

ANALYZING SYLLOGISMS

OR

ANONYMUS AURELIANENSIS III - THE (PRESUMABLY) EARLIEST EXTANT LATIN COMMENTARY ON THE PRIOR ANALYTICS, AND ITS GREEK MODEL.

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Παρὸς τῶν θεῶν . . . τὸ δύως ἐπεθύμησα
φιλοσοφίας μὴ ἐμπεσεῖν εἷς τεινα
σοφιστὴν μηδὲ ἀποκαθίσαι ἐπὶ τοῦ
συγγραφᾶς ἢ συλλογισμοῖς ἀναλύειν
ἢ περὶ τὰ μετεωρολογικὰ καταγίνεσθαι.
πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα θεῶν Βοηθῶν
καὶ τύχης δεῖται.

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus,
In sicut ipsum 1.17

Many a young student from Antiquity or the Middle Ages would have loved to be in a position to do what Marcus Aurelius did: thank divine favour for not having had to sweat over the analysis of syllogisms. Few had the emperor's luck. For most, the way to philosophy was paved with syllogisms; major, minor and middle terms; conversion; reduction ...

'To analyze syllogisms' is the expression used by Marcus. Was he thinking of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* when he wrote those words? It is by no means inconceivable, as he lived at a time when Aristotle's position as supreme - and almost sole - authority on logic was beginning to be established.

Authoritative texts beget commentaries. Boethius of Sidon (late first c.BC?) may have been one of the first to write one on *APr*. There is some evidence that Aspasius wrote one, and good evidence that Herminus and Galen did so. They were all contemporaries of Marcus Aurelius. They were followed by (among others) Alexander of Aphrodisias (ca. 200); Porphyry (3rd c.); Iamblichus, Themistius, and Maximus (all 4th c.); Syrianus, Proclus and Marinus (all 5th c.); Ammonius (5th-6th c.); Philoponus and Elias (6th c.); Stephanus (7th c.); Psellus (11th c.); Michael of Ephesus (12th c.); Leo Magentinus (13th c.); Sophonias (ca. 1300) - i.e., nearly everybody who ever counted as an important figure in Greek Aristotelian scholasticism was also the author of a commentary on the *Prior Analytics*.

B o e t h u s : see MORAUX 1973: 164-70. A s p a s i u s : Boethius *Int.* ed. 2^a p.293 Meiser (the text is ambiguous; perhaps a commentary on *Int.* is meant; cf. SCHMIDT 1907: 33) H e r m i - n u s : see SCHMIDT 1907: 32-39. G a l e n : Galen's *De propriis*

libris 11, p.118 Müller (*Scripta minora II*)=XIX.41 Kühn. A l e x - a n d e r : book I extant, edition in CAG II.1. P o r p h y r y : Ammon. *APr.* (CAG IV.6) 31.15 – but the reference may be to P.'s Introduction to Categorical Syllogisms. I a m b l i c h u s : DALS-GAARD LARSEN 1972: 72-75. T h e m i s t i u s : Ammon. *APr.* (CAG IV.6) 31.17; Ps.-Ammon. *APr.* (CAG IV.6) 39.2; Anon.cod.Paris. 2061 *APr.* f.30r-v, printed in BRANDIS 1836: 156b-157a. M a x i m u s : Ammon. *APr.* (CAG IV.6) 31.16-22; Anon.Paris. 2061 *L.c.* S y r i a n u s : Ammon. *APr.* (CAG IV.6) 31.24; Ps.-Ammon. *APr.* (CAG IV.6) 39.2. P r o c l u s : Ammon. *APr.* (CAG IV.6) 31.24; Ps.-Ammon. *APr.* (CAG IV.6) 39.2; Leo Magentinus *APr.* (text in this paper). M a r i n u s : Leo Magentinus *L.c.* A m m o n i u s : partly extant: edition in CAG IV.6. P h i l o p o n u s : book I extant; edition in CAG XIII.2. E l i a s : Proem extant, edition in WESTERINK 1961. S t e p h a - n u s : see CAG XVIII.3:VI. P s e l l u s : extant in many mss. (thus Vat.Barb.gr. 164: 43-61). M i c h a e l : see CAG II.3:58.25-27 & III.1:XVIII. L e o : extant in several mss. (thus Vat.gr.244: 139r-296v). S o p h o n i a s : extant, edition in CAG XXIII.3.

Since each commentator borrowed extensively from one or more of his predecessors, the Greek *Priora-* exegesis was guaranteed a considerable stability. Even if all ancient commentaries had perished, we could be sure their Byzantine successors would contain much ancient doctrine. We should even be able to detect it in some cases. Commenting on Aristotle's definition of syllogism in *APr.* I.1.24^b 18sqq., Leo Magentinus says¹ that the requirement that the conclusion be different ($\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\nu$) from the premisses has the purpose of distinguishing the real syllogisms from the so-called διφορούμενοι syllogisms, like 'If it is day, it is day; but it is day; therefore it is day' – even without help from Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary², we should be capable of recognizing this as an ancient item going back to a time when something was known about Stoic logic.

As a matter of fact, some of the late ancient commentaries survived till Byzantine times, and a few (more or less complete) even till our days. Hence, it is easy to document the continuity of the Greek tradition from the Antonine Period to the Paleologian.

If we turn to the Latin West, the situation is quite different. The – presumably few – ancient teachers who conducted logic classes in Latin did not have a translation of the *Prior Analytics* before the early sixth century when Boethius provided it. It is certain that Boethius planned to satisfy the need for a commentary that he thus created, but it is not clear whether the plan materialized.³ No Westerner between Boethius and

1. Ms.Vat.gr.244: 144v.

2. CAG II.1.18.

3. De Rijk 1964: 155-6.

Abelard is known to have read the *Prior Analytics*.¹ The first extant Latin commentary is from the second half of the 12th century (see below), and we have several from the following centuries. The medieval works sometimes contain items familiar to readers of Greek commentaries. Thus Albert the Great illustrates problems of conversion by means of the propositions 'no old man will be a boy' and 'no jar is in wine' (*nullus senex erit puer - nullum dolium est in vino*).² These propositions defy the rules of conversion, for they are true, but their converses, viz. 'no boy will be an old man' and 'no wine is in (a) jar' are false. In Greek commentaries we find οὐδεὶς νέος πρεσβύτης ήν πάλαι and οὐδεὶς κέραμος ἐν οὖνῳ used to illustrate the same problem.³

Some instances of agreement between the Greek and the Latin tradition may be due to chance. In some cases Arabic works or late ancient Latin opuscula (Boethius' monographs on syllogistic in particular) may have mediated between East and West. But was there not a more direct link? We know that when the Westerners began to study the *Sophistici Elenchi* and the *Posterior Analytics* (in the 12th century), their first steps were guided by translations of Greek commentaries.⁴ Was the Latin *Priora*-exegesis started in the same way? We have had to reckon with this possibility since Minio-Paluello discovered that a twelfth century manuscript (Firenze, BNC, Conv. Soppr. J.6.34) of the *Prior Analytics* contains a considerable number of marginal scholia translated from the Greek.⁵ But it is still unknown whether these scholia were widely known and influential in 12th century Western Europe, and whether the Florentine corpus is all the Westerners had; if there were no more scholia, they can only have played a minor role in the formation of the Latin tradition; but if the Florentine scholia are extracts from a whole commentary that was available in Latin, that commentary may have been influential.

1. Minio-Paluello, A.L.III.1-4:IX.

2. Albertus APr. I.I.X, Borgnet I.473. I have discussed this passage in Ebbesen 1981b.

3. οὐδεὶς νέος πρεσβύτης ήν πάλαι: Anon., Comm.APr., cod.Paris.gr.2061: 10v; cf. Philop.APr. (CAG XIII.2) 50.14-24. οὐδεὶς κέραμος ἐν οὖνῳ: Philop.APr.48.24-49.5. In *Logica "Cum sit nostra"* (De Rijk, Logica Modernorum II.2:427) we find 'nullus puer fuit senex', i.e. the same variant as in Anon.Paris 2061; and 'nulla corrupta erit virgo', a variant of οὐδεμία παρθένος γυνὴ ήν πάλαι, which occurs in Anon.Paris.2061:10r (cf. Philop.APr.50.16-25).

4. See CIMALG 16, CIMALG 34, and Ebbesen 1981a.

5. Minio-Paluello 1972: 347-356; *id.* in the preface of A.L.III.1-4, where the scholia are published on pp.293sqq.

Ms. Orléans, BM 283, which dates from the second half of the 12th century, contains a large fragment of a contemporary Latin commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, as far as I know the only extant 12th century work of its kind. I call the author, and his work, "Anonymus Aurelianensis III".¹

I have described the ms. in CIMAGL 16 (1976) 1-2. The *Priora* commentary is found on pp. 178-203 in part 6 of the ms. (three quires: pp. 156-171, 172-187, 188-203 [erroneously '187-203' in CIMAGL 16:2], according to my notes from an examination of the ms. in 1975; but I am afraid I have overlooked something, because the correct order of the leaves is 178/9-180/1-182/3-184/5-188/9-186/7-190/1-196/7-198/9-192/3-194/5-200/1-202/3, indicating that 186-9 is a bifolium that has been folded the wrong way, while 190-201 is a gathering of three sheets in which the two middle sheets (192-199) have been folded the wrong way, 202/3 probably being a single leaf). The commentary contains a proem (*incipit* "Circa hoc propositum praemittenda") and scholia on APr. I.1.24^a10-I.31.46^a34 (*explicit, ex abrupto*, "propositum superiorum, i.e. divisionem quae quasi quoddam superius est .. (2 illegible letters)"

I have only made a detailed study of a few passages of the commentary, but the results indicate that it merits further investigation. The following conclusions seem to emerge:

- (1) The Florence scholia are just excerpts from a more extensive collection, presumably a full-scale commentary.
- (2) This commentary (henceforward "Commentum Graecum") was influential, at least in the environment from which Anon. Aurel. III stems.
- (3) This environment was one in which the Greek commentaries on the Posterior Analytics and the Elenchi that Jacobus Veneticus had translated were also influential.
- (4) The translation of the *Priora* used by Anon. Aurel. III was the standard version, the one called "Recensio Florentina" by Minio-Paluello after the principal manuscript, the very *Florentinus* that contains the translated scholia. However, Anon. Aurel. III knew at least one reading from "Recensio Carnutensis" - and one that provides a link to the Florentine scholia.
- (5) Commentum Graecum was, in book I, very closely related to Philoponus' commentary on the book, but not identical with it. This is no new discovery, but there is additional evidence corroborating this conclusion of Minio-Paluello's.

1. "Anonymus Aurelianensis I" and "Anon. Aurel. II" are my names for the authors of two other works from the same manuscript (editions in CIMAGL 34 (1979) & CIMAGL 16 (1976), respectively).

(6) Anon.Aurel.III lends some support to Minio-Paluello's view that the translator of *Commentum Graecum* was Boethius. But the matter cannot be regarded as settled.

Re 1. *Anonymus Aurelianensis III* contains passages that depend on Greek scholia not represented in the Florence ms. Thus,

(a) in the exposition of 24^a22 (see text at the end of this paper), *Anon.Aurel.III* operates with two ways of distinguishing between dialectic and apodictic, 'secundum usum' (τῇ χρήσει) and 'secundum materiam' (τῇ θλῃ). Cf. *Alex. APr.* (CAG II.1) 12.21sqq., *Ammon APr.* (CAG IV.6) 19–21; cf. also *Philoponus APr.* (CAG XIII.2) 21.25 sqq. – but Philoponus has ἐκ τῆς φύσεως instead of τῇ θλῃ. There is no scholium on this passage in the Florence ms.;

(b) the long scholium on 24^b18–20 (the definition of syllogism) follows a Greek model. The Florence ms. has no scholium on this passage. The text of *Anon.Aurel.III* is printed below. I have compared it with Apuleius, *Peri hermeneias* pp.184–5 ed.Thomas; Boethius, *De syllogismo categorico*, PL 64:821–2; Alexander, *APr.* (CAG II.1) 16–23; id., *Top.* (CAG II.2) 7–15; Ammonius, *APr.* (CAG IV.6) 24–32; Philoponus, *APr.* (CAG XIII.2) 30–36; Anon. cod. Paris. gr. 2061, *APr.* ff.5v–8v. I have also looked up some later Greek scholiasts, but they had nothing of interest to offer.

Anonymus Aurelianensis III is independent of Apuleius. Boethius' *De syllogismo categorico* has been used; thus the expression 'perridiculi syllogismi' (p. 18, line 20, below) stems from there. But other items which *Anon.Aurel.III* shares with one or more Greek commentators are not found in Boethius. Thus our *Anonymus* says that the inclusion of 'positis' in the definition of syllogism is intended to exclude both hypothetical syllogisms and non-declarative propositions. This is in agreement with Philoponus and Alex. *APr.*, but not with Boethius. Similarly, *Anon.Aurel.III* says that 'aliud' serves to exclude not only the 'perridiculi syllogismi', but also "the tres coniugationes inutiles in which the evident is inferred from the evident, the evident from the non-evident, or the non evident from the non evident". This interpretation is also Philoponus', but not Boethius'. *Anon. Aurel. III* also says that 'quiddam' serves to exclude 'syllogismi immodiificati'. So do *Anon.Paris. 2061* and (with a slightly different wording) Philoponus, but not Boethius. Finally, Boethius does not mention that some elements in the definition have to do with the syllogism's matter, others with its form. *Anon.Aurel.III* and Philoponus (plus some of the other Greeks) say so.

Re 2. It is clear from the passages cited above that *Commentum Graecum* exerted a considerable influence on *Anonymus Aurelianensis III*. Its influence is also detectable in the analyses of the definition of syllogism in *Anonymus Aurelianensis I*, *Comm.SE* (CIMAGL 34:22-24), *Anonymus Aurelianensis II*, *De Paralogismis* (CIMAGL 16:24-27 & 40-42), and *Anonymus Cantabrigiensis*, *Comm.SE* (ms.Cambridge, St.John's D.12:80v-81rB).

Notice in particular that all three texts pay great attention to the distinction between the syllogism's matter and form.¹ *Anonymus Cantabrigiensis* says (81rA):

Notandum itaque quod cum Vito Topicorum dicatur interimendam esse definitionem assignatam alicui composito quae materiae tantum meminit, compositionem et formam compositi praetereundo, proprii principii observator Aristoteles in definitione syllogismi, qui est quoddam compositum, materiae et formae meminit syllogisticae.

Materia autem syllogismi duplex est, nam alia est principalis, alia secundaria. Prima et elementaris materia syllogismi sunt termini, maior sc. extremitas, minor, et medium. Secunda materia (quia et ipsa est ex alia, ut prima) sunt propositiones, maior sc. propositio, minor, et conclusio, quia dimidiatas propositionum est.

Forma autem syllogismi triplex est: modus, figura, complexio. Modus est dispositio regularis duarum propositionum; figura regularis terminorum ordinatio; complexio est necessaria adiunctio propositionum ad conclusionem.

Solet autem a quibusdam ipsa conclusio forma dici: sicut enim materia rudit est nec sufficit ad perfectionem compositi donec forma adveniens totum perficiat, sic inutilis videtur et vane sumpta propositionum praemissio donec conclusio quodammodo ipsas propositiones informat.

The last paragraphs sounds as if it contains a *verbatim* quotation of *Commentum Graecum* ("vane sumpta" = μάτην εὐλημμένη).

Notice also that *Anon.Aurel. I*'s exposition of 'diversum' = ἔτερον (CIMAGL 34:22) agrees with *Anonymus Aurelianensis III* and Philoponus against Boethius; and that *Anon.Aurel.I*'s interpretation of 'positis' = τεθέντων (CIMAGL 34:23, last paragraph) presupposes a Greek text distinguishing between τέθεσθαι and ὑποτέθεσθαι (cf. *Philop.APr.*, CAG XIII.2: 33.6-8).

The *Aurelianenses*, then, and No. III in particular, lend support to the hypothesis that the medieval Latin *Priora* exegesis was built on Greek

1. Cf. *Ammon.APr.* (CAG IV.6) 4; *Philop.APr.I* (CAG XIII.2) 6.10-15, 32.31-33.2, 270.16-20; *Ps.-Philop.APr.II* (CAG XIII.2) 387.8-11, 388.3-6; the Florentine scholia, A.L.III.1-4: 295, 311, 330. The idea that a syllogism's form is its conclusion, the premisses being its matter, may have been inspired by Arist. *Ph.* 2 c.3 & 7 (cf. Simplicius *Ph.* (CAG IX) 317-18 & 368; *Philop.Ph.* (CAG XVI) 247 & 305. Arist. *APo.* II.11.94^a24 may also have played a role; see scholia on the passage in CAG XIII.3: 376, 568-9 and CAG XXI.1: 140-141.

foundations. But more research is needed to get a clearer picture of the size of the debt Anonymus Aurelianensis III owes to the Greek commentator; and the possibility remains that the Greek commentary was only known to a limited circle and left few marks on the later Latin tradition. 13th century commentaries should be carefully studied to see whether this possibility can be discarded.

Re 3. The three Aurelianenses and Anonymus Cantabrigiensis share a dependence on *Commentum Graecum*. But that is not all. The sections on the definition of syllogism in *Anonymi Aurelianenses I* and *III* are so similar that a very intimate connection between the two texts must be assumed. Perhaps *Anonymus No. One* and *No. Three* were one and the same person. But *Anonymi Aurelianenses I* and *II* are also closely related, and so are *Anon. Aurel.I* and *Anonymus Cantabrigiensis*.¹ Hence, the environment in which *Anon.Aurel.III's* *Priora*-commentary was created seems to have been the same as the one that produced the works of *Anon.Aurel.I*, *Anon.Aurel.II*, and *Anon.Cantabrigiensis*. But that was an environment in which *Jacobus Venetus'* translations of Greek commentaries were influential.² *Ergo etc.*

Notice that the proem of *Anon.Aurel.III* contains a quotation (p. 15 below) of "Alexander's" commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* (or possibly on the *Elenchi*)³, partly overlapping with quotations in *Anonymus Aurelianensis I* and *Anonymus Cantabrigiensis' Comm.SE*.⁵

I have proposed the date 'ca. 1160-80' and the provenance 'Northern France' for *Anonymus Aurelianensis I*.⁶ I will propose the same for *Anonymus Aurelianensis III*.

Re 4. The following are *Anon.Aurel.III's* lemmata for 24^a10-^b12:

Primum est dicere circa quid et de quo ... intentio, quoniam circa demonstrationem et <de> demonstrativa disciplina, deinde determinare quid est propositio ... propositio igitur ... oratio affirmativa vel negativa alicuius de aliquo ... Dico autem ... omni inest aut nulli ... alicui aut non alicui aut non omni ... sine universali ... differt autem ... sumptio alterius partis ... interrogatio contradictionis ... Nihil autem differt ut fiat ... nam et qui demonstrat ... qui interrogat ... aliquid de aliquo esse vel non esse ... secundum praedictum modum; demonstrativa ... si vera sit ... per primas sumpta; dialectica ... apparentis ... probabilis.

The deviations from *Recensio Florentina* (*Aristoteles Latinus III.1-4:5-6*) are insignificant. The words I have italicized are significant deviations from *Recensio Carnutensis* (*A.L.III.1-4:143*).

1. See CIMAGL 34:XVII sqq.

2. See CIMAGL 34:XVII sqq.

3. The text is fragment 7 in Ebbesen 1981a, vol.II.2; it is discussed in vol.III.

4. CIMAGL 34: 9&42.

5. Ms.Cambridge, St.John's D.12:82vB.

6. CIMAGL 34:XXVIIIsq.

Anon.Aurel.III, then, used the Florentine recension. But he knew at least one reading from the other one. His comment on 24^a10 runs (p.178B): "PRIMUM EST DICERE CIRCA QUID, id est ad quem finem spectat INTENTIO. Unde adiungit QUONIAM CIRCA DEMONSTRATIONEM, quasi 'Bene dico CIRCA QUID, quoni-am circa demonstrationem est intentio hic; est enim finis totius logici negotii; ET DE QUO est intentio hic' - DE ponitur causale, unde et alia translatio hic habet GRATIA CUIUS". *De quo* is the Florentine recension's rendition of τένος. The Chartres text has *cuius*. The first of the Florentine scholia from Commentum Graecum contains the sentence, "Ait ergo circa quid est intentio, id est circa demonstrationem et cuius gratia."

Re 5. The scholium of Anon.Aurel.III on 24^b18-20 resembles Philoponus' more than any other Greek scholium known to me. But in his comment on 'quiddam' in the definition of syllogism, Anon.Aurel.III says the word excludes 'syllogismi immodificati' = ἀσυλλόγιστοι συλλογισμοί. Among the Greeks, only Philoponus and Anonymus cod.Paris.2061 agree with our Latin author - but Philoponus says ἀσυλλόγιστοι συζυγίαι (CAG XIII.2:34.7), Anon.Paris.2061 says καὶ τὸ 'τέ' καλῶς πρόσκειται διὰ τοὺς ἀσυλλόγιστους συλλογισμούς· οἱ γὰρ ἀσυλλόγιστοι συλλογισμοὶ πολλὰ συνάγουσι παρὰ τὰς προτάσεις, ὡς προϊόντες σὺν θεῷ εἰσόμεθα. τὸ οὖν 'τέ' πρόσκειται ἵνα μικρὸν τι ἔτερον γένηται τὸ συμπέρασμα παρὰ τὰς προτάσεις καὶ μὴ πολλοὶ ὥστε συλλογισμοί (Paris.gr.2061:6v).

In the scholium on 24^a22, Anonymus Aurelianensis III is closer to Alexander and Ammonius than to Philoponus and Anon.Paris.2061 (see above "*Re 1*").

These findings are in agreement with Minio-Paluello's: Commentum Graecum on *APr.I* was very similar to Philoponus', yet contained some non-Philoponean scholia and formulations, some of which occur in other Greek commentaries.

This state of affairs suggests that Commentum Graecum was either a lost work from about the sixth century or a Byzantine (? 12th century) rehash of material from that period - exactly like the *Posteriora*-commentary that Jacobus Veneticus translated.¹ Since

(a) the Florentine scholia on *APr.II* have many cases of *verbatim* agreement with the Byzantine collection of scholia on that book published in CAG XIII.2;²

1. See CIMAGL 16, CIMAGL 34, and Ebbesen 1981a.

2. See Minio-Paluello 1972 and the apparatus of the edition of the Florentine scholia in A.L.III.1-4.

(b) there seems to be a connection between knowing *Commentum Graecum in APr.* and the *Elenchi-* and *Posteriora-* commentaries translated by Jacobus (*v. supra*);

(c) there are indications that Jacobus used Michael of Ephesus' private collections of scholia on the *Elenchi*,¹

- it looks like a reasonable conjecture that *Commentum Graecum in APr.* was given to the West by Jacobus, and that the Greek original was one or more manuscripts in Michael of Ephesus' possession. Michael is known to have commented on *APr. II*, but the work appears to have been lost.

But there is one formidable argument against this assumption, as we shall immediately see.

Re 6. Minio-Paluello has argued that the Florentine scholia must have been translated by Boethius because the translator's habits coincides with the consul's.² *Anonymus Aurelianensis III* provides evidence that *Commentum Graecum* had 'immodificati' for ἀσυλλόγιστοι. This very peculiar translation occurs in one (and as far as I know, only one) other place; that place is in Boethius' translation of the *Sophistici Elenchi*, at c.6 168^a21 (A.L. VI.1-3:15.8).

If Boethius was the translator, the Greek text of *Commentum Graecum* cannot be much later than the year 500. On the other hand, the closeness to Philoponus in several parts of book I makes a much earlier date improbable. Minio-Paluello once suggested a role for Proclus in gathering and composing the scholia that constituted *Commentum Graecum*.³ Syrianus, Ammonius, or even Marinus would be equally good guesses - it is no serious obstacle that there are some divergences between *Commentum Graecum* and the extant Ammonian commentary since the latter is a student's reportation.

Most of the argument I presented above for a Byzantine origin of *Commentum Graecum* may be discarded as too weak to fight the linguistic evidence for the date 'ca.400-500'. But I do not feel comfortable about accepting this date because there is strong evidence that while Philoponus' and Alexander's commentaries on *APr. I* were extant in Byzantine times, no ancient commentary on *APr. II* had been preserved; consequently, people would often use Alexander or Philoponus (sometimes in a revised edition) on book I and a more recent collection of scholia on book II - the one in ms. Vat. gr.231 (& other mss.), for instance, or the one printed in CAG XIII.2.

1. See CIMAGL 34:XII and Ebbesen 1981a.

2. Minio-Paluello 1972:355-6. *Id.* in AL.III.1-4:LXXXVIIsq.

3. Minio-Paluello 1972:354.

The CAG edition of Philoponus reflects the manuscript situation by letting a Byzantine collection of scholia on Book II follow Philoponus' on book I. Is it not remarkable that no known commentary on book I is closer to *Commentum Graecum* than Philoponus', and none on book II closer to *Commentum Graecum* than the one in CAG XIII.2? To complete our confusion, a couple of passages in the Florentine scholia which do not agree with the commentary on *APr.II* in CAG XIII.2:387sqq., match passages in scholia which occur as marginals in a few Greek mss., and with the indication τοῦ Φιλοπόνου.¹

It seems that to accept Boethius as the translator of *Commentum Graecum*, we must assume that Ps.-Philoponus *APr.II* consists for the most part of excerpts from the real Philoponean commentary on *APr.II*; and that Philoponus' commentary on *APr.I-II* copied a work that was the same as or closely related to the one Boethius translated. This is not impossible. But is it probable?

The clue to the age of *Commentum Graecum* may lie hidden in the first scholium on book II (A.L. III.1-4:330), a pretty straightforward translation of Ps.-Philop., CAG XIII.2:387.6-11 & 388.3-5. The scholium says that (1) Alexander thought the σκοπός of book II was to take up some points that had been left aside in book I; (2) the more acute commentators think the σκοπός is to treat of the matter of syllogisms, their form having been dealt with in book I; (3) book I is useful for the theory and demonstration, book II for the theory of dialectic (because it is about the matter of syllogisms).

There is a remarkable similarity between this scholium and Leo Magentinus' on the same passage. Leo says (ms.Vat.gr.244:240r):

Διαφέρωσ τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας σκοπὸς ἀπεδόθη παρὰ τῶν παλαιῶν. Πρὸ καὶ λοις μὲν εἶπεν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἔδίδαξεν, ἥγουν τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ἐν οἷς ἔδίδασκε ποταπὸν συμπέρασμα συνάγεται ἐκ δύο καταφατικῶν ἢ ἐκ μιᾶς ἀποφατικῆς τῆς δὲ ἐτέρας καταφατικῆς. ἐνταῦθα δὲ διδάσκει περὶ τῆς ὅλης τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, ἥγουν τῶν προτάσεων. Διαψεύδεται δὲ προφανῶς. ἐν γὰρ τῷ Περὶ εὐπορίας προτάσεων μέθοδον παρέδωκεν ἐφευρετικὴν τῶν προτάσεων. Ὁ δὲ Μαρῖνος² σκοπὸν ἔχειν ἐνταῦθα εἶπε διαλαβεῖν περὶ τῶν λυσιτελούντων εἰς τὴν διαλεκτικὴν. Τίνα δέ εἰσι ταῦτα; — τὸ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων ἀληθὲς συνάγειν συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ

1. A.L.III.1-4:354.15-17 ~ Vat.gr.209 printed in CAG XIII.2:XII; 368.16 sqq. ~ CAG XIII.2:XIII.

2. cf.ms.Paris.gr.1917:160v=Brandis 1836:188^a46-b1.

αίτεῖσθαι, ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ ἄλλα τινά. Διαψεύδεται δὲ καὶ οὕτος· πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διαλεκτικὸς οὐ λαμβάνει ψευδεῖς προτάσεις ἀλλὰ πιθανάς· ἔτερον δὲ ὅτι οὐκ εὔθὺς διδάσκει περὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς. Ὁ δὲ Ἄλέξανδρος δοκεῖ κρείτονα σκοπὸν ἀποδιῦναι εἴπων ὅτι διδάσκει δσα ἔφθασε παραλεῖψαι παραδιδούς τὴν συλλογιστικὴν μέθοδον. "Εστι δὲ οὖδε τοῦτο ἀληθές· πάντα γάρ τὰ συμπληρωματικὰ τῆς συλλογιστικῆς μεθόδου παρέδωκε καὶ οὐδέν τι παρέλειψεν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι ἐνταῦθα παραδίδωσι τὰ παρεμποδίζοντα τὸν ἀποδεικτικὸν συλλογισμὸν καὶ μὴ ἐδύντα προβαίνειν αὐτόν· εἰσὶ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων συλλογίζεσθαι, ἡ κύκλῳ δεῖξις, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι, ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἱατρούς δρῶμεν οὐ μόνον τὰ πρὸς ὑγείαν λυσιτελοῦντα φάρμακα διδάσκοντας ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ θανατηφόρα, οὐχ ἵνα τούτοις χρῶνται ἱατρεύοντες ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα μᾶλλον ἐκφεύγωσι — καὶ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης παρέδωκεν ἃ εἶπομεν ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ πραγματείᾳ, ἵνα ἀποδεικνύοντες μὴ τούτοις χρώμεθα ὡς παρεμποδίζουσι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

Leo's scholium and Ps.-Philoponus' are quite clearly related: both mention three proposals for answering the question, "What is the theme of APr.II?". But Leo's has a famous name attached to each proposal, whereas the only name in Ps.-Philoponus' is Alexander. It is not impossible that the archetype of these scholia contained only one name, Proclus and Marinus being later additions (but not by Leo; he cannot have had access to the books his scholium refers to). But it is, perhaps, a little more probable that the archetype mentioned three views and their proponents. If this was so, the archetype cannot have been composed before the very last years of the 5th century (because of the mention of Marinus, who succeeded Proclus as head of the Academy in 485 or thereabouts); - but it must have been composed so early that it could be employed by the man who gave it the shape it has in Ps.-Philoponus and Commentum Graecum. If we want to maintain that the Latin translation of this man's scholium was done by Boethius, the man must have written it before ca. 520. This is not impossible. But is it probable?

* * *

Marcus Aurelius thanked the Gods for not having had to analyze syllogisms. I too shrink back from doing it. But it might be worth someone's while to investigate the analysis of syllogisms in Anon.Aurel.III, the Greek commentaries, and the fragments of Commentum Graecum. We might learn something more about the origins of scholastic logic. Some of the questions this paper leaves open could, perhaps, be answered - πάντα δὲ ταῦτα θεῶν βοηθῶν καὶ τύχης δεῖται.

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APPENDIX:

Excerpts from Anonymus Aurelianensis III's commentary on *Analytica Priora*, ms. Orléans BM 283:p.178 ff.

Orthography and punctuation are the editor's, not the scribe's. Thus 'Analytici' represents the manuscript reading 'analetici' or 'analethici' – or 'ana.', for both this and other words are often much abbreviated.

The signs '...' are used to mark marginal or interlinear additions (all by the text scribe, I think).

ANONYMI AURELIANENSIS III COMMENTARIUM IN ARISTOTELIS

ANALYTICA PRIORA.

PROOEMIUM.

Circa hoc propositum praemittenda sunt quid magis vere dicatur materia logicae, et circa quid eius doctrinae tota versetur intentio, et quis eius ordo et ratio ordinis.

Materia ergo huius artis est idem quod instrumentum artificis, scilicet syllogismus. Licet enim inductio etiam sit instrumentum huius artificis, tamen praecipue eius instrumentum est syllogismus; unde Aristoteles: "Utendum est syllogismo ad dialecticos, inductione autem magis ad plures" -- et quidem "plures" vocat imperitos, quorum est multitudo; ad eos loquendo utendum est inductione, ad dialecticos vero tamquam sapientes utendum est syllogismo. In quo innuitur verius appellari instrumentum dialecticae syllogismum quam inductionem; sed non ita contingit in hoc instrumento sicut in ceteris: in ceteris enim sufficit cui scire uti instrumento etsi nesciat facere instrumentum, ut appareat in cithara et similibus; in hoc autem cum scientia utendi instrumento necessaria est quoque scientia faciendi ipsum; unde Aristoteles, cum in octavo Topicorum tradat doctrinam utendi instrumento, in ceteris operibus dat doctrinam faciendo ipsum. Hoc ergo instrumentum artificis materia est ipsius artis, quoniam tota artis doctrina spectat ad ipsum, sicut et artis rhetoricae magis vere potest dici materia oratio, quae est eius instrumentum: omnes enim partes eius artis, quae sunt inventio, dispositio etc., ad quamlibet partem orationis spectant, quoniam

⁶ est: *lectio incerta*, fort. erit vel dicitur. 7-8 Arist.Top.8.2.
^{157^a} 18-20. 13 cui: *lectio incerta*. 19 et: est 283, ut videtur.
 20 quae: *lectio incerta*.

necesse est exordium invenire et disponere, pronuntiare, in memoria habere, et eloqui; similiter et quamlibet aliam partem orationis; quare, cum tota ars in oratione versetur, patet orationem artis esse materiam. Ad hoc tamen videntur adversarii Boethius et Tullius qui hypothesim di-
5 cunt esse materiam rhetoricae et thesim materiam logicae. Ad quod dico materiam vocari de quo fit aliquid. Boethius autem et Tullius materiam vocant id in quo versatur ars operando. Nos materiam dicimus artis de quo agit ars instruendo, sicut et materia cuiuslibet locutionis dicitur de quo locutione agitur.

- 10 Constat quod syllogismus est materia logicae si constiterit quod tota eius doctrina ad syllogismum spectet et circa ipsum versetur, quod est secundum eorum quae proposuimus. Ad quod dico quoniam consideratio cuiuscumque compositi in duobus attenditur: in materia scilicet eius et forma.
- 15 Forma autem syllogismi duplex est, sc. dispositio terminorum quae figura vocatur, et dispositio propositionum, quae dicitur modus, et utraque unica est ad omnia genera syllogismorum. Figurae enim et modi syllogismorum communes sunt syllogismis dialecticis, demonstrativis et sophisticis. Et quoniam forma syllogismorum unica est ad 20 omnia genera eorum, unicam facit Aristoteles doctrinam de forma syllogismorum et generalem in Prioribus Analyticis.

Materia autem syllogismorum varia est secundum diversa genera eorum: demonstrativi enim syllogismi materia sunt immediatae propositiones, dialectici probabiles propositiones, sophistici aliquando materia 25 sunt sophisticae propositiones, aliquando materiam habet eandem cum demonstrativo vel dialectico: sophista enim quandoque imitatur dialecticum vel demonstratorem in materia sed decipit in forma, aliquando imitatur eos in forma, sed decipit in materia.

Quoniam ergo secundum diversa genera syllogismorum multiplex est materia eorum, ideo multiplicem doctrinam tradit Aristoteles: de materia demonstrativi in Posterioribus Analyticis et de materia dialectici

13 compositi: compositum 283.

25 sunt: *lectio incerta*.

in Topicis; de materia autem sophistici doctrinam non facit, quia quae dicit de sophisticis propter cavendum dicit, non propter docendum.

Sicut autem forma syllogismorum est duplex, ita et materia duplex, scilicet termini et propositiones. De qua materia dupliciter agitur:

- 5 particulariter in Posterioribus et in Topicis, sicut dictum est, et generaliter de terminis in Praedicamentis et de propositionibus in Peri Hermeneias.

Unde, cum tota consideratio syllogismorum sit in materia et forma eorum, et tota doctrina logicae ad materiam syllogismorum spectet vel 10 ad formam, patet quoniam magis vere dicitur syllogismus materia ipsius.

Ordo vero eius talis est ut praecedentibus doctrina terminorum in Praedicamentis, inde propositionum in Peri Hermeneias, tertio se-quantur Piores Analytici secundum Boethium, qui huius ordinis hanc ponit causam quod universaliora priora sunt particularibus; in Pri-15 oribus autem, quia generalis fit doctrina syllogismorum, et in To- picis et in Posterioribus fit particulariter - quare praecedere de-bet doctrina Priorum Analyticorum et inde sequi particulares doctri- nae Topicorum et Posteriorum. Topica vero debent praemitti Posteri- oribus, quoniam in probabilibus tamquam facilioribus et quae firmam 20 non habent veritatem primo est insudendum, ut ad necessitatem de- monstrationum, quae finis est totius logicae, veniatur. De Sophisti- cis autem Elenchis nullam facit mentionem in ordine huius doctrinae, quoniam non est eorum doctrina pars logicae, cum neque ad materiam neque ad formam syllogismorum pertineant.

- 25 Alexander vero de ordine logicae aliter sentit in hoc solo quod Prioribus Analyticis Topica vult praemitti eo quod, ut ait, probabilibus insudan- tes facilius in necessariis /178B/ proloquimur: ideoque, cum in Pri- oribus necessitas demonstrationum quodammodo doceatur, debent, ut ait, praemitti Topica quae probabilitatem docent. Elenchos etiam ultimos

11 doctrina: doctrinam 283. 13 cf. Boethii comm. in Isagogen, ed. 1^a, p.
13 Brandt. 25 sqq. ≈ Philop. APo. 3. 2. sqq.

in ordine ponit eo quod, ut ait, incommodum est sophisticum negotium ad demonstrationes; quare inter Piores et Posteriores, qui ad demonstrationem pertinent, interseti non debuit.

His hactenus generaliter praemissis ad ea quae specialiter circa 5 hunc librum attenduntur veniamus. Ea autem sunt: intentio auctoris. finis intentionis, modus agendi, qua philosophia utatur, et libri inscriptio.

Intendit ergo Aristoteles syllogisticam formam duplificem generaliter ostendere. Quid autem sit forma et quomodo duplex vel generalis 10 dictum est. Agit autem de 'hac' forma hoc fine ut paretur lectori copia syllogizandi dialectice et demonstrative. Maxime tamen copia syllogizandi demonstrative huius operis et totius logici negotii est finis.

Agit vero hoc ordine: primo proponit et continue exequitur generalem 15 finem et praecipuum logicae; secundo proponit et continue exequitur quaedam elementa sequentis doctrinae, sc. quid sit propositio syllogistica et in quo differat dialecticae propositio a demonstrativa, quid terminus, quid syllogismus, quis perfectus, quis imperfectus, quid in toto esse vel non esse, quid de omni vel de nullo praedicari, 20 et demonstrationes conversionum in propositionibus simplicibus et contingentibus et necessariis. Quibus expeditis tertio loco incipit agere de proposito docens figuram et modos syllogismorum qui fiunt ex simplicibus vel ex contingentibus vel ex necessariis vel mixtum ex eis, adiungens demonstrationes omnium coniugationum, tam utilium 25 quam inutilium. Et quoniam haec pertinent ad generationem syllogismorum, quam scire non sufficit ut simus idonei ad syllogizandum, ut simus idonei ad hoc adiungit quae propositio in qua figura possit concludi et quae non. Ad ultimum vero agit de conversione per contrapositionem. Et hunc quidem ordinem habet in primo libro; quis vero 30 sit ordo secundi, cum ad ipsum ventum fuerit dicetur.

10 hoc: modo add. & exp. 283. 20 conversionum: conclusionum 283 a.c.
26 ut^l: qui 283 a.c., ut videtur.

Logicus est Aristoteles in hoc negotio secundum eam partem quae est iudicium formae, unde et hoc opus Analytice vocatur, non a iudicio sed a materia iudicii; quia autem docet iudicium syllogismorum per resolutionem libri, inscriptio est prior Analytice. Et quare Analytice vocatur dictum est. Prior vero dicitur respectu posterioris quae docet iudicium materiae. Unde 'et' videtur illa debere vocari prior, quoniam materia praeiacet formae, propter quod et iudicium materiae videtur prius esse iudicio formae. Quod quidem verum est si attendas ea quorum est iudicium, cum tamen illa quae docet iudicium for-
mae prior dicatur quia generalior est et haec posterior quia est particularis.

Proponens ergo generalem et praecipuum finem logicae sic agit:
PRIMUM EST DICERE

.....

<c.1, 24^a22, 283:179A> DIFFERT AUTEM quoniam describendo syllogisti-
cam incluserat dialecticam et demonstrativam, consequenter assignat differentiam inter illas. Sed tenuem hoc loco assignat differentiam, secundum usum sc. quem habent ad syllogizandum, ubi dialectica †praemittitur† interrogando, demonstrativa sumendo. In Posterioribus vero Analyticis, quoniam de materia ibi agitur syllogismorum, secundum materiam assignat differentiam istorum dicens demonstrativam con-
stare ex terminis immediatis et inhaerentibus et causis conclusionis, ex quibus non constat dialectica. Hic vero, quoniam de forma syllo-
gismorum agit, differentiam assignat earum secundum formam et †ac-
centum† quem habent ad syllogizandum.

.....

25 <c.1, 24^b18, 283:179A> SYLLOGISMUS AUTEM post partes syllogismi syl-
logismum describit et descriptionem paucis exponit et quis syllogis-
mus sit perfectus et quis imperfectus et quare adiungit. Incipit a

2 cf. Boethii *Diff.Top.I*, PL 64:1047. 3 materia: *fort.materie* 283.
6 unde 'et': *vel* verum 283. 12 praecipuum: principium 283 a.c., ut
videtur. 14 sqq. cf. Alex. APr. 12.21; Ammon. APr. 19-21; Philop. APr. 21.
25 sqq. 19 ibi: *lectio incerta*. 20 istorum: *an istarum scribendum?*
25 sqq.: cf. Philop. APr. 32sqq.

definitione syllogismi, 'a' genere eius, dicens SYLLOGISMUS EST ORATIO, per quod etiam removentur omnia quae sunt alterius generis. Quae autem sequuntur sunt differentiae per quas removentur non res aliorum generum sed alia eiusdem generis; et aliae quidem earum ad materialiam pertinent syllogismi, aliae ad speciem, aliae ad complexionem: et speciem quidem voco conclusionem respectu materiae, id est propositionis et assumptionis, quas et Aristoteles vocat anteesyllogismum; quae, quoniam praeveniunt tamquam materia et ad perfectionem syllogismi adicitur eis conclusio tamquam forma, dicuntur illa materia, et conclusio species sive forma. Idcirco in definitione syllogismi post ORATIO adiungitur IN QUA POSITIS: prima differentia est et pertinet ad materiam; et removentur per hoc hypothetici syllogismi in quibus 'non' ponuntur aliqua absolute sed duo vel alterum eorum sub condicione ut ex eis inferatur. Removentur etiam quaecumque orationes sunt aliae ab enuntiativis, quoniam in eis nihil ponitur, cum nihil affirment vel negent.

Per hoc quod sequitur, QUIBUSDAM, removentur exempla et enthememata: per hoc enim adiectum notatur pluralitas positorum, quae non est in enthememate et exemplo. Et haec iterum pertinet ad materiam.

20 Per hoc autem quod sequitur, ALIUD, removentur perridiculi syllogismi et tres coniugationes inutiles quibus scilicet infertur ex certo certum vel ex incerto certum vel ex incerto incertum; quae prorsus sunt inutiles: quarta enim sola est utilis, qua scilicet infertur ex certo incertum. Quo modo illatum dicitur aliud a praemissis non solum voce et eius significatione, sed etiam incertitudine cum praemissa sint certa. Et pertinet haec differentia ad speciem.

Sed quoniam /179B/ non debet in syllogismo concludi quodcumque aliud a praemissis, ideo adiunctum est QUIDDAM, quod nomen cum sit 30 †participium† notat non quidlibet posse concludi, sed quiddam modificatum sc.; per quod removentur syllogismi immodificati, quales sunt qui fiunt ex solis indefinitis vel particularibus.

5 materiam: naturam (ām) 283. 7 Arist. APr. I. 25. 42^b 5. 9 adicitur: addicitur vel abdicitur 283. 20 perridiculi: cf. Boeth. Syll. Cat., PL 64:822A.

Quod autem sequitur EX NECESSITATE differentia est pertinens ad complexionem – removentur per hoc inductiones, quae, licet quaedam necessitatem habeant, tamen non habent necessitatem complexionis de qua hoc agitur. Necessitas enim alia est complexionis, alia rerum; et complexionis quidem tantum est si dicatur 'omnis homo ambulat et omnis ambulans loquitur, ergo omnis homo loquitur' – in hoc enim syllogismo medium ad nullum extremorum habet inhaerentiam necessariam qua probetur conclusio, et si forte aliquam inhaerentiam habet ad alterum eorum, contingens est, 'non' necessaria; quare non necessaria inhaerentia rerum inter quas sit habitudo facit conclusionem sequi hic, sed sola necessitas complexionis. Rerum vero est tantum necessitas cum dicitur 'Socrates est homo, ergo Socrates est animal'. Similiter et inductione, cum dicitur 'omne rationale est substantia et omne irrationale substantia, ergo omne animal est substantia': hic enim necessario sequi conclusionem facit necessaria inhaerentia partium ad totum, non aliqua dispositio terminorum vel propositionum. Rei autem necessitas aliquando simpliciter est naturae et non causae, ut cum <dicitur> 'Socrates est risibilis, ergo est homo': etsi enim risibile necessariam habeat inhaerentiam ad hominem, tamen non est eius causa; – aliquando ita est necessitas naturae quod etiam est causae, ut cum dicitur 'Socrates est homo, ergo est risibilis'. Syllogismus ergo semper habet necessitatem complexionis, sed quandoque cum necessitate rei, quandoque sine ea; et si fuerit in eo necessitas rei cum causa, dicitur "syllogismus propter quid"; si vero sit in eo necessitas rei sine causa vel complexio sine necessitate rei, vocatur "syllogismus quoniam".

Per hoc ergo quod hic dictum est EX NECESSITATE removentur inductiones quae etsi quandoque habeant necessitatem, numquam tamen habent necessitatem complexionis quam Aristoteles hic significare intendit, unde etiam adiungit ACCIDIT, per hoc innuens necessitatem hanc posse esse etiam in terminis sibi contingenter inhaerentibus.

2 quae: quare 283 (*an quia scribendum?*). 9 alterum: alteram 283.

9 quare: *an quia scribendum?* 19 necessariam: nec causam 283.

29 significare: *significare* 283. 31 sibi: *vox corrupta?*

Per hoc autem quod sequitur, EO QUOD HAEC SINT, removentur syllogismi habentes minus vel superfluum, quoniam `si' hoc fuerit, praemissa aut non sufficiunt ad conclusionem aut non omnia ad hanc cooperantur.

- 5 DICO AUTEM: Posita descriptione exponit eius ultimam partem 'propter haec sint' idem esse quod conclusionem contingere 'propter haec', i. e. praemissa, [†]e quibus[†] hoc etiam sic exponit adiungens 'propter haec' etc. EST NULLIUS EXTRINSECUS TERMINI INDIGERE, id est nihil minus habere quam sufficiat ad conclusionem. Si enim minus
 10 haberet, non contingenter conclusio propter praemissa.



⁷ e (*ante quibus*): *lectio incerta*.

11 τέλος addidi.