo generatur debilior habitus, ut suspicio; tertius est actus <mediante> quo generatur in nobis adhuc habitus debilior, et iste habitus dicitur estimatio. Iuxta primum ordinatur dyaletica, iuxta secundum retherica, iuxta tertium poetria: totus enim poetarum est processus per similitudines. Vnde ex hoc quod aliquid cibus assimilatur abhominabilici dicitur abhominabilis (abhominabile, ms.), tamen hoc contingit aliqui, non tamen contingit omnibus, et ideo in istis contingit faciliter errare. (f.148ra-b)\textsuperscript{113}

b) Anonymus Cordubensis, *Quest., sup. I Post.*

The division of logic given by the anonymous author of the questions on the first book of *Posterior Analytics* in the *accessus* which is preserved in the ms. Cordoba, Cabildo 52 and in the ms. Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., S.Croce, Plut. XII sin. 3, is perhaps the most faithful to 'Thomas' model.\textsuperscript{114} The only difference lies in the fact that the Anonimus Cordubiensis, unlike Thomas, calls all kinds of inference 'syllogism': this reminds us of the Greek commentators of Aristotle, but can be simply interpreted as sign of a superficial consideration of the topic. Furthermore, he makes explicit the opposition between logic as rational science and *sermocinales scientiae*, which was not explicitly pointed out by Thomas (together with its first five

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\textsuperscript{112} A reference to Greek commentators to justify the centrality of *Post. An.* is not rare in the logical work of this period. Cf. ps.-Boethius, *Quest. sup. Pr.*, I, q.1: l.31va: "tota logica finaliter ordinatur(?) ad scientiam demonstratium tamquam ad principalem partem logices... secundum quod uult Simplicius supra librum *Predicamentorum*"; Simon de Faverisham, *Quest. sup. Post.*, I, q.1: "ars demonstrandi est ultimum et optimum in arte syllogizandi, scientia enim de syllogismo ordinatur ad scientiam de demonstratione, et hoc aduertens quidam expositor Grecus supra librum *Posteriorum* dicit quod demonstratio finis est logici negotii, alias enim logicas scripturas propter demonstrationem tradidit nobis Aristoteles" (f.80ra). Cf. *Proem. Merton.*, in Ebbesen 1974: 156-62, p.46; Sigerus de Cortraco, *Ars Priorum*, in Wallerand 1913: 8. But cf. also al-Fārābī, *De scientiā*, 2, 143 (quoted above, 2.2.). The identification of *Alexander* with Johannes Philoponus has been demonstrated by Ebbesen 1976: 89-91 (the passage which is referred to by Iacobus is edited at p.91).

\textsuperscript{113} I could profit by a previous transcription by Sten Ebbezen who kindly put it at my disposal. A part of this text has been also published in Gauthier 1989b: 7, app.

\textsuperscript{114} In the Firenze ms. (as well as in München, Staatsbibl., Clm 8005, where the prologue is missing) these questions are in a (perhaps later) rearranged form: cf. Gauthier 1989b: 60*-61*. 
questions, the prologue will be edited in the next issue of CIMAGL).

c) ps.-Boethius de Dacia, Quaest. sup. Post.

In this anonymous\textsuperscript{115} collection of questions the division of logic, which is very close to Thomas’, occurs in a rather unusual place. After the first three questions concerned with the scientific status of logic and with its subject,\textsuperscript{116} the text runs as follows:

Dupliciter autem dividitur\textsuperscript{117} logica secundum divisionem istius rationis\textsuperscript{118} entis quod est intentio secunda, quoniam quaedam est intentio secunda\textsuperscript{119} quae causatur ex simplici apprehensione rerum ab intellectu, cuiusmodi est genus, species et differentia, de\textsuperscript{120} quibus est liber \textit{Prædicamentorum}. Aliae sunt intentiones causatae a compositione et divisione ipsarum rerum ab intellectu facta, cuiusmodi est enuntiatio et partes eius et proprietates, de quibus est liber \textit{Peri hermeneias}. Tertio sunt quaedam intentiones causatae ex collatione illarum rerum\textsuperscript{121} ad invicem ab intellectu facta, de quibus est tertia pars logicae, quae dividitur in sophisticam, quam tradit Aristoteles in \textit{Elenchis} de syllogismo sophisticismo; et in\textsuperscript{122} inventivam, quae dividitur in\textsuperscript{123} tres partes: scilicet in dialecticam, quae traditur\textsuperscript{124} in \textit{Topicis} de dialectico syllogismo; et in\textsuperscript{125} rhetoricam, quae traditur\textsuperscript{126} in \textit{Rhetorica} Aristotelis\textsuperscript{127} de syllogismo rhetoricò; et in poetriam, quam tradit

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\textsuperscript{115} Its ascription to Boethius of Dacia has been proved untenable (cf. Ebbesen & Pinborg 1970: 47). I will quote from the transcription and collation made by Jan Pinborg (whose orthography I will keep) and kindly put at my disposal by the Director of IGLM. For a description and a comparison between the mss. which contain this work, see Ebbesen & Pinborg 1970: 1-8 and 27 (tentative stemma); Gauthier 1989b: 61*-62*. The prologue is contained in the following mss.: 1) Brugge, Stadtbibl. 509, f.59va (B); 2) Épinal, Bibl. mun. 137 (48), f. 152va-b (E); 3) Erlangen, Univ. 213 (485), f.84va (Er); München, Staatsbibl., Cim 8002, f.66va (M); Salamanca, Univ. 1839, f.95ra (S). Since B contains a different version of this prologue, it will not be used; M is usually rather incorrect, therefore only some significant variants from it will be indicated in apparatus.

\textsuperscript{116} Q.1: \textit{Urnum logica sit scientia}; q.2: \textit{Urnum syllogismus in tota logica sit subiectum}; q.3: \textit{Urnum ens sit vel possit esse subiectum in tota logica}. About the latter two questions, the author maintains that both \textit{sylogismus} and \textit{ens} can be considered as subject of logic: syllogism is in fact the principal \textit{intentio}, "ideo non differt dicere logicae esse de syllogismo ut de subiecto vel (et E) de ente secundum rationem" (S f.94vb-95ra).

\textsuperscript{117} dividitur ] dividatur S
\textsuperscript{118} rationis] communis E M S
\textsuperscript{119} secunda] om. S
\textsuperscript{120} de] cum Er M
\textsuperscript{121} illarum rerum] om. Er M S
\textsuperscript{122} in] om. E M S
\textsuperscript{123} in] et Er
\textsuperscript{124} quae traditur] quam tradit E Er M
\textsuperscript{125} ct] om. E Er M
\textsuperscript{126} quae traditur] quam tradit E Er M
\textsuperscript{127} Aristotelis] sicut add. E
<Aristoteles> in quodam libello quem adhuc apud\textsuperscript{128} nos non habemus translatum.\textsuperscript{129} Dividitur etiam\textsuperscript{130} tertia pars logicae in iudicativam, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro Priorum et in libro Posteriorum, quem ad praesens sumpsumus exponendum, in quo de syllogismo demonstrativo tamquam de materia et subiecto determinatur.

This is the only case in which the division of \textit{pars inventiva} is given without mentioning the acts of assent. An explanation might be the conciseness of our text, which only summarizes the division. The reference to Aristotle’s \textit{Poetics} as a little book still untranslated has been interpreted by Gauthier (1989b: 62*) as an indication that the author knows Moerbeke’s translation, and therefore he dates this work a little after 1278. In my opinion, this argument is rather weak, since the same statement about \textit{Poetics} could be interpreted as a sign that the author knows (from Averroes’ \textit{Expositio}),\textsuperscript{131} or from other sources\textsuperscript{132} that Aristotle wrote a booklet on poetics, but he regrets that the Latins (or, as Gauthier suggests, the Parisian masters) do not have it yet, at least directly translated from Greek. His statement does not seem to imply that he believes that this booklet is still extant (apart from its partial translation from Arabic), or that someone has already translated it. Hence, he probably wrote before 1278. This conclusion is corroborated by comparison with the commentary by the Anonymus Cordubensis. At the end of his q.4 dealing with the subject matter of logic, he reports an alternative solution to the objection that syllogism can not be the subject of logic since it is also the subject of the \textit{Prior Analytics}:

\begin{quote}
Alio modo solet solvi et satis bene, quod syllogismus simpliciter est subjunctum in parte logice, ut in libro Priorum: hic est syllogismus secundum quod syllogismus est absolute, et determinatur enim ibi de eo secundum se et secundum quod syllogismus est, et quantum ad ea que consequuntur ipsum secundum quod syllogismus est; sic (set, ms.) autem non est subjunctum in tota logica; set syllogismus simpliciter, id est syllogismus totaliter utuniversaliter, quantum ad omnes partes eius et passiones <et partes> subjunctias et integrales, et hoc est diuersimode, et ideo etc. (C f.81vb)
\end{quote}

The distinction between two senses of the expression 'syllogismus simpliciter' is adopted by ps.-Boethius in order to solve the same objection in his q.2 of his commentary on \textit{Post. An.} I:

\textsuperscript{128}  apud] ad E
\textsuperscript{129}  habemus translatum] pervenit E
\textsuperscript{130}  etiam] autem E
\textsuperscript{131}  The translator, Hermannus Alemannus, introducing his work, says that he had problems because of the different ways in which Arabs and Greeks compose verses: "Postquam cum non modico labore consummaveram translationem Rethorice Aristotilis, volens manum mittere ad eius Poctriam, tantum inveni difficultatem propter inconvenientiam modi metricandi in grecco cum modo metricandi in arabico, et propter vocabulorum obscuritatem, et plures alias causas, quod non sum confius me posse sane et integre illius operis translationem studiis tradere latiorum" (Averroes, \textit{Exp. Poet.}, AL XXXIII: 41).
\textsuperscript{132}  See, for instance, what Bacon said about Hermannus' translation of \textit{Poetics}, above 3.1.
Ad aliud dicendum quod nichil unum et idem et sub eadem ratione consideratum potest esse subiectum totius et partis; set sub diversis rationibus bene potest. Vnde silogismus est subiectum in Prioribus quantum ad ea que sibi competunt unde silogismus simpliciter, non unde talis uel talis. Qui, quamuis non sit aliquid aliud quam ille uel iste in re, tamen proprietates aliquae conveniunt ei unde silogismus simpliciter que (qui, mss.) non conveniunt ei unde ille uel iste, sicut aliquae conveniunt animali unde animal que non conveniunt ei unde tale uel tale. Silogismus autem [simpliciter (om. M)] consideratur simpliciter, id est totaliter, quantum ad ipsum silogismum simpliciter, et partes eius subiectuas, et proprietates earum in tota logica est subiectum tamquam illud cui omnia alia attribuuntur, sicut prius dictum est. (S f.94vb; M f.66vb)

In q.12, discussing the question "utrum oportet precognoscere ante demonstrationem si est (scil. subiectum)", the Anonymus Cordubensis reports the terminology used by some "antiqui":

Si autem sumitur 'si est' pro ente, ita quod cognoscentem quid est oportet scire quod ipsum sit ens, dicendum quod sic, quia ens in natura cuiuscumque entis particularis ineditur; et enti, ut si sit, accidit esse in effectu et etiam non esse, quare cognoscentem quodcumque ens oportet scire si est, et hoc est quod sit ens. Et tale esse vocabant antiqui <esse> essentie. Et quia ens consequitur esse uel fuisset uel fore uel posse aliquid istorum, ideo cognoscentem quid est aliquid oportet cognoscere quod est uel fuit uel erit uel possit esse uel fuisset uel fore. Et talia entia uocauit Auicenna (Aduincit(?), ms.) entia non prohibita. (C f.83rb)

Both the reference to Avicenna and to the concept of esse essentie are present in a passage of the ps.-Boethius on Post. An. I, q.10 ("utrum de subiecto oportet precognoscere quia est"): 

Intelligendum autem per Auicennam, quod eorum que apprehenduntur ab intellectu aut ymaginatone quedam sunt necessaria ex sua ratione, ut eterna; quedam impossibilita ex sua apprehensione, ut chimera uel yrhoceroeo et figmenta que Auicenna appellat 'prohibita'; tertio sunt quedam que non sunt necessaria, nec impossibilita, set possibilita esse et non esse, ut homo et similia. De illis que sunt impossibilita manifestum est quod definitioe non habent, secundum quod dicit Aristotile secundo huius, quod de traelaepho et yrhceruo non contingit (oporee: S) scire quid sunt. Illa autem que sunt possibilita definitioe habent et oportet quod sint aliqua natura cui non repugnat esse, et tale esse non prohibitum per se oportet presupponere scientem de aliquo. Nichilominus per accidens presupponit esse secundum actum, quia dfinito est universalis que nuncquam corrupitur, set semper manet133. quia cum corrupitur in uno particuli remanet in alio, quoniam cum particularia [[corrupturntur]] in uno climate corrupturntur, in alio remanent. Et ideo scientem quid est oportet precognoscere si est actu non per se cum non includitur in sua ratione. Propter hoc si aliquid ponat uniersale totaliter destrui, quod est impossible secundum Aristotilem, adhuc poteris scire quid est. Scientem ergo quid est oportet precognoscere quia est non prohibitum secundum naturam suam. Et

133. semper manet] om. S
hoc [[est]] esse essentia appellatur. (S f.96rb; M f.67rb-va)

It should be noticed that the terminology that the Anonymus Cordubensis labels as "employed by the antiqui", is accepted without any caution by ps.-Boethius. These comparisons suggest that the commentary by ps.-Boethius should be earlier than that of the Anonymus Cordubensis. 134
d) Anonymus, Sicut dicitur ab Aristotile

If the arguments about the relative chronology of the two previous commentaries hold, the same interpretation of the reference to Aristotle's Poetics can be applied to a similar passage which occurs in the anonymous prologue to Porphyry (which will be edited in the next issue of CIMAGL). The division of logic is preceded by a short divisio scientiarum, but strangely enough, after a rather long ethically oriented introduction, the author does not mention moral sciences. A theoretical framework such as that of Henricus Brito's (see above, 1.1.) might explain this oddity as a lack of the main division between practical and speculative sciences. In Henricus' Philosophia the division between principales and adminiculativa was a division of the speculative branch (and this is, perhaps, the only place the division could be fitted in). The anonymous prologue offers a theory faithful to Thomas' model: description of the subject of logic as ens or actus rationis; division of logic according to the operations of reason. However, these features might be an effect of second hand borrowings: this text is in fact very close to Iacobus de Duaco's prologue for the preference granted to dichotomies in dividing the new logic (simpliciter vs. concernens aliquam materiam; mat. necessaria vs. probabilis) and the whole field (compositio has two meanings).

e) Sigerus de Cortraco: the confluence of old and new traditions

Siger, magister artium at Paris in 1309 and colleague of Radulphus Brito, sums up the paradigm in the prologue to his Ars Priorum (in Wallerand 1913): 1) "ens rationis est subjectum in tota logica sive syllogismus universaliter sive modus sciendi", even though differently: ens is the subject according to predication; syllogismus according to attribution; and modus sciendi as instrument; 2) there is no question

134. As a matter of fact, the terminology labeled as 'old' by the Anonymus was being used for many years by Henry of Ghent (since at least 1276, date of his first Quodlibet): what the Anonymus could have meant is that the theological distinction between esse essentiae and esse existentiae was no more in use among the logicians. Furthermore, I would not exclude that also Iacobus de Duaco could refer to him in his polemics against those who do not allow an infinite regress in demonstration and find the source of the first demonstration in senses, memory and experience (cf. I, q.10: f.149rb-va, and ps.-Boethius, Quest. sup. Post., I, q.5: f.95va; cf. also Simon de Favermisham, Quest. sup. Post., I, q.2: f.80rb-va, where this position is described as dictum antiquorum). But, the correspondence between Iacobus' text and ps.-Boethius' is not perfect. Furthermore, from a doctrinal point of view (at least, about the subject matter of logic) Jacobus seems to be at an earlier stage, while ps.-Boethius holds positions which are comparable with those of the Anonymus Cordubensis.
about the status of logic, but from the first point one can infer that it is a rational science; 3) among the three alternative divisions of logic that can be drawn from its subjects, one is a repetition of Thomas' and his followers', viz. that secundum divisionem entis rationis (pp.6-8);\textsuperscript{135} the two others revive older methods of dividing logic, viz. penes divisionem syllogismi (p.8)\textsuperscript{136} and penes divisionem modi sciendi (pp.8-9). Only the first division includes rhetoric and poetics, again employing the device of the three degrees of assents: opinio for Topics; persuasio for Rhetoric;\textsuperscript{137} and existimatio for Poetics. Sigerus probably found the two other divisions in works written before 1270 and he probably did nothing but repeat what his sources said. His case confirms that the division penes divisionem syllogismi was structurally not suited for that purpose, since it did not consider the cognitive effects of the different types of argument; and shows that the more the range of sources was widened, going back to the generations before Thomas, the more rhetoric and poetics were fading and disappearing from the field of logic.

f) The so-called 'Averroists' of Bologna: Gentilis de Cingulo and Angelus de Aretio

Gentilis de Cingulo's and Angelus de Aretio's prologues to Ars Vetus\textsuperscript{138} reveal the influence of the new paradigm on the Bolognese school of logic, even though with some noticeable differences. In Gentilis' prologue rhetoric and poetics receive only a short mention:

Set ut eius naturam magis uideamus est scendi quod tota loyca est de entibus factis ab intellectu secundum quod concedunt committere loquentes de ipsa. Set triplex est operatio intellectus secundum quod patet terto De anima. Una est simplicium intelligentia, ut puta quando intellectus intelligit simplicem quiditatem aliquius, ut quando intelligit quiditatem hominis uel asini simpliciter. Alia est operatio intellectus que est indiiuisibilium compositio, ut puta quando intellectus componit unum cum alio per

\textsuperscript{135} It reminds several previous prologues: Siger ascribes to Philoponus the introduction of the third operation of the soul (p.6; see above, footnote 89); he makes use of the analogy between reason and nature in order to divide syllogistic inferences, and exemplifies the necessary natural effect in reference to corpora coelestia (p.7; cf. Simon and Anonymus Cordubensis); talking about the pars indicativa, he quotes a definition of judgement which is ascribed to Cicero (p.7; cf. also Anonymus Cordubensis: f.81ra); as well as many other masters of those days, he refers to Simplicius (and Albert) in order to affirm the priority of demonstration (p.8; see above footnotes 32, 107 and 112).

\textsuperscript{136} See above, par. 2.1. He does not mention in this division the three operations of reason, as the logician after 1275 usually did (see below, 4.2).

\textsuperscript{137} To this terminological change might have contributed both a revival of Boethian-Ciceronian tradition, such as in Radulphus Brito (Sup. Top. Boeth., IV, q.1, in Green-Pedersen 1978: 85, where both terms, suspicio and persuasio, are employed), and Giles' commentary on Rhet., where he mentions Thomas' suspicio only in order to criticize it, preferring al-Farâbî's fides or credullitas; persuasio is used by Giles as a technical terms for rhetorical argument (following Moerbeke's translation of pishe - p.163; see below, 4.2.2.).

\textsuperscript{138} The first one was probably written at the turn of the century (cf. Tabarroni 1989: 277-78, with bibliographical references); Angelus de Aretio, a pupil of Gentilis, taught logic and natural philosophy in Bologna in the first decades of the XIVth century.
copulam urbaelem. Tertia est discursus unius ad alterum. Hanc autem tertiam operationem non ponit Philosophus, set quidam eius commenator nomine Iohannes Gramaticus ipsum superaddidit. Solum autem Philosophus ponit primas duas. Secundum hanc autem triplicem operationem intellectus distinguitur tota loyca. Nam de prima operatione intellectus, scieltic de simplici intelligentia indiuisibilitum, determinatur in Preditamentis. Ibi enim determinatur de terminis incomplexis ordinabilibus in linea predicamentali secundum sub et supra, que secundum primam operationem ab intellectu adprehenduntur. In libro autem Perymenias determinatur de propositionibus siue enunitionibus que secundum secundam operationem intellectus adprehenduntur ab ipso, que est indiuisibilitum composito. Secundum autem tertiam operationem distinguuntur libri artis noue, que est discursus unius ad alterum. Talis autem discursus non est nisi sicut quidam modus arguendi, ut 'si hoc est, ergo hoc est'. Iste autem modus arguendi potest duplicitier considerari. Vel sub ratione sua communis, non descendendo ad aliquam sui partem subjectiunam, secundum quod simplicer adprehenditur ab intellectu; et ut sic de ipso determinatur in Prioribus. Ibi enim determinatur de omni modo possibili arguendi, ymmo non solum determinatur de modis arguendi dyalectice, set etiam de modis arguendi rectorice uel poetice, quod patet in illo capitulno: Quoniam autem dyalectici et rectorici, II Priorum. Vel potest considerari ut contrahitur ad aliquam sui partem subjectiunam; et hoc est duplicitier. Quia uel per illam eius partem subjectiunam probatur conclusio uera, ut uera est, et necessaria, ut necessaria est, uel solum probatur conclusio uera, non tamen ut uera et necessaria, set solum probabilis. Si primo modo, sic de ipso determinatur in Posteri<ori>bus; nam ibi determinatur de demonstratione per quam probatur conclusio necessaria et ut necessaria. Si secundo modo, et hoc est duplicitier. Quia uel uere probatur conclusio probabiliter uel non probatur aliquo modo neque uidetur et hoc totum accipiantur pro uno membro - uel uidetur probabiliter, non tamen (enim, ms.) probatur. Si primo modo, ut sic de ipso determinatur in Topicis: ibi enim determinatur de sillogismo dyalectico et de illo sillogismo qui pure dicit priuationem illius. Et hoc est rationale quod hoc fiat in eodem libro, quia sicut dicitur II Celi et mundi: rectum est iudex sui et obliqui. Ubi enim determinatur de uno habet determinari de alio. Si autem consideratur secundo modo, sic de ipso determinatur in Elencis. Ibi enim determinatur de sillogismo sophystico, qui uidetur inferre suam conclusionem, non tamen infert, set peccat per aliquam fallaciaram. Et hic terminetur distinctio totius loyce quantum ad libros qui sunt de esse loyce. (f.1rb-va)\(^{139}\)

Gentilis does not strictly follow the main stream: dialectic is divided from demonstrative and from sophistical sciences in a traditional way (penes partes subjectivas), but rhetorical and poetical inferences are not placed under it: they are dealt with in the second book of Prior Analytics together with dialectical inference. One can conclude from these short remarks that Gentilis probably conceives of the book of Rhetoric and Poetics, as well as the Topics, as particular disciplines subordinate to Prior Analytics as to a general science, but he does not make this conclusion explicit in his further division of the new logic. On the contrary, his choice of the traditional way of dividing prevents him from separating dialectic from its minor sisters.

\(^{139}\) The text has been transcribed from the ms. Firenze, Bibl. Naz., Conv. Soppr., J.X.30 by Andrea Tabarroni, who very kindly allowed me to quote it.
On the other hand, Angelus’ preference for the account of the parts of logic which is based on the classification of the cognitive habits produced allows him to include explicitly rhetoric and poetics in logic:

Si autem illa principia sint adgenerativa habitus veri, hoc est tripliciter, quia aut sunt adgenerativa oppiniosis aut persuasionis aut suspicionis: si oppiniosis sic est sillogismus dialecticus nam sicut scientia est habitus adgeneratus per sillogismum demonstrativum sic et oppinio est habitus adgeneratus per sillogismum dialecticum; de isto autem sillogismo dialektico determinatum est in topicis. Si autem sit adgenerativa persuasionis sic est sillogismus rectoricus et iste principaliter non est locus; quodam modo saltem est locus ex hoc [est] quod dictum est in primo Rectorice: dictum est enim quod rectorica est assecutiva dialectice. Si autem sit adgenerativa suspicionis sic est poeticus. (f.4va)

As in Siger, suspicio has abandoned rhetoric and is attached to poetics: we shall see that this was probably an effect of the criticism raised by some philosophers against Thomas’ arrangement (cf. 4.2.).

4.1.3. A follower of Bacon? The Questio in Poetria

Gilbert Dahan edited in 1980 an anonymous question on Poetics (end of XIIIth-beginning of XIVth cent.) entirely devoted to the discussion of the relationship of poetics with the other parts of logic. It shares many points with the previous division of logic: logic considers the concepts produced by the acts of reason; therefore, logic has to be divided following their distinction. The classification is quite similar in its first part to that of Iacobus de Duaco: "Ut autem dimittamus actum intellectus simplicia apprehendentem et actum apprehensum ad invicem componentem et dividentem et actum ab uno in alius discursivum in communi et conceptus vocales istis respondentes, qui tractantur in libris predicamentorum, peryermencias et priorum..." (p.215). But its author is more interested in the division of reasoning in speciali, and here he appears to revive Bacon’s distinction: dialectic and demonstration serve the speculative intellect, rhetorical and poetical arguments the practical one (p.215). He then distinguishes rhetoric from poetics arguing that the former is addressed to other people, the latter to the speaker himself. This, as Dahan points out, is rather original. A possible source might have been Averroes

140. The ms. Vat. Lat. 4472: f.4rb, on which is based the transcription made by Roberto Lambertini, who very friendly allowed me to quote it, has temptativus, whereas the ms. Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., Strozzi 99: f.16r, reads rethoricus, which gives a better sense.

141. See above, par. 3.1.

142. "Actui autem intellectus per comparationem ad appetitum quoad alteros dirigitur, respondet persusio rethorica, seu sillogismus rethoricus, qui propter multitudinem populi cum quibus conversatur quis, ad exemplum et emplimenta abreviatus est, et ideo quia homines per fidem ad invicem convivunt, dictur persusio que ad alterum est fidem generare. Actui autem intellectus per comparationem ad appetitum per quem homo in seipso dirigitur respondet persusio poetica. Et quia quilibet propriis estimationibus maxime credit et propriis fantasis maxime innititur, ideo sermo poeticus seu sillogismus poeticus ymaginativus a philosopho appellatur" (pp.215-16).
commentary on the opening words of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* translated from the Arabic by Hermannus Alemannus: "Ambe (scil. rhetorica et ars topical) intendent unum finem et est sermo ad alterum: non enim utitur eis homo ad se ipsum, ut est in demonstrativis, sed tantum ad alterum" (Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 16673: f.65vb; Toledo, Bibl. Cap. 47.15: f.36rb). Use of Hermannus’ translations might explain also the rather frequent occurrence of the phrase *sermones passionales*, without assuming any dependence upon Giles of Rome (whose classification of logic, as Dahan recognizes, is quite different). The anonymous writer knows Thomas’ classification (perhaps indirectly), since he distinguishes rhetoric from poetics arguing that the former yields *fides*, the latter *estimatio*. But at the end of the question, he answers the last argument *quod non* (poetics is not different from the science of demonstration) by appealing to an "old" solution: "Quarta ratio antiqua solutione solvenda est: poetica enim, sicut quaelibet ars alteri applicabilis, considerari potest ut docens passiones subjici generis, sicut demonstrationes que docent naturam et passiones sillogismi demonstrativi. Alio modo potest considerari ut utens, et sic gradu certitudinis plane differt a parte logice demonstrativa, ut dictum est, quoniam demonstrativa applicata aliis scientiam de eis instrumentaliter facit, poetica vero estimationem quamdam debilem inclinantem solum ad aliquid appetendum et fugiendum" (p.219). This *antiqua solutio* is not only reminiscent of Bacon’s positions, but is also very close to Radulphus Brito’s discussion of the scientific status of rhetoric, as we shall see in the next paragraph.

143. Giles of Rome makes a similar statement about *sermo*, but he refers explicitly to Aristotle’s *Politics*, I, I, 1253a 9-10; cf. Aegidius, *Sup. Rhet.*: f.5vb: "habere sermonem est proprium homini; propter quod Philosophus primo *Politiorum* probat hominem naturaliter esse magis civile et sociale omni alio animali, eo quod solus ipse habet sermonem et sermo sit semper ad alterum*. Since in Aristotle’s text, one can not find but only the first of the two sentences that Giles ascribes to it ("sermonem autem solus habet homo supra animalia"), Averroes’ commentary might have been also Giles’ source.

144. The doctrines common to Giles and the anonymous listed by Dahan (1980: 211-12) are too general to be conclusive. There is, however, a much closer point of contact. Both of them think that rhetoric (Giles explicitly omits poetics) is more apt to argue about moral or political matters, but they do admit that it can also descend in speculative sciences, or vice versa, that speculative arguments can be applied to practical subjects. Compare the two following texts: "Sed nec solum circa modum sciendi et processum rationis quem logica docet hec alternatio et reciprocatio reperitur; ymmo et in ipsis scientiis realibus, maxime practica puta fabrica aut consimilis alia, propter speculare adisci potest, quoniam aliquid speculationis habet; et maxime speculativa, puta methafisica, propter operari, ut puta si quis per methafisicam rebus cognitos circa agenda, prudencias gesturum negocia se putaret" (*Q. in poct.* 216-17); "nam sicut est in speculativo et practico quod scientia illa est speculativa que ad speculationem ordinatur, illa vero practica que ad praxis, nichilominus tamen summe speculativam posset quis velle scire propter opus, ut puta quis forte vellet scire metaphysicam ut per eam dirigeretur in agendis et maxime practicam, ut puta fabricam, vellet quis scire propter speculationem et ut sciret etiam si nichil per eam operari deberet" (*Aegidius, Sup. Rhet.*: f.1va). The resemblance is very tight, but one can not say whether the former text depends on the latter.
4.2. A few opponents

As the cases of Iacobus de Duaco, Sigerus de Cortraco and Gentilis de Cingulo indicate, the division of logic *penes divisionem syllogismi* was hardly suited to expound the new arrangement of logic. Other examples can be mentioned: Boethius of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. lib. Topicorum* (p.6-7); Gerardus de Nogento (ascr.), *Quaest. sup. lib. Posteriorum* (ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 16170: f.113rb); Anonymus, *Philosophia* (ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq. Lat. 1374: f.9rb-va).  

145 All these logicians adopt the three-operations main division, but revive the traditional division of syllogisms.  

146 Can they be considered as opponents of the Thomistic extended conception of logic? This conclusion can not be drawn only from their divisions of logic. Missing Boethius of Dacia's commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, one must look at other logicians who, adopting this traditional division of logic, offer also a discussion about the relationship between logic (or dialectic) and rhetoric, such as Radulphus Brito and Giles of Rome.

4.2.1. Radulphus Brito: the collapse of Thomas' classification of logic

Some of Brito's prolego to logical works (only partially edited) remind in their structure the *Philosophiae* of the masters of arts around the middle of the century: a commendation of philosophy precedes the classification of the sciences, then the division of logic comes. Brito adopts as main division the distinction between speculative and practical sciences, then divides the speculative in *principales* and *administrativae*. Like the anonymous author of *Sicut dicitur ab Aristotele*, he affirms that the *administrativae* are only two: grammar and logic. But for him logic does not contain rhetoric: the two divisions of logic Brito usually gives are *secundum divisionem syllogismi* (just like Siger), and *penes divisionem secundarum intentionum*.  

147 Even if rhetoric has no place in his *divisio scientiarum*, Brito devotes to it and to its relationships to dialectic the last three questions of his commentary on Boethius' *De differentiis topicis* (IV, qq.1-3, in Green-Pedersen 1978). From the first question (*Utrum rhetorica sit scientia*), one can probably guess the reason why he did not adopt Thomas' methods of classifying the books of logic. In his *determinatio*, Brito claims that rhetoric, as well as dialectic, comes in two forms: *docens* and *utens*. In the first sense, rhetoric is a science "quia habitus generatus in nobis de aliquo (scil. de enthimemate, exemplo, oratione persuasiva) per eius causas et propria principia" (p.85). In the second sense, it is not a science, since it is a weak cognitive habit which Radulphus calls *credulitas* and *suspicio*. This position not only exactly parallels

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145. This text was published by Grignaschi 1972: 106-107, and ascribed to Petrus de Sancto Amore. This attribution, however, rests on no evidence (cf. Gauthier 1989b: 59*, n.5).


that of the author of the *Questio in Poetriam*, but is probably the application to rhetoric of an argument that Thomas himself put forth discussing the differences between philosophers, dialecticians and sophists in his commentary on *Metaphysics*:

"dialectica enim potest considerari secundum quod est docens, et secundum quod est utens. Secundum quidem quod est docens, habet considerationem de istis intentionibus (scil. entibus rationis), instituenus modum, quo per eas procedit possid ad conclusiones in singulis scientiis probabilter ostendendas; et hoc demonstrative facit, et secundum hoc est scientia. Utens vero est secundum quod modo abuncto utitur ad concludendum alicud probabilter in singulis scientiis; et sic recedit a modo scientiae."  

Just before, in the same *lectio*, he has opposed the procedure of dialecticians to that of scientists-philosophers: "dialecticus autem circa omnia praedicta procedit ex probabilibus; unde non facit scientiam, sed quamdam opinionem" (n.574, p.160). This means that Thomas' division of logic is fallacious, from both Brito's and his own point of view, since it ends classifying dialectic, rhetoric and poetics in so far as *utentes*, and not as they are sciences.

However, if Brito conceives of rhetoric as a science, why does he not mention it in his classification? A tentative answer might come both from the second question (*Utrum rhetorica differat a dialectica*), and from the structure of his division of sciences. According to him, dialectic and rhetoric are distinct because:

1) they have different subjects (*syllogismus dialecticus* vs. *oratio persuasiva*);  
2) they employ distinct instruments (*syllogismus* and *inductio* vs. *enthimema* and *exemplum*);  
3) they have opposite aims (or *modi considerandi*): "quia dialecticus determinat de oratione dialectica ut ordinatur ad movendum virtutem apprehensionis, sicut *intellectum speculativum*. Sed oratio persuasiva, de qua est rhetorica, non ordinatur ad hoc ut speculetur, sed ordinatur ad movendum appetitum judicis, scilicet *ad movendum virtutem irascibilem et concupiscibilem*, irascibilem ut habeat indignationem partis adversae et concupiscibilem ut habeat miserationem partis proprie" (p.89 - ital. mine). He then concludes his question pointing out that, even though dialectic, as well as rhetoric, makes use of general instruments, those of dialectic are suited for every matter, while those of rhetoric are better suited for ethics. Since he also, in his *divisio scientiarum*, describes grammar and logic as disciplines which are instruments for *speculative* sciences, it would seem that a right place for rhetoric would be as an instrument for *moral* sciences. But he does not explicitly say so.

As Lewry (1983: 57) remarked, in the above quoted passage "Aristotle has been quietly assimilated into the matrix of mid-century rhetoric". Brito probably followed


149. It is interesting to notice that Brito does not use the phrase *syllogismus rhetoricus*, as the previous masters did.

150. In order to show that in rhetorical matters one could hardly find a true universal proposition, Radulphus adduces the example of a false clue.
a line of thought and of teaching which was represented by Boethius of Dacia, and by Johannes Dacus (whose traditional approach to the *trivium* and his dependence upon Arnulfus Provincialis and other Parisian masters of the same period are well known): a philosophical current which was perhaps less influenced by the theologians. But this hypothesis, as well as the previous one, needs further research to be confirmed.

4.2.2. Giles of Rome: a Thomist above suspicion?

Since Giles usually agrees with the general lines of Thomas' thought (even in his commentary on Rhetoric), his deviation from Thomas' division of logic is at least surprising. But this fact might be explained. In the first lectio of his commentary on Rhetoric, Giles discusses in depth the question of how rhetoric is distinct from the other sciences. He explicitly excludes grammar and poetics from consideration, since the former is "ad libitum" (which means presumably "ad placitum") and the latter is based on gestures and representations. He wants to concentrate upon the other sciences that proceed in a rational way. He, therefore, distinguishes three kinds of argument (*rationes*) that are proper to a discipline or to a group of them: probable arguments are employed by dialectic, persuasive by rhetoric, and demonstrative by all other sciences. Adhering to Thomas' model, he states that the differences between these disciplines result from the types of habits engendered by them: *viz.* opinio, fides or credulitas, and scientia. But, if the distance between scientia and the two other habits is apparent, much more subtlety is required to explain what makes the difference between opinio and fides. In this case, his terminology is dependent on

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153. In a future paper, I will show Giles' dependence upon Thomas' theory of emotions as it is expounded in *S.Th.,* In-Iae. In what follows, I will quote Giles' text collating it from the following mss.: P = Paris, Bibli. Nat., Lat. 6457: f.255ra and ff.; R = Ravenna, Bibli. Class., 409: f.1ra and ff.; S = Paris, Bibli. Univ. de la Sorbonne, 120: f.1ra and ff.; V = Vat. Lat. 776: f.103ra and ff.; and from the 1515 Venice edition (ed.). All the quotations or references without any further indication are meant to be from ed.

154. The same point is made in his *De part. ess.*: f.a.l.r. As far as grammar is concerned, I could not indicate any particular source for Giles' statement, since every grammarians would probably agree with him on the fact that language is a matter of convention. He probably referred to the *gramatica positiva* (vs. *gramatica regularis*), which according to Iacobus de Duacio (q.5: f.148vb) can not be the subject of a science ("quia quod hoc dicto significat, de hoc non est scientia quia est unolatate, nec concludit potest per demonstrationem"). For his second statement, which does not appear to be drawn from Albert or Thomas (viz. Gundissalinus), I think he refers to Averroes' *Exp. poet.,* AL XXXIII: 41, 42, 44-45 and 47 (about *represantatio*); 47: "et ista representatio per sermonem completur quando coniungitur ei tonus et metrum; et in recitatoribus carminum reperiantur dispositiones alie preter eas que sunt in metro et orationes, que faciunt orationes magis representativam, scilicet gestus mutales et immutationes vultuum, prout iam dictum est in libro Rhetorice; even though Averroes claims that "gestus sunt magis proprii Rhetorice quam libro Poetrie" (p.64).
Arabo-Latin sources: thus one can find the term *credulitas* in al-Fārābī’s *Didascalia* as translation of the Arabic term for the Greek *pistis*, but Giles uses it to name the cognitive habit yielded by persuasive arguments. However, he does not forget Thomas’ term for it. The reference to his commentary on *Posterior Analytics* is quite clear:

dixerunt autem aliqui magni non super hoc libro, super quo nihil fecerunt, sed in aliis suis scriptis, credulitatem siue fidem differre ab opinione secundum certitudinem, quo certius adheremus hiis que opinamur, quam hiis que credimus: nam huissumodi credulitas et potissime que generatur per rethoricam quaedam suspicatio debet dici.

Giles considers Thomas’ view (or the view he ascribes to Thomas), along with al-Fārābī’s (rhetoric is about particular events, dialectic is concerned with universals), as either false or far from the real basic difference. According to him, a more general characterization of their distinction is the following: since the intellect sometimes gives its assent to propositions following its own nature, and sometimes in so far as it is moved by the will, one can conclude that dialectical reasoning produces an assent of the first type; rhetorical arguments, on the contrary, deal with subjects about which the intellect can be moved to assent by the will (such as particular

155. Cf. §§ 2: 155; 3: 156, where it could be interpreted as a cognitive habit; but cf. § 4: 157, where al-Fārābī recalls the Aristotelian distinction between *téchnoi* and *diechnoi pístis* (*Rhet.* I, 2, 1355b 35): "credulitates autem persuasive seu quandam habentes sufficientiam fiunt etiam quandoque per orationes et quandoque non per orationes".

156. magn... scriptis] om. S ed.
157. certitudinem] fortitudinem P
158. quod] quia ed.
159. et] si add. et exp. V
160. suspicatio] suspicio est vel S
161. P f.255rb; R f.1ra; S f.1rb; V f.103rb; ed. f.1rb. The adjective *magni* is employed elsewhere by Giles to refer to Thomas (cf. Wielockx 1985: 237, n.41). The use of this expression and the reference to Thomas’ writings shed light on the omission of the whole passage in S: the latter could be a first redaction written before the death of Thomas and before the publication of Thomas’ logical works; the other ms. are witnesses of an addition to this first redaction made after 1275. One can also infer that: 1) in his first version of the commentary (written around 1272-73; cf. Donati 1990), Giles did not have under his eyes Thomas’ *Exp.* I. *Post.*: 2) this fact can explain why his references to Thomas’ theory is so quick and somehow incorrect (Thomas did not say anything there about the certainty of the acts of assent); 3) Giles had the opportunity to read or to listen something about Thomas’ views, and reported them by heart (or with the help of some private notes); 4) a double redaction can also explain why in the prologue the University tradition (P R V) omits the traditional derogatory statement ("ubi, quia honus expostoritis assensi (assumpsit, ed.), nolo mihi ascribi que (quia, ed.) proferam, sed tales promulgabo sententiam qualem credam Aristotelem intendisse", S f.1ra; ed. f.1ra): after some years of work as commentator, he had no need of such a device.
events)\(^{162}\) (ed. f.1rb-va). With this device, Giles is able to appropriate Thomas’ and al-Fārābī’s positions and to list six differences between rhetoric and dialectic: 1) rhetoric is more concerned with ethical subjects; dialectic with speculative ones; 2) rhetoric deals with emotions (which can move the intellect), while dialectic does not; 3) the audience of rhetorical arguments is simple and rough; that of dialectical reasonings is subtle and ingenious; 4) their instruments are, respectively, enthymeme and example, syllogism and induction; 5) rhetoric usually refers to particular events; dialectic makes general statements; 6) both of them make use of loci, but in a different way (ed. f.1va).\(^{163}\)

It is interesting to compare Giles’ commentary on the first sentence of Rhetoric with the interpretation of it given by some of Thomas’ followers. Connecting it with other passages of Aristotle’s text,\(^{164}\) they interpreted "Rhetorica assequitiva dialectice est" as equivalent to "rhetorica est pars dialectice".\(^{165}\) Giles is far from agreeing, and tries to assign a more precise sense to Aristotle’s words: ‘to follow’ (assequi) means, according to him, to be both equal and different. Rhetoric is an imitation of dialectic, and shares with it three features (subject, method, scope); for three others, on the contrary, it is largely deficient (certainty, instruments, relationship to the intellect). But since Giles has under his eyes also Hermannus’ translation from Arabic, he wants to make the two versions fully agree and concludes:

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\(^{162}\) Notice that the typology of the acts of assent is based on Thomas’ thought: cf. Qq. disp. de verit., q.14, a.1, ed. Leonina, XXII.2: 436-438; S.7th, Ia-IIae, q.15, a.1, ed. Leonina, VI: 110; q.17, a.6, vol.VI: 122. Giles’ rejection of Thomas’ view about rhetoric is deduced from Thomas’ theories.

\(^{163}\) In a future paper, I will deal with Giles’ discussion on the latter point, which is related to a background of University debates. Simon of Faversham includes Giles list in his own, adding two differences: “Sed est notandum quomodo dyaletica se habet ad rethoricam, quia Philosophus uult quod rethorica est pars dyaletica. Notandum ergo est quod septuplex est differentia inter dyaleticam et rethoricam. Prima est quia dyaleticam magis descendent in materia speculatoria, rethorica uero magis in practicam, <id est in> materia<rn> moralem, quia Philosophus in Rethorica sua entia rationis applicat materie morali (materialia, mm.). Ex isto appareat quod rethorica ordinatur ad felicitatem practicam que consistit in usu sapientie, quae est suprema uirtutum intellectualum. Secunda differentia est quia rethorica habet determinare de passionibus anime, ut ira et concupiscencia; sed dyaletica non. 3\(^{nd}\) est differentia quia iudex rethorice grossus est, dyalete autem ingeniosus. 4\(^{th}\) est quantum ad instrumentum, quia rethorica utitur entinemate et exemplo, sed dyaletica inducitio et silologismo tamquam potissim instrumentis. V\(^{th}\) differentia est quia persuasio rethorica est circa singularia, sed dyaletica persuasio (add. in mg.) circa uniuserialia. Sexta est quantum ad locum, quia aliter sumuntur loci dyaletici et aliter loci rethoric. 7\(^{th}\) differentia est quia disputatio dyaletica est unius ad alterum, sed rethorica est unius ad tertium ut ad iudicem, quia omnia quae facit rethoricus facit ut inducat iudicem ad comminationem partis proprie et indicationis partis adueree. 8\(^{th}\) differentia est quia rethor utitur rationibus persuasius, dyaletics autem probabilibus, quia triplex sunt rationes: persuasius, probabiles et demonstrativae; sic autem different quia persuasio generat <***, ratio probabilis > opinio<nem>, demonstratio autem scientiam” (Sent. Top. Ar., ms. Leipzig, Universitātsbibl. 1359: f.24rb; the lacuna in the text can not be easily filled since if Simon followed Giles, then he would have written credulisias or fides; if he was consistent, he would have put estimaio or suspicio). I could use a transcription made by N.J. Green-Pedersen.

\(^{164}\) Aristotle explicitly called it "pars quedam dialectice" (I, 2, 1356a 30-31, transl. Guill., AL XXXI.2: 164).

\(^{165}\) Cf. the texts of ps.-Boethius on An. Pr. (4.1.1.b), Iacobus de Duaco (4.1.2.a), Anonymus Cordubensis: f.81ra, and the anonymous Sicut dicitur ab Aristotele: f.13rb.
sex ergo modis rethorica dyaleticam assequitur.\textsuperscript{166} tribus ut equatur et tribus ut deficit. Philosophus tamen magis uidetur attendere\textsuperscript{167} de assecutione que acceptur secundum equalitatem in ambitu, ut quia quelibet ex quibusdam communibus.\textsuperscript{168} unde in alia translatione habetur quod rethorica convertitur arti topicæ.\textsuperscript{169} Et Alpharabius exponit huiusmodi conversionem esse quandam adequationem et equipollentiam.\textsuperscript{170} (P f.256ra; R f.1vb; S f.2rb; V f.104rb; ed. f.2ra)

Rhetoric and dialectic are therefore distinct from one another. Their relationship is specified in a later passage (lectio quarta) where Giles comments on Aristotle's statement that rhetoric "est pars quaedam dialectice" and faces the problem whether rhetoric is subalternate to dialectic or whether it can be said to be part either of dialectic or of politics. He wants to exclude proper subalternation, claiming that the relevant requirements are not met (ed. f.7va-b). He adds an analogy with sophistica from which one can infer that he is talking about dialectic in a strict sense and not about dialectic = logic in general. If for Thomas' followers the new division of logic implied a subalternation of rhetoric to dialectic, Giles was certainly an opponents of it.

Finally, two points are to be stressed:

1) In his commentary on Rhetoric, Giles holds that actus rationis are the subjects of logic. He probably got this view from Thomas, misinterpreting his ambiguous expressions. Some years later, in his commentary on Sophistici Elenchi Giles changed his mind and tried to save what he said in his previous work: "etsi aliquo modo de actibus rationis sit logica, proprie non est de actibus, sed de intentionibus et conceptibus qui formantur per huiusmodi actus... communiter ergo loquendo dialectica est de actibus rationis, quia huiusmodi conceptus actus rationis dici possunt, propter quod communia scripta hec dicentia non falsificamus. Nam et nos in rhetorica, ubi superficialius de dialectica locuti sumus, non curavimus distinguere inter huiusmodi conceptiones et actus rationales, sed diximus dialecticam et rhetoricam esse de actibus rationis huiusmodi" (Pro.: f.2va-b).

2) If in Sup. Rhet., Giles implicitly considers as synonyms 'rationalis' and 'sermocinalis', so that he can affirm that dialectic and rhetoric are both rational and sermocinalis scientiae (ed. f.2ra; 4vb; 5rb; 6va; passim); in Sup. Soph. El., he appears again to correct his previous opinions: "si communi nomine scientiae rationales possunt dici sermocinales, et econverso, tamen, ut patet per habita, dialectica propriæ est rationalis, quia est directa intellectus et rationis; grammatica vero propriæ est sermocinalis, quia dirigit sermonem et linguam" (Pro.: f.2rb). The same holds for

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166. assequitur] sequitur ed.
167. attendere] intendere R
168. communibus] casibus P
170. al-Fârâbî, Did. in Rhet., § 58: 250; cf. § 14: 172.
rhetoric,\textsuperscript{171} and this view inspires Giles division of philosophy, where, once left again grammar out of consideration, he puts both dialectic and rhetoric under rational science. Consequently, his division of logic does not include rhetoric, but it is close to that of Boethius of Dacia, viz. based on three-acts distinction and, as far as \textit{logica nova} is concerned, on the types of syllogistic inference (\textit{De part. phil.}: f.a.iii.v).

Giles’ last mention of \textit{suscipio} occurs in his later commentary on \textit{Posterior Analytics}. Rejecting the view that logic is a science, he now holds that it is a \textit{modus scienti\ae} and that different kinds of cognitive habits can be engendered by it: "aliquando scientia, aliquando modus scienti\ae, aliquando opinio, aliquando fides, aliquando suspicio, aliquando deceptio, aliquando ignorantia" (f.a.5va). Then he explains how these habits differ and with which discipline they are connected: "opinio autem differt a fide et suspicione, quia suspicio est infra fidem, fides infra opinionem. Ideo quando ea per quae manuducimus ad assentientum aliqua sunt quedam representationes et quedam metaphore, prout procedit ars poetica, dicuntur solum aggenerare suspicione; sed si ille persuasiones sint validiores, prout procedit ars rhetorica que validius arguit quam ars poetica, dicuntur persuasiones ille aggenerare quandam credulitatem et quandam fidem, ita quod per fidem quam aggenerantur rationes rhetorice firmius adheremus quam per suspicionem quam aggenerant manuductiones poetice" (ibid.). As a pupil of Thomas (even in a large sense), Giles is simply unfaithful. He is, however, self-consistent: since in \textit{Sup. Rhet.} he preferred al-Fârâbî’s terms to Thomas’, \textit{suscipio} eventually becomes a synonym of \textit{estimatio}, covering the cognitive habits produced by poetical arguments; and traces of this terminological change are visible in XIV\textsuperscript{th} century texts (see, for inst., Angelius de Aretio and Sigerus de Cortraco).

5. Conclusion

It is time to come to a \textit{prima vindemiatio}. It is probable that not all the texts that bear witness to Thomas’ influence in the last decades of the XII\textsuperscript{th} century have been brought to light. Nevertheless, the general lines of the reception of the new conception of logic are rather clear, and confirm the 'thought-appeal' exerted by some theologians upon the Parisian \textit{matres ès artes}. But while Thomas was able to say something more about rhetoric than what the cognitive effects of rhetorical arguments are, his followers only knew that rhetoric yields \textit{suscipio} in the hearer’s mind and that it deals with rhetorical syllogisms. Commenting on a passage of the \textit{De interpretatione} (17a 2-7), Thomas makes clear what is the domain of logic (in its strict sense) in contrast to rhetoric and poetica:

\begin{quote}
consideratio huius libri directe ordinatur ad scientiam demonstrativam, in qua animus
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{171} \begin{quote}
"Rhetorica enim non est realis nec est proprie sermocinalis, sed est magis rationalis. Nam entinemata et rationes et persuasio videntur esse totum corpus rhetorice, et id circa quod principaliter versatur rhetorica, ut videtur velle Philosophus in primo \textit{Rhetoricorum}" (f.3ra; cf. \textit{Sup. Rhet.}: f.2vb).
\end{quote}
While logic focuses on the truth values, so that the logician's philosophy of language is essentially a semantics of terms oriented to scientific knowledge, rhetoric and poetics, on one hand, and grammar, on the other, deal with the other linguistic functions, each from its own points of view. Rhetoric and poetics consider the intended effects of language on the hearer as something which is built up on a semantics which is not truth-values oriented: as a matter of fact, these types of discourse do not signify a *mentis conceptus* which is either true or false, but mean that something must or should be done by their addressee (*ib.*: u.68-88, p.37) and try to make it done through an emotional appeal. One would like to know more about this pragmatically oriented semantics, but Thomas was not compelled to go any further by the text he commented on.

Thomas' followers show a simplifying attitude towards rhetoric and poetic, which leads them to the conclusion that they are minor parts of dialectic, able only to yield weak cognitive habits: Thomas' classification is transmitted through the chain of second-hand borrowings and, like the wine of Bacon's simile, it looses its force and taste of novelty. As a matter of fact, the 'new' conception of logic ends by neglecting the expressive function of language and by stressing only its cognitive import. But, as we saw, this division of logic had an intrinsic weakness, and Brito seems to have been the first to realize that it was untenable.

With Giles' commentary on *Rhetoric* perhaps something new happens. Even though Giles does not adheres to the new way of classifying logic, he does - like Thomas - point out the peculiar approach to language proper to rhetoric. The second principal difference between dialectic and rhetoric listed by Giles is that the latter takes into account *sermones passionales*. Nevertheless, this kind of speech is not the subject matter of rhetoric, on the contrary, according to Giles, it is a feature of language dealt with by the (docens) rhetorician only *per accidens*: rhetoric is a rational science since it considers *essentialiter* the ways one has to follow in order to persuade, which, like syllogism, is an operation of the reason (*Sup. Rhet.*: f.4rb-va). For him, as for Thomas' followers, rhetoric is essentially a rational science, and is not really interested in analysing how a speech can yield emotional effects. But, as a matter of fact, his position on this point does not seem to be less waving than that expressed in the text he comments on. Sometimes Aristotle admits that the actual content (what Grimaldi calls *prāγma*) of a rhetorical argument is less
important than ϑήθος or πάθος (the two other sources of rhetorical arguments, or πίστεις), even though the leading role of the latter, as well as of style, is only an effect of the moral decay of the citizens (III, 1 1403b 31-35). As far as emotions are concerned, we can also notice that, while Giles assigns to them a minor role discussing the methodology of rhetoric (commenting on the first book), he devotes to them the second (and last) series of declarationes, or questions, at the outset of his exposition of the second book. The stress put on emotions in Giles' commentary is certainly a novelty in the sphere of the disciplines of language, and the subsequent commentator on Rhetoric discuss many questions about emotions. The approach to this new field appears to be rather traditional: following Aristotle, the commentators focus on the emotions in themselves rather than on the emotional effects of language. However, as Aristotle's discussion of the expressive function of language comes only in book 3, perhaps only a closer inspection of Giles' commentary on that book can change the impression that Aristotle's Rhetoric only renewed the interest in ethical and political subjects without stimulating a pragmatic approach to language.

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