RADULPHUS BRITO ON THE SUFFICIENCY
OF THE CATEGORIES*

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In the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> Kant makes these comments:[1]

> This then is a list of all original pure concepts of synthe-
> sis, which belong to the understanding <u>a priori</u> ... The classi-
> fication is systematical, and founded on a common principle ...
> It is not the result of a search after pure concepts undertaken
> at haphazard, the completeness of which, as based on induction
> only, could never be guaranteed. Nor could we otherwise under-
> stand why these concepts only, and no others, abide in the pure
> understanding. It was an enterprise worthy of an acute thinker
> like Aristotle to try to discover these fundamental concepts;
> but as he had no guiding principle he merely picked them up as
> they occurred to him, and at first gathered up ten of them,
> which he called <u>categories</u> or <u>predicaments</u>. Afterwards he
> thought he had discovered five more of them, which he added under
> the name of <u>post-predicaments</u>. But his table remained imperfect
> for all that, not to mention that we find in it some modes of
> pure sensibility (<u>quando</u>, <u>ubi</u>, <u>situs</u>, also <u>prius</u>, <u>simul</u>), also an
> empirical concept (<u>motus</u>), none of which can belong to this
> genealogical register of the understanding. Besides, there are
> some derivative concepts, counted among the fundamental concepts
> (<u>actio</u>, <u>passio</u>), while some of the latter are entirely wanting.

Since Kant it has generally been taken as self-evident that Aristotle's

categories are an arbitrary classificatory system, neither complete nor

necessarily exclusive of one another. Prior to Kant we find similar com-

ments in the Port Royal <u>Logic</u>.[2] The critique of Aristotle appears to be

derived from the so-called "nominalist" tradition of the 14th century, but

as yet the precise origin of the attack on the 10-category scheme has not

been located.[3]

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1. Kant 1924, p. 67 (B107).
2. Arnauld 1964, pp. 42-45.
3. Sten Ebbesen has mentioned to me that Buridan was not convinced that
the list of ten categories is exhaustive.

In the ancient world Aristotle's categories were criticized by the Stoics and by Plotinus. However, for at least 50 years in the late 13th and early 14th centuries the Scholastics not only accepted the 10 categories as sufficient for the description of the whole of empirical reality but presented defenses of the point. These sufficientiae can be found, for example, in Albert the Great, who presents at least three different schemata of the categories,[4] in his pupil Thomas Aquinas,[5] in Simon of Faversham,[6] Peter of Auvergne,[7] and in Radulphus Brito, the subject of this discussion. They generally occur in commentaries on the Categories but can be found in other places, such as discussions of the Liber Sex Principiorum, and in Aquinas' case, a commentary on the Metaphysics. Elaborations on specific points are scattered throughout the literature, e.g., explanations of why action and passion must be two distinct categories and cannot be identified with motion, which is not a categorial concept.[8]

In the light of Aristotle's casual treatment of his ten categories and the subsequent criticisms of Aristotle it may be asked whether the Scholastics were oblivious to the criticisms of Aristotle. Or were they perhaps so motivated by blind obedience to the auctores that it never occurred to them to challenge the ten category scheme? There are no simple answers to these questions, but the text from Radulphus shows that there were serious attempts to show that there could be ten and only ten cate-

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4. Albertus Magnus 1890a, I, 7; VI, 1-2; 1890b, I, 1, 6.
5. Thomas Aquinas 1961, 891-892 (pp. 345-346).
6. Simonis Anglici sive de Faversham 1957, Q. 12.
7. Cf. Pinborg 1974, 41.
8. Cf. Albertus Magnus 1890b, II, 1, 5; G. Burlaeus 1497, 48r-49r. This edition of Burley does not have numbered pages, so I am supplying what should be the proper pagination.

gories. The <u>sufficientiae</u> are akin to what philosophers, using a Kantian phrase, call a "transcendental deduction" of the categories, but they probably are not sufficiently rigorous to receive that honorific characterization. Nevertheless, in the light of the recent revival of essentialism these efforts to justify the categories are of considerable philosophical interest, and they do show that philosophers like Kant are guilty of short-changing Scholastic thought.

The text edited here is from Radulphus Brito, described by Pinborg as "one of the most prolific and important authors among the <u>Modistae</u>."[9] Writing around 1300, he represents a high point of the medieval realist tradition in grammar and semantics. Shortly thereafter the terminist movement became predominant, so interest in the more formal aspects of logic supplanted discussions of ontological matters such as the categories.

Our text is Question 8 of Radulphus' <u>Quaestiones</u> <u>super</u> <u>librum</u> "<u>Praedicamentorum</u>." The nature of the Radulphus manuscripts has been discussed by Pinborg.[10] This edition is based on three manuscripts: B (ruxelles, B. Royale 3540-47 f. 75v-77r), O (simo, Coll. Camp. 39 f. 14r-14v, L(ondon, British Library, Harley 7357 f. 47v-49r). Three others have been consulted. Padova, B. Anton. XX 457 f.30r-31r and Salamanca, UB 2350 f.21r-22r contain the same version of the text as BOL —the "A-version".[11]

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9. Pinborg 1980, 56.
10. Pinborg 1980, 56-58.
11. Pinborg <u>l.c.</u>

However, Nürnberg, Stadt. Cent. V 21 f. 82r-82v gives a divergent text which Pinborg[12] calls the "B-version" of the Radulphus corpus. In it there are eight _rationes_ instead of six. The added arguments against the ten-category system are: (a) that corporeal and incorporeal substances should be distinct genera, and (b) there should be as many kinds of being as there are kinds of motion. The kinds of motion pertain to four categories, substance, quantity, quality, and _ubi_; therefore, there should be only these four categories. Also to the two _sufficientiae_ in the "A" manuscript tradition Nürnberg adds two (or one and a half) more. The first accepts the preceding delineation of six categories and treats of the four (_quando_, _ubi_, _situs_, _habitus_) which are caused totally extrinsically. The discussion of these hardly differs from what is said previously. The second additional _sufficientia_ covers all ten categories. It differs from the others mainly in that _ubi_ and _situs_ are included under the measuring/measured division rather than that of containing/contained, and _habitus_ is described via a comparison of the had to the having.

As for the three manuscripts used in this edition of the question, no one is so clearly superior to the others that it can be regarded as the main text, with the others taken as somewhat inferior variants. An offhand judgment would be that B is the best text over all, with O slightly inferior and L the least accurate. But each is better with regard to some passages and worse with regard to others. For example, in the _rationes_ L and O correspond in the first three arguments with B being deviant. Then in argument four L and B present parallel texts, whereas in argument five the correspondence is between B and O and then back to L and O. These shifts

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12. Pinborg 1980, 57.

occur at random throughout the text. L contains some important omissions, notably in the first _sufficientia_ and in the replies. Textual errors include: (L) "Secundo Metaphysicae" for "Quinto Metaphysicae" in _Ratio_ 4. (B) "Passio" for "positio" at the end of the second _sufficientia_. (O) "Tempus" for "quando" in the third reply. The most interesting discrepancy occurs with regard to the first _sufficientia_, where a threefold distinction is made between something compared as agent to patient, or measure to measured, or containing to contained. Only O _per se_ states this correctly, i.e., "hoc est tripliciter." B has "dupliciter" here, whereas L has "dupliciter" corrected to "tripliciter." In view of these considerations my aim has been to present a smooth, intelligible text which is philosophically interesting rather than to adhere rigidly to a given presentation.

As for the content of the question, the history underlying it is as yet unclear, but some preliminary observations can be made: The _rationes_ were no doubt standard arguments at the time. Their origin is not known, but three of them, the first, fifth, and sixth, can be found in Simon of Faversham,[13] who is known to have influenced Radulphus.[14] The second argument, that action and passion are one and identical with motion, is a very common one, anticipated by Aristotle himself (_Physics_ III, 3), which can be readily found in commentaries on the _Liber Sex Principiorum_.[15] The most extensive discussion of the issue in the literature occurs in Simplicius.[16] The third argument, which collapses four of the extrinsic categories into relation, is from Plotinus.[17]

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13. Simonis Anglici sive de Faversham 1957, Q. 12.
14. Pinborg 1975, 41-44, 48, 68-69.
15. See note 8 above.
16. Simplicius 1971-75, II, pp. 415ff.
17. Plotinus 1969, VI, 1: 13-14, 23-24; VI, 2: 16; VI, 3: 3, 11. Also Simplicius 1971-75, II, pp. 410ff., 468ff.

The history of the _sufficientiae_ also requires further research, but as Radulphus says, there seem to be two traditions. The one called the "expositio antiqua" probably dates back to the anonymous 12th century treatise, the Liber Sex Principiorum (erroneously attributed to Gilbert de la Porrée). Prior to that there was very little treatment of the last six categories, and the LSP constitutes an attempt to fill in that philosophical gap. The LSP provides detail on the six "extrinsic" categories but does not justify the ten category system. The first attempts to do this appear to have come about in the 13th century, when commentaries on the LSP were written. Probably one of the main _antiqui_ is Albert the Great, whose justifications occur both in his Categories and LSP commentaries.[18] The other tradition evidently derives from Simplicius, as Radulphus notes. Simplicius' extensive treatment of all ten categories was not available until 1266, when his commentary on Aristotle was translated into Latin by William of Moerbeke,[19] and about ten years later it was commonly known in the universities.[20] Thomas Aquinas is the first philosopher known to have cited Simplicius, in his Summa Theologiae,[21] but the only _sufficientia_ in Thomas, in his Commentary on the Metaphysics,[22] seems closer to the _expositio antiqua_. Albert is not known to have been familiar with Simplicius.[23] The "sufficientia Simplicii" does not occur in Simplicius as such, and it is not clear what passages in Simplicius are being alluded to.[24]

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18. See note 4 above.
19. A. Pattin in Simplicius 1971-75, I, p. XI.
20. Pattin in Simplicius 1971-75, I, p. XX.
21. Cf. Pattin in Simplicius 1971-75, I, p. XIV.
22. See note 5 above.
23. Cf. Pattin in Simplicius 1971-75, I, pp. XIX-XX.
24. Possibly Simplicius 1971-75, I, pp. 90-92; or II, 406-410.

In the following text classical orthography is employed, and several minor variants have been omitted from the apparatus. The paragraphing is mine rather than that of the scribes, and numbers for the rationes have been added.

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QUAESTIONES SUPER LIBRUM PRAEDICAMENTORUM

QUAESTIO 8

Utrum praedicamenta sint tantum 10, nec plura nec pauciora

Consequenter quaeritur utrum praedicamenta sint tantum 10, nec plura nec pauciora.

1. Arguitur primo quod sint pauciora quam 10, quia quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum, tot modis dicitur et reliquum. Modo substantia et accidens sunt opposita, et non est nisi unum praedicamentum substantiae. Ergo non erit nisi unum praedicamentum accidentis, et sic solum erunt duo praedicamenta.[1] Major habetur I Topicorum.[2] Minor patet de se.

2. Item probatio quod actio et passio sunt unum praedicamentum, et[3] per consequens non erunt nisi 9 praedicamenta,[4] quia illa quae habent aliquod commune supra se non sunt distincta praedicamenta, immo continentur sub uno praedicamento. Modo actio et passio habent aliquod commune supra se quod[5] praedicatur de ipsis sicut motus,[6] nam actio est motus, et passio est motus, et[7] tunc sunt novem.[8]

3. Item probatio quod quando,[9] ubi,[10] situs et habitus non distinguuntur a relatione, quia illa[11] quae referuntur ad alterum sunt de genere relationis et per consequens non distinguuntur a relatione. Modo ista quattuor[12] praedicamenta, quando,[13] ubi,[14] etc., referuntur ad alterum;[15] quare etc. Probatio minoris, quia quando est quod ex adiacentia temporis derelinquitur in re temporali. Modo adiacentia ad alterum refertur,[16] dicitur enim adiacentia alteri adiacentia. Et etiam[17] ubi, secundum auctorem Sex Principiorum,[18] est circumscriptio ex loci circumscriptione[19]

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1 argumenta B. 2 Cf. Arist. Top. 1.15.106a9ff. 3-4 om. B. 5 et O.
6 om. B. 7-8 om. LO. 9-10 om. B. 11 om. L. 12 om. LO. 13-14 ubi, situs
B. 15 relationem O. 16 est B. 17 om. BO. 18 Minio-Paluello, 48. 19 con-
scriptione L.

procedens. Modo circumscriptio ad aliquid est. Habitus etiam est[1] ad aliquid. Dicitur enim habitus habituati[2] habitus. Situs[3] etiam,[4] vel positio, ad[5] aliquid est,[6] quia est ordinatio partium in loco. Modo ordinatio dicitur ordinabilium ordinatio. Sic autem[7] erunt 6 praedicamenta.

4. Item ostenditur quod quando et ubi faciunt unum praedicamentum, quia si causa est univoca,[8] effectus[9] est univocus,[10] sicut apparet ex intentione Philosophi in multis locis, I Posteriorum,[11] v[12] Metaphysicae,[13] et[14] II Physicorum.[15] Modo causa istorum, scilicet[16] quando et ubi, est univoca.[17] Ergo[18] ista[19] univoce continentur sub aliquo, et sic non facient distincta praedicamenta. Minor declaratur,[20] quia ubi causatur a loco, et quando causatur a tempore. Modo locus et tempus univoce continentur sub quantitate continua, et[21] sic erunt octo.[22]

5. Item arguitur quod sunt plura quam 10, quia sicut se habet agere ad pati, ita videtur[23] se habere[24] habere ad haberi. Modo[25] agere et pati sunt distincta praedicamenta; ergo habere et haberi facient[26] distincta praedicamenta duo.[27] Major[28] patet, quia habere est activum, et[29] haberi est passivum.[30] Et[31] sic sunt 11.[32]

6. Item: Quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum, tot[33] modis dicitur[34] et reliquum. Modo substantia et accidens opponuntur; ergo[35] quot erunt praedicamenta accidentium, tot erunt praedicamenta[36] substantiae.[37] Modo[38] novem sunt praedicamenta accidentium; ergo novem erunt praedicamenta[39] substantiae[40] et sic erunt 18 praedicamenta.[41]

1-2 dicitur alicuius B. 3-4 ord.inv. LO. 5-6 om. B. 7 enim L, om. O. 8 unica B. 9-10 et effectus O. 10 unicus B. 11 Cf. Arist. Post. Anal. 1.24.85b10ff., & 2.16.98a35ff. 12 II L. 13. Arist. Metaph. 5.6.1016a24-1016b11? Cf. 7.6-9. 1031a28-1034b19, 12.3-5.1070a-1071a. 14 om. B. 15 Cf. Arist. Phys. 2.3. 195b22-28. 16 om. BL. 17 unica BO. 18 in B, igitur in L. 19 om. L. 20 est B. 21-22 ideo etc. L, om. O. 23-24 se habet O. 25-27 et sic facient duo praedicamenta L. 26 erunt B. 28-30 om. B. 29 om. O. 31-32 om. LO. 33-34 om. O. 35-37 om. B. 36 om. O. 38 et B. 38-40 om. L. 39,41 om. B.

In oppositum est Philosophus, qui non[1] enumerat nisi 10 praedicamenta, nec[2] plura nec pauciora.

Dico breviter[3] quod solum sunt 10 praedicamenta, nec plura nec pauciora. Et hoc probatur[4] sic,[5] dando sufficientiam istorum praedicamentorum,[6] quia omne ens vel est ens[7] per se subsistens vel[8] est ens in alio. Si est ens per se subsistens,[9] sic est praedicamentum substantiae. Si sit ens[10] in alio existens,[11] hoc est dupliciter, quia aut est ens in alio existens absolute,[12] aut in relatione ad alterum praeterquam ad subjectum[13] in quo est. Si sit ens[14] in alio[15] in relatione ad alterum praeterquam ad subjectum[16] in[17] quo est, sive[18] in[19] relatione ad alterum,[20] sic est relatio,[21] sive[22] praedicamentum relationis. Si sit ens in[23] alio absolute,[24] hoc est dupliciter, quia vel causatur in[25] subjecto ab intrinseco vel ab extrinseco. Si ab intrinseco, hoc est dupliciter, quia aut consequitur subjectum ratione materiae,[26] aut ratione formae. Si consequitur[27] subjectum[28] ratione materiae, sic est quantitas, quia[29] quantitas consequitur subjectum[30] ratione materiae, ut vult Boethius[31] supra capitulum de quantitate.[32] Si autem[33] consequitur subjectum[34] ratione formae, sic est qualitas. Si autem sit ab extrinseco, hoc[35] est tripliciter,[36] quia aut unum comparatur ad alterum sicut agens ad patiens, aut sicut mensura ad mensuratum, aut sicut continens ad contentum. Si primo modo, sic[37] sunt ista[38] duo praedicamenta,[39] actio et passio, actio ex parte agentis, passio ex parte patientis, et actio consequitur subjectum ratione formae, passio autem

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1-2 ponit X *(?)* non B. 3 om. L. 4-6 declaratur sufficientia istorum B. 5 om. L. 7 om. LO. 8-9 et L. 10 om. L. 11 om. B. 12 om. O. 13 substantiam B. 14 om. L. 15 existens add. L, praeter add. & del. O. 16 substantiam BL. 17-19 in quo est O a.c., sive in O p.c., ut videtur. 18-20 om. B. 21-22 om. B. 23-24 magis absolutum B, absolutum L. 25 a substantia vel B, a O. 26 et sic add. B. 27-28 om. L. 29-32 om. L. 30 substantiam O. 31 Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis 2, PL 64:202B-C. 33 om. B. 33-34 om. L. 35 sic O. 36 dupliciter B & L a.c. 37 tunc B. 38 om. O 39 sicut add. O.

ratione materiae, quia sicut[1] formae est agere, ita[2] materiae[3] pati. Si

autem unum comparatur ad alterum sicut mensura[4] ad mensuratum,[5] sic est

quando, quod causatur ex adiacentia temporis ad rem temporalem. Tempus

enim est mensura extrinseca respectu rei temporalis. Si autem comparatur

ad invicem sicut continens ad contentum, hoc est dupliciter, quia vel penes

habitudinem continentis ad contentum, vel penes habitudinem contenti ad

continens. Si penes[6] habitudinem contenti ad continens,[7] sic[8] est habitus,

quia[9] habitus[10] est corporum et eorum quae circa corpus sunt adiacentia,

unde causatur ex habitudine contenti ad continens. Si[11] autem[12] penes

habitudinem continentis ad contentum, hoc est dupliciter, quia   aut

continens comparatur ad contentum secundum se et absolute, et   sic est

ubi, quod causatur ex loci circumscriptione, aut continens comparatur ad

contentum secundum suas partes, et sic est situs vel positio, quae est

ordinatio partium in loco. Et ista sufficientia concordat cum sufficienta

Simplicii.

Alia sufficientia[13] potest haberi[14] ab expositione[15] antiqua,[16] sic: omne

quod est, aut est substantia vel accidens. Si sit[17] substantia, sic est

praedicamentum substantiae. Si sit[18] accidens, aut causatur ab intrinseco

aut ab extrinseco aut partim ab intrinseco et partim ab extrinseco. Si

autem[19] causetur[20] ab[21] intrinseco,[22] aut est absolutum[23] aut respectivum

praeterquam ad subjectum[24]. Si sit absolutum, aut consequitur subjectum[25]

ratione materiae, et[26] sic est quantitas,   aut ratione formae, et[27] sic

est qualitas.[28] Si sit respectivum, sic est relatio. Si autem[29] sit[30]

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1 om. LO. 2 et L, om. O. 3 autem add. O. 4 mensuratur ab extrinseco B, extrin-
seca add. O in mg. 5 mensura extrinseca add. L. 6-7 secundo B. 8 sicut L.
9-10 om. B. 11 sed B. 12 om. BL, sit add. O. 13-14 est sufficientia accepta B,
sufficientia ponitur O. 15-16 expositore antiquo BO. 17 om. B. 18 om. B.
19 om. BL. 20 causatur L. 21-22 sic (c̄ addito & deleto) B. 23 absolute L.
24,25 substantiam L. 26,27 om. L. 26-28 aut formae, primo modo est quan-
titas, secundo modo qualitas B. 29-30 om. B. 30 insit L.

partim ab intrinseco et partim ab extrinseco, aut est ab intrinseco[1]

ratione formae, et[2] sic est actio, quia[3] actio[4] consequitur aliquid ratione

formae, vel[5] ratione materiae, et[6] sic est passio. Si sit ab extrinseco,

aut accipitur[7] penes habitudinem mensurae ad mensuratum, et sic est quando,

quod causatur in re temporali ex tempore, vel penes habitudinem contenti

ad continens, et hoc est dupliciter, quia vel contentum habet continens vel

e converso. Si primo modo, sic est habitus, quia aliquis cappatus habet

cappam. Si continens[8] habet contentum,[9] hoc est dupliciter, quia vel

comparatur ad contentum secundum se vel secundum suas partes. Si[10] primo mo-

do,[11] est ubi. Si secundo[12] modo, sic[13] est positio.[14] Sic[15] ergo

apparet quod[16] sunt 10 praedicamenta, nec plura nec pauciora.[17]

Tunc[18] ad rationes:

1. Ad[19] primam:[20] Cum[21] dicitur[22] 'quot modis dicitur[23] unum opposi-

torum,'[24] etc., verum[25] est[26] quoad significata et[27] non[28] quoad supposita.

Et[29] cum dicitur 'substantia et accidens opponuntur', concedatur:[30] 'ergo[31]

quot sunt praedicamenta[32] substantiae,' etc.,[33] dico quod[34] non oportet quod[35]

quot sunt supposita unius quod tot sint[36] alterius. Sed quot sunt signifi-

cata[37] unius, tot sunt significata alterius. Tamen supposita accidentis

sunt plura quam supposita substantiae. Tamen quia aliquis diceret quod

'accidens' diceretur analogice de accidentibus specialibus, sicut de

quantitate, qualitate, et aliis,[38] et tunc ista sunt significata acci-

dentis et non supposita, ideo aliter[39] potest dici: quando dicitur 'quot

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1 extrinseco B. 2 om. B. 3-4 om. La.c., quae L p.c. 5 si B. 6 om. B. 7 excipitur
B. 8-9 contentum habet continens O, secundo modo L. 10-11 om. La.c., si secun-
dum se Lp.c., sic add. B. 12-13 secundum suas partes L. 13 tunc B. 14 passio B.
15-17 om. B. 16 tantum add. L. 18 om. B. 19-20 om. B. 21-22 om. O. 23-24 om. L.
25-26 concedendo B. 27 om. BL. 28 tamen add. L. 29 om. B. 30 concedo L.
31-32 ideo sunt in praedicamento B. 33-34 om. O. 35-36 quod tot sunt supposita
unius quot sunt B, quot sint supposita unius quod sunt La.c., quod tot sint sup-
posita unius quot sunt Lp.c., quod quot sunt suposita unius [quod quot sint add.
& del.] quod tot sint supposita O. 37 supposita B. 38 cetera B, sic de aliis L.
39 ad hoc B.

modis dicitur[1] unum oppositorum,' etc.,[2] verum est si illa plura significata unius[3] oppositi[4] opponantur alteri secundum proprias rationes ipsorum. Et[5] cum[6] dicitur 'substantia et accidens opponuntur,' verum est, et ideo quot modis dicitur[7] substantia,[8] tot modis dicitur accidens,[9] secundum communem[10] rationem accidentis. Sed quantitas et qualitas et alia praedicamenta accidentium secundum proprias rationes non opponuntur substantiae, sed magis ut conveniunt in ratione accidentis secundum rationem communem per quam sunt accidentia.[11] Vel potest dici quod substantia et accidens sunt[12] entia[13] disparata.[14] Modo[15] illa regula[16] solum habet[17] intelligi in illis quae sunt vere opposita.

2. Ad aliam:[18] 'Illa quae habent aliquod commune supra se,' etc., concedo, si[19] sit[20] aliquod commune univocum.[21] Cum[22] dicitur 'actio et passio habent aliquod commune supra se,' dico quod falsum est, non enim habe<n>t aliquod commune[23] univocum.[24] Et[25] cum dicitur quod ista[26] continentur sub motu,[27] aliqui dicunt quod motus est de essentia actionis et passionis, quod tamen[28] non credo esse verum. Unde ista praedicatio,[29] 'actio est motus; passio est motus,'[30] non est praedicatio essentialis. Immo est praedicatio subjecti de accidentibus[31] et materialis, quia actio et passio sunt quaedam proprietates fundatae in motu, et ad hoc potest adduci textus Philosophi II Physicorum.[32] Dicit enim ibi[33] quod actio et passio non sunt unum, sed motus cui haec insunt. Ergo vult quod actio et passio insunt motui sicut subjecto. Verum[34] est quod[35] frater Thomas[36] vult ibi quod sint motus essentialiter.

1-2 etc. L. 2 et reliquum 0. 3-4 illius supposita B. 4 soppositi L.
5 om. B. 6 om. 0. 7 om. 0. 8-9 substantia et accidens BO. 10 om. B.
11 entia in alio B, in aliquo add. L. 12-14 sub esse disparata sunt L.
13-14 essentiae disparatae B. 15 om. B. 16 ratio L. 17 soli debet L.
18 quando dicitur add. 0. 19-20 sicut B. 21 et add. L. 22-24 om. 0.
23 om. B. 25 om. B. 26 om. B. 27 scilicet actio et passio add. 0.
28 om. L. 29-30 om. L. 31 accidente 0. 32 immo Arist. Phys. 3.3.202b19-22.
33 om. 0. 34-35 Sed. B. 36 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Exposito in VII libros
Physicorum Aristotelis 3.5.

3. Ad aliam: Cum dicitur 'illa quae referuntur,'[1] etc., concedo, si per se et[2] essentialiter referuntur ad aliud.[3] Et[4] cum dicitur 'quando et[5] ubi, etc.,[6] referuntur ad aliud,' falsum[7] est:per se non referuntur ad aliud.[8] Et[9] quando probatur[10] quod quando[11] est adiacentia,[12] dico quod quando non est adiacentia sed derelinquitur ex adiacentia, sive[13] ex habitudine temporis[14] ad rem temporalem. Unde quando non est[15] relatio, sed est modus essendi[16] secundum quem aliquis dicitur esse in tempore sicut esse hodierum, esse[17] hesternum,[18] esse[19] crastinum,[20] etc.[21] Et[22] ubi[23] non est relatio, sed est consequens habitudinem continentis ad contentum. Etiam[24] habitus[25] non est relatio, sed est modus essendi secundum quem aliquis[26] denominatur habere aliquid et causatur ex habitudine contenti ad continens. Sed bene verum est quod supra ipsum habitus potest fundari relatio.[27] Etiam[28] positio[29] est quidam modus essendi et[30] causatur in subjecto ex ordinatione[31] partium in comparatione ad locum,[32] sicut[33] sessio et consimilia. Isti enim sunt quidam modi essendi secundum quos aliquis dicitur habere partes in[34] comparatione[35] ad locum.[36] Et non est situs[37] talis ordinatio partium sed est quidam modus essendi[38] causatus[39] in subjecto[40] ex tali ordinatione.[41]

4. Ad aliam: Cum dicitur 'si causa est univoca,'[42] etc., verum est[43] si[44] causa secundum quod causa est[45] univoca,[46] et effectus est univocus.[47] Et[48] cum dicitur 'causa a qua causantur quando et ubi[49] est univoca,'

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1 ad aliud add. B.   2 om. L.   3 aliquid B.   4 om. B.   5 om. L.   6 om. B.
7-8 om. L.   9-10 cum dicitur B.   11 tempus O.   12 etc. add. O.   13-14 rei temporalis O.   15 om. O.   16 om. O.   17-18 om. O.   19-20 om. L.   21 et sic de aliis LO.   22-23 ubi etiam B.   24-27 om. L.   24-25 habitus similiter B. 26 om. B.   28 om. B.   29 vel add. B.   29-32 situs non est relatio, sed est modus essendi causatus ex comparatione ad locum ex ordinatione partium in subjecto L.   30 om. O.   31 coordinatione B.   33-36 om. B.   34-35 om. O. 37 habitus BO, habitus L a.c., situs L p.c.   38 om. O.   39-40 om. B. 41 coordinatione, vel ordine derelictus B.   42 unica O.   43 quod add. O. 44 scilicet B.   45 om. B.   46 unica O.   47 unicus BO.   48 om. B.   49 et habitus add. O.

falsum est secundum quod est[1] causa istorum. Et[2] cum probatur[3] quod tempus et locus a quibus ista[4] causantur[5] sunt univoce contenta[6] sub quantitate continua, dico quod tempus et locus possunt dupliciter considerari, vel secundum esse reale quod habent extra animam, vel quantum ad rationem communem[7] intelligendi[8] in istis repertam. Modo quantum ad istam rationem communem univocantur in quantitate continua, et sic non sunt causa istorum, sed quantum ad[9] esse reale non univocantur[10] in aliquo. Et ut sic sunt causa quando et ubi.

5. Ad aliam:[11] 'sicut se habet agere ad pati,' etc., dico quod est simile et dissimile.[12] Simile est in[13] hoc[14] quia sicut 'agere' significatur per modum activi et 'pati' per modum passivi, ita 'habere' significatur ut[15] activum,[16] et[17] 'haberi' ut passivum. Sed in[18] alio[19] est dissimile, quia[20] idem[21] est modus essendi[22] secundum[23] quem aliquis dicitur habere et secundum quem aliquis[24] dicitur haberi, sicut idem est modus essendi[25] secundum quem aliquis dicitur habere cappam et secundum quem cappa dicitur haberi ab ipso, quia secundum quemcumque[26] istorum aliquis dicitur cappatus. Sic autem non est[27] in agere et pati, quia non est idem modus essendi[28] secundum quem aliquis est[29] agens et secundum quem aliquis[30] est[31] patiens. Vel potest[32] dici[33] quod habere et haberi faciunt diversa praedicamenta,[34] sed[35] habere secundum[36] quod continens habet contentum habet[37] reduci ad praedicamentum ipsius ubi.

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1 om. O. 2 om. BL. 3 dicitur B. 4 om. BL. 5 illa add. L, istis add.&del.
B. 6 concepta L. 7-8 intelligendi et communem L. 8 communem? add. O.
9 suum add. LO. 10 in istis add.&del. O. 11 conceditur? add. O. 12 et add.
B. 13-14 om. B. 15-16 per modum activi L. 17 om. O. 18-19 om. B. 20 ideo
add. L. 21 non add.&del. L. 22 om. O. 23-25 om. L. 24 om. B. 25 om. O.
26 unumquemque O, quemcumque add. L, quendam del. L. 27 om. O. 28 om. O.
29,31 dicitur O. 30 om. L. 32-33 dicatur B. 34 unde
habere/i secundum quod continens habet contentum facit praedicamentum habitus
add. L. p.c. 35 scilicet O. 36 scilicet O. 37 rem add. L.

6. Ad aliam: cum[1] dicitur[2] 'quot modis dicitur unum[3] oppositorum, tot[4] modis dicitur et reliquum,'[5] ista[6] soluta est prius,[7] quia istud[8] verum est si opponantur secundum proprias rationes cuiuslibet significati. Modo sic non est in proposito, ut visum[9] est.[10]

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1 quando B. 1-2 om. O. 3-5 etc. L. 4-5 etc. O. 6-7 solum est prius B, illa vero prius est soluta L. 8 om. B. 9-10 ostensum est supra ideo etc. B, sequitur quaestio nona add. B.