ON THE DOCTRINE OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE
OF GILBERT PORRETA AND HIS FOLLOWERS

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I. Introduction.

The sources of our knowledge of the Sprachlogik of Gilbert Porretta and
the Porretan school are highly heterogeneous, but they share one feature:
They do not treat of the doctrine of grammar and logic in its own right,
but always with the intention of elucidating some problem connected with
our description of God or the world. Without doubt Gilbert's commentaries
to the Boethian *opuscula sacra*¹ are the main source. Round this work
larger and smaller treatises from different times are grouped, which are
all in some way connected with the Porretan movement. Among these works
the dialogue of Everard of Ypres² is by far our most explicit witness of
the doctrine of logic and language as it was to be found with the later
Porretans. Finally, the gloss on Priscian *Promisimus*³, which was in all
probability composed after Gilbert's death in 1154, refers to some views
alleged to be characteristic of the Porretans.

For two of the anonymous treatises within the Porretan movement ⁴ the
question of authorship is of immediate importance, as their editor,

1) ed. N.M Häringer, The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers,
   Toronto 1966. (Henceforth references to this edition are alone
   indicated by page-number, e.g. 245/45 means p. 245 line 45).
2) ed. N.M. Häringer, A Latin Dialogue on the Doctrine of Gilbert of
   Poitiers, Med. Stud. 15 1953. (Henceforth quoted "Dialogus").
3) excerpts are edited by R.W. Hunt, Studies on Priscian in the eleventh
   and twelfth Centuries I & II, Med. and Ren. Stud. vol. 1 1941/44 &
   vol. 2 1950. (Henceforth quoted "Hunt I" and "Hunt II").
   27 1965 (henceforth quoted "Ad heresim compescendam") and Tractatus
   de Trinitate, ed. N.M. Häringer, Rech. théol. anc.et méd. 39 1972
   (henceforth quoted "Quod Patris et Filii").
Professor N.M. Hāring, thinks that there is sufficient evidence to attribute them to Gilbert himself. In this article I shall not go into this issue, but only attempt to show how their logical and grammatical points of view fit into the theories of the Porretani.

While innumerable books and articles are available on the Gilbertian philosophy and theology, his doctrine of logic and language is to some extent a neglected field. Professor N.M. Hāring has indeed published some very illuminating articles on the importance and function of the Sprachslogik in the doctrine of metaphysics, of Christology, and of Trinity, but the two last of these articles are based on the assumption that Everard's dialogue is a trustworthy testimony to Gilbert's original teaching, which is, as will be shown, true only with some modifications.

In his large book on Gilbert, Professor H.C. van Elswijk has devoted a chapter to the Sprachslogik. Here, in line with the views of Professor Hāring, van Elswijk outlines a development from Bernard of Chartres to Gilbert, but van Elswijk's main source, John of Salisbury's Metalogicon, does not seem to justify this interpretation.

II. General Theory of Signification:

According to the general view of the period one has to distinguish

5) Ad heresim compescandam p. 29 (Hāring's introduction) and Quod Patris et Fili p. 32 (Hāring's introduction).
6) As differences between the doctrines of these treatises and those of Gilbert's commentary on Boethius are to be found, further inquiries must decide whether reasons can be found for affirming that Gilbert changed his theories on these points.
7) see the bibliography in Hāring's edition of Gilbert's commentaries on Boethius.
9) N.M. Hāring, Sprachlogische und Philosophische Voraussetzungen zum Verständnis der Christologie Gilberts von Poitiers, Scholastik 32 1957.
10) N.M. Hāring, Petrus Lombardus und die Sprachlogik in der Trinitätslehre der Porretanerschule, Miscellanea Lombardiana 1957.
12) Hāring, Case., op.cit. p. 5.
13) van Elswijk op.cit. p. 142.
14) This division is the foundation for almost any discussion of the nommen in the twelfth century - see L.M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum II,1, Assen 1967 (henceforth quoted "de Rijk II,1") p. 227 and 245. In this very precise form it is found with Everard in Dialogus p. 253. See also Sententiae Divinitatis, ed. B. Geyer, Münster 1909 p. 55 (henceforth quoted "SD").
between three aspects in dealing with the "impositio nominis": a) that, to which (cui) a name is given, b) that, from which (a quo) a name is given, and c) that, because of which (propter quod) a name is given. That is to say: the name is a name of a real thing, and the thing acquires this name from its form, and, ultimately, we name things to express or expound a comprehension or a statement, so that any meaningful word is a sign of a concept. In other words, we name things to express concepts to others.

Within this very common and general framework Gilbert's considerations, too, are situated[15]. Before entering on a detailed analysis of Gilbert's logical and linguistic theories it might be useful to outline Gilbert's use of some descriptive grammatical and logical terms which at least later on developed into technical terms.

Significatio is to Gilbert as to his contemporaries a word with a vague meaning. Often it has an affinity to what we would call "sense, connotation, or intention": "HEC ENIM nomina et res illis significate - i.e. servitus et dominium - et illa, de quibus dicitur, DIFFERUNT"[16]. On the other hand it is also used for the function we would call "reference, denotation, or extension": "Quorum significatorum illud, quod primum exposuimus, grammatici vocant "substantiam". Illud vero, quod secundo exposuimus, .... in omni facultate "qualitatem" appellant"[17]. Naturally, this does not prevent that several instances of "significare" are to be found in which both meanings are contained unspecified[18].

Modus significandi is a term of rare appearance in Gilbert's works. It seems to Gilbert to have had no terminological demarcation, and it is used to designate any difference or change in sense[19]. The most interesting instance of "modus significandi" we find in the passage where

15) Commentarius in Epistolas S. Pauli (by Gilbert Porret), British Museum Cod. Add. 11853 fol. 79v: "secundum generalem modum dicendi, quo scilicet animi conceptus significacione vocis exponitur ...". Concerning "the name from the form" see below p.46.
16) 154/90. Even if this statement expressly is referred to relative nouns it seems to imply a notion of meaning which does not comprise denotation. For the equivocity of "significare" see de Rijk II,1 p. 526 and p. 536.
17) 296/37. Compare the undistinguishing use of "significare" and "appellare" 294-296.
18) e.g. 67/55 - 92/84 - 290/82.
Gilbert states that "corpus, corporalis, corporeum" have different modi significandi, because by the form of the word, the ontological form from which the name is given is shown to be either a substantial, a qualitative, or a quantitative one.20

Appellare and appellatio are likewise used without any technicality, and they seem to be used as the equivalent of "to name" as in Priscian and the earlier grammarians21: "VELUT SI communem naturaliter appellationem usus ad unum contrahens ...."22. For Everard, however, appellatio has clearly a technical use23 which is hardly surprising in view of the fact that he wrote after 119024.

As far as suppositio is concerned, the beginning of the later terminological meaning can just be made out in Gilbert's works. To him as to his contemporaries, "supponere" meant primarily "to place as subject-term" or "to function as subject"25. In connection with the doctrine of the "genera predicamentorum", however, it is used in its "etymological" sense "to place under"26. Through a combination of both significations Gilbert sometimes uses "supponere" in a way which does, to a certain extent, resemble the later technical sense: The function of the subject as standing for something:

... item "album est corporeum", "album est accidens", quamvis eisdem nominibus rerum suppositio in propositis enuntiationibus fiat, priores tamen de substantiis nominum, seconde vero de qualitatibus eorundem intelligende sunt27.

III. A Quo: Nomina Naturalia.

In determining Gilbert's doctrine of logic and language a factor of

20) 170/90.
22) 107/84 - compare 260/80. To Gilbert "nominare" seems primarily to have the sense "to give a proper name" - see 174/25 - 185/53. The use found 119/35 and 277/66 is hardly of principal interest.
23) Dialogus p. 254, that is: in a preterministic sense, "to refer" without any implication of tense.
26) 117/85 sqq.
27) 296/49 - compare 106/59.
immense importance is his view of the ontological structure of the world.  

According to Gilbert we perceive that every single thing has several different characteristics, but in spite of this plurality the thing is one. Therefore, we must trace the multiplicity back to something other than the thing itself, that is to its form. In other words, through the numerical plurality of characteristics we recognize that there is a difference between what a thing is, and that by which it is what it is, or, in Gilbert's terminology, between *id, quod est* and *id, quo est*. However, the total form (*id, quo est*) is composed of several forms which are not on an equal level, because some are substantial (which forms Gilbert calls *subsistentia*) and make the thing a subsistens, while others are accidental. The substantial part of the total form is itself composed of several forms—the specific *subsistentia* of the thing (e.g. homo) being constituted of a differential (rationale) and a general *subsistentia* (animal). In its turn the general *subsistentia* may comprise several forms, which is the case with a subalternated genus. Several

28) It has often been argued that Gilbert's grammatical considerations led him to metaphysics, but far more reasonable is the view that his metaphysics are determining his doctrine of language, see R.J. Westley, A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete, The Modern Schoolman, p. 37 1960.

29) This discussion is focused only on the relationship between the object and its form. The problem whether an object (subsistens) is composed of parts (e.g. as the human body) or is simple in this respect (e.g. as the human soul) does not bear on this issue, for according to Gilbert, no object has essential or existential being from its parts, these being themselves subsistenses. So the discussion of the composition of the subsistens as far as parts are concerned is distinctively secondary to the doctrine of the distinction between *id quod est* and *id quo est*.

30) 202/79 sqq.

31) Whether the substantial part of the total form (e.g. homo) has a unity superior to those of the parts of the total substantial form (e.g. rationale—animal) is a question to which Gilbert does not expressis verbis provide an answer, but reasons are to be found for affirming that Gilbert's system does carry this implication. As a full exposition of this issue would lead us deep into Gilbert's teaching of the relationship between metaphysics and the two sciences naturals and mathematica we shall keep to our chosen path. The perception of forms as substantial and accidental is a subject only loosely touched on with Gilbert, but the general tendency is to consider this perception as something natural to the intellect (184/25), whereas the ontological basis seems to be "consvetudo rerum" (323/61 – 332/67 – 352/3).
accidents follow this *subsistentia as propria* (e.g. *coloratum follows corpus*), and these accidents are in the thing just as the substantial forms, but they are also said to adhere to the substantial form. Another kind of accidents is not "formal" (inherent) but circumstantial, being based on a collection of one thing with others, and these *circumstantiae* find their expression in the predicates that are placed in the last seven categories.

As any thing has its own form, and as this form, which is the collection of the substantial and the accidental forms, is singular, no other thing is something by virtue of this particular form. This is the true *singularitas* which allows several things (which because of the difference between their total forms are "numero differentes") to be counted not only by distribution (e.g. "homo, homo" about different human beings), but also by collection (e.g. "homines")

Add to this the *singularitas* which every part of the total form of the individual holds, e.g. the thing is white through a single form, whereas it is rational through another (that is the constitutive forms of the total form are also "numero differentes").

For this reason Gilbert denies the existence of universals in the traditional Platonic sense i.e. of common forms in which all members of a species participate. He acknowledges only the existence of singular immanent forms. These he considers universal in the sense that any single form which is a part of the total form has at least another single form to which it is similar:

UNIVERSALES SUNT, QUE plures secundum se totas inter se suis effectibus similes, DE pluribus SINGULIS subsistentibus inter se vere similibus PREDICANTUR, UT HOMO, ANIMAL, LAPIS, LIGNUM, CETERAQUE HUIUSMODI, QUE quantum ad subsistentias, que horum sunt qualitates, VEL GENERA, ut animal, lapis, lignum, VEL SPECIES ut homo.

To this doctrine Gilbert's most momentous pupil, Otto of Freising, gives his full support stating that the single forms are universal in the

32) 208/64 sqq.
33) 124/87 sqq.
34) The distinction between "simplex" and "individuum" is not relevant to this issue. For mathematica and classes see below p.63.
35) 104 sqq.
36) if not "actualiter", at least "naturaliter" - 273/68. No total forms are mutually similar as they are individual.
37) 269/4o.
sense that their mutual similarity allows them to be united under a common concept. It is therefore hardly surprising that according to Gilbert names are given to objects because of their own total or particular forms:

De uno singulariter et individualiter Christo divina et humana natura his, que ab eisdem sunt indita Christo, nominibus ... predicanter and, similarly, from Otto of Freising we learn:

Cum enim omne esse ex forma sit, quilibet subsistens rem et nomen a sua capitis forma.

This is especially evident in the case of nomina propria which are given to the objects from their own total forms. Since no ontological reason is to be found why every single thing should not have its own proper name as it has its own proper form, the distinction between proper nouns and appellatives becomes arbitrary.

In Gilbert's time the connotative aspect of signification of the appellative nouns was usually based on a communitas formæ. In other words the fact that several objects share the same appellative name was explained by assuming the existence of a common form in which the objects concerned participate jointly.

As Gilbert denied the existence of truly universal or common forms – a denial consequential of his ontological maxim of the singularitas formæ – he was forced to reject the current view of the ontological basis of signification.

This rejection Gilbert words in the following somewhat enigmatic way:

38) "Universalem vero non dico ex eo, quod una in pluribus sit, quod est impossible, sed ex hoc, quod plura in similitudine uniendo ab assimilandis unione universalis quasi in unum versabilis dicatur. Qualis est a plurium similitudine maior corporeitas, minor animalitas, minima vel ultima humanitas significata", Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici ed. F.J. Schmale, Darmstadt 1974 p. 242.
39) 345/28.
40) Otto of Freising, Gesta, op.cit. p.244.
41) 75/36. The constituent of individuality is to Gilbert the collection of all single forms, the parts of the total form - 272/27.
42) "Quibusdam non sunt posita (scil. nomina propria), sed per demonstrativum pronomen et nomen appellativum intelliguntur, cum dicitur: hic lapis, hoc lignum et huiusmodi". 270/59. Naturally, this doctrine has as its basis the ontological doctrine that everything is individual – see 270/78.
43) This doctrine is advocated in e.g. the "Glosule" – see Hunt I p.212 note 4. Compare de Rijk II,1 p. 527. For William of Conches' theory see de Rijk II,1 p. 224.
"Homo" et "sol" a grammaticis "appellativa nomina": a dialecticis vero "dividua" vocantur. "Plato" vero et eius singularis albedo ab eisdem grammaticis "propria": a dialecticis vero "individua".

It stands to reason that just as "albus" said of Plato may be called a proper noun because the albedo of Plato from which Plato is called "albus" is ontologically singular and therefore proper in the sense of being confined to the esse of Plato, so — considering the ontological singularity of all forms, substantial and accidental — "homo" said of Plato may be called a proper noun because the humanity of Plato is ontologically singular and proprium to the esse of Plato.

This discussion of the relationship between appellative and proper nouns is of importance in defining signification for the sole reason that with Gilbert the only difference between the two kinds of nouns is exactly that the appellative nouns have signification whereas the proper nouns have none. So, when from an ontological point of view Gilbert equalizes nomina appellativa and propria his principal interest is to state that he dissociates himself from the attempt to place an ontological distinct basis of the signification of appellative nouns. Also he wants to show that as far as the relationship between forma and nomen is concerned, no distinction is to be drawn between appellative and proper nouns. In short when appellative as well as proper nouns are given on the basis of the singular and proper forms this relationship forma — nomen cannot

44) 273/30.
45) In this passage it is not the form "albedo" which is characterized as proprium but the name "albus" which is imparted Plato from his own inherent and singular form "albedo" as is quite evident from the syntactical structure of the sentences ("dividua", "propria", and "individua" all imply "nomina").
46) 58/40.
47) Signification is with Gilbert (see below p.49) a result of the abstraction. The abstraction which is with Gilbert the method of the so-called mathematical science fulfills two functions: first it "separates" the forms from matter, the id quod's, and secondly it "separates" from each other the forms of the total form of the particular object. These separated forms are then united according to similarity and the concepts thus gained are the basis of signification. Proper nouns, however, are derived from the total forms of the objects and as no total form is similar to another total form (274/75 sqq. – 144/63 sqq. 272/85 – 269/37 sqq. – 270/78 (!) – 271/85 – 146/19) and as abstraction is unable to handle forms unless they are dissolved into constituent parts, proper names seem to be imposed according to criteria of denomination only, and consequently to have no signification (in the sense of connotation).
constitute signification which is characteristic only of appellative nouns.

Thus having repudiated the current ontological understanding of the basis of signification (in the sense of connotation) Gilbert is forced to find another explanation for the fact that signification permits several objects to share the same appellative name and thus to establish the principal distinction between proper nouns and appellatives

The criterion of signification which allows one name to be affirmed of several things Gilbert finds in the similarity existing between the parts of the total forms by which the things concerned are formed:

ideoque ipsorum (scil. hominum) forme multe similiter natura et actu et fuerunt et sunt et erunt, a quibus hoc plena inter se conformatum vagy dividuum nomen (scil. nomen appellativum) hominibus ipsis inditum est.

This conformity is perceived in the so-called mathematical science which has abstraction as its proper method, by means of which the simple forms are extracted both from the thing of which they are causes, and from one another, that is from the concretion (i.e. the collection of several forms in one thing). In this way mathematica unites the "separated" forms under a concept without any regard for the fact that the forms are numerically different. As a science mathematica is not part of naturalis scientia in the limited sense, for the principal aim of naturalis is to perceive the things and their forms as singular ("numero differentes") and concrete, and therefore it is not in a position to receive the results of mathematica implicitly. From mathematica, however, naturalis does learn the genus of the forms, or that in regard to which the forms are mutually similar:

Neque rationalis speculatio (scil. naturalis) perfecte id, quod est esse aliquid, capít, nisi disciplinalis (scil. mathematica) quoque id, unde illus est, quid sit, firmiter teneat.

48) This principal distinction we have already touched upon above p.47 and the preceding note. That the contingent distinction between propria and appellativa is said to be arbitrary (above p.46) only implies that it is theoretically justified to name any object with a proper name, though in fact we only use proper names for the sake of convenience (e.g. the only animals endowed with proper names are pets of some sort).

49) Of course it is true that strictly speaking Gilbert does not advance a new criterion but modifies the commonly accepted one replacing the ontological foundation by an epistemological foundation.

50) 273/64 sqq.
51) 84/74.
This communication of knowledge form mathematica to naturalis is the foundation of signification in the sense of connotation\textsuperscript{52}. It is because of this "intentional" or "connotative" conception that several different things have the same name and are said to be the same ratione signification\textsuperscript{53}, in spite of the fact that in reality they are by no means the same, neither with respect to \textit{id quod est}, nor to \textit{id quo est}:

Que vero significandi ratione eadem sunt, plus quam semel dicendo numeramus distributione vel ea, que vere est, sicut dicitur distributione, ut cum de Platone et Cicerone loquentes dicimus "homo, homo", et numerantes tam illos, que sunt, quam diversas humanitates ab altera quarum alter et alter ab altera dicitur "homo"\textsuperscript{54}.

Here the strictly "mathematical" comprehension has gone through a decisive alteration. From being only a perception of abstracted and therefore \textit{modo speculate}\textsuperscript{55} separate forms, it has become a comprehension of the ontologically inherent forms as concretized as well as of the things formed. In this setting, therefore the proper "mathematical" perception becomes secondary in proportion to the proper "natural" principle of the numerical diversity between objects\textsuperscript{56}.

IV. Cui - Reference.

Whereas the connotative aspect of signification of the appellative noun thus rests on a "mathematical" perception which, modified, is taken over by naturalis, the appellatio or the denotative aspect of signification of the natural names (e.g. "homo", "albus") is characterized by its ability to stand both for the actual subject and for the single form of the subject\textsuperscript{57}:

\textsuperscript{52} 142/12.
\textsuperscript{53} that is: because of the unitas which abstractio as a unio brings about (unity of concept).
\textsuperscript{54} 104/95 sqq. "Hec enim est sola ratio, qua cuilibet nominis appellatio naturaliter est communis: si videlicet qualitas - secundum quam est nomen - illis, quorum est nomen, tota forma substantia est communis: ut homo vel album", 302/30 sqq. - for this use of "appellatio" see above note 17).
\textsuperscript{55} 85/95.
\textsuperscript{56} 120/37 sqq. - see above p.45. As a full exposition of Gilbert's theory of the relationship between scientia naturalis and mathematica would divert our study considerably from the main theme we hope these hints will suffice to show that Gilbert in no way fuses the two distinct sciences.
\textsuperscript{57} William of Conches polemizes against this doctrine - see de Rijk II,1 p. 228. Petrus Helias brings another critique of this point of view, but his polemic does not affect Gilbert's theory - see Pinborg op. cit. p. 50, de Rijk II,1 p. 230-31, and below p.61.
In naturalibus posito nomine, quo id, quod est, et id, quo est, significatur\textsuperscript{58}.

In accordance with this principle "homo" in the proposition "homo est risibilis" refers to the actual subject, the subsistence, which Gilbert calls "substantia nominis", while in the proposition "homo est individuorum forma" the noun "homo" stands for the form, the subsistentia, which Gilbert calls "qualitas nominis":

Verbi gratia si quis dicit "homo est risibilis" item "homo est individuorum forma", nominis nomen quicquid in una id in altera affirmatione significat, i.e. et id, quod intelligitur homo, et id, quo esse debet homo. Quorum significatorum illud, quod primum exposuimus, grammatici.....

Sed in prima affirmatione non id, quo est homo - i.e. nominis qualitas - sed is, qui ea est homo - i.e. nominis substantia - risibilis esse proponitur. In secunda vero affirmatione non is, qui est homo, sed id, quo est homo - i.e. nominis qualitas - individuorum forma dicitur\textsuperscript{59}.

In this way Gilbert expounds Priscian's definition of the noun in the light of the possible references of the nomen:

Omne vero nomen diversa significat, substantiam videlicet et qualitatem: ut "album" id, quod appellatur "album" - quod est substantia nominis - et id, quo appellatur "album" - quod est eiusdem nominis qualitas\textsuperscript{60}.

For the determination of this ambiguity in the appellatio of the nomina naturalia the criterion is - as we shall see - sensus auctoris and ratio predicandi\textsuperscript{61}.

In some quarters of the Porretan school, however, this double aspect of the appellatio nominis is not primarily linked with reference and sensus auctoris, but with the original impositio, and therefore, strictly speaking, only substantia nominis is considered the proper denotatum of the noun, and qualitas nominis is reduced to being accidental to the noun.

To this effect we read in the treatise Ad heresim compescendam:

Illud enim, quod nomen significat pro substantia, proprietas nominis

\textsuperscript{58} 86/21.
\textsuperscript{59} 296/34 sqq. Note that in the first lines of the quotation Gilbert points out that a noun is not equivocal because it has different "kinds" of denotata. For William of Conches' version of this rule, see K.M. Fredborg, The Dependence of Petrus Helias' Summa super Priscianum on William of Conches' Glose super Priscianum. Cahiers 11, 1973 p. 18 sqq.
\textsuperscript{60} 297/57 - see also the quotation below p. 52.
\textsuperscript{61} see pp. 296-298 and below p. 52.
est, quandoquidem nomen habeat significare substantiam ex inventione, qualitatem vero ex accidenti\textsuperscript{62}.

Likewise, Everard shifts the point at issue, and by considering the subject as normally standing for a thing and the predicate as normally standing for a form, he lets this particular syntactical relationship be the means of deciding whether the noun \textit{significat proprie}, which is to be interpreted as "standing for the thing the noun was originally given to designate". Thus he thinks that a noun \textit{significat proprie} only the subject-matter, the thing, and only \textit{improprie} the form:

\textit{Attende, quod nomen quandoquidem significat id, cui impositum, et hoc proprie, ut "homo est animal"; quandoquidem id, ex quo impositum est, et hoc improprie, ut de eo fiat sermo, ut "homo est species"\textsuperscript{63}.}

The most likely background for this viewpoint is, indeed, to be found with Gilbert, since he states that if the subject-term of a compound refers to anything else than a subsistence (\textit{id quod}) we have an instance of tropical predication\textsuperscript{64}, but this is far from being equivalent to the doctrine that the concrete (i.e. natural) name only refers to the form \textit{improprie}. This deviation from Gilbert is part of Everard's more extensive attempt to correct Gilbert's view of the relationship between the concrete and the mathematical name, to which relationship we shall later direct our attention.

V. Propter Quid — The Primacy of Sensus.

As \textit{significatio} (in the sense of "denotation") or \textit{appellatio} is thus instrumental in indicating the reference of the nouns, and as \textit{appellatio} is ambiguous as far as natural names are concerned, natural names being able to stand for a thing and for a form\textsuperscript{65}, a further means of determination is required to settle the actual reference of the noun in a proposition.

Naturally, Gilbert does not deny that signification alone (i.e. as connotation) brings about comprehension, but this kind of understanding is vague:

\textit{Sed et cum in aliis intelligetiam excitet certa rei proprietas aut certa vocis positio (= impositio, inventio), ut cum dicitur "homo}

\textsuperscript{62} p. 37. For "proprietas nominis" see below p. 53. It is worth noting that the author knew the Porretan interpretation of the term "proprietas nominis" but only uses it applied to the "substantia nominis".

\textsuperscript{63} Dialogus p. 254.

\textsuperscript{64} for this distinction see below p. 55.

\textsuperscript{65} "quia omnis dictio diversa significat" 350/54.
albus", quoniam certum est albedinem proprium esse corporalitatis, potest putari dictum esse secundum aliquam humani corporis partem, aut cum dicitur "canis est sensibilis", quoniam certum est, cuuis speciei sit, quaecumque qualitas significatur hac voce, quamvis nesciat auditor, ex cuuius illarum (scil. qualitatis seu speciei) sensu hoc dictum sit, scit tamen, quod non nisi de eo, qui illarum aliquam habet ... 66.

This may also explain why Gilbert only once 67 uses the word 'impositio' in the sense it had to most of his contemporaries, for the decisive point to him was not the "original" meaning, but the actual use of a term in a sentence (i.e. when also the precise denotation of the term had to be determined).

The criterion thus required of determining the denotation Gilbert finds in the sensus auctoris 68 to which we obtain access through the rationes by which the predicate is attributed to the subject:

Ille enim lectoris vigilantia debet attendere, acceptis dictionum significationibus, quibus significatorum propositi conveniant rationes, et de quibus interpretes id, quod dictum est, intelligendum explanat. 69.

Only when the systematical ambiguity has been parsed in this way - which demands an extensive training in philosophy and logic 70 - can a perfect understanding be achieved: "Ibique mentis sue intellectum constitutae". 71.

In full harmony with this view Gilbert carries on a vehement controversy with those of his contemporaries who are of the opinion that signification (as connotation) is in itself sufficient to render a proposition intelligible 72.

This discussion is continued within the Porretan school. Possibly

66) 64/59 sqq. "In quo etiam, quia omnis dictio diversa significat, quid et de quo diligens auditor attendit. Verbi gratia: cum hoc nominem, quod est "corpus", subicimus - quia et id quod est et id quo est corpus designat - supponimus eo sive subsistentiam sive quod ea subsistit et vel alucius partem, que corpus est, vel id, cuius ipsum est pars" 350/54 sqq.
67) see the preceding quotation.
68) 68/59.
69) 296/31 sqq. - compare 297/81 sqq. and 298/84: "... de tot significatis, id, quod ad propositum pertinet, convenientiam illi rationum amminiculuis eligat".
70) Usually "logic" is a general term for grammar, dialectics, and rhetoric - see for instance 297/85.
71) 298/90.
72) 67/55 sqq. and 298 sqq. This polemic is probably directed against William of Conches and Petrus Helias - see note 57.
as a consequence of this debate the Porretans interpret the term 'proprietas nominis' to have the signification "the things for which a name may stand". For this decisive interpretation the external authority is a maxim by Hieronymus: "Non solum nomina, sed nominum proprietates i.e. personas confitemur". So in Everard's dialogue, one of the participants, Ratus, expressly says:

Nominum proprietates sunt res eis signifcatum. Unde proprium est nominum significare substantiam et qualitatem.

In the treatise Quod Patris et Filii we find the same doctrine. Naturally, this terminology owes much to Gilbert's exposition of the definition of the noun given by Priscian, but we have no evidence of Gilbert's using the term 'proprietas nominis' for the reference of the noun in a sentence.

Thus the context becomes the decisive criterion to the Porretans, for which Gilbert coined the term ratio propositi to the effect of establishing what later logicians and grammarians would call the suppositio subjecti. In this way ratio propositi becomes opposed to significatio (in the connotative aspect), and we learn from Gilbert:

Quod vero TERTIO REPETITUR hoc nomen, quod est "DEUS", CUM et Pater nuncupatur "Deus" et FILIUS nuncupatur "Deus" ET SPIRITUS SANCTUS NUNCUPATUR "Deus", sicut nominis, ratione significandi, sic et rei illius, ex qua horum quisque dicitur "Deus", ratione propositi, repetitio fit.

and from the treatise Quod Patris et Filii:

In secunda (scil. Deus est Deus) vero de Deo iuxta propositi rationem vel Patre vel Filio vel Spiritu Sancto non Deus, sed dicitur deitas.

The term was ordinarily understood to apply to the grammatical properties of word-classes - for Abaelard's use of "proprietas nominis" see de Rijk II, 1 p. 198.

74) see Dialogus p. 261.
75) Dialogus p. 261. Thus several trends are juxtaposed without any discussion of their compatibility, see above p. 51.
76) p. 38.
77) see above p. 50.
78) The Porretans, however, considered also the predicate to be dependent on the context. It stood either for a singular form or for a class of forms (see below pp. 56 and 61 and the text quoted above p. 51-52). The doctrine of the suppositio or appellatio predicati is not far off - see de Rijk II, 1 p. 553.
79) lo3/46. It may be argued that here "ratio propositi" merely means "for the reason stated above", but there can be no doubt that this is the basis from which the perhaps later and more explicit Porretan terminology sprang. For another instance of "ratio propositi" with Gilbert see the quotation above p. 52.
80) p. 49.
Simon of Tournai, too, uses the distinction as something granted:

... "Deus est homo", nomine Dei agitur de persona composita Christi, ratione propositi, non significati 81,

... "homo est Simon". Hic quoque agitur de eodem nomine hominis ratione propositi, non significati, quamvis "homo" non determinate significet Simonem, ut ibi ... 82.

In Everard's dialogue several cases of this opposition are to be found 83, and in the following text we are very close to the distinction between suppositio determinata - suppositio confusa:

Cum igitur hoc nomen "Deus" ibi positum confuse significet et ita ibi indefinite personam subiciat, sed determinate et finite ratione propositi, licet non proponendi, ideo... 84.

VI. Natural Predication 85.

Having seen how Gilbert defines nomen and its constituent aspects which do not allow of a pre-contextual stipulation of meaning, we may now turn to Gilbert's theory of predication in order to explain how subject and predicate function in a proposition and to show how the double aspect of the appellatio nominis (denotation) is active in making the predication intelligible.

Syntactically the subject indicates matter (that is: the id, quod est, or the subsistence) the place of the subject-term being vicis materie 86 while the predicate-term represents a form claimed by the predication to be inherent in the thing:

Numquam enim id, quod est, predicatur. Sed esse et quod illi adest predicabile est et sine tropo non nisi de eo, quod est 87. Nam de quocumque aliquid predicatur, id predicato quidem est hoc, quod nomine ab eodem sibi indito et verbi substantivi compositione - cuius ammini-culo predicatur - esse significatur 88.

82) M. Schmaus, ed., Texte der Trinitätslehre des Simon von Tournai, Recher. théol. anc. et méd. 4 1932 p. 71. The Porretans are not mentioned by name, but the text cited occurs as an argument for the Porretan theory of "predicatio de Deo".
83) e.g. p. 254.
84) Dialogus p. 270. For a parallel with Simon see Warichez op cit. p.141.
85) Other sciences than naturalis e.g. ethica and theologica use other types of predication for instance "denomination" - see 227/60. Whether predications in mathematica are to be judged by the standards of natural predication is a question to which Gilbert provides no answer - see below p.67.
86) 262/45.
87) 293/53 - compare 93/30.
88) 175/12-compare "Quod Patris et Filii" p. 47.
When actually the subject fulfils this requirement of standing for an *id quod* of which an *id quo* is predicated, Gilbert considers the proposition to have the quality "literal" as we profess a "naturalem convenientiam". And as in this case there is a direct correspondance between the proposition and the state of affairs – a "rerum atque dictionum consequentia".

However, speech may also have another quality than the literal i.e. the figurative. As figurative speech, which Gilbert sometimes calls *usus loquendi* or *eloctio*, those propositions are to be classed in which the subject refers to a form instead of a thing. They are figurative not because the concrete name stands for the form *improperie*, but because, syntactically, the subject indicates matter, and because a form may only denominatively be called matter.

In predicative propositions the greater importance is attached to the predicate: "Non tam supposituri aliquid predicamus, quam predicaturi supponimus". But in natural and literal predications the subject standing for a thing, it is not of the thing as a void hypokeimenon we predicate, but of the thing as it is formed by that particular form from which the thing has been given the name which is placed as subject in the proposition:

NIHIL omnino SECUNDUM MATERIAM, que predicate forme subest (scil. the subsistence) – dictione, qua illa forma exponitur (scil. the predication) – ESSE DICITUR (scil. the subsistence), SED tantum SECUNDUM eam, ex qua rei proposita est appellatio, rei ipsius PROPRIAM FORMAM.

Christi persona illo suo ab humanitatis subsistentia nomine, quod est "homo", subjecta.

On the basis of this fact, Adhemar of St. Ruf writes:

89) 63/35.
90) 63/31 sqq.
91) for "qualitas orandi" see the preceding note.
92) 90/28. For St. Anselm "usus loquendi" is the ordinary speech – see Henry op. cit. p. 11.
93) 309/30.
94) It is evident that according to Gilbert the syntactical doctrine of the place of the subject-term being "vicis materia" is without relevance to the principal equality of the two denotata of the noun,
95) 81/73 sqq.
96) 349/49.
97) 89/1 sqq. It is worth noting that in the first part of the quotation Gilbert merely denies that a thing has esse from the id quod,
98) 348/2 – compare 117/98. According to this principle in a diffinitiva demonstratio the thing is placed as subject by the noun derived from the general form. Against this rule Magister Carnerus offended – see Hunt II p. 41-42.
Necessarium est enim omni legenti, ut et rem cognoscat, que suscepit nomen, et nominis causam, qua nominatur, que nominis qualitas a grammaticis nuncupatur, que simul uno et eodem nomine significantur. In other words, the double aspect of the appellative noun is active in predications, but whereas the substantial aspect has the accent in natural predications, we shall later see that the formal aspect prevails in logical predications.

As any thing is id, quod est, through its own single form, and as the universal is nothing but a collection of forms based on their mutual similarity, it is impossible to predicate the same form of two different things, but on account of the connotation of the appellative nouns it is not impossible for different things to be attributed the same name:

NAM QUOD de his (scil. Plato, Aristoteles, Cicero) ter dicitur "homo", propter formarum - que de illis uno tamen nomine dicuntur - diversitatem singulare, que per se facte sunt, appellationes congregaturn in numerum, ut - quoniam unusquisque a sua, que non est alterius, subsistentia dicitur "homo" - ipsi simul dicuntur esse tres homines. Et quamvis ratione significatis illius, qua nomen quodlibet appellativum "quale aliquid" significare dicitur, repetitio eiusdem nominis fiat, rerum tamen eodem nomine est predicata numeralis diversitas.

It is to that effect Gilbert writes:

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100) The anonymous commentary on Gilbert's commentary on the Pauline epistles can therefore state that the noun placed as subject "supponat qualitatem", and the context clearly shows that this is to be considered valid even in a natural and literal proposition (see above p. 54). Boulogne-sur-Mer cod. 24 fol. 138vb - Bibliothèque Nationale Cod. Lat. 3154 fol. 15vb: "QUI FACTUS EST (Rom. 1,3). "Qui" infinitum nomen nullam substantiam vel qualitatem habet nisi substantiam et qualitatem nominis, quod per ipsum refertur. Quare cum referat "Filio Dei" idem est dicere "qui factus est" quod "Filius Dei est factus". Sed quoniam "factura" predicamentum est secundae rationis, secundum quid insit, adiungit, scilicet: SECUNDUM CARNEM. Cum ergo dicitur "factus" fit subjecto predicamenti accommodatio, cum dicitur "secundum carnem" fit predicamenti per causam declaratio. Est autem in prima iunctura verborum accidentia, et consequens conexio in secunda. Cum enim "qui" eandem qualitatem supponat quam "Deus" vel "Filius Dei", et "factus" predict qualitatem opposite nature, id est humanitati addictam, est in connexione predicati ad subjectum accidentia. For the distinction between predications consequent and consequentes or accidentales see below p. 58.

101) 312/7 sqq.

102) 102/37 sqq. - compare 72/56 - 269/50 sqq.
... unitas omnium a se diversorum in quolibet facultatum genere predicamentorum comes est, for the superior unitas is that of the individual, which sets it off from any other individual, and to this we may add the unitas that any part of the total form is endowed with.

So in natural propositions the predicate always stands for the subject's singular form and never for a universal form, whereas in logical propositions - as we shall see - the predicate stands for a class of singular forms.

Consequently, when we are told in the gloss Promistimus: "Contra Porretanos, qui dicunt nomen in apposito nullius esse persone", and if "nullius persone" is intended to mean that the predicate stands for a form which is not confined to the esse of the subject but for a universal form, and not just meant to refer to the fact that the predicate is not standing for the subsistens, we have to realize that just as it is impossible to trust contemporary sources for Gilbert's theological doctrines unless they can be verified in Gilbert's own writings such is also the case as far as his grammar and logic are concerned.

VII. Types of Natural Predications.

In the literal and natural predications (sub eadem qualitate dicendi) Gilbert finds it cogent to draw some distinctions:

Docti vero, quos una facies diversarum dictionum non decipit, sensus ipsos, qui sub eadem dicendi qualitate diversi sunt, dividunt.

Apart from the interesting features of these distinctions themselves, they are eminently fit for broadening our understanding of Gilbert's theory of predication and for confirming our general exposition of the relationship between the two appellative aspects of the nomen.

One of the primary distinctions is between "predicationes secundum se" or "secundum rem" and "predicationes secundum aliud". What is

103) 175/10.
104) Hunt II pp. 51-52.
105) I have found no other Porretan text to this effect.
106) see below p. 68.
107) see A.M. Landgraf, Untersuchungen zu den Eigenlehren Gilberts de la Porreëe, Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 54 1930, for N.M. Häring's articles see the bibliography in his edition of Gilbert's commentaries on Boethius.
108) 192/40.
109) 134/77.
predicated secundum se is the forms actually inherent in the things, whereas the forms predicated secundum aliud are only the circumstances (circumstantiae) in which the thing is located. Thus this distinction between predicates has its foundation in the ontological structure of the thing, according to which there is a difference between being by nature and by status 110.

The mathematical science treats of the circumstances in the same way as of the inherent forms, the last seven categories being mathematical 111, while grammarians and dialecticians realize that they are only extrinsecus affixa 112.

Thus, it should be noticed that the distinction 'secundum se - secundum aliud predicationes' is not equivalent to that between substantial and accidental predications, because the accidents of quality and quantity 113 are predicated secundum se just as the substantial forms:

QUE SECUNDUM REM predicationes, CUM DICUNTUR DE REBUS causa subsistentiarum suarum, quibus in illis adsunt, sibi SUBJECTIS VOCANTUR quidem "ACCIDENTIA" eo, quod rerum illarum subsistentiis adsunt, sed tamen "secundum rem" eo, quod ipsis subsistentibus ipsa quoque insunt et eadem esse alicui faction 114.

Another important distinction exists between predicationes consequentes and inconsequentees which has its basis in metaphysics like the former. On innumerable occasions Gilbert stresses that every substantial form is accompanied by several accidental forms which are proper to it, that is: the substantial form cannot be in the thing unless these accidents likewise inform the thing. This relation is thus reflected in predications that, having placed the thing as subject of the proposition by a form, we may predicate either a form following (adherent to) this form, or a form following another form in the thing 115. Yet the fact that a proposition

110) see above p. 45.
111) 117/63 sqq. and 209/86.
112) 125/15.
113) That "qualitas" and "quantitas" are also used as natural principles is a complication in Gilbert, but as it does not strictly pertain to our subject we can omit a treatment.
114) 138/70.
115) Here I follow the outline in SD p. 98–99 which resumes the main feature of Gilbert's more comprehensive treatment (258/51 sqq.). It is worth noting that "consequentia" here means "consistency in predication", while in 63/32 it means "correspondance" in the sense of the Aristotelian semantic-model.
is "inconsequent" does not prevent the proposition from being true, because the subject refers to the whole thing:  

Et generaliter quoscumque unum mult is secundum eandem facultatem appellatur nominibus, quilibet eorum — facta suppositione rei, cuius sunt nomina — vere possunt cetera predicari. Sed non omnia predicata his, quibus fit supposition, conexionis consequentia reddunt.

The distinction plays a very important part in Gilbert's teaching of the communicatio idiomatum, and, influenced by Gilbert, we find Hugh of St. Cher using the distinction which he himself traces back to Peter the Lombard, with whom it is at most found only embryonically.

VIII. Verbum Substantivum.

Having thus given an account of Gilbert's doctrine of the nouns and their part played in predications we must now turn to Gilbert's teaching of the other constituent of predications, that is to Gilbert's doctrine of the verbum substantivum.

In this domain Gilbert distinguishes sharply between the doctrines of the philosophers and the theologians, and he mentions that even among the philosophers there is a difference of opinion as to the verbum substantivum. As some philosophers are convinced that no distinction is to be found between existential and essential forms they believe that being accompanies anything subjected to their discourse, and by this being becomes an equivocal concept. The closest parallel to this point of view we find in the first opinion mentioned in the Glosule. Other philosophers divide the forms so that the things are (esse — exist) through the substantial forms, while they are something (esse aliquid) through qualities and quantities. This view is mentioned by Boethius in the De Hebdomadibus, but I have not been able to find a contemporary parallel.

Gilbert dissociates himself from both views and prefers to adhere to the doctrine of the theologians.

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117) 346/56 sqq. see also above note loo. Compare the doctrine of "conversio particularis affirmative" in the treatise "Ad heresim com-pescendam" p. 37.
119) 193-194.
120) Hunt I p. 225.
121) That Gilbert sides with the theologians is evident from the fact that he claims every form to be essential and denies that "esse" is equivocal — see 82/1 – 87/56 – 97/52 – 118/8 – 119/38 – 154/96 –
The theologians for their part claim any predication of 'est' to be a predication of the divine essentia:

Cum enim dicimus "corpus est" vel "homo est" vel huiusmodi, theologici hoc esse dictum intelligunt quadam extrinseca denominatione ab essentia sui principii.\(^{122}\)

But this metaphysical exposition has, indeed, not exhausted Gilbert's doctrine of the verbum substantivum for later in his commentary to Boethius' De Hebdomadibus he writes:

Sed non modo id, quod est et aliquid est, itemque vel id, quo est, vel id, quo aliquid est, verum etiam illud IPSUM ESSE OMNIUM RERUM, quod significamus, cum de aliquo dicimus "est" vel "aliquid est".\(^{123}\)

Here it becomes evident that Gilbert distinguishes between the force of the verbum substantivum as substantivum or existential ('est') and as a means of predication ('est aliquid'). But it is equally conspicuous that the verbum substantivum always retains its proper force (i.e. existential) so that esse is in no way equivocal.\(^{124}\) It is therefore scarcely surprising that in contradistinction to the second group of philosophers the theologians never acknowledge a particular substantial or existential form, but claim every form to be qualitative or quantitative (that is:

Et similiter unumquodque subsistens essentia sui principii predicant non esse aliquid, sed esse; illa vero, que in ipso creato est, subsistet non esse, sed esse aliquid.\(^{125}\)

The natural demarcation between the substantial form and the accidental is not invalidated by this doctrine, however, for it is through the substantial form that the thing is said to be aliquid in eo, quod est (that is: the form through which God gives existence), whereas it is through the accidental form the thing is aliquid tantum.\(^{126}\)

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122) 193/55 sqq.
123) 220/83 sqq.
124) Gilbert's view can thus be considered as a combination of Magister Guido's and the sixth in the "Closule"; see Hunt I pp. 226-227 and de Rijk's analysis in de Rijk II,1 pp. 103-104. Haring's interpretation of Otto of Freising is not quite convincing as it is Ioehelius and not Gilbert who claims that "est" said alone of something is without signification (Gesta op. cit. pp.238-240) - for Haring's interpretation see "Quod Patris et Filii" p. 16 (Haring's introduction).
125) 193/60.
126) 197/55 sqq. where Gilbert states that this point of view differs from that of the second group of philosophers.
Everard's doctrine of the *verbum substantivum* rests on the assumption that 'est' is equivocal and, consequently, cannot be classified as Gilbertian.

IX. Logical Predications.

According to Gilbert logic divides the predicates (the forms predicated) according to their *rationes predicandae*\(^{128}\), also called *dissерendи rationes*\(^{129}\).

The logical *rationes* are themselves predicated of the form as subject:

*Diligenter tamen est Attendendum, quod cum dicitur "album est accidentis" nequaquam album ex albedinis causa, sed albedo ipsa "accidentis" appellatur\(^{130}\).*

These *rationes* must be predicated consequently\(^{131}\), just as *nomina a rationibus dissерendи* (e.g. "contrarium" - called "nomina nominum" with other logicians) must be predicated of the thing itself placed as subject by the form according to which the thing is ascribed the name of the predicate:

*Quamvis enim et "corpus" et "album" et "contrarium" eiusdem rei sint nomina, non tamen secundum eandem rationem, quoniam "corpus" et "album" a naturis: "contrarium" vero a dissерendи ratione ide appellant. Ideoque de illo "contrarium" non vere poterit predicari, nisi eo nomine, quod illi a causa contrarietatis impositum est, supponatur ita: "Album est contrarium" vel huiusmodi alio nomine cuiiper rei a causa sue contrarietatis imposita\(^{132}\).*

The logical predications are according to Gilbert totally conformed to the pattern for natural predications; for in logical propositions as well as in natural ones we predicate a form of a thing:

... *cum naturaliter inabstracta prout sunt rationalis speculatio concipit. Sic enim dicitur de specie quedam secunda substantia predicari.*

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127) *Dialogus* p. 253.
128) 142/12.
129) 347/86.
130) 347/84sqq.
131) That is: the form has to be placed as subject represented by the name expressing the particular property of the form according to which the property of the predicate is ascribed to the form. So the form "albedo" has to be placed as subject represented by its nomen *specialisimum* "albedo" according to which the form is said to be accidental, and not by its nomen *generalissimum* "qualitas" for it is not as a quality the form "albedo" is said to be accidental, *qualitas* being a genus *predicamentorum* (see below note 15o) and not a ratio *predicandi*.
132) 347/74 - 88 - compare SD p. 74-75.
Non enim hic intelligendum est de eo, quod species est, aliquid predicare, sed de subsistentia potius, in quo est subsistentia specialis, nec de eo id, quod est secunda substantia, quod scilicet solum subsistens est - quod omneo impossibile est predicari - sed que in eo est, subsistentia 133.

So, in Gilbert's theory of logical predications the same ambiguity appears as in the later terministic theory of *suppositio simplex* 134. Having classified predications of the second intentions as logical, Gilbert proceeds to include predications of higher-order predicates 135 in logic.

Whereas contingent propositions about a single thing are, naturally, only valid for one thing, the logical propositions are valid for classes of things, and that is due to the fact that from logical propositions we do not only gain information concerning the properties of a thing, but also concerning being itself, or, in other words, what it means to be of a certain kind:

Hac enim diffinitione "homo est animal rationale" non solum que res sit homo, sed etiam esse homo demonstratur. Non solum enim qui est homo est animal rationale, sed etiam hoc est esse hominem esse vident licet animal rationale 136.

As we acquire a knowledge of being, the accent of the subject is placed on the formal aspect of the appellative noun, though not in a way to make the logical propositions figurative as in case of predications of 'est accidens' of the form of the white thing, because as subject we place the single things which have these mutually similar forms 137.

To this effect Gilbert may also write that in a *divisiva diffinitione*, where species is predicated of genus, the general subsistentia is *substantiv a significatione preposita* 138.

So in the last resort *sensus auctor is* is the criterion determining whether a proposition is natural or logical. Thus, it cannot be completely wrong to claim that by his ontology based on the principle of *singularitas*, and his constant interest for the context, Gilbert has to some extent anticipated the distinction "suppositio indeterminata - determinata" 139.

133) 93/3o sqq.
135) for this expression see Henry p. 241.
136) 244/45 sqq.
137) perhaps 23o/32 sqq. can be interpreted to this effect too.
138) 262/5o.
139) One part of the later suppositio simplex is with Gilbert to be placed under suppositio indeterminata.
at any rate, and it is notable that this is valid for subject as well as for predicate.  

X. A QUO: Nomina Mathematica.

According to Gilbert not only naturalis but also mathematica furnishes speech with names. These mathematical or abstract names\(^{141}\) (e.g. "albedo", "humanitas") name the forms as abstracted by the mathematical abstraction, and thus the forms are said to be something ab efficiendo similiter aut dissimiliter\(^{142}\), that is the abstract names are given the forms through a similarity found by the abstraction to exist between the actual things of which the forms are causes. As the abstraction is not only a separation of the form from the id quod, matter, but also a separation from the other forms in the concretion of the total id quo, and as any thing is individual by the dissimilitudo of the total form\(^{143}\), mathematica does not impose a name of the total form inherent in a given id quod, but only of a part of the total form regardless of its being substantial or accidental\(^{144}\).

The most wellknown instances of the mathematical imposition of names are according to Gilbert the names of the Aristotelian categories. Gilbert defines a category as a genus predicamentorum; this we may interpret to mean either a class in which the forms are placed according to the principle of mutual similarity extracted by the method of abstraction, or as a concept comprising all the mutually similar forms. Thus e.g. 'qualitas' is a nomen mathematicae abstractionis\(^{146}\) because it is given to some forms on the basis of their mutually similar effects, the actual things, which they cause to be qualia. As mathematica has innumerable other genera predicamentorum (e.g. "color", "albedo") than the Aristotelian categories,

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\(^{140}\) Compare the second quotation p. 52.

\(^{141}\) 167/10.

\(^{142}\) 91/56. The abstraction is the method, while the similarity in effects is the ontological basis.

\(^{143}\) "ut et eorum, que ita separatur, et eorum, a quibus separatur, natura atque proprietas comprehendatur" 215/45.

\(^{144}\) see above p. 45 note 36.

\(^{145}\) See 91/51. For this reason the total form of Plato which is individual and therefore dissimilar has not been named according to the proper principles of mathematical imposition - see 144/73.

\(^{146}\) 116/53. It may also be called "nomen a genere predicamentorum" (117/69) because it is imposited on the basis of the concept constituted by the mathematical abstraction.

\(^{147}\) 116/46, for instance the forms contained under the genus predicamentorum "color" and all "immaterial" forms.
it is evident that according to Gilbert the Aristotelian categories are in principle no different from any other mathematical concept or name; however, they do have the characteristic of being \textit{generalissima genera predicamentorum}^{148}.

It is thus fairly clear that mathematica is exclusively concerned with the "contents" (genus) of the forms in contradistinction to \textit{naturalis} or \textit{rationalis} which is occupied primarily with the \textit{rationes formarum}^{149} i.e. the ways in which the forms inhere in the subject as either substantial or accidental\textsuperscript{150}, and with the ways in which the forms adhere in the concretion as either general, differential, specific or accidental.

While the ontologically concrete form is thus named by an abstract

\textsuperscript{148) 116/46.}
\textsuperscript{149) 86/23. For the distinction between the ratio and the genus of forms see 142/11 - 161/2.}
\textsuperscript{150) That "substantia" is a "locus rationis" and not a "genus predicamentorum" (116/36 - 117/77 - 118/97 - 119/16 - 119/21 sqq. - "categoria" is with Gilbert the dialecticians' name for the form predicated (163/4)) is indeed a rather unique feature of Gilbert's "system". As Gilbert defines "genus predicamentorum" - or "cathegoria" in the ordinary sense - as a classification of forms according to their essential aspect (their genus), Gilbert is confronted with the problem of how to consider "substantia" in light of this criterion. If "substantia" is to be a category as the other nine categories that collect different forms according to their similarity in effects, then some particular substantial (or existential) forms must be mutually resembling in the "formal" constitution of things even so opposed as material and immaterial subsistences. This view Gilbert finds in the writings of Porphyry and Boethius (116/40). But Gilbert cannot make this opinion his own primarily because he thinks that material and immaterial subsistences have no basic form "common" as they are effects of the two dissimilar subsistentie perpetue i.e. corporalitas and spiritualitas (332/55 sqq. - 336/59 sqq.). For this reason Gilbert defines "substantia" as a "locus rationis" which means that "substantia" is the name of forms given on account of the way in which they inhere in an id quod i.e. as conditioning the generation and the corruption of the things (209/82 sqq.) Thus "substantia" and "accidens" are expressions of the ways in which the forms can inhere in an id quod while the nine categories are the classes to which forms belong on account of some similarity in their essential aspect.

To this doctrine Gilbert is ultimately directed by his understanding of the relationship between the Creator and the creation and the opposition between the natural and the theological understanding of the world (164/58 sqq.). As a full account of this extremely complicated doctrine would by far exceed the limit of the present study and as it does not strictly pertain to our subject we shall let these hints suffice.
name in mathematica, it is also named by the natural name (nomen naturalis participationis), corresponding to the nomen a genero predicamentorum, e.g. both qualitas and quale denote the single forms. In this way the problem arises how the two kinds of names are interrelated.

Gilbert emphasizes that relatio and relatum or qualitas and quale are the same genus, and so it cannot be preposterous to suppose that, likewise, album and albedo may be said to be either the same genus or to be of the same genus. As we have already seen, Gilbert links significatio in the sense of connotation with a kind of intentional conception gained in mathematica, and furthermore supported by Everard’s statement: "Cum sententia magistri fuerit, quod idem significarent (scil. nomina concreta and mathematica)" we may reasonably interpret Gilbert’s exposition to mean that somehow the concrete and the mathematical names have the same signification. However, a very essential distinction between the two kinds of names is to be found: they are situated within two different sciences, and, consequently, it is a matter of course that the mathematical name cannot be used to designate the form in its concrete aspect. The matter is accordingly far from being lucid with Gilbert, and it is further obscured by the fact that sometimes Gilbert places the abstract names instead of the concrete in natural propositions, but this usage can probably be explained by its prevalence in the common philosophical jargon of the period.

In the anonymous treatise Quod Patris et Filiī the abstract name is defined in opposition to the concrete so that the abstract name is distinguished from the concrete both with respect to genus and to ratio:

... et relationem non modo omni genere verum etiam omni ratione a relato secerni est necessarium.

This distinction is constructed in accordance with Gilbert’s account of the ontological interrelationship between id quod est and id quo est.

151) 116/53.
152) see above p. 46.
153) 116/51 - 117/65.
154) see above p. 48.
155) Dialogus p. 255.
156) see e.g. 146/35.
157) see for instance Pinborg op. cit. p. 43 sqq.
158) "Quod Patris et Filiī" p. 37.
159) 293/57 - 92/90.
which to Gilbert, naturally, is not the same as the relationship between
the concrete and the abstract noun, as they are explicitly said to be the
same genus or of the same genus.\footnote{160}

Everard tries to constitute the abstract name as the proper name of
the form, but he carries out this manoeuvre by distinguishing also in the
abstract name between substantia nominis and qualitas nominis. By this
an abstract name, e.g. albedo, is said to have as substantia the same
form as the quality of the concrete name (album) and as quality "facit
album".\footnote{161} It seems highly unlikely that Gilbert ever advocated this
theory, primarily because it introduces the subsistence into mathematica
through the quality of the abstract name, which is totally at variance
with the\footnote{162} whose construction, according to Gilbert, is the
ultimate purpose of the mathematical abstraction.\footnote{163} Secondly, it clashes
with Gilbert's curtailment of the distinction "substantia nominis - quali-
tas nominis" to natural names.\footnote{164} Ultimately, such a distinction seems
devoid of meaning for names of forms which are certainly not formed by
other forms. This aspect of Everard's theory\footnote{165} has arisen from his notion
that in sentences as 'homo est species' the word 'homo' is used only im-
properly for the form, and ought to be replaced by the abstract 'humanitas'.
That Gilbert in no way uses the distinction literal - figurative proposi-
tions to constitute a distinction between "denotatum proprium - improprium"
in the natural names we have seen above.\footnote{166}

XI. Mathematical Predication.

As mentioned above, in naturalis we predicate genus of species,\footnote{167}
e. g. "homo est animal", because homo is species generis, the special subsi-
stentia in homo being composed among other forms of the general subsisten-
tia (animal) by concretion.

In mathematica, however, we predicate according to Gilbert genus

\footnote{160} 116/51 - 117/65.
\footnote{161} Dialogus pp. 254-255.
\footnote{162} That is: Classification of the forms according to their "contents".
\footnote{163} 84-85.
\footnote{164} 86/21.
\footnote{165} The theory is so unwieldy that it is hardly reasonable to give an
account of it in full.
\footnote{166} see above p. 51.
\footnote{167} 86/31 sqq.
generis of species individuorum, that is we predicate a genus predicamentorun of the individuals' forms (species individuorum) e.g. "albedo est color", not because this form (albedo) is concretized together with a general form, the abstraction having resolved the concretion, but because the abstracted forms may be classified in accordance with their "contents". "Genus generis" is, therefore, an expression of the respect in which the single forms are similar - is the category under which the single forms are to be placed. The term 'genus generis' may be interpreted either as an equivalent to "general genus" in the sense "class", because in the nine categories differentia are not to be found, and therefore only generalissima and specialissima, or as a pun on the different senses with which Gilbert uses 'genus', having both the sense "form", and that of "general concept, class", so that the expression will amount to "the class to which the form belongs".

While the anonymous treatise Quod Patris et Filii has a perfectly lucid and plain exposition of the mathematical predication, which is in full harmony with Gilbert's teaching, the mathematical predication becomes an almost insuperable problem with Everard. The primary reason for this is Everard's introduction of the distinction between substantia and qualitas nominis in the abstract names. An additional reason for his difficulty in proposing a reasonable theory is his misinterpretation of Gilbert's expression "species individuorum" by which the term is supposed to signify a special feature of the forms as considered in scientia mathematica. However, to Gilbert 'species individuorum' merely expresses the fact that though, from a mathematical point of view, the form is not concrete but separate and in this way is not considered in so far as it is species generis, it is still of the ontologically inherent and concretized forms we predicate mathematically. This is so because these forms are the only ones existing. Thus the closest parallel to the mathematical predication as far as subject is concerned is to be found in the logical or natural figurative predication of the predicabilia. In other words,

168) Dialogus p. 249.
169) 2o9/84 - 92/2 - 261/19.
170) 155/11 - 312/5.
171) "Quod Patris et Filii" p. 47.
172) Dialogus p. 257.
173) see above p. 61.
'species individuorum' is an expression of the ontological inherence of the *id quo* in the *id quod*\(^{174}\).

XII. Conclusion.

Summing up the characteristics of Gilbert's doctrine of logic and language, we may say that Gilbert by no means constitutes logic as a separate science, but in practice uses it as a science of the "formal" constitution of the world\(^{175}\), and in this respect he is no more successful than e.g. Abaelard\(^{176}\).

Another main feature in Gilbert's doctrine is the stress laid upon the double aspect of the appellative noun, the function of which is not grammatically established beforehand, but always dependent on the sensus auctoris which accentuates now one aspect, now the other. Our access to the *sensus auctoris*, in which the referential function is comprised, is through the *rationes* by which the predicate is attributed to the subject. On this point Gilbert may be said to have anticipated the terminists\(^{177}\), just as he seems to have had a perception of the programme fundamental to the later contextual approach\(^{178}\), his interest being always turned to the actual use of a word in a sentence. In continuation of this trend the predicate never stands for a universal form in the ordinary sense of the word, but either for a single form, or for a class of single forms.

It stands to reason that in his theory of predicabion Gilbert is inclined to the inherence-theory, but it is worth mentioning that by his ontology based on the individual, and by his equalization of the two aspects of the noun, and, ultimately, by his teaching of predicabion of the single form, his version of the inherence-theory is not exposed to the

\(^{174}\) 262/43 sqq.

\(^{175}\) Indeed on one occasion Gilbert mentions the loci of the dialecticians from which evident conclusions are drawn (191/6 sqq.) but wherever logic is seen at work it is occupied with arguments drawn from the properties of things.

\(^{176}\) see Dialectica, ed. L.M. de Rijk 1970 pp. XCVII-XCVIII and Jan Pinborg op.cit. p. 51.

\(^{177}\) see de Rijk II,1 p.561. A theological application of the principle is found in the Porretan collection of questions München Clm. 18918 fol. 118va: "Quedam naturalia nomina sunt, que, si absolute proferantur, non melius de una quam de alis personis intelliguntur, ut "potentia", "sapientia", "benignitas", "amor", "caritas". Si vero, cum adiuncte profera(n)tur, significantius cadunt in unam quam in aliam personam".

\(^{178}\) for this distinction see de Rijk II,1 p. 116.
critique from the adherents of the twoname-theory which is practically in-
cluded in his theory of predication

Where Gilbert's theory, however, had its weakest point was in the
theory of the abstract nouns. These were given a far too restricted area
for functioning, being limited to mathematica, and Gilbert himself reveals
this problem by sometimes employing abstract names to designate forms as
concrete. Perhaps one could say that this distance between Gilbert's
theory and practice meant that the later Porretans were forced to construct
a theory in which the abstract noun had a broader sphere of operation.
But thereby they were pressed, as it were, to the other front, so that
they had to restrict the ability of the appellative noun to stand for forms.
Consequently, they tried to adopt the current distinction between the noun
as primarily a name of the subsistence, and as only secondarily ("impropr"e
or "ex accidenti") a name of forms. To this development Everard's Dialogue
is our primary source. Naturally, they were not conscious of removing the
very foundation of Gilbert's theory by this manoeuvre.

With this interpretation, however, we have advanced further in recon-
struction than the sources actually permit. Unless decisive discoveries
are made of hitherto unknown Porretan manuscripts, we must accept that
Porretanism as a grammatical and logical school of thought is a field
for which we only can see the rough outlines.

179) Gilbert uses the same argument to defend his theory of inherence as
Abaelard to criticize his own earlier theory of inherence — see
134/75 sqq. and Dialectica op. cit. p. 159/31 sqq.