

THE DEPENDENCE OF PETRUS HELIAS' SUMMA SUPER PRISCIANUM  
ON WILLIAM OF CONCHES' GLOSE SUPER PRISCIANUM:<sup>1)</sup>

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Petrus Helias' SUMMA super Priscianum has been called "a systematic survey of the discussions carried out in his days rather than an original exposition of his own". (De Rijk (18) 230)<sup>2)</sup>. The SUMMA only mentions two masters, Anselm and Manegold, but quotes and discusses the doctrines of many more, unnamed grammarians, as is the usual practise in the textbooks to the Artes and to be found in textbooks from the Eleventh century too, e.g. the GLOSULE (Hunt (11) 202,204). Yet the omission of one Master's name is curious. Why did Peter omit the name of William of Conches? The similarity between the SUMMA and William of Conches' GLOSE super Priscianum is so close that it deceived Thurot ((19) 53, cf. Jeauneau (14) 242 n.98) into thinking that the later version of William's GLOSE (MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. 15130 fol. 1-137 v, olim Saint Victor 930) was written by a pupil of Peter's: "On y trouve de nombreux passages transcrits presque littéralement de Pierre Hélie, que l'auteur contredit cependant plusieurs fois". Thurot did not know the author of the GLOSE of the Parisian MS and until E. Jeauneau (14) brought to light the MS of the earlier version, found in MS Firenze, Bibl. Laur. San Marco 310 fol. 1-82v,

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- 1) I should like to thank prof. Jan Pinborg, whose lectures in the spring 1973 on classical and mediaeval grammar have provided the inspiration for this paper and whose kind help and learning have saved me from many misunderstandings. Any errors that remain will be mine only.
  - 2) Numbers in the brackets refer to books, listed in the bibliography in the end of this paper.

scholars had to rely only on William's "program of grammatical teaching", found in the end of his *PHILOSOPHIA*, for the knowledge of his grammatical doctrine. There (Jeauneau (14) 218) William stated that it was his aim to elucidate the definitions, given by Priscian, and state the "causa inventionis" for all the parts of speech and for their accidents, as his predecessors had not been careful enough in doing so.

When R. Hunt wrote his two important articles on grammar in the Twelfth century (11), (12), he took care to point out that Petrus Helias followed William's program with regard to the careful setting out of the "causa inventionis" even for the minor subdivisions of the parts of speech which led Hunt to the suspicion that Peter might be exploiting William's *GLOSE*. Also the sections about the definition and properties of the noun, from Peter's *SUMMA*, printed in De Rijk's *Logica Modernorum* ((18) 231 f.), show that Peter knew William's doctrine on this which he carefully quotes, but does not like. Yet it remains to be shown to what degree the *SUMMA* is dependant on William's *GLOSE* and to adduce some proof that Peter wrote with William's *GLOSE* at his elbow and not from a third common source and that the *GLOSE* is anterior to the *SUMMA*.

#### The Date of the *SUMMA*.

The external evidence to the anteriority of the *GLOSE* is rather vague. The *GLOSE* in its two versions, said to be from William's "youth" and "old age" (Jeauneau (14) 215), is not dateable except in the relative chronology of William's work, where the *GLOSE* in the earlier version is reckoned to be the last treatise from William's youth (1120 - 1130) and the later version written after the *Dragmaticon*, which William wrote about 1144 - 1149.

Nor has any precise date been assigned to Petrus Helias' *SUMMA* and we have to rely on the scanty information concerning Peter's life and the relative chronology of his works. The fullest account of Peter's life is that by N. M. Häring, in *Zur Ge-*

schichte der Schulen von Poitiers im 12. Jahrhundert, Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 47, Köln 1965, p.35, to which I have only one item to add.

The information about Peter's life comes from two different sources, from his students and from the charters of Poitiers.

I. From his pupils we know that he was a master in the liberal arts. Peter taught John of Salisbury rhetoric around 1141 (*Metalogicon* II, 10, Webb 80) and William of Tyre was his student between 1144 and 1154, probably in Paris. William of Tyre tells us further that Petrus Helias was from Poitiers, "*natione Pictavensis*", had studied under Thierry of Chartres and that Peter was not teaching (in Paris?) during all these ten years:

"hos (Peter, Ivo of Chartres and Bernardus Brito) alternatim, secundum quod eorum negocia presentes eos permittebant vel absentes, annis audivimus circiter decem", (ed. Huygens (8) 822).

In the *Metamorphosis Goliae* (ed. Huygens (4) 771 v, 198) Peter is mentioned too and again grouped with Ivo of Chartres and Bernardus Brito; unfortunately the date of this strange poem is rather vague, written sometime between 1141 and 1160.

Finally in a letter from bishop Arnolf of Lisieux which can have been written at any time between 1141 and 1181 we find the bishop asking Petrus Helias to send back his lazy nephew (P.L. 201, 29 A).

II. In the charters from Poitiers on the other hand we only hear about Petrus Helias' later life.

A Petrus Helias has in an unknown capacity signed a charter in 1147 in *Cartulaire de l'Abbaye de Nouaillé*, ed. P. de Monsabert, *Archiv. histor. du Poitou* XLIX, 1936, no.209, p.326.

In 1152 a Petrus Helias fought over some land with the monks of *Nôtre-Dame-de-l'Étoile* (*Histoire Littéraire* XIII, p.303).

In 1156 a Petrus Helias signed as "*capicerius*": "*Huius rei testes magister Arnaudus Pictavensis ecclesiae, Briocensis archidiaconus, Petrus Helias eiusdem ecclesiae capicerius, Raginandus...*" B. Ledain, *Cartulaires et Cartes de l'Abbaye de l'Absie*, *Archiv. hist. du Poitou* XXV, Poitiers 1895, p.91.

In 1157 he again signed as "capicerius", in *Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de l'Ouest* XIV, 1847, p.161.

In 1166 he is mentioned in a letter from John of Salisbury (P.L. 199, 159 A) where the bishop of Poitiers is asked to send back some books, which magister Petrus Helias had kept for magister Galterius, clericus Remensis. Peter's presence in Poitiers is not implied in the letter. After then nothing more is heard of Petrus Helias in the charters of Poitiers or in letters to the bishop there, but in a chronicle, which stops at 1190 a Petrus Helias appears as "dean" of Poitiers: "Fuit enim in Pictavensi ecclesia decanus magister Petrus Helias, in scientia litterarum secularium magnus philosophus (Thurot (19) 508).

Are we here dealing with the same man? I doubt it and should prefer to think of at least two different Petri Heliae, the one being the renowned Parisian master in the liberal Arts, the other living in Poitiers, having the low assignation of a capicerius and maybe later becoming dean of Poitiers. Nor is our grammarian likely to be the cancellarius (where?) who wrote several treatises on law (Thurot (19) 18).

The SUMMA could have been written at any time while Peter was teaching in Paris. There is reason to believe that it is later than his commentary on the *De Inventione*, identified in 1973 by John O. Ward from MS Roma, Vatican, Fondo Ottobon. lat. 2993 with the otherwise anonymous commentary "sicut ordo...", found in three other manuscripts:

Cambridge Pembroke Coll. 85, section III, fol. 1-16 in the particular quire's foliation, fol. 83-99a in the section's foliation.

Brescia, Bibl. Civ. Queriniana A.V. 4(no.4) fol. 69-113v.

Napoli Bibl. Naz. Fondo Princ. V.D. 25.

This commentary which has an *Accessus* very similar to the one in Thierry of Chartres' commentary on the *De Inventione*, has a gloss on "materia", dividing it into "materia unde fit" and "materia in qua fit" (Ward (20) 286) to which the corresponding entry on "materia" in the *Accessus* to the SUMMA refers:

MS Paris, Arsenal 711 fol. 1 ra: "Materia cuiuslibet artis est id in quod artifex agit secundum artem. Non enim arti auxilianda est materia unde fit sed potius in qua fit sicut alibi aperte est demonstratum".

MS Cambridge Pembroke Coll. 85 sect.III fol.83 rb: "Materia vero duplex est unde fit ut ex ferro gladius vel in qua fit ut f<orma> eius in qua formatur gladius...Si enim haberet materiam ex qua fieret oporteret ut forma illi materie adveniret ut inde fieret hec ars...Ars igitur non habet materiam nisi in qua fit.."

The original distinction between "materia unde fit vel in qua fit" goes back to Victorinus (ed. Halm, Rhet. Lat. Min. 174,4 Leipzig 1863) but the frase "sicut alibi aperte est demonstratum" is more reasonably interpreted as Peter referring to a full gloss in an earlier treatise than quoting an authority, Victorinus.

The "terminus ante quem" in the series of Petrus Helias' work is the COMMENTUM SUPER BOETIUM DE TRINITATE from ca. 1148 (Häring (6)24) as his doctrine on the "modi significandi" of the parts of speech is stated authoratively in the COMMENTUM.

The authorship of the COMMENTUM is however hotly disputed as the editor, prof. N.M. Häring, has interpreted the close agreement of the COMMENTUM on Thierry of Chartres' trinitarian glosses as the evidence of Thierry's authorship. I should prefer to think that it rather shows the student's (Peter's) strong dependence on his master (Thierry). (see appendix II below).

1148 as a "terminus ante quem" fits well with the impression that Peter only knew the earlier version of William's GLOSE not the later version from ca. 1150. Any exact knowledge of this does however presuppose a full critical edition of both William's GLOSE and Peter's SUMMA<sup>3)</sup>.

The two authors should be allowed a certain freedom in the handling of material, especially as Petrus Helias is writing a "summa", not a commentary proper with the lemmata from Priscian

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3) An edition of the SUMMA is promised by L. Reilly in Bulletin de Philos. Méd. 13, p.51, Louvain 1971.

introduced before each gloss, as in the GLOSE.

Also the difference between the two versions of the GLOSE is mostly in the nature of additions, made in the later version, which could have been omitted on purpose by Petrus Helias, though hardly as consistently as in the passage, printed below. Minor textual discrepancies between the two versions of the GLOSE are as liable to be scribe's errors as deliberate alterations made by William in the later version.

ad Prisc. II 25, Keil II 58, 19

William of Conches GLOSE <sup>4)</sup>		Petrus Helias SUMMA <sup>4)</sup>
Later version	Earlier version	
Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 1513o fol. 29 ra	Firenze, Bibl. Laur. Marc. 31o fol. 29 va	Paris, Bibl. Arsenal 711 fol. 22 ra
HEC ENIM: Inter nomina que naturaliter sunt communia posuerat que- dam indiccertain (!) sed quibusdam videbatur quod non essent appel- lativa quia unumquod- que dicitur album a sua albedine propria et magnum et nigrum a sua nigredine et sic de ceteris adiectivis, sed Priscianus dicit /fol. 29 rb/ ea esse appellativa<..>	HEC ENIM. Inter no- mina que naturaliter sunt communia posue- rat quedam adiecti- va sed quibus<dam> videbitur (!) quod non esse<n>t apel- lativa quia unus- quisque <sup>5)</sup> dicitur albus a sua albedi- ne propria, niger a sua nigredine et sic de aliis adiec- tivis dicunt ea esse propria <sup>6)</sup> .	Illud quoque vi- dendum est quod de adiectivis in- terponit quod sunt appellativa, quod quibusdam non vi- debatur eo quod unusquisque di- citur albus a sua albedine. Unde putabant quod hoc adiec- tivum et cetera essent propria nomina.

4) Henceforth M = MS Firenze, Bibl. Laur. Marc 31o, fol. 1-82 v  
P = MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. Lat. 1513o, fol. 1-137 v  
A = MS Paris, Bibl. Arsenal 711, fol. 1-178 v.

5) unumquodque MS.

6) appellativa MS.

(ibid.) GLOSE P.  
Later version.

Sed de ad-  
iectivis diver-  
sa est senten-  
tia inde nostram  
ponamus.

Adiectivum est  
illud nomen quod  
significat idem quod  
inest substantie et  
determinat illud in-  
esse et potest addi-  
ci nomini quod sig-  
nificat substantiam  
in eadem, i.e. in  
predicamento (!) vel  
in subiecto, par-  
te(m) propositionis  
vel in predicamen-  
to (!) vel in sub-  
iecto. Modo hanc  
diffinitionem expo-  
namus.

"Adiectivum est  
nomen" in hoc re-  
moventur cetere  
partes orationis  
sed quia hoc ha-  
bent hec nomina  
"homo" "animal"  
etc. que signi-

(ibid.) GLOSE M.  
Earlier version.

Sed quia de  
adiectivis diver-  
sa est sententia  
nostram inde po-  
namus.

Adiectivum est  
illud nomen quod  
significat id quod  
inest substantie  
et potest addici  
nomini ipsi sig-  
nificant*<i>* sub-  
stantiam in eadem  
parte propositio-  
nis i.e. vel in  
predicato vel in  
subiecto. Modo  
hanc diffinitio-  
nem exponamus.

"Adiectivum est  
nomen" in hoc re-  
moventur cetere  
partes orationis  
sed quia hoc ha-  
bent<sup>7)</sup> hec nomi-  
na "homo" "ani-  
mal" etc. que sig-

(ibid.) SUMMA.

Sed quia de adiec-  
tivis diverse sunt sen-  
tentie necessarium duxi-  
mus ut nostram breviter  
attingendo poneremus.

Adiectivum er-  
go nomen est. Est  
illud nomen quod  
significat illud  
quod inest substan-  
tie et potest ad-  
ici nomini signi-  
ficanti substan-  
tiam et in eadem  
parte propositio-  
nis, hoc est vel  
in predicato vel  
in subiecto.

In hoc ergo quod  
dicitur "nomen  
est" cetere par-  
tes orationis re-  
moventur sed quia  
hoc habent etiam  
nomina que sub-  
stantiam signifi-

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7) hoc habent] hic homine MS.

(ibid.) GLOSE P.  
Later version.

ficant substanti-  
am et hec "omnis"  
"quidam" que signi-  
ficant modos loquen-  
di ad remotionem il-  
lorum est additum  
"quod significet(!)et  
quod inest substan-  
tie" sed quia hoc  
totum habet "albedo"  
hoc nomen additur  
"et determinat ines-  
se" sed quia hoc ha-  
bet hoc nomen "pa-  
ter" et similia que  
tamen non sunt ad-  
iectiva addit "et  
potest addici nomini  
quod significat sub-  
stantiam in eadem  
parte propositionis"  
sed secundum hoc  
hec nomina "risi-  
bile, rationale"  
sunt adiectiva.  
Dicimus enim ani-  
mal risibile et  
rationale, bipes.

(ibid.) GLOSE M.  
Earlier version.

nificant substanti-  
am et hec "omnis"  
"quidam" que sig-  
nificant modos lo-  
quendi ad remotio-  
nem illorum est  
additum: "quod sig-  
nificat quod inest  
substantie", sed  
quia totum hoc ha-  
bet "albedo" hoc  
nomen et hoc nomen  
"pater" et similia  
que tamen non sunt  
adiectiva additum  
est "et potest  
adici nomini quod  
significat sub-  
stantiam in eadem  
parte propositio-  
nis", scil. secun-  
dum hoc hec nomi-  
na "risibile, ra-  
tionale" sunt ad-  
iectiva.  
Dicimus enim ani-  
mal risibile, ani-  
mal rationale.

(ibid.) SUMMA.

cant et ea que sig-  
na<sup>8)</sup> esse dicuntur  
idcirco ad /fol.  
22rb/ eorum re-  
motionem addi-  
tur "quod signi-  
ficat quod inest  
substantie" sed  
quia rursus hoc  
totum habet "al-  
bedo" hoc nomen  
et hoc nomen "pa-  
ter" et similia,  
quorum nullum est  
adiectivum addi-  
tum est "et pot-  
est adici nomini  
significanti sub-  
stantiam in eadem  
parte propositionis".  
(ibid.) Secundum ergo  
hanc descriptionem ad-  
iectiva sunt hec nomi-  
na scil. risibile ra-  
tionabile et similia.  
Dicimus enim animal  
risibile, animal ratio-  
nale, animal bipes.<sup>9)</sup>

8) signa = modos loquendi, cf. GLOSE in De Rijk (18) 223.

9) bibes MS.



(ibid.) GLOSE P.  
Later version.

(ibid.) GLOSE M.  
Earlier version.

(ibid.) SUMMA.

Iterum dicunt quidam quod omne nomen est substantivum vel adiectivum, iudicantes illud substantivum quod per se potest subsistere in aliqua parte propositionis, adiectivum vero quod non.

Iterum dicunt aliqui quod omne nomen est substantivum vel adiectivum, indicantes illud substantivum quod per se potest subsistere in aliqua parte propositionis, adiectivum vero quod non.

Antiqui vero solent hanc divisionem facere quod omne nomen adiectivum est vel substantivum, dicentes illud nomen esse substantivum quod per se subsistere potest in aliqua parte propositionis, adiectivum vero non.

Dicunt quod "Socrates est albus" est imperfecta oratio, qui confunduntur auctoritate Boethii, qui has ponit: "homo iustus est. Homo iustus non est".<sup>10)</sup> Et secundum eos risibilis non posset poni in vera propositione et convenienti quia hoc non est propositio secundum eos: "Socrates est risibilis". Sed dicere "Socrates est homo risibilis" teste Boethio, inconveniens est.<sup>11)</sup>

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10) Com. in librum Arist. ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ, 2, IIII c.10, ed. Meiser 267.

11) Com. in librum Arist. " " , 1, ed. Meiser 157.  
Com. in librum Arist. " " , 2, ed. Meiser 364.

(ibid.) GLOSE P.

Later version.

Sed non nobis placet hec divisio quia non habetur ex auctoritate et falsum est quod adiectivum non potest per se poni in eadem parte propositionis, ut in sequentibus ostendemus.

Causa vero inventionis adiectivorum hec est. Cognitis substantiabilibus qualitatibus ignorantur accidentales. Ideo inventa sunt que significarent ipsas que etiam inesse alicui determinarent. Significant autem adiectiva communes qualitates vel quantitates et nominant ea quibus insunt ille qualitates vel quantitates.

Si queratur que nomina sunt substantivorum... illa(m)

(ibid.) GLOSE M.

Earlier version.

Sed nobis non placet hec divisio quia non habent ex auctoritate et falsum est adiectivum per se non possit poni in eadem parte propositionis ut in sequentibus ostendemus.

Causa vero inventionis adiectivorum hec est. Cognitis substantiabilibus qualitatibus ignorantur accidentales. Ideo inventa sunt que sic significarent ipsas quod etiam inesse alicui determinarent. Significant autem adiectiva communes qualitates vel quantitates et nominant ea quibus insunt ille qualitates vel quantitates. Continuatio...

(ibid.) SUMMA.

Sed hec divisio ex nulla auctoritate habetur. Preterea illud plane falsum est quod adiectivum non possit poni per se in eadem parte propositionis ut in sequentibus demonstrabitur.

Sed prius de causa inventionis adiectivorum et de significatione et de nominatione dicemus. Inventionis ergo (ergo) adiectivorum causa hec est. Quoniam enim cognitis substantiabilibus qualitatibus ignorantur accidentales proprietates. Ideo inventa sunt adiectiva que sic eas significarent ut substantiis insunt. Significant autem adiectiva vel communes qualitates vel quantitates et nominant ea in quibus ille qualitates vel quantitates insunt...

(ibid.) GLOSE P.

Later version.

tantum que significant  
substantiam. Posset ta-  
men veraciter dici so-  
lum "quis" esse substan-  
tivum nomen. Non enim  
aliud in toto Prisciano  
vocatur substantivum.  
Continuatio...

The verbal agreement between the SUMMA and the GLOSE, especially in the earlier version, shown in the passage above, covers a number of "mechanical" and "doctrinal" aspects of Peter exploiting the GLOSE. There is the same disposition of material in both, the same doctrine and the views of other grammarians are quoted via the GLOSE, sometimes as above introduced by Peter with the addition "Antiqui dicunt".

I shall in the following pages concentrate on the doctrinal dependence of the SUMMA on the GLOSE where verbal agreement can be found, as the "mechanical" aspects will be obvious. In passages where the verbal agreement is sufficiently strong the SUMMA will for practical reasons be treated as a third manuscript, with the discrepancies only indicated in the notes.

#### Common grammatical Doctrine in the SUMMA and the GLOSE.

In the following pages I shall for practical reasons confine my discussion to the treatment of the noun and the verb and print and discuss mostly those passages where verbal agreement between the two assures us that Petrus Helias wrote with the GLOSE in

front of him. In doing so I shall discuss some key concepts in Twelfth century grammar, treated from the point of view of terminology and, as very few texts are yet available in print, I shall let the texts as far as possible speak for themselves, reserving my own judgements to the conclusion. Two appendices are added in the end, appendix I having the full text of William's gloss on the signification of the pronouns, appendix II giving a short discussion of the authorship of COMMENTUM SUPER BOETIUM DE TRINITATE, as this treatise discussed grammatical matters, important for the history of the term "modus significandi".

#### Causa inventionis.

In his PHILOSOPHIA William writes on his doctrine of grammar:

Et quoniam in omni doctrina gramatica precedit de ea dicere proposuimus quoniam, etsi Priscianus inde dicat, tamen obscuras dat inde diffinitiones nec exponit; causas vero inventionis diversarum partium et diversorum accidentium in unaquaque pretermittit. Antiqui vero glosatores satis bene litteram continuaverunt et fere et plerumque et bene regulas exceperunt, sed in expositione accidentium erraverunt. Quod ergo ab istis minus dictum est dicere proposuimus, quod obscure exponere... (Jeauneau (14) 218).

So in his GLOSE William states the "causa inventionis" for every part of speech, every accident and even the subdivisions of the accidents. It is noticeable that these very passages which give William's doctrine on the causa inventionis and the treatment of the accidents of the parts of speech, considered by William to be innovatory and original, are those where the verbal agreement between the GLOSE and the SUMMA is closest.

I give a selection of the "causa inventionis" for the noun and the verb, preceded by the "causa inventionis" for "vox":

GLOSE M fol. 4 ra<sup>12)</sup>

Tertium vero i.e. vocem qua intellectus explicaretur non est operata. Unde auctores invenerunt has voces per quas homo homini convenienter suam voluntatem manifestaret.

Causa inventionis for the noun and the verb:

ad Prisc. II, 18

(ibid.) M fol. 26 vb<sup>13)</sup>

...significat enim substantiam. Ad cuius evidentiam causam inventionis nominum deinde quid habeant significare postea quid nominare.

Causa ergo inventionis nominum hec est. In omni perfecta oratione dicitur aliquid et de aliquo. Fuit igitur necesse ut inveniretur aliqua vox ad disc(er)rendum de quo est sermo...

fol. 27 rb:

Causam inventionis verbi superius ostendimus, scil. ut haberet homo quod significaret quid de altero dicitur.

SUMMA A fol. 15 vb

Illud quoque sciendum est quod communis causa inventionis omnium dictionum est ut haberet homo quo modo propriam voluntatem alteri manifestaret.

(ibid.) A fol. 17 va

Nos ergo primo que sit causa inventionis nominum deinde quid est quod ait substantiam et qualitatem significare, ad ultimum quid nomina diversa habent nominare.

Causa inventionis hec est:

In omni perfecta oratione dicitur aliquid et de aliquo.

Fuit igitur repertum nomen ad discernendum de quo fieret sermo, verbum vero ad discernendum quid dicitur de eo.

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12) P fol. 5rb: "...Sed quodcumque sit genus locutionis ista tria necessaria sunt, res de qua <est> sermo, intellectus scil. habitus de re, vox per quam alii manifestet loquens suum intellectum de re. Ut igitur haberet homo per quod alii manifestaret voluntatem suam reperte sunt significative voces". The stress on "loquens suum intellectum" is also found in the gloss PROMISIMUS from the second half of the century, cf. Hunt (12) 10, 32. De Rijk (18) 112.

13) lacuna in P on Prisc. II 17-21.

Verbal agreement in stating the "causa inventionis" is found not only for the parts of speech, but also in the glosses on their accidents and the subdivisions of accidents.

A typical example of this is to be found in the gloss on a subdivision of the accident, "species", for the proper nouns. William, following his program in the PHILOSOPHIA, criticizes Priscian for not stating the "causa inventionis", while Peter omits the criticism, but writes out the passage from William's GLOSE.

ad Prisc. II 24, Keil II 58,5

GLOSE M fol. 29 ra, P fol. 28 rb

SUMMA A fol. 21 va

COGNOMEN EST. Hic tractat de  
cognomine<sup>14)</sup> ostendendo quid

Causa inventionis cognominum  
est hec:

sit sed non propriam causam  
inventionis nec significa-  
tionem nec nominationem il-  
lius dicit. Nos tamen cau-  
sam inventionis dicamus que  
talis est. Cum diversi ab  
una honesta persona prin-  
cipium generationis habe-  
rent<sup>15)</sup> ut se de eius fa-  
milia notarent<sup>16)</sup> nomen il-  
lius nomini suo adiungebant  
et dicebatur<sup>17)</sup> cognomen.

Cum enim diversi ab una per-  
sona principium generationis  
haberent, ut se de familia  
eius notarent nomen eius suo  
nomini adiungebant et dice-  
batur cognomen.

The "causa inventionis" is not a novel concept in mediaeval grammar, invented by William and taken over by Peter. It is closely connected with the "impositio nominum" and discussed in logical tracts too, cf. Abaelard (5) 118,127. "impositum" is used in the same sense as inventum in the Eleventh century

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14) cognitione M.

15) haberetur P.

16) om. P.

17) dicebant P.

gloss GLOSULE:

GLOSULE on Prisc. II 18: PROPRIUM EST NOMINIS SIGNIFICARE SUBSTANTIAM...significat illam substantiam ad quam designandam est inventum...

Propria enim nomina sic sunt inventa et imposita ut semper significant aliquam certam personam discretam ab aliis per aliquas certas proprietates. Non enim sunt inventa propter differentiam substantiarum...

Similiter appellativa sunt inventa ad significandas substantias similes aliis in aliqua qualitate...Sunt igitur qualitates i.e. proprietates precipua causa inventionis nominum. (from De Rijk (18) 522).

The "causa inventionis" for a word is its meaning, which is the most important constituent in the distinction of the parts of speech:

GLOSULE on Prisc. VIII 9 Non enim sunt iudicande voces secundum actum constructionis sed secundum propriam naturam inventionis. (from Hunt (11) 212 n.4).

Yet even if the GLOSULE stress the importance of the concept of "causa inventionis" it does not give it such a developed treatment as can be found in the GLOSE and in the SUMMA (cf. Hunt (11) 214). This difference in degree is important as it is part of the effort that William of Conches took to sort out logical and ontological connotations in the diffinitions of Priscian.

#### NOMINATIO, SUPPOSITIO and SIGNIFICATIO.

Of the three: words, thought, reality, words are invented to give the meaning of what is in the thought only, "loquens suum intellectum de re" P fol. 5 rb (cf. De Rijk (18) 222 f. for the particular significata of the fourfold division of nouns). This is the "significatum" of a noun while the denotation of the noun is the "nominatum" i.e. the particular thing or concept denoted when the word is used in a context.

The term "nominatio" (= appellatio) goes back to Priscian XVII 72 (Keil III 150,4) where it is used when referring to an actual person. Later, in the Eleventh century gloss GLOSULE "nominare" is used rather often and in the sense of denoting the actual subjectmatter i.e. "res".

Ut homo per impositionem significat rem Socratis et ceterorum hominum i.e. nominando. (De Rijk (18) 228).

William of Conches and Petrus Helias use "nominatum" in the sense of subjectmatter in so far as it is determinate and particular (text and discussion in De Rijk (18) 222-228). Thus words like "omnis" "nichil" and the interrogative pronoun (P fol. 31 va) "quis" etc. being indeterminate have no "nominatum". The "nominatum" does not have to be existing, "chimera" for instance has a nominatum, i.e. "significatum animi".

The existing ontological substratum of the word is rarely discussed in the GLOSE, but appears to be called "suppositum":

GLOSE P fol. 95 va<sup>18)</sup> ad Prisc. XVII 23, Keil III 122.

NAM QUERENTES SUPPOSITI SUBSTANTIAM DICIMUS<sup>19)</sup> "QUIS AMBULAT et nota quod in hac arta dicitur substantia res per se existens et id quod res per se existens<sup>21)</sup> dicitur esse cum queritur "quid sit" et suppositum dicitur actuale quod subiacet locutioni...

PERSONA VERO i.e. substantia AGENS EST INCERTA qui enim has facit questiones quid agitur cognoscet sed a quo agitur ignorat. Vel suppositum<sup>22)</sup> dicamus quod subiacet actui vel passioni quasi fundamentum<sup>23)</sup> sed istis non est suppositum<sup>24)</sup> nisi substantia unde dicit QUERERE SUBSTANTIAM SUPPOSITI<sup>25)</sup> i.e. ipsum suppositum<sup>26)</sup> quod est substantia.

18) M stops at Prisc. XVI 16.

19) NAM SUBSTANTIAM ALICUIUS SUPPOSITI QUERENTES DICIMUS, Keil III 122,1.

21) existans MS.

22) subpositum MS.

23) fondamentum MS.

24) subpositum MS.

25) subpositi MS.

26) subpositum MS.



Petrus Helias uses the word "nominatio" in the same way as William of Conches, but the "suppositum" in two ways (pace De Rijk (18) 517-519).

I. as the ontological substratum (= William's view):

SUMMA A fol. 94 ra ad Prisc. XII 1 ...Pronomen vero significat substantiam sine qualitate et significat rem ut substat. Unde et in libro constructionum (XVII 23) suppositum dicitur significare quia non formam sed rem forme vel sicut forme suppositam, sine forme tamen<sup>27)</sup> respectu significat...

I.a. as the ontological substratum which is endowed with certain properties:

SUMMA fol. 133 vb ad Prisc. XVII 23, Keil III 122

Interiserit autem hec Priscianus que digna sunt consideratione. Ait enim quod "quis" querit de substantia suppositi et verbum obscurum est; exponamus:

Substantia itaque ut diximus quandoque dicitur a substando quando<que> a subsistendo et utroque modo "quis" querit de substantia suppositi quia quandoque querit de substantia suppositi, i.e. de substantia ut est supposita proprietati. Hec enim est substantia a substando ut quando fit interrogatio per "quis" et proprium nomen, ita quod respondetur pronomen ut "quis est Socrates" respondetur vel ego vel tu vel ille, et ibi per "quis" queritur /fol. 134 ra/ de substantia i.e. de supposito proprietati a qua datum est hoc nomen Socrates. Cum enim quero "quis est Socrates" non dubito de proprietate a qua datum est hoc nomen Socrates. Illam enim iam teneo cum dico "quis est Socrates" sed quero de supposito illi proprietate quod designatur per pronomen. Pronomen enim designat rem sine respectu proprietatum. Aliquando autem per quis queritur de substantia suppositi i.e. de subsistentia scil. de ipsa proprietate cui supposita est substantia. Ut cum quero "Quis est ille" et respondetur Socrates non dubito de supposito. Illud enim iam

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27) tantum MS.

teneo ad oculum sed dubito cui proprietati sit suppositum et illam proprietatem quero per hoc nomen "quis".

Cum ergo respondetur "Socrates" determinatur illa proprietas a qua datum est hoc nomen<sup>28)</sup> Socrates...

## II. Suppositum = the subjectterm in a proposition.

SUMMA A fol. 61 rb ad Prisc. VIII 1: Sicut enim nomen re-pertum est ad significandum de quo dicitur<sup>29)</sup> ita et verbum ad significandum quod de aliquo dicatur<sup>30)</sup>. Unde nomen numquam apponitur nisi auxilio verbi substantivi, nec verbum supponitur nisi auxilio nominis substantivi. Sed quodlibet nomen per se supponitur et verbum per se apponitur.

Suppositum is used in the same sense in the gloss on "regimen" A fol. 178 ra (printed in Thurot (19) 242, cf. De Rijk (18) 518). This use of "suppositum" and "appositum" is found in the school of the "Porretani" (cf. Hunt (12) 51 and Pinborg (16) 49).

The signification of a noun is the "essence" of the thing "taken in its abstract nature apart from the individual things participating in this nature" (De Rijk (18) 227). The signification is determined by the very first coining of the word, i.e. the "impositio". Different "impositiones" as in "canis" make nouns equivocal, but different "nominata", as in the propositions "the horse runs", "horse is a noun", do not cause equivocation.

ad Prisc. II 29

GLOSE M fol. 30 ra P fol. 30 ra  
et est omonimum vel equivocum  
quod una voce diversa princi-  
paliter significat...

ad Prisc. II 23

M fol. 29 ra P fol. 28 va  
...et si possemus dicere<sup>31)</sup>  
quod esset (sc. cognomen)

SUMMA A fol. 22 vb

...omonimum quia una voce  
principaliter plura signi-  
ficat...

A fol. 21 va

Et potest dici quod equivo-  
cum est omne cognomen quan-

---

28) hoc nomen hoc nomen MS.

29) dicatur De Rijk (18) 517.

30) dicitur De Rijk ibidem.

31) concedere M.

equivocum quantum ad principalem significationem, univocum quantum ad secundariam. Aliud<sup>32)</sup> tamen dicamus quod vocum que significant diversa principaliter, alie ex diversis inventionibus, ut Pirrus, alie ex significatione et translatione ut genus: principium generationis et universale. Alie ex diverso adiuncto ut "homo currit" et "homo est nomen".

(ibid.) Sed omnis que ex diversis impositionibus diversa significant equivoca est, sed non omnis que ex translatione, quoniam translationum alia fit ex necessitate quia scil.<sup>33)</sup> res caret nomine ut in predicto exemplo de genere, alia fit ornatu ut si aliquem<sup>34)</sup> dolosum vocemus vulpem, alium<sup>35)</sup> audacem leonem.

tum ad principalem significationem, univocum vero quantum ad secundariam. Illud etiam dici potest quod vocum alie significant diversa principaliter et alie ex diversis inventionibus ut Pirrus, alie ex translatione ut genus, alie ex diversis ad-/21 vb/-iunctis ut in cognitionibus contingit. Illud enim antiquorum falsum est ut ex diversis adiunctis hoc vocabulum "homo" diversa significet ut cum dicitur "homo currit", "homo est species", "homo est nomen". In his namque omnibus "homo" idem significat. Vide ergo quod omnis vox que ex diversis impositionibus diversa significat equivoca est, sed non omnis que ex translatione quoniam translationum alia fit necessitate quia scil. res caret nomine ut in premissio exemplo de genere, alia vero fit propter ornatum ut cum dolosum dicimus vulpem, audacem vero leonem.

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32) addit M.

33) si P.

34) aliquid P.

35) om. M.

Sed translatio ex<sup>36)</sup> necessitate facit equivocationem, non translatio facta<sup>37)</sup> ornatu. Vox vero<sup>38)</sup> ex diverso adiuncto diversa significans non facit equivocationem. Non enim dicimus hoc nomen "equus" esse equivocum quamvis hic significat unum "equus currit" et hic aliud "equus est nomen".

Translatio vero facta necessitate equivocationem facit et non translatio facta ornatu. Vox quoque ex diverso adiuncto diversa significans non facit equivocationem.

Different "significata" cause equivocation while different "nominata" do not. A part of this theory is the discussion of "materiale impositum" (= the later "materiale suppositum"). The term is not new and the "antiqui" to which William refers here might be the authors of GLOSULE (cf. Hunt (11) 211 n.4) or NOTE DUNELMENSES, II (Hunt (11) 216 n.3). "Materiale impositum" is found in Petrus Helias' SUMMA too (De Rijk (18) 232).

GLOSE M fol. 28 va P fol. 27 va ad Prisc. II 22

Vel dicamus quod etiam ibi<sup>39)</sup> significat communem qualitatem omnium corporum sed non determinat illam inesse corpori nec nominat corpus sed universale commune<sup>40)</sup> multorum corporum. Et secundum hanc sententiam in his duabus propositionibus "homo est species" et "homo vivit" homo hoc nomen<sup>41)</sup> idem significat sed diversa nominat et<sup>42)</sup> similiter in utrisque idem subicitur i.e. eadem species sed aliter et aliter: in prima enim ita subicitur quod de eadem specie est sermo<sup>43)</sup> in secunda ita quod est sermo de uno individuo indefinite<sup>44)</sup>

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36) om. M.

37) ex P.

38) om. P.

39) ubi P.

40) commune] sed communem P.

41) homo hoc nomen] hoc nomen homo M.

42) om. M.

43) est sermo] sermo est M.

44) indefinite P.

Item<sup>45)</sup> hic "homo est nomen"<sup>46)</sup> significat propriam qualitatem<sup>47)</sup> huius nominis sed nominat se ipsum. Quod antiqui vocaverunt materiale impositum. Est enim materiale impositum vox se ipsam nominans.

Petrus Helias introduced "suppositum" into his discussion of equivocation. This is part of tradition as he in the excerpt below is quoting GLOSULE (cf. Hunt (11) 202). As the GLOSULE has "sibi suppositis" i.e. "suppositum" probably in the sense of ontological substratum, I should prefer to think that Petrus Helias is using "suppositum" in the same way, not in the sense of the subjectterm in a proposition (the view of De Rijk (18) 518).  
SUMMA A fol. 20 va

Opponitur iterum de equivocis que nullam communem qualitatem videntur significare. Canis enim et huiusmodi alia equivoca nil confert suppositis nisi nomen.

Et dicunt quam plures quod signi-/20 vb/-ficata equivocorum hanc solam convenientiam habent quasi communem qualitatem quod ab eadem voce significantur et in participatione eiusdem nominis conveniunt.

Alii vero dicunt quod nomen equivocum non est unum nomen, sed plura nomina diversa quia diversas qualitates in diversis significationibus ponit.

The definition of "sinonima" Peter also took over from William of Conches:

ad Prisc. II 29

GLOSE M fol. 30 ra P fol. 30 ra

Sinonima sunt nomina que et  
multivoca et sunt sinonima  
vel multivoca<sup>48)</sup> diversa nomina  
que idem principaliter

SUMMA A fol. 22 vb

...et sunt eadem sinonima que  
multivoca i.e. diversa nomina  
que idem significant principaliter et nominant.

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45) iterum M.

46) hic add. M.

47) qualitas P.

48) multivoca .. .... ut albus et albedo cor. P.

significant et idem nominant  
i.e. quicquid significat<sup>49)</sup>  
unum et reliquum et quicquid  
nominat<sup>50)</sup> unum et reliquum.  
Si enim<sup>51)</sup> idem significant  
sed diversa nominant non sunt  
sinonima, ut albus et albedo.  
Iterum si idem nominant sed  
diversa significant non sunt  
sinonima<sup>52)</sup> ut homo et risi-  
bile<sup>54)</sup>.

(ibid.) Si enim significant idem  
et diversa nominant non sunt  
sinonima ut album et albedo.  
Rursus licet<sup>53)</sup> nominent idem  
si tantum diversa significant  
non sunt sinonima ut homo et  
risibile.

#### OFFICIUM.

Among the technical terms belonging more strictly to grammar an important one is "officium". The two determining factors in distinguishing the parts of speech are the meaning, "significatio", and the function "officium".

GLOSE ad Prisc. II 19 M fol. 28 ra<sup>55)</sup>

Ad discernendum que pars orationis est dictio scil. VIS i.e. officium et SIGNIFICATIO i.e. quod officium habet et quam significationem et bene dicit utrumque esse considerandum et non alterum tantum.

Sepe enim voces habent eandem significationem ut "lego" et "lectio" nec tamen sunt eadem pars orationis quia non habent idem officium, sepe vero idem officium ut proprium nomen et pronomen nec tamen sunt eadem pars orationis quia non habent eandem significationem et ideo unum sine alio ad discernendas partes orationis non sufficit.

49) significet M.

50) nominaverit M.

51) om. M.

52) unum P.

53) licent MS.

54) cf. Metalogicon ed. Webb (3) 127,25: "Multivoca autem sunt, cum in eiusdem rei intellectum et nominationem plura verba concurrunt".

55) P has a lacuna fol. 25 vb - 26 v ad Prisc. II 17 - II 21.

The term "officium" is used in two ways. In the first sense it is associated more strictly with the origin of a part of speech, "officium" meaning the specific function of denotation and signification, peculiar to that part of speech. In this sense "officium" is part of common grammatical doctrine used in Priscian XVII 38, and more widely as a technical term in the Eleventh century GLOSULE (Hunt (11) 212) and by grammarians quoted by William in the GLOSE (see below p.49). I print the discussion of the property of the pronoun in the GLOSE and the SUMMA: ad Prisc. II 18<sup>56)</sup>

GLOSE M fol. 27 vb

Sed queritur cum sepe pronomen relativum ad appellativum refertur ut hic "homo currit, idem disputat" quare dicat esse proprium pronominis pro proprio nomine poni. Ad quod dicimus quod quamvis <ad> appellativum nomen referatur numquam tamen pro appellativo ponitur quod ut sit manifestum dicamus quod appellativum nomen habet significationem i.e. communem qualitatem et officium i.e. ostendere de qua specie rerum sit id de quo est sermo sed non separere eum ab aliis eiusdem speciei. Pronomen vero nullum istorum facit quia non significat communem qualitatem nec ostendit de qua specie rerum sit sermo. Ergo nec significatione nec officio ponitur pro appellativo nomine.

SUMMA A fol. 19 vb

Sed queritur cum sepe refertur pronomen ad appellativum nomen cur potius dicatur poni pro nomine proprio quam pro appellativo. Ad appellativum namque sepe refertur ut cum dicitur "homo currit idem disputat".

Ut ergo manifestum fiat quod numquam pronomen ponitur pro appellativo nomine licet referatur ad ipsum dicendum est quod appellativum nomen et habet significare communem qualitatem et habet officium scil. ut ostendat de qua specie vel genere rerum sit id de quo sermo est. Pronomen vero non demonstrat ergo nec significatione nec officio ponitur pro nomine appellativo.

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56) The discussion is repeated in the glosses on Prisc. XII 1 (Pronouns) P fol. 77 ra, SUMMA A fol. 94 rb.

Significatio vero proprii nominis est propria qualitas, officium vero eiusdem est sic ostendere de quo sit sermo quod separet illum ab omnibus aliis quamvis hoc sepe non faciat, equivocatione impediante. Pronomen vero etsi significationem non habet proprii nominis, officium tamen habet i.e. determinate et separatim ab omnibus aliis ostendere de quo sit sermo.

Quamvis igitur ad appellativum nomen referatur <non> tamen pro ipso appellativo ponitur sed pro proprio nomine i.e. ad officium implendum quod faceret proprium nomen rei de quo est sermo si ibi poneretur et ideo dicit proprium est pronominis pro aliquo proprio nomine poni.

Nomen vero proprium significat propriam qualitatem et est eius officium ostendere de quo est sermo, separando illud ab omnibus aliis, quamvis hoc sepe <non> faciat, equivocatione impediante. Pronomen vero quamvis significationem proprii nominis non habeat tamen eius officium habet i.e. determinate et separatim ab omnibus aliis ostendere de quo est sermo.

Quamvis ergo referatur ad appellativum nomen non tamen pro ipso ponitur sicut demonstratum est sed pro nomine proprio ponitur hoc est ad complendum officium quod faceret proprium nomen si ibidem poneretur et ideo dicit proprium esse pronominis poni pro nomine proprio.

"Officium" is used as a technical term for the function of the interrogative pronouns, i.e. their particular meaning:

ad Prisc. II 30

GLOSE M fol. 31 ra P fol. 31 va  
<Causa inventionis>: Omnis igitur dubitatio vel<sup>57)</sup> de re simplicis<sup>58)</sup> est<sup>59)</sup> vel<sup>60)</sup> de inhe-

SUMMA A fol. 23 vb

<Causa inventionis>: Omnis autem dubitatio aut de re simplici aut de rerum sim-

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57) vel est M.

58) simplici de P.

59) om. M.

60) om. P.



rentia rerum simplicium<sup>61)</sup> vel est de consecutione rerum inherrentium.

Sed quia omnes<sup>62)</sup> simplices<sup>63)</sup> res<sup>64)</sup> in X generalissimis continentur i.e. substantia, qualitate<sup>65)</sup> etc. iccirco X<sup>66)</sup> sunt genera simplicium<sup>67)</sup> questionum quid sit, quantum sit, quale sit etc.

Ad querendum igitur de re simplici<sup>68)</sup> invente sunt quedam dictiones que ab officio<sup>69)</sup> dicuntur interrogative. Ad querendum de inherentia rerum cathogorice propositiones sunt invente, ad querendum de consecutione hypothetice.

Sunt igitur<sup>70)</sup> interrogative dictiones invente<sup>71)</sup> ut per eas quereretur de re simplici<sup>72)</sup>. Significat vero omnis interrogativa dictio illud generalissimum cuius species ad questionem<sup>73)</sup> per ipsam factam<sup>74)</sup> pos-

plicium inherentia aut de ipsarum consecutione sed quoniam res simplices omnes in decem generalissimis continentur ideo simplicium questionum X sunt genera, quid sit, quale sit vel quantum et alia huiusmodi secundum ordinem X predicamentorum.

Ad querendum ergo de re simplici reperte sunt quedam dictiones que ab officio dicuntur interrogative ut "quis" et "qualis" et huiusmodi alie et ut significantiones earum breviter attin-

gam:  
Omnis interrogativa dictio significat illud idem quod nomen generalissimi cuius species ad questionem factam per eandem dictionem possunt responderi ut "quis" substantiam, "qualis" quali-

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61) simplicium P.

62) he M.

63) simplices P res M.

64) simplices M.

65) quantitate M.

66) iccirco X] iccirca P.

67) simplicium P.

68) simplici P.

69) ab officio] abscondite M.

70) invente add. M.

71) om. M.

72) simplici P.

73) factam add. M.

74) om. M.

sunt responderi ut "quid" significat substantiam quia ad quid est respondentur<sup>75)</sup> species substantie, "qualis" qualitatem<sup>76)</sup> quia ad quale est respondentur species qualitatis et sic de aliis. Sic habemus inventionis causam<sup>77)</sup> interrogativorum nominum et significationem. De nominatione illorum dicimus quod nichil nominant unde etiam<sup>78)</sup> numquam predicantur.

tatem eodemque modo dicendum de ceteris.

Sunt tamen qui dicunt quod interrogative dictiones significant substantiam et qualitatem sed eandem quam et nomina quibus adiunguntur vel que eis respondentur.

Illud quoque addendum est quod interrogative dictiones nichil nominant.

The syntactical function of a word is called "officium" too, but the concept is not very developed in the GLOSE and the SUMMA and "officium" could more correctly be rendered as "use". Thus in the discussion of the lack of the article in Latin William and Peter (SUMMA A fol. 17 ra) note that the Latin words "hic, haec, hoc" have the same function as the Greek article and the same meaning when they are used before a noun when learning the declensions. I print the gloss from the GLOSE, which is shorter and clearer:

M fol. 26 va P fol. 25 va ad Prisc. II 16.

Officium vero est articuli extra orationem in doctrina puerorum dictionibus preponi in declinando ad discernendum genus et<sup>79)</sup> casum et numerum.

Likewise "officium" is used in a rather vague manner as "use", when we hear that the "officium" of the praenomen is to be put before the proper noun (GLOSE M fol. 29 r P fol. 29 v SUMMA A fol. 21 va).

The same vague notion of syntactical function mixed with

75) renpondentur P, respondetur M.

76) qualitate M.

77) inventionis causam] causam inventionis M.

78) om. M.

79) om. P.

semantical considerations can be found in the Eleventh century gloss GLOSULE:

Non tamen negamus idem "est" consideratum in ipsa oratione vim verbi obtinere sed aliud est agere de vocibus per se consideratis, aliud de eisdem ad vim et officium quod habent in oratione posite relatis. Nam quantum ad vim huius orationis "homo est animal" "est" non per se tantum sed cum aliis hoc solum significat quod illa res que est homo sit illa res que est animal. Hoc autem ex vi verbi habere non potest, immo ex vi substantivi (from De Rijk (18) 114 f.).

This is the "officium copulationis" of which Abelard is speaking in DIALECTICA (ed. De Rijk (5) 135,12). It is interesting to see that at this stage of development of grammatical doctrine the syntactical function of a part of speech is still subservient to the meaning of the words (cf. Abelard, DIALECTICA ed. De Rijk (5) 125: "Prima autem nominum causa fuit significationis impositio, secuta est autem postea constructionis diiudicatio"). Thus a century later is the first time when we meet the term "officium" with the full flavour of "syntactical function": Gloss ADMIRANTES to the DOCTRINALE by Alexander Villadei.

Ista nomina "Roma, Carnotum" et similia possunt considerari dupliciter, aut quantum ad impositionem et significationem et sic sunt nomina simpliciter, aut quantum ad officium et sic sunt adverbia quia accipiuntur pro adverbiiis localibus et consimilibus (Thurot (19) 333).

"Officium" is used rarely after the Twelfth century as a grammatical term. The only other example from later treatises to be found in Thurot's excerpts is also from the gloss ADMIRANTES (Thurot (19) 390) and probably only used here as this glossator knew and quoted Petrus Helias' SUMMA and therefore inherited some of his, by then, obsolete terminology.

Likewise the use of "officium" in logical textbooks, current in the Twelfth century (cf. Gilbert of Poitiers in Pinborg (16) 49), disappeared in the next century, being substituted by "proprietas" (De Rijk, Logica Modernorum II, 2 Assen 1967, p.707).

## MODUS SIGNIFICANDI and CONSIGNIFICATIO.

A term of greater longevity was the term "modus significandi" the key word in later mediaeval grammatical doctrine. But while "modus significandi" and "consignificatio" in later doctrine is used generally for the special properties of the parts of speech and for their accidents (Pinborg (15) 35) William of Conches and Petrus Helias use the concept more sparingly.

Neither Petrus Helias nor William of Conches define their use of "modus significandi" and only Petrus Helias uses "modus significandi" generally as the term for the special properties of a part of speech (Thurot (19) 153 f.), but in the treatment of the particular part of speech, he works out the "causa inventionis" rather than the "modus significandi".

William of Conches, and incidentally Petrus Helias, when he copies out sections from William's GLOSE, distinguish the parts of speech only by their "significatio" and when the case is difficult, as in the discussion of "quis" and the pronouns, by their "officium". Neither author use "modus significandi" or "consignificatio" as a technical term for the accidents, with two exceptions (see below).

"Modus significandi" is used in two ways in the GLOSE.

I. It is partly used for "officium", but in a wider sense. In the discussion of "quis", William points out that for the "significatum" "quis" could belong to the pronouns, as it signifies only substance, but it differs from the pronouns in "modus significandi", as "quis", being a noun according to Priscian and William, defines the substance, i.e. signify substance and quality, while the pronouns only refer to the substance. It will be remembered that the "officium" of the pronouns was to give a determinate reference to the subjectmatter (cf. above p.24) which is only done by the relative or demonstrative property inherent in the pronouns, the "modus significandi":

GLOSE M fol. 27 vb ad Prisc. II 18.

Priscianus deinde subiungit quare sint nomina dicens SED SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIAM QUAMVIS INFINITAM ut "quis" VEL QUALITATEM ut "qualis" etc. et notandum quod uni de istis non aufert esse pronomen res significata /fol. 28 ra/ sed modus significandi ipsam, reliquis ipsa significata res. Neque enim "quis" in eo quod significat substantiam non amittit esse pronomen sed in modo significandi i.e. quod ita significat eam quod diffinit eam<sup>80)</sup>. Pronomen vero diffinit ipsam vel demonstratione vel relatione. "Qualis" vero et "quantus" ex significatione amittunt<sup>81)</sup> esse pronomina quia significant et qualitatem vel quantitatem, que non significantur a pronominibus.

GLOSE M fol. 60 ra P fol. 76 rb ad Prisc. XII 1

...ut igitur breviter dicamus omne<sup>82)</sup> pronomen significat substantiam de qua est sermo per ipsum ita quod nullam eius<sup>83)</sup> qualitatem. Differt ergo a nomine<sup>84)</sup> et convenit cum eo.

In hoc enim quod significat substantiam convenit cum eo sed in modo significandi differt ab illo. Nomen enim<sup>85)</sup> sic significat substantiam quod<sup>86)</sup> et illius qualitatem.

The same division in "res significata" and "modus significandi" is found under the treatment of the verb:

GLOSE M fol. 51 rb P fol. 57 ra ad Prisc. VIII 2

VERBO ACCIDUNT OCTO: SIGNIFICATIO SIVE GENUS...Est igitur<sup>87)</sup> significatio equivocum<sup>88)</sup> ad tria: ad ipsum significatum, ad modum significandi, ad accidens quod hic vocatur genus.

80) causam MS.

81) admittunt MS.

82) esse P.

83) illius P.

84) pronomine corr. M.

85) ergo M.

86) quam P.

87) ergo P.

88) om. M.

Do these three passages imply that we here have the germ of the later doctrine of "modus significandi"? I think not. The term has yet no definite meaning of its own, nor does it strictly mean more than an additional meaning which cannot be divorced from the main sense of the part of speech. It is interesting to note that Petrus Helias rejected this interpretation of "quis":  
SUMMA A fol. 110 va

Sunt qui dicant quod (i.e. "quis", "quae" etc.) significant substantiam infinite et iste modus significandi ei est pro qualitate. Michi autem videtur quod "quis" significat substantiam et qualitatem infinitam i.e. rem qua forma subsistentem vel qua forma subsistens.

II. The other use of the "modus significandi" in the GLOSE is a stricter application of the term to the property of the adjective as a predicate to signify quality and the inherence of this quality in the subjectterm of a proposition. The application of the term is however rather loose in the first excerpt, printed below, but the further sequence of excerpts makes it probable that William borrowed the term "modus significandi" from logic (cf. Abaelard, *Dialectica* ed. De Rijk (5) 123,15 ff.).

ad Prisc. II 14

M fol. 25 va P fol. 24 vb

Non enim omnis vox que constat ex dictionibus est oratio sed<sup>89)</sup> illa que inherentiam significat. He<sup>90)</sup> voces enim "hic homo" "in domo" "omnis homo" et similes non sunt orationes quamvis ex dictionibus constant<sup>91)</sup> quia nullam rerum inherentiam significant<sup>92)</sup>. Sed dicunt quod secundum hoc nulla imperfecta oratio est oratio quod nullam inherentiam significat.

Nos vero dicimus quod imperfecta oratio inherentiam significat<sup>93)</sup> ut ista "homo albus" inherentiam accidentis et

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89) sed *cum* corr. M.

90) hec M.

91) constant M.

92) significat M.

93) significant corr. P.

subiecti. Si inde concluditur<sup>94)</sup>: ergo significat verum vel falsum, dicimus<sup>95)</sup> non. Quia non omne quod significat inherentiam verum vel falsum significat sed illud quod proponendo illam significat. Non enim sola significatio sed modus significandi facit veritatem vel falsitatem sed quia magis hoc ad dialecticam pertinet quam ad gramaticam<sup>96)</sup> illud ad tempus postponamus.

In this stricter use of the term "modus significandi" may be substituted by "consignificatio" (cf. Pinborg (15) 3o ff.). This is born out by a parallel passage in the METALOGICON by William's student, John of Salisbury, and by William's own definition of "consignificatio".

GLOSE M fol. 27 ra (De Rijk (18) 224)

Sed de adiectivis nominibus queremus quid significant. Dicimus igitur quod "albus"<sup>97)</sup> idem accidens significat quod et "albedo" sed aliter quia determinat inherentiam illius accidentis et subiecti quod hoc nomen "albedo" non facit. Ergo hec duo nomina non in re significata differunt sed in modo significandi.

METALOGICON, (ed. Webb (3) 124,16)

Sic a bonitate bonus, a fortitudine fortis dicitur...Unde ex opinione plurium idem principaliter significant denominativa et ea a quibus denominantur sed consignificatione diversa. This use of "modus significandi" and "consignificatio" is the second in the list of "consignificationes" in the GLOSE.

GLOSE M fol. 26 rb P fol. 25 rb ad Prisc. II 15

Et notandum quod consignificare est polissemis sermo. Consignificare enim est secundario significare ut ibi: verbum est quod consignificat tempus, set hoc modo non consignificant<sup>98)</sup> predicte dictiones (i.e. prepositions and conjunctions). Iterum consignificare dicitur etiam<sup>99)</sup> denominare ut

94) concludunt M.

95) dicemus M.

96) sed quia...gramaticam] sed cum hoc magis ad dialeticam quam ad gramaticam pertinet M.

97) album De Rijk.

98) significant M.

99) om. P.

predicatum consignificat subiecto. Sed neque hoc modo consignant. Tertio modo dicitur consignificare quod per se dictum nichil significat<sup>100)</sup> set cum alio dictum aliquid<sup>100a)</sup> significat et hoc modo consignant...

So at this early stage of the doctrine of "modus significandi" we still find the term used most strictly in a logical context (cf. Pinborg (15) 30-38) but tentatively being used as a grammatical term, tresspassing in the realm of the older "officium".

#### SECUNDARIA SIGNIFICATIO and PROPRIETAS COMMUNIS of the Accidents of the Parts of Speech.

It is well known (Hunt (12) 34 and Pinborg (15) 33) that Petrus Helias divided the accidents into "secundaria significatio" when the accident added a particular meaning to the word, as in the case of the "numerus" and "genus" of the noun and the "tempus", "modus", "numerus" and "forma" of the verb, and into "proprietas communis" when the accident did not contribute to the sense of the word. This is the case in the "species" (derivatives and non-derivatives) "figura", "casus" of the noun and the "genus", "coniugatio", "persona", "species" and "figura" of the verb.

Furthermore when this secondary meaning, adduced by the accident, corresponds to the verbal form of the word, i.e. terminations, as in the case of the gender and number of the noun and the "modus", "numerus" and "forma" (a quasi-accident) of the verb he distinguished between "accidens secundum rem", i.e. the meaning, and "accidens secundum vocem", i.e. the termination.

These distinctions which were considered peculiar to Petrus Helias are in fact found in William of Conches' GLOSE. They might not have originated with William but their overall appli-

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100) nichil significant M.  
100a)om. P.



cation is probably his own, - as in the case of the "causa inventionis" - to judge from his "program" set forth in the PHILOSOPHIA. There are long stretches of verbal agreement, in which I for the sake of brevity sometimes have treated the SUMMA as a third MS.

# SPECIES and NUMERUS of the Noun.

ad Prisc. II 22

GLOSE M fol. 28 vb P fol. 27 vb, SUMMA A fol. 2o vb

Accidentia igitur<sup>101)</sup> partium orationis dupliciter<sup>102)</sup> dicuntur, partim enim dicuntur accidentia communes dictionum proprietates<sup>103)</sup> partim communes<sup>104)</sup> secundarie significationes ut in hoc nomine species<sup>105)</sup> dicitur accidens nomini quia<sup>106)</sup> est<sup>107)</sup> communis<sup>108)</sup> omnium nominum proprietas dirivari<sup>109)</sup> ab aliquo vel a nullo<sup>110)</sup> que<sup>111)</sup> dicitur species<sup>112)</sup>.

Numerus vero est eiusdem nominis accidens<sup>113)</sup> i.e.<sup>114)</sup> secundaria significatio. Cum enim nomen principaliter significet qualitates<sup>115)</sup> secundario determinat utrum<sup>116)</sup> de uno an de pluribus sit sermo quod in gramatica dicitur<sup>117)</sup> numerus. Tractantes igitur de singulis accidentibus<sup>118)</sup>

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101) accidentia igitur] et vide quod accidentia A.

102) duppliciter A.

103) enim...proprietates] dicuntur vocis proprietates communes A.

104) om. A.

105) ut...species] species namque A.

106) nomini quia] non ea que M.

107) est om. A.

108) communis proprietas A.

109) proprietas dirivari om. A.

110) nullo dirivari A.

111) que proprietas A.

112) sicut postea demonstrabitur add. A.

113) eiusdem nominis accidens] nominis eiusdem accidens P, tale accidens nomini A.

114) i.e.] quod eius est A.

115) significet qualitates] sign. qualitas M, substantiam vel aliquid aliud significet A.

116) an add. P.

117) in gramatica dicitur] dicitur in arte gramatica A.

118) Tractantes...accidentibus] Nos itaque de singulis accidentibus tractantes A.

demonstrabimus quale sit<sup>119)</sup>, an communis proprietas an secundaria significatio. Si<sup>120)</sup> quis insistat<sup>121)</sup> illa accidentia cui subiecto insint<sup>122)</sup>, an aeri quod est vox an loquenti, dicimus hec esse nugatoria quia dicimus accidit proconvenit<sup>123)</sup>.

GLOSE M fol. 44 rb P fol. 47 va

Et est sciendum quod numerus alius realis, alius vocalis. Et est realis numerus singularitas et pluralitas, vocalis vero est numerus terminatio, qua discernitur utrum de uno an de pluribus sit sermo<sup>124)</sup>.

SUMMA A fol. 46 rb

Numerus in gramatica modis duobus consideratur. Tum dicitur secundum rem tum secundum vocem. Numerus vero secundum rem est pluralitas vel singularitas. Numerus vero secundum vocem est forma dictionis ex qua discernitur utrum ad unum vel ad plura pertineat locutio...

Petrus Helias is doubting that "numerus secundum rem" is a good term for such nouns as the collective nouns and introduces here "modus significandi":

SUMMA A fol. 46 va

Nomina itaque licet non omnia secundario singularitatem vel pluralitatem significant et fortasse magis esset congruum dicere quod nomina nec principaliter nec secundario predicta significant sed sunt modi significandi ut quoniam nomen significat singulariter vel pluraliter.

William of Conches does not use "modus significandi" here, but

119) scil. add. P.

120) Tunc si P.

121) instat M.

122) insunt P.

123) Si quis...convenit] Si quis autem demonstret in quo subiecto sint accidentia huiusmodi an scil. aeri quod est vox secundum quosdam an loquenti an alicui alii sicut diversi diversa super hoc senserunt nos vero dicimus quod (quia MS) inutilis est huiusmodi inquisitio et frivola; hec enim accidentia sola similitudine dicuntur, non aliqua rei subiecte informatione A.

124) discernitur...sermo] the bottom of the folio is cut away in M here.

both authors use it for the quasi-accident, "forma", of the verb (see below).

### GENUS of the Noun.

GLOSE M fol. 41 ra P fol. 45 rb, SUMMA A fol. 39 vb

Genus igitur in gramatica aliud reale aliud vocale<sup>125)</sup>. Reale vero genus<sup>126)</sup> est sexus vel masculinus vel femininus dictum a generando quia hi<sup>127)</sup> duo sexus possunt generare. Videntes igitur<sup>128)</sup> auctores alterum de his sexibus esse in quibusdam rerum, in quibusdam neutrum, tales inveniunt voces quibus sic substantiam<sup>129)</sup> nominarent quod<sup>130)</sup> secundo significarent an aliquem sexum esse in ipsa vel neutrum...<sup>131)</sup> M ibid. P fol. 45 va A fol. 40 ra: Est ergo reale genus sexus, vocale vero genus est terminatio vel constructio ex qua vox discernit alterum sexum vel neutrum vel est simile cum discernentibus alterum sexum vel neutrum<sup>132)</sup>.

GLOSE M fol. 41 rb P fol. 45 va, SUMMA A fol. 40 ra

Viso quid sit reale genus quid vocale queramus quod illorum dicatur nomini accidere<sup>133)</sup>. Si dicamus reale genus<sup>134)</sup> accidere nomini i.e.<sup>135)</sup> esse<sup>136)</sup> secundariam significationem nominis<sup>137)</sup> non convenit<sup>138)</sup> omni nomini. Albedo enim<sup>139)</sup>

125) genus...vocale] Genus ergo in gramatica duobus modis consideratur secundum rem et secundum vocem A.

126) Reale...genus] Genus vero secundum rem A.

127) hii P.

128) itaque A ergo P.

129) substantias A.

130) ut A.

131) an aliquem...neutrum] an aliquis sexuum inesset eis an neuter A.

132) Est ergo...neutrum] Genus vero secundum vocem est discretio alterius sexus vel neutri vel per articuli adiunctionem ut "hic vir" "hec mulier" "hoc mancipium" vel per diversas terminationes ut albus, -ba, -bum, vel per alterius iungibilitatem ex qua dinoscitur cuius generis sint ea quibus articulare pronomen non adiungitur... A.

133) Viso...accidere] Ex his manifestum est quoniam A.

134) dicamus...genus] dixerimus genus secundum rem A.

135) Si...i.e. om. P.

136) esse eius A.

137) om. A.

138) conveniet A.

139) Albedo enim] quia albedo hoc nomen dico A.

nullum sexum secundario significat. Dicamus<sup>140)</sup> ergo hoc de<sup>141)</sup> vocali sic: Genus<sup>142)</sup> accidit<sup>143)</sup> i.e. convenit nomini scil.<sup>144)</sup> talis terminatio et constructio ex qua discernat alterum sexum vel neutrum vel ex qua sit<sup>145)</sup> simile discernentibus<sup>146)</sup>.

#### FIGURA of the Noun.

GLOSE M fol. 44 vb P fol. 49 rb

Et est figura de illis accidentibus que sunt communes proprietates dictionum non de illis que sunt secundarie significationes.

The SUMMA has the same doctrine but with an interesting addition:

SUMMA A fol. 48 ra

...Patet autem ex predictis quod figura est de illis accidentibus que sunt communes vocum proprietates.

Non enim potest esse no-/fol. 48 rb/-minis secundaria significatio. Habet enim nomen significare tribus modis:

- I. representationem et per se totum ut hoc nomen "albus" representat albedinem hoc accidens animo nostro vel
- II. nominationem et secundum se totum, iterum ut "albus" nominat rem albam,
- III. vel representationem sed secundum partem sui, ut "albus" per terminationem representat et genus et numerum et casum sed nullo istorum modorum representat nomen figuram non est ergo figura nominis secundaria significatio.

This is a combination of William's "significatio est equivocum ad tria" printed above p. 29 and a gloss in the GLOSE ad locum:

140) dicimus M.

141) ergo hoc de] hoc ergo P ergo quod A.

142) vocali...Genus] genus secundum vocem A.

143) accidit nomini A.

144) i.e. P.

145) om. M.

146) convenit...discernentibus] convenit ei aliquo predictorum modorum alterum sexum discernere vel neutrum vel esse saltem simile in constructione nominibus alterum sexum vel neutrum discernentibus. Et est genus secundum vocem communis proprietas vocum A.

GLOSE M fol. 45 ra P fol. 49 va

Sic igitur quedam accidentia dictionum discernuntur<sup>147)</sup> in parte ipsorum ut numerus, casus, genus, quedam in tota ipsius quantitate ut figura, quedam in sensu ut species.

#### CASUS of the Noun.

GLOSE M fol. 46 ra P fol. 50 vb, SUMMA A fol. 49 vb

Et notandum quod casus in gramatica duobus modis<sup>148)</sup> accipitur. Aliquando enim dicitur casus talis<sup>149)</sup> proprietas dictionis<sup>150)</sup> scil. cadendi in alium<sup>151)</sup> vel cadendi ab alio<sup>152)</sup>. Aliquando<sup>153)</sup> vero dicitur casus<sup>154)</sup> vox cui convenit ista<sup>155)</sup> proprietas quod cadit in alium vel cadit<sup>156)</sup> ab alio...<sup>157)</sup>

Casus is only a proprietas communis in the GLOSE and the SUMMA and therefore not divided into "casus secundum rem" and "casus secundum vocum", though such a distinction did exist in other grammatical treatises (of the Twelfth century?), as it was criticized by the Modistae later (Thurot (19) 249).

#### The Accidents of the Verb.

(For the accidents "species", "figura", "numerus" the GLOSE and the SUMMA refer to the treatment under the noun:)

#### The GENUS of the Verb.

GLOSE M fol. 51 ra P fol. 56 vb, SUMMA A fol. 62 va

Est igitur genus verbi qualitas communis<sup>158)</sup> verborum con-

147) non discernuntur M.

148) Et notandum...modis] Casus igitur duobus modis in gramatica A.

149) om. A.

150) dictionis talis A.

151) aliam A.

152) alia. Et vox illa alicuius esse dicitur casus cui convenit ista proprietas A.

153) Quandoque A.

154) talis...casus] om. M.

155) convenit ista] ista convenit P.

156) cadat M.

157) vox cui...ab alio] vox ipsa cui convenit in alium casum cadere vel ab alio A.

158) om. A.

tracta ex terminatione et significatione. Non<sup>159)</sup> enim sola terminatio facit genus cum eandem terminationem habeant verba diversorum generum ut activa et neutra. Similiter nec sola significatio facit genus. Ergo<sup>160)</sup> de terminatione<sup>161)</sup> et significatione dicamus ut istis coniunctis videamus quod genus possit inde effici<sup>162)</sup>.

William does not in this accident keep up his distinction of secondary signification or "proprietas communis", but uses the rather vague term "qualitas" as the accident adds no extra meaning to the main sense of the verb, but is embodied in the main sense, i.e. "agere vel pati".

GLOSE M fol. 51 rb P fol. 56 vb

Sic igitur predictae qualitates ex terminatione et significatione contractae dicuntur genera verborum.

Petrus Helias, on the other hand, regards the accident to be a "communis proprietas", but appears not to be too sure:

SUMMA A fol. 63 ra

Videntur autem esse communes proprietates vocum, non secundarie significationes.

#### The TEMPUS of the Verb.

The tense of the verb is a secondary signification.

GLOSE P fol. 59 vb<sup>163)</sup>

SUMMA A fol. 67 vb

...Et hoc est accidens de illis que sunt secundarie vocum significationes. Cum enim verbum principaliter significet actionem vel passionem secundario tempus significat i.e. determi-

Patet autem ex his que predicta sunt quod tempus est secundaria significatio verbi non communis proprietas. Sic enim principaliter agere vel pati significat ut secundario etiam

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159) nec A.

160) om. A, ergo et P.

161) ergo add. A.

162) dicamus...effici] dicendum est ut ex his coniunctis quod genus inde effici possit videamus.

163) M has a lacuna ad Prisc. VIII 30-93, between fol. 52 v and 53 r.

nat eam esse presentem ut "le-  
go" vel preteritam ut "legi"  
vel futuram ut "legam".

"quando" significet i.e. vel in  
presenti vel in preterito vel  
in futuro...

The authority of Aristotle is brought in here too:  
GLOSE P ibid.

Quod autem secundario significatur tempus a verbo testatur  
Aristotiles qui ait "verbum est quod consignificat tempus"<sup>164)</sup>  
William divides "tempus" into three different kinds, "tempus ge-  
neralis, totalis, partialis". This distinction he made in the  
GLOSE SUPER PLATONEM too (ed. Jeauneau (7) 176 f.). The dis-  
tinction is mentioned by Petrus Helias, but rejected.  
GLOSE P ibid.

Et notandum quod tempus tribus  
modis accipitur, generaliter,  
partialiter, totaliter... (of  
these William prefers tempus  
partialis for the tense of  
the verb) P fol. 60 ra:  
...Tempus quod accidit verbo  
ac si diceret pars preterita  
vel presens vel futura, non  
totum spacium secundario sig-  
nificatur a verbo.

SUMMA A fol. 61 va

Tempus ut antiquis visum est  
tribus modis accipitur, gene-  
raliter, totaliter, particula-  
riter(!)... fol. 61 vb: Dixe-  
runt itaque antiqui quod se-  
cundum hanc ultimam acceptio-  
nem tempus verbo accidit quia  
verbum significat ut eis vide-  
tur non illud magnum spatium  
sed partes eius. Quod longe  
aliter mihi videtur. Nec enim  
verba puto consignificare tem-  
poris<sup>165)</sup> quantitatem sed tem-  
pus quando.

#### The MODUS of the Verb.

The moods are divided into "modus realis" and "modus vocalis",  
the former being the secondary signification, the latter the  
"proprietas communis":

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164) Perihermeneias 16 b et alibi.

165) tempus MS.

GLOSE P fol. 64 va - vb<sup>166)</sup>, SUMMA A fol. 75 va

Et est realis modus<sup>167)</sup> affectus animi circa actionem vel passionem<sup>168)</sup>.

...Aliquando enim afficimur ipsam indicare aliquando impere aliquando<sup>169)</sup> alii coniungere. Ad quos<sup>170)</sup> affectus animi secundario significandos quedam collectiones vocum<sup>171)</sup> sunt invente que vocales modi<sup>172)</sup> dicuntur<sup>173)</sup>.

GLOSE P fol. 64 vb

SUMMA A fol. 75 vb

Cum igitur accidit verbo, si de reali<sup>174)</sup> hoc dicitur sic exponimus: Modus accidit verbo i.e. est secundaria significatio verbi. Si de vocali hoc dicitur, sic: Modus accidit verbo i.e. talis collectio vocum qui affectum animi significet convenit verbo.

Accidit autem verbo modus uterque sed modus secundum rem accidit verbo i.e. est eius secundaria significatio et ut veracissime loquar modus secundum vocem magis est quedam communis proprietas vocum.

#### The CONIUGATIO of the Verb.

The coniugation of the verb is considered a "communis proprietas":

GLOSE P fol. 67 va<sup>175)</sup>

SUMMA A fol. 80 ra

Sed queritur quod accidens dicitur coniugatio an secundaria verbi significatio an communis

Ut tamen magis proprie loquar videtur coniugatio esse verborum quedam secundum predictas

166) M has a lacuna, cf. note 163.

167) realis modus] modus secundum rem A.

168) vel passionem om. P.

169) aliquando] quandoque optare quandoque A.

170) hos autem A.

171) voces P.

172) modis P.

173) secundario significandos...dicuntur] designandos secundario reperte sunt quedam vocum collectiones que dicuntur modi secundum vocem A.

174) reale MS.

175) M has a lacuna, cf. note 163.



verborum qualitas cui dicimus  
quandam communem verborum qua-  
litem vocari coniugationem  
scil. similitudinem declina-  
tionis.

declinationes similitudo ut  
sit coniugatio communis verbo-  
rum proprietas non eorum se-  
cundaria significatio.

### The PERSONA of the Verb.

In the "persona" of the verb Petrus Helias disagreed with William's view that "persona" is a secondary signification (a doctrine he shared with the later Ralph of Beauvais, Hunt (12) 34 f.). Petrus Helias held that "persona" was only a "communis proprietas"; he also referred to William's distinction between "persona realis" and "persona vocalis", which he rejected, but with the interesting addition that he might in the later glosses slip into using those very terms! Knowing his way of exploiting William's and other grammarians' glosses we know why.

GLOSE M fol. 53 vb P fol. 68 va, SUMMA A fol. 80 vb - 81 ra  
Est igitur<sup>176)</sup> persona ut ait Boetius<sup>177)</sup> rationalis<sup>178)</sup>  
creature<sup>179)</sup> individua essentia<sup>180)</sup> i.e. individuum quod  
potest uti ratione<sup>181)</sup>. In hac ergo<sup>182)</sup> persona tres  
sunt<sup>183)</sup> diversitates<sup>184)</sup>. Aliquando enim<sup>185)</sup> loquitur  
de se aliquando ad alium de ipso<sup>186)</sup> aliquando ad aliam  
diversam a se et ab illa ad quam<sup>187)</sup> loquitur. Sed ex  
hoc<sup>188)</sup> quod potest loqui dicitur persona.

176) et igitur] ut autem sententiam antiquorum primo exequar A.

177) est (res suprascript.) add. A.

178) rationabilis M.

179) om. A. nec P.

180) substantia A.

181) individuum...ratione] res singularis que ratione uti potest A.

182) autem A.

183) om. M.

184) notantur vel sunt add. manu corr. M.

185) tantum A.

186) alium de ipso] aliam de ipsa A.

187) ad quam] ad quem P, ad qua M.

188) Sed ex hoc] ex hoc igitur A.

GLOSE M et P ibid.

Persona igitur accidit verbo quia est secundaria<sup>189)</sup> significatio.

SUMMA A fol. 81 rb

Est itaque persona communis proprietas non secundaria vocum significatio.

"persona realis" and "persona vocalis":

GLOSE ibid.

PRIMA EST. Diffinit primam<sup>190)</sup> personam ita quia<sup>191)</sup> ex diffinitione potest cognosci et realis et vocalis persona<sup>192)</sup> prima, i.e. que persona debeat<sup>193)</sup> indicari prima et que vox prime persone sic... (the same argument is carried through for the other personae).

SUMMA A fol. 81 rb

Quod autem quidam dixerunt personam tum secundum rem tum secundum vocem debere accipi non omnino veraciter dictum credimus. Licet nos et illam sententiam in locis quibusdam fortasse interposuerimus. Dicit tamen Priscianus quod prima persona est que loquitur de se vel sola vel cum aliis...de se vel solam ut "lego" vel cum aliis ut "legimus". Illud enim attribuit rei quod vocis est propter doctrine indifferentiam. Eodemque modo de secunda et tertia dicendum est.

#### The "forma" of the Verb.

The quasi-accident "forma" is divided into "forma realis" and "forma vocalis". The "formae" are described as "modi significandi", which is hardly used as a technical term here.

189) eiusdem add. M.

190) om. M.

191) ita quia om. P.

192) om. M.

193) persona debeat] persona prima dabat M.

GLOSE M fol. 27 va<sup>194)</sup>, SUMMA A fol. 19 va ad Prisc. II 18  
 (PROPRIUM EST VERBI ACTIONEM SIVE PASSIONEM SIVE UTRUMQUE CUM  
 MODIS ET FORMIS ET TEMPORIBUS SINE CASU SIGNIFICARE)...Nunc  
 de forma dicamus predicendi<sup>195)</sup> modos significandi actionem  
 vel passionem<sup>196)</sup>. Significamus igitur aliquando actionem  
 ita<sup>197)</sup> quod secundo<sup>198)</sup> meditationem ut lecturio quan-  
 doque inchoationem ut legisco quandoque frequentationem ut  
 lectito<sup>199)</sup> et similia. Hec igitur determinationes<sup>200)</sup> cir-  
 ca actionem vel passionem dicuntur forme realis in gramati-  
 ca, vocalis vero<sup>201)</sup> dicuntur terminationes<sup>202)</sup> que hoc<sup>203)</sup>  
 designant ut -urio, et -to, vel -xo et similia<sup>204)</sup>. Verbum  
 igitur<sup>205)</sup> significat actionem vel passionem cum utraque  
 forma...

Scattered references to other grammarians throughout the GLOSE  
 make it clear that the distinction between an accident "realis"  
 and "vocalis" was common grammatical doctrine in William's days,  
 to which he probably only added his systematical division into  
 secondary signification and "proprietas communis".

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194) P has a lacuna ad Prisc. II 17- 21.

195) Nunc...predicendo] <Forma> ut intelligatur oportet ut A.

196) pretermittamus add. A.

197) igitur aliquando actionem ita] ergo actionem quandoque sic A.

198) secundo] circa eam determinamus A.

199) vel desiderium ut "viso" add. A.

200) determinationis M.

201) realis...vero] secundum rem in gramatica. Forme vero secun-  
 dum vocem A.

202) determinationes A.

203) ista A.

204) et -to...similia] et -to...similis M, -to, -sco et huius-  
 modi A.

205) itaque A.

## CONCLUSION.

It seems safe to conclude that Petrus Helias relied heavily on the work of his predecessors. He quotes earlier grammarians from the Eleventh and Twelfth century, viz. the GLOSULE and the formalized approach to the "causa inventionis" and the treatment of the accidents he took over from William of Conches, literally writing out long sections from the GLOSE, of which he probably only knew the earlier version. His claim to an original attempt of clarifying the demarcation border between grammar and logic is seriously impaired too (Hunt (11) 220). His terminology is not as strict as William's as in the case of the "suppositum" and "modus significandi" and the treatment of the pronouns. Yet in extending the use of "modus significandi" to the accident "numerus" of the noun he shows an advance in doctrine, but breaks up his own distinction into a kernel of meaning inherent in the noun and qualified by the accident's secondary signification.

In the development of grammatical doctrine William of Conches - and Petrus Helias - do not pose as innovators but stand at the end of a period refining systematically earlier grammarians' views. Their doctrine is built around the semantical concepts of the noun and verb having a kernel of meaning of their own, which can be qualified by a secondary "impositio"; or by a secondary meaning added by the accidents, verbally expressed in the termination probably invented by the "Impositor".

The relationship to the "logical" and "ontological substratum" was carefully worked out in the assignation of a "nominatum" to all nouns and adjectives and interrogative and indefinite pronouns; the special properties of these parts of speech were handled as the "officium" or "modus significandi", when they needed to solve the intricate difficulties which their purely semantical grammar put them in. Yet the ontological considerations were kept firmly in hand and while they freely used logical terminology it was kept to the limit. Grammarians of that period did not deal in "propositiones", but in sentences.

Compared with the grammarians of the end of the next century much of their systematical treatment of semantical concepts appears to be naive, mainly because of a lack of understanding of syntax and because of a still primitive knowledge of logic. How far they knew the "new" logic of the middle of the Twelfth century is difficult to say yet when neither the GLOSE nor the SUMMA are edited in a critical edition. This is a desideratum especially in the case of the GLOSE, where a full text would elucidate too what caused William to rework some of the earlier version.

## APPENDIX I.

## GLOSE

P fol. 76 va ad Prisc. XII 1

(shorter in M fol. 6o r)

Sed queritur cum pronomen referatur ad nomen appellativum, ut, si dicam "homo ambulat, idem movetur", ad hoc appellativum nomen scil. "homo" refertur hoc pronomen "idem", cur magis dicatur poni pro proprio nomine quam pro appellativo? Ad quod quidam sic respondent: quod et pro appellativo et pro nomine proprio ponitur pronomen, sed quia frequentius ponitur pro proprio quam pro appellativo iccirco dicitur poni pro nomine proprio. Sed quia parum valet ista expositio iccirco ostendamus qualiter pronomen ponatur semper pro nomine proprio, illud premonstrantes quod duobus modis dicitur una dictio poni pro alia, vel ubi illa prius ponebatur vel in significatione illius i.e. ad significandum quod illa significat, et priore quidem modo pronomen ponitur pro appellativo nomine, ut si dicam "homo ambulat, idem movetur", "idem" ibi ponitur, ubi nomen prius ponebatur i.e. in subiecto termino propositionis, sed in significatione appellativi nominis numquam ponitur pronomen sed semper in significatione proprii et hoc modo accipitur a<u>ctor<is> "poni pro proprio nomine" cum dixit pronomen accipi pro proprio nomine.

Vere sunt igitur due propositiones "pronomen ponitur pro proprio nomine", "pronomen ponitur pro appellativo nomine" sed aliter et aliter accipitur "poni pro nomine". Et quia dicimus pronomen poni pro proprio nomine i.e. in significatione illius de significatione utriusque ad evidentiam huius loci pauca dicamus.

Significat quidem nomen proprium substantiam individuum cum qualitate propria, nomen vero appellativum vel genus vel speciem vel aliud universale vel figmenta animi vel modos loquendi de rebus etc.

De significatione pronominum hoc invenimus in a<u>ctoribus quod ipsa significant substantiam sine qualitate i.e. quod ipsa significant meram substantiam. Iccirco quidam male intelligentes auctoritatem confingunt quasdam substantias meras et omnibus accidentibus spoliatas. Cum queritur ab eis quid sit et ubi sit talis substantia dicunt nullam talem esse in actu sed in sinu nature tales sunt multe.

Alii subtilius perscrutantes dicunt quod talis substantia omni accidente spoliata<est>. Est enim generalis<s>imum substantia ut si quis intelligat hominem absque omni propria qualitate, reperiet hanc speciem hominem; si quis vero sic iungat intellectu ab homine formas que illam speciem constituent, scil. rationale, mortale, bipes gressibile statim repperit hoc genus animal. Iterum separans formis constituentibus, animalis corpus remanet; seiuncta corporeitate remanet substantia in sua simplicitate (!) i.e. carens omni accidente et talem substantiam significat pronomen.

Hoc asserunt quidam errantes /fol. 76 vb/ ex verbis auctorum et male ea intelligentes quia nichil aliud est "nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate" quam hoc "significat substantiam et qualitatem" et est idem dicere "pronomen significat substantiam sine qualitate vel meram substantiam" quod "pronomen significat substantiam et non qualitatem". Et quamvis non sit substantia sine qualitate tamen potest significari sine qualitate i.e. ita quod nulla eius qualitas significetur, sicut cum non sit homo qui non sit aliquis homo possumus loqui de homine, ita quod de nullo homine loquimur et eo modo quo potest esse sermo de rebus possunt significari.

Dicimus enim quod etiam ubi pronomen refertur ad appellativum nomen ibi ponitur pro proprio nomine i.e. in significatione proprii nominis i.e. ad significandum aliquam individuum substantiam. Nam si dicatur "homo ambulat, idem movetur", istud pronomen "idem" ponitur ad significandum propriam substantiam. Intelligimus enim per hoc pronomen "idem" quod ille idem homo qui ambulat movetur; si dicatur quod

nescimus per illud pronomen de quo sit sermo, dicimus quod<sup>1)</sup> verum est sed ille qui profert forsitan scit pro quo proferrat "homo ambulat" et de eodem verum est quod movetur. Et sive sciatur, sive nesciatur de quo homine sit sermo, tamen scitur per pronomen "idem" quod ille qui ambulat movetur, quod nesciretur si nomen repeteretur. Nam tunc propositiones possunt esse vere vel false pro diversis ut si diceretur "homo ambulat, homo movetur", sed cum pronomen relativum ibi ponitur pro eodem vere sunt semper (!) ambe propositiones vel false, ut cum dicitur "homo ambulat, idem movetur" ad eandem personam referendus est actus uterque.

Sed querent de hoc pronomine "ego" utrum significet aliquam substantiam individuum et sic habeat significationem alicuius nominis proprii. Si dicamus quod habet significationem alicuius nominis proprii, querent cuius, an huius nominis, "Socratis" an alterius. Ad quod dicimus quod habet significationem omnium priorum nominum proferentium illud et ita significat multas substantias individuales.

Unde dicent illud esse equivocum. Nos vero dicimus quod non est quia numquam una prolatione nisi unam significat substantiam quare non est equivocum. Sed voce<sup>(s)</sup> ille, que una prolatione diversa significant, ut hoc nomen "canis", equivoce<sup>2)</sup> sunt, sed obiciunt:

Cum hoc pronomen "ego" infinitas significet substantias significat eas naturaliter an ad placitum? non possumus dicere quod naturaliter.

Opportet igitur quod ad placitum; concludunt igitur ex impositione quod licet possimus<sup>3)</sup> contradicere tamen concedimus quod ex impositione significat omnes loquentes, "tu" omnes illos ad quos sermo dirigitur, "iste" omnes illos de quibus est sermo per ipsum, similiter "ille" et cetera pronomina.

1) quia MS.

2) equivoce MS.

3) possumus MS.



Sed obiciunt: si pronomen "ego" ex impositione significat omnes loquentes igitur aliquis imposuit illud ad omnes loquentes significandum, quod si concedatur concluditur: ergo aliquis imposuit illud ad significandum multos quos non cognoscebat. Non enim qui imposuit hoc pronomen "ego" cognoscebat omnes illos qui tunc loquebantur de se per hoc pronomen "ego" vel postea nascituri erant et locuturi de se per hoc pronomen. Et ita imposuit aliquis /fol. 77 ra/ vocem ad significandum quod quando imposuit nescivit esse significativum.

Iccirco non est mirum de hoc pronomine "ego" et de aliis si habeant multos significare quos non cognoscebat<sup>1)</sup> ad quod respondetur quod hoc non est mirum. Non enim imponitur huius pronominis illud ad significandum aliquam rem determinate, ita scil. quod <si> diceret "ego" hoc pronomen significaret hunc hominem vel hunc, sed ita imposuit quod hoc pronomen significaret omnes loquentes cumque essent, sive nati iam essent sive nascituri sive eos cognosceret sive non. Nec hoc est mirum si quis imposuit hoc pronomen ad significandum quod non cognoscebat. Nam qui imposuit hoc nomen "homo" licet ipsum imposuisset ad unam tantum speciem significandam, tamen sic imposuit quod nominaret omnes homines, tam bene illos quos ignorabat impositor quam quos cognoscebat ille qui inposuit et de quibus nesciebat quod essent significandi per illa pronomina.

Aliter solent alii magistri exponere hoc capitulum scil. quod pronomina ponuntur pro proprio nomine et non pro appellativo, licet ad appellativum referatur sicut predictum est. Illi dicunt quod propria nomina habent significationem et officium, similiter appellativa habent significationem et officium.

Propria nomina igitur significant aliquam substantiam et eius propriam qualitatem. Officium eorum est nominare illam eandem rem quam significant, ita scil. quod discernant

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1) Iccirco...cognoscebat] in marg. additum.

illam ab omnibus aliis, sicut hoc nomen "Socrates" significat Socratem. Et habet propriam hanc qualitatem que designatur hac descriptione albus crispus musicus Sophronici filius et ita nominat quod significat i.e. Socratem, quod discernit eum ab omnibus aliis, quantum impositum est i.e. nisi equivocatio impediat vel ignorantia impositionis nominis.

Appellativa vero nomina habent significare aliqua universalis et aliquam communem qualitatem ut "homo". Hoc nomen significat hanc speciem: hominem, communem qualitatem: rationale. Officium eorum est omnia individua illorum universalium que significant nominare, sed nullum eorum ab aliis distinguere sicut predictum appellativum i.e. "homo" omnia individua huius speciei hominis habet nominare sed nullum distinguere ab aliis.

Pronomen igitur nec significatione nec officio ponitur pro appellativo quia <non> significat qualitatem communem ut appellativum et quicquid pronomen nominet vel significet distinguit ab omnibus aliis quod appellativum minime facit et ita nec officio ponitur pro appellativo.

Pro proprio autem nomine ponitur saltem officio. Nam quamvis non significet propriam qualitatem ut nomen proprium; quod tamen significat distinguit ab omnibus aliis rebus, ut proprium nomen quod significat similiter distinguit naturaliter ab omnibus aliis rebus.

## APPENDIX II.

## THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE COMMENTUM SUPER BOETIUM DE TRINITATE.

The COMMENTUM SUPER BOETIUM DE TRINITATE, printed among Thierry of Chartres' trinitarian treatises, has by the editor prof. N.M. Häring been vigorously defended as a treatise from Thierry's hand although the COMMENTUM, which is found without indication of authorship in three of the four manuscripts, is ascribed by the scribe, who wrote the COMMENTUM, to (Petrus) Helias in the fourth manuscript, Oxford, Bodl, Lyell 49 fol. 81.

Häring's reasons for ascribing the COMMENTUM to Thierry are sound, based on doctrinal and stylistic considerations (Häring (1) 28-38 and (6) 20 ff.), yet the stylistic similarities between the COMMENTUM and the other trinitarian glosses by Thierry are not decisive.

Literary devices such as the common Accessus scheme (auctoris intentio, utilitas libri, causa operis / ad quem scribit) did not originate with Thierry, but are taken over from Boethius' work. Even if this Accessus scheme is not found in other trinitarian glosses from the middle of the Twelfth century and peculiar to Thierry, it should not surprise us that Petrus Helias used them too in the COMMENTUM. After all, Petrus Helias used the same Accessus scheme for the Artes in his SUMMA (Hunt (13) 88 ff.) and in the commentary on the De Inventionem (Ward (20) vol. II 284) which Thierry used for his rhetorical glosses (Fredborg (10) 10). Other stylistic similarities between the COMMENTUM and Thierry's theological treatises as the rhetorical glosses on Boethius' proems "facit dociles, attentos, benivolos" are certainly not peculiar to Thierry but stock literary devices found in many authors of the period cf. William of Conches' GLOSE SUPER PRISCIANUM (Jeauneau (14) 246), William of Conches' GLOSE SUPER PLATONEM (ed. Jeauneau (7) 65, 67) and Gilbert of Poitiers COMMENTARIES ON BOETHIUS, DE TRINITATE (ed. N.M. Häring (2) 66).

The doctrinal similarities between the COMMENTUM and the other trinitarian glosses by Thierry and his pupil Clarembald of Arras are more important as proof of Thierry's authorship. Yet we have seen that Petrus Helias was not above using long passages from other authors in his SUMMA and, as he is a pupil of Thierry's, one would expect a certain agreement between their views.

The close agreement between the COMMENTUM and the trinitarian glosses by Clarembald of Arras, explained by Häring as Clarembald writing out passages from Thierry's COMMENTUM (Häring (1) 28-38) could as easily be explained as Petrus Helias and Clarembald following the same lectures by Thierry, both copying freely from their teacher. That interpretation gives a better sense to Clarembald's statement that he followed his master, Thierry's lectures in writing his glosses not Thierry's written work, (ed. Häring (1) 64), a statement which puzzled Häring.

Finally, Häring's objection to Petrus Helias as a master of theology because he is only renowned as a master in the liberal arts does not carry enough weight. If the COMMENTUM on other grounds can be ascribed to Petrus Helias, the COMMENTUM itself will vindicate Petrus Helias' abilities in theology, and he would naturally be assigned a place among the big group of masters from that period teaching both. Thierry of Chartres too was mainly remembered for his interest in the liberal arts. (Metalogicon ed. Webb (3) 16,16). So I can see no very firm reasons for refuting the testimony of the scribe who considered Petrus Helias to be the author of the COMMENTUM.

On the other hand a little, positive proof of Petrus Helias' authorship can be found in the comparison of the COMMENTUM and the SUMMA. The doctrine in both treatises is not incompatible and a certain literal agreement can be found, but mostly in very short passages and as part of doctrine shared with other masters of the Twelfth century.

The most interesting agreement between the SUMMA and the COMMENTUM is a gloss on the number of the cathegories, where

the COMMENTUM quotes Petrus Helias' definition of the parts of speech, according to their "modum significandi". Such grammatical observations are not found in Thierry's glosses ad locum in his other commentaries and lectures on the De Trinitate:

COMMENTUM ed. Häring (6) 97  
ad De Trinitate IV 6

SUMMA MS Arsenal 711 fol.16 rb  
ed. Thurot (19) 152 f.

Prisc. II 15

Predicamentum igitur est predicabile... sed ita ut quamvis plura sint quorum unumquodque in eo quod quid est nec aliter predicetur et unumquodque illorum predicamentum sit substantie non tamen propter hoc plura vel diversa sint substantie predicamenta quia omnia illa unum sunt predicamentum, sicut quamvis unumquodque nomen sit hec pars orationis scilicet nomen et plura sint nomina non tamen ideo plures sunt partes quarum unaqueque sit nomen eo videlicet quod omnia nomina una pars orationis sunt propter unum et eundem quem habent significandi modum.

Sed dicet aliquis: "dictiones sunt infinite; sed unaqueque dictio est pars orationis ita scil. quod unaqueque illarum per se accepta est illa pars. Ergo partes orationis sunt infinite". Quod non provenit cum multe et infinite dictiones sint una et eadem pars orationis, ita quod unaqueque illarum per se accepta est illa pars. Scis quare omnia nomina dicantur esse una pars et eadem orationis, ita quod unumquodque illorum est illa pars, ideo scil. quia hec pars orationis distinguitur ab aliis secundum suum modum significandi.

Yet this argument for the number of the categories need not to have originated with Petrus Helias, but could have been taken over from Thierry's lectures as Thierry in his LECTIONES (ed. Häring (6) 188) and the abbreviated lectures found in the ABBREVIATIO MONACENSIS (ed. Häring (6) 365) refer to a similar argument.

The agreement between the COMMENTUM and the SUMMA here can be interpreted in two ways. Either it is the single positive evidence of Petrus Helias' authorship of the COMMENTUM and we have a new important treatise among Petrus Helias' work. Or,

if Thierry's referring to a similar argument for the number of the categories in the *LECTIONES* and the abbreviated form of these, the *ABBREVIATIO MONACENSIS*, is reckoned to be more important and we therefore consider Thierry to be the author of the *COMMENTUM*, we have to conclude that the doctrine of "modus significandi" of a part of speech probably came to Petrus Helias from his master Thierry of Chartres and that this one original contribution to the grammatical doctrine, otherwise for a great part taken over from William of Conches, was not his at all but also a part of Petrus Helias' exploitation of his masters' work. Another gloss in the *COMMENTUM*, also different from Thierry's glosses ad locum in the other trinitarian treatises, but agreeing with the *SUMMA* should be interpreted in the same way:

*COMMENTUM* ed. Häring (6) 103  
ad De Trinitate IV 30

*SUMMA* Arsenal. 711 fol. 18 v  
ad Prisc. II 18, (Hunt. (11)  
230)

PREDICAMENTA inquit substantie, qualitatis etiam et quantitatis, sunt huiusmodi ut id quod predicatur idem sit actu cum eo quod subicitur. Socrates namque et magnitudo Socratis idem actuale sunt. Idem enim actu sunt.

Primo ergo dicendum est quod cum sint decem prima rerum genera, scil. substantia et qualitas et alia huiusmodi, cetera vero omnia tamen idem actu sunt cum substantia, - Socrates enim et albedo Socratis idem actu sunt - non dico quod sint idem sed dico quod idem actu sunt, quoniam quantum ad esse actu non differunt.

Of these two interpretations it seems more reasonable to me that Petrus Helias, as the scribe wrote, is the author of the *COMMENTUM* and that he here too exploited his predecessors' work. The promised edition of the *SUMMA* will make his lack of originality more evident and we shall in the comparison of Petrus Helias' newly found Commentary on the *De Inventione* and the commentary on the same by Thierry of Chartres find another reasonable mean of determining the particular manner of borrowing and thus on firmer grounds judge the importance of Petrus Helias in the history of the *Artes* in the middle of the Twelfth century.

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