

ON THE DOCTRINE OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE OF GILBERT PORRETA AND HIS FOLLOWERS

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I. Introduction.

The sources of our knowledge of the *Sprachlogik* of Gilbert Porreta and the Porretan school are highly heterogeneous, but they share one feature: They do not treat of the doctrine of grammar and logic in its own right, but always with the intention of elucidating some problem connected with our description of God or the world. Without doubt Gilbert's commentaries to the Boethian *opuscula sacra*¹ are the main source. Round this work larger and smaller treatises from different times are grouped, which are all in some way connected with the Porretan movement. Among these works the dialogue of Everard of Ypres² is by far our most explicit witness of the doctrine of logic and language as it was to be found with the later Porretans. Finally, the gloss on Priscian *Promisimus*³, which was in all probability composed after Gilbert's death in 1154, refers to some views alleged to be characteristic of the Porretans.

For two of the anonymous treatises within the Porretan movement⁴ the question of authorship is of immediate importance, as their editor,

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- 1) ed. N.M. Häring, The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, Toronto 1966. (Henceforth references to this edition are alone indicated by page-number, e.g. 245/45 means p. 245 line 45).
 - 2) ed. N.M. Häring, A Latin Dialogue on the Doctrine of Gilbert of Poitiers, Med. Stud. 15 1953. (Henceforth quoted "Dialogus").
 - 3) excerpts are edited by R.W. Hunt, Studies on Priscian in the eleventh and twelfth Centuries I & II, Med. and Ren. Stud. vol. 1 1941/44 & vol. 2 1950. (Henceforth quoted "Hunt I" and "Hunt II").
 - 4) ed. N.M. Häring, Commentarius in Symbolum "Quicumque vult", Med. Stud. 27 1965 (henceforth quoted "Ad heresim compescendam") and Tractatus de Trinitate, ed. N.M. Häring, Rech. théol. anc. et méd. 39 1972 (henceforth quoted "Quod Patris et Filii").

Professor N.M. Häring, thinks that there is sufficient evidence to attribute them to Gilbert himself⁵. In this article I shall not go into this issue, but only attempt to show how their logical and grammatical points of view fit into the theories of the *Porretani*⁶.

While innumerable books and articles are available on the Gilbertian philosophy and theology⁷, his doctrine of logic and language is to some extent a neglected field. Professor N.M. Häring has indeed published some very illuminating articles on the importance and function of the *Sprachlogik* in the doctrine of metaphysics⁸, of Christology⁹, and of Trinity¹⁰, but the two last of these articles are based on the assumption that Everard's dialogue is a trustworthy testimony to Gilbert's original teaching, which is, as will be shown, true only with some modifications¹¹. In his large book on Gilbert, Professor H.C. van Elswijk has devoted a chapter to the *Sprachlogik*. Here, in line with the views of Professor Häring¹², van Elswijk outlines a development from Bernard of Chartres to Gilbert¹³, but van Elswijk's main source, John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon*, does not seem to justify this interpretation.

II. General Theory of Signification:

According to the general view of the period¹⁴ one has to distinguish

- 5) Ad heresim compescendam p. 29 (Häring's introduction) and Quod Patris et Filii p.32 (Häring's introduction).
- 6) As differences between the doctrines of these treatises and those of Gilbert's commentary on Boethius are to be found, further inquiries must decide whether reasons can be found for affirming that Gilbert changed his theories on these points.
- 7) see the bibliography in Häring's edition of Gilbert's commentaries on Boethius.
- 8) N.M. Häring, The Case of Gilbert of Poitiers, Bishop of Poitiers, Med. Stud. 13 1951.
- 9) N.M. Häring, Sprachlogische und Philosophische Voraussetzungen zum Verständnis der Christologie Gilberts von Poitiers, Scholastik 32 1957.
- 10) N.M. Häring, Petrus Lombardus und die Sprachlogik in der Trinitätslehre der Porretanerschule, Miscellanea Lombardiana 1957.
- 11) H.C. van Elswijk, Gilbert Porreta, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée, Louvain 1966 p. 128.
- 12) Häring, Case., op.cit. p.5.
- 13) van Elswijk op.cit. p. 142.
- 14) This division is the foundation for almost any discussion of the nomen in the twelfth century - see L.M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum II,1, Assen 1967 (henceforth quoted "de Rijk II,1") p. 227 and 245. In this very precise form it is found with Everard in Dialogus p. 253. See also Sententie Divinitatis, ed. B. Geyer, Münster 1909 p. 55 (henceforth quoted "SD").

between three aspects in dealing with the "impositio nominis": a) that, to which (cui) a name is given, b) that, from which (a quo) a name is given, and c) that, because of which (propter quod) a name is given. That is to say: the name is a name of a real thing, and the thing acquires this name from its form, and, ultimately, we name things to express or expound a comprehension or a statement, so that any meaningful word is a sign of a concept. In other words, we name things to express concepts to others.

Within this very common and general framework Gilbert's considerations, too, are situated¹⁵. Before entering on a detailed analysis of Gilbert's logical and linguistic theories it might be useful to outline Gilbert's use of some descriptive grammatical and logical terms which at least later on developed into technical terms.

Significatio is to Gilbert as to his contemporaries a word with a vague meaning. Often it has an affinity to what we would call "sense, connotation, or intention": "HEC ENIM nomina et res illis significate - i.e. servitus et dominium - et illa, de quibus dicuntur, DIFFERUNT"¹⁶. On the other hand it is also used for the function we would call "reference, denotation, or extension": "Quorum significatorum illud, quod primum exposuimus, grammatici vocant "substantiam". Illud vero, quod secundo exposuimus, in omni facultate "qualitatem" appellant"¹⁷. Naturally, this does not prevent that several instances of "significare" are to be found in which both meanings are contained unspecified¹⁸.

Modus significandi is a term of rare appearance in Gilbert's works. It seems to Gilbert to have had no terminological demarcation, and it is used to designate any difference or change in sense¹⁹. The most interesting instance of "modus significandi" we find in the passage where

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- 15) *Commentarius in Epistolas S. Pauli* (by Gilbert Porreta), British Museum Cod. Add. 11853 fol. 79v: "secundum generalem modum dicendi, quo scilicet animi conceptus significatione vocis exponitur ...". Concerning "the name from the form" see below p.46.
- 16) 154/90. Even if this statement expressedly is referred to relative nouns it seems to imply a notion of meaning which does not comprise denotation. For the equivocity of "significare" see de Rijk II,1 p. 526 and p. 536.
- 17) 296/37. Compare the undistinguishing use of "significare" and "appellare" 294-296.
- 18) e.g. 67/55 - 92/84 - 290/82.
- 19) 222/17 - 226/52 - 250/21.

Gilbert states that "corpus, corporalis, corporeum" have different modi significandi, because by the form of the word, the ontological form from which the name is given is shown to be either a substantial, a qualitative, or a quantitative one²⁰.

Appellare and *appellatio* are likewise used without any technicality, and they seem to be used as the equivalent of "to name" as in Priscian and the earlier grammarians²¹: "VELUT SI communem naturaliter appellationem usus ad unum contrahens"²². For Everard, however, *appellatio* has clearly a technical use²³ which is hardly surprising in view of the fact that he wrote after 1190²⁴.

As far as *suppositio* is concerned, the beginning of the later terminological meaning can just be made out in Gilbert's works. To him as to his contemporaries, "supponere" meant primarily "to place as subject-term" or "to function as subject"²⁵. In connection with the doctrine of the "genera predicamentorum", however, it is used in its "etymological" sense "to place under"²⁶. Through a combination of both significations Gilbert sometimes uses "supponere" in a way which does, to a certain extent, resemble the later technical sense: The function of the subject as standing for something":

... item "album est corporeum", "album est accidens", quamvis eisdem nominibus rerum suppositio in propositis enuntiationibus fiat, priores tamen de substantiis nominum, secunde vero de qualitativibus eorumdem intelligende sunt²⁷.

III. A Quo: Nomina Naturalia.

In determining Gilbert's doctrine of logic and language a factor of

20) 170/90.

21) see D.P. Henry, A Commentary on De Grammatico, Dordrecht 1974 p.214.

22) 107/84 - compare 260/80. To Gilbert "nominare" seems primarily to have the sense "to give a proper name" - see 174/25 - 185/53. The use found 119/35 and 277/66 is hardly of principal interest.

23) Dialogus p. 254, that is: in a preterministic sense, "to refer" without any implication of tense.

24) N.M. Häring, The Cistercian Everard of Ypres and His Appraisal of the Conflict between St. Bernard and Gilbert of Poitiers, Med. Stud. 17 1955 p. 161.

25) 279/12 - 300/75 - 301/76 - 301/81. See J. Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Überblick, Stuttgart 1972 pp.48-49.

26) 117/85 sqq.

27) 296/49 - compare 106/59.

immense importance is his view of the ontological structure of the world²⁸

According to Gilbert we perceive that every single thing has several different characteristics, but in spite of this plurality the thing is one. Therefore, we must trace the multiplicity back to something other than the thing itself, that is to its form²⁹. In other words, through the numerical plurality of characteristics we recognize that there is a difference between what a thing is, and that by which it is what it is, or, in Gilbert's terminology, between *id, quod est* and *id, quo est*³⁰. However, the total form (*id, quo est*) is composed of several forms which are not on an equal level, because some are substantial (which forms Gilbert calls *subsistentie*) and make the thing a subsistens, while others are accidental. The substantial part of the total form is itself composed of several forms³¹ the specific *subsistentia* of the thing (e.g. homo) being constituted of a differential (*rationale*) and a general *subsistentia* (*animal*). In its turn the general *subsistentia* may comprise several forms, which is the case with a subalternated genus. Several

28) It has often been argued that Gilbert's grammatical considerations led him to metaphysics, but far more reasonable is the view that his metaphysics are determining his doctrine of language, see R.J. Westley, A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete, The Modern Schoolman, p. 37 1960.

29) This discussion is focused only on the relationship between the object and its form. The problem whether an object (subsistens) is composed of parts (e.g. as the human body) or is simple in this respect (e.g. as the human soul) does not bear on this issue, for according to Gilbert, no object has essential or existential being from its parts, these being themselves subsistenses. So the discussion of the composition of the subsistens as far as parts are concerned is distinctively secondary to the doctrine of the distinction between *id quod est* and *id quo est*.

30) 202/79 sqq.

31) Whether the substantial part of the total form (e.g. homo) has a unity superior to those of the parts of the total substantial form (e.g. *rationale - animal*) is a question to which Gilbert does not expressis verbis provide an answer, but reasons are to be found for affirming that Gilbert's system does carry this implication. As a full exposition of this issue would lead us deep into Gilbert's teaching of the relationship between metaphysics and the two sciences *naturalis* and *mathematica* we shall keep to our chosen path. The perception of forms as substantial and accidental is a subject only loosely touched on with Gilbert, but the general tendency is to consider this perception as something natural to the intellect (184/25), whereas the ontological basis seems to be "*consuetudo rerum*" (323/61 - 332/67 - 352/3).

accidents follow this *subsistentia* as *propria* (e.g. *coloratum* follows *corpus*), and these accidents are in the thing just as the substantial forms, but they are also said to adhere to the substantial form³². Another kind of accidents is not "formal" (inherent) but circumstantial, being based on a collection of one thing with others, and these *circumstantie* find their expression in the predicates that are placed in the last seven categories³³.

As any thing has its own form, and as this form, which is the collection of the substantial and the accidental forms, is singular, no other thing is something by virtue of this particular form³⁴. This is the true *singularitas* which allows several things (which because of the difference between their total forms are "numero differentes") to be counted not only by distribution (e.g. "homo, homo" about different human beings), but also by collection (e.g. "homines")³⁵. Add to this the *singularitas* which every part of the total form of the individual holds, e.g. the thing is white through a single form, whereas it is rational through another (that is the constitutive forms of the total form are also "numero differentes").

For this reason Gilbert denies the existence of universals in the traditional Platonic sense i.e. of common forms in which all members of a species participate. He acknowledges only the existence of singular immanent forms. These he considers universal in the sense that any single form which is a part of the total form has at least another single form to which it is similar³⁶:

UNIVERSALES SUNT, QUE plures secundum se totas inter se suis effectibus similes, DE pluribus SINGULIS subsistentibus inter se vere similibus PREDICANTUR, UT HOMO, ANIMAL, LAPIS, LIGNUM, CETERAQUE HUIUSMODI, QUE quantum ad subsistentias, que horum sunt qualitates, VEL GENERA, ut animal, lapis, lignum, VEL SPECIES ut homo³⁷.

To this doctrine Gilbert's most momentous pupil, Otto of Freising, gives his full support stating that the single forms are universal in the

32) 208/64 sqq.

33) 124/87 sqq.

34) The distinction between "simplex" and "individuum" is not relevant to this issue. For mathematica and classes see below p.63.

35) 104 sqq.

36) if not "actualiter", at least "naturaliter" - 273/68. No total forms are mutually similar as they are individual.

37) 269/40.

sense that their mutual similarity allows them to be united under a common concept³⁸.

It is therefore hardly surprising that according to Gilbert names are given to objects because of their own total or particular forms:

De uno singulariter et individualiter Christo divina et humana natura his, que ab eisdem sunt indita Christo, nominibus ... predicantur³⁹.

and, similarly, from Otto of Freising we learn:

Cum enim omne esse ex forma sit, quilibet subsistens rem et nomen a sua capit forma⁴⁰.

This is especially evident in the case of nomina propria which are given to the objects from their own total forms⁴¹. Since no ontological reason is to be found why every single thing should not have its own proper name as it has its own proper form, the distinction between proper nouns and appellatives becomes arbitrary⁴².

In Gilbert's time the connotative aspect of signification of the appellative nouns was usually based on a *communitas forme*⁴³. In other words the fact that several objects share the same appellative name was explained by assuming the existence of a common form in which the objects concerned participate jointly.

As Gilbert denied the existence of truly universal or common forms - a denial consequential of his ontological maxim of the *singularitas forme* - he was forced to reject the current view of the ontological basis of signification.

This rejection Gilbert words in the following somewhat enigmatic way:

38) "Universalem vero non dico ex eo, quod una in pluribus sit, quod est impossibile, sed ex hoc, quod plura in similitudine uniendo ab assimilandis unione universalis quasi in unum versabilis dicatur. Qualis est a plurium similitudine maior corporeitas, minor animalitas, minima vel ultima humanitas significata", Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frederici* ed. F.J. Schmale, Darmstadt 1974 p.242.

39) 345/28.

40) Otto of Freising, *Gesta*, op.cit. p.244.

41) 75/36. The constituent of individuality is to Gilbert the collection of all single forms, the parts of the total form - 272/27.

42) "Quibusdam non sunt posita (scil. nomina propria), sed per demonstrativum pronomen et nomen appellativum intelliguntur, cum dicitur: hic lapis, hoc lignum et huiusmodi" - 270/59. Naturally, this doctrine has as its basis the ontological doctrine that everything is individual - see 270/78.

43) This doctrine is advocated in e.g. the "Glosule" - see Hunt I p.212 note 4. Compare de Rijk II,1 p. 527. For William of Conches' theory see de Rijk II,1 p. 224.

"Homo" et "sol" a grammaticis "appellativa nomina": a dialecticis vero "dividua" vocantur. "Plato" vero et eius singularis albedo ab eisdem grammaticis "propria": a dialecticis vero "individua"⁴⁴.

It stands to reason that just as "albus" said of Plato may be called a proper noun⁴⁵ because the albedo of Plato from which Plato is called "albus" is ontologically singular and therefore proper in the sense of being confined to the esse of Plato, so - considering the ontological singularity of all forms, substantial and accidental⁴⁶ - "homo" said of Plato may be called a proper noun because the humanity of Plato is ontologically singular and *proprium* to the *esse* of Plato.

This discussion of the relationship between appellative and proper nouns is of importance in defining signification for the sole reason that with Gilbert the only difference between the two kinds of nouns is exactly that the appellative nouns have signification whereas the proper nouns have none⁴⁷. So, when from an ontological point of view Gilbert equalizes nomina appellativa and propria his principal interest is to state that he dissociates himself from the attempt to place an ontological distinct basis of the signification of appellative nouns. Also he wants to show that as far as the relationship between *forma* and *nomen* is concerned, no distinction is to be drawn between appellative and proper nouns. In short when appellative as well as proper nouns are given on the basis of the singular and proper forms this relationship *forma* - *nomen* cannot

44) 273/50.

45) In this passage it is not the form "albedo" which is characterized as *proprium* but the name "albus" which is imparted Plato from his own inherent and singular form "albedo" as is quite evident from the syntactical structure of the sentences ("dividua", "propria", and "individua" all imply "nomina").

46) 58/40.

47) Signification is with Gilbert (see below p.49) a result of the abstraction. The abstraction which is with Gilbert the method of the so-called mathematical science fulfils two functions: first it "separates" the forms from matter, the *id quod*'s, and secondly it "separates" from each other the forms of the total form of the particular object. These separated forms are then united according to similarity and the concepts thus gained are the basis of signification. Proper nouns, however, are derived from the total forms of the objects and as no total form is similar to another total form (274/75 sqq. - 144/63 sqq. 272/45 - 269/37 sqq. - 270/78 (!) - 271/85 - 146/19) and as abstraction is unable to handle forms unless they are dissolved into constituent parts, proper names seem to be imposed according to criteria of denomination only, and consequently to have no signification (in the sense of connotation).

constitute signification which is characteristic only of appellative nouns.

Thus having repudiated the current ontological understanding of the basis of signification (in the sense of connotation) Gilbert is forced to find another explanation for the fact that signification permits several objects to share the same appellative name and thus to establish the principal distinction between proper nouns and appellatives⁴⁸.

The criterion of signification which allows one name to be affirmed of several things Gilbert finds in the similarity existing between the parts of the total forms by which the things concerned are formed⁴⁹:

Ideoque ipsorum (scil. hominum) forme multe similiter natura et actu et fuerunt et sunt et erunt, a quibus hoc plena inter se conformitate vere dividuum nomen (scil. nomen appellativum) hominibus ipsis inditum est⁵⁰.

This conformity is perceived in the so-called mathematical science which has abstraction as its proper method, by means of which the simple forms are extracted both from the thing of which they are causes, and from one another, that is from the concretion (i.e. the collection of several forms in one thing). In this way *mathematica* unites the "separated" forms under a concept without any regard for the fact that the forms are numerically different. As a science *mathematica* is not part of *naturalis scientia* in the limited sense, for the principal aim of *naturalis* is to perceive the things and their forms as singular ("numero differentes") and concrete, and therefore it is not in a position to receive the results of *mathematica* implicitly. From *mathematica*, however, *naturalis* does learn the genus of the forms, or that in regard to which the forms are mutually similar:

Neque rationalis speculatio (scil. naturalis) perfecte id, quod est esse aliquid, capit, nisi disciplinalis (scil. mathematica) quoque id, unde illus est, quid sit, firmiter teneat⁵¹.

48) This principal distinction we have already touched upon above p.47 and the preceding note. That the contingent distinction between propria and appellativa is said to be arbitrary (above p.46) only implies that it is theoretically justified to name any object with a proper name, though in fact we only use proper names for the sake of convenience (e.g. the only animals endowed with proper names are pets of some sort).

49) Of course it is true that strictly speaking Gilbert does not advance a new criterion but modifies the commonly accepted one replacing the ontological foundation by an epistemological foundation.

50) 273/64 sqq.

51) 84/74.

This communication of knowledge from *mathematica* to *naturalis* is the foundation of signification in the sense of connotation⁵². It is because of this "intentional" or "connotative" conception that several different things have the same name and are said to be the same *ratione significandi*⁵³, in spite of the fact that in reality they are by no means the same, neither with respect to *id quod est*, nor to *id quo est*:

Que vero significandi ratione eadem sunt, plus quam semel dicendo numeramus distributione vel ea, que vere est, sicut dicitur distributione, ut cum de Platone et Cicerone loquentes dicimus "homo, homo", et numerantes tam illos, que sunt, quam diversas humanitates ab altera quarum alter et alter ab altera dicitur "homo"⁵⁴.

Here the strictly "mathematical" comprehension has gone through a decisive alteration. From being only a perception of abstracted and therefore *modo speculandi*⁵⁵ separate forms, it has become a comprehension of the ontologically inherent forms as concretized as well as of the things formed. In this setting, therefore the proper "mathematical" perception becomes secondary in proportion to the proper "natural" principle of the numerical diversity between objects⁵⁶.

IV. Cui - Reference.

Whereas the connotative aspect of signification of the appellative noun thus rests on a "mathematical" perception which, modified, is taken over by *naturalis*, the appellatio or the denotative aspect of signification of the natural names (e.g. "homo", "albus") is characterized by its ability to stand both for the actual subject and for the single form of the subject⁵⁷:

52) 142/12.

53) that is: because of the unitas which abstractio as a unio brings about (unity of concept).

54) 104/95 sqq. "Hec enim est sola ratio, qua cuiuslibet nominis appellatio naturaliter est communis: si videlicet qualitas - secundum quam est nomen - illis, quorum est nomen, tota forme substantia est communis: ut homo vel album", 302/30 sqq. - for this use of "appellatio" see above note 17).

55) 85/95.

56) 120/37 sqq. - see above p. 45. As a full exposition of Gilbert's theory of the relationship between scientia naturalis and mathematica would divert our study considerably from the main theme we hope these hints will suffice to show that Gilbert in no way fuses the two distinct sciences.

57) William of Conches polemizes against this doctrine - see de Rijk II, 1 p. 228. Petrus Helias brings another critique of this point of view, but his polemic does not affect Gilbert's theory - see Pinborg op. cit. p. 50, de Rijk II, 1 p. 230-31, and below p. 61.

In naturalibus posito nomine, quo id, quod est, et id, quo est, significatur⁵⁸.

In accordance with this principle "homo" in the proposition "homo est risibilis" refers to the actual subject, the subsistence, which Gilbert calls "substantia nominis", while in the proposition "homo est individuorum forma" the noun "homo" stands for the form, the subsistentia, which Gilbert calls "qualitas nominis":

Verbi gratia si quis dicat "homo est risibilis" item "homo est individuorum forma", hominis nomen quicquid in una id in altera affirmatione significat, i.e. et id, quod intelligitur homo, et id, quo esse debet homo. Quorum significatorum illud, quod primum exposuimus, grammatici.....

Sed in prima affirmatione non id, quo est homo - i.e. nominis qualitas - sed is, qui ea est homo - i.e. nominis substantia - risibilis esse proponitur. In secunda vero affirmatione non is, qui est homo, sed id, quo est homo - i.e. nominis qualitas - individuorum forma dicitur⁵⁹.

In this way Gilbert expounds Priscian's definition of the noun in the light of the possible references of the nomen:

Omne vero nomen diversa significat, substantiam videlicet et qualitatem: ut "album" id, quod appellatur "album" - quod est substantia nominis - et id, quo appellatur "album" - quod est eiusdem nominis qualitas⁶⁰.

For the determination of this ambiguity in the appellatio of the nomina naturalia the criterion is - as we shall see - *sensus auctoris* and *ratio predicandi*⁶¹.

In some quarters of the Porretan school, however, this double aspect of the *appellatio nominis* is not primarily linked with reference and *sensus auctoris*, but with the original *impositio*, and therefore, strictly speaking, only *substantia nominis* is considered the proper *denotatum* of the noun, and *qualitas nominis* is reduced to being accidental to the noun. To this effect we read in the treatise *Ad heresim compescendam*:

Illud enim, quod nomen significat pro substantia, proprietas nominis

58) 86/21.

59) 296/34 sqq. Note that in the first lines of the quotation Gilbert points out that a noun is not equivocal because it has different "kinds" of denotata. For William of Conches' version of this rule, see K.M. Fredborg, *The Dependence of Petrus Helias' Summa super Priscianum on William of Conches' Glose super Priscianum*. Cahiers 11, 1973 p. 18 sqq.

60) 297/57 - see also the quotation below p. 52.

61) see pp. 296-298 and below p. 52.

est, quandoquidem nomen habeat significare substantiam ex inventione, qualitatem vero ex accidenti⁶².

Likewise, Everard shifts the point at issue, and by considering the subject as normally standing for a thing and the predicate as normally standing for a form, he lets this particular syntactical relationship be the means of deciding whether the noun *significat proprie*, which is to be interpreted as "standing for the thing the noun was originally given to designate". Thus he thinks that a noun *significat proprie* only the subject-matter, the thing, and only *improprie* the form:

Attende, quod nomen quandoquidem significat id, cui impositum, et hoc proprie, ut "homo est animal"; quandoquidem id, ex quo impositum est, et hoc improprie, ut de eo fiat sermo, ut "homo est species"⁶³.

The most likely background for this viewpoint is, indeed, to be found with Gilbert, since he states that if the subject-term of a compound refers to anything else than a subsistence (*id quod*) we have an instance of tropical predication⁶⁴, but this is far from being equivalent to the doctrine that the concrete (i.e. natural) name only refers to the form *improprie*. This deviation from Gilbert is part of Everard's more extensive attempt to correct Gilbert's view of the relationship between the concrete and the mathematical name, to which relationship we shall later direct our attention.

V. Propter Quid - The Primacy of Sensus.

As *significatio* (in the sense of "denotation") or *appellatio* is thus instrumental in indicating the reference of the nouns, and as *appellatio* is ambiguous as far as natural names are concerned, natural names being able to stand for a thing and for a form⁶⁵, a further means of determination is required to settle the actual reference of the noun in a proposition.

Naturally, Gilbert does not deny that signification alone (i.e. as connotation) brings about comprehension, but this kind of understanding is vague:

Sed et cum in aliis intelligentiam excitet certa rei proprietas aut certa vocis positio (= impositio, inventio), ut cum dicitur "homo

62) p. 37. For "proprietas nominis" see below p. 53. It is worth noting that the author knew the Porretan interpretation of the term "proprietas nominis" but only uses it applied to the "substantia nominis".

63) Dialogus p. 254.

64) for this distinction see below p. 55.

65) "quia omnis dictio diversa significat" 35o/54.

albus", quoniam certum est albedinem propriam esse corporalitatis, potest putari dictum esse secundum aliquam humani corporis partem, aut cum dicitur "canis est sensibilis", quoniam certum est, cuius speciei sit, quaecumque qualitas significatur hac voce, quamvis nesciat auditor, ex cuius illarum (scil. qualitatis seu speciei) sensu hoc dictum sit, scit tamen, quod non nisi de eo, qui illarum aliquam habet ...⁶⁶.

This may also explain why Gilbert only once⁶⁷ uses the word 'impositio' in the sense it had to most of his contemporaries, for the decisive point to him was not the "original" meaning, but the actual use of a term in a sentence (i.e. when also the precise denotation of the term had to be determined).

The criterion thus required of determining the denotation Gilbert finds in the *sensus auctoris*⁶⁸ to which we obtain access through the *rationes* by which the predicate is attributed to the subject:

Illud enim lectoris vigilantia debet attendere, acceptis dictionum significationibus, quibus significatorum propositi conveniat ratio, et de quibus interpres id, quod dictum est, intelligendum explanat⁶⁹.

Only when the systematical ambiguity has been parsed in this way - which demands an extensive training in philosophy and logic⁷⁰ - can a perfect understanding be achieved: "Ibique mentis sue intellectum constituat"⁷¹.

In full harmony with this view Gilbert carries on a vehement controversy with those of his contemporaries who are of the opinion that signification (as connotation) is in itself sufficient to render a proposition intelligible⁷².

This discussion is continued within the Porretan school. Possibly

66) 64/59 sqq. "In quo etiam, quia omnis dictio diversa significat, quid et de quo diligens auditor attendit. Verbi gratia: cum hoc nomen, quod est "corpus", subicimus - quia et id quod est et id quo est corpus designat - supponimus eo sive subsistentiam sive quod ea subsistit et vel alicuius partem, que corpus est, vel id, cuius ipsum est pars" 350/54 sqq.

67) see the preceding quotation.

68) 68/59.

69) 296/31 sqq. - compare 297/81 sqq. and 298/84: "... de tot significatis, id, quod ad propositum pertinet, convenientiam illi rationum amminiculis eligit".

70) Usually "logic" is a general term for grammar, dialectics, and rhetoric - see for instance 297/85.

71) 298/90.

72) 67/55 sqq. and 298 sqq. This polemic is probably directed against William of Conches and Petrus Helias - see note 57.

as a consequence of this debate the Porretans interpret the term 'proprietas nominis' to have the signification "the things for which a name may stand"⁷³. For this decisive interpretation the external authority is a maxim by Hieronymus⁷⁴: "Non solum nomina, sed nominum proprietates i.e. personas confitemur". So in Everard's dialogue, one of the participants, Ratus, expressedly says:

Nominum proprietates sunt res eis significatae, Unde proprium est nominum significare substantiam et qualitatem⁷⁵.

In the treatise *Quod Patris et Filii* we find the same doctrine⁷⁶.

Naturally, this terminology owes much to Gilbert's exposition of the definition of the noun given by Priscian⁷⁷, but we have no evidence of Gilbert's using the term 'proprietas nominis' for the reference of the noun in a sentence.

Thus the context becomes the decisive criterion to the Porretans, for which Gilbert coined the term *ratio propositi* to the effect of establishing what later logicians and grammarians would call the *suppositio subjecti*⁷⁸. In this way *ratio propositi* becomes opposed to *significatio* (in the connotative aspect), and we learn from Gilbert:

Quod vero TERTIO REPETITUR hoc nomen, quod est "DEUS", CUM et Pater nuncupatur "Deus" et FILIUS nuncupatur "Deus" ET SPIRITUS SANCTUS NUNCUPATUR "Deus", sicut nominis, ratione significandi, sic et rei illius, ex qua horum quisque dicitur "Deus", ratione propositi, repetitio fit⁷⁹,

and from the treatise *Quod Patris et Filii*:

In secunda (scil. Deus est Deus) vero de Deo iuxta propositi rationem vel Patre vel Filio vel Spiritu Sancto non Deus, sed dicitur deitas⁸⁰.

73) The term was ordinarily understood to apply to the grammatical properties of word-classes - for Abaelard's use of "proprietas nominis" see de Rijk II, 1 p. 198.

74) see Dialogus p. 261.

75) Dialogus p. 261. Thus several trends are juxtaposed without any discussion of their compatibility, see above p. 51.

76) p. 38.

77) see above p. 50.

78) The Porretans, however, considered also the predicate to be dependent on the context. It stood either for a singular form or for a class of forms (see below pp. 56 and 61 and the text quoted above p. 51-52). The doctrine of the suppositio or appellatio predicati is not far off - see de Rijk II, 1 p. 553.

79) 103/46. It may be argued that here "ratio propositi" merely means "for the reason stated above", but there can be no doubt that this is the basis from which the perhaps later and more explicit Porretan terminology sprang. For another instance of "ratio propositi" with Gilbert see the quotation above p. 52.

80) p. 49.

Simon of Tournai, too, uses the distinction as something granted:

... "Deus est homo", nomine Dei agitur de persona composita Christi, ratione propositi, non significati⁸¹,

... "homo est Simon". Hic quoque agitur de eodem nomine hominis ratione propositi, non significati, quamvis "homo" non determinate significet Simonem, ut ibi ...⁸².

In Everard's dialogue several cases of this opposition are to be found⁸³, and in the following text we are very close to the distinction between *suppositio determinata* - *suppositio confusa*:

Cum igitur hoc nomen "Deus" ibi positum confuse significet et ita ibi indefinite personam subiciat, sed determinate et finite ratione propositi, licet non proponendi, ideo...⁸⁴.

VI. Natural Predication⁸⁵.

Having seen how Gilbert defines nomen and its constituent aspects which do not allow of a pre-contextual stipulation of meaning, we may now turn to Gilbert's theory of predication in order to explain how subject and predicate function in a proposition and to show how the double aspect of the *appellatio nominis* (denotation) is active in making the predication intelligible.

Syntactically the subject indicates matter (that is: the *id*, *quod est*, or the subsistence) the place of the subject-term being *vicis materie*⁸⁶ while the predicate-term represents a form claimed by the predication to be inherent in the thing:

Numquam enim id, quod est, predicatur. Sed esse et quod illi adest predicabile est et sine tropo non nisi de eo, quod est⁸⁷. Nam de quocumque aliquid predicatur, id predicato quidem est hoc, quod nomine ab eodem sibi indito et verbi substantivi compositione - cuius amminiculo predicatur - esse significatur⁸⁸.

81) J. Warichez, ed., *Les Disputations de Simon de Tournai*, Louvain 1932 p. 140.

82) M. Schmaus, ed., *Texte der Trinitätslehre des Simon von Tournai*, *Recher. théol. anc. et méd.* 4 1932 p. 71. The Porretans are not mentioned by name, but the text cited occurs as an argument for the Porretan theory of "predicatio de Deo".

83) e.g. p. 254.

84) *Dialogus* p. 270. For a parallel with Simon see Warichez op cit. p.141.

85) Other sciences than naturalis e.g. ethica and theologica use other types of predication for instance "denominatio" - see 227/60. Whether predications in mathematica are to be judged by the standards of natural predication is a question to which Gilbert provides no answer - see below p.67.

86) 262/45.

87) 293/53 - compare 93/30.

88) 175/12-compare "Quod Patris et Filii" p. 47.

When actually the subject fulfils this requirement of standing for an *id quod* of which an *id quo* is predicated, Gilbert considers the proposition to have the quality "literal" as we profess a "*naturalem convenientiam*"⁸⁹, and as in this case there is a direct correspondance between the proposition and the state of affairs - a "*rerum atque dictionum consequentia*"⁹⁰.

However, speech may also have another quality than the literal i.e. the figurative⁹¹. As figurative speech, which Gilbert sometimes calls *usus loquendi*⁹² or *elocutio*⁹³, those propositions are to be classed in which the subject refers to a form instead of a thing. They are figurative not because the concrete name stands for the form *improprie*, but because, syntactically, the subject indicates matter⁹⁴, and because a form may only denominatively be called matter⁹⁵.

In predicative propositions the greater importance is attached to the predicate: "Non tam supposituri aliquid predicamus, quam predicaturi supponimus"⁹⁶. But in natural and literal predications the subject standing for a thing, it is not of the thing as a void *hypokeimenon* we predicate, but of the thing as it is formed by that particular form from which the thing has been given the name which is placed as subject in the proposition:

NIHIL omnino SECUNDUM MATERIAM, que predicate forme subest (scil. the subsistence) - dictione, qua illa forma exponitur (scil. the predication) - ESSE DICITUR (scil. the subsistence), SED tantum SECUNDUM⁹⁷ eam, ex qua rei proposita est appellatio, rei ipsius PROPRIAM FORMAM.

Christi persona illo suo ab humanitatis subsistentia nomine, quod est "homo", subjecta⁹⁸.

On the basis of this fact, Adhemar of St. Ruf writes:

89) 63/35.

90) 63/31 sqq.

91) for "qualitas orandi" see the preceding note.

92) 90/28. For St. Anselm "usus loquendi" is the ordinary speech - see Henry op. cit. p. 11.

93) 309/30.

94) It is evident that according to Gilbert the syntactical doctrine of the place of the subject-term being "*vicis materia*" is without relevance to the principal equality of the two denotata of the noun,

95) 81/73 sqq.

96) 349/49.

97) 89/1 sqq. It is worth noting that in the first part of the quotation Gilbert merely denies that a thing has *esse* from the *id quod*,

98) 348/2 - compare 117/98. According to this principle in a diffinitiva demonstratio the thing is placed as subject by the noun derived from the general form. Against this rule Magister Garnerus offended - see Hunt II p. 41-42.

Necessarium est enim omni legenti, ut et rem cognoscat, que suscepit nomen, et nominis causam, qua nominatur, que nominis qualitas a grammaticis nuncupatur, que simul uno et eodem nomine significantur⁹⁹.

In other words, the double aspect of the appellative noun is active in predication¹⁰⁰, but whereas the substantial aspect has the accent in natural predication, we shall later see that the formal aspect prevails in logical predication.

As any thing is id, quod est, through its own single form, and as the universal is nothing but a collection of forms based on their mutual similarity¹⁰¹, it is impossible to predicate the same form of two different things, but on account of the connotation of the appellative nouns it is not impossible for different things to be attributed the same name:

NAM. QUOD de his (scil. Plato, Aristoteles, Cicero) ter dicitur "homo", propter formarum - que de illis uno tamen nomine dicuntur - diversitatem singulare, que per se facte sunt, appellationes congregantur in numerum, ut - quoniam unusquisque a sua, que non est alterius, subsistentia dicitur "homo" - ipsi simul dicantur esse tres homines. Et quamvis ratione significationis illius, qua nomen quodlibet appellativum "quale aliquid" significare dicitur, repetitio eiusdem nominis fiat, rerum tamen eodem nomine est predicata numeralis diversitas¹⁰².

It is to that effect Gilbert writes:

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- 99) ed. N.M. Häring, *The Tractatus de Trinitate* of Adhemar of St Ruf, AHDLM 1964, 1965 p. 134.
- 100) The anonymous commentary on Gilbert's commentary on the Pauline epistles can therefore state that the noun placed as subject "supponat qualitatem", and the context clearly shows that this is to be considered valid even in a natural and literal proposition (see above p. 54). Boulogne-sur-Mer cod. 24 fol. 138vb - Bibliothèque Nationale Cod. Lat. 3154 fol. 15vb: "QUI FACTUS EST (Rom. 1,3). "Qui" infinitum nomen nullam substantiam vel qualitatem habet nisi substantiam et qualitatem nominis, quod per ipsum refertur. Quare cum referat "Filio Dei" idem est dicere "qui factus est" quod "Filius Dei est factus". Sed quoniam "factura" predicamentum est secunde rationis, secundum quid insit, adiungit, scilicet: SECUNDUM CARNEM. Cum ergo dicitur "factus" fit subjecto predicamenti accommodatio, cum dicitur "secundum carnem" fit predicamenti per causam declaratio. Est autem in prima iunctura verborum accidentia, et consequens conexio in secunda. Cum enim "qui" eandem qualitatem supponat quam "Deus" vel "Filius Dei", et "factus" predicet qualitatem opposite nature, id est humanitati addictam, est in conexione predicati ad subjectum accidentia". For the distinction between predicationes consequentes and inconsequentes or accidentales see below p. 58.
- 101) 312/7 sqq.
- 102) 102/37 sqq. - compare 72/56 - 269/50 sqq.

... unitas omnium a se diversorum in quolibet facultatum genere predicamentorum comes est¹⁰³,

for the superior *unitas* is that of the individual, which sets it off from any other individual, and to this we may add the *unitas* that any part of the total form is endowed with.

So in natural propositions the predicate always stands for the subject's singular form and never for a universal form, whereas in logical propositions - as we shall see - the predicate stands for a class of singular forms.

Consequently, when we are told in the gloss *Promissimus*: "Contra Porretanos, qui dicunt nomen in apposito nullius esse persone"¹⁰⁴, and if "nullius persone" is intended to mean that the predicate stands for a form which is not confined to the *esse* of the subject but for a universal form¹⁰⁵, and not just meant to refer to the fact that the predicate is not standing for the *subsistens*¹⁰⁶, we have to realize that just as it is impossible to trust contemporary sources for Gilbert's theological doctrines unless they can be verified in Gilbert's own writings¹⁰⁷ such is also the case as far as his grammar and logic are concerned.

VII. Types of Natural Predications.

In the literal and natural predications (*sub eadem qualitate dicendi*) Gilbert finds it cogent to draw some distinctions:

Docti vero, quos una facies diversarum dictionum non decipit, sensus ipsos, qui sub eadem dicendi qualitate diversi sunt, dividunt¹⁰⁸.

Apart from the interesting features of these distinctions themselves, they are eminently fit for broadening our understanding of Gilbert's theory of predication and for confirming our general exposition of the relationship between the two appellative aspects of the *nomen*.

One of the primary distinctions is between "*predicationes secundum se*" or "*secundum rem*" and "*predicationes secundum aliud*"¹⁰⁹. What is

103) 175/10.

104) Hunt II pp. 51-52.

105) I have found no other Porretan text to this effect.

106) see below p. 68.

107) see A.M. Landgraf, Untersuchungen zu den Eigenlehren Gilberts de la Porrée, Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 54 1930, for N.M. Häring's articles see the bibliography in his edition of Gilbert's commentaries on Boethius.

108) 192/40.

109) 134/77.

predicated *secundum se* is the forms actually inherent in the things, whereas the forms predicated *secundum aliud* are only the circumstances (*circumstantie*) in which the thing is located. Thus this distinction between predicates has its foundation in the ontological structure of the thing, according to which there is a difference between being by nature and by status¹¹⁰.

The mathematical science treats of the circumstances in the same way as of the inherent forms, the last seven categories being mathematical¹¹¹, while grammarians and dialecticians realize that they are only *extrinsecus affixa*¹¹².

Thus, it should be noticed that the distinction 'secundum se - secundum aliud predicationes' is not equivalent to that between substantial and accidental predications, because the accidents of quality and quantity¹¹³ are predicated *secundum se* just as the substantial forms:

QUE SECUNDUM REM predicationes, CUM DICUNTUR DE REBUS causa subsistentiarum suarum, quibus in illis adsunt, sibi SUBJECTIS VOCANTUR quidem "ACCIDENTIA" eo, quod rerum illarum subsistentiis adsunt, sed tamen "secundum rem" eo, quod ipsis subsistentibus ipsa quoque insunt et eadem esse aliquid faciunt¹¹⁴.

Another important distinction exists between *predicationes consequentes* and *inconsequentes* which has its basis in metaphysics like the former. On innumerable occasions Gilbert stresses that every substantial form is accompanied by several accidental forms which are proper to it, that is: the substantial form cannot be in the thing unless these accidents likewise inform the thing. This relation is thus reflected in predications that, having placed the thing as subject of the proposition by a form, we may predicate either a form following (adherent to) this form, or a form following another form in the thing¹¹⁵. Yet the fact that a proposition

110) see above p. 45.

111) 117/63 sqq. and 209/86.

112) 125/15.

113) That "qualitas" and "quantitas" are also used as natural principles is a complication in Gilbert, but as it does not strictly pertain to our subject we can omit a treatment.

114) 138/70.

115) Here I follow the outline in SD p. 98-99 which resumes the main feature of Gilbert's more comprehensive treatment (258/51 sqq.). It is worth noting that "consequentia" here means "consistency in predication", while in 63/32 it means "correspondance" in the sense of the Aristotelian semantic-model.

is "inconsequent" does not prevent the proposition from being true, because the subject refers to the whole thing¹¹⁶:

Et generaliter quotienscumque unum multis secundum eandem facultatem appellatur nominibus, quolibet eorum - facta suppositione rei, cuius sunt nomina - vere possunt cetera predicari. Sed non omnia predicata his, quibus fit suppositio, connexionis consequentia reddunt¹¹⁷.

The distinction plays a very important part in Gilbert's teaching of the *communicatio idiomatum*, and, influenced by Gilbert, we find Hugh of St. Cher using the distinction which he himself traces back to Peter the Lombard, with whom it is at most found only embryonically¹¹⁸.

VIII. Verbum Substantivum.

Having thus given an account of Gilbert's doctrine of the nouns and their part played in predications we must now turn to Gilbert's teaching of the other constituent of predications, that is to Gilbert's doctrine of the *verbum substantivum*.

In this domain Gilbert distinguishes sharply between the doctrines of the philosophers and the theologians¹¹⁹, and he mentions that even among the philosophers there is a difference of opinion as to the *verbum substantivum*. As some philosophers are convinced that no distinction is to be found between existential and essential forms they believe that being accompanies anything subjected to their discourse, and by this being becomes an equivocal concept. The closest parallel to this point of view we find in the first opinion mentioned in the *Glosule*¹²⁰. Other philosophers divide the forms so that the things are (*esse* - exist) through the substantial forms, while they are something (*esse aliquid*) through qualities and quantities. This view is mentioned by Boethius in the *De Hebdomadibus*, but I have not been able to find a contemporary parallel.

Gilbert dissociates himself from both views and prefers to adhere to the doctrine of the theologians¹²¹.

116) 346/45 - 346/68 sqq.

117) 346/56 sqq. see also above note 100. Compare the doctrine of "conversio particularis affirmativa" in the treatise "Ad heresim compescendam" p.37.

118) W.H. Principe, Hugo of St. Cher's Theology of the Hypostatic Union, Toronto 1970 pp. 242-43.

119) 193-194.

120) Hunt I p. 225.

121) That Gilbert sides with the theologians is evident from the fact that he claims every form to be essential and denies that "esse" is equivocal - see 82/1 - 87/56 - 97/52 - 118/8 - 119/38 - 154/96 -

The theologians for their part claim any predication of 'est' to be a predication of the divine *essentia*:

Cum enim dicimus "corpus est" vel "homo est" vel huiusmodi, theologici hoc esse dictum intelligunt quadam extrinseca denominatione ab essentia sui principii¹²².

But this metaphysical exposition has, indeed, not exhausted Gilbert's doctrine of the *verbum substantivum* for later in his commentary to Boethius' *De Hebdomadibus* he writes:

Sed non modo id, quod est et aliquid est, itemque vel id, quo est, vel id, quo aliquid est, verum etiam illud IPSUM ESSE OMNIUM RERUM, quod significamus, cum de aliquo dicimus "est" vel "aliquid est"..¹²³

Here it becomes evident that Gilbert distinguishes between the force of the *verbum substantivum* as *substantivum* or existential ('est') and as a means of predication ('est aliquid'). But it is equally conspicuous that the *verbum substantivum* always retains its proper force (i.e. existential) so that *esse* is in no way equivocal¹²⁴. It is therefore scarcely surprising that in contradistinction to the second group of philosophers the theologians never acknowledge a particular substantial or existential form, but claim every form to be qualitative or quantitative (that is: that by which the thing has *esse aliquid*):

Et similiter unumquodque subsistens essentia sui principii predicant non esse aliquid, sed esse; illa vero, que in ipso creata est, subsistentia non esse, sed esse aliquid¹²⁵.

The natural demarcation between the substantial form and the accidental is not invalidated by this doctrine, however, for it is through the substantial form that the thing is said to be *aliquid in eo, quod est* (that is: the form through which God gives existence), whereas it is through the accidental form the thing is *aliquid tantum*¹²⁶.

136/12 - 117/84. For the connection between the essentialitas forme and the discussion of esse and substantialitas see below note 150.

122) 193/55 sqq.

123) 220/83 sqq.

124) Gilbert's view can thus be considered as a combination of Magister Guido's and the sixth in the "Glosule"; see Hunt I pp. 226-227 and de Rijk's analysis in de Rijk II, 1 pp. 103-104. Häring's interpretation of Otto of Freising is not quite convincing as it is Iohelinus and not Gilbert who claims that "est" said alone of something is without signification (Gesta op. cit. pp. 238-240) - for Häring's interpretation see "Quod Patris et Filii" p. 16 (Häring's introduction).

125) 193/60.

126) 197/55 sqq. where Gilbert states that this point of view differs from that of the second group of philosophers.

Everard's doctrine of the *verbum substantivum* rests on the assumption that 'est' is equivocal and, consequently, cannot be classified as Gilbertian¹²⁷.

IX. Logical Predications.

According to Gilbert logic divides the predicates (the forms predicated) according to their *rationes predicandi*¹²⁸, also called *disserendi rationes*¹²⁹.

The logical *rationes* are themselves predicated of the form as subject:

Diligenter tamen est attendendum, quod cum dicitur "album est accidens" nequaquam album ex albedinis causa, sed albedo ipsa "accidens" appellatur¹³⁰.

These *rationes* must be predicated consequently¹³¹, just as *nomina a rationibus disserendi* (e.g. "contrarium" - called "nomina nominum" with other logicians) must be predicated of the thing itself placed as subject by the form according to which the thing is ascribed the name of the predicate:

Quamvis enim et "corpus" et "album" et "contrarium" eiusdem rei sint nomina, non tamen secundum eandem rationem, quoniam "corpus" et "album" a naturis: "contrarium" vero a disserendi ratione idem appellant. Ideoque de illo "contrarium" non vere poterit predicari, nisi eo nomine, quod illi a causa contrarietatis impositum est, supponatur ita: "Album est contrarium" vel huiusmodi alio nomine cuilibet rei a causa sue contrarietatis imposito¹³².

The logical predications are according to Gilbert totally conformed to the pattern for natural predications; for in logical propositions as well as in natural ones we predicate a form of a thing:

... cum naturaliter inabstracta prout sunt rationalis speculatio concipit. Sic enim dicitur de specie quedam secunda substantia predicari.

127) Dialogus p. 253.

128) 142/12.

129) 347/86.

130) 347/84sqq.

131) That is: the form has to be placed as subject represented by the name expressing the particular property of the form according to which the property of the predicate is ascribed to the form. So the form "albedo" has to be placed as subject represented by its nomen specialissimum "albedo" according to which the form is said to be accidental, and not by its nomen generalissimum "qualitas" for it is not as a quality the form "albedo" is said to be accidental, *qualitas* being a genus predicamentorum (see below note 150) and not a *ratio predicandi*.

132) 347/74 - 88 - compare SD p. 74-75.

Non enim hic intelligendum est de eo, quod species est, aliquid predicare, sed de subsistente potius, in quo est subsistentia specialis, nec de eo id, quod est secunda substantia, quod scilicet solum subsistens est - quod omnino impossibile est predicari - sed que in eo est, subsistentia¹³³.

So, in Gilbert's theory of logical predications the same ambiguity appears as in the later terministic theory of *suppositio simplex*¹³⁴. Having classified predications of the second intentions as logical, Gilbert proceeds to include predications of higher-order predicates¹³⁵ in logic.

Whereas contingent propositions about a single thing are, naturally, only valid for one thing, the logical propositions are valid for classes of things, and that is due to the fact that from logical propositions we do not only gain information concerning the properties of a thing, but also concerning being itself, or, in other words, what it means to be of a certain kind:

Hac enim diffinitione "homo est animal rationale" non solum que res sit homo, sed etiam esse homo demonstratur. Non solum enim qui est homo est animal rationale, sed etiam hoc est esse hominem esse videlicet animal rationale¹³⁶.

As we acquire a knowledge of being, the accent of the subject is placed on the formal aspect of the appellative noun, though not in a way to make the logical propositions figurative as in case of predications of 'est accidens' of the form of the white thing, because as subject we place the single things which have these mutually similar forms¹³⁷.

To this effect Gilbert may also write that in a *divisiva diffinitione*, where species is predicated of genus, the general subsistentia is *substantiva significatione preposita*¹³⁸.

So in the last resort *sensus auctoris* is the criterion determining whether a proposition is natural or logical. Thus, it cannot be completely wrong to claim that by his ontology based on the principle of *singularitas*, and his constant interest for the context, Gilbert has to some extent anticipated the distinction "suppositio indeterminata - determinata"¹³⁹

133) 93/30 sqq.

134) see for instance Petrus Hispanus: Tractatus - called afterwards Summule Logicales, ed. L.M. de Rijk 1972 p. 81/14 sqq.

135) for this expression see Henry p. 241.

136) 244/45 sqq.

137) perhaps 230/32 sqq. can be interpreted to this effect too.

138) 262/50.

139) One part of the later *suppositio simplex* is with Gilbert to be placed under *suppositio indeterminata*.

at any rate, and it is notable that this is valid for subject as well as for predicate¹⁴⁰.

X. A QUO: Nomina Mathematica.

According to Gilbert not only *naturalis* but also *mathematica* furnishes speech with names. These mathematical or abstract names¹⁴¹ (e.g. "albedo", "humanitas") name the forms as abstracted by the mathematical abstraction, and thus the forms are said to be something *ab efficiendo similiter aut dissimiliter*¹⁴², that is the abstract names are given the forms through a similarity found by the abstraction to exist between the actual things¹⁴³ of which the forms are causes. As the abstraction is not only a separation of the form from the *id quod*, matter, but also a separation from the other forms in the concretion of the total *id quo*, and as any thing is individual by the *dissimilitudo* of the total form¹⁴⁴, *mathematica* does not impose a name of the total form inherent in a given *id quod*, but only of a part of the total form regardless of its being substantial or accidental¹⁴⁵.

The most wellknown instances of the mathematical imposition of names are according to Gilbert the names of the Aristotelian categories. Gilbert defines a category as a *genus predicamentorum*; this we may interpret to mean either a class in which the forms are placed according to the principle of mutual similarity extracted by the method of abstraction, or as a concept comprising all the mutually similar forms. Thus e.g. 'qualitas' is a *nomen mathematice abstractionis*¹⁴⁶ because it is given to some forms¹⁴⁷ on the basis of their mutually similar effects, the actual things, which they cause to be *qualia*. As *mathematica* has innumerable other *genera predicamentorum* (e.g. "color", "albedo") than the Aristotelian categories,

140) Compare the second quotation p.52.

141) 167/10.

142) 91/56. The abstraction is the method, while the similarity in effects is the ontological basis.

143) "ut et eorum, que ita separantur, et eorum, a quibus separantur, natura atque proprietates comprehendatur" 215/45.

144) see above p.45 note 36.

145) See 91/51. For this reason the total form of Plato which is individual and therefore dissimilar has not been named according to the proper principles of mathematical imposition - see 144/73.

146) 116/53. It may also be called "nomen a genere predicamentorum" (117/69) because it is imposed on the basis of the concept constituted by the mathematical abstraction.

147) 116/46, for instance the forms contained under the genus predicamentorum "color" and all "immaterial" forms.

it is evident that according to Gilbert the Aristotelian categories are in principle no different from any other mathematical concept or name; however, they do have the characteristic of being *generalissima genera predicamentorum*¹⁴⁸.

It is thus fairly clear that mathematica is exclusively concerned with the "contents" (genus) of the forms in contradistinction to *naturalis* or *rationalis* which is occupied primarily with the *rationes formarum*¹⁴⁹ i.e. the ways in which the forms inhere in the subject as either substantial or accidental¹⁵⁰, and with the ways in which the forms adhere in the concretion as either general, differential, specific or accidental.

While the ontologically concrete form is thus named by an abstract

148) 116/46.

149) 86/23. For the distinction between the ratio and the genus of forms see 142/11 - 161/2.

150) That "substantia" is a "locus rationis" and not a "genus predicamentorum" (116/36 - 117/77 - 118/97 - 119/16 - 119/21 sqq. - "categoria" is with Gilbert the dialecticians' name for the form predicated (163/4)) is indeed a rather unique feature of Gilbert's "system". As Gilbert defines "genus predicamentorum" - or "categoria" in the ordinary sense - as a classification of forms according to their essential aspect (their genus), Gilbert is confronted with the problem of how to consider "substantia" in light of this criterion. If "substantia" is to be a category as the other nine categories that collect different forms according to their similarity in effects, then some particular substantial (or existential) forms must be mutually resembling in the "formal" constitution of things even so opposed as material and immaterial subsistences. This view Gilbert finds in the writings of Porphyry and Boethius (116/40). But Gilbert cannot make this opinion his own primarily because he thinks that material and immaterial subsistences have no basic form "common" as they are effects of the two dissimilar subsistentie perpetue i.e. corporalitas and spiritualitas (332/55 sqq. - 336/59 sqq.). For this reason Gilbert defines "substantia" as a "locus rationis" which means that "substantia" is the name of forms given on account of the way in which they inhere in an id quod i.e. as conditioning the generation and the corruption of the things (209/82 sqq.) Thus "substantia" and "accidens" are expressions of the ways in which the forms can inhere in an id quod while the nine categories are the classes to which forms belong on account of some similarity in their essential aspect.

To this doctrine Gilbert is ultimately directed by his understanding of the relationship between the Creator and the creation and the opposition between the natural and the theological understanding of the world (164/58 sqq.). As a full account of this extremely complicated doctrine would by far exceed the limit of the present study and as it does not strictly pertain to our subject we shall let these hints suffice.

name in *mathematica*, it is also named by the natural name (*nomen naturalis participationis*)¹⁵¹, "corresponding" to the *nomen a genere predicamentorum*, e.g. both *qualitas* and *quale* denote the single forms¹⁵². In this way the problem arises how the two kinds of names are interrelated.

Gilbert emphasizes that *relatio* and *relatum* or *qualitas* and *quale* are the same genus¹⁵³, and so it cannot be preposterous to suppose that, likewise, *album* and *albedo* may be said to be either the same genus or to be of the same genus. As we have already seen¹⁵⁴, Gilbert links *significatio* in the sense of connotation with a kind of intentional conception gained in *mathematica*, and furthermore supported by Everard's statement: "*Cum sententia magistri fuerit, quod idem significarent (scil. nomina concreta et mathematica)*"¹⁵⁵, we may reasonably interpret Gilbert's exposition to mean that somehow the concrete and the mathematical names have the same signification. However, a very essential distinction between the two kinds of names is to be found: they are situated within two different sciences, and, consequently, it is a matter of course that the mathematical name cannot be used to designate the form in its concrete aspect¹⁵⁶. The matter is accordingly far from being lucid with Gilbert, and it is further obscured by the fact that sometimes Gilbert places the abstract names instead of the concrete in natural propositions, but this usage can probably be explained by its prevalence in the common philosophical jargon of the period¹⁵⁷.

In the anonymous treatise *Quod Patris et Filii* the abstract name is defined in opposition to the concrete so that the abstract name is distinguished from the concrete both with respect to genus and to ratio:

... et relationem non modo omni genere verum etiam omni ratione a relato secerni est necessarium¹⁵⁸.

This distinction is constructed in accordance with Gilbert's account of the ontological interrelationship between *id quod est* and *id quo est*¹⁵⁹,

151) 116/53.

152) see above p. 46.

153) 116/51 - 117/65.

154) see above p. 48.

155) *Dialogus* p. 255.

156) see e.g. 146/35.

157) see for instance Pinborg op. cit. p. 43 sqq.

158) "*Quod Patris et Filii*" p. 37.

159) 293/57 - 92/90.

which to Gilbert, naturally, is not the same as the relationship between the concrete and the abstract noun, as they are explicitly said to be the same genus or of the same genus¹⁶⁰.

Everard tries to constitute the abstract name as the proper name of the form, but he carries out this manoeuvre by distinguishing also in the abstract name between *substantia nominis* and *qualitas nominis*. By this an abstract name, e.g. *albedo*, is said to have as *substantia* the same form as the quality of the concrete name (*album*) and as quality "*facit album*"¹⁶¹. It seems highly unlikely that Gilbert ever advocated this theory, primarily because it introduces the subsistence into *mathematica* through the quality of the abstract name, which is totally at variance with the *disciplina*¹⁶² whose construction, according to Gilbert, is the ultimate purpose of the mathematical abstraction¹⁶³. Secondly, it clashes with Gilbert's curtailment of the distinction "*substantia nominis* - *qualitas nominis*" to natural names¹⁶⁴. Ultimately, such a distinction seems devoid of meaning for names of forms which are certainly not formed by other forms. This aspect of Everard's theory¹⁶⁵ has arisen from his notion that in sentences as '*homo est species*' the word '*homo*' is used only improperly for the form, and ought to be replaced by the abstract '*humanitas*'. That Gilbert in no way uses the distinction literal - figurative propositions to constitute a distinction between "*denotatum proprium* - *improprium*" in the natural names we have seen above¹⁶⁶.

XI. Mathematical Predication.

As mentioned above, in *naturalis* we predicate genus of species¹⁶⁷, e.g. "*homo est animal*", because *homo* is *species generis*, the special *subsistentia* in *homo* being composed among other forms of the general *subsistentia* (*animal*) by concretion.

In *mathematica*, however, we predicate according to Gilbert *genus*

160) 116/51 - 117/65.

161) *Dialogus* pp. 254-255.

162) That is: Classification of the forms according to their "contents".

163) 84-85.

164) 86/21.

165) The theory is so unwieldy that it is hardly reasonable to give an account of it in full.

166) see above p. 51.

167) 86/31 sqq.

generis of *species individuorum*, that is we predicate a *genus predicamentorum* of the individuals' forms (*species individuorum*) e.g. "albedo est color", not because this form (albedo) is concretized together with a general form, the abstraction having resolved the concretion, but because the abstracted forms may be classified in accordance with their "contents".

"Genus generis" is, therefore, an expression of the respect in which the single forms are similar - is the category under which the single forms are to be placed. The term 'genus generis' may be interpreted either as an equivalent to "general genus" in the sense "class", because in the nine categories *differentie* are not to be found, and therefore only generalissima and specialissima¹⁶⁸, or as a pun on the different senses with which Gilbert uses 'genus', having both the sense "form"¹⁶⁹, and that of "general concept, class"¹⁷⁰, so that the expression will amount to "the class to which the form belongs".

While the anonymous treatise *Quod Patris et Filii* has a perfectly lucid and plain exposition of the mathematical predication, which is in full harmony with Gilbert's teaching¹⁷¹, the mathematical predication becomes an almost insuperable problem with Everard¹⁷². The primary reason for this is Everard's introduction of the distinction between substantia and qualitas nominis in the abstract names. An additional reason for his difficulty in proposing a reasonable theory is his misinterpretation of Gilbert's expression "*species individuorum*" by which the term is supposed to signify a special feature of the forms as considered in *scientia mathematica*. However, to Gilbert '*species individuorum*' merely expresses the fact that though, from a mathematical point of view, the form is not concrete but separate and in this way is not considered in so far as it is *species generis*, it is still of the ontologically inherent and concretized forms we predicate mathematically. This is so because these forms are the only ones existing. Thus the closest parallel to the mathematical predication as far as subject is concerned is to be found in the logical or natural figurative predication of the predicabilia¹⁷³. In other words,

168) *Dialogus* p. 249.

169) 209/84 - 92/2 - 261/19.

170) 155/11 - 312/5.

171) "*Quod Patris et Filii*" p. 47.

172) *Dialogus* p. 257.

173) see above p. 61.

'species individuorum' is an expression of the ontological inherence of the *id quo* in the *id quod*¹⁷⁴.

XII. Conclusion.

Summing up the characteristics of Gilbert's doctrine of logic and language, we may say that Gilbert by no means constitutes logic as a separate science, but in practice uses it as a science of the "formal" constitution of the world¹⁷⁵, and in this respect he is no more successful than e.g. Abaelard¹⁷⁶.

Another main feature in Gilbert's doctrine is the stress laid upon the double aspect of the appellative noun, the function of which is not grammatically established beforehand, but always dependent on the *sensus auctoris* which accentuates now one aspect, now the other. Our access to the *sensus auctoris*, in which the referential function is comprised, is through the *rationes* by which the predicate is attributed to the subject. On this point Gilbert may be said to have anticipated the terminists¹⁷⁷, just as he seems to have had a perception of the programme fundamental to the later contextual approach¹⁷⁸, his interest being always turned to the actual use of a word in a sentence. In continuation of this trend the predicate never stands for a universal form in the ordinary sense of the word, but either for a single form, or for a class of single forms.

It stands to reason that in his theory of predication Gilbert is inclined to the inherence-theory, but it is worth mentioning that by his ontology based on the individual, and by his equalization of the two aspects of the noun, and, ultimately, by his teaching of predication of the single form, his version of the inherence-theory is not exposed to the

174) 262/43 sqq.

175) Indeed on one occasion Gilbert mentions the loci of the dialecticians from which evident conclusions are drawn (191/6 sqq.) but wherever logic is seen at work it is occupied with arguments drawn from the properties of things.

176) see *Dialectica*, ed. L.M. de Rijk 1970 pp. XCVII-XCVIII and Jan Pinborg op.cit. p. 51.

177) see de Rijk II,1 p.561. A theological application of the principle is found in the Porretan collection of questions München Clm. 18918 fol. 118va: "Quedam naturalia nomina sunt, que, si absolute proferantur, non melius de una quam de aliis personis intelliguntur, ut "potentia", "sapientia", "benignitas", "amor", "caritas". Si vero, cum adiuncte profera(n)tur, significantius cadunt in unam quam in aliam personam".

178) for this distinction see de Rijk II,1 p. 116.

critique from the adherents of the twoname-theory which is practically included in his theory of predication¹⁷⁹.

Where Gilbert's theory, however, had its weakest point was in the theory of the abstract nouns. These were given a far too restricted area for functioning, being limited to *mathematica*, and Gilbert himself reveals this problem by sometimes employing abstract names to designate forms as concrete. Perhaps one could say that this distance between Gilbert's theory and practice meant that the later Porretans were forced to construct a theory in which the abstract noun had a broader sphere of operation. But thereby they were pressed, as it were, to the other front, so that they had to restrict the ability of the appellative noun to stand for forms. Consequently, they tried to adopt the current distinction between the noun as primarily a name of the subsistence, and as only secondarily ("impropre" or "ex accidenti") a name of forms. To this development Everard's *Dialogue* is our primary source. Naturally, they were not conscious of removing the very foundation of Gilbert's theory by this manoeuvre.

With this interpretation, however, we have advanced further in reconstruction than the sources actually permit. Unless decisive discoveries are made of hitherto unknown Porretan manuscripts, we must accept that Porretanism as a grammatical and logical school of thought is a field for which we only can see the rough outlines.

179) Gilbert uses the same argument to defend his theory of inherence as Abaelard to criticize his own earlier theory of inherence - see 134/75 sqq. and *Dialectica* op. cit. p. 159/31 sqq.