DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE LOCI DIALECTICI
IN WORKS FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE 13TH CENTURY

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I. LIST OF UNPRINTED WORKS DISCUSSED

Commentaries on Aristotle's Topics:
1. Robertus, Notitiae supra librum Topicorum Aristotelis.
   MS: Lisboa, Biblioteca nacional, Fundo Alcobaça 175, ff. 1-113.
   Incipit: Sicut dicit Aristoteles in libro Elenchorum et in I. libro Poste-
   riorum in hoc capitulo: Communicant omnes scientiae secundum communia etc.
   differt demonstrativa.....
   Explicit: ...quod definitio destruitur per destructionem aliorum praedica-
   torum, et non habet oppositionem cum istis nisi quantum ad suum totum esse,
   et sic patet solutio illius oppositionis.
   Book VII ends here at the bottom of f. 113ra, the rest of the page has been
   cut off, f. 113v is blank. The MS ends here, book VIII is not found. The
   ascription to Robertus is only found in the headline on f. 1r. The MS is
   XIII cent. See texts nos. 1-2, in part III of this paper.

2. Robertus, Scriptum super libro Topicorum.
   Incipit: Totum negotium logicum est de sermone, quia sermo est proprium
   instrumentum doctoris, et hoc quia totum negotium logicum est ad docen-
   dum...
   Explicit: Ad aliud dicendum quod non dicit idem quod prius, quia prius do-
   cuit inspicere in propositionibus, hic vero non in <***>. Et sic patent
solutiones ad ea quae quaerebantur. Explicit scriptum super libro Topicorum secundum reverendum doctorem magistrum Robertum.

The MS is XIII/XIV cent. Several works in it have often been ascribed to Kilwardby.¹ See text no. 6. Further extracts are found in Cahiers Inst. M. A. gr. lat. 9 (1973), pp. 29-35.

3. Anonymus.

MS: Todi, Biblioteca Comunale 54, ff. 61ra-109va.

Incipt: Supposita divisione philosophiae sciendum quod omnis logica aut est de syllogismo aut de partibus syllogismi. Si de syllogismo, sic est scientia libri Priorum...

Explicit: Hic autem dicit idem de generalibus conclusionibus et universalibus, nam ad universales oportet habere orationes factas, ideo quia ad eas abundare continue est difficile.

MS from XIII cent.; f. 68vb is blank, here the dubia on the last lectio of book I should have been written.² See texts nos. 7-8.


MSS: Six are known, used here is Perugia, Biblioteca Comunale Augusta 1077, ff. 1-119vb.

Incipt: Triplex est principium immediate causans res, scilicet natura, mos et ratio. Et penes hoc triplex principium sumitur triplex genus rerum...

Explicit: Ad secundum dicendum quod ista documenta differunt, quia unum sumitur circa conclusiones speciales, secundum sumitur circa conclusiones universales.

Adenulph is called magister (artium) in a document from 1250, and this seems to be the best clue to dating his commentary.³ See text no. 9.

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5. Robertus de Cilnac(1)obi, Commentum super librum Toporum Aristotelis. MS: Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr. Conv. soppr. B 4. 1618, pp. 95a-151b. Incept: Cum liber Toporum Aristotelis, quem prae manibus habemus, non sit de syllogismo in universalis, ut de subiecto, nec de aliqua... Explicit: ...et ad huiusmodi statim et continue abundare est difficile, ut dicit ibi: oportet autem, et sic terminatur iste liber. amen. amen. amen. Explicit commentum super omnem librum Toporum Aristotelis venerabilis fratris Roberti de Cilnacoli de ordine fratrum praedicatorum. The place name of the author is given as Cilnacobi at the beginning of the text and as Cilnacoli at the end. No place of that name seems to exist, so it is probably an error. At least since Quétif-Echard the work has been ascribed to Robert Kilwardby. Indeed 'Kilwardby' is often written in curious ways in the MSS, but 'Cilnac(1)obi' seems more deformed than most of what we find. MS from XIII/XIV cent. See texts nos. 16-17.

Commentaries on Boethius' Topics:

6. Nicolaus Parisiensis, Notulae super librum Toporum Boethii. MS: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek clm. 14460, ff. 152ra-166vb. Incept: Syllogismus dialecticus duplicem habet virtutem: unam quam con- trahit a dispositione terminorum et propositionum... Explicit: ...ista autem se habent ut principia complexa, scilicet loci eorundem, quia quodammodo sunt eadem et quodammodo diversa. Et ita patet solutio ad quaesita. Deo gratias. For Nicolaus we have the dates 1254 and 1263 which both concern the selling of a house close to Nicolaus' school (scholae). Note what is said under no. 8 of this list. MS from XIII cent. See texts nos. 3-5.


Explicit: ...et istae sex partes instrumenti rhetorici versantur in quilibet parte rhetoricae.
This very short work consists of questions on Boethius' Topics; it is part of a commentary on the whole of *logica vetus*. MS from XIII/XIV cent. 6

8. *Anonymus*.

MS: Cambridge, Peterhouse 205, ff. 60ra–84vb.

*Incipit*: Cum scientia respective dicatur ad scibile necesse est ut secundum <diversitatem> scibilium causetur diversitas...

*Explicit*: ...et ita intellegit hoc quamvis aliquod potest scribi antequam consequatur rem gestam et ita secundum tempus antecedit.

Immediately after the *explicit* given above the *dubia* from the last *lectio* of Nicolaus' commentary (no. 6) are added without any break in the MS; this commentary's own *dubia* to the same part of Boethius' text (preceding the *explicit* given) have nothing in common with Nicolaus'. 7 MS from XIII/XIV cent. See texts nos. 10–12.

Other works:


*Incipit*: Cum omnis scientia sit veri inquisitiva et hoc per modum...

*Explicit*: et ita in diversis et diversimode, sed haec ostensio et illa non est inconveniens.

MS referred to in the text: Oxford, Merton College 289, ff. 33ra–100rb, but many other MSS are known.

Traditionally it was held that Kilwardby's non-theological works date from the time before his entrance in the dominican order, which would make them not later than ca. 1245, but this is not beyond doubt. See texts nos. 13–15.

II. THE STATUS OF THE TOPICS

Aristotle's Topics was used in the teaching at schools (and universities) from about the middle of the 12th century, but in spite of this the ear-


7) For this reason the explicit given in Lohr's repertory (s.v. Robert Kilwardby, cf. note 1) is wrong.
liest commentaries on it which have been found belong to the period round the middle of the 13th century. We can still hope to find earlier commentaries, but to the best of my knowledge we have no promising trace to follow. No exact date can be given for any of the earliest commentaries extant, and even their authors are unknown to us in most cases. As a source of the medieval doctrine about the topics Aristotle's work had to compete with Boethius' De differentiis topicis. Commentaries on this work from the 12th century are extant, but the earliest commentaries from the 13th century are not older than the earliest commentaries on Aristotle's Topics. Again we cannot date them exactly, and we know only one of the authors, viz. Nicolaus of Paris.

This being so, we cannot start the discussion with attributing dates to the several works, rather a relative chronology might be one of the results. But without doubt all the works discussed here belong to the period round the middle of the 13th century.

A. The Lisboa-Robert

The best starting point seems to be the Aristotle-commentary ascribed to some Robertus and found in a Lisboa MS (no. 1). This work does not seem closely connected with any of the other works. On the contrary it proposes some solutions which are criticized in some of the other works, and its author seems to be working hard to find solutions of questions which some of the others solve without trouble.

According to this Robertus there are two types of inference (illatio), one which rests upon the quantity and quality and order of the sentences, i.e. the syllogistic figures and moods. This type of inference is the syllogism simply (syllogismus simpliciter) which is taught in the Prior Analytics. The other type is the dialectical syllogism which in addition to the form of the syllogism simply also has a form constituted by a relation between the terms (habitudo terminorum) or, in other words, by a locus. It is traditional in medieval logic to distinguish between these two types of inference, we find that done at least since Abelard. But it is new to view it as a distinction between two types of syllogisms, the more traditional view connected the loci with inferences which are not syllogisms.

This change will be due to Aristotle's Topics where the inferences based on loci (mainly at least) are said to be syllogisms right at the beginning of the work. The additional form in the dialectical syllogism are the loci, i.e. principles of inference (rationes inferendi) which are derived from being as such or being taken generally (ens indeterminatum, ens in quantum ens), not from any special category (genus) of being. These principles are certain general concepts (intentiones) as e.g. genus, species, definition, i.e. the concept as such of being a genus etc. which is common to all genera etc. whatsoever. As these general concepts are derived from being as such the dialectician cannot form them himself, but must take them over from the metaphysician who has being as such as the formal object of his science. The principles of inference which dialectic in this way receives from metaphysics are necessary and always hold. What is only probable in a dialectical syllogism are the actual terms and sentences to which the principles are applied in the several arguments. It is in accordance with tradition that extralogical considerations are required to decide if an inference based upon a locus holds, but in the 12th century this would mean that we cannot decide the question by purely formal reflections, that we must investigate the things which the terms actually stand for, i.e. we must look at the particulars; and this gave rise to questions of meaning. This idea is certainly preserved in our Robert when he explains that the terms and sentences of a topical inference are probable. But his statement that also the principles which constitute the form of the topical inferences are dependent upon ontology is a further step. It states in clear words what was only hinted at earlier. And the point is a good point, for truly if our ontology changed radically so that we no longer had the concept of genus, we should not have a locus a genere either. However, the view that the loci are concepts not from any special category, but from being taken generally gives them a peculiar status among our concepts, they are concepts of a high generality, they are basic in our conceptual scheme.

A natural consequence of this high generality is that the loci can give valid inferences whatever is the subject matter of the arguments to which

9) Text no. 1 of this paper; on 100a 21sq., f. 4vb; on 100b 24sq., f. 7vb; on 114b 25sq., f. 50va; on 116a 13sq., f. 53va.
10) Text 2.
11) Cf. the discussions about "locus est res" as rendered in Green-Pedersen, The Doctrine... (note 8) esp. pp. 134-136, 138-140.
they are applied. But Robert draws another interesting consequence from the status of the loci: the actual applications of the loci to arguments take place through maximae propositiones which can be specified according to the subject matter actually under debate. The principle of inference itself, i.e. the locus differentia, the name of the locus or the class of the maximae possible for one locus, cannot be so specified, and is not stated in the arguments, but stands outside as a basis granting them necessity. Remarkable reflections upon this are found in the discussions of the loci a generatione and a corruptione. A peculiarity of these loci is that the words which are their names (i.e. 'generatio', 'corruptio') are stated in the arguments based upon them, while in arguments based upon e.g. the locus a genere we do not find the word 'genus' but e.g. 'animal'. Robert has to explain away Aristotle's actual text, but he poses the problem in an interesting way: the principle of inference should not be stated in the argument, because it is not the middle term, but the relation of which the middle term is an instance (habitudo mediī), it is e.g. generalitas, i.e. the being a genus as such. The same idea is expressed elsewhere (e.g. in the discussion of the locus a simili which suffers from the same peculiarity as the locus a generatione) by claiming that the locus is not the middle term, but is dispositio mediī. However this should be rendered exactly it certainly means something which has a wider application than a single argument and which is constitutive of the form of the arguments.

The same high generality is not found in demonstrative science, which works with specific categories of being and considers the several things according to their nature, according to what each of them is. This yields no concepts which are principles of inference, so the demonstrative syllogism adds no new form to the syllogism simply. Consistently Robert will not recognize the locus a causa as a dialectical locus. It is at best a demonstrative one, if it is a locus at all, because a cause gives us specific and certain knowledge about some one thing. Such knowledge we cannot acquire by the general concepts of dialectic, by help of them we can only

12) On 114b 17sq., f. 49vb; on 115b 11sq., f. 51va.
13) On 116a 13sq., f. 53va; on 109b 30sq., f. 39rb; text 2.
14) On 114b 17sq., f. 49vb.
15) On 104a 12sq., f. 21vb; on 109b 30sq., f. 39va; on 114b 25sq., f. 50vb; on 116a 13sq., f. 53va; on 117b 2sq., f. 56ra.
16) Text 1; on 100b 24sq., f. 7vb.
presume something, as far as specific things are concerned. So Robert
denies that any section of Aristotle's work deals with the locus a causa.
Boethius, it is true, lists such a locus, but this is because Boethius
takes loci to be principles of any kind of reasoning, be it dialectical,
rhetorical or demonstrative. Aristotle, on the other hand, knows only of
loci in dialectic. This last is no bad description of a fundamental
difference between Aristotle's and Boethius' Topics, but I do not know
this way of distinguishing between the two works from any other medieval
text.

The extrinsic loci can give only "uncertain and weak" conclusions,
because they are not taken from concepts constituting features which are
essential and proper to the things to which they are applied, while intrin-
sic loci are, and therefore yield "stronger" conclusions. At another
place it is even stated that only the intrinsic loci a definitione and a
genere are taken from what is essential. This is certainly consistent
with the view that formal reflections alone cannot decide whether an
argument based on a locus is good or not, nor need it conflict with the
idea of the ontological dependence of the loci as such, but it seems hard-
ly compatible with the rejection of the locus a causa as a dialectical
locus. Why should cause be rejected while definition can be kept as a
dialectical locus? Does cause yield more certain and specific knowledge
than definition? We can hardly say so.

To conclude about the Lisboa-Robert: the most remarkable point in his
work is his grasp of the peculiar status of the concepts which constitute
the loci, concepts like genus, species. Such concepts are certainly not
purely logical, if our ontology was radically different we could not have
them. Nor are they on a par with the concepts of physical or natural
sciences (which are paradigms of ontological sciences), because they are
not restricted to a special category of being, but works equally well in
all of them, which makes them rather fundamental in our conceptual scheme
and our reasoning. These concepts stand somehow on the borderline between
logic and ontology. As a critical note we may add that this counts for the
loci on which the medieval discussions about the nature of the loci always

17) Proemium, f. 1ra-b; on 106b 30sq., f. 31vb; on 109b 30sq., f. 39va; on
118a 35sq., f. 57vb.
18) On 102b 28sq., f. 17rb-vb.
19) On 106b 30sq., f. 31va.
concentrated, viz. genus, species. Had they chosen to concentrate on e. g. the *oppositiones*, their statements might have been different. But admittedly it can be said that genus, species are more typical of the loci than are the *oppositiones*. Can we generalize from the ontological dependence of the topics to an ontological dependence of logic as a whole? I have found no express statements, but most consistently the answer would be no. As the ontologically dependent concepts, the loci, are a new form, we will expect Robert to deny an ontological dependence of the logic of the Prior Analytics, the syllogism simply. But this does not answer the question as far as the *logica vetus* is concerned.

B. A Parisian Group

Next let us discuss together some works which display obvious similarities among themselves, viz. the commentary on Boethius by Nicolaus of Paris (no. 6), the anonymous commentary on Boethius in a Paris MS (no. 7), the commentary on Aristotle in an Oxford MS ascribed to some Robertus (no. 2), the anonymous commentary on Aristotle in a Todi MS (no. 3), and the commentary on Aristotle by Adenulph of Anagni (no. 4). The anonymous commentary in Paris is so short that only very little can be found in it, but what we can find agrees with the other works. Nicolaus and Adenulph were masters in Paris, and the MS in Paris containing the anonymous commentary once belonged to Pierre de Limoges, a Parisian master, so I propose that we consider the whole group as belonging to Paris in spite of the fact that one of the MSS to day is found in Oxford. The word 'group' may be misleading, I do not intend thereby to convey that these works form a group in opposition to other Parisian masters, but only that they are together representatives of standpoints which must have been fairly widespread, to judge from their number. Another feature which testifies to this is that these works rarely take the trouble to argue in detail, they seem to expect their standpoints to be easily accepted.

This group agrees with the Lisboa-Robert in holding that in the dialectical syllogism - but not in the demonstrative one - a new form is added to that of the syllogism simply, this new form being a relation between the terms or the relation of a locus (*habitudo localis*). Most of them add that this relation is necessary, but Nicolaus holds that only those rela-

20) See the references in note 6.
tions which are intrinsic loci are necessary. The fact that the conclusions which we obtain from dialectical syllogisms are often only probable is due to the terms and sentences actually used, which may be only contingent. 21

In all five works we meet an almost slogan-like definition of the locus dialecticus which runs: the locus is a (general/common) relation of one thing to another (habituus (generalis/communis) ret ad rem). 22 To this they add that as the locus accordingly in a way can be called a thing (Todi, Adenulph), it is for the metaphysician to define the nature and number of the loci, because he has things and the general divisions of being (Robert) as his proper object; the dialectician must presuppose such knowledge from the metaphysician, as he does not consider the things, but only some features of the things (modi rerum, Nicolaus). 23 The loci can be applied to any subject matter whatsoever, they are not restricted to a special category. 24 In contrast to the topics, the syllogism simply works by relations between words (habitudines vocum), Robert and Adenulph inform us. 25

Unfortunately all this is stated very briefly, often in passing, and sometimes in discussions where the point is something else. Compared with the Lisboa-Robert there is a certain development. It is perceived more clearly that the proper field of the topics are certain general concepts (intentiones) as such. This is brought out especially in the discussions whether the locus a causa is a dialectical locus, which the Lisboa-Robert denied. This group answers that we can consider a cause in two ways: either according to the concept of being a cause (secundum intentionem causae), that would mean establishing that the relation (habituus) of cause to

21) Nicolaus text 3; Robert prooemium, f. 182ra, f. 182rb, f. 182va; Cahiers Inst. M. A. gr. lat. 9, p. 31; on 100a 25sq., f. 183vb; on 133a 8sq., f. 211rb; on 162b 3sq., f. 219va-b; Todi prooemium, f. 61ra; on 1022 5sq., f. 64rb; on 155b 3 sq., f. 95vb; Adenulph on 100a 19sq., f. 3rb, f. 3vb; f. 4rb; on 100a 25sq., f. 5rb; on 100b 24sq., f. 6va-b; on 101a 5sq., f. 7rb; on 102b 15sq., f. 14ra-b; on 112b 1sq., f. 34ra.

22) Nicolaus text 4; 5; on 11868sq., f. 157vb; on 11908sq., f. 159vb; Robert text 6; Cahiers 9, p. 32; Todi prooemium, f. 61rb; on 109a 34sq., f. 69va; on 113b 15sq., f. 72rb; text 8; Adenulph text 9; on 100a 19sq., f. 4rb; on 103b 2sq., f. 15va; Anon. Paris f. 182ra; f. 182va.

23) Nicolaus text 4; Robert, Cahiers 9, pp. 31-32; Todi prooemium, f. 61rb; Adenulph prooemium, f. 3rb; on 103b 2sq., f. 15va.

24) Nicolaus on 1173sq., f. 153ra; on 1190sq., f. 159rb; Robert, Cahiers 9, p. 29; on 114a 26sq., f. 195vb; Adenulph on 100a 19sq., f. 3vb; on 114a 27sq., f. 37rb.

25) Robert on 100a 25sq., f. 183vb; Adenulph on 100b 24sq., f. 6vb; on 103b 2sq., f. 15va.
effect is at play here, and then we have a locus; this is what dialectic does, and accordingly it is a topical science. Or we can look for the nature of the cause (substantia causae), i.e. which thing is actually the cause here? The answer to this question is not given by pointing to the concept of cause as such (i.e. the locus), it requires an answer pointing to a specific thing; this is the question of demonstrative science, which accordingly is not topical. Quite similar discussions are found on the locus a definitione. 26

But these concepts and relations are concepts and relations of things, even to the degree that our group is ready to consider them things, as we learned. So the dependence on ontology is by no means weaker than for the Lisboa-Robert. Rather it is more conspicuous, for here we no longer hear of being taken generally, but of the things. By this change the concepts become more easily comparable with the concepts of the physical sciences, because they lose the background which gave them their peculiar character of generality. We have, admittedly, some texts telling us that the loci do not belong to any determinate category (genus determinatum), one in Robert even strongly reminiscent of the Lisboa-Robert as to the wording, but these texts only speak of the applicability of the loci. 27 Still these concepts differ from the concepts of the natural sciences by being general or common (generalis, communis), i.e. not essentially connected with any kind of thing, but equally accidental to all things. 28 But this accidental- lity is nowhere explained, it feels only postulated; and moreover it risks running counter to the view that the intrinsic loci yield necessary con- clusions because they are taken from what is essential to the thing. 29

It can be argued that there is no contradiction, for while it is essential to a thing to be e.g. some genus, the concept of genus as such does not essentially belong to some thing. But this only changes the problem a little, for since it is the concept as such which is the locus, how could there be any intrinsic loci at all?

26) Nicolaus on 1173Csq., f. 152vb; on 1180Csq., f. 155vb; on 1215Asq., f. 166va; Robert text 6; on 155b 3sq., f. 212ra; Todi proemium, f. 61rb; text 8; Adenulph on 100a 19sq., f. 4ra-b; on 109b 30sq., f. 29vb; on 152b 30sq., f. 98vb; text 9.
27) Robert Cahiers 9, p. 29; Adenulph on 100a 19sq., f. 3vb; on 114a 27sq., f. 37rb.
28) Nicolaus text 5; Robert text 6; Todi text 8; Adenulph text 9.
29) Nicolaus text 3; on 1186Bsq., f. 157vb-158ra; Robert on 119a 2sq., f. 198va; Adenulph on 119b 35sq., f. 48va.
It is also illustrative to follow the discussions whether the locus should be stated in the arguments. The anonymous Todi explains that neither the maxim (maxima propositio) nor the difference (locus differentia) should be stated, as the general concepts themselves (ipsae intentiones) should not be found in the argument, but only the things which partake in them (res subiectae intentionibus). 30 From Adenulph we learn that the difference - which is that from which the argument is taken (a quo sumitur) - is not stated in the argument, as e.g. not 'species', but 'homo'. 31 Nicolaus holds that neither the maxim nor the difference are stated, because "a place is outside that which is stored in it" (locus est extra locatum). 32 Robert explains that the principle of inference (ratio inferendi) cannot be stated, and explains this further as meaning that the maxim should not be stated, but illustrates it with an example to the effect that the difference should not be stated. 33 According to the anonymous Paris-commentary the maxim cannot be stated, while the difference can. 34 Common to all this is that we find no real explanation of the problem; there is nothing like the clear conception in the Lisboa-Robert of the difference as a general principle which is specified through the maxims to the several arguments. What hints there are of an explanation points in another direction: a distinction between levels, and once again it points to the view of the concepts as such as the proper field of the topics, as in the anonymous Todi and in Adenulph. Nicolaus' "explanation" is a metaphor, it seems meant to convey an idea of a difference of nature of some kind, but which and how? We can notice that both Nicolaus and Robert use the same metaphor in explaining that the loci are accidental and not essential relations. 35

A last point: Nicolaus tells us briefly that intrinsic loci are valid for categorical, extrinsic for hypothetical syllogisms; we are also informed that both kinds of syllogisms have the same form. 36 We are not told why the loci are divided so, but the idea is certainly inspired from Boethius, De differentiis topicis, the end of book II. 37 Adenulph holds that

30) Todi text 7.
31) Adenulph on 114a 27sq., f. 37ra-b; on 114b 37sq., f. 38ra-b; on 137b 15sq., f. 77ra.
32) Nicolaus on 1186Bsq., f. 157rb, f. 158vb.
33) Robert on 114a 26sq., f. 195vb.
35) Nicolaus text 5; Robert text 6.
36) Nicolaus on 1190Bsq., f. 159ra; on 1181Dsq., f. 156va.
37) Patrologia Latina 64. 1196A.
loci are not found in hypothetical syllogisms, but he does not explain why. 38

To sum up: this Parisian group views the general concepts as such and the relations implied in them as the proper field of the topics, because a locus is e. g. the concept of genus as such. This helped to clarify discussions about the loci a causa and a definitione. On the other hand the ontological dependence for this group is not upon being taken generally, but upon the things, and this makes the generality of the topical concepts less obvious, and it becomes more difficult to attribute a special character to these concepts in comparison with the concepts of the physical sciences. In other words: the ontological dependence is felt more heavily. The group states clearly that we cannot generalize from the ontological dependence of the topics to an ontological dependence of logic as a whole, in that they inform us that the logic of the Prior Analytics (the syllogism) is based upon relations between words - not things.

C. The Anonymous Peterhouse Commentary on Boethius

From the author of this commentary (no. 8) we learn nothing as to whether there is a new form in the dialectical syllogism in comparison with the syllogism simply. But in its discussion of what a locus is there is some similarity with the Parisian group. Our author raises the question whether a locus is a thing (res ipsa) or a relation (habitudo ipsa) or the conaretum (literally 'what has grown together') of a thing and a relation. He holds that it is a conaretum, the relation constituting the form (i. e. making it what it is) and the thing the matter of this conaretum. 39 How should conaretum be rendered? It is striking that our author has chosen the word which is normally the opposite of 'abstract'. Moreover what he says is parallel to what could be said of a concrete particular: from a material viewpoint it is a thing, from a formal viewpoint it is e. g. a genus or a species. But it is clear that our author does not want to say that the locus is a concrete thing. Probably we have here a foreshadowing of what Radulphus Brito later (c. 1290-1300) called intentio in concreto, i. e. not a concept taken absolutely, but the outcome of applying a concept to a thing, as e. g. not humanitas, specialitas, but homo, species. 40

38) Adenulph on 108b 8sq., f. 26va; on 110a 23sq., f. 30va.
39) Text 12.
If this is true we have a significant change from the other works: the locus is no longer a concept as such, there is in it a certain duality, it is only constituted when a concept is applied to a thing. Or in other words: here we have a fresh way of stating that the loci are not purely logical concepts. Probably our author was inspired to put the question in the way he does by hearing time and again that "the locus is a relation of one thing to another", but his answer brings in completely new tools. Unfortunately his text is not very informative.

The duality found in the locus is utilized in answers to different questions. We learn that the loci - or at least the greater part of them - yield necessary inferences, as they are based on the things, i.e. on what is real. This the rhetorical loci cannot, as they are only based on signs. But on the other hand as it is the relation which is the form of the locus, the division of the loci into intrinsic, extrinsic and middle ones is made according to the differences of the relations holding between the thing which infers and the thing inferred; the division is not made in accordance with the division of being (ens).

The loci are common in the sense that they do not belong to any special subject matter, but are some general features formed equally well in any kind of subject matter. Accordingly demonstrative science does not use loci, as it asks questions about the special nature (natura appropriata) of some subject. In this there is really not much original, let us note only that the explanation concentrates on something else than did the Parisian group. To find the background for the generality we must look to the point to be discussed next.

A most remarkable thing in the work is the comment on Boethius' division of all questions into logical, physical and ethical ones. Our author explains that the difference between logical questions and all other questions is that logic is concerned with things of the second conceptual level (res secundae intentionis). This idea is set out in a text which presents certain difficulties. There our author distinguishes between first

41) On 1173Csq., f. 61va; on 1205Csq., f. 76ra; on 1206Dsq., f. 77ra; on 1212Asq., f. 81vb.
42) On 1180Bsq., f. 70ra.
43) On 1173Csq., f. 61rb-va; on 1182Asq., f. 68rb; on 1194Bsq., f. 72vb; on 1212Asq., f. 81vb.
44) De differentiis topicis I, PL 64, 1180A.
the natural things, as e. g. man (homo) which he calls res primae intentionis (things of the first conceptual level); above them comes the signs (notae) of these things, as e. g. the word 'man' ('homo'), which he calls either res secundae intentionis (things of the second conceptual level) or nomina primae impositionis (names of the first word-level); above them again follow words signifying them; these are the names of the parts of speech and of the grammatical categories (e. g. 'nomen', 'verbum' = 'noun', 'verb') when single words are concerned, and e. g. 'affirmatio', 'negatio' when sentences are concerned; they are called nomina secundae impositionis (names of the second word-level). Schematically it would look so (single quotation marks indicate words in contrast to things or concepts):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nomen II. imposit.</th>
<th>'nomen'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nomen I. imposit.</td>
<td>'homo'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>homo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this text it is surprising to find words like the word 'man' called things of the second conceptual level, and more surprising is it that the typical logical concepts, as e. g. genus, species, are not introduced at all. It is almost meaningless to say - as our author does - that logic is concerned with things of the second conceptual level, as e. g. the word 'man'. Something must be wrong in the text. We know the corresponding combination of the two distinctions between different levels, respectively for words (impositio) and concepts (intentio) from other medieval texts. We can compare our text with an approximately contemporary commentary on Priscianus Maior, sometimes but probably incorrectly ascribed to Robert Kilwardby, and with Ockham, Summa Logicae, and with Walter Burley's commentary on Logica vetus (Porphyry). From this comparison it results

45) Text 11.
that the figure should look like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nomen II.</th>
<th>'nomen'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>imposit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nomen II.</th>
<th>'species'</th>
<th>species</th>
<th>res II. intent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intent.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nomina I.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>imposit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nomen I.</th>
<th>'homo'</th>
<th>homo</th>
<th>res I. intent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intent.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Middle Ages received the two distinctions between different levels in different ways. The distinction between different word-levels was taken from Boethius. Boethius calls words which are names of natural things *nomina primae positionis*, while *nomina secundae positionis* are names of those first names (*nomina nominibus*). These second names Boethius exemplifies with names of the grammatical categories and of the parts of speech. This distinction was often used in the 12th century, and generally the authors kept very strictly to Boethius' text in that they recognized only grammatical terms like 'nomen', 'verbun' (="noun", "verb") as words of *secunda impositio*; the tendency to recognize also e. g. 'genus', 'species' as words of *secunda impositio* was slight and apparently did not win general acceptance. The distinction between different concept-levels (*intentiones*) was probably taken over from Avicenna, and there was never a restriction on it to grammatical terms only. It is not known when the idea of combining the two distinctions came up, but of course they could not avoid being compared at some time. Also the restriction made on words of *secunda impositio* to grammatical terms only was liable to cause trouble when the comparison was made. At any rate the result as seen in the figure is not happy. Firstly historically, because there can hardly be any doubt that the two distinctions originally aimed at the same, the difference being only that the one distinguished words, the other concepts. But also systematically it is unsatisfying, because there is no good reason to

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49) Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis. Pat. Lat.* 64, 159.
consider the word 'nomen' (= 'noun') as being of a higher level than the word 'species'.

To return to our anonymous Peterhouse commentary: there is in the text an indication of an error: three times our author tells us that a word of secundae impositio "tertio imponitur"; in all three cases we lack a "secundo", so we are tempted to correct into "secundo", corresponding to what we find in the fourth case where our author no longer talks of single words but of sentences. However this "error" occurs three times, and such a simple correction does not improve the text sufficiently; moreover the "tertio" receives some support from the commentary on Priscianus Maior, just mentioned. There we read: " tertiorum nominum impositio" about the names of the parts of speech. So probably the error was not committed by the scribe, but lies with our author who has "omitted" something.

However for our purpose here we need not ponder too much over the problems raised by the combination or by the text. What is important to us is that our author holds the distinguishing characteristic of logic to be that it is concerned with things of the second conceptual level, i. e. its concepts are concepts of the concepts in the other sciences. This makes logic completely different from other sciences. It will not prevent the concepts of logic from being derived from the things, but it will prevent them from being tied to a special subject matter.

But apparently the idea of logic as concerned with higher level concepts has not penetrated the thoughts of our author to any high degree. He uses the term secundae intentiones only once more in the whole commentary, and then only to state briefly that "(locus) non abstrahit a secundis intentionibus". 52 When at the beginning of his work he discusses the field of logic, he draws the consequence we would expect and explains that while any other science has something which is its special object, logic (and the other sciences of the trivium) has no such proper object, but is characterized by teaching the method of all other sciences. Indeed this seems the only possible way of stating the proper field of a science working on a higher level than the rest. But our author only states it as an alternative - his preferred alternative, admittedly - to allotting a special object to logic on a par with other sciences. 53

52) On 1194Bsq., f. 72vb.
53) Text 10.
As a last point should be mentioned that our author holds the extrinsic loci "more valid" for hypothetical syllogisms than for categorical ones, because arguments based on extrinsic loci often contain more than three terms.  

In concluding we can say that in this commentary we find a fresh view of the nature of the locus: a locus is only constituted by the application of a general concept to a thing. This contrasts with the view of the Parisian group of the loci as concepts taken absolutely, but the way of posing the question seems influenced from discussions like those in the Parisian group. The Peterhouse commentary also introduces a distinction between levels, where the topics like the other parts of logic is placed among the higher level sciences, but this is not an idea which our author makes much use of.

D. Robert Kilwardby

One of the most famous authors from the period discussed here was Robert Kilwardby (†1279). Unfortunately it is a serious problem to decide which of the many works belonging to the period and ascribed to some Robertus were written by Kilwardby. Both the Lisboa-Robert and the Oxford-Robert as well as the anonymous Peterhouse commentary on Boethius have been tentatively ascribed to Kilwardby, and the same counts for a Firenze commentary on Aristotle (no. 5) which we have not discussed yet,  

but until now nothing was certain. We possess, however, two works certainly by Kilwardby which give some information about his views on the topics, viz. the De ortu scientiarum  and his commentary on the Prior Analytics (no. 9). Both works are found in many MSS, several of which are ascribed to Kilwardby, and moreover they agree on the points where we can compare them.

Contrary to what we found in most of the works discussed earlier Kilwardby holds that there is no new form in the dialectical syllogism in comparison with the syllogism simply. There is one form common to all syl-

54) On 1194Bsq., f. 72vb.
55) See the references to Lohr and Grabmann in note 1. The Oxford-Robert was originally ascribed to Kilwardby by Grabmann because he thought it identical with the Firenze commentary. In Cahiers 9 (see under no. 2 in the list) I followed Grabmann in believing that the Oxford-Robert was Kilwardby, I wish to take that back now.
logisms, viz. the syllogistic form taught in the Prior Analytics; the dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms differing from it only by their respective matters. But there are inferences which are not of the syllogistic form. While the (categorical) syllogism obtains its validity by the *dicó de omní et de nullo*, the other forms of inference (e. g. the enthymeme, the hypothetical syllogism) are valid by the relation of a locus (*habitudo localis*), and they can all be reduced to the hypothetical syllogism, but not to the categorical. Or to put it otherwise: all topical reasoning as such (*secundum quod huiusmodi*) starts from a hypothesis, i. e. from the choice of one of two contradictory possibilities, and arguments of this type are reducible to the hypothetical syllogism which is different in form from the categorical syllogism. Such inferences follow not by the form (*complexio*), as the categorical syllogism does, but they follow necessarily (*necessario*) by the major or minor premise, or again: the inferences which hold not by the form but by the terms, follow by the relation and the consequence of things (*habitudo et consequentia rerum*).

This way of distinguishing between topical and syllogistic arguments is more in the traditional line than what we met in the other works who made it a distinction between two types of syllogisms. However what necessitated the distinction between two forms for the other authors was the view that the loci are relations implied in certain general concepts dependent upon our ontology, while the syllogism simply has no such basis. What Kilwardby's statements about topical inferences come down to as regards their dependence upon the things is that we must investigate what their terms stand for before deciding about their validity. This will mean that some arguments which are not formally valid will be considered good, and that some formally valid arguments do not yield true conclusions. Apparently this was one of the points which induced Kilwardby to distinguishing between two forms of inference rather than reflections on dependence or not upon ontology. He felt it a problem that some inferences in

57) Comm. on Prior Analytics (= APr), proemium, f. 34rb; O. S. XLVIII § 454; LIII §§ 495, 502, 506.
58) APr on 46a 32sq., f. 68va; on 47a 1sq., f. 70ra; text 15. Cf. I. Thomas, Maxims in Kilwardby. Dominican Studies VII (1954), 129-146; esp. pp. 133-134. The paper contains rather extensive extracts from the text.
59) APr text 14; on 47a 1sq., f. 70va.
60) APr on 38a 14sq., f. 59ra.
61) See: Jan Pinborg, Topik und Syllogistik im Mittelalter. Sapienter ordi-
spite of being formally valid nevertheless yield false conclusions. And it was partly to account for this he made the distinction. Only at a later period of the Middle Ages the distinction between a valid inference and a true conclusion was made without trouble. Secondly Kilwardby was prompted to make the distinction by choosing the positio antecedentis and the destruatio consequentis, i.e. in modern terms modus ponens and modus tollerens as model-examples of loci; they certainly differ fundamentally from the categorical syllogism and cannot be reduced to it, but only to the hypothetical. That he has chosen them as models is probably due to the fact that we are in the Prior Analytics and not in the Topics.

This does not mean that Kilwardby finds no essential connection between logic and the things. On the contrary: logic must start from a knowledge of the things (notitia rerum), otherwise it would teach only fictitious reasoning (figmentalariter ratiocinari). This knowledge of the things logic receives from metaphysics which considers things in so far as they are existent (secundum rationem entitatis). After having received from metaphysics a knowledge of which things exist logic considers certain features of the things (modi/rationes rerum) which it finds by comparison between the things. These features make up the proper object of logic. From them the logician abstracts the concepts which form the basis of reasoning, and which when they are made concrete (concretae), or in other words applied to some one thing make this thing rational, i.e. make it possible to reason about this thing. In this way logic establishes the method of reasoning utilized in all sciences. It can establish this method either in abstraction from any matter whatsoever (Prior Analytics) or adapted to the matters of respectively dialectic and demonstrative science. Logic teaches this method of reasoning to all other sciences. In the commentary on the Prior Analytics it is stated more briefly that metaphysics is concerned with the natural things, while logic is concerned with the rational things (res rationis), and accordingly it is for logic to teach the finding (inventio) and evaluation (iudicium) of arguments.

62) Text 14. For the problem in general see Pinborg o. c. in note 61.
63) Text 15.
64) O. S. LIII § 518.
65) O. S. XLVIII §§ 444-458; LVIII § 573-579. In § 450 we should probably read concretas and not concretes, cf. § 143 and § 158.
66) Text 13; cf. O. S. LIII § 493.
that the distinguishing characteristic of logic as compared to other sciences is that it teaches the method of reasoning utilized in all sciences seems to be a central point to Kilwardby and is stated very often. The idea in itself is in no way original, of course, but the context in which it is stated, viz. as a consequence of logic's having certain features of the things as its proper concern in contrast to metaphysics' having the things as existent as its proper concern cannot be dismissed as simply traditional. There was nothing similar e. g. in the works we discussed earlier. Another consequence of logic's having these features of the things as its proper object is that the concepts by which logic operates belong to the second conceptual level (*secundae intentiones*), for such higher level concepts are formed from comparisons between the things, not directly from the things. Fortunately Kilwardby does not mention the distinction between word-levels (*impositiones*), and thus spares us all the trouble we had in the Peterhouse commentary.

So though logic is - and necessarily is - bound up with the things, it is an independent science in that it does not depend on any other science for its central concepts, but forms them itself. It depends upon metaphysics for a knowledge of which things exist and no more. It turns out to be a science quite different from the physical sciences and even from metaphysics: it works on a higher conceptual level than the rest, and it establishes the method of reasoning utilized in all sciences. To our purpose here we should notice that the topics is not held to be dependent upon our ontology to any greater degree than the other parts of logic.

Let us mention briefly, for the sake of completeness, that dialectic and demonstrative science can use the same means (*medium*) in their arguments, e. g. cause, definition, but demonstrative science takes it as appropriate (*proprium*) to a special subject matter, dialectic as common to many. For this reason dialectic yields only probable conclusions, demonstrative science true conclusions.

From what we have learned about Kilwardby from the De ortu scientiarum and his commentary on the Prior Analytics, it results that neither the Lisboa-Robert nor the Oxford-Robert can be Kilwardby. Who they are I do

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67) APR text 13; O. S. XLVIII § 456; LIII § 493, 523; LVIII § 578, 585.
68) O. S. XLVIII § 459.
69) O. S. LVII.
not know, we have candidates enough from the period, but no guide to selecting the right one.

The Peterhouse commentary certainly stands very close to Kilwardby in many respects, but I do not think that it is written by him. The same man who wrote chapters XLVIII and LVIII of the De ortu scientiarum would not write the prooemium of the Peterhouse commentary which says that either we can allotted to logic a special subject as we do to other sciences, or we can hold the distinctive characteristic of logic to be that it teaches the method of reasoning. Kilwardby could only choose the second alternative, and he has a clear background for taking that stand, a background which is missing in the Peterhouse commentary. Nor does the Peterhouse commentary connect the loci with the hypothetical syllogism to the exclusion of the categorical, as Kilwardby does. Most of all: Kilwardby would never write such a confused text as no. 11 of this paper, where we miss exactly that which was intended to be the point of the text; he was far too good a thinker to commit such a thing. To an objection that perhaps the Peterhouse commentary is earlier than the other works by Kilwardby discussed here, I will say that this can hardly be the case: the concretum of the Peterhouse commentary and the rationes conaretae in Kilwardby certainly express the same idea, but to my impression the idea is further developed in the Peterhouse commentary than in the De ortu scientiarum. Also I would tend to find the combination of the two distinctions between word-levels and concept-levels in the Peterhouse commentary later than the short text about secundae intentiones in the De ortu scientiarum. Admittedly this is only impressions, but the objection about a young Kilwardby does not account for the confusion in text no. 11, Kilwardby would never have written that text. And let us not forget that the discussion about the nature of the locus in the Peterhouse commentary apparently had the corresponding discussions in the Parisian group as its background.

How do things stand about the mysterious Robertus de Cilnac(1)obi (no. 5)? This is an elusive problem, for that commentary is very brief and contains little but expositions of the text. On all points where we can compare it with Kilwardby they agree, but none of the points seems decisive.

A list of the more remarkable agreements: There is one form common to all syllogisms, viz. the one taught in the Prior Analytics, the dialectical syllogism differing from it only by its matter. 70 Logic is characterized

70) On 101b 37sq., p. 98a; on 155b 3sq., p. 140a.
by teaching the method of reasoning to all other sciences. Dialectic and demonstrative science can use the same means (medium) in their arguments, but dialectic uses it as common to many subjects, demonstrative as appropriate to some special subject. These seem to be the best comparisons we can make, and that is certainly not much. I find no objections against ascribing the work to Kilwardby, but I consider it an open question. At any rate, if the work is by Kilwardby, we shall not learn much about him from it, it is too short.

E. Conclusion

Some of our authors, viz. the Lisboa-Robert and the Parisian group, held that the topics was dependent upon our ontology while other parts of logic (Prior Analytics) were not. Kilwardby, on the other hand, and the Peterhouse commentary took all parts of logic to be equally dependent upon ontology. But let us put this difference aside by taking account of the topics only. Again we have on the one hand the Lisboa-Robert and the Parisian group who held that the topics received from metaphysics its central concepts, while Kilwardby held that it received from metaphysics only a knowledge of the things existing, which it had to presuppose before it could itself form its central concepts. Apparently the Peterhouse commentary would again side with Kilwardby. In the Lisboa-Robert it is obvious why the topics must depend upon metaphysics for its central concepts: to him these concepts are derived from being simply or being qua existent, and that was always considered the proper field of metaphysics. But why does the Parisian group hold that concepts established by the "relation of one thing to another" are formed in metaphysics, while Kilwardby holds that concepts established by comparisons between things are formed not in metaphysics, but in logic? The answer must be that to the Parisian group the concepts depend upon the nature of the things to a higher degree than they do to Kilwardby. It is plain that to Kilwardby holding that the concepts belong to the second conceptual level they can only very indirectly depend upon the nature of the things, but can the Parisian group hold that the concepts depend upon the nature of the things, and at the same time

71) Text 16, 17.
72) On 104a 1sq., p. 100b; on 155b 3sq., p. 140a.
73) It may be illustrative to read text 16 alongside with O. S. XLVIII §§ 448-460.
hold that they are common to all categories of things? At any rate we should not exaggerate the difference between Kilwardby and the Parisian group, the divergence seems rather to be a question of where to put the stress within a conception common to both parts than a question of two conflicting conceptions. Kilwardby gives a higher developed and more consistent interpretation of this common conception. So we could also set up a borderline separating the Lisboa-Robert from the rest, as he completely lacks the link between the things and the concepts, which the others call features of the things (modi rerum). Kilwardby and the Peterhouse commentary are more than by anything else divided from the rest by their view that the formal object of logic are certain general concepts in their application to things (rationes concretae, concretum), not the concepts as such or absolutely, as the others hold. But this is also a way of connecting logic with things.

Has the order of discussing the works followed a line of development? Not in the sense that the works discussed last (Peterhouse com. & Kilwardby) give a sort of result taken over by the following generations. We can see this from a comparison with an author who is certainly later than any discussed here: Boethius de Dacia. In his commentary on Aristotle's Topics (c. 1270-75)74 we learn that logic is concerned with features of the things (modi rerum), but these can be reduced to the things, as they would otherwise be fictions of the intellect (figmentum intellectus), and they are reducible to the things to the degree that not only logic as a whole but any part of logic is determined by the things and their properties. Accordingly the founder of logic (qui logicam inventit) is a metaphysician who studies the natures of the things, not a logician; and any knowledge of logic presupposes knowledge of the things. The concepts of logic are common (communes), and therefore they cannot yield true knowledge of any subject matter. About higher level concepts Boethius has nothing. Apart from the fact that Boethius states this about logic as a whole and not only about the topics, it is more in line with the Parisian group than with Kilwardby. Which is not to say that it is strange to Kilwardby, anyone who reads Boethius' prooemium parallel with chapters XLVIII and LVIII

of the De ortu scientiarum will find a clear affinity between them. But Kilwardby has taken some steps which Boethius does not take. However the ideas in Kilwardby (and the Peterhouse comm.) which were not taken up by Boethius were not forgotten. The doctrine of higher level concepts was soon taken up again. In the commentary on Peter of Spain by Simon of Faversham (?) from c. 1275–80\textsuperscript{75} we meet the term secundae intentiones on almost every page in the tract of the loci. The idea of concretum and rationes concretae we find developed, as already mentioned,\textsuperscript{76} in Radulphus Brito near the end of the 13th century.

As to chronology, the only fact I consider established is: the Lisboa–Robert is earlier than any of the other works. Kilwardby and the Parisian group I propose we consider almost contemporary, and the Peterhouse commentary perhaps a little later than them. From the dates which we have about Kilwardby and members of the Parisian group it seems impossible to hold that Kilwardby was later than the Parisian group. The Lisboa–Robert perhaps belongs to the late thirties, while the rest could be written c. 1245–60. All the works discussed seem to me definitely to belong to Parisian tradition.

And to make a last sweeping statement: We have learned that there was in Paris in the years c. 1240–1275 not one simple clear line of development, but the question of the relation of our logic to our ontology was a central and much debated problem.\textsuperscript{77}

\textbf{III. SELECTED TEXTS}

The orthography has been normalized, and corrections have been proposed where it seemed necessary, but otherwise the texts have been left as they are found in the manuscripts.

\textit{Robertus, Notitiae supra librum Topicorum Aristotelis}

Lisboa, Biblioteca nacional, Fundo Alcobaca 175.

\textit{1. f. lra - proemium}

Sicut dicit Aristoteles in libro Elenchorum et in I. libro Posterorum in


\textsuperscript{76} Cf. note 40.

\textsuperscript{77} I wish to thank professor Jan Pinborg for his advice, especially concerning sections C–E.
hoc capitulo: "Communicant omnes scientiae secundum communia" etc., differt demonstrativa a dialectica eo quod demonstrativa generis determinati est, dialectica vero indeterminati. Et quia dicit Aristoteles in libro Elenchorum, quoniam secundum quae arguunt qui elenchis utuntur non oportet tempore sumere finem omnium quae sunt scientiae, quia fortasse infinitae sunt scientiae, propter hoc concludit elenchos veros infinitos esse et demonstrationes similiter; et propter hoc arguit quod non sunt omnium elenchorum quaserendi loci, sed eorum qui sunt secundum dialecticam, loci enim isti sunt finiti et communes ad omnem artem et potentiam. Cum ergo dialectica sit indeterminati generis - et intellegatur ibi de dialectica utente et non docente, dialectica enim docens est quaedam demonstrativa, et est de dialectico syllogismo - palam est quoniam dialectici est considerare intentiones quae consequuntur ens indeterminatum in quantum huiusmodi; et quia huiusmodi intentiones non sunt determinatae circa aliquod ens, sed circa quodlibet, erit dialectici considerare intentiones consequentes ens in quantum est ens. Sed cum demonstrativa sit determinati generis, non erit huiusmodi considerare intentiones quae consequuntur ens in quantum est ens, sed intentiones quae consequuntur ens determinatum in aliquo genere. Cum ergo rationes inferendi consequuntur ens in quantum est ens, dialectici erit considerare intentiones quae rationes inferendi dicuntur, cuiusmodi intentiones sunt istae: genus, definitio, species etc. Sed cum demonstrator sit circa aliquod genus determinatum, non erit eius considerare praedicas intentiones, quae rationes inferendi dicuntur. Cum ergo praedicas rationes loci sint - quod patet per loci definitionem, locus enim est sedes argumenti - manifestum est quod dialectica localis sive topica debet dici, demonstrativa vero non.

Et quia in libro Posteriorum dicit Aristoteles quoniam non est resolutio in his in quibus monstratur indifferenter verum ex falso et ex vero, sed in his in quibus necessae est vera per vera monstrare, et sicut dicit Aristoteles, si esset impossibile verum ex falsis monstrare facile esset resolvere, quia ergo in dialecticis contingit indifferenter vera per falsa et vera demonstrare, demonstratio autem non ostendit nisi verum per verum, manifestum quod demonstrativa erit analytica, dialectica non.

Quod autem in dialecticis contingat monstrare per falsa et vera verum et non in demonstrativis patet sic: Locus est principium syllogismi dialectici, demonstrativi causa. Quare cum falsum non possit esse causa quare verum
sit, non est possibile, demonstratorem per falsa verum ostendere. Patet utique quod dialectica non est analytica sed topica.

Non est autem una scientia de syllogismo simpliciter et de dialectico syllogismo, cum doctrina de syllogismo simpliciter analytica dicatur; sicut enim patet ex iam dictis dialecticus syllogismus ultra principium syllogismi simpliciter non addit solum materialia principia, ex quibus fit illatio, sed addit principia quae sunt rationes inferendi. Unde addit principia materialia et formalia. Determinat enim in libro Toporum in I. principia materialia, scilicet principia ex quibus est dialecticus syllogismus, in sex libris sequentibus determinatur principia quae sunt rationes inferendi, scilicet formalia principia, quae loci appellantur. Est enim illatio duplex: una quae causatur e qualitate et quantitate propositionum et ordine earundem, et haec determinatur in libro Priorum; alia est quae causatur ex habitudine terminorum, quae habitudo vocatur locus, et haec determinatur in libro Toporum. Quare manifestum est quod dialecticus syllogismus novam formam addit ultra syllogismum simpliciter. Ideo doctrina de syllogismo dialectico et syllogismo simpliciter sunt doctrinæ separatae. Demonstrativa vero ultra principia syllogismi simpliciter solummodo addit principia ex quibus fit illatio, scilicet materialia principia, non enim addit principia quae sunt rationes inferendi, cum huiusmodi rationes non consideret demonstrator, quia consequuntur ens indeterminatum, et ideo demonstrativus syllogismus non addit formam novam ultra syllogismum simpliciter. Propter hoc non sunt duae doctrinae separatae de demonstrativo syllogismo et syllogismo simpliciter, sed est una doctrina continua ex eis.

a) finem] sine/sive ms.

2. f. 3ra - I, 100a 19sq.
Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit "ex probabilitibus", non enim semper procedit dialecticus ex probabilitibus, sed aliquando ex necessariis. Verbi gratia: haec principia 'de quocumque species, et genus', 'de quocumque definitio, et definitum' sunt necessaria. Et ita cum dialecticus accipiat haec eo quod haec sunt principia dialecticae, manifestum est quod dialecticus non semper est ex probabilitibus.

Ad hoc dicitur quoniam dialecticus semper est ex probabilitibus, unde si accipiat aliqua necessaria, non accipit ea in quantum sunt necessaria, sed in quantum sunt probabilia.
Aliter potest dici quod duo sunt principia syllogismi dialectici: materia et formalia. Materialia principia sunt termini, propositiones, problemata, et haec omnia probabilia sunt et non necessaria. Sed principium formale est ratio inferendi, sicut illatio. Et quamvis materia syllogismi sit contingens et probabilis, tamen illatio est necessaria, quare et principia illusionis necessaria debent esse. Sed hoc principium a)de quocum-que genus, et species\textsuperscript{a)} non est principium materiale syllogismi nec ex quo fiat illatio vel syllogismus, non enim ponitur intra syllogismum, sed est principium inferendi extra syllogismum. Unde quia est principium illusionis, et illatio necessaria, multo fortius illud principium necessitatem debet habere. Unde principia syllogismi dialectici materialia, quae intra syllogismum sunt, ex quibus est syllogismus, huiusmodi sunt probabilia et contingentia. Sed principium extra quod est ratio inferendi et principium illusionis, illud principium necessarium debet esse. Unde quaedam principia accipit dialecticus a se sicut principia materialia, ut propositiones, problemata, et haec omnia probabilia sunt et contingentia. Sed illusionem a se non accipit, sed a libro Priorum. Similiter haec principia 'de quocumque species, et genus', 'de quocumque definitio, et definitum' ab alio accipit, scilicet a primo philosopho. Et haec principia quae ab alio accipi, necessaria sunt et non contingentia. Et sic patet quod non oportet omnia principia dialecticae esse contingentia et probabilia, sed quaedam sunt contingentia et probabilia sicut principia materialia, quaedam vero sunt necessaria sicut principia formalia et principia illusionis, quia ista non accipit a se, sed ab alio.

\textsuperscript{a)} de-species] de quocumque species, et genus malim.

Nicolaus Parisiensis, Notulae super librum Topicorum Boethii
München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm. 14460.

3. f. 152ra - prooemium

Syllogismus dialecticus duplicem habet virtutem: unam quam contrahit a dispositione terminorum et propositionum, aliam quam contrahit ab habitudine terminorum. Primam contrahit a dispositione trium terminorum quantum ad figuram et propositionum quantum ad modum, et istam virtutem habet a syllogismo exemplari, et ista est necessaria. Alia vero quam contrahit ab habitudine terminorum est habitudo localis, et ista est aliquando necessaria, aliquando non. Necessaria est sicut in habitudine definitionis ad definitionem; non necessaria est sed probabilis sicut in loco a maioribus in

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aliis locis extrinsecis, ibi enim non est aliqua necessitas, sed probabilis solum. Unde cum syllogismus dialecticus istam duplicem virtutem habeat, duplex erit eius effectus, scilicet inferre quantum ad primam eius virtutem et facere notum quantum ad secundam, quoniam per habitudinem localem facit notum. Unde cum quaedam ratiocinationes sint dialecticae, et syllogismus istam duplicem virtutem habeat, quaedam erunt ratiocinationes quae participant unam iastarum, quaedam aliam, quaedam utramque. Dico ergo quod si syllogismus exemplaris participat illam virtutem, quae causatur a dispositione trium terminorum et duarum propositionum, inductio autem et exemplum cum enthymemate participant illam quae causatur ab habitudine locali, dialecticus vero syllogismus participat utramque - est enim ibi dispositio trium terminorum et duarum propositionum et earum habitudo localis - unde dialecticus non considerat syllogismum dialecticum quantum ad dispositionem trium terminorum et duarum propositionum, quoniam supponit ipsam a syllogismo exemplari, sed considerat ipsum a quantum ad habitudinem localem. Et ex hoc appareat quid est subiectum huius libri, et etiam Topicorum Aristotelis, quoniam inductio, enthymema et exemplum et syllogismus dialecticus prout uniuntur in hoc quod est argumentatio localis. Et principaliter hic et in libro Topicorum Aristotelis determinatur de syllogismo dialectico, quia sicut dicit inferius omnes aliae argumentationes habent reduci ad syllogismum dialecticum. Unde non dico quod argumentatio per se sit probabilis neque localis, sed hoc totum scilicet argumentatio localis, quoniam quaedam probantur ratione argumentationis, quaedam ratione loci.

a) ipsum] ipsam ms.

4. f. 153ra - I, 1173Csq.

Item videtur quod Aristoteles fuerit diminutus, cum non determinet de locis secundum substantiam, sed secundum usum, vel ille superfluos cum determinet.

Ad hoc dicendum quod Aristoteles non fuit diminutus, quia non debuit determinare, quia determinare de substantia locorum hoc est determinare habitudinem rei ad rem, et hoc non pertinet ad dialecticum, sed supponit a metaphysico, quia dialecticus non considerat res sed modos rerum. Unde dico quod Aristoteles non fuit diminutus, quoniam hoc non erat de esse vel de consideratione dialecticarum. Sed quia Boethius determinat quaedam et multa quae erant de bene esse ipsius, propter hoc Boethius determinavit de substantia locorum; et forte fuit superfluos, quia quamvis hoc non deter-
minaret, non propter hoc minus perfecte haberemus dialecticam.

5. f. 163rb – IV, 1207Dsq.
Item quæritur quare rhetoricæ et dialectica potius dicantur esse inventiva locorum quam medicina vel alia scientia, cum ibi inveniatur aliquando habitudo rei ad rem, sicut in istis.

...........

Ad aliud dicendum quod locus non est habitudo cuiuslibet rei ad rem, sed habitudo rei ad rem extrinsecam, et communis est locus, quia locus extra locatum est. Et ideo cum in medicina et in aliis scientiis ab istis sit solum inventio habitudinis rei ad rem specialem, propter hoc aliae scientiae ab his non dicuntur inventivae locorum.

Robertus, Scriptum super libro Topico rum

6. f. 182vb – prooemium
Circa quartum (utrum demonstrativa possit esse localis sicut dialectica) sic:

Sicut dialecticus utitur loco, ita demonstrator utitur loco a causa, et ita videtur quod demonstrativa sit localis sicut ista.

Item: cum locus nihil aliud sit quam habitudo rei ad rem, cum demonstrator utitur habitudine rei ad rem, videtur quod utitur loco.

Item: dicit in Elenchis quod non omnium locorum quaerendi sunt loci sophistici nec [est] eorum quae sunt circa dialecticam, et ita vult quod specialium scientiarum sunt loci.

Ad primum dicendum quod locus est accidentalis rei et est extra locatum, et successive potest capere multa locata, et ideo cum demonstrator non confirmet multa argumenta per eandem habitudinem non erit localis.

Ad obiectum ergo dicendum quod in loco duo sunt: substantia eius et intentio. Unde dicendum quod demonstrator utitur substantia loci non tamen intentione loci, quia si fiat tale argumentum: 'terra interponitur, ergo eclipsis est', dicit quod est locus a terrae interpositione et non a causa; unde confirmet per specialem habitudinem et non communem, et ideo non utitur intentione, cum intentio loci sit capere multa locata successive.

Per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.

Further extracts from this work can be found in Cahiers Inst. M. A. gr. lat. 9 (1973), pp. 29-35.
Anonymus
Todi, Biblioteca comunale 54.

7. f. 69vb - II, 109a 34sq.
Gratia huius quaeritur, utrum locus qui est maxima et locus qui est differentia maximae intret substantialiter argumentum vel virtualiter.


8. f. 95va - VIII, 155b 3sq.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum demonstrativa sit localis. Et videtur quod sic, quia quidam est locus a causa et quidam ab effectu, ergo cum demonstrator consideret causam et effectum, videtur quod demonstratoris sit considerare locum.

Item: locus dialecticus nihil aliud est quam habitudo rei ad rem. Cum ergo quaelibet rerum habitudo nihil aliud sit quam locus, cuius est considerare habitudines rerum, eiusdem est considerare locum. Sed demonstratoris est considerare rerum habitudines. Ergo ipsius est considerare locum.

Ad oppositum: demonstrator procedit ex propriis, locus autem consequitur generales et communes\(^a\) intentiones entis, sicut genus, speciem, totum, partem et huiusmodi. Cum ergo demonstrator non consideret communia sed propria, eius non est considerare.

\(\text{f. 95vb}\)

Ad aliud dicendum quod demonstrator considerat substantiam causae sive id quod est causa et non intentionem causae, et locus sumitur ab intentionibus rerum, et propter hoc demonstratio non est localis, quia solum considerat hanc causam et non intentionem causae.

Ad aliud dicendum quod habitudo rerum quaedam est communis et quaedam est propria, et demonstrator non considerat communes habitudines rerum, sed solum proprias, et locus dialecticus consequitur communes habitudines
rerum et non proprias.

a) communes] omnes ms.

Ademulphe Anagninus, Notulae Topicae
Peragia, Biblioteca Comunale Augusta 1077.
(The text printed here has been checked with Cambridge, Peterhouse 205, f. 263ra-b (C)).

9. f. 102va-b - VIII, 155b 3sq.
Circa quintum sic proceditur: dicit Auctor quod dialectici inquirituris et
demonstratoris similis est consideratio in locum inveniendo; ergo vult
quod demonstrator locum inveniat; ergo demonstrativa debet dici localis.
Quod est falsum. Ergo primum.

Item quaeuritur utrum demonstrativa debeat dici localis. Et videtur quod
sic, quia locus a causa et ab effectu sunt loci dialectici. Sed demonstra-

tor considerat causam et effectum. Ergo demonstrativa debet dici localis.
(f. 102vb)

Item ad idem: Locus nihil aliud est quam habitudo rei ad rem. Ergo cuius

est considerare rerum habitudines, eius est considerare locum. Sed demonstra-


tor est considerare rerum habitudines. Ergo et locos. Ergo debet
dici localis.

Solutio: Ad primum dicendum quod tam dialecticus quam demonstrator in-

veniunt locos, non tamen sequitur quod propter hoc debeat a) dici localis,
quia in loco sunt duo, scilicet substantia loci et intentio loci. Demo-


nstrator considerat locum secundum sui substantiam, unde considerat causam

et effectum secundum sui substantiam. Quod patet: si quaeritur a demonstra-
tore: unde locus? 'fumus est, ergo ignis fuit', ipse respondet: ab igne.
Logicus autem considerat locum secundum sui intentionem. Et dicitur scien-
tia localis ab intentione loci. Ideo dialectica debet dici localis, et non

demonstrativa.

Ad secundum dicendum quod iam patet solutio, quia demonstrator conside-

rat causam secundum sui substantiam, dialecticus secundum intentionem sui, et

ab intentione sumitur locus, et non a substantia, et ideo non opponis.

Ad tertium dicendum aliter quod duplex est habitudo: communis et pro-
pria. Dialecticus considerat habitudines communes, demonstrator proprias.
Et loci sequuntur habitudines communes. Propter hoc demonstrativa non de-
bet dici localis.

a) debeat] debent C.

Anonymus
Cambridge, Peterhouse 205.

10 f. 60ra-b - prooemium.
Cum scientia respective dicatur ad scibile necesse est ut secundum <diversitatem> scibilium causetur diversitas scientiarum, et quia scibile est illud quod est - quia <quod> non est non contingit scire, ut dicit Aristoteles - oportet quod secundum diversitatem entium sit diversitas scientiarum.

.........
(f. 60rb)
Aliter potest dici et fortasse melius quod praedictae scientiae summuntur secundum diversitatem scibilium. Triviales autem scientiae non sic, sed omnium aliarum scientiarum praeparant instrumentum; diversimode tamen rationalis ab aliiis, quia alia secundum materiam, scilicet grammatica et rhetorica quodammodo, rationalis autem philosophia secundum formam, et hoc est secundum quod dicitur quod illa <docet> modum omnium aliarum scientiarum. Et sic dicuntur diversimode rationales scientiae et aliae, et sic patet quod logica est scientia et sub neutra aliarum scientiarum contenta. Et huic consonat Augustinus in libro De doctrina christianae dividens philosophiam in illam quae est de rebus et illam quae est de signis.

11 f. 66vb-67ra - I, 1180A.
Consequenter quaeritur de secundo, scilicet utrum haec divisio (quaestionis in logicam, naturalem, moralem) fuit conveniens vel non, et hoc est quaerere utrum sit superflua vel deminuta vel non.

Quod autem sit superflua videtur sic: omnis res aut est ab operatione nostra aut ab operatione naturae. Ergo omnis quaedam vel erit de rebus exeuntibus a) ab operatione nostra in esse, et tunc est moralis, vel ab operatione naturae, et tunc erit quaedam naturalis. Ergo omnis quaedam aut erit naturalis aut moralis, quare superfluit tertium membrum.

Ad idem: non est dividens et b) divisum eiusdem. Sed quaedam [est] hic dicta est quaedam <logica> sive dialectica. Ergo non habet dividi per quaeestionem logicam. Superfluit igitur tertium membrum.
Ad idem: omnis quaestio est de subjecto et praedicato vel antecedente et consequente. Haec autem sunt res logicae, quare ei<s> erit quaestio logica. Igitur superfluit alia duo membra.

.......... Ad hoc dicendum, [quod] et primo ad ultimum quod non componitur ex terminis significantibus aliquid. Praeterea: necesse est quaestionem multiplicari secundum terminos significantes sive significata terminorum, et ideo datur haec divisio quaestionis <secundum> significata terminorum. Significatam enim per terminos aut est res primae intentionis aut secundae; et dico primam intentionem sive rem primae intentionis, quae est res naturalis ut homo, vel moralis ut iustitia, rem secundae intentionis dico quae est nota eiusdem, ut hoc nomen 'homo' vel 'iustitia', sicut haec dictio 'nomen' tertio imponitur ad significandum hoc nomen 'iustitia'. Unde sicut hoc nomen 'homo' primo imponitur ad significandum hanc rem quae est homo, vel hoc nomen '<iustitia>' hanc qualitatem quae est iustitia, [unde] sic [ut] haec dictio 'nomen' tertio imponitur ad significandum hoc nomen 'homo' et ad significandum hoc nomen 'iustitia', sicut communis ad haec. Eodem modo intellegendum est de verbis, sicut enim hoc verbum 'currit' primo imponitur ad significandum huiusmodi actum qui est cursus, similiter haec dictio 'verbum' tertio imponitur ad significandum id quod est nota huiusmodi actus, sicut hanc dictionem 'currit' vel commune ad haec. Similiter intellegendum est de oratione et partibus orationis, haec enim affirmatio 'homo currit' habet significacionem aggregatam ex significacionibus convenientibus partibus eius secundum primam impositionem, hoc vero nomen 'affirmatio' secundo imponitur ad significandum notam aggregatam ex illis partibus quae sunt primae impositionis, et ideo huiusmodi nomina 'nomen' et 'verbum', 'affirmatio', 'negatio' et cetera dicuntur nomina secundae impositionis, et res significatae per haec dicuntur res secundae intentionis. Res vero significatae per ea quorum haec sunt nota dicuntur res primae intentionis, et nota earum nomina primae impositionis. Hic igitur manifestando res significatae per terminos quaestionis aut erunt res praeae intentionis aut secundae; si primae intentionis, aut exeunt in esse ab operatione nostra aut ab operatione naturae. Si ab operatione nostra, tunc moralis, et quaestio composita ex terminis significantibus huiusmodi res dicitur quaestio moralis. Si ab operatione naturae, tunc naturalis, et quaestio composita ex terminis significantibus huiusmodi res dicitur naturalis. Si vero sint res secundae intentionis, tunc quaestio composita ex
terminis significantibus huiusmodi res dicitur quaestio logica.

Ex iam dictis <patet> qualiter respondendum sit ad primum objectum, quod licet omnis res vel sit ab operatione nostra vel ab operatione naturae, non tamen est omnis res naturalis vel moralis et sumatur primae intentionis, solum enim res quae est primae intentionis et ab operatione nostra dicitur moralis, et quae ab operatione naturae, naturalis. Ex rebus autem secundae intentionis est quaestio logica vel rationalis.

Ad secundum dicendum quod quaestio logica sive dialectica dicitur communiter et proprie. Communiter vero dicitur quaestio dialectica omnis quaestio quae terminabilis est per rationes dialecticas, et sic omnis quaestio potest dici dialectica (f. 67ra) quia componitur ex terminis, quibus est antecedens vel consequens vel extraneum, a quibus sumuntur loci. Alio modo dicitur quia<ca> componitur ex terminis dialecticis et significantibus res dialecticas, quae sunt res secundae intentionis. Et primo <modo> sumitur quaestio secundum quod est divisa, secundo modo secundum quod est dividens.

Ad tertium dicendum quod quantum ad partes quaestionis quae sunt signa est omnis quaestio logica, cujusmodi sunt subjectum, praedicatum, antecedens, consequens, quantum vero ad significata per huiusmodi partes non est omnis quaestio logica, eo quod signum potest esse res logica et secundae intentionis vel non logica sicut res primae intentionis.

a) exeuntibus] exit ms.p.cor.  b) et] per ms.

12. f. 69va - II, 1185Asq.

Dubitatur hic primo, cum dicis locum a specie vel a genere, utrum li 'a specie' vel 'a genere' dicat rem ipsam vel habitudinem ipsam vel concretum ex re et habitudine. Non rem ipsam, quia tunc a diversitate rei sequetur diversitas loci, unde non esset idem locus: 'est album, ergo est coloratum' qui est hic: 'est homo, ergo est animal', quod falsum est. Eadem ratione ostendi potest quod non dicat concretum. Si vero dicat habitudinem ipsam, tunc ut videtur potius deberet dici: locus ab habitudine speciei quam a specie.

Item: cum habitudo speciei ad genus et generis ad speciem secundum substantiam sit eadem sicut via ab Athenis ad Thebas et e converso, tunc idem esset locus a specie et locus a genere, quod falsum est.

Item: species nominat ipsum rem et non habitudinem. Cum ergo dicimus locum a specie, li 'a specie' dicit rem et non habitudinem.
Ad quod dicendum quod nec dicit rem tantum nec habitudinem tantum, sed concretum ex re et habitudine, sed intellege quod ipsa res est materiale tamquam formale, et ideo ab habitudine denominatur locus. Unde manente eadem habitudine manet idem locus. Et ideo quia non est eadem habitudo generis ad speciem quae est speciei ad genus, nec idem locus. Species etiam non nominat rem speciei absolute dictam sed sub habitudine ad genus. Et sic patet quomodo dicendum sit ad obiecta.

a) habitudo vero vel similia inserenda putto.

Robertus Kilwardby, Notulae Libri Priorum

The following excerpts are based on Oxford, Merton College 289 (A), which is the MS referred to by the folio-numbers. Where this MS's text was obviously wrong, readings have been supplied from Bruxelles BR 1797-98 (B) (lacking in no. 13), Cambridge Peterhouse 205 (C) or Oxford Merton College 280 (D), as shown in the apparatus.

13. f. 33ra-b – proemium.

Cum omnis scientia sit veri inquisitiva, et hoc per rationem et modum disserendi, logica autem habeat modum inquirendi veritatem in aliis scientiis determinare a), patet quod logica rationem et modum disserendi determinare debet. Sed ratio disserendi secundum Boethium duas habet partes, scilicet inventionem et iudicium. Igitur logica de utraque habet determinare, ut dicatur quaedam pars logicae de arte inveniendi, quaedam de arte iudicandi.

Sed tunc dubitatur cum in omni scientia fiat inventio et iudicium secundum quod unaquaque scientia disserit, propter quid istae duae partes magis logicae quam alii scientiae attribuuntur.

Et dicendum quod licet omnis scientia inveniat et iudicet, tamen sola logica modum et artem inveniendi et iudicandi determinat, et ideo istae partes ei soli attribuuntur.

Sed tunc dubitatur propter quid in doctrinis specialibus non doceatur ars inveniendi et iudicandi sicut in logica.

Et dicendum quod inconveniens est simul quaerere scientiam, et modum sciendi. Doctrinae autem specialis determinant ipsas scientias. Quare modum sciendi non determinabant. Sed modus sciendi consistit in inveniendo et iudicando. Quare modus inveniendi et iudicandi non habet determinari in aliqua scientia speciali, et ideo in logica, quae est scientia communis,
determinatur. Ratio autem quare inconveniens est simul dare scientiam et modum scienti et modum sciendi haec est: doctrinae speciales sunt generis determinati et circa principia determinati generis nec excedunt ea. Sed extra determinata principia determinati generis sunt modi communes. Quare scientiae speciales ad modos communes determinandos non se extendent. Sed modus inniendi et iudicandi est modus communis pluribus scientiis. Quare de illo in aliqua scientia speciali determinari non poterit. Et ita patet intentum.

Sed tunc dubitatur: si enim inconveniens est simul determinare b) scientiam et modum sciendi, logica autem est una scientia, necesse est aliam praecedere logicam, quae rectificet logical in modum sciendi et docendi. Et si hoc, consimilis est ratio de illa quae praecedit logicam, et ita vel procederetur in infinitum, vel aliqua scientia simul determinabit scientiam et modum sciendi, quod est contra propositionem prius habitam.

Et dicendum quod logica simul determinat scientiam et modum sciendi, et hoc non est inconveniens, est enim logica de modo sciendi et docendi, unde illa potest se ipsam rectificare in modo, et non indiget alia praecedente, quae rectificet ipsam, quia cum ipsa determinet scientiam et modum sciendi, haec non sunt duo apud ipsam, quia quod c) est modus omnium scientiarum est ei scientia. In aliis autem scientiis, ut in doctrinis specialibus, alia est scientia et modus sciendi, et ideo in illis inconveniens est simul dare scientiam et modum. Patet igitur responsio ad obiectum, praedicta enim proposito non extenditur ultra scientias speciales, ut iam patet.

.........

Sed adhuc restat dubitatio quia cum scientia specialis modum inventiendi et iudicandi determinare non habeat, sed scientia communis, scientia autem communis est duplex, scilicet logica et metaphysica, dubitatur quare magis apud logicam determinatur iste modus quam apud metaphysicam.

Et dicendum quod inventio et iudicium partes sunt artis disserendi, quae completur per syllogismum, qui est res rationis. Quare inventio et iudicium quae sunt circa res rationis sunt. Logica autem de rebus rationis determinat. Et ideo ad logicam pertinent determinatio inventionis et iudicii. Metaphysica autem non est de rebus rationis, sed magis de rebus naturae, communiter accipiendo (f. 33rb) naturam secundum earum essentias puras et per rationes profundas et verissimas. Et ideo metaphysica de modo praedicto non habet determinare.

Ex his manifestum ergo est quod inventio et iudicium partes sunt logi-
cae, et quod solius logicae, et propter quam causam.

a) determinare] om. A. b) determinare] om. A. c) quod] om. AC.

14. f. 41ra - I, 25b 26sq.
Adhuc dubitatur de primo modo, videtur enim quod sit inutilis coniugatio, quia est reperire terminos omni et nulli inesse; quod autem sit reperire terminos omni inesse per se patet, quod autem nulli inesse patet hic: 'omne aes est naturale, et omnis statua est aes', sit ita, et tamen nulla statua est naturalis.

Et dicendum quod instantia nulla est, hic enim determinatur forma syllogistica in communissima materia, quae abstrahit a materia probabil et necessaria et apparenti, unde forma quae hic determinatur non tantum inveniri potest in dialecticis et demonstratvis, sed etiam in sophisticis. Unde dicendum quod sequitur conclusio, scilicet 'omnis statua est naturalis', secundum artificem huius libri a); vel si non, neganda est prima secundum ipsum, forma enim bona est secundum ipsum, et non excluditur a forma syllogistica hic determinata. Et ad huius evidentiam sciendum quod duplex est syllogismus, scilicet ille cuius necessitas est localis, ubi ex maior vel minori necessario sequitur conclusio, et talis est syllogismus dialecticus vel demonstrativus; alius est cuius necessitas est complexionalis tantum, hoc est causata ex debita complexione terminorum ad invicem et propositionum, et talis communis est syllogismo dialectico, demonstrativo et sophisticio, et talis syllogismi necessitas et forma hic determinatur. Artifex igitur libri Priorum abstrahit syllogismum et similiter esse praecedat in propositionibus syllogisticis. Unde abstrahit illud esse ab esse per se et per accidentes, et ita concedit praedicationes accidentales. Unde cum sic argumentatur: 'omne aes est naturale, omnis statua' etc., dicet vel quod conclusio est vera, quamvis per accidentes, vel quod prima est falsa, quamvis per accidentes, numquam autem formam argumentum negaret.

a) huius libri] librorum(?) A libri D.

15. f. 73ra-b - I, 50a 5sq.
Deinde dubitatur de hoc quod non a) vult syllogismos ex hypothesi posse reduci in syllogismum, omne enim genus argumentationis in syllogismum reduci potest, et syllogismus ex hypothesi est aliquod genus argumentationis.

Adhuc: si dicam: 'oppositorum non est una potestas, ergo nec una disci-
plina', constituitur enthymema in tribus terminis, quare addita aliqua propositione fiet syllogismus.

Si autem dicat aliquid quod hoc verum est, sed non debet addiri propositione ad propositiones praeeventes, contradicit Aristotelis in principio huius capituli: quod si desit aliqua propositione, addenda est, si superfuit, auferenda. Adhuc addatur maior sic: 'quorumcumque non est una potestas, nec disciplina una. Sed oppositorum non est una potestas. Ergo nec disciplina una'.


......

Et dicendum quod syllogismus dupliciter est, scilicet ostensivus et categoricus cuius necessitas per dici de omni et de nullo procedit, vel hypotheticus cuius necessitas est magis vel a positione antecedentis vel a destructione consequentis vel a natura oppositionis vel aliqua c) alia huiusmodi habitudine locali. De syllogismo primo loquitur hic Aristoteles et locutus est per totum I. huius, de secundo autem non.

Dicendum igitur quod syllogismi ex hypothesi possunt reduci in syllogismum hypotheticum, sed non in syllogismum simplicem et categoricum.

Et dicendum ad primum quod omne genus argumenti reducitur ad syllogismum hunc vel illum sub disjunctione, sed non in syllogismum ostensivum categoricum, de quo loquitur hic.

Et per hoc idem patet responsio ad secundum et tertium, maior enim propositione apposita, quae condicionalis d) est, fit syllogismus hypotheticus et infert per habitudinem localem, scilicet a positione antecedentis.

......

Consequenter quaeritur ubi Aristoteles determinabit modos syllogismorum ex hypothesi, sicut dicit se determinaturum esse.

Et dicendum quod in II. huius et in Topicis.

Sed tunc quaeritur quare non determinat in II. huius de omni e) syllogismo ex hypothesi, ut de illo qui est secundum similitudinem et qui secundum proportionem et a maior et a minori et a casibus et huiusmodi, solum enim de illo qui est per impossibile et quibusdam alius paucis determinat.
Et dicendum quod in hac doctrina habet determinare syllogismos et modos syllogismorum, qui communiter necessitatem habent et communes sunt ad omnem materiam. Syllogismus autem per impossibile et alii de quibus agit in II. hiusmodi sunt, probant enim ex necessitate, et hoc in quacumque materia. Sed syllogismus ex hypothesi qui est secundum similitudinem et qui est a proportione et a maiorii et hiusmodi omnes non sunt universaliter se habentes ad omnem materiam, sed ad probabilem tantum, solum enim probabiliter concludunt f) et non cum necessitate simpliciter, unde cum nullus est de usu demonstratorum sed dialecticorum, et ideo non debuit de his in hac doctrina determinare, sed in topicis.


16. p. 95a - proemium

Cum liber Topicorum Aristotelis, quem prae manibus habemus, non sit de syllogismo in universalis, ut de subjecto, nec de aliqua parte integrali syllogismi, quia nec de termino nec de enuntiatione, erit igitur de syllogismo dialectico, cum non sit de syllogismo litigioso nec etiam de syllogismo demonstrativo; nam sicut se habet syllogismus dialecticus ad hanc scientiam, sic syllogismus simpliciter dictus ad scientiam libri Priorum et demonstrativus ad librum Posteriorum et litigious ad librum Elenchorum. Est autem liber Priorum de syllogismo in universalis ut de subjecto, et sic de aliiis. Erit ergo iste liber de syllogismo dialectico, ut de subjecto.

.........

Ad oppositum sic: Idem <debet> esse subjectum huius scientiae et scientiae Topicorum Boethii, scientia enim est eadem, quamvis auctores sint diversi. Si igitur illa scientia est de loco dialectico vel de locis dialecticis, et ista scientia erit eodem modo de loco dialectico vel de locis dialecticis, ut de subjecto.

Adhuc: idem non est subjectum et instrumentum eiusdem. Ergo si locus dialecticus est instrumentum artis dialecticae, non erit subjectum eiusdem.

.........

Possumus tamen aliter dicere et forte melius, quod haec doctrina traditur tam per modum artis quam per modum scientiae; et secundum quod ars est
habet materiam in qua operatur, scilicet quaecstionem dialecticam sive pro-
blema; secundum vero quod est scientia habet subiectum de quo et cuius par-
tibus facit cognoscere passiones; et haec diversitas fere accidit in qua-
libet parte logices.

Ad primam ergo rationem contra hoc dicendum quod sicut in Topicis Boe-
thii agitur de locis dialecticis et etiam de syllogismo dialectico, simi-
liter in hac scientia; sed de syllogismo dialectico ut de subiecto, de lo-
cis vero tamquam de principiis subiecti. Et propter hoc recipit ille liber
talem intitulationem, et similiter alius liber, quia loci dialectici sunt
quasi principia subiecti.

Ad secundam dicendum quod nihil prohibet idem esse subiectum scientiae
et instrumentum artis sive operantis secundum artem, praecipue in logica
quae cum sit scientia et modus procedendi in scientiis determinatis, nec
solum alias scientias sed etiam se ipsam aliquid modo rectificat, nec solum
aliarum sed sui ipsius praeparat instrumenta. Et propter hoc dicitur: lo-
gica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum.

17. p. 104a - I, 107b 19sq.

Quarto quaeritur utrum ad logicum pertineat considerare differentias rerum
et similitudines. Si enim completio universi est ex rebus secundum conve-
nientias et differentias se habentibus, cuius est considerare universi
completionem, eius est considerare differentias et similitudines rerum et
non alterius. Philosophus autem mundi completionem considerat et non logi-
cus. Philosophus ergo, non logicus habet considerare differentias et simi-
itudines rerum.

Et dicendum quod philosophi est scire et considerare similitudines et
differentias rerum, modum autem sciendi et considerandi differentias re-
rum ex sua scientia non habet, sed ex scientia communi quae est dialecti-
ca, secundum quod in prima philosophia habetur: malum est quaerere scien-
tiam et modum sciendi per quam declaratur.