NICOLAUS DRUKKEN DE DACIA’S COMMENTARY ON THE PRIOR Analytics

- WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE THEORY OF CONSEQUENCES

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The manuscript Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek, Ampl. 8° 74 contains on ff. 1ra-34rb a commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics with the following incipit:

CIRCA LIBRUM PRIORUM. Omissa recommendatione, quia lectura est cursoria, quae sit possibilis. Et arguitur primo quod non, quia aliquid syllogismus fuit et corrumpebatur et numquam regenerabatur.

The explicit runs:

... sicut 'omnis homo videt asinum, omnis equus videt hominem' etc., quia casu posito praemissae essent verae et conclusio falsa. Et sic dicendum ad secundam rationem etc. EXPLICIUNT QUAESTIONES MAGISTRI NICOLAI DE DACIA SUPRA LIBRUM PRIORUM.

By the ascription to a Danish master Nicolaus the work deserves a place in the series Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi. The edition is in preparation, and according to the present plans it will be published around 1985. Here it is my intention to introduce the work to a wider circle, partly in the hope that any reader acquainted with another manuscript containing the same work will inform us.

The manuscript was written by a single hand which is normally assumed to be Parisian. At one place it gives the year 1342. Besides our work it contains writings by Richard Kilvington and Balduin de Sernaco. On a first impression there will probably be general agreement that our work originated in Paris at some time in the first half of the 14th century. The very first lines of the text inform us that the commentary goes back to a cursory reading. From this we may conjecture that the author was not yet a master when he composed his work, since cursory readings were the job of bachelors. It is quite interesting in its own right to meet a commentary which derives from a cursory reading. I am not aware of any other Aristotle-commentary which openly acknowledges to be so.

The author.

Our first question concerns the identity of the author. Jan Pinborg has already identified him with Nicolaus (Danish: Niels) Drukkken who is the

only Dane by the name of Nicolaus known from Paris in the relevant period.² I shall here only summarize his results. Nicolaus Drukken is first mentioned in the documents as living in the Danish student-house in Paris at some time between 1329 and 1336. In 1340 he passed his master’s degree in the faculty of arts, under the Scottish master Johannes de Rathey. His inception took place in 1341 under his countryman Henricus de Unna, from the south-western part of Sweden (Skåne) which then belonged to Denmark. Nicolaus was elected procurator of the English nation (to which the Danes belonged at the university of Paris) in 1342-43, 1343, and 1344, and also in 1344 rector of the university. The latest mention of him in Paris is from 1345. Later he is found as a canon in Köln, and later again in Worms where he died between 1355 and 1357.³ There are no signs of a university career after he left Paris, nor of theological studies anywhere.

Obviously all the dates of this Nicolaus Drukken precisely fit the author of the commentary in the Erfurt-MS. It is incredible that another Dane by the name of Nicolaus could have taught in Paris at the same period, without any mention in the documents from the time, for the period is well-documented for the English nation, due to the existence of the liber procuratorum. So the identification seems certain.

Now we can be a little more precise about the date of our work. As Nicolaus obtained his master’s degree in 1340, the commentary will in all probability antedate that year, and it is reasonable to assume it to date from 1338-1340, or a little broader from the last half of the 1330s. However, we note that the work is ascribed to magister Nicolaus, but this need not exclude that it was composed by a bachelor. Probably Nicolaus only "published" it later when he was already a master.

The work.

Our commentary consists of 40 questions, several of them rather long. The first three questions have an introductory character, dealing with general problems about the syllogism and our approach to it. Question no. 4 opens with the statement that now we are to discuss the text (circa textum). All the following questions reasonably well relate to various sections of Aristotle’s text. Yet the questions cover far from all parts of Aristotle’s

² Pinborg 1968.
work, and most of the questions could easily have been discussed in other contexts. However, the order in which the problems are discussed follows the order of Aristotle. There are only rare and brief attempts at interpretations or discussions of Aristotle's text. This loose connection with the text commented on is no special characteristic of our work. Yet both the commentary by Radulphus Brito⁴ (c. 1300) and that by Jean Buridan⁵ (some years earlier than Nicolaus?) seem to cover Aristotle's text better. Notably, Nicolaus does not divide his commentary into two books, like Aristotle's text and the other commentators. In fact, Nicolaus hardly discusses any of the material which both Radulphus and Buridan deal with in book II, as taken from Aristotle's text. So it seems that Nicolaus omits book II. There is no statement in his text that this is so. Nor is there any sign that the commentary is incomplete, as preserved in our manuscript. Now, Nicolaus' work derives from a cursory reading. Due to this fact it would probably be shorter than a commentary going back to an ordinary reading. However, we know hardly anything about the differences to expect between Aristotle-commentaries deriving from these two different kinds of lectures.

One remarkable point about Nicolaus' work is the conspicuous signs it shows of British influence on Paris in the period. First of all this is clear from the three references Nicolaus gives to Walter Burley, by name. Two of these plainly, and probably also the third, go to the De puritate artis logicae. Tractatus longior. The first reference⁶ criticizes Burley for distinguishing between subiectum propositionis and subiectum locutionis (which Nicolaus calls s. emanationis) in discussing the rule cuiuslibet contradictionis altera pars est vera, in connection with sentences with oblique terms under his exposition of suppositio confusa et distributiva.⁷ We cannot follow Nicolaus' criticism here, but we should notice that it relates to Burley's view of supposition. For supposition is a point where Nicolaus is sharply critical of Burley, as his next reference shows.

In that place Nicolaus vigorously criticizes Burley for holding the view that simple supposition means that a term stands for the common nature, i.e. the universal (suppositio simplex est quando subiectum vel prae-

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4. Radulphus Brito, APR.
5. Johannes Buridanus, APR.
6. Qu.4, f.4vb.
dicatum supponit pro natura communis.\(^8\) There is apparently no place where Burley straightforwardly defines simple supposition in this manner. Yet Burley's discussion in the *De puritate* of simple supposition shows that Nicolaus' statement is a correct, although abbreviated and polemical interpretation of Burley's view. Several times Burley emphasizes that a term in simple supposition stands for the common or universal.\(^9\) There are even two places where Burley uses the very term common nature.\(^10\) It is possible that Nicolaus can be referring to Burley's earlier work *De suppositionibus*,\(^11\) but it is improbable. First, there is no occurrence of 'common nature' in this work. Secondly, Nicolaus' primary objection to Burley is that there does not exist such a common thing (*res communis*), only singular things exist. This is a discussion in which Burley is involved in the *De puritate*, but not in the earlier work. Let us notice that Nicolaus' criticism is in line with Ockham's attack on Burley,\(^12\) but it hardly derives from a single place in Ockham's text.

Nicolaus' third reference to Burley undoubtedly goes to the *De puritate*. It concerns some points of doctrine about hypothetical syllogisms, and several passages from a whole page of Burley's work lie just beneath the surface of Nicolaus' text.\(^13\) Again Nicolaus is critical of Burley, but only mildly.

It is also inevitable to assume that Nicolaus was acquainted with Ockham's *Summa logicae*, although he never mentions Ockham by name. But at least in two places he evidently relies on him. The one exposes the doctrine of supposition. The other is a specific point under the theory of consequences, where Nicolaus follows Ockham in stating that any consequence holds by an intrinsic or extrinsic "middle". We shall return to both places. There are several other places where it is possible or even probable to assume that Nicolaus utilizes Ockham's work, but none of them seems unambiguously connected with a specific passage in Ockham, and so they demand a very detailed comparison before the assumption can be confirmed. This task must wait for the forthcoming edition. But we shall see in the following that Ockham's influence on Nicolaus' ideas is significant.

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8. Qu.33, f.28rb-va.
9. Gualterus Burley, PAL pp.7,28sq.; 8,5-8; 13,9sq.; 14,24sq.; 17,2sq.; 18,2sq.
13. Qu.38, f.32va. - Gualterus Burley PAL p.89.
So there are at least two British authors whose influence on Nicolaus we can trace. It seems more difficult to find contemporary Parisian authors to whom Nicolaus is indebted in the same conspicuous manner. To a certain extent this is probably due to our limited acquaintance, as yet, with the relevant Parisian works from the period. The immediately most interesting author with whom to compare Nicolaus is Jean Buridan. We shall meet a few places in the following sections where Nicolaus may possibly have been influenced by Buridan. Yet on a first impression Buridan hardly exercised a strong influence on Nicolaus. But again, this will require a detailed comparison which can only be undertaken in the edition.

But certainly we should not exaggerate the British influence on Nicolaus. This is quickly seen if we compare his work with Richard of Campsall's commentary on the Prior analytics. With that work Nicolaus' commentary has few similarities; obviously he stands much closer to both Rudolphus Brito and Jean Buridan. His work is a genuinely Parisian one.

It is no new information we obtain from Nicolaus' text when it reveals traces of English influence on Paris. This is already a well-known fact. We need only remind ourselves of the famous statute against Ockham, issued by the faculty of arts in 1340. But Nicolaus' text may help us to assess more precisely how and on which points an average Parisian master was influenced by British authors.

Points from Nicolaus' doctrine:
his nominalism - the syllogism - supposition.

A comprehensive study of the medieval commentaries on Aristotle's Prior analytics has not yet been undertaken. Hence it is difficult in many cases to distinguish the points where Nicolaus chooses a course of his own from those where his text is just traditional. Yet there are places where standpoints are expressed which contribute toward a picture of the ideas of the author, although we can certainly not obtain anything like a full picture of the "philosophy" or the "logic" of our author. E.g. several of the recurrent semantical problems of the Middle Ages are hardly mentioned.

From several straightforward and elaborated statements it is plain that Nicolaus is a convinced nominalist, apparently much in line with Ockham. This comes out e.g. in Nicolaus' discussion of the nature of the principle dici de omni et de nullo. About this principle Nicolaus informs us that

14. Richardus de Camisale, APR.
15. Qu.5, f.5ra-vb; cf. qu.15, f.15rb.
it is customary to describe it as a disposition or a qualification of the predicate in relation to the subject (*dispositio praedicati in ordine ad subiectum*). He accepts that we can put it that way, but the phrase tends to mislead us. So he underlines that the principle is not an accident nor a disposition nor a property nor, generally, an entity of a sort which in reality belongs to the terms or to the sentence, but it is simply a sentence where nothing can be subsumed under the subject about which the predicate cannot be predicated (*dici de omni non est aliqua res, quae vocatur dispositio, quae realiter inhaeret nec subiecto nec praedicato vel toti propositioni, sed nihil aliud est nisi una propositio, in qua nihil est sumere sub subiecto, de quo non praedicatur praedicatum*). Accordingly the rule that any valid syllogism must be governed by the principle just means that in any syllogism there must be a universal premiss in which nothing can be subsumed etc. (... *omnis bonus syllogismus debet regulari per dici de omni vel de nullo, et hoc vult dicere quod in omni syllogismo debet esse aliqua propositio universalis, in qua nihil etc.*). Nicolaus' explanation of the principle is clearly in line with Ockham's, and certainly the nominalistic attitude which Nicolaus discloses is one which Ockham would approve of. However, Ockham does not take the opportunity to point out the unlucky metaphysical implications hidden in the traditional phrase. So Nicolaus is hardly indebted to Ockham on this particular point, but for his general attitude.

In his explanation of what a figure and a mood of the syllogism is, Nicolaus' approach is the same. It is customarily said that the moods and figures are the formal principles (*principia formalia*) of the syllogism. Nicolaus is willing to grant so much. Only we must not consider them entities really distinct (*res realiter distincta*) from the syllogism, but added to it or belonging to it like a disposition or a property. A figure is simply the terms of a syllogism arranged in a certain manner (*figura nihil aliud est quam isti termini sic ordinati*). Similarly a mood is just two universal premisses or one universal and one particular.

Again, Nicolaus utilizes his discussion of conversion to inform us about his discomfort at some customary manners of speaking, because they seem to attribute to certain concepts a kind of real existence. We should not speak as if there were some thing called a disposition, really distinct from the convertent sentence and its converse, which is found in one of them

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17. Qu.5, f.5vb; qu.36, f.31ra-b; qu.37, f.32ra.
like something existing in its own right (aliqua res quae vocatur dispositio, quae realiter distinguitur a convertente et conversa, et quae sit in una illarum subiective). No, a conversion is just the two sentences, one of which is converted into the other.  

The expressions which Nicolaus so eagerly opposes seem to have been phrases customarily used by Parisian masters, at least of earlier generations, in their expositions of the three phenomena. Both Radulphus Brito and Siger of Courtrai use them, and we may catch a glimpse of the risk which Nicolaus warns us against when Radulphus calls conversion a passio animae.

Nicolaus' discussion of the principle dico de omni etc. is one of the places where we may assume that he refers to Jean Buridan's commentary on the Prior analytics. Nicolaus does not only state his own view, but he also sketches the solutions of some other authors. One of the views he cites considers the dico de omni etc. an abbreviation for a long expression (longa oratio) signifying a sentence in which nothing can be subsumed under the subject about which etc. Nicolaus explains that this opinion agrees with his own in denying any kind of independent existence to the principle. But apparently he finds it not rigorous enough, in that it does not insist upon the fact that the principle is nothing whatsoever besides a premiss of a certain form. The authors expressing this view, according to Nicolaus, proceed to expose how the question asking which entity the principle is, reveals a misunderstanding, just like a question about which thing is signified by a compound expression (oratio) like 'Socratem moveri'. Both 'Socratem' and 'moveri' may signify or stand for (supponere) a thing, but there is no special entity which the compound expression signifies or stands for. Now, all this is one of the explanations which Buridan suggests, although in other words and with different examples. However, it is not quite clear if it is his own opinion, for he refers to "some people", "other people".

We may take the opportunity to mention a few features of Nicolaus' doctrine about the syllogism. From the things already said it will be clear that Nicolaus is of the opinion that any valid syllogism is governed by the principles dico de omni or dico de nullo; the syllogisms of the

18. Qu.6, f.6ra.
20. Qu.5, f.5rb-va.
21. Ioannes Buridanus, APR. I qu.5.
first figure are so directly (immediate), those of the other figures indirectly, i.e. via reduction to the first figure. Nicolaus states this time and again. 22 It is traditional doctrine which causes no surprise. Something like it will be found in almost any medieval treatise on the syllogism, at least from the 13th century and onwards.

But on some points there was apparently discussion about the syllogism in Nicolaus' time. One such point was the so-called expository syllogism (syllogismus expositiorius), i.e. the syllogism the middle term of which is singular, e.g. a proper name like 'Socrates'. In the eyes of many mediev- als there were problems connected with applying such syllogisms to the three persons of the Holy Trinity. This is probably the reason why it attracted so much attention. Nicolaus informs us 23 that some philosophers (philosophi) say that this kind of syllogism is not valid by the dico de omni etc., as this principle cannot be applied to singular terms, but only to common ones. Instead they hold the opinion that this kind of syllogism is valid by a rule stating that whichever two things are identical with one and the same third, are identical with each other (quaeaeque uni et eadem sunt eadem, illa inter se sunt eadem). This is the rule for the affirmative syllogisms; for the negative ones the rule is: whichever two things are not identical etc. Nicolaus expresses some doubts whether this rule can validate expository syllogisms, yet he criticizes it neither strongly nor at length. But he replies that an expository syllogism like any other can be and is governed by the dico de omni etc. For in a sentence with a singular term as its subject nothing is subsumed under the subject, about which the predicate cannot be predicated, and this is all which is required, not that the subject should signify more than one thing. However, Nicolaus adds that possibly an expository syllogism is not governed by any rule at all, but is notified (evident) to us by experience through the senses or the intellect (sed notificatur per experientiam ad sensum vel ad intellectum).

One of the "philosophers" to whom Nicolaus refers can be Buridan. In his commentary on the Prior analytics, 24 this author explains that the expository syllogism is not governed by the dico de omni etc., because this principle only applies to common terms. It is instead governed by

22. E.g. qu.5, f.5va-b; qu.6, f.6ra; qu.20, f.19rb; qu.21, f.20rb; qu.23, f.21va; qu.29, f.26ra-b; qu.31, f.27va.
23. Qu.39, f.33va.
the very rule about which Nicolaus is so sceptical. Buridan goes
even further in his Summulae where he describes this principle,
in its affirmative or negative form, as one validating all syllo-
gism. 25 Apparently he considers it to be somehow connected with the
dici de omni etc., which he also exposes as governing all syllogisms. 26
In his treatise on consequences he also exposes the rule about the identi-
ity or non-identity of the things represented by the terms as one validating
all, respectively affirmative or negative, syllogisms, and there we learn
nothing about the dici de omni etc. 27
So here is a point where Nicolaus disagrees with Buridan. But cer-
tainly not with Buridan alone. What makes us think especially of him is
the importance he seems to attach to the principle and the development its
scope of application undergoes in him. But Buridan did not invent the prin-
ciple. Siger of Courtrai briefly mentions that expository syllogisms are
governed by it. 28 More remarkable is Radulphus Brito's rather long dis-
cussion of the expository syllogism. He hesitates a good deal about it.
Either we may consider it a syllogism, although not governed by the dici
de omni etc., since its middle term is not a common one. Or we may follow
Aristotle who does not consider it a syllogism, but a special kind of in-
fERENCE which he calls expositio. In the latter case Radulphus considers
it valid by the same principle as Buridan. 29 Apparently Radulphus here
refers to Aristotle's proof of syllogisms by ekthesis, in which connection
Aristotle almost literally states "Buridan's principle". 30
Nicolaus is partly in line with Ockham about the expository syllogism.
We do not know what Ockham thinks about "Buridan's principle" for this kind
of syllogism, nor does he apparently discuss the dici de omni etc. in con-
nection with it. He states, however, that this syllogism is evident by it-
self, and does not need further proof (per se evidens, nec indiget ulterio-
ri probatone). 31 Obviously this is Nicolaus' alternative validation. Yet
Nicolaus differs from Ockham concerning another point about the expository
syllogism. According to Ockham it can only be found in the third figure

27. Iohannes Buridanus, Cons.III c. 4, pp.84-5.
28. Sigerus de Corraco, APr. p.28.
   2.08, p.51; 10.25, p.167.
of the syllogism. Nicolaus informs us that he is acquainted with this opinion, but he disagrees with it. He argues for his standpoint by setting out the rules to be observed for expository syllogisms in the various figures.

This leads us to another point about which discussion took place in Nicolaus' time, viz. the number of syllogistic figures. Is there a fourth figure? Nicolaus answers the question in the affirmative. However, as the first and the fourth figure differ only by the change of the order of the premises (per easdem propositiones licet transpositas), Aristotle and many other authors do not count the fourth one a figure in its own right. Nicolaus seems willing to consider this a possible course to choose in this question, but he prefers the solution that there are four figures. Accordingly he exposes the rules for this figure.

In this question Nicolaus is more progressive than Ockham. In Ockham's opinion we should not posit a fourth figure, because it would consist only in the change of order of the two premises, and hence no new valid moods would result. Much the same is said by Buridan in his commentary on the Prior analytics, although he is less negative than Ockham. In his Summulae, Buridan finds it possible to establish a fourth figure, and in his treatise on consequences Buridan straightforwardly posits four syllogistic figures, although admitting that the fourth may be considered superfluous. So here Nicolaus is closer to Buridan than to Ockham.

Let us now turn to Nicolaus' doctrine of supposition which he exposes in one long question. The point of greatest interest is his definition of the three main types of supposition. Personal supposition is defined: a term has personal supposition when it stands for its signifcateg, whether this is a word, a concept or an extramental thing (... supponit pro suo signicato, quicquid sit illud sive voce sive conceptus sive res extra). Material supposition occurs when a term stands for a word, spoken or written, which it does not signify (... supponit pro voce vel scripto quam vel quod non significat); e.g. 'hoc scriptum "hanc" est dixyllum'. But when a

32. Guillelmus Ockham, SL III-1 c.16, pp.403-5.
33. Qu.39, f.33rb-va.
34. Qu.36, f.31rb-va.
36. Ioannes Buridanus, APR.I qu.41.
39. Qu.33, ff.28ra-30ra.
term stands for a word which it signifies, then it has personal supposition, as e.g. in the sentence 'ista vox est qualitas'. A term has simple supposition when it stands for an intention or concept of the mind which it does not signify (... supponit pro intentione quam <non> significat), as e.g. in the sentence 'ista intentio homo est species'. But if a term stands for an intention which it signifies, as e.g. 'intentio est qualitas', then it has personal supposition. From this follows that any sentence the subject of which has simple - and probably also material - supposition is singular (est mere singularis). However, the definition of simple supposition is disputed, Nicolaus informs us. Walter Burley, according to him, is of the opinion that a term having simple supposition stands for the common nature (natura communis), i.e. the universal. This is certainly not an entirely adequate reproduction of Burley's doctrine, for according to him a term has simple supposition when it stands for its signifite. Yet Burley and Nicolaus agree about which sentences we are to consider having terms in simple supposition. Further, it is probably a fair interpretation of Burley's long discussion that if we take the terms in such sentences to stand for their signifitates, then we are led to ascribe a kind of existence in its own right to the universals. It is to this consequence of Burley's conception of simple supposition Nicolaus replies that there does not exist any such common natures. The common nature can only exist as singulirs; it is impossible for any subsisting thing to be universal (... nulla est talis res communis, quin sit singularis ... impossibile est aliquam substantiam esse universalem). By destroying this consequence of Burley's standpoint, Nicolaus apparently thinks that he has proved the untenability of Burley's definition of simple supposition.

Nicolaus' description of these three main divisions of supposition is evidently inspired by Ockham, indeed it is almost taken over from him. But it also shows traces of acquaintance with Burley's arguments against Ockham, and in this respect it goes somewhat beyond Ockham.

Next Nicolaus lists some rules for the supposition of the terms in various types of sentences. The first of these says that the terms of a sentence have personal supposition, unless it is restricted (restringatur) by e.g. a syncategorem or a demonstrative pronoun. He claims that this

42. Gualterus Burley, PAL pp.9-16.
is a rule which is true with him (apud me vera), but again it is possible to find some inspiration in Ockham.\textsuperscript{43} Only Nicolaus goes further than Ockham, in fact uncomfortably far, for he apparently claims that we have to say '\textit{nulla est species}' in order to have simple supposition, and not only '\textit{homo est species}'.

At last Nicolaus subdivides personal supposition, which he does exactly like Ockham.\textsuperscript{44} However, he does not refer to Ockham for this division, but to Peter of Spain (\textit{Petrus Hispanus, auctore Summalarum}). This is not true of the authentic text of Peter of Spain,\textsuperscript{45} but we should remember that we do not know what the text of Peter of Spain which Nicolaus used looked like, only that it will have been extensively revised. Further, the divergence between Nicolaus and Peter of Spain mainly consists in the fact that Peter does not state so many subdivisions as Nicolaus does.

The various points discussed in this section are certainly too diverse to yield a full picture of Nicolaus, yet they have given us a certain impression of his personality and his set of ideas. First of all we have realized how heavily he is influenced by Ockham. Not just in the sense that he refers to or quotes texts from Ockham, but more remarkably so that he will take standpoints quite in line with Ockham's way of thinking in questions where we cannot find texts in Ockham which Nicolaus can have simply modelled his own text after. So we are left with the impression of a person who was able to put his personal stamp on the influences to which he submitted himself.

\textit{The definition of valid consequence}

Now we shall turn to a somewhat more detailed discussion of Nicolaus' version of the theory of consequences. To this subject he devotes many passages and much space. There is even a place where he dresses up a list of rules for consequences in the same manner as we meet in treatises on consequences.\textsuperscript{46} However, the most interesting point is probably his reflections on the concept of valid consequence, as we find them expressed in several places where he discusses whether a particular consequence or a particular sort of inference is valid or not. During such discussions Nicolaus introduces at least five different suggestions for definitions of val-

\textsuperscript{43} Qu.33, f.28va. - Guillelmus Ockham, SL I c. 65, pp.197-8.
\textsuperscript{44} Qu.33, f.28vb. - Guillelmus Ockham, SL I c. 70, pp.209-12.
\textsuperscript{45} Petrus Hispanus, Tractatus VI,8-9, pp.82-3.
\textsuperscript{46} Qu.9, f.9rb-vb.
id consequence. Not all of these satisfy his requirements to a valid consequence, but any of them state something which is required for it. One suggested definition is:

(1) A consequence is valid if the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent (being true) *(antecedens non potest esse verum sine consequente).*\(^{47}\) From the context it is clear that the formulation leaves open the possibility that there may be times when things are so that the antecedent can be true without the consequent; but things being as of now this is not possible.

Against this definition of valid consequence Nicolaus argues first that in accordance with it one would have to grant that any true sentence can imply any other true one; which he apparently considers absurd. Secondly, since some sentences can sometimes be true and sometimes false, it would follow that a consequence can sometimes be valid and sometimes not. Hence we must make the requirements of the definition more rigorous so that it runs: '... the antecedent can never *(numquam potest)* be true' etc. Yet, although this condition is required in order to make a consequence valid, it does not by itself suffice, but needs to be supplemented by (3) discussed below.

Another definition which Nicolaus introduces as supported by other authors, but which he does not consider satisfactory, is:

(2) A consequence is valid, if the opposite of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent *(oppositum consequentis non potest stare cum antecedente).*\(^{48}\)

According to Nicolaus this condition is certainly required for a valid consequence, but it is not sufficient. For observing only this requirement we should have to grant the validity of a consequence from an affirmative particular or indefinite sentence to a universal one, if only the predicate of the consequent is *per se superius* in respect of the subject of the antecedent and of the consequent. E.g. this one '*homo est animal, ergo omnis substantia est ens*'. Hence we must conclude that there are consequences materially valid besides those formally valid (under (3) we shall see what Nicolaus means by 'formally valid'). But we can rephrase the definition so: '*... from the contradictory opposite of the consequent the contradictory opposite of the antecedent can be inferred*' *(ex contradictorio consequentis potest inferri contradictorium antecedentis)*. Then the defini-

\(^{47}\) Qu.9, ff.8vb-9ra; cf. qu.16, f.16ra.

\(^{48}\) Qu.4, f.4rb.
tion fulfils the requirement (3) described below which is Nicolaus' basic demand to a valid consequence.

Definition (1) is that which comes closest to modern conceptions of implication; it is at least highly similar to the definition of strict implication, although it would require a further specification of the idea of possibility contained in it to decide about the identity of the two. But it is the definition which Nicolaus seems to find least satisfying. He is much more at home with (2) in which he even seems to find an affinity with his own definition of valid consequence, as we saw, even though this is very differently phrased:

(3) A consequence is valid and formal, if the total signicate of the consequent is the signicate of the antecedent (totum significatum consequentis est significatum antecedentis), or if anything which is signified by the consequent is signified by the antecedent (quicquid significatur per consequens debet significari per antecedens), or if the antecedent signifies the signicate of the consequent (antecedens significat significatum consequentis), so that when our intellect apprehends the antecedent, then by its natural judgement it infers the consequent (intellectus ex naturali suo iudicio ex antecedente infert consequens). In various places Nicolaus adds that the same is not true the other way around (non e converso), i.e. we cannot exchange 'antecedent' and 'consequent' in the formulas.

This linking of the signicate of the consequent to that of the antecedent is what we call the form of a consequence (forma consequentiae), and any consequence which does not fulfil this requirement is neither formal nor valid (formalis et bona). The same definition was expressed by older logicians (dicta antiquorum logicorum), Nicolaus claims, when they said that the antecedent includes the consequent.

This definition is the one to which Nicolaus himself subscribes. As can be seen from the notes he exposes and discusses it several times. But there is no place where he really argues for it. Once he assumes that someone might ask him to prove it. To this imagined request he replies that he

49. Qu.4, f.4ra-b; qu.7, f.6vb; qu.9, f.9ra.
50. Qu.9, f.9ra.
51. Qu.9, f.9ra; qu.14, f.14ra; qu.29, f.26rb.
52. Qu.4, f.4rb; qu.7, f.6vb; qu.9, f.9ra.
53. E.g. qu.4, f.4rb; qu.7, f.6vb.
54. Qu.14, f.14ra.
55. Qu.7, f.6vb; qu.14, f.14ra.
considers it impossible to demonstrate (demonstrare) the definition. All he can do is to explain the contents of it and then expect his reader (or the imagined opponent) to perceive the truth of it.⁵⁶ This may sound weak, but apparently it is not a quibble invented for the occasion, for in another place and concerning a different problem Nicolaus expresses the standpoint that there are things which cannot be proved, but which can only be exposed so that the reader or listener may grasp their truth.⁵⁷ Further it reminds us of Nicolaus' alternative suggestion about the validity of the expository syllogism.⁵⁸ However, all these texts contain only brief hints which do not permit us to go into any detail.

The most important point to notice in Nicolaus' definition is the fact that he considers the form of a consequence to be the affinity between or the inclusion of the signifcite of the consequent in the signifcite of the antecedent. A consequence which falls short of this requirement is not a formal one. But this linking together of the significates also constitutes the validity of a consequence. So a consequence failing in this respect is not valid either. Hence the validity and the formality of a consequence coincide. There is no consequence which is valid but non-formal.

Due to his rather restricted view of valid consequence Nicolaus is led to reject a number of consequences which are often considered valid by other authors. Already under the discussion of (1) above we saw that he did not accept consequences valid only at some time, but not at all times. Obviously he must also consider non-valid the consequences where the consequent signifies more than the antecedent (si consequens significat plus quam antecedens).⁵⁹ Certainly it is also quite consistent that he rules out the validity of consequences where the significates of the consequent and the antecedent are separate (disparata), for in such cases our intellect cannot infer the consequent from the antecedent.⁶⁰ One consequence which Nicolaus for this reason does not consider valid is 'homo currit, ergo baculus stat in angulo', i.e. one consisting of two true, but as to their significates, unconnected sentences. We saw already above that Nicolaus found (1) defective, because it granted the validity of such consequences. This plainly shows how far Nicolaus is from a modern truth-

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56. Qu.7, f.6vb.
57. Qu.4, f.4va.
58. Above p.49.
59. Qu.1, f.2ra; qu.4, f.4ra.
60. Qu.7, f.6vb-7ra; qu.9, f.9ra.
functional conception of consequence. Further Nicolaus is also led to reject the rules: 'from the impossible anything follows' and 'a necessary sentence follows from any sentence'. This, of course, he is bound to do, given his view of valid consequence, for clearly there is no affinity or link between the significate of an impossible sentence and that of any other sentence; and similarly concerning necessary sentences.

From the discussions, briefly reproduced here, in connection with these three proposals (1-3) for the definition of valid consequence, it appears that Nicolaus basically conceives of a consequence as an inference, not as a conditional sentence, unlike many other medieval authors, e.g. Ockham. In agreement with this, his examples of consequences more often contain an ergo than a si. Nor is there any place where he explicitly equates a consequence and a conditional sentence.

In a few places Nicolaus propounds another definition of valid consequence, which he appears to consider related or even identical with (3). Certainly it is also highly similar to (3), yet it differs from it in that it pays regard to the state of affairs of the things signified by the sentences in the consequence. Or in other words: like (1) and (2) it includes considerations about truth and falsity, which really need not be taken into account at (3). The definition runs:

(4) A consequence is valid, if it is impossible for things to be as signified by the antecedent without things being as signified by the consequent (nullo casu possibili posito sic potest esse sicut significatur per antecedens quin sic erit sicut significatur per consequens).

Apparently Nicolaus accepts this definition, for there is nowhere any criticism and hardly even discussion of it, only he adduces it much more rarely than (3). In contrast Nicolaus apparently does not feel so well at ease with the last proposal for a definition of valid consequence which he mentions. This is based upon reflections entirely different from the preceding ones:

(5) A formal consequence is one which holds by its form and (= i.e.) by (the structure resulting from) the combination of its terms, so that wheresoever there is a similar combination of terms, howsoever they signify, there is always in the same manner a valid consequence

61. Guillelmus Ockham, SL II c. 30, p.347,1-5. - Cf. Ashworth 1974, p.120.
62. Qu.6, f.6ra; qu.9, f.9ra; qu.16, ff.15vb-16ra.
(formalis consequentia est talis, quae tenet gratia formae et gratia complexionis terminorum, ita quod ubicunque erit consimilis complexio terminorum, qualitercumque illi termini significant, semper eodem modo est consequentia bona). 63 In other cases where this definition is stated, the clause about the signification of the terms is substituted by a phrase saying: "in every matter" (in omni materia), and it is added that the terms must have the same supposition (eodem modo supponentibus). 64

In modern terms this is a definition of a consequence which is valid for syntactical reasons. But in contrast to the preceding definitions it does not simply define valid consequence, but formal consequence. Or in other words; it presupposes a "counterpart", viz. material consequence, i.e. one valid for semantical reasons or by the signification of its terms. This is also Nicolaus' objection against it. In the place where he discusses it at greatest length, 65 he introduces it as a definition given by some people. Then he briefly comments on it saying that in his opinion any valid consequence is formal. After that he proceeds to propound (3) as an alternative definition of formal consequence, and as the one he adheres to. All the same, in the end of this question he answers the arguments first in agreement with (3) and secondly in agreement with (5). This may reflect some doubt in Nicolaus' attitude to this definition. Probably he finds that it states something which is required from a valid and formal consequence, but which does not suffice to constitute one.

After having followed no less than five definitions of valid consequence we might expect that the subject is exhausted. Yet there is still one demand from Nicolaus to a valid consequence which we have not mentioned. Any valid consequence holds by an extrinsic "middle" or by an intrinsic one or by both (medium extrinsecum vel intrinsecum vel utrumque). 66 Nicolaus also calls it an intrinsic and extrinsic locus. An intrinsic "middle" or locus is a sentence formed from the subjects or predicates of the antecedent and the consequent of the consequence to which it is added. E.g. the consequence 'homo currit, ergo animal currit' holds by the intrinsic "middle" 'homo est animal'. If such a "middle" is true and necessary, the consequence is a valid and formal consequence. If the "middle" is not necessary, although true, the consequence is not valid. An extrinsic "middle"

63. Qu.14, f.14ra.
64. Qu.13, f.13ra; qu.14, f.13vb.
65. Qu.14, ff.13vb-14ra.
66. Qu.9, f.9ra-b; qu.13, f.13rb-va; qu.19, f.19ra; qu.23, f.21rb; qu.25, f.23va; qu.27, f.24rb; qu.31, f.27va.
or locus is a maxim (maxima propositio), i.e. a necessary sentence which
the intellect forms, and which cannot be demonstrated (demonstrari) by
anything else, but which is a principle which any well-ordered intellect
approves of (qui quilibet intellectus assentiret, bene tamen dispositus),
as we find them in the dialectical loci. Such a maxim is a general rule
by which several consequences hold. An example is: exclusiva et univer-
salis (propositio) de terminis transpositis convertuntur. Nicolaus does
not anywhere relate this doctrine of "middles" to his definition of valid
consequence, i.e. esp. (3), and there is no clue in his text to deciding
if he considers it an additional requirement to valid consequence. But
at least it seems impossible to say that the demand for a "middle" in any
consequence is already contained in any of the proposed definitions.

The very number of definitions with which Nicolaus is acquainted is
a testimony to the lively interest in the concept of consequence in his
period. Virtually all the suggestions for the definition of valid con-
sequence which were to appear in the whole Middle Ages occur already in
Nicolaus. We see this if we follow the discussions about valid consequence
in the late- or post-medieval period, as they are set out by E.J. Ashworth.67
There we find all the definitions mentioned in Nicolaus, except, appar-
ently, for his own (3), and no really new one has been added, even though
a lot of refinements have been made, of course. Among these we may mention
two, which do occur in Nicolaus, but only incidentally. The one is the de-
mand that the terms must not be given a new meaning (sine nova impositione),
which Nicolaus mentions a few times, especially in connection with (4).68
Another is the requirement that the antecedent and the consequent must be
simultaneously stated (simul formatis); also this one is found in Nicolaus
only rarely.69

The history of the medieval development of the theory of consequences
has not yet been written. Still it may be both possible and informative
to compare the various definitions discussed by Nicolaus with other authors.
The definitions (1) and (2) are extremely common; in fact almost any medie-
aval work dealing with consequences mentions them. However, they are often
treated more like criteria of valid consequence than like definitions; i.e. they are requirements which a consequence must fulfil in order to be

68. E.g. qu.9, f.9ra.
69. E.g. qu.9, f.9va; qu.14, f.14va; qu.29, f.26ra. - Cf. Boh forthcoming.
valid, but not exhaustive descriptions of what it is for a consequence to be valid. Most authors, both those writing before the time when the composition of specific treatises on consequences began and those writing later, include other points in their descriptions of valid consequence. Yet there seems to have been a period around the time of the composition of the very earliest treatises on consequences (c. 1300) when many authors contented themselves with these two criteria. Both Walter Burley in his treatise on consequences (before 1302) and two contemporary anonymous treatises do no more than adduce these two criteria to test consequences for their validity. Like Nicolaus, they add the precision to (2) that the opposite must be the contradictory opposite. In connection with (1) two of them, like Nicolaus, make the change to 'never', and they proceed to state that in this form the criterion applies to consequences which are absolutely, i.e. always, valid (consequentia simplex), in contradistinction to consequences only valid at the times when things are as of now (consequentia ut nunc). We saw that Nicolaus' discussion of (1) reflected this distinction. Apparently Walter Burley never attempted further to define valid consequence, for also in his later work De puritate artis logicae (both versions) we find only these two criteria adduced. Nor does Ockham seem to have taken any further steps in the question of the validity of a consequence. He is very brief on the matter, but both (1) and (2) are mentioned by him.

So if we can take our findings in these authors adequately to cover the situation - but that is far from certain - we can conclude that in the period from c. 1300 to c. 1325 the medievals did not feel any need for a further investigation and definition of the concept of valid consequence than that which is already contained in (1) and (2). It also appears that they considered the two connected, at least they often apply the two together.

Definition (4) is Jean Buridan's definition of valid consequence. He propounds it both in his commentary on the Prior analytics and in his treatise on consequences, and in both places he plainly intends it to

72. Gualterus Burley, PAL pp.61,30sq.; 63,30-64,19; 199,26-200,5; 207, 14-30.
73. Guillelmus Ockham, SL III-3 c. 38, pp.727,1-728,22; cf. II c. 31, p.347,3-5.
74. Iohannes Buridanus, APR. II qu. 5; qu.6. - Idem, Cons. I c. 3, p.22.
be a real definition of the concept of valid consequence, not simply a criterion. I am not aware of any earlier author in whom we find this definition. But following Buridan several later authors define valid consequence in this manner. Among the earliest to do so are Albert of Saxony, Ralph Strode, and Marsilius of Inghen. Yet already these authors are not entirely satisfied with the definition, but add some refinements to it.\textsuperscript{75} If it is true that this definition originated with Buridan, then Nicolaus' mention of it may be considered evidence for his acquaintance with (at least some of) Buridan's writings.

(5) is the definition commonly given by the medievals of formal consequence, but only of that, not generally of valid consequence. Something like it seems to have been introduced together with the very concept of formal consequence. One of the earliest authors to mention this concept, viz. William of Ockham, defines it rather differently as to the wording, but probably not as to the idea he entertains about it.\textsuperscript{76} However, (5) is found already in Buridan, and in almost all later authors.\textsuperscript{77} Like (4) also (5) is plainly thought of as a definition, not only a criterion.

It remains for us to discuss (3), the definition to which Nicolaus wholeheartedly adheres. He claims, as we saw, that earlier authors also stated this definition, although in different words. This is true. We can trace it as far back, at least, as Abélard, who lays it down that in any true consequence (\textit{consecutio/consequentia}) the meaning of the consequent is required by the meaning of the antecedent (\textit{sensus exigitur}), or the meaning of the consequent is included or understood (\textit{includitur/intellegitur}) in the antecedent.\textsuperscript{78} From the manner in which Abélard phrases his statements it appears that they derive from Boethius' explanation that the meaning (\textit{sententia}) of the conditional sentence consists in the fact that if the antecedent is, then necessarily the consequent must be. This description Boethius applies to what he calls natural consequence (\textit{naturae consequentia}), but not to accidental consequence.\textsuperscript{79} Also in the 13th century


\textsuperscript{76} Guillelmus Ockham, SL III-3 c. 1, p.589,45-54.


\textsuperscript{78} Petrus Abelardus, Dial.253,28sq.; 271,28sq.; 283,39-285,2. - Idem, Top. 238,40sq.; 244,29sq.; 309,18sq.

a number of authors take the standpoint that such a linking between the antecedent and the consequent must occur, if the consequence is to be considered a true one. A few authors who only casually mention the concept of consequence state so about the concept in general. But the authors who enter into a more detailed discussion of the concept normally take the standpoint that the consequent is so contained in the antecedent \( (de \textit{intellectu/intellegitur/auditur/incluitur}) \) only at the species of consequence which they recognize as a consequence in the full sense of the term. Some authors label this species an absolute consequence, others a natural one \( (\textit{simplex/naturalis}) \). Besides this one the term 'consequence' is also commonly applied to others — or at least another — species of consequence, in which such a linking does not occur, and which our authors call either accidental or as of now consequence \( (\textit{accidentalis/ut nume}) \). But strictly speaking the latter should not be labelled consequence. And when we use 'consequence' as a generic designation of both species, it is used only equivocally \( (\textit{aequivocatur}) \), these authors state. This attitude towards the various species of consequence and to the requirements which a consequence in the proper sense of the word must fulfil is evidently the historical background for Nicolaus' idea of what it is for a consequence to be valid and for his rejection of all other species of consequences. The only significant change is that Nicolaus identifies this single valid species with formal consequence. However, this does not so much indicate a doctrinal divergence as a change in the historical circumstances, for the concept of formal consequence does not at all occur until some time after 1300.

So Nicolaus' definition of valid consequence had a long history behind it. But not much future was in stock for it. Marsilius of Inghen mentions the idea, but only as part of the background for his own definition of consequence, which is our (4). The virtually unknown Robert Fland and Ralph Strode use the idea (with additions) to describe formal consequence, but not valid consequence in general. Also a few later authors support the idea, but the majority of the authors apparently pay no regard to it.

80. Boethius Dacus, Top. II qu. 6, p. 120, 32 sq.; II qu. 23, pp. 150-152. An- gelius de Camerino, Top. on II, 4, 11], 12 sq., f. 47rb.
82. Marsilius de Inghen, Cons. f. 85 va.
84. Ashworth 1974, pp. 128sq.
Nicolaus' opinion that any consequence must be based upon a "middle" or a *locus* also has its foreshadowings in earlier periods. Various authors in the 13th century state that a *locus* or a topical relationship (*habitudo localis*) is required in a consequence. Some of them even underline that this condition is imposed upon a consequence in the proper sense of the word, i.e. a necessary (absolute or natural) consequence. Yet the 13th-century ideas are not identical with Nicolaus', for the 13th century utilizes the traditional conception of a *locus*, whereas Nicolaus is far removed from it. Nicolaus' distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic "middles" is an entirely new interpretation of a terminology which is traditional in the topics. As far as I know, the doctrine in a form similar to Nicolaus' is first found in Walter Burley's treatise on consequences (before 1302). Here it is utilized to distinguish various species of consequences, in that Burley claims that an absolute consequence (*consequentia simplex*) holds by an intrinsic "middle", which is described exactly like Nicolaus does, whereas an extrinsic "middle" validates an accidental consequence. Almost the same is found in the long version of Burley's *De puritate*, only there it is a natural consequence which is validated by an intrinsic "middle". The two Ps.-Ockham treatises on logic express the same idea, only they reverse things by making an intrinsic "middle" validate an as of now consequence and an extrinsic one an absolute consequence.

But the author whom Nicolaus followed in composing his text on "middles" in consequences is Ockham. According to Ockham any formal consequence holds by an extrinsic "middle"; but some formal consequences may also hold by an intrinsic "middle" besides the extrinsic one. Material consequences, on the other hand, hold only by intrinsic "middles", not by extrinsic ones. With some omissions Nicolaus' text follows Ockham's line for line, except, of course, that Nicolaus does not say anything about material consequences which he does not recognize as valid.

Thomas Bradwardine composed a treatise on consequences in reaction to Ockham. In the beginning of this work he distinguishes formal and non-formal consequences (he does not use the term 'material') solely by their

88. (Guilelmus Ockham), Elementarium logicae p.255. - (Guilelmus Ockham), Tractatus minor p.77.
basis in various "middles". A formal consequence is one which holds by an intrinsic "middle", which he defines like Nicolaus and Ockham. In contrast a non-formal consequence holds not by an intrinsic "middle", but by a necessary sentence which Bradwardine exemplifies by a rule similar to what the other authors call extrinsic "middles". Both species of consequences are necessary, according to Bradwardine who rejects all non-necessary consequences and consequences valid only as of now. This distinction leaves us with a rather curious conception of the formality of a consequence.

But plainly Bradwardine is in line with Burley, although their doctrines do not entirely coincide, and together these two authors are opposed to Ockham and the Ps.-Ockham treatises. Nicolaus, as already mentioned, modelled his text after Ockham's; yet he cannot really be placed on either of the sides. For unlike all the other authors he does not utilize the doctrine of various "middles" to distinguish different species of consequences.

So it is possible to find foreshadowings of the doctrine of "middles", and especially to find contemporary authors who elaborate the idea. But there are not, to the best of my knowledge, any later authors who mention or even hint at the idea. Neither in Buridan nor in Marsilius of Inghen nor in Ralph Strode can we find a word about it. So it must have been given up very soon after Nicolaus' time.

From the points we have discussed here, it seems possible to conclude that Nicolaus composed his commentary at a period full of much debate about the concept of consequence. A simple criterion for testing the validity of consequences was no longer considered sufficient, but there was felt a need for a real definition of valid consequence. In the attempts to establish this, various ideas from earlier times were drawn upon, but only few of them lasted for more than a short time. Apparently in connection with these considerations the idea of basing consequences on loci, which enjoyed some support earlier, but hardly a universal one, was elaborated along untraditional lines. But also this idea was soon given up again. Nicolaus' text makes it possible for us to acquire some information about a period when the authors felt the need for a deeper discussion of the concept of consequence, but before certain main lines of the development had yet been clarified.

The division of consequences

From the preceding section it will appear that Nicolaus really rejects any division of consequences; to him there is only one species of valid con-

90. Thomas Bradwardine, Cons. ff.117vb-118ra.
sequence. Yet he discusses a possible division of consequences, and it will be quite interesting to follow his exposition of this matter. The first step of the division is quite harmless, viz. that of dividing into syllogistic and enthymematic consequences. The syllogistic consequence is identical with the syllogism; it is always a formal consequence, and it is always validated by an extrinsic "middle", but sometimes in addition also by an intrinsic one.

The problems arise about the further division of enthymematic consequences which other people make. According to Nicolaus they divide them into consequences absolutely valid (consequentia simplex) and those valid only as of now (consequentia ut nunc), i.e. at certain times valid and at other not, according to how things are at various times. Absolute consequence these people again subdivide into material and formal consequences. Nicolaus certainly does not accept such a division, and we already know why not. The interesting point here is rather that Nicolaus subordinates the division into formal and material consequences under the division into absolute and as of now consequences. Most authors do it the other way round, so that the division into as of now versus absolute consequences is considered a subdivision of material consequence. So it is done by Jean Buridan, and the same is the case with almost all other authors. I am aware of only one author doing as Nicolaus, viz. Peter of Mantova (c.1400).

This fact leads us to assume, as we did in the preceding section, that Nicolaus wrote his commentary before the time when certain general lines about the theory of consequences had been agreed upon and established as common doctrine. This impression is confirmed if we look at the situation before Nicolaus. The distinction between absolute and as of now consequences was introduced at some time in the 13th century. The two terms may derive from a passage in the Prior analytics where Aristotle uses them, although about premisses and not about consequences; but we cannot be sure of that as yet. The distinction between formal and material consequences, on the other hand, was not known in the 13th century, nor in the earliest treatises on consequences from the 14th century. Even Walter Burley does not operate with these two species of consequences.

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91. Qu.9, ff.8vb-9ra.
92. Qu.9, ff.8vb-9ra; qu.1, ff.1vb-2ra; qu.9, f.9rb; qu.14, f.14va. - Cf. Guillelmus Ockham, SL III-3 c. 1, p.588, 34-5.
93. Qu.9, ff.8vb-9ra.
only uses the term 'formal consequence' a few times, and then hardly as a technical term, at least not in contradistinction to 'material consequence', which term does not occur at all in his writings. 97 Ockham introduces the distinction, 98 but he does not explicitly state how he considers it in relation to the distinction between absolute and as of now consequences; he simply juxtaposes the two distinctions. The same situation occurs in the Ps.-Ockham Tractatus minor, 99 whereas the Elementarium logicae compares the two distinctions, but apparently without subordinating one to the other. 100

From this it seems that Nicolaus belonged to the earliest authors who were acquainted with both distinctions, and that at first there was much uncertainty as to how the two were to be considered in relation to each other. However, soon after Nicolaus the question was settled, but differently from the solution he reproduces.

Concluding remarks

From the preceding pages there has emerged a picture, not of one of the great original minds of the Middle Ages, but still of a master whose ideas deserve our attention. First, Nicolaus was a convinced Ockhamist teaching in Paris at a period when various measures were taken against the spreading of Ockham's doctrine. On a first impression it appears incomprehensible that a person taking the standpoints Nicolaus does could subscribe to such proceedings. But we know that Nicolaus did in 1341. 101 And how could a master expressing opinions so openly inspired by Ockham be elected rector of the university? Yet so was Nicolaus in 1344. 102 A closer study of Nicolaus' work may help us to understand this apparent contradiction, and so contribute to a fuller comprehension of what exactly was at issue in the attempts to stop Ockham's influence in Paris.

Apart from such questions of university politics, Nicolaus' commentary still deserves our interest. For we have seen that he was not a master who simply took over Ockham's opinions. Rather he received a basic inspiration from Ockham, but he was able to recast it into a personal form and to apply it to problems where he had no exact model in Ockham's writ-

97. Gualterus Burley, PAL pp.84,11sq.; 86,9sq.
99. (Guillelmus Ockham), Tractatus minor p.77.
100. (Guillelmus Ockham), Elementarium logicae pp.254-5.
102. Denifle 1894, 68.
ings. So in him we meet a "Parisian version" of Ockhamism. Further there were areas where Nicolaus received only slight inspiration from Ockham.

We have seen this in the theory of consequences. Also for the understanding of the historical development of this doctrine it is well worth following the traces Nicolaus' text shows us of a vivid debate in his time.

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