WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX ON BOETHIUS' TOPICS ACCORDING TO ORLEANS BIBL.
MUN. 266.

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The manuscript Orleans B. M. 266 has attracted a good deal of interest from students of Medieval logic. It is a miscellaneous manuscript containing 28 logical works from the 12th century. 1) The manuscript comes from Fleury. One of the interesting points about the manuscript is its many references to the teachers and contemporaries of Peter Abelard. 2) Especially it contains some works which are ascribed to Gauzelinus (Jocelyn) of Soissons or his pupils either by the manuscript or by modern research. 3) In the manuscript are also found some "sententie secundum magistrum Petrum" which have been tentatively ascribed to Abelard by Minio-Paluello. 4) The rest of the "magistri" are only referred to, or to put it in other words: the rest of the works are anonymous.

I have been concerned with the commentaries on Boethius, De Differentiis Topicis found in the manuscript. Four such gloss-commentaries are found in the manuscript, all anonymous. The first of them (pp.43a-78a, incomplete) is also found in two other manuscripts. 5) It seems to have no connection with the three other commentaries. No magistri are referred to by name in this commentary.

The three other commentaries are placed together in the manuscript. First a short description of them:

1) See the description of the MS in L.Minio-Paluello, Twelfth Century Logic II, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura Roma 1958, pp.XLI-XLVI.
3) MS p.149a glosses on De Divisione ascribed to J. by the MS. MS.p.154 bsq. "De generibus et speciebus" ascribed to J. by Ritter (Geschichte der Philosophie VII,1844,363).
4) MS pp.278-281. See Minio-Paluello op.cit. pp.XXXIX-XLI. The texts are edited op.cit.pp.111-114 (paralogismus), 114-121 (totum).
5) Paris Arsenal 910,ff.105-120; Vat.Reg.Lat.230,ff.72-79v; information found in L.M.De Rijk, Logica Modernorum I, Van Gorcum Assen 1962,p.119. I have studied this comm. in the Paris-MS.
1. pp. 194b-204b ("Supplementa")

**Incipit:** Incipiunt supplementa Notularum super topica Boethii. Quaeritur quare propositio sit vera, ad quod diversae possunt causae reddi...

**Explicit:** Nam et definitio et descriptum, id est res significatae a definitione et descriptione etc.

The last words in the commentary is a gloss on III, 1204A,6. Since the gloss is unusually short, it is possibly incomplete. It is more difficult to say whether the commentary originally was longer. Typical of this commentary is that it does not comment upon every part of the text, but only upon selected parts, while the rest is omitted. The words "supplementa notularum" in the title should be noticed, for the commentary so often refers to other notes that it seems safe to conclude that the purpose of this work is only to give some supplements to one or more commentaries already existing. The following references are found:

- Notulae: pp. 196a; 197a(twice); 199a; 200b; 201b.
- Aliae notulae: pp. 195b; 197a.
- Novae notulae: p. 197b.

2. pp. 205a-229b ("Quoniam")

**Incipit:** Quoniam in hoc opere tota Boethii materia circa differentias maximarum propositionum versatur, utrum hic de omnibus...

**Explicit:** Possunt enim in eadem re diversissime(?) in corr. habendum diversi respectibus esse sed tamen diverso modo tractandum ab aliis utpote.

The last sentence sounds incomplete, but if so, only little can have fallen out as the third book is almost finished here. (The fourth book was not normally commented upon in the 12th century.) Like the preceding commentary this often has omissions in the text. References to notulae or glossae are also found here:

- Glossae: pp. 214b; 220b.
- Glossae secundum magistrum W: p. 223b.

3. pp. 230a-235b ("Boethium")

**Incipit:** Boethium esse auctorem huius operis et quam hic habeat materiam titulus indicat...

**Explicit:** ... et ita non est vera 'Socrates sedet' de Socrate stante, cum in notulis.
The last words are from the gloss upon II, 1187C, so the commentary is obviously incomplete. The last sentence as it stands sounds incomplete, but if we make a slight change writing cetera instead of cum (cā instead of cū), the sentence and the last gloss would be complete. This would seem reasonable since nothing is missing in the contents of the last gloss. Like the two preceding commentaries this one omits many sections of the text. References to notulae are also found in this commentary:

Notulae: pp. 233a; 235a; 235b.

The references to notulae etc. in all three commentaries in connection with the omission of many (but different) passages of Boethius' text might indicate some connection between the three commentaries. Most of the references tell us that we can find further treatment of the subject in the notulae. Four times even the same words are used (pp. 197a; 200b; 227a; 233a). In these four places an explanation is given of the subject, and then is added: "cetera in notulis". As proposed earlier the same may be the case on p. 235b. Possibly we may conclude from this that all three commentaries have wanted to give some supplements to an already existing commentary or set of commentaries, which was normally used in the school where our three commentaries have originated.

But are the notulae etc. referred to the same in the three commentaries? It is not possible to make a comparison between the references in the three commentaries, for nowhere do all three commentaries refer to notulae, and not even two of the commentaries give a reference at the same place. Moreover the references are so short that it is not possible to reconstruct the contents of the text in the notulae. The information that you could find "cetera in notulis" cannot be used as a basis for reconstructing the text of the "notulae".

We could, however, look at the contents of the three commentaries to see whether there are some agreements. I think that we can safely say that on all points the three commentaries either take the same doctrinal standpoints or at least have knowledge of the standpoints taken by the others. But to settle the question it would be necessary to study further commentaries to make out where the important dividing lines go. I hope to take up this broader question in subsequent studies.

What has so far interested me concerning these commentaries is that all three refer to some M (= magister) W. His name is normally given as W, but in fragment 14 (below) we find the form Vitil. This magister can
be identified as William of Champeaux: In fragment 9 he is quoted as holding the opinion that every 'propositio' has two 'sensus', a grammatical one and a dialectical one. From Abelard's glosses on the De differentiis Topicis 6) we know that this was the opinion of William of Champeaux. It can still be objected that W need not be the same person in all three commentaries, but on the basis of fragments no. 1,3,4,14 and 8,10,12 we can safely conclude that he is the same person in two of the three commentaries, namely the "Supplementa" and the "Quoniam". In the last commentary (the "Boethium") W is referred to three times, none of which can be compared with any of the references found in the two others. But if we accept that the three commentaries have probably originated in the same school, there need remain no doubt on this point.

Did the authors of our commentaries get their knowledge of William's doctrines from his teaching or from his writings? It is not easy to decide, but presumably his writings are the more probable source, because 1) his views are often contradicted in our commentaries, which might indicate that they have not been written by direct pupils of him; 2) in frgt. 17 the "Quoniam" refers to "glossae secundum magistrum W". This title may indicate either writings by William himself or notes from his teaching taken by his pupils.

Now follows an edition of the references to magister W found in the three commentaries. The orthography has been normalized. A few words of comment have been added now and then.

Fragment 1
("Quoniam" on I,1174D, p. 208b)
From a discussion of argumentum. Different opinions are quoted, "quidam enim dicit voces et intellectus esse argumentum"; some objections are raised against this doctrine, then follows:

Magister vero W ipsas res probantes vocat argumentum, ut in hac consequentia 'si Socrates est homo, Socrates est animal' hominem illam rem


a) argumentum] i.mg. b) iterum] lectio dubia.

Cf. fragments 3,4,14; and Abelard Glos. Top. I,1176C; ed. cit. p.234,30-235,25, where an opinion is discussed according to which "oportet eam (=maximam propositionem) accipi circa res ipsas non circa voces". Abelard's whole discussion in this place seems (from fragments 8,10,12) to concern an opinion of William's. For the last two lines of the frgt. cf. Abelard Glos. Top. I,1180C; ed. cit. p. 296,4sq.

Fragment 2
("Quoniam" on I,1174D, p. 209a-b)

From a discussion of argumentatio. It is discussed whether an argumentatio is a propositio or not. This is answered in the negative, since an arg.is neither a categorical nor a hypothetical proposition. Among other things it is said:

Dicit iterum a) Boethius <si dico> 'si est a est b', neque dico esse a neque dico esse b, sed eas esse socias in veritate, id est: si hoc est illud est;
et ita videtur velle in nulla hypothetica esse positionem partium. Sed in argumentatione est positio partium. Ergo non est hypothetica.

A little later magister W is quoted:

Magister tamen W supradicta verba Boethii, scilicet 'si est a est b' determinat dicens Boethium hoc de continuativis consequentiis intellexisse non de subcontinuativis, quae sunt argumentationes. Continuativas autem vocat illas quae sine certidudine partium proferuntur, subcontinuativas vero illas dicit quae proferuntur cum partium certitudine, ut haec 'Socrates est homo, ergo est animal', quam dicit talem sensum habere 'Socrates est homo' et 'Socrates est animal' et 'si est homo est animal'.

a) iterumJ lectio dubia.

After this the author of the commentary attacks W, even though he is not quite certain which standpoint to take in this debate. A similar discussion of argumentatio can be found in Abelard Glos. Top. II,1183A; ed.cit. p. 321,26-324,22.

**Fragment 3**

("Quoniam" on I,1174D, p. 210b-211a)

LOCUS EST Quaeritur quid sit locus differentia, scilicet an vox an habitudo an ipsa res. Vox autem non videtur esse locus, quia non est sedes argumenti, nullus enim intellectus qui sit argumentum trahit firmatatem ab aliqua voce. Habitudo vero, id est specialitas, generalitas, paritas, oppositio non est locus, quia res tantum a) secundum illam habitudinem est locus. Unde Boethius: res id quod est res secundum habitudinem locus est. Dicamus igitur rem esse locum, non tamen // (211a) propter habitudinem, quod vult magister W, cum secundum nos quedam habitudines nihil sint, ut generalitas et specialitas etc., sed propterea quia est medius terminus non in quaestione positus adductus ad duas extremitates coniungendas in quaestione positas.

a) tantumJ lectio dubia.

cf. fragments 1,4,14.
Fragment 4

("Supplementa" on I,1174D, p. 197a)
It is discussed whether locus is vox or intellectus or res. The author of the commentary holds the opinion that it is res and quotes Boethius for this view; then follows:

Exponamus ergo quo melius possimus modo "res est sedes, id est firmitas argumenti". Ad similitudinem a) vide regis. Et ut haec verius b) colligam, cum c) dico 'res est locus' idem est ac si dicerem res quae est locus est res illa per quam habeo creduliter illam actionem ad illud argumentum, ut homo est locus huius argumenti 'Socrates est homo, ergo Socrates est animal'. Inquirat aliquis generalem causam quare unaquaeque res sit locus sui argumenti. Non habeo generalem, sed in diversis diversas possumus annotare, ut homo qui concepit argumentum est materiam vel species ultimae extremitatis, animalis scilicet, quod iterum concepit argumentum; et sic per singula attribue diversas causas secundum quod assignare poteris. Si dicit quis quod extremitates sunt locus, dico quod non sunt, non enim est conveniens, ut quod inquisitum erat fidem faciat argumento. Dictum est rem esse locum, sed si tantum dicamus rem esse locum, sedem argumenti, quid dicemus, ubi complexio probat complexionem, ut in conversione a pari simplistic. Vox enim non est locus, quia locus est res etc., nec res, quia eaedem res sunt significatae a propositione quae erant in quae- stione. Dicamus igitur simplistic sequentes magistrum W, quod ipsa prima propositio est locus, et in ea significatur proprietas quaedam per a pari simplistic, quae innascitur propter talem conversionem, per quam ipsa propositio locus est. Quod autem Boethius dixit locus est res etc. non dixit ut vel et voces res vocavit. Vel sequendo magistrum nostrum dicamus nullum locum esse d) ubi complexio probat complexionem, nec est necessae ut unumque argumentum firmetur loco differentiali, et sic vitabimus quod vox non est locus, sed res.

a) similitudinem] similiter(?) ms.  b) haec verius] lectio dubia.  
c) cum] lectio dubia.  d) esse] signum additionem fortasse indicans add. ms.
Fragment 5

("Boethium" on I,1175C, p. 233a)
NON ENTM IN SOLO HOMINE IUSTITIA etc. Nota quod iustitia maiorem terminum vocat homine, quia est in homine et in aliis quam in homine. Sic homo potest dici maius iustitia, quia homo est in iustis et in aliis. Sed sic est intellegendum: iustitia est in homine et in aliis, homo vero non est in iustitia nec esse potest, et ideo iustitiam maiorem terminum vocavit. Alii accipiunt 'homo' pro 'hic homo' ut magister W.

Fragment 6

("Supplements" on I,1175D, p. 198b)
FIERI AUTEM POTEST Hic videndum est in qua acceptione oratio praedicativa subiciatur. Magister W dicebat per definitiones idem significari quod per definitum, et secundum hoc potest leviter intelligi quod oratio praedicatur, id est significat rem illam quae demonstratur inesse; et similiter de oratione subiecta.

The author proceeds to attack this standpoint of W.

Fragment 7

("Quoniam" on I,1176C, p. 212b)
From a discussion "utrum (the division of propositions into maximae and non-maximae) sit sufficiens de omni propositione necne". Some have raised the objection that according to this division false propositions would be maximae (they cannot be proved by other prop.). The author argues against this view, then follows:

Alii vero dicunt hanc divisionem de vera propositione tantum factam esse. Sed secundum hoc non videntur omnes maximae propositiones in ea contineri, cum quaedam sunt falsae ut hae: 'si aliquid immediate removetur'etc. et iterum 'quod non valet in maior et non valet in minori'. Magister vero W hanc divisionem dicit esse sufficientem de omni vera et verisimili propositione, supradictae enim maximae propositiones non sunt verae, sed verisimiles. Cui si probetur illas verisimiles non esse maximae propositiones, respondet quod in quantum sunt maximae propositiones earum approbatio non potest inveniri, id est ex sua inventione constant ex credibi-
libus vocibus, sicut etiam ista 'de quocumque praedicatur species et genus'. Vel non negat, sicut et nos, [non] posse eas aliis approbari, sic exponendo verba Boethii: quorum non potest approbatio inveniri notior se, ut 'posita specie ponitur genus' cum probetur per hanc 'posito homine ponitur animal', non est haec notior illa; quod mirum videtur, cum per hanc agatur determinare et proprie de homine et animali, per illam vero inde-terminate et improprie. Haec enim 'posita specie ponitur genus' proprie hoc dicit: si species ponitur et genus ponitur, secundum quod non est maxima propositio; figurative autem hoc dicit: 'posito homine ponitur animal' et 'posita margarita ponitur lapis' et huiusmodi. Dicunt tamen quod non est notior, quia licet 'homo' et 'animal' significent, a) tamen 'genus' et 'species' melius res designant, quia etiam habitudinem inter illas notant.

a) significant[ ] significet ms.

Fragment 8

("Quoniam" on I,1176C, p. 213a)

Quaeritur de maximis propositionibus, utrum sint unae vel multiplices. Ad quod dicit magister W eas esse multiplices ut haec 'de quocumque praedicatur species et genus' multiplex ideo est, quia generat hos multos sensus: 'si est homo est animal', 'si est margarita est lapis' et reliquos consimiles.

The author proceeds to argue against this view.

Cf. Fragments 10,12 and Abelard, Glos.Top. on I,1176C, ed.cit. pp. 231,26-238,34, where Abelard in great detail argues against the view that maximae are multiplices. Cf. also the comments upon fragment 1.

Fragment 9

("Quoniam" on I,1177B, p. 213b)

Boethius' words "in omni praedicativa quaestione quaeri utrum praedicatus inhaereat subiecto" are quoted and a discussion on this point is opened; unfortunately the text seems rather corrupt.

Then follows:
Magister tamen W dicit unamquamque propositionem et quaestionem habere duos sensus: unum grammaticum et alium dialecticum. Verbi gratia 'Socrates est albus' habet hunc grammaticum 'Socrates est alba res' et hunc dialecticum 'albedo inhaeret Socrati'. Et iterum haec quaestio 'utrum Socrates est homo vel non est homo' habet illum grammaticum quem proprici generat, et bunc dialecticum 'utrum praedicatum inhaeret subjecto', quem hic dicit Boethius esse communem omnibus praedicatīvis quaestionibus.

The author then contradicts this standpoint saying that if this is true then each proposition has four 'sensus', besides the grammatical one and the dialectical one also a physical and an ethical sensus. Abelard Gloss. Top. on I,1177D ed.cit.p.271,38-276,40 states: "... praeceptor noster Willemus eiusque sequaces duos sensus tam in propositionibus quam in quaestionibus assignabant". Abelard gives the same two examples and explains William's doctrine exactly as our commentary does. This fragment forms the basis of the identification of magister W as William of Champeaux. Abelard proceeds to argue against this view. His arguments have nothing in common with the more amusing than cogent argument in our commentary. For an interpretation of this doctrine see L.M.De Rijk, Logica Modernorum II,1, Van Gorcum Assen 1967,pp.183-85; and Jan Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter, Problematum 10, Frommann-Holzboog Stuttgart 1972, p.46.

Fragment 10
("Supplementa" on I,1179C, p.199b)
NAM SI GENUS NON EST, SPECIES Hoc adducitur ad exemplum illarum propositionum hypotheticarum, quae fiunt ex illis quae constant ex duabus affirmatīvis per destructionem consequentis. Sed nobis ad rem dicebat magister W quod bene ad rem, quia haec talis locutio multiplicem facit intellectum, scilicet generat intellectum consequentiarum omnium quibus servit, in quo sensu est maxima propositio et facit fidem illis quibus servit. Generat etiam unum primum sensum, sicut ista 'si non est animal non est homo', in quo sensu non est maxima propositio.

After this some arguments of a magister G against the standpoint of W are quoted. The author of our commentary seems to support G. On this magister G see later. Cf. Fragments 8,12 and the references to Abelard given at no.8.
Fragment 11

("Boethium" on I,1180C, p. 234a)
PROBABLE EST QUOD VIDETUR etc. Nota secundum alios, scilicet magistrum W et suos, probable vocari quod potest probari, et ita est idem probable quod necessarium et sophisticum.

Fragment 12

("Supplementa" on II, 1185D p. 201b-202a)
IDEO UNIVERSALES etc. Maximae propositiones continent ceteras. De hac continentia aliter sentit magister W et aliter magister G. Dicebat enim magister W quod maxima proposicio multiplex est ad multos sensus, ut ista 'posita specie ponitur genus'. Haec facit unum intellectum, scilicet quem ferunt voces, qui est adunctus huic 'si est species est genus' qui est unus, ut iste 'si pater est, filius est', sed in hoc sensu non est maxima nec facit evidentiam. Facit tamen et alios multos sensus, omnes illos scilicet quos faciunt consequentiae omnes, in quibus fit proposicio de specie ad suum genus. Sed nec etiam in his sensibus est maxima, nisi bene intelligantur. Possett enim sic intellectus servire huic consequentiae 'si homo est species, et animal est genus' et non huic 'si est homo est animal' ut agatur de individuis. Debet itaque sic intelligi in illo multiplici sensu 'posito speciali a) constituto ponitur generale constitutum'. Ecce quomodo maxima proposicio continet ceteras, scilicet et consequentias quibus serviunt et argumentationes. Sensus autem argumentationum idem faciunt quod argumentationes secundum magistrum W, quia subcontinuativos faciunt sensus, b) et maxima proposicio similiter. b) Sed magister G aliter sentit. Sed antequam videamus quid ipse sentiat, consideremus quidnam sententiae magistri sui W opponat. In primis enim dicit: nemo unquam habuit/(p.202a) sensus alicuius maximae propositionis, nec est ratio quod maxima proposicio faciat fidem huic consequentiae 'si est homo, est animal', cum non faciat nisi earum sensus. Quis enim recipit 'si est homo est animal' propter seipsam et propter hanc aliam 'si Socrates est margarita Socrates est lapis' et propter similis? Aut propter se recepta exit illa prior aut propter alias. Ad hoc dicebat magister W, quod non propter sensus fidem faciat alius, sed propter voces; sunt enim in maxima propositione voces significantes habitudines propter quas magis recipiuntur sensus illarum quibus serviunt, et non propter
voces ipsius consequentiae, quae non notant habitudinem. c) Item certiores debent esse in maxima propositione, sed non sunt; certior enim est illa quae unum significat intellectum quam illa quae habet infinitos intellectus. Solvit tamen magister W quod non propter intellectus certiores sunt, sed propter nomen habitudinem. c) Nunc tandem dicendum quid tamen d) magister G [sen]sentiat. Dicit itaque quod maximae propositiones faciunt quosdam sensus generales ad sensus illarum quas continet, ut 'posita specie ponitur genus' quendam cathegoricam facit intellectum, qui concipit omnes species et omnia genera hoc modo: 'si species est in aliquo, et genus suum est in eodem'. Et per hoc totum modum concipiendi designo. Hoc autem argumentum 'Socrates est homo, ergo Socrates est animal' concipit partem illarum rerum quas concipit intellectus maximae propositionis et prorsus eodem modo, hominem scilicet et animal concipit, et ideo iste partialis, ille vero universalis et totalis dicitur.

a) speciali[m] generali ms  b) et - similiter i mg.  c) Item - habitu-dinum i mg sup.  d) Tamen lectio valde dubia.

Cf. fragments 8,10 and the reference to Abelard given at 8. The magister G quoted is probably Gauslenus (Jocelyn) of Soissons; see later. I have nowhere else found the information that Jocelyn should be a pupil of William.

Fragment 13

("Quoniam" on II, 1186D, p. 219b-220a)

OMNES IGITUR LOCI Hic facit Boethius talem divisionem, quod locus differentialis alius inhaerens, alius extrinsecus, alius medius. Et notandum quod inhaerens locus secundum magistrum W inhaerens vocatur propter inhaerentem habitudinem. Sed si omnis vocatur inhaerens qui habet inhaerentem habitudinem, tunc omnis extrinsecus et omnis medius est inhaerens. Cum enim omnis extrinsecus propter extrinsecam habitudinem extrinsecus dicatur, et omnis medius propter mediam habitudinem medius secundum magistrum W dicatur, et omnis habitudo inhaerens alicui subiecto sit, oportet quod omnis extrinsecus et omnis medius sit inhaerens. Non enim in hac argumentatione 'si est homo est animal' specialitas hominis est affinior ipsi animali, specialitas dico quae secundum magistrum W est habitudo
inhaerens, quam in hac 'si est homo non est lapis'//(220a) oppositio hominis ipsi lapidi, oppositio dico quae est extrinseca habitudo. Sicut enim oppositio hominis numquam erit lapidis, ita specialitas hominis numquam erit animalis generis.

Then follows the author's view.
Cf. fragment 14.

Fragment 14
("Quoniam" on II,1186D, p. 220a)
Examples are given of loci a substantia (= locus a definitione, a descriptione, a nominis interpretatione):

A definitione ut hic:'si est animal rationale mortale, est homo'. De quo loco sic magistro Willemo opponitur: si definitio est hic locus inhaerens, tunc habet inhaerentem habitudinem respectu termini quaestionis, scilicet hominis. Sed quod definitio respectu alicuius rei aliquam habitudinem habeat propter quam dicatur esse locus patenter falsum est. Non enim ideo definitio probat definitum quod definitio est significans et definitum significatum. Si enim hoc esset, tunc similiter 'homo' ista vox probaret Socratem illam rem, ut si dicetur: 'si est homo est Socrates'. Ad quod dicit magister W definitionem non esse locum, sed tantum evidentiam loci, ipsum autem hominem explicite significatum esse locum et habere habitudinem respectu sui ipsius [in] implicite significati.

Cf. fragments 1,3,4,13.

Fragment 15
("Boethium" on II,1187A, p. 235a)
SUBSTANTIAE INTEGRA DEMONSTRATIO DEFINITIO EST etc. Aliqua oratio dicitur plenum rei esse ostendere, quando de (ea) tot generat intellectus, quod omnia non possunt simul inventiri in alia[m] natura[m], ut 'animal rationale mortale', et etiam compositus eius intellectus rem ex illis compositam concipit. Sed neque compositus neque simplex est intellectus <qui> omnes formas rei quam definit effectrices concipit, quamvis sit
aliorum. Magister W dicet quod vel 'rationale' vel 'mortale' ponuntur
ibi pro omnibus formis hominis substantialibus.

Fragment 16
("Quoniam" on II,1188B, p. 221b)
AUT PRAETER HOS Hic magister W reddit causam quare Boethius locum a com-
muniter accidentibus separat ab aliis inhaerentibus, hanc scilicet, quod
alii dantur in necessariis argumentationibus, iste vero in non-necessa-
riis tantum. Sed hoc nihil est, quia in hac consequentia 'si est risi-
bilis est navigabilis', quae necessaria ita est quod per utrumlibet
quod ipsa dicit impediri non potest, datur locus a communiter accidentibus.

a) navigabilis] s.l.

Then follows the author's view.

Fragment 17
("Quoniam" on II, 1188C, p. 223b)
A long discussion on totum integrum is found. The central point of this
is whether a "totum" is destroyed if some "pars" is destroyed or taken
away. Our author makes a distinction between pars essentialis and pars
quantitativa. Only if the part destroyed is essentialis the "totum" is
destroyed. Then he adds:

In glossis autem secundum magistrum W alia habetur determinatio.

W's view is not set forth, the discussion is continued as before regard-
less of the insertion about W. A little further on the author states
that "magister noster(?) P hanc conatur tenere sententiam" (i.e.destructa
eius (=Socrates) minima parte ipse quoque destruatur), which according
to our author seems to be contrary to faith. The word transcribed as
"noster" is most difficult to read in the microfilm I possess. It has
been read as noster by De Rijk (Logica Modernorum I p. 112n). Is this
magister P identical with Peter Abelard? I have not been able to find
anywhere that Abelard takes the view quoted here. In this connection the
interest is of course especially attracted to the "sententiae" on "totum"
found in the same manuscript (pp. 279a-281a) edited by Minio-Paluello (see note 4), but no exact parallel can be found there. Nor could any parallel be found in the Dialectica in the discussion of totum integrum (ed.cit. pp.343-46), but probably the view ascribed to P in our commentary is not incompatible with the view in the Dialectica. Abelard's Glosses on the Diff. Top. end at II,1184A, so a comparison with that work is impossible.

Fragment 18
("Supplementa" on II,1194B, p. 203b)

AC PRAETER HANC etc. Aut hic mentitur Boethius aut magister W, qui dicit multos esse locos praeter illos quos Boethius enumerat in hoc suo tractatu, ut est locus a praedicato, a subjecto, ab antecedenti, a consequenti, a pari per contrapositionem et cetera huiusmodi. Dicunt tamen quidam quod nec Boethius mentitur nec a) magister W. Non enim egit Boethius in hoc libro nisi de locis tempore suo usitatis, magister vero W dicit etiam de aliis. Nobis autem videtur quod in huiusmodi argumentis, ubi complexio probat complexionem nullus debet rationabiliiter locus assignari.

a) nec] s.l. lectio dubia.

A discussion on locus a praedicato follows. This locus is taken as an example of the loci mentioned. The gloss ends: (204a)

Nostri vero magistri de huiusmodi consequentiis est sententia, quod non est in his ubi complexio complexionem probat dandus locus aliquis differentia, sed tantum maxima propositio, quae nec etiam dialectica erit [erit], id est constans ex nomine differentiae.

Cf. fragment 4. The view of magister noster seems to have something in common with Abelard, cf. Dialectica, ed.cit. 256-62, especially 261,34-37 and 367,22sq. Abelard's Glosses on Diff. Top. end at II,1184A, so a comparison with that work is impossible.

These fragments do not give us a complete picture of William's logic, but they contain some interesting things. At least four points should be noticed:
1) Every sentence has two senses (frgt. 9), a grammatical one and a dialectical one. This point has been discussed so elaborately in the two works referred to at frgt. 9 that nothing need be added here.

2) & 3) A locus is not words or concepts but things (frgt. 1, 3, 4, 14) and a 'maxima propositio' is "multiplex ad multos sensus" (frgt. 8, 10, 12). A discussion of these two doctrines is found in Abelard's glosses on the Topics (on I, 1176C, ed.cit.p. 231, 26sq.), where one is connected with the other. Abelard's discussion gives some useful supplements towards a better understanding. He states that some people have held the opinion that maximae are "in sensu multiplices". He explains that what gives a maxima an equivocal sense is the relative pronouns which it contains. Under this term he includes such words as quicumque, se, suus, ipse, idem. Take e.g. the sentence 'omnis homo diligit'; this is one sentence with one sense. But if 'se' is added then 'omnis homo diligit se' has more than one sense, because now it means 'iste diligit se' and 'ille diligit se' etc. In this way it is really more than one sentence. One of the reasons for introducing this doctrine of the equivocal sense in a maxima, Abelard proceeds to explain, is that it can be used to detect some fallacies, e.g. fallacies in the use of the law 'quicquid sequitur ad consequens, illud idem sequitur ad antecedens'. By means of the doctrine of the equivocal sense you can point out that the antecedent and the consequent do not refer to the same things. Another reason for this doctrine is that if a maxima is to be true it must be interpreted as having the same sense as the several consequences which it proves. This means that it must be interpreted as being a statement about things, not about words, for the consequences which it proves are statements about things, not about words. If a maxima was expounded as having only one sense, this would be a sense of its own, and about some special thing (or word), and why would it then be able to prove the several consequences which it actually proves? It can prove these several consequences, because it contains the senses of different sentences about different things simultaneously.

These are the main points of information which Abelard gives us about the doctrine of an equivocal sense in a maxima. His exposition fits very well with our fragments. Abelard does not at all agree with this doctrine. Our fragment 12 also gives arguments against William's doctrine, arguments which are ascribed to magister G (Jocelyn probably, see later). Since
there are no parallels between the arguments quoted in our fragment and Abelard's arguments, the latter's arguments shall not be exposed here. The central point of C's arguments is that such an equivocal sense could never make anyone accept a consequence. William answers that this equivocal sense does not in itself prove a consequence. The reason why a maxima proves a consequence is that its terms are 'voces significantes habituidines', e.g. genus, species. Such words are not found in the consequences which are proved by the maxima. So according to William two things distinguish a maxima: 1) it has an equivocal sense which is a necessary condition for being able to prove a consequence. 2) Its terms are 'voces significantes habituidines', which is the reason why it proves a consequence.

4) It is stated in frgt. 18 (cf. frgt.4) that William held the opinion that there are more loci than those enumerated by Boethius. Some examples of loci not found in Boethius are given: locus a praedicato, a subjecto, ab antecedenti, a consequenti, a pari per contrapositionem. Our commentary does not share William's view. The view found in our commentary seems to have something in common with the view of Peter Abelard (Dialectica ed.cit. p. 256-62), who argues that loci are not found in syllogisms and that e.g. the loci just mentioned (a praedicato etc) are not real loci, but only some kind of rules. Here a comparison with two tracts on logic found by De Rijk would be interesting. 7) The one is called "Introductio secundum Wilgelmus" and the other seems to come from St. Victor. De Rijk holds the opinion that Wilgelmus is probably William of Champeaux. As the school of St. Victor was founded by William in 1108 the other tract, too, might have some connection with William. At least the two tracts come close to each other in doctrinal standpoints. Among other things these two tracts discuss the loci dialectici. In fact we find that rules are given of loci a subjecto and a praedicato (ed.cit. p. 138,143-44) and ab antecedenti and a consequenti (ed.cit.p. 136-37). The tracts seem to hold the opinion that a locus is necessary in every argument. In De Rijk's words they hold that the loci are the pivots of every argument (ed.cit.p. 139). Our commentary does not expressly attribute this opinion to William, but it seems natural to interpret frgt. 4 in that way.

7) The works are found in Vienna V.P.L. 2499 ff. 23r-32r and 33r-42r. Partly edited in L.M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum II, I,130-139 and 139-145.
A comparison should of course be tried between the fragments edited here and what is otherwise left of William's writings. The only work which can be ascribed to William with certainty is some theological 'sententiae' edited by O. Lottin. 8) Some points in these sententiae are philosophically interesting, but we find nothing similar to the matters dealt with in our fragments.

The positions held by William are often contradicted in our commentaries, so apparently our commentaries have not been written by some of his pupils. From which school do our commentaries come? A suspicion of Peter Abelard has been mentioned in connection with frgt. 4,17,18, but a comparison between Abelard's gloss-commentary on the Topics and our three commentaries does not confirm the suspicion. Much is found in our commentaries which cannot be found in his commentary, and some of it seems to be incompatible with his standpoint.

Besides W the "Supplementa" mentions one more name, namely G or Gos. Since some works in the manuscript are ascribed to Gauslenus (Joscelin, Jocelyn) of Soissons, 9) G is probably identical with him. However, so little is known about Jocelyn's doctrinal standpoints that it is not possible to confirm or refute this conjecture. The "Supplementa" quotes him seven times, 10) twice it is stated that he did not agree with William (frgt. 10 & 12), but once it seems to be said that he was a pupil of William's (frgt. 12). I have not been able to find this stated about Jocelyn anywhere else. The positions of G are not contradicted in our commentary, but it is not always clear whether it agrees with him or not. At any rate we have no material which can be used to decide 1) whether G is identical with Jocelyn and 2) whether our commentaries belong to his school or not.

So we shall have to leave open the question of the place of origin of our commentaries. But as all the names mentioned in the manuscript belong to the circle of men (including adversaries) round Abelard, it can be taken for granted that our commentaries should be placed in this very environment.

9) See note 1 & 3 and De Rijk, Logica Modernorum I, 47.
10) P. 197a; 198a; 199a; 199b; 201a; 201b; 202a.