Simon of Faversham Quaestiones super De motu animalium
A partial edition and doctrinal study
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1 Introduction

In chapters 3 and 4 (699a12–700a25) of De motu animalium Aristotle considers the principles of movement in the heavenly and sublunary spheres. This partial edition contains Simon of Faversham’s treatment of the relation between the outer sphere and the earth in his question commentary on De motu animalium. The introduction contains a doctrinal analysis of the edited text.

References to classical texts are abbreviated in accordance with Liddell, Scott, and Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon. The abbreviations used for medieval texts are easily identifiable in the bibliography. I adjust the orthography and punctuation in quotations from medieval and renaissance texts. References to Aristotle are made to the relevant editions of Aristoteles Latinus.

1.1 Text and tradition

1.1.1 Authorship, date and location

The text succeeds a question commentary on De somno et vigilia by Simon of Faversham and precedes questions to De longitudine vitae, De juventute and De respiratione which most likely are by Simon of Faversham too.¹ The commentary on De motu animalium has no ascription and seems to end abruptly after question 8,² but since the text is found among texts that are certainly or most likely written by Simon of Faversham, that is a very reasonable and common assumption.³

Simon of Faversham was probably born no later than 1260 and died in the summer of 1306.⁴ He is educated in Oxford, but taught in Paris during the 1280’s before returning to Oxford in 1289 at the latest to be named vice chancellor, and subsequently deacon at Oxford and rector in Preston near his home town

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¹ This order of texts is preserved in Merton 292 and to some extent in the manuscript from La Casa del Libro in Puerto Rico, see section 3.1 on page 117. On the questions on De somno et vigilia, see Ebbesen, "Introduction (Quaest. in De somno)", 93. The manuscript contains the following explicit after De respiratione: "Explicit quaeestiones de juventute et senectute, de inspiratione et respiratione disputate a Domino Symone de Faverisham" (f. 401va).
² De Leemans, "Commentaries on MA", 332 also mentions this.
⁴ About the life of Simon, see Ebbesen, "Introduction (Quaest. in SE)", 3–6; Longeway, Simon of Faversham, §1–2 and shorter Lohr, "Arist. Commentaries, Robertus – Wilgelmus", 141.
of Faversham. His œuvre mostly consists of commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus, and his commentaries on the *Organon*, *Physics*, *De anima*, *Meteologica* (exposition and questions) as well as *Parva naturalia*, and finally *De motu animalium* have come down to us. Besides that, he also treats Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, possibly *Liber de sex principiis*, and Priscian’s *Institutiones grammaticae*.⁵

Aside from references to Simon as ‘Simon Anglicus’ and even ‘magister Simon Anglicus Parisius’ in Parisian manuscripts, his stay in Paris is substantiated by parallels between his texts and the work of other Parisian masters, especially Peter of Auvergne and to some extent Giles of Rome.⁶ They were both masters at the Faculty of Arts during the 70’s and 80’s, although Giles of Rome was hit by Etienne Tempier’s famous condemnations and had a hiatus in his teaching activities in 1277–85. Simon is often considered to be rather fond of Albert the Great and to take a stand, either adaptive or hostile, towards the work of Thomas Aquinas.⁷

Simon arrived at Paris in the 70’s and taught at the Faculty of Arts, maybe until 1289. His question commentaries were probably written in this period, although some revision after his return to England is possible.⁸ In the present commentary we also find some indications of his presence in the Parisian environment: At several points the text corresponds closely with Peter of Auvergne’s commentary on *De caelo*, while a passage in question 4 seems to be inspired by Giles of Rome’s commentary on the *Physics*.⁹ It seems likely that the text was written in Paris during the 1270’s or 80’s, possibly with some changes after 1289.

The two witnesses to the text, Merton College 292 and the manuscript from La Casa del Libro, Puerto Rico (no shelfmark), are dated to the 14th century, so they cannot give us any clues to the date of a text.¹⁰ But it might be possible to specify the date somewhat. In question six Simon refers to Simplicius’ commentary on *De caelo* (l. 194). Moerbeke translated this commentary in June 1271, but it may not have been available to the Parisian masters before 1274. After the death of Thomas Aquinas in 1274, the Dominican General Chapter received a letter from the Parisian masters requesting some philosophical texts that Aquinas had promised to send them. Moerbeke’s translation of Simplicius’ commentary on

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⁵ Longeway, *Simon of Faversham*, §2; on the commentary on Priscian’s *Institutiones*, see Lewry, “Comm. of Simon and ms. Merton 288”.
⁷ See Ebbesen, "Introduction (Quaest. in SE)", 11 on Albert and Longeway, *Simon of Faversham*, §3 on Aquinas.
⁸ Ebbesen, "Introduction (Quaest. in De somno)", 93
⁹ On Peter of Auvergne, see section 1.1.2 on the next page, on Giles of Rome, see section 1.2.1 on page 101.
De caelo is mentioned, and that may indicate that they did not have access to it.\textsuperscript{11} If we assume that Simon, like Peter of Auvergne, used Moerbeke’s translation, 1274 would be a likely terminus post quem of Simon’s commentary. Unfortunately we have no texts on De caelo ascribed to Simon, but it might be gleaned from his questions to the Physics or Meteologica which translation he used. These texts have yet to be published and analyzed properly.

1.1.2 The context of the commentary

De motu animalium was practically unknown until around 1260 when Moerbeke translated the text. A single exception is Albert the Great who tracked down an anonymous translation that is the basis of his Liber de principiis motus processivi.\textsuperscript{12} In late antiquity and the Arabic commentary tradition De motu animalium is also practically unknown.\textsuperscript{13} As there was no pre-existing commentary tradition, late 13\textsuperscript{th} century commentaries had to base their treatment on that of related matters in texts that were already well known.

Simon’s commentary seems to be part of a larger family of commentaries to De motu animalium.\textsuperscript{14} The tradition consists of exposition as well as question commentaries. Peter of Auvergne’s exposition is transmitted in three redactions and seems to be the basis of all subsequent expositions of the text.\textsuperscript{15} When we turn to the question commentaries, Simon’s text is one of the more peculiar examples. It is, with its eight questions, significantly shorter than the remaining commentaries that contain 21 or 22 questions. Furthermore, it occasionally skips one or more questions that all the other commentaries contain.\textsuperscript{16} Based on an analysis of the list of questions in all the commentaries, it is tempting to assume two separate groups,\textsuperscript{17} but a preliminary analysis of one (practically) common question gives reason to doubt this superficial distinction into two disparate groups.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{11} Birkenmajer, Untersuchungen, 4 and 5–7. Galle ("Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on De Caelo in Context", 47*–48*) presents similar considerations in her dating of Peter of Auvergne’s commentary on De caelo.


\textsuperscript{13} About the Latin, Arabic and Greek tradition, see De Leemans, "Commentaries on MA", 274–76, De Leemans, "Secundum viam naturae et doctrinae", 197–206 and finally De Leemans, "Introduction", xvi–xxii

\textsuperscript{14} Pieter de Leemans presents all the witnesses to the medieval tradition in De Leemans, "Commentaries on MA".

\textsuperscript{15} De Leemans, "Commentaries on MA", 278–79.

\textsuperscript{16} See the table in De Leemans, "Commentaries on MA", 280.

\textsuperscript{17} De Leemans, "Commentaries on MA", 281–82.

\textsuperscript{18} Pieter De Leemans has undertaken such an analysis on the question 'Utrum intellectus sit
Meanwhile, a comparison of the present text with the questions in Merton College 275 (fols. 220ra–232vb + 233v, group 2B in De Leemans’ classification) reveals numerous remarkable correspondences. De Leemans has discussed whether the text might be ascribed to Peter of Auvergne.¹⁹ But he has let me know that there might be some doubt about the certainty of the ascription, and that it alternatively could be an adaptation of Peter’s exposition commentary into the format of a question commentary by an unknown author. So although there is a possibility that the author of the text in Merton 275 might be Peter, it is still uncertain, and I will refer to him as ‘Anonymus’.

The work of Simon and Anonymus correspond rather closely to each other in their structure and treatment of the material. Simon skips a few questions that Anonymus includes, but when the questions correspond, they generally contain the same material. On the other hand, one of the two frequently contains arguments that are not to be found in the other commentary.²⁰ In some passages the texts are almost verbatim identical, but usually they use individual expressions in a closely connected terminology. Anonymus is generally, and especially in questions 8 and 9 (Simon’s 4 and 5) significantly more verbose and explicit in his arguments than Simon. In general he also gives more references to authorities than Simon. To some degree we can recognize the same phenomenon in Jean of Jandun’s commentary (2A in De Leemans), but his commentary is generally more different from Simon and Anonymus and has long passages that we can recognize in neither of those.

These commentaries on De motu animalium also present some connection to Peter of Auvergne’s questions on De caelo. This might be expected if Peter’s exposition of De motu animalium actually is the basis of the subsequent expositions in the tradition. But the correspondences are occasionally rather close: Simon’s question 4 corresponds so closely with Peter’s question 10 to De caelo 2 that approximately two thirds of Simon’s question can be found in Peter’s, albeit the order of the exposition differs between the two texts. We note that the parts that Simon does not share with Peter’s De caelo commentary are not present in the corresponding question in Anonymus either. I will not attempt to draw any

¹⁹ See De Leemans, “Commentaries on MA”, 322–24 and especially De Leemans, “Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s MA”.

²⁰ To give some examples, Simon presents unique arguments from l. 55 to the end of the determination, from l. 80 to the following section, from l. 169 to l. 171 and finally from l. 177 to l. 187. On the other hand, the determination in Anonymus’ question 9 (Simon’s question 6) contains several smaller arguments and examples that are not to be found in Simon, while he actually also explains ad 1.2 where Simon remains silent.
conclusions about the relation between Anonymus and Peter on the basis on this one example, but it is none the less remarkable.²¹ A thorough investigation of the relationship between Peter’s questions to De caelo and his expositions of De motu animalium, and possibly Anonymus’s questions, is quite a different task, but I am confident that would present some interesting results and might even shed some light on the identity of Anonymus.

I have only tried to sketch the relations between Simon, Anonymus, and Peter’s questions on De caelo, since a general analysis presupposes an investigation of the whole tradition. But Simon’s questions are certainly part of a larger group of commentaries that seem to be rather closely connected, while further doctrinal studies of the texts might be able to determine some of their more intricate connections.

1.2  Doctrine
1.2.1  Question 4: The location and rotation of the heaven

Here we will focus on the location of the heaven and in what sense it rotates around its centre.²² The question springs from the problem raised by Aristotle of the relation between the movement of animals on the surface of the earth and the revolution of the heaven around it.²³

We will investigate the problem in Aristotle, Averroes, and Aquinas to see where Simon stands on the question. We can then see whether either Albert the Great or Giles of Rome might have inspired Simon in some of the considerations that can be found in neither the Anonymous from Merton 275 nor Jean of Jandun’s commentaries.

Simon ends his fourth question by concluding that the heaven is dependent on something else in its rotation, but only in a certain sense. He argues that (1) all movement is movement in relation to something, and that (2) the outer sphere is the first entity that is moved, and that it therefore must move in relation to the first thing at rest (primo quiescens et immobile, l. 46). The earth is the first thing at rest, and therefore the outer sphere must depend on the earth in its rotation. He modifies this by stating that a rotating sphere by its very definition has an unmoved centre around which it rotates, and that the earth has its natural place in the centre of the universe.

²¹ For some correspondences between Simon and Peter’s questions to De caelo, see Simon Q.4 and Peter II.9 and II.10; Simon Q.5 and Peter II.10 and II.39, Simon Q.6 and Peter II.10, II.18 and II.40, which only have minor correspondences in each question.

²² The term ‘heaven’ refers to the outer sphere of the universe, while ‘heavens’ refers to the whole supralunar universe.

²³ Arist. MA 1.698a1–3.699a14. According to Trifogli (Oxford physics in the 13th cent., 187) this is a common medieval problem when Physics-commentaries discuss the concept of locus, place.
In *Physics* IV.5 Aristotle discusses the consequences of his definition of place (τόπος, *locus*). If something is completely contained by something else, it is in a place, *in loco*. But this place cannot be in motion.²⁴ This creates the problem that the outer sphere of the heaven is not surrounded by anything, while it moves, causes movement, and functions as the absolute place of all other physical bodies. The problem arises from the definition of place and movement, since both require something in relation to which something is either in a place or in movement.²⁵

Averroes confronts this problem and asks whether the outer sphere of the fixed stars is *in loco* and how it is moved.²⁶ Apart from his own solution, he also presents five previous solutions to the problem (by Philoponus, Themistius, Avempace, Avicenna and Alexander of Aphrodisias). He maintains that the outer material sphere is locally immovable because the centre of the universe, i.e. the earth, is essentially immovable. But the sphere moves in an incessant rotation, although there is nothing outside it in relation to which it can move. So while any other material being essentially has a location as an effect of being contained by the outer sphere, the sphere itself only has an accidental location by proxy of its essential centre.²⁷ Averroes repeats this idea that the heaven only moves in relation to its centre, occasionally with reference to *De motu animalium*.²⁸ Albert the Great presents a loyal restatement of Averroes’ discussion and solution to the problem.²⁹

According to Aristotle, some things, for instance the heaven and the soul, are only located accidentally.³⁰ But Averroes’ analysis of the accidental location differs from Aristotle’s: The elements of the outer sphere have a location by their partial reciprocal contact, although the material of the outer sphere is not encompassed by anything on the side that makes up the very limit of the sphere.³¹ They move in a constant circular motion and are the very outer elements existing *in loco*. The heaven itself is not a *locus* but rather the limit that defines and “touches”

²⁵ According to Ross (“Introduction to *Phys.*”, 57–8) these problems are caused by a alternation between absolute and relative location in Aristotle. Morison (*On location*, 155–61, 169–71) argues that there is no such distinction in Aristotle because everything has a location by virtue of the immovable nature of the universe. This interpretation is dismissed by Bostock, *Space, time, matter, and form*, 128–34.
²⁶ Aver. *In phys.* iv c. 43, f. 141–43.
²⁷ Aver. *In phys.* iv c. 43, f. 142H
²⁸ Aver. *In Cael.* i c. 97, f. 65K, II. c. 17, f. 107B; viii c. 84, f. 432F; c. 55, f. 197A. De Leemans (“Secundum viam naturae et doctrinae”, 199–200) lists some further passages where Averroes refers to *De motu animalium*.
³¹ Cf. Hussey, “Notes”, 120.
the moved elements without itself being in movement (Phys. iv 5.212b18–21).³² Both locus and allcubi (τόπος and που) exist, but in the same manner as the limit of a physical being. As mentioned, Averroes on the other hand maintains that the heaven has a constant but accidental location because of the immobility of its centre.

Aquinas rejects Averroes’s solution (and thereby tacitly Albert’s) in his treatment of the Aristotelian passage. He explicitly supports Themistius’ assumption, that the heavenly sphere is only moved in the sense that its elements are in motion.³³ According to him, the accidental location of the heaven is in conflict with Aristotle’s previous definition of accidental location and movement.³⁴ He supports Themistius’ solution by reference to book 6 of Physics, but unlike Averroes and Albert he takes the movement of a circle and that of the heaven to be similar in that they are moved only in relation to their parts (secundum partes) without being moved as a whole (secundum totem).³⁵ Thus when Aristotle says that the accidental location of the heaven is caused by the internal relations of the elements in the outer sphere, it fits seamlessly with Aquinas’ interpretation of the heaven’s location secundum partes.³⁶

Simon acknowledges that his solution is taken from Averroes. He defines movement as a change over time: When something at time \(T_2\) is different from how it was at a previous time \(T_1\), then a movement has taken place.³⁷ But this change requires something in relation to which the moved can be different (ll. 25–27). In the case of the heaven, this something is the earth, since the heaven rotates around it. Since it moves with the earth as its immovable centre, the earth has to be considered the place (locus, l. 55) of the heaven.³⁸

Averroes divides moved bodies into those that essentially are in a place by being encompassed by another (immovable) body, and those that are in a place accidentally by not being contained by an immovable body.³⁹ The four sublun-
ary elements belong to the first group, while the heavenly bodies by their spher-
ical nature belong to the second group.⁴⁰ This seems to be the basis of Simon’s
distinction between the bodies that have a *locus proprie* by being encompassed
by another body, and those that do not have a *locus proprie* because they move
around an immovable centre. So the spheres never change the distance to their
natural and necessary centre but orbit around it (ll. 55–62).

Although Simon seems to get elements of his solution from Averroes, he
never mentions the accidental location of the heavenly sphere and the essen-
tial location of the earth. This plays none the less a central role in Averroes
and to some extent in Albert the Great. Compared to Averroes, Albert spends
more energy on explaining the connection to the passage in book 6 of *Physics* (vi
9.240a29–b7) where Aristotle says that a circulating sphere is only accidentally
at rest. Albert takes this to mean that the sphere is moved “secundum totum,
secundum formam, et non secundum subiectum”.⁴¹ Albert’s explanation of the
change in the relation of the elements of the inside of the heavenly sphere and the
surface of the earth might form the basis of Simon’s explanation of how different
parts of the heaven relate to (*respiciunt*) different parts of the earth (ll. 68–71).⁴²
But the language used by Simon bears a conspicuous resemblance to a passage
on book 4 of *Physics* by Giles of Rome.⁴³

Actually, Simon’s rather short text contains several striking resemblances to
Giles’ commentary.⁴⁴ Although there is no clear match between the structure of
their arguments, material, or problems, the doctrinal correspondence is gener-
ally rather close when Giles and Simon address the same themes and are easily
comparable. There are even some examples of a strong similarity in phrasing.
Besides the above-mentioned passage, I would point to the following conclusion
to Giles’ fourth *dubium*:

> Si enim poneremus caelum nullo modo esse in loco, ut posuit Alex-
> ander, vel si poneremus ipsum esse in loco solum secundum partes,
> ut posuit Themistius, vel si diceremus ipsum esse in loco ratione
> superficiei ultimae, ut quidam alii posuerunt, numquam per motum
> eius mutaret locum. Sed si ponimus ipsum esse in loco per com-
> parationem ad centrum vel per comparationem ad terram, cum
totum caelum semper respiciat eandem terram, partes vero caeli

⁴⁰ Aver. *In phys.* iv c. 43, ff. 142M-43A.
> idem sit subiecto, tamen formaliter variatur.”
non semper respicient easdem partes terrae, salvabimus in caelo quod per eius motum mutet locum, et salvabimus quod quantum ad eius partes mutet locum secundum substantiam.

Aeg. Rom. In Phys. iv lec. 8, dub. 4, f. 74rb

Giles refers to Alexander, Themistius and ‘quidam alii’ who seem to represent the standard arguments discussed in the tradition, and if we turn to Averroes, Albert, and Aquinas, we see that they those discuss same problems. But the similarity in phrasing in Giles and the related passage in Simon is striking (see ll. 63–72).

It is still unclear quite what it means when, in the same passage, Simon says: “ideo dicitur quod caelum secundum partes mutat locum secundum subiectum, quia in illo ubi est modo una pars in quo prius fuit altera.” (ll. 71–72). At first sight this might seem to conflict with the fact that the heaven does not move “secundum subiectum” but “secundum formam et dispositionem tantum” (above, ll. 68–71). He cannot conclude the question by accepting that the heaven only moves because the parts move, since that is the position ascribed to Themistius that he wants to refute. A comparison with Jean of Jandun’s corresponding passage indicates that Simon’s passage is best understood as two separate statements: When we consider the heaven as a whole, it only moves its complete disposition without altering its relation and distance to the earth (ll. 68–71).46 But if we consider each part of the heaven in relation to the earth, they change their place in both form and subject (secundum formam et subiectum).47

The use of subiectum might seem a bit opaque, but it certainly stems from Averroes’ treatment. In a refutation of Themistius’ assumption that the heaven as a whole has a place because of the place of the parts, he states that the whole is nothing but the sum of the parts. This means that the rotation of all the parts entails a rotation of the whole heavenly sphere. By referring to the passage in Physics 6 concerning the rotation of a sphere, he maintains that the sphere is in

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45 That the heavens are at a place by the surface of the outer sphere (superficiei) is ascribed to Gilbert of Poirré (see Anon. Lib. sex princ. §55) by Albert (In Phys. iv tr. I, c. 13, p. 270a). Those same commentators and arguments are at the heart of the discussion in the English tradition too, see Trifogli, Oxford physics in the 13th cent. 186–202
46 Giles adds that “totum ergo caelum semper respicit totam terram”, Aeg. Rom. In Phys. iv l. VIII, dub. 2, f. 73vb
47 Joh. Jand. In MA q. VI, f. 65vb. He writes: “Unde sicut caelum est primo motu, illud fixum, quod requirit in motu suo, est primo fixum, et est causa fixionis omnibus aliis. Istud autem est terra, respectu cuius caelum motum alter se habet nunc et prius, unde caelum secundum se totum alter se habet respectu terrae, quantum ad dispositionem, non secundum subiectum, sed partes ejus alter se habent respectu terrae et secundum subiectum et quantum ad dispositionem, ut dicit Commentator quarto Physicorum.”
movement both in relation to the parts and the whole.⁴⁸ The Aristotelian passage from book six reads as follows in Michael Scotus’ translation:

Ad hoc autem dicamus primo quoniam partes non retinent eundem locum aliquo tempore omnino, deinde totum etiam transfertur semper ad aliud ab eo in quo erat. Arcus enim qui accipitur, cuius principium est a puncto A, non est idem cum arcu cuius principium est a puncto B, aut a puncto C, aut ab aliquo aliorum punctorum, nisi sicut musicus et homo sunt homo, quia accidit ei. Unde necesse est ut unus eorum arcurum transferatur alter ad alterum semper, et numquam quiescat.⁴⁹

Averroes says that if we imagine a circle with an arbitrary number of points (see fig. 1), each sequence of dots (e.g. ABCA, BCAB, and CABC) represents a separate circle, and the rotation of the circle would result in a transference of the points of each circle, which he terms to be a change secundum formam although there is no change in the circle’s “matter” (secundum materiam). These circles are only identical in the same way as ‘man’ and ‘musical’ are identical, that is by being ascribed to the same subject (the circle, sphere or musical man). But such an identity is only accidental, while true identity is defined as formal identity. Thus the circles are only identical by being plotted on the same underlying circle, but are formally different by having different starting points.⁵⁰

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⁴⁸ Aver. In phys. iv c. 43, f. 141II.
whole of the celestial sphere is moved by the transposition of the different points in the whole disposition, while the parts are moved both secundum formam and secundum subiectum, which must mean that they change their location on the sphere compared to a previous time instance (their form) and hence that they change the part of the sphere which they concern (their subject), as both Simon and Giles of Rome put it (respiciunt).

In sum Simon’s basic argument on the simultaneous rest and movement of the heavenly sphere has its ultimate source in Averroes. It also seems that Simon finds most of the material for his analysis in Averroes, although he avoids discussing the accidental place of the heaven and essential place of the earth. It is not possible to determine the exact relationship between Giles of Rome and Simon’s commentaries, but in this case Simon is more explicit and verbose than the Anonymous in Merton 275, while he also has the noted correspondences with Giles of Rome. It is thus possible that besides using Averroes (maybe through Albert) that he also glanced at Giles’ commentary on Physics.

1.2.2 Quaestio 5: Immobility of heaven and earth

In question 4 Simon shows that the heaven is independent of any fixed point, but only in the sense that a rotating sphere by definition rotates around its centre, and that earth is located at the centre of the universe and makes up the fixed point of the heaven. In question 5 he focuses on the immobility of heaven and earth in a discussion of whether the fixation of heaven is triggered by the immobility of the earth. The question is an expanded answer to the second ratio principalis of the previous question that claims a proportionality between the movement of animals and the celestial spheres. Simon concludes that the immobility of earth follows from the immobility of the heaven. Behind Simon’s discussion we can glimpse a conflict between a rather radical solution by Averroes and a more approachable alternative by Albert. Before presenting this, we will briefly sum up Simon’s arguments and the basis in the Aristotelian text.

Aristotle presents a preliminary definition of heavy and light in De caelo. Bodies that move toward or away from the centre should be considered heavy and light respectively. The heavier a body is, the stronger its tendency to move towards the centre is, while correspondingly the lightness of a body determines its tendency to move away from the centre. In book 4 of De caelo Aristotle states

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51 See the quote of Giles on page 100 and line 71 in the edition. This distinction is also reflected in Averroes’s later conclusion in Aver. In phys. iv c. 43, ff. 142H and is repeated by Albert, In Phys. iv tr. I, cap. 13, p. 268a.


53 Cael. i 3 269b23–26.
that earth and fire are absolutely heavy and light.⁵⁴ Because of this, earth necessarily moves as close as possible to the centre, its natural place. Movement is considered natural when it is caused by a body that is not at its natural place and is not hindered in its movement towards that place.⁵⁵ The centre is considered the direct opposition to the outer limit of the universe and constitutes an inner boundary of how far a body can move away from the outer limit.⁵⁶ Therefore, it is also rather the centre of the whole universe than the centre of the earth that defines the natural place of the earth.⁵⁷

Simon establishes a distinction (ll. 108–109) between the earth’s movement towards and rest at the centre and its immobility from the centre, and we recognize a less clear cut version of this distinction in Aristotle.⁵⁸ He can therefore first conclude that since the place of the earth is caused by its gravity,⁵⁹ and since everything inside the heaven is caused by it, that also the earth’s gravity, and hence its location, must be caused by the heaven. He can further conclude that if the earth is located at the centre of the universe, and that centre is immobile, so must the place of the earth be. The immobility of the heaven is caused by the immobility of the prime mover (ll. 126–130). When the immobility of the universe is caused by the prime mover, the location of the earth is caused by the definition of gravitas, and the location of the earth is a consequence of the definition of centre, it is easy for Simon to disprove the first ratio principalis that claims that the earth is the first immovable thing in the universe (ll. 132–140).

Albert the Great and Averroes understand this question in two fundamentally different ways.⁶⁰ They agree that the gravity of the earth defines the centre as its natural place.⁶¹ Albert calls gravity the earth’s forma generis, and the centre of the universe realizes this form as the efficient cause by being defined as the place furthest away from the outer sphere. The great distance to the first movement of the outer sphere causes a condensation of matter in a cold, immovable and heavy state. The distance of the earth further from and lack of participation

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⁵⁴ Cael. iv 4.311a18–b29.
⁵⁵ In Phys. viii 4.255b11–16 he says that this is the definition of lightness and gravity (i.e. heaviness). As the limit of a movement as the form of the moved body, see Gill, "Aristotle on Self-Motion", 260–61 and Duhem, Le Système du monde I, 208–9.
⁵⁶ Preliminarily defined in Cael. 1 6.273a8–12, and more thoroughly in IV.4.311b29–312a6. About the centre and outer limit as the poles within which all movement exists, see Cael. 1 8.277a20–23 and Cael. iv 3.310b7–11, cf. Phys. iv 4.212.a24–28.
in the nobility of the prime mover is defined as its final cause: The purpose of the existence of the earth is to be the element furthest away from the prime mover.⁶²

Albert does not mention his disagreement with Averroes, who does not consider the gravity and geometrical definition of the centre of the sphere sufficient. Averroes defines a final and formal cause for the place of the earth and especially its immobility. Referring to De motu animalium he explains the final cause and refers to his own discussion of the movement of the heaven around the earth (described on pages 98–99). Neither humans nor other animals are able to move the earth from the centre since it requires a power greater than the one keeping it fixed at the centre. And when something supports itself on or moves around an immovable fixed point, that fixed point must be stronger in its immobility than the thing supporting itself on or revolving around it.⁶³ Heaven and earth are characterized by such a balance of power, and the necessity of this power balance is the final cause of the immobility of the earth.⁶⁴

Furthermore, Averroes argues that the geometrical centre of the sphere only accidentally causes the immobility of the earth. The centre is only relevant to the movement of earth and fire because of the definition of gravity, while the concept of centre is only relevant to a rotating body. The centre can on its own only be considered a remote cause that rather maintains than causes the immobility of the earth.⁶⁵

But what is that supposed to mean? The rotation of the sphere must necessarily have a centre of rotation, and therefore the rotation itself realizes its own pivotal point by its rotation and in this way acts as a causa agens. The immobility of the earth is not caused by this centre but rather by earth being absolutely heavy, which is defined as the strongest possible tendency towards the centre. As an effect of its own form the earth is essentially kept at the centre that arises from the rotation of the outer sphere.⁶⁶ In this way the centre is the accidental rather than efficient cause of the immobility of the earth. The final cause of this form is the rotating sphere’s need of a pivotal point. Averroes must therefore mean that the immobility of the heaven in one sense is caused by the immobility of the earth, since the heaven needs this immovable fixed point in its rotation. In another sense this fixed point only exists by virtue of the rotation of the sphere.

Simon rejects Averroes’ argument (ll. 148–149), but the arguments he refers

⁶³ Arist. MA 2.698b10–21.
⁶⁴ The same reference to De motu animalium and a similar rationale are to be found at Aver. In Cael. II c. 17, f. 107B–D that concerns Arist. Cael. II.3. But there he only says that the earth is moved naturally to the centre.
⁶⁵ Aver. In Cael. II. c. 102, f. 165B–D.
⁶⁶ Aver. In Phys. IV, c. 43, f. 142G.
to are the ones that he has just used in the previous question to explain in what sense the heaven moves in relation to a fixed point. His simple denial of their validity or strength is therefore surprising. But as we can see from Simon’s answer to the first ratio principalis of question 4, as well as the solution in question 5, he cannot accept that the place, immobility, and rotation of the heaven is dependent on the earth to the extent that Averroes seems to assume. In both cases he does this by reference to the prime mover being the first cause (ll. 76–87 og ll. 126–130).

In this fifth question Simon rather seems to follow Albert the Great than Averroes: We cannot allow the place of the earth in the centre to establish the fixation of the heaven, for this would entail an undesirable dependency. The place of the earth is therefore rather caused by its form, i.e. its gravity, which springs from the relationship between up and down, centre and periphery, and ultimately the heaven as cause of everything within it.

1.2.3 Question 6: The relative strength of heaven and earth

I question 6 Simon concentrates on a problem that follows naturally from the previous question, while it also relates to a problem in De motu animalium. The distance between heaven and earth is fixed, but the question about the fixation of the heaven gave rise to the problem whether earth causes or follows from this fixed periferal distance. The question whether the earth has more strength in its immobility than the heaven in its rotation is correlated to these causal relations. According to Aristotle, the earth would have to be stronger in its immobility than the heaven in its rotation if it caused this rotation of the heaven, otherwise the heaven would be able to move the earth from its place.⁶⁷

In this section we will present Simon’s and Aristotle’s arguments for the immateriality of the unmoved mover since it lies at the foundation of Simons general argument. Before discussing two of his primary sources, Averroes and Simplicius, we should address the extent of neo-Platonic doctrine in the question, and finally we can have a look at Aquinas and Albert the Great’s alternative solutions, compared to Simon.

The determination consists of two sections: First Simon describes the unmoved mover, and then he is able to determine the relative strength of the movement of the heaven and immobility of the earth. His characterization of the unmoved mover consists of two general arguments: (1) The unmoved mover is immaterial and of infinite power, and (2) he moves everything by being loved and desired. The argument for the unmoved mover’s immateriality is based on (1a) the assumption of an unmoved mover for the eternal movement of the heaven,

and (1b) that if the mover establishes the substance of every being ex nihilo, he must be of infinite power.⁶⁸ It poses no problem to Simon to consider the prime mover as efficient cause and creator. But the creation of being from nothing requires an unlimited power, and the creator can therefore not be either material or a property of a material body.

The requirement of an eternal mover is an integrated part of Aristotle’s own argument,⁶⁹ and Simon seems to lift his argument right from the end of *Metaphysics* 8, although with a phrasing much like Averroes’s.⁷⁰ But Simon is clearer in his characterization of the prime mover as an efficient cause than Aristotle. This is partly because Aristotle does not have the same notion of creation, since his universe is eternal and not created,⁷¹ and partly because the prime mover in *Metaphysics* primarily is described as the final cause of all movement,⁷² whereas there is no place where he also unambiguously characterizes the prime mover as efficient cause.⁷³ Ross notices that the unmoved mover is efficient cause by being the final cause.⁷⁴ Although the matter is disputed in Aristotle, it is already a well know interpretation to consider the unmoved mover the efficient cause at the time of Alexander, and in the medieval tradition it is the standard interpretation.⁷⁵

Question 6 shares some doctrine with the neo-Platonic tradition, especially in the passage where Simon explains the unmoved mover’s influence on the material universe (ll. 188–204). He refers to the prime mover as the “causa productiva omnium” (ll. 199–200), and looking at the movement of the heaven and the prime mover, we recognize the idea that the heavens are moved by a longing

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⁷³ Graham ("Commentary", 179). He refers to Simplicius (In *Phys.* 1360.24–1363.24) who argues that the prime mover is the efficient cause in agreement with Ammonius (1363.8–12), Alexander and "οἱ άλλοι τινες τῶν Περιπατητικῶν" (1362.11), cf. In *Cael.* 1 9.277b9, 271 as well.
⁷⁴ Genequand ("Introduction", 36–7) presents this problem in the Arabic tradition, especially Averroes.

For examples in the medieval tradition, see Aquin. *In Phys.* vii I. II, sec. 4, 1, XXI, sec. 10 (philosophical) and ST t q. 44 (theological), Alb. Magn. *De caus.* t tr. 1, cap. 9, Petr. Alv. *In Cael.* 1 q. 18 og q. 27.
(appetitum) for similarity with the boundless perfection of the prime mover.\textsuperscript{76} Simon splits this imitation into two stages: There is a need of a mediating mover between the absolutely infinite \textit{primus motor} and the bodily substances. Simon ascribes the doctrine to Averroes, but the same idea can be recognized in \textit{Liber de causis}: There has to be a middle term of infinite substance but finite activity between the two beings whose substance as well as activity are finite and infinite, respectively.\textsuperscript{77}

Besides this passage there are no other clear doctrinal correspondences between Simon’s three questions and \textit{Liber de causis}, and in his description of the two movers, Simon’s language has more in common with Peter of Auvergne than \textit{Liber de causis}.\textsuperscript{76} Aside from these minor doctrinal similarities there are no other clear traces of neo-Platonic material in Simon’s commentary, so after all the neo-Platonic influence on this treatment of Simon’s is rather modest.

Simon quotes Aristotle, Averroes and Simplicius as the philosophical sources of his argument on the movement of the heavens and the activity of the unmoved mover. So an introduction to the relation between mover and moved in those two will throw some light on Simon’s argument.

When it has been established that the unmoved mover is immaterial, he obviously cannot cause the movement of the heaven by a physical contact. We know from Aristotle that the objects of thought and desire move without any physical contact, and this desire drives the outer sphere into motion while all other celestial bodies move in imitation of the movement of the outer sphere.\textsuperscript{79} When a longing causes the movement of the celestial bodies, it is natural to assume some degree of animation of the spheres.\textsuperscript{80} Averroes argues that the soul of the spheres only consists of intellect and longing which, in their case, coincide because their longing is intellectual rather than sensual. But the spheres cannot imitate the prime mover by being unmoved, so instead they approach the perfection of the first mover by the most elevated and sublime activity, the eternal circular motion.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{76} See Genequand, "Introduction", 39 for an outline of the idea of movement as an \textit{imitatio Dei} from Plato’s \textit{Theaetetus} (Tht. 176b) through Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, to reach it’s epitome in Plotinus’, and Proclus’ neo-Platonism.


\textsuperscript{78} Petr. Alv. \textit{In Cael.} ii q. 18, cf. II, q. 16 and I, q. 27 ad. 2.

\textsuperscript{79} Arist. \textit{Metaph.} xii 7.1072a26–27. Ross ("Introduction to \textit{Metaph.}", cliii) notices that Aristotle never successfully proves that an immaterial passion can cause a physical movement.

\textsuperscript{80} Arist. \textit{Metaph.} xii 8.1073a24–b1.

Averroes distinguishes between substantial, qualitative and local change, and a change in one of these categories does not necessarily imply the others. Thus the outer sphere can be changeable in respect of place, but not in respect of substance.⁸² In this way the spheres can act as intermediaries between the fully immutable prime mover and the bodies that are subject to coming to be and passing away. The celestial spheres all seem to be moved in successive order by the prime mover and more directly by their respective surrounding spheres.⁸³ The elliptical orbit of the sun finally creates variations in the four sublunary elements that result in generation and destruction on earth.⁸⁴

In a similar way, Simplicius rejects the statement by Alexander that the prime mover can cause the motions of all the spheres, since there is nothing to prevent several spheres from longing for the same substance.⁸⁵ According to Simplicius, the prime mover only causes the simple and stable movement of the outer sphere, while the unstable movements of all the subsequent spheres are caused by different, but eternal, substances. He supports this assumption with the passage from *Metaphysics* about the necessity of a host of unmoved movers causing the movements of the lower spheres. In this way only the outer sphere has the prime mover as its direct cause while the lower spheres have their own movers.⁸⁶

We also find this idea of an intermediary mover causing the movements of the lower spheres in Simon, and he expresses it succinctly when he says that if something is moved “in ratione amati et desiderati” (the outer sphere), then something also has to be moved “in ratione amantis et desiderantis” (the lower spheres).⁸⁷ That the prime mover moves the outer sphere exclusively is presented in Simplicius as an alternative to Alexander’s interpretation of the prime mover’s effect on the whole celestial system. Averroes seems to develop this concept by creating a certain symmetry: The outer sphere stands in the same relation to the prime mover as the sphere just below the outer sphere stands to that one and so forth.

In opposition to this, Albert and Thomas take Alexander’s position, albeit without any acknowledgement of their inspiration. Albert stresses that everything that is moved longs for the first cause. He expands and emphasizes the pervasive influence of the first cause in an extended explication of its role as

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⁸³ *Aver.* In *Metaph.* xii c. 38, f. 321B–D.


⁸⁵ *Aver.* In *Metaph.* xii c. 38, f. 321B–D.

⁸⁷ See l. 192–194.
a Platonic highest good.⁸⁸ We cannot find this in Thomas, who instead distances himself from the idea of a chain of causes where a separate intelligence realizes the outer sphere, which then realizes its own celestial body, which then again realizes yet another intelligence in an unbroken sequence from the first cause down to the moon. He attributes the assumption of this chain of efficient causes to Avicenna. Like Alexander (as expounded by Simplicius), Thomas does not see any problem in a single substance causing several separate substances, since the causality is not based on substantial but rather intelligible being.⁸⁹

Simon concludes his determination by considering the place of the earth in its immobility. What seems to be a simple repetition of the argument of the immobility of the earth from question 5 is in a sense very natural. He concludes question 5 by supporting the immobility of the earth through reference to the immobility of the prime mover. When in question 6 he has explained movers and movement in the celestial regions, he can return to the place of the earth. As previously explained (ll. 113–114), the earth moves towards the centre by virtue of its gravity, which is caused by the mover and movement of the heaven just as a *causa aequivoca*. The cause is equivocal because it does not belong to the same *species* and does not have the same definition as the effect, but it does precede and cause the effect. He must have the same argument in mind as above (ll. 114–116), that everything within the heaven is caused by it and therefore ultimately by the unmoved mover.⁹⁰

He finally focuses on the immobility of the earth that is defined by the privation of movement (ll. 226–229).⁹¹ But as this privation must be considered a negative property or cause, the immobility of the earth is rather caused by the absence of a moving cause than the presence of a retaining or fixing cause. The immobility of the first mover is here the ultimate cause (ll. 233–239). Thus he can conclude question 6 by emphasizing the infinite character of the prime mover relative to the finite character of the earth: It has its place at the centre by the absence of movement (which barely can be considered a *virtus*), while the unmoved mover not only causes the movement of the heaven, but the existence

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⁹⁰ I have not been able to find parallels where the unmoved mover is taken to cause the gravity of the earth in the same way as an equivocal cause. On the unmoved mover as equivocal cause of being and the universe in Aristotle, see Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle" and Patzig, "Theology and Ontology in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*". On logical equivocation and analogy in the 13th century, see Ashworth, "A Thirteenth-Century Interpretation of Aristotle on Equivocation and Analogy".
of all beings, and hence the superiority confirms the relative strength between heaven and earth.

1.3 Conclusion

This edition presents three questions by Simon in which the relative strength of the prime mover, the moved heaven and the immovable earth are up for examination. The rotation of the heaven establishes the centre of the world as the immovable centre of the rotating sphere. The earth is, by virtue of its form, located at this centre because this ultimate ‘down’ of the universe is the natural place of heavy bodies. The combination of the necessary centre of the rotating sphere and the essential character of the earth establishes the immobility of the earth, while the metaphysical priority of the heaven relative to the earth can be maintained.

Simon prefers using well established authorities, most notably Averroes and to some extent the late antique commentators. Simon acknowledges Averroes as the *Commentator* and generally builds on Averroes’ solutions. On the other hand, Simon does not mention authorities such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, but we often sense the contours of their respective positions in Simon’s problems and discussions.
2 Bibliography

2.1 Manuscripts

La Casa del Libro (no shelfmark), San Juan, Puerto Rico, ff. 332ra–334vb.
Merton College Library 275, Bodleian Library, Oxford, ff. 223r–226v.

2.2 Editions


— *Opera omnia*. Vol. 10: *Liber de causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*. Ed. by A. Borgnet. Vives, 1890.


Giles of Rome. *In libros de physico auditu Aristotelis commentaria.* Venice, 1502.


### 2.3 Secondary literature


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3 Edition

3.1 Manuscripts

Simon’s commentary is preserved in two manuscripts:

**P**  San Juan, Puerto Rico, La Casa del Libro, no shelfmark (ca. 1380), ff. 332ra–334vb.⁹² The text is fragmentary, and lacks the first two and the beginning of the third question. It is not possible to determine the manuscript’s geographical origin conclusively by palaeographical analysis, but it is written in either Paris or Oxford. The current codex only contains 52 folios (with some loose leaves) which have a medieval foliation that ends at to 337.⁹³ From Lohr’s references to the codex, it can be gathered that the preserved remains might contain works solely by Simon of Faversham.⁹⁴ The text of my partial edition is preserved on folios 332ra–33rb.

**M**  Oxford, Merton College 292, ff. 393v-396v (beg. 14ᵗʰ cent.). This English codex contains seven philosophical booklets gathered during the 14ᵗʰ century. The last booklet contains Simon’s commentary on the *Parva Naturalia* consisting of questions on *De somno et vigilia, De motu animalium, De longitudine et brevitate vitae, De iuventute et senectute*, and *De respiratione*.⁹⁵ Besides Simon of Faversham, the codex contains works by Duns Scotus, John Sackville, Robert Kilwardby, Robert Grosseteste, and Albert the Great.⁹⁶ The text of my partial edition is preserved on folios 395ra–96ra.

My collation reveals that P generally presents a better text than M. The two witnesses differ in 106 cases (excluding errors corrected by the scribes), and of those 52 influence the meaning of the text, but in only 12 cases does M have

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⁹³ These notes are based on a thorough palaeographical and codicological analysis of the codex performed by Ms Karen Cana-Cruz, the executive director at La Casa del Libros, who sent them to me in a private correspondence.

⁹⁴ A fragment of questions on *De generatione et corruptione* (ff. 226r–v, 268r–69v, one loose leaf) is anonymous and only preserved in P, so we cannot ascribe it to Simon with certainty. Lohr does not hesitate to ascribe the remaining texts to Simon (Lohr, "Arist. Commentaries, Robertus – Wilgelmus", 143–45). They contain questions on *Physics* (ff. 2r–24v, 48r–60v), *recolleciones* on *Meteora*, questions on *De anima, De somno et vigilia* (all loose leaves), *De motu animalium* (ff. 332ra–34vb), *De longitudine et brevitate vitae* (ff. 334vb–37rb), and *De iuventute et senectute* (ff. 337rb–vb). All the texts are fragmentary.

⁹⁵ For an edition of his questions on *De somno et vigilia* and *De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, see Simon of Faversham, "Quaestiones super librum De somno et vigilia. An Edition" and Ebbesen, "Gerontobiologiens grundproblemer" (partial).

⁹⁶ For a description of the manuscript, see Thomson, *Catalogue*, 226–27.
a superior reading. M contains some minor lacunae where only P supplies us with the text.⁹⁷ In general, the scribe of M makes some errors of carelessness, but they are of little consequence since there can be no doubt about the correct readings.⁹⁸ P makes none none of these errors, and the scribe is thorough in spotting and correcting his own errors during transcription. There are also some examples where M’s text is intelligible, but P is more explicit.⁹⁹ Finally, some common errors make it highly probable that the two manuscripts descend from a common ancestor,¹⁰⁰ but they are most likely not copied from the same source since P’s questions on De longitudine et brevitate vitae that follow the questions on De motu animalium lack the first four questions of M.

3.2 Ratio edendi

The edition is based on P, preferring M when it presents better readings. I occasionally emend the text when neither of the manuscripts present an acceptable reading, and when at a loss I resort to obeli. I have imposed my own punctuation, paragraphing and orthography. The spelling is normalized to classical orthography, mostly in accordance with Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary. The section headings and numberings are metatext added by me and do not occur in the manuscripts. The manuscripts make abundant use of abbreviations, but they have only warranted a mention when their resolution is problematic. M was transcribed from a high quality microfilm reproduction, and P from digital color photographs of a very high quality. Both reproductions leave no doubt of how the manuscripts look like. I refer to the original foliation of both manuscripts. The apparatus fontium contains my suggestions concerning all explicit and a few implicit references to authorities. All references are to the editions listed in the bibliography on page 112.

3.3 Acknowledgements

I owe Prof. Dr Sten Ebbesen much gratitude for encouraging me to work with Simon’s text and especially for his reliable assistance with problematic passages and generous advice on the analysis and publication of medieval texts. I am also especially grateful to La Casa del Libro for providing me with a beautiful digital reproduction of their manuscript, P, the superior witness to the text. In particular, I have to thank the executive director, Ms Karen Cana-Cruz, for her thorough analysis of the codex and her patient helpfulness.

⁹⁸ Lines 32, 72, 96, 129, 184, 229, and 241.
⁹⁹ Lines 8, 120, 123, 143, and 158–159.
¹⁰⁰ Lines 10, 235, and possibly 37.
3.4 Sigla

M  codex 292 Collegii Mertonensis Oxoniae.
P  codex sine numero in *Casa del libro*, San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Ioan.  Ioannis Gandavensis *Quaestiones super Parva Naturalia*, Venetiis 1607.

<album>  album *addendum censeo*.
[album]  album *delendum censeo*.
†album ac†  verba album ac *corrumpa esse videntur*.
«album»  album, *iam deperditum vel invisibile, in codice integro extitisse puto*.
a.c.  *ante correcturam*.
cf.  *confer*.
l.  *linea*.
s.l.  *supra lineam*.
in mg.  *in margine*.
iter.  *iteravit*.

3.5 Conspectus quaestionum

1. Utrum contingat aliquid se ipsum movere primo (M 393vb).
2. Utrum contingat animali ex se ipsiis moveri (M 394rb).
3. Utrum animalis moti ex se necesse sit aliquam partem quiescere (M 394vb).
4. Utrum caelum in motu suo dependeat ab aliquo corpore fixo et immobili.
   (M 395ra, P 332ra)
5. Utrum fixio caeli et eius immobilitas sit ex fixione centri et eius immobili-
   tatione. (M 395va, P 332va)
6. Utrum motum caeli sit maioris virtutis in movendo quam terra in quie-
   scendo (M 395vb, P 332vb)
7. Utrum in motu locali inanimatorum sit ponere aliquid fixum et immobile
   cui motor eorum assignatur. (M 396ra, P 333rb)
8. Utrum species sensibilis apprehensa per sensum vel per intellectum nata
   sit alterare corpus ad caliditatem vel frigiditatem. (M 396va, P 333vb)

\[ \text{necesse} \] necessario \( M \) \[ \text{ab} \] s.l. \( P \) \[ \text{eius} \] \[ \text{et} \] \( M \) \[ \text{immobilitas} \] \[ \text{ime}^{\text{a}} \] \( M \) \[ \text{immensitas} \]
\text{De Leemans} \[ \text{centri} \] \[ \text{caeli} \] \[ \text{M: De Leemans tacite M corregit ad terrae} \] \( 10 \) \[ \text{aliquid} \] \[ \text{aliquod} \] \( P \) \[ \text{immobile} \] \[ \text{ex} \] \( P \) \[ 12–13 \] \[ \text{nata sit} \] \[ \text{sit nata} \] \( M \)

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Quaestiones 4–6 super De motu animalium

Quaestio 4: Utrum caelum in motu suo dependeat ab aliquo corpore fixo et immobili

Dubitabit autem aliquis etc. Consequenter quaeritur circa partem illam ubi Philosophus movet dubitationem circa motum caeli. Movet ibi istam dubitationem utrum caelum dependeat ab aliquo in motu suo. Ideo quaeritur utrum caelum in motu suo dependeat ab aliquo corpore fixo et immobili.

1. Et arguitur quod non.

1.1 Si caelum in motu suo dependeret ab aliquo corpore fixo et immobili, hoc esset aut propter indigentiam motoris aut mobilis. Si propter indigentiam motoris, aut ergo propter indigentiam motoris primi aut appropriati. Non propter indigentiam motoris simpliciter primi quia, cum primus motor sit virtutis infinitae in motu suo nullo indiget, nec appropriati quia, cum sit substantia separata, perfectionem suam recipit a motore simpliciter primo. Videtur igitur quod in motu suo nullo inferiori dependeat, quare etc. Nec propter indigentiam mobilis quia, cum mobile sit continuum et aeternum, a nihilo dependet, et maxime non indigebit aliquo quod est infra eum et ab eo causatum est.

1.2 Item, si motus caeli indigeret aliquo, hoc non esset nisi quia motor caeli affigeretur aliqui, sed hoc non est possibile quia nos videmus quod motor animalium in movendo firmatur ad aliquod fixum et immobile quia movet impellendo et trahendo. Sed motor caeli non movet trahendo et impellendo quia ibi non est resistentia mobilis ad motorem. Non enim movet ipsum, nisi quodomodo et quando necesse est moveri.

2. Oppositum arguitur: Caelum movetur ex se sicut et animalia quae sunt hic moventur ex se et proportionaliter. Sed nos videmus quod animalia quae sunt hic indigent aliquo fixo et corporeo; ergo etc.

3. Ad quaestionem dico quod caelum in motu suo dependet ab aliquo fixo et immobili, et hoc probatur, quia illud quod movetur aliter se habet nunc quam prius, sed illud quod aliter se habet nunc quam prius requirit aliquid respectu

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cuius se habet nunc aliter quam prius. Sed si illud moveretur eodem motu et eadem velocitate qua caelum movetur, tunc caelum respectu illius non se haberet nunc aliter quam prius. Oportet ergo quod illud respectu cuius caelum se habet nunc aliter quam prius sit simpliciter immobile et quiescens, vel saltim quod non moveatur eodem motu quo caelum movetur. †Primum autem est manifeste verum. Sicut enim caelum est primo motum, sic indiget primo fixo. Primum autem fixum est simpliciter fixum, quod enim primum tale simpliciter tale. Caelum igitur in suo motu indiget aliquo quod sit fixum et immobile.

Illud autem fixum non est aliud indivisible, quia indivisible non quiescit, cum quies sit privatio motus eius quod aptum natum est moveri et ubi et quando, <sed> indivisible non est natum moveri, quia omne quod movetur est divisible, et ideo non est quiescens. Igitur igitur quiescens est divisible et corporeum. Et illud non est aliqua pars caeli quia si esset aliqua pars caeli, tunc una pars caeli quiesceret alis partibus motis, et sequeretur statim distractio partium caeli, quod est impossible. Ideo illud respectu cuius caelum movetur est divisible, nec est aliqua pars caeli, ut ostensum est, nec est extra caelum, quia extra caelum nec est locus, nec tempus. Igitur est infra caelum, contentum ab eo. Cum igitur caelum sit motum primo, oportet quod illud sit quiescens primo.

Tale autem quod est primo fixum et quiescens non existens aliqua pars caeli, non est nisi terra quia illa est primo quiescens et immobile contentum infra caelum. Non autem indiget isto sicut illo super quod movetur, quia isto modo indigent animalia aliquo fixo, sed indiget illo tamquam illo circa quod movetur, et ideo dicitur libro Caeli et mundi quod caelum movetur circa aliquod quiescens, et hoc dicitur terra.

Sed intelligendum secundum Commentatorem quod caelum nec est in loco nec in loco movetur, nisi per comparisonem ad centrum respectu cuius aliter se habet nunc quam prius. Et ideo, quia caelum aliter se habet nunc quam prius per comparisonem ad centrum, ideo movetur per comparisonem ad centrum, unde dicitur quod locus secundum caelum est centrum. Caelum enim est in loco per centrum secundum Commentatorem, et est intelligendum quod, si quæreramus motum propter locum, sicut alii competit moveri, sic ei competit esse in loco ita quod quaedam moventur in loco quia sunt in corpore ea continent, et talibus competit locus proprie, quaedam moventur circa locum, et eis non competit locus

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proprie quia sint in loco, sed quia sunt circa locum, et quia de ratione ultimae sphaerae est quod non movetur in loco nec a medio, nec ad medium, sed circa medium, ideo locus ultimae sphaerae assignandus est circa aliquid.

Iuxta quod est intelligendum quod caelum per motum localem locum non mutat, sive ponendo caelum non esse in loco, sicut ponit Alexander, sive ponendo caelum esse in loco secundum partes, sicut ponebat Themistius, sive ponendo caelum esse in loco ratione superficie, sed ponendum est quod sit in loco per comparationem ad centrum, et locum mutat per comparationem ad centrum. Cum enim totum caelum semper eandem terram inspiciat, totum caelum non immutat locum secundum subjectum, sed secundum formam et dispositionem tantum, et cum partes diversas ipsius caeli partes diversas ipsius terrae respiciant, ideo dicitur quod caelum secundum partes mutat locum secundum subjectum quia in illo ubi est modo una pars in quo prius fuit altera. Et ideo bene dixit Commentator quod caelum est in loco per comparationem ad centrum, cum respectu illius moveatur.

Ad rationes:

Ad 1.1 Ad primam cum arguitur “si caelum indiget aliquo fixo, hoc est” etc., dico quod non indiget propter indigentiam | motoris nec mobilis, sed propter indigentiam motus qui procedit comminiter ab utroque, moveri autem super aliquod fixum et quiescens, vel saltim circa, est de ratione motus in universali quia de ratione motus est se habere nunc aliter quam prius. Hoc autem non potest esse nisi respectu aliquid quiescentis, sicut patet de mure progrediente in harena, et ideo motus caeli indiget aliquo fixo circa quod movetur ipsum caelum, sed hoc non est propter indigentiam motoris, cum sit virtutis infinitae. Sed primus motor, licet sit virtutis infinitae, non posset causare motum in non tempore quia hoc esset facere contradictoria, et ad nihil se extendit virtus primi quod includit contradictionem, nec etiam posset causare motum, nisi esset aliquid quiescens propter eandem rationem.

Et propter dissolutionem secundae rationis cum arguitur “si motus caeli indiget” etc.
Quaestio 5: Utrum fixio caeli et eius immobilitas sit ex fixione terrae

Consequenter quaeritur utrum fixio caeli et eius immobilitas sit ex fixione centri et eius immobilitatione.

1 Et arguitur quod sic.

1.1 Primum in unoquoque genere est causa omnium aliorum quia quod est primum tale est maxime tale, sed quod est maxime tale est causa omnium aliorum. Sed primum quiescens est terra. Omnia enim corpora quae moventur, aut moventur secundum se tota, aut secundum plures partes, sed terra non movetur secundum se totam nec secundum plures eius partes; ideo etc.

1.2 Item, quod est maxime tale est causa omnium aliorum, sed terra est maxime quiescens quia aut simpliciter non movetur, aut non movetur secundum plures eius partes.

1.3 Item, hoc vult Commentator quarto Physicorum. Dicit enim ibi quod caelum est in loco per centrum ideo etc.;

2 Oppositum arguitur. Quies posterioris non est causa quietis prioris. Sed quies terrae est posterior quie te caeli, cum caelum sit causa omnium eorum quae sunt in eo, ergo etc.

3 Potest dici quod fixio caeli non est ex fixione terrae, sed magis e converso fixio terrae causatur ex fixione caeli.

In quiescente contingit duo considerare, scilicet esse eius | in loco illo in quo quiescit, et immobilitas eius ex loco illo. Nunc autem esse terrae in loco medio non est causa fixionis caeli sed magis e converso, cuius declaratio est: per eandem naturam terra est in loco medio et movetur ad locum medium, quia per eandem naturam per quam aliquid movetur ad locum aliquem, per eandem naturam est ibi cum motum est. Sed terra est in medio per suam gravitatem, ergo etc. Quod ergo est causa gravitatis terrae est causa esse eius in medio. Sed caelum est causa gravitatis terrae, quia dicit Philosophus libro Meteorum quod caelum est causa omnium accidentium corporum in eo existentium, ut unde principium motus, quare esse terrae in medio non est causa fixionis caeli. Item, nec immobilitas eius ex loco medio est causa immobilitatis caeli quia ipsa terra, sicut apparret ex primo Caeli et mundi, est in loco medio et movetur
ad locum medium non quia medium terrae, sed quia medium mundi. Sed medium mundi non mutat locum, ideo nec terra. Et causa quare medium mundi non mutat locum est quia caelum non egreditur locum suum, quia si egrederetur caelum locum suum, medium mundi sequeretur. Ipsum ergo caelum non movetur ex medio quia non egreditur locum suum, quare immobiles terrae non est causa immobilitatis caeli sed magis everso.

Immobilitas autem et fixio caeli est a primo principio quia est simpliciter immobile a quo esse habuit. Ita quod, sicut omnis motus reductur ad primum motorem sicut in causam, et ideo omnis immobilitas ad immobilitatem eius habet reduci, et ideo dicendum est quod causa immobilitatis caeli est immobilitas princi-

Ad rationes:

Ad 1.1 Ad primam cum arguitur “primum in uno quoque genere” etc., concedo maiorem. Ad minorem dico quod terra non est primum quiescens, sed caelum est primum quiescens. Sed tu dices “caelum est primum mobile, qualiter ergo est primum quiescens?” Dico quod caelum est maxime quiescens quia non mutat locum suum secundum subiectum, numquam enim egreditur locum suum, unde caelum dicitur primum mobile in loco et primum quiescens et ideo immobile extra locum quia extra locum suum non graditur, et ideo est primum quiescens et immobile, et ex hoc est quod terra extra locum suum non movetur, et immobiles caeli est causa immobilitatis terrae et non everso.

Ad 1.2 Ad secundum dicendum quod terra non est maxime quiescens inter corpora, sed caelum, quia ipsum nec generatur nec corrumpitur nec mutat locum suum secundum subiectum nec secundum totum nec secundum partes ita ut acquirat aliquam partem loci quam prius non habuit. Terra autem corrumpitur et generatur et movetur secundum plures eius partes, quare plures sunt causae immobilitatis caeli quam terrae, et ideo immobilitas eius est causa immobilitatis terrae.

Ad 1.3 Ad Commentatorem dicendum quod verum est. Commentator est illius opinionis, rationes tamen eius efficaciam non habent.
Quaestio 6: Utrum motor caeli sit maioris virtutis in movendo quam terra in quiescendo

Consequenter quaeritur utrum motor caeli sit maioris virtutis in movendo quam terra in quiescendo.

1 Et arguitur quod non.

1.1 Nulla virtute infinita est accipere maiorem virtutem quia infinito non est maius, sed virtus qua quiescit terra est virtus infinita; ergo [etc.] Ista virtute non est accipere maiorem, nec virtutem quae movet caelum, nec aliquam aliam. Probatio minoris: Quia terra quiescit per tempus infinitum et sempiternum, si motus primus sit sempiternus, sed effectus infinitus est a virtute infinita, ergo quies terrae est a virtute infinita. Motor ergo caeli non est maioris virtutis in movendo quam terrae in quiescendo.


2 Oppositum arguitur: Causa universalis prima est maioris virtutis quam causa particularis quia virtus causae particularis est a virtute causae universalis. Sed causa universalis prima est causa esse terrae et quietis eius quia dictum erat prius quod quies terrae est ex motu caeli, motus autem caeli est ex motore primo, et ad multa plura se extendit motor caeli quam ad quietem terrae; ideo etc.

3 Ad hoc est intelligendum quod motor caeli non est corpus nec aliqua virtus in corpore, quia oportet quod motor caeli sit infinitae virtutis cum moveat in...
tempore infinito, et quia motor caeli agit substantiam cuiuslibet entis producendi ex nihilo. Quod autem producit aliquid ex nihilo est infinitae virtutis. Ideo motor primus est virtutis infinitae. Sed nulla virtus in corpore est finita cum virtus sequatur magnitudinem, et non est ponere magnitudinem infinitam, et ideo non est ponere virtutem in corpore infinitam, quare motor caeli non est virtus in corpore, sed motor caeli separatur a magnitudine volens et intelligens. Ideo motor caeli movet caelum per voluntatem et cognitionem, et ideo dicitur quod motus caeli nec est naturalis nec violentus nec mixtus sed penitus purus et perfectus per appetitum et cognitionem.

Modo ita est quod motus qui est per appetitum, est respectu alicuius appetibilis, ideo motus primus factus per appetitum et cogitationem est respectu alicuius appetibilis primi. Et quia motus caeli est motus respectu alicuius appetibilis pri-mi, ideo motor caeli ipsum movet respectu appetibilis primi, et ideo dicit Commentator duodecimo *Metaphysicae* quod motor simpliciter primus movet caelum in ratione amati et desiderati, et praeter istum motorem ponitur alius qui movet in ratione amantis et desiderantis. Unde arguit Simplicius primo *Caeli et mundi* quod si est motor primus qui movet in ratione amati et desiderati, et erit motor qui movet in ratione amantis et desiderantis. Nihil enim amatur nisi ab amante, nec desideratur nisi a desiderante.

Ille autem motor in ratione amantis et desiderantis est proximus motor caeli, est enim potentiae finitae. Producit autem a causa prima universalis productiva omnium, et per virtutem ipsius ad aliquid genus entis determinatur. Ab isto autem motore proximo procedit motus finitus et determinatae velocitatis, et ideo ille motor est potentiae finitae. Sed motor movens in ratione amati et desiderati est potentiae infinitae quoniam per eum omnia procedunt in esse et movent et moventur.

Circa quietem terrae est considerare duo, scilicet esse eius in loco medio, et immobilitatem eius a loco medio, unde, licet idem sint secundum rem, differunt secundum rationem, et ideo causas diversas adminus secundum rationem requirunt.

Et ideo cum quæritur utrum virtus motoris caeli sit maior in movendo quam virtus qua quiescit terra in quiescendo, dico quod virtus motoris caeli maior est, quia virtus per quam terra quiescit est finita et non infinita. Quoniam dato quod...
sit infinita, aut intellegimus per quietem terrae esse eius in loco medio, aut per quietem intellegimus eius immobilitatem. Si virtutem quam habet per esse, virtus autem per quam terra est in loco medio est finita quia terra per eandem virtutem est in loco medio et movetur ad locum medium. Sed terra movetur ad locum medium propter gravitatem, quare est in loco medio propter gravitatem. Gravitas autem terrae finita est quia sequitur quantitatem terrae, quae finita est. Virtus ergo similitur per quam terra est in loco medio est finita.

Gravitas autem per quam terra est in loco medio causatur ex motore caeli et motu caeli ut a causa aequivoca nomine et specie cum eo, unde motus caeli neque est gravis neque levis neque motor caeli neque ipsum caelum. Causa autem aequivoca est maioris virtutis quam suus effectus. Ideo virtus motoris caeli in movendo est maior virtute per quam terra quiescit in loco proprio. Ideo si consideremus virtutem terrae quiescentem quae est esse in loco medio, finita est, et sequitur conclusio principalis.

Si consideremus immobilitatem eius in loco medio, virtus per quam terra habet immobilitatem nec est finita nec infinita quia immobilitas privatio quaedam est, ut dictum est superius, quia immobilitas est privatio motus quodammodo in quo natum est moveri quando et ubi. Privationis autem non est aliqua positiva causa sed destructiva magis. Igitur immobilitas terrae ex loco medio non est aliqua causa positiva, quare nulla virtus sibi debetur quae sit finita vel infinita. Iuxta quod intelligendum quod immobilitas terrae habet causam privatam aeternam. Ideo dicitur quod terra aeternaliter quiescit, causa huius quietis est privatio causae moventis per tempus infinitum. Hoc patet per Commentatorem libro Caeli et mundi dicentem quod terra <non> movetur extra locum suum quia medium mundi non movetur extra locum suum. Medium autem mundi non movetur extra locum suum quia caelum non egreditur extra locum suum, et causa huius est quia motor primus immobiliter movet. Ideo privatio causae moventis per tempus infinitum est causa immobilitatis terrae in loco medio.

Ideo considerando quietem, ut est immobilitas terrae a loco medio, habet causam privatam aeternaliter durantem. Virtus tamen sibi non debetur quae sit finita vel infinita. Considerando in quiete virtutem per quam terra est in loco medio, sic est finita, et sequitur conclusio principalis, quod motor caeli sit maioris virtutis in movendo quam terra in quiescendo.
Ad 1.1 Ad rationem primam, cum arguitur “nulla virtute infinita est maior”, dico quod verum est. Ad minorem, cum dicitur quod virtus per quam terra quiescit est infinita, dico per interemptionem quia virtus per quam terra quiescit est gravitas quae quidem virtus finita est. Si autem quies dicat mihi immobilitatem terrae in loco medio, sic sibi debetur causa privativa sempiterniter durans, non tamen virtus finita vel infinita, cum immobilitas sit quaedam privatio, et ideo potest dici quod si sit virtus, est finita vel sibi non debetur virtus.

Ad 1.2 Ad aliud dicendum quod, cum motor caeli sit maioris virtutis in movendo quam terra in quiescendo, si ita esset quod motor caeli, cum movet, affiget terrae, tunc movendo caelum impelleret terram, sicut nauta, sed quia non est sic de motore caeli, ideo non procedit.

245 virtute | virtus P  250 finita | in mg. P  252 cum | sicut M

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