ANALYZING SYLOGISMS

OR

ANONYMUS AURELIANENSIS III - THE (PRESUMABLY) EARLIEST EXTANT LATIN COMMENTARY ON THE PRIOR ANALYTICS, AND ITS GREEK MODEL.

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Many a young student from Antiquity or the Middle Ages would have loved to be in a position to do what Marcus Aurelius did: thank divine favour for not having had to sweat over the analysis of syllogisms. Few had the emperor's luck. For most, the way to philosophy was paved with syllogisms; major, minor and middle terms; conversion; reduction ...

'To analyze syllogisms' is the expression used by Marcus. Was he thinking of Aristotle's Prior Analytics when he wrote those words? It is by no means inconceivable, as he lived at a time when Aristotle's position as supreme - and almost sole - authority on logic was beginning to be established.

Authoritative texts beget commentaries. Boethus of Sidon (late first c.BC?) may have been one of the first to write one on APr. There is some evidence that Aspasius wrote one, and good evidence that Herminus and Galen did so. They were all contemporaries of Marcus Aurelius. They were followed by (among others) Alexander of Aphrodisias (ca. 200); Porphyry (3rd c.); Iamblichus, Themistius, and Maximus (all 4th c.); Syrianus, Proclus and Marinus (all 5th c.); Ammonius (5th-6th c.); Philoponus and Elias (6th c.); Stephanus (7th c.); Psellus (11th c.); Michael of Ephesus (12th c.); Leo Magentinus (13th c.); Sophonias (ca. 1300) - i.e., nearly everybody who ever counted as an important figure in Greek Aristotelian scholasticism was also the author of a commentary on the Prior Analytics.

Libris 11, p.118 Müller (Scripta minora II)-XIX.41 Kühn. A lex -

Since each commentator borrowed extensively from one or more of his predecessors, the Greek Priora- exegesis was guaranteed a considerable sta-

bility. Even if all ancient commentaries had perished, we could be sure their Byzantine successors would contain much ancient doctrine. We should even be able to detect it in some cases. Commenting on Aristotle's defi-
nition of syllogism in APr. I.1.24β18sqq., Leo Magentius says that the requirement that the conclusion be different (ἐτερον) from the premisses has the purpose of distinguishing the real syllogisms from the so-called διαφορομενοι syllogisms, like 'If it is day, it is day; but it is day; therefore it is day' – even without help from Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary, we should be capable of recognizing this as an ancient item going back to a time when something was known about Stoic logic.

As a matter of fact, some of the late ancient commentaries survived till Byzantine times, and a few (more or less complete) even till our days. Hence, it is easy to document the continuity of the Greek tradition from the Antonine Period to the Paleologian.

If we turn to the Latin West, the situation is quite different. The – presumably few – ancient teachers who conducted logic classes in Latin did not have a translation of the Prior Analytics before the early sixth century when Boethius provided it. It is certain that Boethius planned to satisfy the need for a commentary that he thus created, but it is not clear whether the plan materialized.

1. Ms.Vat.gr.244: 144v.
2. CAGII.1.18.
Abelard is known to have read the Prior Analytics. ¹ The first extant Latin commentary is from the second half of the 12th century (see below), and we have several from the following centuries. The medieval works sometimes contain items familiar to readers of Greek commentaries. Thus Albert the Great illustrates problems of conversion by means of the propositions 'no old man will be a boy' and 'no jar is in wine' (nullus senex erit puer - nullum dolium est in vino). ² These propositions defy the rules of conversion, for they are true, but their converses, viz. 'no boy will be an old man' and 'no wine is in (a) jar' are false. In Greek commentaries we find οὖσεις νέος πρεσβύτης ἦν κάλα λι and οὖσεις κέραμος ἐν οἶνῳ used to illustrate the same problem. ³

Some instances of agreement between the Greek and the Latin tradition may be due to chance. In some cases Arabic works or late ancient Latin opuscula (Boethius' monographs on syllogistic in particular) may have mediated between East and West. But was there not a more direct link? We know that when the Westerners began to study the Sophistici Elenchi and the Posterior Analytics (in the 12th century), their first steps were guided by translations of Greek commentaries. ⁴ Was the Latin Priora-exegesis started in the same way? We have had to reckon with this possibility since Minio-Paluello discovered that a twelfth century manuscript (Firenze, B.N.C., Conv. Suppr. J.6.34) of the Prior Analytics contains a considerable number of marginal scholia translated from the Greek. ⁵ But it is still unknown whether these scholia were widely known and influential in 12th century Western Europe, and whether the Florentine corpus is all the Westerners had; if there were no more scholia, they can only have played a minor role in the formation of the Latin tradition; but if the Florentine scholia are extracts from a whole commentary that was available in Latin, that commentary may have been influential.

¹ Minio-Paluello, A.L.III.1-4:IX.
² Albertus APr.I,I,X, Borgnet I.473. I have discussed this passage in Ebbesen 1981b.
³ οὖσεις νέος πρεσβύτης ἦν κάλα λι: Anon., Comm.APr., cod.Paris.gr.2061: 10v; cf. Philop.APr. (CAG XIII.2) 50.14-24. οὖσεις κέραμος ἐν οἶνῳ: Philop.APr.48.24-49.5. In Logica "Cum sit nostra" (De Rijk, Logica Modernorum II.21427) we find 'nullus puer fuit senex', i.e. the same variant as in Anon.Paris 2061; and 'nulla corrupta erit virgo', a variant of οὖσεις παρθένος γυνη ἦν πάλαι, which occurs in Anon.Paris.2061:10r (cf. Philop. APr.50.16-25.
⁴ See CIMAGL 16, CIMAGL 34, and Ebbesen 1981a.
⁵ Minio-Paluello 1972: 347-356; id.in the preface of A.L.III.1-4, where the scholia are published on pp.293sqq.
Ms. Orléans, BM 283, which dates from the second half of the 12th century, contains a large fragment of a contemporary Latin commentary on the Prior Analytics, as far as I know the only extant 12th century work of its kind. I call the author, and his work, "Anonymus Aurelianensis III".  

I have described the ms. in CIMAGL 16 (1976) 1-2. The Priora commentary is found on pp. 178-203 in part 5 of the ms. (three quires: pp. 156-171, 172-187, 188-203 [erroneously '187-203' in CIMAGL 16:2], according to my notes from an examination of the ms. in 1975; but I am afraid I have overlooked something, because the correct order of the leaves is 178/9-180/1-182/3-184/5-188/9-186/7-190/1-196/7-198/9-192/3 -194/5-200/1-202/3, indicating that 186-9 is a bifolium that has been folded the wrong way, while 190-201 is a gathering of three sheets in which the two middle sheets (192-199) have been folded the wrong way, 202/3 probably being a single leaf). The commentary contains a proem (incipit "Circa hoc propositum praemittenda") and scholia on APr.I.1.24a10-I.31.46a34 (explicit, ex abrupto, "propositum superiorum, i.e. divisionem quae quasi quoddam superius est .. (2 illegible letters)"

I have only made a detailed study of a few passages of the commentary, but the results indicate that it merits further investigation. The following conclusions seem to emerge:

1. The Florence scholia are just excerpts from a more extensive collection, presumably a full-scale commentary.

2. This commentary (henceforward "Commentum Graecum") was influential, at least in the environment from which Anon.Aurel.III stems.

3. This environment was one in which the Greek commentaries on the Posterior Analytics and the Elenchi that Jacobus Veneticus had translated were also influential.

4. The translation of the Priora used by Anon.Aurel.III was the standard version, the one called "Recensio Florentina" by Minio-Paluello after the principal manuscript, the very Florentinus that contains the translated scholia. However, Anon.Aurel.III knew at least one reading from "Recensio Carnutensis" — and one that provides a link to the Florentine scholia.

5. Commentum Graecum was, in book I, very closely related to Philoponus' commentary on the book, but not identical with it. This is no new discovery, but there is additional evidence corroborating this conclusion of Minio-Paluello's.

1. "Anonymus Aurelianensis I" and "Anon.Aurel.II" are my names for the authors of two other works from the same manuscript (editions in CIMAGL 34 (1979) & CIMAGL 16 (1976), respectively).
Anon. Aurel. III lends some support to Minio-Paluello's view that the translator of Commentum Graecum was Boethius. But the matter cannot be regarded as settled.

Reg. 1. Anonymus Aurelianensis III contains passages that depend on Greek scholia not represented in the Florence ms. Thus,

(a) in the exposition of 24 b 22 (see text at the end of this paper), Anon. Aurel. III operates with two ways of distinguishing between dialectic and apodictic, 'secundum usum' (τῷ χρήσει) and 'secundum materiam' (τῷ _OLD 2108). Cf. Alex. APr. (CAG II.1) 12.21 sqq., Ammon APr. (CAG IV.6) 19-21; cf. also Philoponus APr. (CAG XIII.2) 21.25 sqq. — but Philoponus has Ἐκ τῆς φύσεως instead of τῇ _OLD 2108. There is no scholium on this passage in the Florence ms.;

(b) the long scholium on 24 b 18-20 (the definition of syllogism) follows a Greek model. The Florence ms. has no scholium on this passage. The text of Anon. Aurel. III is printed below. I have compared it with Apuleius, Peri hermenetis pp.184-5 ed.Thomas; Boethius, De syllogismo categorico, PL 64:821-2; Alexander, APr. (CAG II.1) 16-23; id., Top. (CAG II.2) 7-15; Ammonius, APr. (CAG IV.6) 24-32; Philoponus, APr. (CAG XIII.2) 30-36; Anon. cod. Paris. gr. 2061, APr. ff.5v-8v. I have also looked up some later Greek scholiasts, but they had nothing of interest to offer.

Anonymus Aurelianensis III is independent of Apuleius. Boethius' De syllogismo categorico has been used; thus the expression 'perridicii syllogismi' (p. 18, line 20, below) stems from there. But other items which Anon. Aurel. III shares with one or more Greek commentators are not found in Boethius. Thus our Anonymus says that the inclusion of 'positis' in the definition of syllogism is intended to exclude both hypothetical syllogisms and non-declarative propositions. This is in agreement with Philoponus and Alex. APr., but not with Boethius. Similarly, Anon. Aurel. III says that 'aliud' serves to exclude not only the 'perridicii syllogismi', but also "the tres coniugationes inutiles in which the evident is inferred from the evident, the evident from the non-evident, or the non evident from the non evident". This interpretation is also Philoponus', but not Boethius'. Anon. Aurel. III also says that 'quiddam' serves to exclude 'syllogismi immodi- ficati'. So do Anon.Paris. 2061 and (with a slightly different wording) Philoponus, but not Boethius. Finally, Boethius does not mention that some elements in the definition have to do with the syllogism's matter, others with its form. Anon. Aurel. III and Philoponus (plus some of the other Greeks) say so.

Notice in particular that all three texts pay great attention to the distinction between the syllogism's matter and form. Anonymus Cantabrigiensis says (81rA):

Notandum itaque quod cum *Vito* Topicorum dicatur intertemendum esse definitionem assignatam alicui composito quae materiae tantum meminit, compositionem et formam compositi praetereundam, proprii principii observator Aristoteles in definitione syllogismi, qui est quoddam compositum, materiae et formae meminit syllogisticae.

Materia autem syllogismi duplex est, nam alia est principalis, alia secundaria. Prima et elementaris materia syllogismi sunt termini, major sc. extremitas, minor, et medium. Secunda materia (quia et ipsa est ex alia, ut prima) sunt propositiones, major sc. propositio, minor, et conclusio, quia dimi<di>etas propositionum est.

Forma autem syllogismi triplex est:modus, figura, complexio. Modus est dispositio regularis duarum propositionum; figura regularis terminorum ordinatio; complexio est necessaria adiunctio propositionum ad conclusionem.

Solet autem a quibusdam ipsa conclusio forma dici: sicut enim materia rudis est nec sufficit ad perfectionem compositi donec forma adveniens totum perficiat, sic inutilis videtur et vane sumpta propositionum praemissio donec conclusio quodammodo ipsas propositiones informat.

The last paragraphs sound as if it contains a *verbatim* quotation of Commentum Graecum ("vane sumpta" = μάτην ἐλαμμένη). Notice also that Anon.Aurel.I's exposition of 'diversum' = ἓτερον (CIMAGL 34:22) agrees with Anonymus Aurelianensis III and Philoponus against Boethius; and that Anon.Aurel.I's interpretation of 'positis' = τεθέντων (CIMAGL 34:23, last paragraph) presupposes a Greek text distinguishing between τεθέντων and ὑποτεθέντων (cf.Philop. *APr.*, CAG XIII.2: 33.6-8).

The Aurelianenses, then, and No. III in particular, lend support to the hypothesis that the medieval Latin *Priora* exegesis was built on Greek

1. Cf.Amon.APr.(CAG IV.6) 4; Philop. *APr.I* (CAG XIII.2) 6.10-15, 32.31-33.2, 270.16-20; Ps.-Philop. *APr.II* (CAG XIII.2) 387.8-11, 388.3-6; the Florentine scholium, A.L.III.1-4: 295,311,330. The idea that a syllogism's form is its conclusion, the premises being its matter, may have been inspired by Arist. *Ph.* 2 c.3 & 7 (cf. Simplicius *Ph.* (CAG IX) 317-18 & 368; Philop. *Ph.* (CAG XVI) 247 & 305. Arist. *APo.* 11.94*24 may also have played a role; see scholia on the passage in CAG XIII.3: 376,568-9 and CAG XXI.1: 140-141.
foundations. But more research is needed to get a clearer picture of the size of the debt Anonymus Aurelianensis III owes to the Greek commentator; and the possibility remains that the Greek commentary was only known to a limited circle and left few marks on the later Latin tradition. 13th century commentaries should be carefully studied to see whether this possibility can be discarded.

Re 3. The three Aurelianenses and Anonymus Cantabrigiensis share a dependence on Commentum Graecum. But that is not all. The sections on the definition of syllogism in Anonymi Aurelianenses I and III are so similar that a very intimate connection between the two texts must be assumed. Perhaps Anonymus No. One and No. Three were one and the same person. But Anonymi Aurelianenses I and II are also closely related, and so are Anon. Aurel.I and Anonymus Cantabrigiensis. Hence, the environment in which Anon.Aurel.III's Priora-commentary was created seems to have been the same as the one that produced the works of Anon.Aurel.I, Anon.Aurel.II, and Anon.Cantabrigiensis. But that was an environment in which Jacobus Venetius' translations of Greek commentaries were influential. Ergo etc.

Notice that the proem of Anon.Aurel.III contains a quotation (p. 15 below) of "Alexander's" commentary on the Posterior Analytics (or possibly on the Eleventh), partly overlapping with quotations in Anonymus Aurelianensis I and Anonymus Cantabrigiensis' Comm. SE.

I have proposed the date 'ca. 1160-80' and the provenance 'Northern France' for Anonymus Aurelianensis I. I will propose the same for Anonymus Aurelianensis III.

Re 4. The following are Anon.Aurel.III's lemmata for 24a10-b12:

Primum est dicere circa quid et de quo ... intentio, quoniam circa demonstrationem et <de> demonstrativa disciplina, deinde determinare quid est propositio ... propositio igitur ... oratio affirmativa vel negativa alciusius de aliquo ... Dico autem ... omni inest aut nulli ... alci aut non alci aut non omni ... sine universalis ... differt autem ... sumptio alterius partis ... interrogatio contradictio-nis ... Nihil autem differt ut fiat ... nam et qui demonstratur ... qui interrogat ... aliquid de aliquo esse vel non esse ... secundum praedictum modum; demonstrativa ... si vera sit ... per primas sump-ta; dialectica ... apparentis ... probabilis.

The deviations from Recensio Florentina (Aristoteles Latinus III.1-4:5-6) are insignificant. The words I have italicized are significant deviations from Recensio Carnutensis (A.L.III.1-4:143).

1. See CIMAGL 34: XVII sqq.
2. See CIMAGL 34: XVII sqq.
3. The text is fragment 7 in Ebbesen 1981a, vol.II.2; it is discussed in vol.III.
4. CIMAGL 34: 9842.
5. Ms. Cambridge, St.John's D.12:82vB.
6. CIMAGL 34: XXVIII sqq.
Anon. Aurel. III, then, used the Florentine recension. But he knew at least one reading from the other one. His comment on 24\(^a\)10 (p. 1788): "PRIMUM EST DICERE CIRCA QUID, id est ad quem finem spectat INTENTIO. Unde adiungit QUONIAM CIRCA DEMONSTRATIONEM, quasi 'Bene dico CIRCA QUID, quoniam circa demonstrationem est intentio hic; est enim finis totius logici negotii; ET DE QUO est intentio hic' – DE ponitur causae, unde et alia translatio hic habet GRATIA CUIUS". *De quo* is the Florentine recension's rendition of τόνος. The Chartres text has *συίς*. The first of the Florentine scholia from Commentum Graecum contains the sentence, "Ait ergo circa quid est intentio, id est circa demonstrationem et συίς gratia."

Re 5. The scholium of Anon. Aurel. III on 24\(^b\)18–20 resembles Philoponus' more than any other Greek scholion known to me. But in his comment on 'quiddam' in the definition of syllogism, Anon. Aurel. III says the word excludes 'syllogismi immodificati' = ἀσυλλογίστων συλλογισμοῦ. Among the Greeks, only Philoponus and Anonymus cod. Paris. 2061 agree with our Latin author – but Philoponus says ἀσυλλογίστων συσφιγγόν (CAG XIII.2:34.7), Anon. Paris. 2061 says καὶ τὸ 'τό' καλῶς πρὸς κεῖται διὰ τοῦ ἀσυλλογίστως συλλογισμοῦ. οἱ γὰρ ἀσυλλογίστων συλλογισμοῖ πολλὰ συνάγονται παρὰ τὰς προτάσεις, ὡς προτόντων σύν θεί ειδομένα. τὸ οὖν 'τό' πρὸς κεῖται ένα μικρόν τί έτερον γένηται τὸ συμπέρασμα παρὰ τὰς προτάσεις καὶ μὴ πολλοὶ ὅσον συλλογισμόν (Paris. gr. 2061:6v).

In the scholium on 24\(^a\)22, Anonymus Aurelianensis III is closer to Alexander and Ammonius than to Philoponus and Anon. Paris. 2061 (see above "Re 1").

These findings are in agreement with Minio-Paluello's: Commentum Graecum on *Apr. I* was very similar to Philoponus', yet contained some non-Philoponean scholia and formulations, some of which occur in other Greek commentaries.

This state of affairs suggests that Commentum Graecum was either a lost work from about the sixth century or a Byzantine (?12th century) re-hash of material from that period – exactly like the *Posteriora* commentary that Jacobus Veneticus translated.\(^1\) Since

(a) the Florentine scholia on *Apr. II* have many cases of verbatim agreement with the Byzantine collection of scholia on that book published in CAG XIII.2;\(^2\)

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1. See CIMAGL 16, CIMAGL 34, and Ebbesen 1981a.
(b) there seems to be a connection between knowing *Commentum Graecum in APR.* and the *Elenchi-* and *Posteriora-* commentaries translated by Jacobus (*v. supra*);

(c) there are indications that Jacobus used Michael of Ephesus' private collections of scholia on the Elenchi,\(^1\) it looks like a reasonable conjecture that *Commentum Graecum in APR.* was given to the West by Jacobus, and that the Greek original was one or more manuscripts in Michael of Ephesus' possession. Michael is known to have commented on *APR.* II, but the work appears to have been lost.

But there is one formidable argument against this assumption, as we shall immediately see.

Re 6. Minio-Paluello has argued that the Florentine scholia must have been translated by Boethius because the translator's habits coincides with the consul's.\(^2\) *Anonymous Aurelianensis III* provides evidence that *Commentum Graecum* had 'immodificati' for ἀυστός ἐκ τοῦ. This very peculiar translation occurs in one (and as far as I know, only one) other place; that place is in Boethius' translation of the *Sophistici Elenchi*, at c.6 168a21 (A.L. VI.1-3:15.8).

If Boethius was the translator, the Greek text of *Commentum Graecum* cannot be much later than the year 500. On the other hand, the closeness to Philoponus in several parts of book I makes a much earlier date improbable. Minio-Paluello once suggested a role for Proclus in gathering and composing the scholia that constituted *Commentum Graecum*.\(^3\) Syrianus, Ammonius, or even Marinus would be equally good guesses – it is no serious obstacle that there are some divergences between *Commentum Graecum* and the extant Ammonian commentary since the latter is a student's reportation.

Most of the argument I presented above for a Byzantine origin of *Commentum Graecum* may be discarded as too weak to fight the linguistic evidence for the date 'ca.400-500'. But I do not feel comfortable about accepting this date because there is strong evidence that while Philoponus' and Alexander's commentaries on *APR.* I were extant in Byzantine times, no ancient commentary on *APR.* II had been preserved; consequently, people would often use Alexander or Philoponus (sometimes in a revised edition) on book I and a more recent collection of scholia on book II – the one in ms. Vat. gr.231 (6 other mss.), for instance, or the one printed in CAG XIII.2.

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2. Minio-Paluello 1972:355-6. Id. in AL.III.1-4:LXXXVISQ.
The CAG edition of Philoponus reflects the manuscript situation by letting a Byzantine collection of scholia on Book II follow Philoponus' on book I. Is it not remarkable that no known commentary on book I is closer to Commentum Graecum than Philoponus', and none on book II closer to Commentum Graecum than the one in CAG XIII.2? To complete our confusion, a couple of passages in the Florentine scholia which do not agree with the commentary on APr.II in CAG XIII.2:387sqq., match passages in scholia which occur as marginals in a few Greek mss., and with the indication τοῦ Φιλοπονου.

It seems that to accept Boethius as the translator of Commentum Graecum, we must assume that Ps.-Philoponus APr.II consists for the most part of excerpts from the real Philoponian commentary on APr.II; and that Philoponus' commentary on APr.I-I-II copied a work that was the same as or closely related to the one Boethius translated. This is not impossible. But is it probable?

The clue to the age of Commentum Graecum may lie hidden in the first scholium on book II (A.L. III.1-4:330), a pretty straightforward translation of Ps.-Philop., CAG XIII.2:387.6-11 & 388.3-5. The scholium says that (1) Alexander thought the σκοπὸς of book II was to take up some points that had been left aside in book I; (2) the more acute commentators think the σκοπὸς is to treat of the matter of syllogisms, their form having been dealt with in book I; (3) book I is useful for the theory and demonstration, book II for the theory of dialectic (because it is about the matter of syllogisms).

There is a remarkable similarity between this scholium and Leo Magentinus' on the same passage. Leo says (ms.Vat.gr.244:240r):

Διαφοράς τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας σκοπὸς ἀπεδόθη παρὰ τῶν παλαιῶν. Πρὸ καὶ οὗ μὲν εἴπεν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι περὶ τοῦ εἶδος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἐξίδαξεν, ἤγουν τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ἐν οἷς ἐξίδασκε ποταπὸν συμπέρασμα συνάγεται ἐκ δύο καταφατικῶν ἢ ἐκ μιᾶς ἄποφατικῆς τῆς δὲ ἐτέρας καταφατικῆς· ἐνταῦθα δὲ διδάσκει περὶ τῆς ὅλης τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, ἤγουν τῶν προτάσεων. Διαφεύγεται δὲ προφανῶς· ἐν γὰρ τῷ Περὶ εὐπορίας προτάσεων μέθοδον παρέδωκεν ἑυφυρετικῆν τῶν προτάσεων. "Ο δὲ Μαρτῖνος ὅσον ἔχειν ἐνταῦθα εἶπε διαλαβέτων περὶ τῶν λυσιτελώντων εἰς τὴν διαλεκτικὴν. Τίνα δὲ εἰσὶν ταῦτα; — τὸ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων ἀληθῶς συνάγει συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ

1. A.L.III.1-4:354.15-17 ~ Vat.gr.209 printed in CAG XIII.2:XII; 368.16 sqq.~ CAG XIII.2:XIII.
αιτείσθαι, ἢ ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ ἄλλα τινά. Διαψεύδεται δὲ καὶ ὁ σωτός ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὲν ἄντι τὸ διάλεκτικόν σου λαμβάνει ψευδές προτάσεις ἄλλα πιθανάς· ἐτερον δὲ ὅτι σύν εὐθὺς διδάσκει περὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἄλλα περὶ τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς. Ὅτι δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος δεῖκει κρείττονα σκοπὸν ἀποδείξει εἰτών ὅτι διδάσκει δόσα ἐσθάε απαρέλεξεν παραδείγματος τῆς συλλογιστικῆς μέθοδον. Ἐστὶ δὲ δέ τούτῳ ἀληθείαν πάντα γὰρ τὰ συμπληρωματικά τῆς συλλογιστικῆς μεθόδου παρέδωκε καὶ οὐδὲν τι παρέλειψεν. Ἡ μετὰ δὲ λέγουσιν ὅτι ἐνταῦθα παραδείγματος τὰ παρεμποδίζοντα τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν συλλογισμων καὶ μὴ ἔδωντα προβαίνειν αὐτῶν· εἰσὶ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐκ συνδέσμων προτάσεων συλλογικόν, ἢ κύκλῳ δειξεῖς, τὸ ἐν ὀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι, ἢ ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ τὸ σμεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον. Ἐπει δὲ τοῦ ἦπερος ὀφείλει φυσικὰ διδάσκοντας ἄλλα καὶ τὰ θανατικά, οὐχ ἐν τούτως χρώνται λατρεύοντες ἄλλ' ἐν μᾶλλον ἑκ- ψεύδοις — καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης παρέδωκεν δὲ εἰσπέμεν ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ πραγματείᾳ, ἦν ἀποδεικνύοντες μὴ τούτως χρώμαθα δὲ παρεμποδίζουσιν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

Leo's scholium and Ps.-Philoponus' are quite clearly related: both mention three proposals for answering the question, "What is the theme of APpr.II?". But Leo's has a famous name attached to each proposal, whereas the only name in Ps.-Philoponus' is Alexander. It is not impossible that the archetype of these scholia contained only one name, Proclus and Marinus being later additions (but not by Leo; he cannot have had access to the books his scholium refers to). But it is, perhaps, a little more probable that the archetype mentioned three views and their proponents. If this was so, the archetype cannot have been composed before the very last years of the 5th century (because of the mention of Marinus, who succeeded Proclus as head of the Academy in 485 or thereabouts); — but it must have been composed so early that it could be employed by the man who gave it the shape it has in Ps.-Philoponus and Commentum Graecum. If we want to maintain that the Latin translation of this man's scholium was done by Boethius, the man must have written it before ca. 520. This is not impossible. But is it probable?

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Marcus Aurelius thanked the Gods for not having had to analyze syllogisms. I too shrink back from doing it. But it might be worth someone's while to investigate the analysis of syllogisms in Anon.Aurel.III, the Greek commentaries, and the fragments of Commentum Graecum. We might learn something more about the origins of scholastic logic. Some of the questions this paper leaves open could, perhaps, be answered —πάντα δὲ ταύτα θεών θεωμάτων καὶ τύχης δείται.
LITERATURE:
A.L. = Aristoteles Latinus.
Brandis, Chr. August 1836: Scholia in Aristotelem (=vol.4 of the Prussian Academy's edition of Aristotle); Berlin.
CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Literarum Regiae Borussicae; Berlin 1882 ff.
CIMAGL = Université de Copenhague, Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age grec et latin; Copenhagen 1969 ff.
Moraux, P. 1973: Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, I.Band (= Peripatoi s); De Gruyter: Berlin/N.Y.
P.L. = Patrologia Latina (Migne).
Schmidt, H. 1907: De Hermino Peripatetico.Dissertatio inauguralis; Marburg.

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APPENDIX:
Orthography and punctuation are the editor's, not the scribe's. Thus 'Analytici' represents the manuscript reading 'analetici' or 'analethici' or 'ana.', for both this and other words are often much abbreviated.
The signs '...' are used to mark marginal or interlinear additions (all by the text scribe, I think).
ANONYMI AURELIANENSIS III COMMENTARIUM IN ARISTOTELIS

ANALYTICA PRIORA.

PROOEMIUM.

Circa hoc propositum praemittenda sunt quid magis vere dicatur materia logicae, et circa quid eius doctrinæ tota versetur intentio, et quís eius ordo et ratio ordinis.

Materia ergo huius artis est idem quod instrumentum artificis, sicut syllogismus. Licet enim inductio etiam sit instrumentum huius artificis, tamen praecipue eius instrumentum est syllogismus; unde Aristoteles: "Utendum est syllogismo ad dialecticos, indictione autem magis ad plures" — et quidem "plures" vocat imperitos, quorum est multitudo; ad eos loquendo utendum est inductione, ad dialecticos vero tamquam sapientes utendum est syllogismo. In quo innuitur verius appellati instrumentum dialecticae syllogismum quam inductionem; sed non ita contingit in hoc instrumento sicut in ceteris: in ceteris enim sufficit cui scire uti instrumento etsi nesciat facere instrumentum, ut appareat in cithara et similibus; in hoc autem cum scientia utendi instrumento necessaria est quoque scientia faciendi ipsum; unde Aristoteles, cum in octavo Topicorum tradat doctrinam utendi instrumento, in ceteris operibus dat doctrinam faciendi ipsum. Hoc ergo instrumentum artificis materia est ipsius artis, quoniam tota artis doctrina spectat ad ipsum, sicut et artis rhetoricae magis vere potest dici materia oratio, quae est eius instrumentum: omnes enim partes eius artis, quae sunt inventio, dispositio etc., ad quamlibet partem orationis spectat, quoniam

necessae est exordium invenire et disponere, pronuntiare, in memoria habere, et eloqui; similiter et quamlibet aliam partem orationis; quare, cum tota ars in oratione versetur, patet orationem artis esse materiam. Ad hoc tamen videntur adversarii Boethius et Tullius qui hypothesim dicunt esse materiam rhetoricae et thesima materiam logicae. Ad quod dico materiam vocari de quo fit aliquid. Boethius autem et Tullius materiam vocant id in quo versatur ars operando. Nos materiam dicius artis de quo agit ars instruendo, sicut et materia cuiuslibet locutionis dicitur de quo locutione agitur.

10 Constat quod syllogismus est materia logicae si constiterit quod tota eius doctrina ad syllogismum spectet et circa ipsum versetur, quod est secundum eorum quae proposuimus. Ad quod dico quoniam consideratio cuiuscumque compositi in duobus attenditur: in materia scilicet eius et forma.

15 Forma autem syllogismi duplex est, sc. dispositio terminorum quae figura vocatur, et dispositio propositionum, quae dicitur modus, et utraque unica est ad omnia genera syllogismorum. Figurae enim et modi syllogismorum communes sunt syllogismis dialecticos, demonstrativos et sophisticos. Et quoniam forma syllogismorum unica est ad omnia genera eorum, unicam facit Aristoteles doctrinam de forma syllogismorum et generalem in Prioribus Analyticis.

Materia autem syllogismorum varia est secundum diversa genera eorum: demonstrativi enim syllogismi materia sunt immediatae propositiones, dialectici probabiles propositiones, sophistici aliquando materia sunt sophisticae propositiones, aliquando materiam habet eandem cum demonstrativo vel dialectico: sophista enim quandoque imitatur dialecticum vel demonstratorem in materia sed decipit in forma, aliquando imitatur eos in forma, sed decipit in materia.

Quoniam ergo secundum diversa genera syllogismorum multiplex est materia eorum, ideo multiplicem doctrinam tradit Aristoteles: de materia demonstrativi in Posterioribus Analyticis et de materia dialectici

13 compositi: compositum 283. 25 sunt: lectio incerta.
in Topicis; de materia autem sophisticī doctrīnam non facit, quia quae dicit de sophisticīs propter cavendum dicit, non propter docendum.

Sicut autem forma syllogismorum est duplex, ita et materia duplex, scilicet termini et propositiones. De qua materia dupliciter agitur: particulariter in Posterioribus et in Topicis, sicut dictum est, et generaliter de terminis in Praedicamentis et de propositionibus in Peri Hermeneias.

Unde, cum tota consideratio syllogismorum sit in materia et forma eorum, et tota doctrina logicae ad materiam syllogismorum spectet vel ad formam, patet quoniam magis vere dicitur syllogismus materia ipsius.

Ordo vero eius talis est ut praeecedentibus doctrīna terminorum in Praedicamentis, inde propositionum in Peri Hermeneias, tertio sequuntur Priorum Analytici secundum Boethium, qui huius ordinis hanc ponit causam quod universaliora priora sunt particularibus; in Prioribus autem, quia generalis fit doctrina syllogismorum, et in Topicis et in Posterioribus fit particulariter - quare praeecedere debet doctrina Priorum Analyticorum et inde sequi particulares doctrinae Topicorum et Posteriorum. Topica vero debent praemitti Posterioribus, quoniam in probabilibus tamquam facilioribus et quae firmam non habent veritatem primo est insudendum, ut ad necessitatem demonstrationum, quae finis est totius logicae, veniatur. De Sophisticis autem Enlenchis nullam facit mentionem in ordine huius doctrinae, quoniam non est eorum doctrina pars logicae, cum neque ad materiam neque ad formam syllogismorum pertineant.

Alexander vero de ordine logicae aliter sentit in hoc solo quod Prioribus Analyticis Topicae vult praemitti eo quod, ut ait, probabilibus insudantes facilius in necessariis /1788/ proloquimur: ideoque, cum in Prioribus necessitas demonstrationum quodammodo doceatur, debent, ut ait, praemitti Topicae quae probabilitatem docent. Enlenchos etiam ultimos

in ordine ponit eo quod, ut ait, incommodum est sophisticum negotium ad demonstrationes; quare inter Priores et Posteriores, qui ad demonstrationem pertinent, interseri non debuit.

His hactenus generaliter praemissis ad ea quae specialiter circa hunc librum attenduntur veniamus. Ea autem sunt: intentionis, intentionis, modus agendi, qua philosophia utatur, et libri inscriptio.

Intendit ergo Aristoteles syllogisticam formam duplicem generaliter ostendere. Quid autem sit forma et quomodo duplex vel generalis dictum est. Agit autem de 'hac' forma hoc fine ut paretur lectori copia syllogizandi dialectice et demonstrative. Maxime tamen copia syllogizandi demonstrative huius operis et totius logici negotii est finis.

Agit vero hoc ordine: primo proponit et continue exequitur generalem finem et praecipuum logicae; secundo proponit et continue exequitur quaedam elementa sequentis doctrinae, sc. quid sit propositio syllogistica et in quo differat dialecticae propositio a demonstrativa, quid terminus, quid syllogismus, quis perfectus, quis imperfectus, quid in toto esse vel non esse, quid de omni vel de nullo praedicari, et demonstrationes conversionum in propositionibus simplicibus et contingentibus et necessariis. Quibus expeditis tertio loco incipit agere de proposito docens figuras et modos syllogismorum qui fiunt ex simplicibus vel ex contingentibus vel ex necessariis vel mixtim ex eis, adiungens demonstrationes omnium conjugationum, tam utilium quam inutilium. Et quoniam haec pertinent ad generationem syllogismorum, quam scire non sufficit ut simus idonei ad syllogizandum, ut simus idonei ad hoc adiungit quae propositio in qua figura possit concludi et quae non. Ad ultimum vero agit de conversione per contrapositionem. Et hunc quidem ordinem habet in primo libro; quis vero sit ordo secundum, cum ad ipsum ventum fuerit dicetur.

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10 hoc: modo add. & exp. 283. 20 conversionum: conclusionum 283 a.c.
26 ut1: qui 283 a.c., ut videtur.
Logicus est Aristoteles in hoc negotio secundum eam partem quae est iudicium formae, unde et hoc opus Analytice vocatur, non a iudicio sed a materia iudicii; quia autem docet iudicium syllogismorum per resolutionem libri, inscriptio est prior Analytice vocatur dictum est. Prior vero dicitur respectu posterioris quae docet iudicium materiae. Unde 'et' videtur illa debere vocari prior, quoniam materia praecipiet formae, propter quod et iudicium materiae videtur prius esse iudicio formae. Quod quidem verum est si atendas ea quorum est iudicium, cum tamen illa quae docet iudicium formae prior dicitur quia generalior est et haec posterior quia est particularis.

Proponens ergo generalem et praecipuum finem logicae sic agit:

PRIMUM EST DICERE

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<c.1, 24²22, 283:179A> DIFFERT AUTEM quoniam describendo syllogistis-cam incluserat dialecticam et demonstrativam, consequenter assignat differentiam inter illas. Sed tenuem hoc loco assignat differentiam, secundum usum sc. quem habent ad syllogizandum, ubi dialectica praemittitur interrogando, demonstrativa sumendo. In Posterioribus vero Analyticis, quoniam de materia ibi agitur syllogismorum, secundum materiam assignat differentiam istorum dicens demonstrativam constare ex terminis immediatis et inhaerentibus et causis conclusionis, ex quibus non constat dialectica. Hic vero, quoniam de forma syllogismorum agit, differentiam assignat earum secundum formam et ac-centum quem habent ad syllogizandum.

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<c.1, 24²b18, 283:179A> SYLLOGISMUS AUTEM post partes syllogismi syllogismum describit et descriptionem paucis exponit et quis syllogismus sit perfectus et quis imperfectus et quare adiungit. Incipit a

6 unde 'et': vel verum 283.  12 praecipuum: principium 283 a.e., ut
25 sqq.  19 ibi: lectio incerta.  20 istorum: an istarum scribendum?
definitione syllogismi, "a" genere eius, dicens SYLOGISMUS EST ORATIO, per quod etiam removentur omnia quae sunt alterius generis. Quae autem sequuntur sunt differentiae per quas removentur non res aliorum generum sed alia eiusdem generis; et aliae quidem earum ad materia pertinente syllogismi, aliae ad speciem, aliae ad complexionem: et speciem quidem voco conclusionem respectu materiae, id est propositionis et assumptionis, quas et Aristoteles vocat antesyllogismum; quae, quoniam praeventiunt tamquam materia et ad perfectionem syllogismi adicitur eis conclusio tamquam forma, dicuntur illa materia, et conclusio species sive forma. Idcirco in definitione syllogismi post ORATIO adiungitur IN QUA POSITIS: prima differentia est et pertinet ad materiam; et removentur per hoc hypothetici syllogismi in quibus "non" ponuntur aliqua absolute sed duo vel alterum eorum sub condicione ut ex eis inferatur. Removentur etiam quaeque orationes sunt aliae ab enuntiativis, quoniam in eis nihil ponitur, cum nihil affirmetur vel negent.

Per hoc quod sequitur, QUIBUSDAM, removentur exempla et enthymemata: per hoc enim adiectum notatur pluralitas positorum, quae non est in enthymemate et exemplo. Et haec iterum pertinet ad materiam.

Per hoc autem quod sequitur, ALIUD, removentur perridiculi syllogismi et tres coniugationes inutiles quibus scilicet infertur ex certo certum vel ex incerto certum vel ex incerto incertum; quae prorsus sunt inutiles: quarta enim sola est utilis, quae scilicet infertur ex certo incertum. Quo modo illatum dicitur alii ad prae

Sed quoniam /179B/ non debet in syllogismo concludi quodcumque aliiad praemissis, ideo adiunctum est QUIDDAM, quod nomen cum sit participium notat non quidlibet posse concludi, sed quiddam modificatum sc.; per quod removentur syllogismi immodificati, quales sunt qui fiunt ex solis indefinitis vel particularibus.

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Quod autem sequitur EX NECESSITATE differentia est pertinens ad
complexionem - removentur per hoc inductiones, quae, licet quaedam
necessitatem habeant, tamen non habent necessitatem complexionis de
qua hoc agitur. Necessitas enim alia est complexionis, alia rerum;
et complexionis quidem tantum est si dicatur 'omnis homo ambulat et
omnis ambulans loquitur, ergo omnis homo loquitur' - in hoc enim
syllogismo medium ad nullum extremorum habet inhaerentiam necessa-
riam qua probetur conclusio, et si forte aliquam inhaerentiam habet
ad alterum eorum, contingens est, "non" necessaria; quare non necessa-
saria inhaerentia rerum inter quas sit habitudo facit conclusionem
sequi hic, sed sola necessitas complexionis. Rerum vero est tantum
necessitas cum dicitur 'Socrates est homo, ergo Socrates est animal'.
Similiter et inductione, cum dicitur 'omne rationale est substantia et
omne irrationale substantia, ergo omne animal est substantia': hic enim
necessario sequi conclusionem facit necessaria inhaerentia partium
ad totum, non aliqua dispositio terminorum vel propositionum. Rei
autem necessitas aliando simpliciter est naturae et non causae,
ut cum <dicitur> 'Socrates est risibilis, ergo est homo': etsi enim risi-
bile necessarium habeat inhaerentiam ad hominem, tamen non est eius causa;
- aliando ita est necessitas naturae quod etiam est causae, ut
cum dicitur 'Socrates est homo, ergo est risibilis'. Syllogismus er-
go semper habet necessitatem complexionis, sed quandoque cum ne-
cessitate rei, quandoque sine ea; et si fuerit in eo necessitas rei
cum causa, dicitur "syllogismus propter quid"; si vero sit in eo necessi-
tas rei sine causa vel complexio sine necessitate rei, vocatur "syl-
logismus quoniam".

Per hoc ergo quod hic dictum est EX NECESSITATE removentur in-
ductiones quae etsi quandoque habeant necessitatem, numquam tamen
habent necessitatem complexionis quam Aristoteles hic significare
intendit, unde etiam addungit ACCIDIT, per hoc innuens necessitatem
hanc posse esse etiam in terminis sibi contingenter inhaerentibus.

2 quae: quare 283 (an quia scribendum?). 9 alterum: alteram 283.
29 significare: adsignificare 283. 31 sibi: vox corrupta?
Per hoc autem quod sequitur, E[O] QUOD HAEC SINT, removentur syllogismi habentes minus vel superfluum, quoniam "si" hoc fuerit, praemissa aut non sufficiunt ad conclusionem aut non omnia ad hanc cooperantur.

5 DICO AUTEM: Posita descriptione exponit eius ultimam partem 'propter haec sint' idem esse quod conclusionem contingere 'propter haec', i. e. praemissa, τε quibus το hoc etiam sic exponit adiungens 'propter haec' etc. EST NULLIUS EXTRINSECUS TERMINI INDICERE, id est nihil minus habere quam sufficiat ad conclusionem. Si enim minus haberet, non contingere conclusio propter praemissa.

7 e (ante quibus): lectio incerta.
11 τέλος addidī.