

THOMAS BRADWARDINE'S
TREATISE ON 'INCIPIT' AND 'DESINIT'

Edition and Introduction

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I. Manuscripts and Editorial Principles

The treatise edited below has been transmitted in four manuscripts, viz.,

A = Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. vat. lat. 3066, fols. 50v-52r;

B = Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale Albert 1^{er}, cod. 14324-43, fols. 15v-18r;

C = Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. vat. lat. 2154, fols. 24r-29v;

D = Vienna, Dominikanerkloster, cod. 187 (153), fols. 215v-218v (Hill Monastic Manuscript Library; Monastic Manuscript Project. No. 16.808).¹

As can be learned from inspecting the critical apparatus appended to the edited text no definite relationships can be shown to exist between the different versions of the text presented by the four MSS. Most variant readings are particular in the sense that they make appearance in only one MS. Cases where two MSS agree against the remaining two do occur but they are comparatively infrequent and reveal no recognizable pattern. For this reason the reading represented by the majority of witnesses has normally been adopted in the edited text. Exceptions to this general principle have been taken only in cases where adoption of the 'lectio difficilior' seemed imperative.

As necessitated by the lack of definable groupings among the four MSS known at present the apparatus has been made as exhaustive as possible. All variant readings have been indicated in the apparatus except the following trivial ones: 'iste'/'ille'; 'sive'/'seu'; 'igitur'/'ergo', as well as obviously insignificant variations in word order. Though this means including a large number of non-sensical readings, in particular from C, alternative strategies would inevitably imply grave risks of arbitrariness.

II. Authorship and Date

Seen on the basis of the alternative posed by the MSS the authorship of the present treatise must have been a moot question in the Middle Ages.

¹ As I have not inspected any of the MSS themselves I refrain from presenting full descriptions. For A and C the reader may consult Weisheipl (1969), p.182, and Maier (1961), pp.90ff. At this juncture I should like to express my gratitude to Professor H. Hubien, Liège, for drawing attention to the existence of B. Furthermore, I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Jan Pinborg who, besides making D known to me, encouraged work on the present edition and made many valuable suggestions. Finally, I am indebted to Adam Bülow-Jacobsen, d.phil., for producing high-quality prints from the microfilm reproducing A.

Whereas A and C point out the well-known Thomas Bradwardine as its author, B and D consider the less celebrated Thomas Maulfeld to have been responsible for this work. However, this discrepancy does not preclude us from deciding the question of authorship with a very high degree of likelihood. If there are particularly strong reasons for ascribing the present treatise to one of the two authors proposed, settling the question of authorship in favour of the other would imply serious difficulties.

In favour of Thomas Bradwardine's authorship argues the fact that A, which is by far the best of the four MSS, explicitly ascribes the treatise to him. The second and more weighty argument comes to light when we fix our attention on the mode of composition of this treatise. The author has clearly attempted to construct his exposition along axiomatic lines or "more geometrico". Now it is a well-known fact that predilection for the axiomatic manner of exposition is a highly characteristic feature of all those works of which Bradwardine is the incontestable author. Thus both the *De Continuo* and the *De Proportionibus* as well as his theological main work, the *De Causa Dei*, are moulded according to the "Euclidian" method of exposition. In the third place the possibility exists of establishing a doctrinal concordance between the present treatise and Bradwardine's other writings. In the *De Continuo* Bradwardine touches on the question whether one should assign internal or external limits to the ceasing of a so-called permanent thing. Here he strongly advocates the point of view that decision of this question should be in favour of an external limit:

... et alicuius rei permanentis, ut hominis, non est aliquod ultimum intrinsecum sui esse.²

As is clear already from the second supposition this point of view is considered to be of fundamental importance in the present treatise:

Secunda suppositio est hec quod non est dare ultimum instans rei permanentis in esse.

Against Bradwardine's authorship of the present treatise an objection might be raised. The author of this work is of the opinion that one cannot possess determinately true knowledge of future states of affairs and, consequently, that future happenings possess a truth-value as yet not settled. On the other hand, so the objection proceeds, from Bradwardine's *De Futuris Contingentibus* as well as from his *De Causa Dei* we know that one of Bradwardine's main objectives³ was to establish a causative concep-

2. Thomas Bradwardine (1957), p. 58⁺ (396).

3. Cf. Leff (1957), pp.103ff.; Oberman (1957), pp.105ff.

tion of the divine prescience and, on this basis, a view of future contingents diametrically opposed to the opinion sustained in the present treatise. To this objection two answers are possible. The first consists in pointing out that in the *De Causa Dei*⁴ Bradwardine informs us that he experienced his "conversion" which opened his eyes to the true nature of God's gracious omnipotence, while he was still in the faculty of arts. By assigning a date to the present treatise within the period prior to the "conversion" one could, accordingly, circumvent the objection. However, this solution is by no means the only possible one. The author of the present treatise stresses the fact that in his treatment of the subject chosen he has decided to disregard God as first cause, thereby implying that in this treatise he is prepared to accept the commonly accepted teachings on the nature of future contingents. This is all the more reasonable inasmuch as the author bases his argument not on the true nature of future events but on man's natural inability to have certain knowledge of the future, which is of course an incontestable fact irrespective of one's view of God's prescience.

Coming to the problem of Thomas Maulfeld's possible authorship of this treatise it is first of all important to realize that our possibility of providing a solution is seriously hampered by our very limited knowledge of Maulfeld's career and authentic production.⁵ However, we know of at least one work whose attribution to Maulfeld is beyond doubt, and which deals with the verbs 'to begin' and 'to cease', and this is his so-called *Confusiones*.⁶ In this work Maulfeld espouses a doctrine on 'desinit' which does not tally well with his having written the present treatise. In expounding propositions containing the verb 'to cease' Maulfeld writes as follows:

Similiter hec dictio 'desinit' dicitur exponi uno modo per unam (scil. propositionem) affirmativam de presenti et negativam de futuro, ut in hac propositione 'Sortes desinit esse' hoc est 'Sortes nunc est et immediate post hoc Sortes non erit'. Alio modo exponitur per unam negativam de presenti et affirmativam de preterito ut 'desinit esse motus' id est 'nunc non est motus et immediate ante hoc fuit motus'.⁷

4. Thomas Bradwardine (1618), fol.308 C ff. (and not in the preface as claimed by Leff (1957), p.13).

5. For Thomas Maulfeld see Maieru (1972), pp.31-32 *et passim*.

6. Professor L.M. de Rijk, Leiden, is preparing an edition of this work.

7. Thomas Maulfeld: *Confusiones*, fols.143v-144r.

Comparing this exposition with the view set forth in Bradwardine's *De Continuo* and in the present treatise we may say that in his *Confusiones* Maulfeld defends the view that the ceasing of permanent objects is limited internally, and that this view is strictly opposed to the one sustained in the present treatise and in the *De Continuo*. Below we shall get an opportunity of showing that this opposition is general in the sense that we are here confronted with two different kinds of approach to the problem of how to expound 'incipit' and 'desinit'.

Having established Thomas Bradwardine as the by far most likely candidate for the authorship of the treatise edited below we may endeavour to fix its date of composition.

Already by the middle of the thirteenth century the two terms 'incipit' and 'desinit' had been classified as syncategorematic words, and as such they formed part of the university teaching in logic under the arts faculty. For this reason it is probable that Bradwardine would have found the most natural opportunity of composing a treatise like the present one during his period of regency in the arts faculty. As far as Bradwardine's biography is known today he was 'magister regens in artibus' in the period from 1322 to 1325.⁸ Furthermore, an early dating of this treatise gains considerably in strength if we turn our attention to the clues provided by the treatise itself. In this treatise Bradwardine carries on a controversy against William Ockham's interpretation of the 'suppositio predicati' in propositions containing the verbs 'to begin' and 'to cease'. In his logical main work, the *Summa Logicae*,⁹ Ockham deals with 'incipit' and 'desinit' on two occasions, viz., in chapter 75 of the first part and chapter 19 of the second. Accepting with the editors of the complete edition of the SL that the entire work was completed already in 1323¹⁰ we would be justified in limiting the period of composition of the present treatise to 1323-1325.

However, even this period may be further reduced! It is an indisputable fact that Bradwardine's polemics against Ockham's views are directed exclusively against Ockham's first treatment of 'incipit' and 'desinit' (SL I, 75). As Ockham's two chapters on these two terms are far from being

8. Thomas Bradwardine (1959), p.296 (Oberman's and Weisheipl's introduction to the edition). Cf. Thomas Bradwardine (1955), pp.3ff. (Crosby's introduction to the edition), and Weisheipl (1968), p.189.

9. Hereinafter referred to by way of 'SL'.

10. William Ockham (1974), p.56⁺.

identical - they are in fact inconsistent - it appears preponderantly likely that the reason for Bradwardine's concentrating on SL I,75 is to be found in the circumstance that he was not yet acquainted with Ockham's treatment in SL II,19. Our interpretation of the discussion between Ockham and Bradwardine¹¹ will make apparent that in SL II,19 Ockham has modified and changed his teaching on exactly those points where he had been attacked by Bradwardine in the present treatise. Inasmuch as Ockham's exposition in SL II,19 can be shown to be a step-by-step reaction to Bradwardine's criticism, and as Ockham himself in the opening section of SL II,19 indicates the existence of a controversy regarding the exposition of 'incipit' and 'desinit' it is by no means far-fetched to conclude that it was Bradwardine's treatise which forced Ockham to alter his convictions. The generally accepted assumption that the single parts of the SL became available successively¹² would seem to tally particularly well with this interpretation of the relationship between Ockham and Bradwardine. Possibly it might also explain the curious fact that the SL contains two mutually incompatible interpretations of 'incipit' and 'desinit'.

With regard to the dating of the present treatise this interpretation of Bradwardine's opposition to SL I,75 and Ockham's response to this criticism in SL II,19 carries the implication that Bradwardine composed his treatise in the period lying between the time of publication of the first and the second parts of the SL. In other words, it is arguable that Bradwardine wrote this treatise as early as 1323.

As the 'igitur' appearing in the 'incipit' of the treatise indicates, Bradwardine's treatment of 'to begin' and 'to cease' may possibly have formed part of a more comprehensive work or series of lectures on syncategorematic words.

III. The Aristotelian Background

Even though already the early scholastics had introduced the two terms 'incipit' and 'desinit' into their treatments of principally equivocal terms¹³ the peculiarly scholastic tradition of 'incipit' and 'desinit' did not see the light of day until around the middle of the thirteenth century. At this point the Aristotelian discussion contained in particular in the sixth and eighth books of the *Physics* was made the basis of the interpretation of

11. See below, section V.3.

12. William Ockham (1974), pp.7⁺ ff.

13. Cf. Kretzmann (1976a), pp.105 ff.

these two words. Consequently, if we are to form an impression of the basis of the medieval tradition we must turn to these Aristotelian texts. However, we cannot, in this context, undertake anything like a full interpretation of Aristotle's deliberations on the nature of time. Primarily because Aristotle's proper doctrine is extremely complicated - and possibly not quite consistent - and secondarily since contemporary discussions have shown the true meaning of the sixth and eighth books of the *Physics* to be a matter of contention among specialists¹⁴ Accordingly we shall restrict ourselves to emphasizing only the basic features in Aristotle's discussion and those distinctions which were considered to be of fundamental importance by the medieval schoolmen.

According to Aristotle time is a continuous entity in the same way as magnitude and motion are (232 b 21 ff.). That time is continuous is to Aristotle the same as saying that any segment of time is infinitely divisible and, consequently, that it is in principle impossible to arrive at a last and indivisible or smallest time-unity. If you cannot reach a last time-unity by a process of repeated divisions of a given segment of time then, correspondingly, it is a grave misconception to consider time as constituted by so-called time-atoms. However, it is quite obvious that we believe events to take place at certain points in time. In doing this we are making cuts in the continuous flow of time in order to designate certain instants as more important or notable than the infinitely large number of other instants which could just as well be designated within any ever so small period of time. According to Aristotle we are perfectly justified in designating points in time since any change that is measured against time happens instantaneously (235 b 6 ff.). By way of example we may say that the runner finishes his race in exactly that instant in which he passes the finishing-line. In spite of the fact that no indivisible time-unity exists and that time is not composed of such time-atoms, it is nonetheless possible to designate extensionless instants in the flow of time. The reason why this does not imply a contradiction is, according to Aristotle, that it is a characteristic feature of continuous entities that an actualized dividing-point is common to both segments into which it divides the continuous entity (231 a 20 ff.). This is to say that an actualized dividing-point in the continuous flow of time is finishing-point of one segment as well as starting-point of the other segment (222

14. See, e.g., Miller (1974); Kretzmann (1976b); Sorabji (1976).

a 10 ff.).¹⁵ If matters were any different one would be forced to maintain that two instants could be in direct contact, and that the period of time limited by the two instants was not further divisible (231 a 29 ff.; 236 a 15 ff.).

However, at this juncture we are confronted with a problem. If it is true that an actualized dividing-point is common to both segments then the law of contradiction seems to be endangered. Taking one of Aristotle's own examples we may focus on the point in which Socrates begins to exist. By designating this point we have divided time into two segments, one in which Socrates does not exist, and one in which Socrates exists. But then somebody poses the question: Does Socrates exist in this dividing-point or doesn't he? On the basis of time's continuity we would be correct in answering in the negative as well as in the affirmative since the dividing-point belongs truly to both segments into which it has divided the continuous entity. Logically speaking, however, this situation is basically intolerable since it would mean giving up the law of contradiction (235 b 13 ff.).

Aristotle's further discussion in the fifth chapter of book six as well as in the eighth chapter of book eight of the *Physics* is devoted not least to the solution of how in different cases this sort of violation of the law of contradiction is to be avoided. The main point in Aristotle's general solution is to demonstrate that from a logical point of view one is justified in attributing the dividing-point to just one of the segments (e.g., 263 b 12 ff.).¹⁶ In this context we shall not deal with these attempts at a solution but, instead, turn to the medieval scholastics in order to see which results they thought themselves justified in extracting from Aristotle's exposition and on which they based their own treatment of the problem.

IV. The Scholastic Tradition Prior to Bradwardine

IV.1 The Main Elements in the Medieval Tradition


In his treatment of beginning and ceasing Aristotle made use, so the scholastics believed, of two distinctions of fundamental importance. The first concerns the kinds of entities whose beginning and ceasing are dealt with. Thus it is important to distinguish between 'res permanentes' and

15. Below we shall observe that not all medieval scholastics were prepared to accept this.

16. Cf. Wilson (1956), pp. 29 ff.; Murdoch (1979), pp. 118 ff.

'res successive'. A permanent thing is, according to the definition commonly provided by the scholastics, an object whose parts exist simultaneously, as for instance a human body. A successive thing is defined as an entity whose parts exist only successively, as for instance local motion. The second distinction of basic relevance to the solution of the problem of beginning and ceasing is that existing between the first and the last instant of being. As one may affirm as well as deny the existence of either a first or a last instant of some object's being, and as it is imperative to attribute the dividing-point to just one of the two segments it is evident that if a first instant of being is denied with regard to some object then, according to the scholastics' reading of Aristotle, a last instant of non-being should be affirmed, and *vice versa*. On the other hand, if a last instant of being is denied with regard to some object then one must affirm a first instant of non-being for this object, and *vice versa*. In other words, if one attributes the dividing-point to the preceding segment of time one is prevented from attributing it to the succeeding segment since logical considerations stipulate the necessity of attributing such a point to only one segment. In the same way attributing the dividing-point to the succeeding segment of time means renouncing on an attribution of this point to the preceding segment.


A common, though by no means universal, combination of these distinctions is the following. For the beginning of a permanent thing one must, according to most scholastics' reading of Aristotle (235 b 13 ff.; 264 a 2 ff.), affirm a first instant of being and thereby deny a last instant of non-being. As to the ceasing of a permanent thing there was considerable disagreement among the scholastics but more often than not it was assumed that Aristotle denied a last instant of being and affirmed a first instant of non-being (cf. 263 b 9 ff.). We may visualize this relationship by means of one of J.E. Murdoch's highly illuminating graphs:¹⁷



Affirming a first instant of being and denying a last instant of non-being was often called making a 'positio de presenti et remotio de preterito'. When affirming a first instant of non-being and denying a last instant of being one was making a 'remotio de presenti et positio de preterito'.

17. Murdoch (1979), p. 121; also used in Murdoch (Anal. Char.).

As regards the beginning of successive things the scholastics felt justified in assuming that Aristotle denied a first instant of being and therefore affirmed a last instant of non-being (cf. 236 a 26 ff.). Equally well founded in Aristotle's teaching (cf. 236 a 3 ff.) was the persuasion that in regard to the ceasing of a successive entity a last instant of being should be deined, whereas a first instant of non-being should be affirmed. Schematically this can be represented like this:¹⁸



In denying a first instant of being and affirming a last instant of non-being one was making a 'remotio de presenti et positio de futuro'.

In order to exhaust the possibilities of combining the two basic distinctions we may mention that someone who in the case of some object's ceasing wished to affirm a last instant of being and deny a first instant of non-being would of course be making a 'positio de presenti et remotio de futuro'.

In medieval logic the terms 'incipit' and 'desinit' were considered to be syncategorematic or exponible words inasmuch as scholastic logicians believed that propositions which contain either of the two verbs carry an implicit negation and possess different significations according to the kinds of objects to which their subject term refers. Accordingly, a logician subscribing to the interpretation of Aristotle's definitions summarized above would maintain that a sentence such as 'Socrates begins to be' is to be expounded by way of the proposition 'Socrates is now and Socrates was not previously'. This kind of copulative sentence corresponds to the 'positio de presenti et remotio de preterito' and was, not surprisingly, called an 'affirmativa de presenti et negativa de preterito'. A proposition such as 'Socrates ceases to be' should be analysed into the sentence 'Socrates is not now and Socrates was previously'; this corresponds to the 'remotio de presenti et positio de preterito' and was termed a 'negativa de presenti et affirmativa de preterito'. Coming to successive entities our average medieval logician would analyse a proposition such as 'Plato begins to run' into the copulative sentence 'Plato is not running now and Plato will be running after this' corresponding to a 'remotio de presenti et positio de futuro' and for this reason called a 'negativa de

¹⁸. According to Murdoch (1979), p. 120; also used in Murdoch (Anal.Char.).

presenti et affirmativa de futuro'. Propositions including the verb 'to cease' and having subject terms denoting successive entities would have to be expounded along the same lines as propositions dealing with the ceasing of permanent objects.

Someone who wished to affirm a last instant of being and deny a first instant of non-being would expound a proposition such as 'Socrates ceases to be' into the sentence 'Socrates is now and Socrates will not be after this' corresponding to a 'positio de presenti et remotio de futuro'; this has as its logical counterpart the terminological expression 'affirmativa de presenti et negativa de futuro'.

Having now supplied a sketch of the Aristotelian background to, as well as the basic elements in, the medieval discussions of the verbs 'to begin' and 'to cease' we may turn to some of Bradwardine's predecessors. In dealing with these scholastics of the thirteenth and very early fourteenth centuries we shall focus in particular on the various grounds they give for assigning either internal or external limits to the different kinds of objects' beginning and ceasing. On this basis we shall be able to identify that branch of the medieval 'incipit' and 'desinit' tradition to which Bradwardine's treatise belongs, as well as pointing out the characteristic features of this work.

IV.2.a William of Sherwood

In chapter sixteen of his 'Treatise on Syncategorematic Words' William of Sherwood deals with the terms 'to begin' and 'to cease'.¹⁹ In the first two paragraphs William argues the necessity of treating these two terms as syncategorematic in spite of the grammatical fact that they are verbs. In the third paragraph William submits his exposition proper of the two terms. Basing himself on Aristotle he draws the common distinction between permanent and successive states or things, and his definitions of these two kinds of objects are completely identical to the ones outlined above. As his starting-point William takes the, according to him, commonly made claim that as applied to permanent objects 'to begin' and 'to cease' should be expounded by a positing of the present and a removing of, respectively, the past and the future. Against this view, which assigns internal limits to both ends of a permanent state, William raises an objection. This objection has the form of a dilemma: if Socra-

19. William of Sherwood (1941), pp. 74-77; (1968), pp. 106-116.

tes begins to be healthy and ceases to be ill we would, on the basis of this exposition of 'incipit' and 'desinit', be forced to affirm either that the instant of beginning and the instant of ceasing are one and the same and, consequently, that Socrates is both healthy and ill at this point, or we shall have to admit that these two instants are different. The consequence of this last alternative is that Socrates will be neither healthy nor ill in the period of time lying between these two instants. Obviously the presupposition of the dilemma is that 'being healthy' and 'being ill' are both permanent states.


As is made apparent in his subsequent treatment William is convinced of the rationality of this argument. First of all William holds that the argument is correct in pointing out that the proposed expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' are flawed inasmuch as they do not allow of change from one permanent state into another permanent state. Furthermore, William's acceptance of the argument implies that he is in concord with that conception of time on which the argument is based. The reason why the suggested expositions do not allow of two permanent states being immediately successive is partly that two points or instants cannot be immediately contiguous²⁰, and partly that a dividing-point or an instant cannot be common to two segments. Seen on the background of Aristotle's view that the continuous character of time demands the community of a dividing instant, and that logical considerations alone call for the attribution of an actualized instant to only one segment it must be said that William has given priority to the logical demand in such a way as to rob continuous time of its defining characteristic.²¹

In his further analysis William stresses that every change is either into a successive or into a permanent state. First William focuses on the case where something changes into a permanent state. In this sort of cases one must, according to William, claim a first instant of being so that we may say that Socrates is really healthy when he begins to be healthy. To the state which precedes the permanent state and which, accordingly,

20. Cf. the last sentence of paragraph seven in chapter sixteen; William of Sherwood (1941), p. 77; (1968), p. 115.


21. It would be tempting to suggest that William's conception of the continuity of time has been more or less similar to the one claiming that a continuous entity contains and consists of a potentially infinite number of points or, in the case of time, instants. Only on this basis does William's denial of the community of the dividing-point and his refusal to accept two immediately contiguous instants make sense. For the medieval conceptions of the 'continuum' see Maier (1949) and (1964) as well as Murdoch (1964) and (1974).

ceases to be one should, on the other hand, attribute a first instant of non-being. Applied to Socrates who regains his health this means that Socrates' being ill must be limited externally. Schematically we may visualize this relationship as follows:




William fails to specify whether he considers 'being ill' to be a permanent or a successive state but, as we shall see below, he believes his exposition of this relationship to be valid on both alternatives.

Next William proceeds to analyse the case where change is into a successive state. In this case it is impossible to assign a first instant of being to the state or object which starts to be. Accordingly, a last instant of being must be claimed for the preceding state which, of course, ceases to be:



Finally, William tries to give a more general elaboration of this analysis which focuses exclusively on the reciprocal exclusiveness existing between first instants of being and last instants of being.

If change is into a permanent state then, according to William, 'to begin' has to be expounded by means of positing the present or by assigning a first instant of being. Consequently, the state from which change is taking place must be limited externally, and this is to say that we must expound the ceasing matching this beginning by a denial of the present and an affirmation of the past. William explicates that this analysis of 'desinit' holds good no matter whether it is associated with permanent or successive objects. Schematically this can be represented like this:



If change is into a successive state then the exposition of 'incipit' and 'desinit' should be quite different. In this case we must accept that the object which starts to be should be limited externally and that 'incipit' should be expounded by a negation of the present. As the dividing-point cannot be common to both segments and as two instants cannot be immediately contiguous this relationship carries the implication that the ceasing corresponding to this beginning should be limited internally or by an affirmation of the present. Obviously this exposition of 'desinit' is valid for permanent as well as successive objects or states.²²

<u>Ceasing</u>	<u>Beginning</u>
Successive states	
Permanent states	Successive states
last instant of being	last instant of non-being

William is fully aware of the fact that in some cases it may not be possible to sustain the existence of a last instant of being. From Aristotle (234 a 24 - b 9; 239 a 10 - b 4) he knows that rest is just such an exception.²³ In cases of this nature William is willing to allow that both 'incipit' and 'desinit' be expounded by means of removing the present. How we are to avoid the logical difficulties arising from this solution William does not specify.

Thus it is clear that William of Sherwood achieves his expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' on the basis of analyses focusing on the different kinds of transition, *viz.*, from permanent or successive states into permanent ones and from successive or permanent states into successive ones. The indisputable presuppositions of these analyses are his view that a point or instant dividing continuous time cannot be common to two

22. Several logicians expounded 'incipit' and 'desinit' with a view to allowing for transitions from permanent to successive objects. To these scholastics it was imperative to deviate from Aristotle and adopt the obviously more convenient alternative of assigning internal limits to the ceasing of permanent things. See, e.g., Ps.-Petrus Hispanus (as quoted by Kretzmann (1976a), p. 112); Thomas Maulfeld (quoted above, section II); and John of Holland (see Wilson (1956), pp. 33ff.). However, in the thirteenth century providing the ceasing of successive objects with internal limits is quite unique with William of Sherwood. Below we shall observe how William Ockham attributes internal limits to the beginning as well as the ceasing of successive objects, but his reasons for doing this are strictly opposed to William of Sherwood's motives.

23. From Aristotle's point of view William might just as well have mentioned 'motion' as such an exception, but of course this would have been the same as admitting that his general rule was inapplicable to successive states or objects.

adjacent segments, as well as his conviction that the expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' should be able to deal with cases of transition.²⁴

The result of these analyses is evidently that it is impossible to give a single and universally valid exposition of either 'incipit' or 'desinit' for any kind of object. Now one has to expound a 'desinit' occurring with permanent things by means of a positing of the present and a removing of the future, now by means of a denial of the present and an affirmation of the past. In this way the expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' as occurring in particular propositions are totally dependent on physical reality inasmuch as the nature and sequence of the elements involved in a particular transition determine which kind of exposition is to be used.²⁵

IV.2.b Walter Burley

Walter Burley's treatise 'De Primo et Ultimo Instanti'²⁶ is not a logical-grammatical examination of 'incipit' and 'desinit' but an investigation into the problems of assigning limits to the beginning and ceasing of different types of entities. The reason for introducing the work into this context is to be found in the fact that this early work of Burley's²⁷

24. That positing a first instant of being excludes the possibility of assigning a last instant of non-being for one and the same object's beginning is maintained by all scholastics and is, in fact, just another way of saying that from a logical point of view a dividing-point should be attributed to just one segment. However, that William applies this principle to the actual transition from one state into another and different state is a direct consequence of his refusal to allow of the dividing-point being common to both segments of time. Thus we may say that all scholastics would agree that affirming a first instant of Socrates' being white is equivalent to denying a last instant of Socrates' not being white. William extends the validity of this principle by claiming that affirming a first instant of Socrates' being white is tantamount to denying a last instant of Socrates being black. Somebody like Peter of Spain would emphatically deny the validity of this extension. Cf. below, section IV.3.

25. I cannot agree with N.Kretzmann (1976a), p.114, when he claims that no medieval logician perceived the inconsistency existing between the commonly provided expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' (cf. above, section IV.1) and change from, e.g., one successive state into another. I believe that all medieval logicians saw this inconsistency, and that two kinds of reaction were possible. The first is epitomized by William of Sherwood who designs his treatment with the express aim of avoiding this inconsistency. The second attitude is that of, e.g., Peter of Spain, William Ockham and Thomas Bradwardine who are all persuaded that this inconsistency is only apparent in the sense that it is based on a faulty understanding of Aristotle's teaching on time.

26. I have used the edition published by H. and C. Shapiro; as this is not critical and for this reason should be used with caution I have on several points consulted the MSS at my disposal.

27. It was written in the period prior to the so-called 'Tractatus Primus' which was composed in the period 1320-1327. See Weisheipl (1968), pp.176, note 61; 181 ff.; 184; and Juarez (1978), pp. 25 ff.

has quite a number of essential features in common with William of Sherwood's exposition of 'incipit' and 'desinit'. Accordingly Burley's work may serve both to show that William of Sherwood's basic approach to the problem of beginning and ceasing was by no means unique, and to emphasize those features which are characteristic of this branch of the medieval 'incipit' and 'desinit' tradition.

Burley draws the distinction between permanent and successive entities; a unique feature of his version of this distinction is the fact that a large number of subdivisions are introduced into the category of permanent objects.²⁸ In the third part of his treatise Burley draws up four rules establishing the first instant of being and the last instant of non-being as well as the last instant of being and the first instant of non-being as mutually exclusive. Like William of Sherwood Burley bases these rules on the conviction that a point dividing time into two segments cannot be common to both segments. Thus in opposition to Aristotle but in agreement with William of Sherwood Burley gives pre-eminence to logical considerations to such a degree that he lets the logical necessity of attributing a dividing-point to only one segment become an attribute of time itself.

In contradistinction to William of Sherwood Burley does not allow of assigning internal limits to successive objects, and in this respect he is a true follower of Aristotle.²⁹ On the other hand he shares William's conscientious concern that the various kinds of states 'fit together' when they have been assigned their different sorts of limit. For this reason Burley is ready to accept that a last instant of being should be allotted to certain species of permanent objects since this guarantees the congruity between the two members in a transition from a permanent state to a successive state or object. Furthermore, as he accepts the existence of changes directly from one permanent object to another permanent object Burley is forced to make allowance for such exceptions. This he does by stressing that in cases of this kind one should deny either that the subsequent permanent thing possesses a first instant of being or that the preceding permanent thing is endowed with a last instant of being. In this manner Burley ends up with a result basically identical to that of William of Sherwood, *viz.*, that there are no universally valid rules for assigning limits to a given object. And the reason for this state of affairs is to be found in the circumstance that the nature and sequence of the elements

28. Walter Burley (1966), pp. 164-166.

29. Cf. below, section IV.3.

constituting a given physical change are determinant in relation to the problem of making limit decisions.

At a later point in time Burley became aware of the fundamental weaknesses of his early theory since in his logical main work, the *De Puritate Artis Logicae*, he has completely revised his views. Now he shares Aristotle's doctrine that a point dividing a continuous entity is common to both segments,³⁰ and his views on which kinds of limit should be assigned to the different sorts of objects are equally altered. He has given up his cumbersome subdivisions within the category of permanent things as well as his former belief in giving a last instant of being to permanent things in their ceasing.

A revision as strong as this calls for an explanation. It is hardly likely that the sole reason can be found in the circumstance that in the *De Puritate Artis Logicae* Burley treats first and last instants from the point of view of logic,³¹ whereas in the *De Primo et Ultimo Instanti* he dealt with limit decision problems in purely physical terms. This radical change of opinion is much more readily explained by assuming that in the period lying between the composition of the two works Burley had come into contact with the second main trend in the medieval 'incipit' and 'desinit' tradition, and that he had been persuaded of its superiority over William of Sherwood's approach. In order to become acquainted with the beginning of this second branch of the medieval tradition we must turn to its first representative known at present, Peter of Spain.

IV.3 Peter of Spain

In his *Tractatus Syncategorematicus*³² Peter of Spain deals extensively with the expositions of the two words 'to begin' and 'to cease'. After having explained why these verbs should be treated as syncategorematic Peter stresses that given any kind of object the assigning of a first instant of its being excludes the assigning of a last instant of its non-

30. Walter Burley (1955), p. 191.

31. The section on 'incipit' and 'desinit' in the *De Puritate Artis Logicae* still reveals the influence of William of Sherwood insofar as the five sophisms concluding the treatment of beginning and ceasing are identical to those treated by William of Sherwood, whereas only two could have been lifted from Peter of Spain's tract on syncategorematic words.

32. As I have not had access to the 1489 printed edition of this work I have used N. Kretzmann's translation of the section dealing with 'to begin' and 'to cease' (Appendix A in Kretzmann (1976a), pp. 122-138).

being, and *vice versa*, just as designating a last instant of its being prevents one from affirming a first instant of its non-being, and *vice versa*. According to Peter the reason for this is to be found in the circumstance that logical considerations necessitate attributing the dividing instant to just one segment in spite of the fact that beginning and ceasing occur in the same indivisible instant, which is to say that a dividing-point is common to both segments into which it divides time.

Having explained why it is that Socrates begins to be and ceases not to be in exactly the same instant Peter draws the by now familiar distinction between permanent and successive objects. However, Peter introduces a subdivision into permanent things. Thus he distinguishes between permanent things which achieve being instantaneously and permanent objects which come into being over a period of time. Becoming man is an example of the first kind of permanent things whereas getting a tan is an instance of the second. This distinction Peter has quite clearly derived from Aristotle's teaching in the *Physics* (264 a 1 ff.), and further on he explicates just how he wishes this distinction to be understood. Becoming white, for instance, may be viewed in two ways: either as a process of change occurring over a period of time or as the end result of such a process. On the basis of the first view 'becoming white' should be limited in the same way as successive objects, whereas the second understanding brings about the necessity of treating 'becoming white' as a truly permanent state.

To the beginning of truly permanent objects Peter assigns internal limits and to their ceasing he allots external limits. On the other hand, successive things are to be limited externally both in their beginning and in their ceasing. For the expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' as occurring in propositions these determinations have the following consequences: when joined to a subject term denoting a permanent object the verb 'incipit' should be expounded by an 'affirmativa de presenti et negativa de preterito' (rule 1), whereas this verb should be expounded by a 'negativa de presenti et affirmativa de futuro' when occurring together with a subject term designating a successive thing (rule 2). The exposition of 'desinit' is common to both types of proposition, i.e., those that deal with permanent things and those that deal with successive things; and a proposition containing the verb 'desinit' should always be expounded by a 'negativa de presenti et affirmativa de preterito' (rule 3).³³

33. Examples illustrating these rules can be found above, section IV.1. Cf. John Quidort (1955), p. 281.

Next Peter proceeds to explain how 'incipit' and 'desinit' convey a notion of different times because of their signification, and why this circumstance does not affect the grammatical tense of these verbs. Peter concludes his interpretation of 'to begin' and 'to cease' by showing how it is possible on the basis of his exposition to solve sophisms involving these two 'syncategoremata'. In this context Peter lays down some rules for determining the 'suppositio subiecti' and the 'suppositio predicati' in propositions containing the verbs 'to begin' and 'to cease'. However, neither these rules nor his solutions to the sophisms bring anything principally new and we may therefore forgo treatment at this juncture.³⁴

By comparing the principal part of Peter of Spain's exposition of 'incipit' and 'desinit' with the one submitted by William of Sherwood (or the younger Walter Burley) it becomes immediately apparent that their approaches are significantly divergent. First of all Peter is of the opinion that an instant dividing the continuous flow of time is common to both segments into which it divides time. Secondly, Peter is convinced that his expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' are universally valid and allow of no exceptions. To him there is no last instant of being for the ceasing of a permanent thing whether the permanent object in question is followed by a permanent or a successive entity, and, consequently, when occurring with a subject term signifying a permanent object 'desinit' should always be expounded in the way indicated. Thirdly, and in complete concord with the preceding, Peter does not at all ask the question of how the different permanent and successive states or entities precede and succeed each other.

On the basis of the nature of this striking difference we might, for the sake of convenience, call Peter of Spain's way of dealing with the problem of 'incipit' and 'desinit' for the 'one-state-approach', whereas William of Sherwood's treatment is characteristic of what we might call the 'two-states-approach'.

Why did Peter adopt the 'one-state-approach'? It can hardly have been a result of negligence. It is not reasonable to suppose that Peter failed to perceive the incommensurability existing between his assignments of internal and external limits to, respectively, permanent and successive entities. If Peter had considered that the expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' should be able to describe transitions from one successive state in to another successive state (e.g., a change from walking to running) or

34. We shall return to these rules for determining the supposition of the subject and the predicate terms in section V.3.aa.

transitions from a permanent into a successive state (e.g., a change from solid metal to still more fluid metal), then he would no doubt have discovered the obvious flaw. Accordingly, Peter must have had very specific reasons for adopting universally valid expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit'. In fact, the reason for Peter's basic stand is almost certainly to be found in his understanding of the Aristotelian definition of time as a continuous entity. To William of Sherwood as well as the younger Walter Burley it is contradictory to admit that an instant belongs to both segments into which it divides time. This is not an understanding of Aristotle which Peter would endorse since, according to his viewpoint, it confuses logical necessity with the essence of time. To Peter it is evident that affirming time to be continuous is tantamount to saying that an instant dividing time into two segments belongs equally to both segments. As we have seen, Peter lays great stress on the community of the dividing-point in the beginning of his exposition of 'incipit' and 'desinit'. The logical necessity of attributing a dividing instant to just one segment does not influence the nature of time itself. For this reason the continuous character of time is the fundamental fact to which logical considerations must of necessity remain secondary in importance.

If this is a valid reconstruction of Peter of Spain's basic view then Peter's adoption of the 'one-state-approach' becomes not only understandable but also mandatory. On the basis of Peter's conception of time's continuity as the basic fact the assigning of even external limits does not preclude a dividing point from truly belonging to that segment which it limits externally. The further and highly significant implication of this is that the fact of a dividing instant being common or of time being continuous ensures that all kinds of time-segments 'fit together' no matter how they are limited. Even in cases where logical considerations demand that two adjoining segments of time be both limited externally there can be no denying that the two adjacent segments form part of the undisrupted flow of time.

To the logician making limit decisions and expounding 'incipit' and 'desinit' this state of affairs is a matter of no small consequence. As the assignment of limits does not influence the sequence of time-segments and is, in fact, without bearing on the possibility of different segments to form part of the one continuous stream of time, and as it is the logician's task to make limit decisions, it is perfectly evident that the lo-

gician is obliged to restrict his deliberations to just one time-segment at a time. Peter's actual treatment of the logical problem of expounding 'to begin' and 'to cease' bears witness to the fact that he has fully perceived this implication.

As seen from Peter of Spain's point of view William of Sherwood's and the younger Walter Burley's conscientious attempts at ensuring the compatibility of time-segments by providing them with limits suitable to the actual succession of states must be rejected as an unfortunate result of a complete misunderstanding of time's continuity.³⁵ Furthermore, as we have seen, William of Sherwood and the young Walter Burley transformed the rule stipulating the mutual exclusivity existing between, on the one hand, a given object's first instant of being and its last instant of non-being and, on the other, its first instant of non-being and its last instant of being into a general rule determining which kinds of time-segments can precede and succeed each other. To Peter of Spain this transformation is a no less grave misconception inasmuch as it would mean attributing a property to time which in the last resort would destroy its continuity. Ironically enough this is tantamount to saying that this transformation would cancel that characteristic of time which, in the first place, necessitates the logicians' making limit decisions and expounding 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions.

Does Peter of Spain's basic evaluation of the task of expounding 'incipit' and 'desinit' imply that he considers it to be a matter of convenience whether one assigns internal or external limits to the beginning and ceasing of a given object? The answer to this is quite clearly NO. To Peter there are particularly good reasons for providing the different kinds of objects with different kinds of limits, and by holding this persuasion Peter probably believed himself to be in perfect agreement with Aristotle.³⁶ As regards successive objects it is abundantly evident that internal limits should be assigned neither to their beginning nor to their ceasing. The reason for assigning external limites is of course that the

35. Of course there was no universally accepted interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine on time in the Middle Ages, and William of Sherwood as well as the younger Walter Burley would have been able to produce a number of arguments aiming to show that Aristotle was on their side. Cf. above, note 21.

36. Below in section V.3.ca, we shall get an opportunity of showing how William Ockham fully shares Peter of Spain's 'one-state-approach' but nevertheless is convinced that a genuinely Aristotelian conception of time renders limit decision problems a matter of pure convention.

definition of successive entities requires that they exist during a period of time or, as Aristotle says, because there is not motion in an instant (239 a 10 - b 4). It is equally reasonable, according to Peter - as well as to Aristotle (cf., e.g., 235 b 14 ff.) - to assign a first instant of being to the beginning of a permanent object inasmuch as assigning an external limit would imply the absurdity that Socrates does not yet exist when he begins to exist. Though neither Aristotle nor Peter says this much one would probably be correct in assuming that endowing the ceasing of permanent objects with a first instant of non-being is the obvious choice inasmuch as the ceasing of a permanent object is itself a successive process.³⁷ As should be evident deliberations of this kind are in perfect concord with Peter's 'one-state-approach'.

V. Thomas Bradwardine

V.1 The Structure of Bradwardine's Treatise

In the introductory section of his treatise (1.1) Bradwardine lays down two basic suppositions and draws the fundamental distinction between permanent and successive things or states. He then proceeds to deal with the exposition of 'incipit', and this section consists of three conclusions and their corollaries. The first conclusion (2.1) deals with 'incipit' as occurring in propositions whose subject terms refer to permanent objects, and this conclusion has two corollaries appended to it (2.1.1 - 2.1.2). The following two conclusions (2.2 - 2.3) deal with 'incipit' as occurring in propositions about successive objects. To each of the two conclusions a corollary is appended, but whereas the corollary of the second conclusion (2.2.1) is quite brief the corollary of the third conclusion (2.3.1) takes up the larger part of the whole treatise. This latter corollary consists of two main parts, the first of which (2.3.1.1) deals with 'res permanentes' and the second and by far the longer (2.3.1.2) regards 'res successive'. This second part of the corollary of the third conclusion is again subdivided into two parts of which the prior (2.3.1.2.1) treats of propositions about local motion whereas the posterior (2.3.1.2.2) concerns propositions about the remaining kinds of motion or change. The section here called '2.3.1.2.1' consists of five conclusions (2.3.1.2.1.1 - 2.3.1.2.1.5) of which only the second has a corollary appended to it (2.3.1.2.1.2.1). Furthermore, this section has a paragraph (2.3.1.2.1.6) treating of the

37. Cf. Wilson (1956), p. 30.

supposition of terms occurring in 'incipit' sentences, and this section is directed explicitly against the views of William Ockham. Having concluded this disproportionately long corollary Bradwardine proceeds to deal with 'desinit' as occurring in propositions about permanent objects (3.1) as well as successive entities (3.2). Next he discusses cases in which 'incipit' and 'desinit' appear in propositions whose subject terms refer to objects that possess being in only one instant (4.1). By way of conclusion (5.1) Bradwardine lays down a set of rules determining the kind of supposition with which the subject term as well as the predicate term signify in propositions containing the verbs 'to begin' and 'to cease'.

There can be no doubt that Bradwardine purposed to write his treatise on beginning and ceasing along axiomatic lines or 'more geometrico'. In this respect the present treatise is similar in particular to the *De Continuo* which is modelled according to the scheme 'definitiones - suppositiones - conclusiones'. That Bradwardine in the present treatise has chosen to substitute 'distinctio' for 'definitio' makes no difference of significance.

However, one must realize that Bradwardine has not been entirely successful in his attempt at imitating Euclid. Thus it is not at all clear why Bradwardine has made the determination of first and last instants of permanent objects into a 'suppositio' when the equivalent determination regarding successive things is introduced as the second conclusion. Bradwardine may possibly have considered the distinction between first and last instants in the case of successive objects as provable in the sense that this distinction follows directly from the nature of successive objects. But in that case we should have expected to find a definition of continuous entities included among the suppositions. Furthermore, Bradwardine has forgotten to introduce 'instantaneous' entities into the introductory section. Perhaps Bradwardine's hesitations about the actual existence of such entities have prompted this omission.

The most confusing feature in the structure of Bradwardine's treatise is no doubt that he places a paragraph dealing with permanent things (2.3.1.1) in the corollary of the third conclusion (2.3), which, just as the far larger part of the corollary (2.3.1.2) deals exclusively with propositions about successive entities. In actual fact there are two reasons why Bradwardine is not justified in giving this paragraph its present position. Firstly, this paragraph does not presuppose any of the three pre-

ceding conclusions but follows directly from the second supposition. Secondly, the thesis sustained in this paragraph is implied by the definition of 'desinit' and accordingly it should have been postponed to the section dealing with this part of the subject.

Disregarding these formal flaws one must, however, say that by his quasi-axiomatic method of exposition Bradwardine has made it comparatively easy for the reader to follow his line of reasoning.

V.2 The Basic Doctrines in Bradwardine's Treatise

Bradwardine's basic expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' as well as his distribution of first and last instants are set out in the introductory section (1.1) and in the two first conclusions (2.1 - 2.2). These are completely identical to those submitted by Peter of Spain and for this reason need not detain our attention.

In the third conclusion (2.3) Bradwardine tries to substantiate the view that it is impossible to maintain that motion begins to be since everything that moves must have been in motion previously,³⁸ or, as Bradwardine says, since 'omnis motus est'. Bradwardine's reason for espousing this view is, in the first place, the observation that every motion must of necessity exist over a period of time. In the second place this view is based on the fact that in continuous entities it is impossible for two points to be immediately contiguous. As we know the exposition of 'incipit' as occurring with terms signifying successive objects is by way of a 'negativa de presenti et affirmativa de futuro'. If, in accordance with this exposition, we take the instant where motion does not yet exist we cannot designate a succeeding first instant in which motion has just achieved being since this first instant should be immediately adjacent to the instant in which motion does not yet exist. The impossibility of designating such an adjoining instant is not just a matter of practical infeasibility, for the very existence of such an immediately contiguous point or instant is precluded by the continuous character of time. Thus we are forced to designate an instant posterior to this, in the strict sense, imaginary instant but in this case it is no longer true that motion begins to be, since at this instant it will be the case that motion has been.

A direct consequence of this line of argument is clearly that all statements about successive entities can be verified only retrospectively.

38. Cf. Aristotle, 236 b 34.

Though this is not made explicit in the present conclusion the rationality of this consequence is underscored in its corollary.

It is well worth calling attention to the circumstance that in this conclusion as in the larger part of his treatise Bradwardine makes his point in a purely logical or metalinguistical language. He does not use the object language and this is true in spite of the fact that he twice claims to be speaking 'physice'.³⁹

In his third conclusion Bradwardine has proved that 'incipit' propositions about successive objects are 'impossibiles' inasmuch as present motion always implies previous motion. Now it would be quite natural to assume that this result would induce Bradwardine into sustaining the view that we should refrain from talking about the beginning of successive entities. But in fact it does not. Bradwardine does not believe that his third conclusion proves that propositions about the beginning of motion should be excluded from everyday language. What the third conclusion shows is that we should be careful not to be deceived by the superficial simplicity of such propositions. In order to complete his analysis and determine the full import of such statements Bradwardine turns to the problem of how the expositions of 'incipit' imply making affirmations about future states of affairs as well.

Firstly Bradwardine sets out to prove that the exposition of 'incipit' as occurring with terms signifying permanent objects implies making affirmative statements about the future (2.3.1.1.). As is well-known, a proposition such as 'Sortes incipit esse' should be expounded by the 'exponentes' 'Sortes nunc est' and 'Sortes prius non fuit'. Inasmuch as one may validly infer either both or just one of the 'exponentes' from the 'exponibile' we may infer the proposition 'Sortes nunc est' from the statement 'Sortes incipit esse'. Since a permanent object does not possess a last instant of being we may, according to Bradwardine, safely draw the further consequence 'Sortes nunc est ergo Sortes erit'.

In opposition to this the objection is made that this inference would imply that there is determinate or certain knowledge of future contingents, and that such a point of view conflicts with that of Aristotle (18 a 33 ff.). Bradwardine counters by drawing a distinction between different kinds of future contingents. In the first place there are future contingents whose truth are consequent on true propositions in the present tense. A future

39. Cf. Murdoch (1979), pp. 122 ff.

contingent of this kind Bradwardine calls a 'nunc futurum contingens' because being necessarily implied by true propositions about the present it conveys no 'real' information about future states of affairs. The second kind of future contingents are those that concern truly future events and whose truth-value is in no way determined before these events take place or do not occur. About such future contingents no certain knowledge can be had, and such knowledge is in no way implied by the expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' as occurring in connection with terms denoting permanent things.

Next Bradwardine proceeds to substantiate that present motion implies not only previous but also future motion. This he does on the basis of the exposition of 'incipit' as occurring with terms signifying successive entities (2.3.1.2). Furthermore, he shows that this implication holds good for rectilinear as well as for circular motion (2.3.1.2.1.1)

Against this conclusion the objection is raised that if present motion implies future motion then surely no proposition about present motion will possess determinate truth-value since its consequent, i.e., a proposition affirming future motion, signifies a future contingent and for this reason cannot be known to be infallibly true. Furthermore, so the objection proceeds, this is certainly absurd and contrary to Aristotle as present motion is something we perceive every day.

In response to this objection Bradwardine points out that some propositions in the present tense are, in fact, statements about the uncertain future and their expositions show them to possess this covert reference to the future. Propositions about present motion are of this sort. In order for such a proposition to be true it is required not only that the object moving occupies a present position different from a past position but also that the object will occupy a future position different from its present position. If the object does not satisfy this last criterion then it will have achieved its last position and, consequently, will no longer be in motion. For this reason any proposition about present motion is certainly a proposition about a future contingent and as such indeterminately true or false.

Bradwardine is not much impressed by the claim that we perceive present motion inasmuch as logical reasoning shows that this is a sheer impossibility. On the contrary, what we perceive is in fact that something has moved. When we observe the billiard-ball rolling on the green cloth

we may at any instant say that the ball has moved because this we have seen, but neither sense perception nor intellectual reasoning allows us to affirm that the ball will continue its motion; it may have come to a stop.

According to Bradwardine it is thus imperative that we make a distinction between permanent and successive objects with regard to the implication 'nunc est ergo erit'. As regards permanent objects this inference holds good for logical reasons only, and therefore the future proposition implied by a present tense proposition is not a statement about a future contingent but a 'nunc futurum contingens'. As regards successive objects a proposition in the present tense is actually a statement about some future state of affairs, and therefore a proposition in the present tense is only true if we grant the truth of the corresponding proposition in the future tense. As a matter of course Bradwardine's view on the logical equivalence of present tense and future tense propositions dealing with successive objects implies that propositions about successive states or objects can be verified only retrospectively; and in this treatise Bradwardine shows himself to be fully conscious of this fact.

In the next four paragraphs Bradwardine builds on the foundation laid in section 2.3.1.2.1.1, and he proves the validity of the following four consequences:

'Sortes incipit moveri localiter, igitur immediate post hoc aliquod spatium erit pertransitum' (2.3.1.2.1.2);

'Sortes incipit moveri localiter, igitur Sortes immediate post hoc erit in duobus locis' (2.3.1.2.1.3);

'Sortes incipit moveri localiter, igitur Sortes non movebitur localiter antequam sit in alio loco quam nunc est' (2.3.1.2.1.4);

'Sortes incipit moveri localiter, igitur Sortes immediate post hoc instans pertransibit aliquod spatium quod non immediate post hoc pertransibit' (2.3.1.2.1.5).

In this context there is no need to deal separately with each of Bradwardine's proofs of the validity of these implications. However, it may be worth while to draw attention to the fact that in addition to the general principle of present motion implying future motion Bradwardine makes use of two further presuppositions.

Not surprisingly the first of these presuppositions is the continuous character of time and magnitudes. As we know, it is a characteristic feature of continuous entities that it is impossible to designate two

points that are immediately contiguous inasmuch as one point being assigned no immediately adjoining point can exist. As regards time this is to say - as indeed Bradwardine does - 'inter quicumque duo instantia cadit tempus medium'. Applied to the problem treated here this principle implies that given a segment of time or a distance limited at one end it is impossible to arrive at a point lying next to the dividing-point irrespective of this point being an internal or external limit.

Bradwardine's second presupposition is the distinction between composite and divisive sense. Though Bradwardine does not use the technical terms 'sensus compositus' and 'sensus divisus' it is evident that the contents of this distinction play an all important part in his argument. In its medieval version this distinction is based on the persuasion that subject and predicate terms change their way of signifying extramental objects if they are preceded by certain other words. Thus in the proposition 'aliquod spatium immediate post hoc erit pertransitum' the term 'aliquod spatium' has 'suppositio determinata' which is to say that the proposition should be verified for some particular and definable distance. For this reason it is licit to make the following inference 'aliquod spatium immediate post hoc erit pertransitum, ergo istud spatium vel illud vel illud, etc.' A proposition which possesses these characteristics is said to have divisive sense. However, if we change the word order of the sentence quoted above and say 'immediate post hoc aliquod spatium erit pertransitum' then we have at the same time changed the supposition of the term 'aliquod spatium'. Now it no longer has determinate supposition but that kind of supposition which is called 'confusa tantum'. This is tantamount to saying that this term refers to a multiplicity of objects and that it is not possible to designate any particular object to which it refers in the context given. This change in supposition is conditioned solely by the fact that we have now placed the word 'immediate' before the 'aliquod spatium'. Propositions endowed with these characteristics are said to have composite sense, and words which influence the supposition of the subject or the predicate term in this manner are said to have 'virtutem confundendi terminum' or 'vim confundendi terminum'. In the third conclusion of the corollary (2.3.1.2.1.3) Bradwardine shows how not only 'immediate' but also 'prius' has this property.

That this distinction between composite and divisive sense is of fundamental importance in the context of Bradwardine's present treatise

should be evident from the fact that no instant immediately adjacent to a limit is assignable in any fixed period of time, just as no such point can be designated in any magnitude. For this reason the first version of the proposition given above is false whereas the second is perfectly true, as Bradwardine aptly explains (2.3.1.2.1.2).

In 2.3.1.2.1.6 follows an examination of the kinds of suppositions with which predicates occur in 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions. As this is directed specifically against Ockham's doctrine as set out in the SL I,75 we shall postpone treatment of this polemic and its results to a later and separate section in the present introduction.⁴⁰

In 2.3.1.2.2 Bradwardine takes up the second part of the subdivision introduced in 2.3.1.2, *viz.*, those kinds of motion that are not local motion. In 2.3.1.2 Bradwardine had promised to show how present motion implies future motion in these other kinds of motion as well. However, as the principal aspects of the case are completely identical whether the motion in question is local or not, Bradwardine restricts his treatment to simply pointing out this identity.

Next Bradwardine turns to dealing with 'desinit' and in two conclusions he proves the identical exposition of 'desinit' as occurring in propositions whose subject terms refer to permanent and successive entities, respectively (3.1 - 3.2). As Bradwardine's exposition of 'desinit' is completely identical to that forged by Peter of Spain, and as Bradwardine's line of reasoning follows clearly from his general views set out earlier in the treatise, we may in this context forgo closer analysis.

Bradwardine introduces a third kind of objects, *viz.*, the instantaneous, in section 4.1. As far as our present knowledge of the medieval 'incipit' and 'desinit' tradition extends, this sort of objects was first introduced into this context by Walter Burley.⁴¹ Bradwardine is not quite convinced of the actual existence of such objects but if they do exist they certainly influence the expositions of 'to begin' and 'to cease'. As these objects possess being in only one instant the exposition of 'incipit' as occurring with subject terms designating objects of this kind must be by way of an 'affirmativa de presenti et negativa de preterito'. In assigning a first and a last instant of being for, respectively, the beginning and the ceasing of such objects one is in fact claiming that these objects begin to be and cease to be in one and the same instant.

40. See below, section V.3.ab - bb.

41. See Walter Burley (1955), pp. 192-194; (1966), p. 164.

Apparently Bradwardine does not attach particularly great importance to these instantaneous entities, and compared to Walter Burley's exposition his treatment is also markedly unoriginal.

V.3 Bradwardine and Ockham in Discussion

As already mentioned Bradwardine's criticism of Ockham's views is exclusively directed against the exposition of the supposition of the predicate term in 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions which Ockham submits in SL I,75. For this reason we shall in the present section proceed in the following manner. First we shall give an account of Ockham's doctrine as it appears in SL I,75 (aa) and show that Bradwardine's reproduction of Ockham's teaching is on the whole loyal (ab). Secondly we shall turn to Bradwardine's criticism of Ockham's view (ba) and to his proper doctrine on which this criticism is founded (bb). In the third place we shall present the exposition of the predicate term's supposition in 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions which Ockham submits in SL II,19 (ca), and finally we shall ask if Ockham's revision of his views on the present subject is related to Bradwardine's criticism (cb).

aa. Ockham's Teaching according to SL I,75

In chapter 75 of the first part of the SL Ockham presents a discussion of the kind of supposition with which predicate terms of 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions are endowed. In the first place Ockham stresses that in propositions of this kind - as also in sentences of the type 'Sortes ter fuit niger' - the predicate term does not have 'suppositio determinata' since one cannot descend from propositions of this kind to 'singularia per disiunctivam'. This is to say that one cannot draw the inference 'Sortes incipit esse grammaticus igitur Sortes incipit esse hoc vel incipit esse illud, etc.' pointing to all to whom the predicate term may refer. The reason for this is of course that Socrates may very well begin to learn grammar without for that reason beginning to exist or to be 'hoc'. It is equally true that in the proposition 'Sortes incipit esse grammaticus' the predicate term does not have 'suppositio confusa et distributiva' since this would entail the absurdity of Socrates' beginning to be all existing grammarians. According to Ockham the predicate term of the proposition given does neither possess 'suppositio confusa tantum' inasmuch as one is not allowed to 'descendere ad singularia per propositionem de disiuncto predicato'. The reason for this is that Ockham does not

consider the following consequence to be valid 'Sortes incipit esse grammaticus igitur incipit esse iste vel ille grammaticus' because Socrates may have been 'ille' long before he started to know grammar.

In accordance with this line of reasoning Ockham draws the conclusion that the predicate term in 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions possesses a kind of supposition for which we have no name:

... unam aliam (*scil.* suppositionem) pro qua tamen nomen non habemus.⁴² This unchristened kind of supposition agrees with 'suppositio confusa tantum' in certain less important respects,⁴³ but its difference in principle from both 'suppositio confusa tantum' and 'suppositio determinata' is cemented by the fact that in opposition to both of these kinds of supposition the unnamed kind of supposition does not allow of any kind of descent.

The ultimate reason for this remarkable state of affairs Ockham finds in the fact that 'incipit' as well as 'desinit' propositions are in fact equivalent to copulative propositions consisting of one proposition in the affirmative and one in the negative. As an example of this Ockham takes the statement 'Sortes incipit esse albus'. This is equivalent to or, in other words, is expounded by the copulative 'Sortes nunc primo est albus et ante non erat albus'. Clearly the predicate term 'white' has different kinds of supposition in the two 'propositiones exponentes'. In the affirmative one it has 'suppositio determinata' whereas in the negative one the predicate term 'white' has 'suppositio confusa et distributiva' because of the negation. Thus according to Ockham one is precluded from assigning any known kind of supposition to the predicate term in 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions because of the fact that statements of this kind are 'exponibiles', and that each of the expounding propositions bestows a different kind of supposition on the predicate term.⁴⁴

ab. Bradwardine's Presentation of Ockham's Teaching in SL I, 75

Coming to Bradwardine's reproduction of Ockham's teaching in SL I, 75 we may say at the outset that it is very loyal. Apart from the fact that Bradwardine has supplemented Ockham's exposition by adding a demonstration

42. William Ockham (1974), p.231/22-23.

43. See William Ockham (1974), pp. 231/23-232/30.

44. Apart from the fact that Ockham as a matter of course substitutes 'suppositio determinata' for 'suppositio simplex', there is basic agreement between Peter of Spain's first rule of supposition (Peter of Spain (1976), p. 126) and Ockham's present exposition. However, it is not at all certain that Peter of Spain would accept the conclusion which Ockham draws from this relationship inasmuch as he seems to attach principal importance to the affirmative 'propositio exponens'. For this see below, section V.3.bb.

showing that the predicate term in 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions has not got either 'suppositio simplex' or 'suppositio materialis' or 'suppositio discreta' Bradwardine follows Ockham quite closely. Thus Bradwardine is correct in placing great stress on the circumstance that the predicate term cannot, according to Ockham, have 'suppositio determinata' since one cannot descend 'per unam disiunctivam', just as it cannot have 'suppositio confusa tantum' inasmuch as one cannot descend 'per propositionem de disiuncto extremo'. Equally Bradwardine underscores Ockham's conclusion that in 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions the predicate term must have some kind of 'suppositio innominata'.

That Bradwardine has left out Ockham's ultimate reason for adopting this viewpoint, *viz.*, that this type of propositions imply a double 'suppositio' in the predicate term, and that this doubleness becomes visible in the expounding of such propositions, is not surprising. Bradwardine has undoubtedly conceived of this premise of Ockham's as evident and trivial.

ba. Bradwardine's Criticism of Ockham's Teaching in SL I,75

As his main point against Ockham's position Bradwardine contends that a term which does not supposit at all cannot possess 'suppositio innominata'. In SL I,75 Ockham had recognized that, as far as the supposition of the predicate term is concerned, there is a principal equivalence between, on the one hand, propositions such as 'Sortes bis bibit vinum' and, on the other, 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions. For this reason Bradwardine, in his criticism of Ockham's views, proceeds to prove that the predicate term in the proposition 'Sortes bis bibit vinum' cannot refer to any 'denotatum'. Saying that 'vinum' has an unnamed kind of supposition is, according to Bradwardine, unreasonable inasmuch as there can be no quantity of wine of which it is true to say that Socrates drinks it twice. According to Bradwardine this line of argument can most reasonably be applied to any predicate term in 'incipit' propositions, provided that the 'incipit' is expounded by removing the present and positing the future. Bradwardine's reason for sustaining this point of view is naturally to be found in the circumstance that in the preceding part of his treatise he has made it abundantly clear that the continuity of time makes it fundamentally impossible to designate a first instant immediately adjacent to any limit or dividing-point. And the reason for this is of course that claiming time to be continuous is tantamount to saying that such a point cannot exist at all. Assigning an external limit to Socrates' becoming white is accord-

ingly the same as denying that there may be a first instant subsequent on this limit and in which Socrates could be white for the first time. Consequently, expounding the 'incipit' in 'Sortes incipit esse albus' by a 'negativa de presenti et affirmativa de futuro' entails denying that the predicate term 'white' has any kind of supposition inasmuch as there is nothing to which it could possibly refer.

The case is quite the opposite if the 'incipit' in the proposition given above is expounded by the positing of the present and the removing of the past or by an 'affirmativa de presenti et negativa de preterito'. Then, according to Bradwardine, there is clearly no problem as in this case the predicate term has 'suppositio determinata'. The reason for this is that on these premisses one is, according to Bradwardine, allowed to make an inference such as 'Sortes incipit esse grammaticus igitur Sortes incipit esse ille grammaticus vel ille, etc.' proceeding in this manner until one has exhausted the finite class of grammarians. One of the members of the disjunction can obviously be identified with Socrates and, accordingly, the 'incipit' proposition can be verified for this individual.

Against allowing of this kind of inference Ockham had, we recall, made the objection that acceptance of this sort of inference would imply accepting that Socrates begins to be 'illud' or Socrates which is patently false inasmuch as Socrates needs not start to be in the absolute sense of the word just because he starts to learn grammar or to be white.⁴⁵ In response to this Bradwardine observes that the objection presupposes using the unexpounded 'incipit' proposition as a premise in an inference or an expository syllogism, and this presupposition Bradwardine is not willing to grant, as 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions are equivalent to hypothetical propositions. Accordingly, the best rebuttal of the objection consists in simply pointing out that using an explicable proposition in this way is unwarranted.

bb. Bradwardine's Proper Doctrine

Summarizing his proper doctrine Bradwardine maintains, in perfect agreement with his criticism of Ockham, that the predicate term in 'incipit' propositions does not supposit at all if the 'incipit' is expounded by removing the present and positing the future. As is evident from Bradwardine's choice of examples in which the predicate term has no supposition he is convinced that the predicate term is without supposition in all

45. William Ockham (1974), p.231/15-18.

'incipit' propositions dealing with successive entities. As regards 'incipit' propositions whose subject terms refer to permanent objects Bradwardine espouses the view that the predicate term has determinate supposition. The supposition of subject terms of 'incipit' propositions poses no problem to Bradwardine as he maintains that in this respect 'incipit' propositions can be analysed in the same way as categorical statements.

The circumstance that Bradwardine does not make explicit how the predicate term supposits in 'desinit' propositions is undoubtedly due primarily to the fact that the section here called '2.3.1.2.1.6' is located in that part of the work which is devoted to the exposition of 'incipit'. However, on the basis of Bradwardine's exposition of 'desinit' as occurring with terms designating permanent and successive objects, respectively, it is evident that he would maintain that the predicate term of such propositions has no supposition. Thus it is not surprising that in his conclusion to the treatise (5.1) Bradwardine extends his previous analysis to be valid for predicate terms occurring in 'incipit' as well as 'desinit' propositions. Furthermore, in section 5.1 Bradwardine adds the rule that in 'incipit' or 'desinit' propositions in the negative the predicate term has 'suppositio confusa et distributiva'; he does not specify whether this rule holds good for only universal and negative propositions or for both universal and particular 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions in the negative.

In order to understand why it is possible for Bradwardine to claim a single kind of supposition for the predicate term in 'incipit' propositions dealing with the beginning of permanent objects in spite of the fact that the predicate term is endowed with two different kinds of supposition in the 'propositionibus exponentibus' it is well worth pointing out that in this respect Bradwardine's exposition rests on a presupposition that is not made explicit. This presupposition stipulates that in the unexpounded 'incipit' proposition the predicate term has the same kind of supposition as in the affirmative 'propositio exponens'.⁴⁶ This means of course considering the negative 'propositio exponens' as secondary in respect to the one in the affirmative, and in fact Bradwardine is not the first to take this stand as it is already to be found with Peter of Spain.⁴⁷

A question must be raised with regard to the consequences of Bradwardine's analysis of the 'suppositio predicati'. Bradwardine believes

46. Of course this is valid for all other kinds of 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions as well.

47. See Peter of Spain (1976), p. 124.

that the predicate term holds no supposition in 'incipit' propositions dealing with successive objects and in 'desinit' propositions dealing with permanent or successive entities. As Bradwardine points out denoting some object ('supponere pro significato') is identical to 'supponere significative'. A question to which Bradwardine provides no answer is whether denying that a predicate term occurs with significative supposition in some proposition is tantamount to claiming that it does not function significatively in this proposition. If Bradwardine's answer to this is YES, then his characterization of the proposition 'motus incipit esse' as 'impossibilis' is clearly equivalent to saying that such propositions are devoid of meaning. But on this interpretation Bradwardine's exposition presented in the extraordinarily long corollary to the third conclusion will be at best rather odd. If Bradwardine's answer to the question is NO, then clearly he must recognize some kind of purely intentional signification. At any rate, Bradwardine's exposition is certainly incomplete in the sense that it does not explain how the predicate term's lack of reference is to be reconciled with the meaningfulness of propositions of this kind.

ca. Ockham's Teaching according to SL II, 19

In chapter nineteen of the second part of his SL Ockham presents a second treatment of propositions containing the verbs 'to begin' and 'to cease'. His reason for introducing propositions of this sort into this context is his conviction that 'incipit' and 'desinit' cause propositions in which they occur to be equivalent to hypothetical propositions inasmuch as such propositions are explicable by means of a copulative statement.⁴⁸

Ockham fully realizes that some logicians expound 'incipit' and 'desinit' differently according to their occurring in propositions whose subject terms refer either to permanent objects or to successive ones. However, Ockham is convinced that the exposition of 'incipit' as well as 'desinit' is purely a matter of convention, and he fails to perceive what gain could possibly be obtained by such diverse interpretation. Instead he proposes to assign just one way of expounding 'incipit' and equally just one way of expounding 'desinit'. Accordingly, 'incipit' should always be expounded by two propositions of which one is in the affirmative and in the present tense, whereas the other should be in the negative and in the past tense. This is to say that Ockham assigns internal limits to

48. William Ockham (1974), pp. 279/5ff.

the beginning of permanent as well as successive entities, and that in the case of 'incipit' he maintains a 'positio de presenti et remotio de preterito'. Consequently, a statement such as 'Socrates begins to be white' is to be expounded by way of the proposition 'Socrates is white now and he was not white immediately prior to this instant'.⁴⁹ On the other hand, a proposition containing 'desinit' should always, according to Ockham, be expounded by a copulative proposition of which the first is in the affirmative and in the present tense and the second in the negative and in the future tense. This is to say that Ockham assigns internal limits to the ceasing of permanent objects as well as successive ones, and that in this case he maintains a 'positio de presenti et remotio de futuro'. Consequently, a statement such as 'Socrates ceases to be white' should be expounded by way of the proposition 'Socrates is white now and he will not be white immediately after this instant'.

Having completed the basic limit decisions Ockham embarks on the task of determining the supposition of the subject term and that of the predicate term in 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions. As regards the supposition of the subject term Ockham finds no real problem since he is convinced that in this respect there is no dissimilarity between 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions on the one hand and categorical statements on the other.

As regards the supposition of the predicate term the matter is more complicated. According to Ockham the predicate term of universal and affirmative propositions of this kind has 'suppositio confusa tantum' since from this sort of statement one can descend neither copulatively nor disjunctively. In other words, one cannot draw the inference 'Omnis homo desinit esse albus ergo omnis homo desinit esse hoc album, vel omnis homo desinit esse illud album'. However, on the basis of Ockham's general definition of 'suppositio confusa tantum',⁵⁰ we are justified in assuming that Ockham would recognize the validity of a 'descensus ad propositionem de disiuncto predicato', which is to say that Ockham would allow of the legitimacy of an inference such as 'Omnis homo desinit esse albus, ergo omnis homo desinit esse hoc album vel illud album, etc.' In a universal proposition in the negative and containing 'incipit' or 'desinit' the

49. At this juncture Ockham draws a distinction between using 'incipit' in a proper sense and using it improperly, and this is based on Aristotle (222 a 10 - 20). As Ockham intends to deal only with the proper use we may leave the improper use out of consideration.

50. William Ockham (1974), pp.211/44 ff.

predicate term has 'suppositio confusa et distributiva'; on the other hand, the predicate term of a singular proposition either in the affirmative or in the negative has 'suppositio determinata'.

In order to substantiate this new - and compared to SL I,75 - rather startling exposition Ockham observes that there are two ways in which terms may have 'suppositio determinata' or 'suppositio confusa et distributiva'. First they may possess these kinds of supposition in the sense that it is possible to descend to the object to which the term in question refers by means of only demonstrative pronouns. If a term has 'suppositio determinata' in this way we may legitimately draw an inference of this kind 'homo currit ergo hoc currit'. The second manner of having 'suppositio determinata' or 'suppositio confusa et distributiva' does not allow of making inferences of this kind. Instead of making a 'descensus per pronomina demonstrativa sola' it is, in this case, necessary to add the common noun from which the descent to demonstrative pronouns is made:

... per pronomina demonstrativa sumpta simul cum illo termino communi sub quo debet esse descensus.⁵¹

Applied to predicate terms in 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions this is to say that predicate terms in these kinds of propositions do not possess either 'suppositio determinata' or 'suppositio confusa et distributiva' in the first sense but only in the second. The reason for this is the fact that an inference such as 'Sortes incipit esse albus igitur Sortes incipit esse hoc vel incipit esse illud, etc.' is invalid inasmuch as Socrates may have become 'hoc' or started to exist long before he becomes white. However, predicate terms of 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions may have 'suppositio determinata' or 'suppositio confusa et distributiva' in the second sense. Consequently, if we are dealing with an 'incipit' or 'desinit' proposition in the singular an inference such as 'Sortes incipit esse albus igitur incipit esse hoc album vel incipit esse illud album, etc.' is perfectly valid. The reason for this is that Socrates may certainly have been 'hoc' before he became white but he was not 'hoc album' before he became white.

cb. Bradwardine's Influence on the Formation of Ockham's Teaching in SL II,19

Compared to the exposition submitted in SL I,75 it should be evident that in SL II,19 Ockham has drastically altered his doctrine on the supposition of the predicate term in 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions. An

51. William Ockham (1974), p.313/93-94.

obvious difference between Ockham's two expositions is of course the different kinds of supposition ascribed to the predicate term. Whereas Ockham in SL I,75 upholds a 'suppositio innominata' for predicate terms, in SL II,19 he is convinced that in no instance of an 'incipit' or 'desinit' proposition is it necessary to assign other than known kinds of supposition to the predicate term. The equally evident, and by no means less significant, difference between Ockham's views as expounded in SL I,75 and SL II,19 is the fact that whereas in SL I,75 Ockham refuses to recognize the validity of a 'descensus de disiuncto predicato' from any kind of 'incipit' and 'desinit' proposition, in SL II,19 he allows of this kind of inference in all cases of propositions containing the verbs 'to begin' and 'to cease'.

Confronted with this state of affairs we are bound to raise the question of Ockham's motives for making this volte-face. Without knowledge of Bradwardine's treatise it would probably be well-nigh impossible to reveal Ockham's incentives for so doing. However, by confronting Ockham's two expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' with Bradwardine's treatise it might be possible to recognize in Ockham's revised exposition a step-by-step reaction to Bradwardine's criticism.

First of all it is necessary to ask how Ockham in SL II,19 avoids the unfortunate consequence that the fact of two different kinds of supposition being ascribed to the predicate term in the 'propositionibus exponentibus' precludes the possibility of assigning any known kind of supposition to the predicate term in the unexpounded 'incipit' or 'desinit' proposition. Though this had been one of Ockham's two principal reasons in SL I,75 for not assigning any known kind of supposition to the predicate term in propositions of this sort, in SL II,19 Ockham does not specify how he has circumvented this possible objection to the doctrine set out in SL II,75. However, from the line of reasoning presented in SL II,19 it is evident that he has done this by giving principal pre-eminence to the affirmative 'propositio exponens'. This is to say that in SL II,19 Ockham has assumed the presupposition on which Bradwardine builds his exposition, and like Bradwardine he has allowed this decision to remain implicit.

Secondly, it is important to note that in SL I,75 Ockham had refrained from making explicit how he wished to expound 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions. However, the example used by Ockham in this context seemed to indicate that he subscribed to the expositions forged by Peter of Spain,⁵²

52. As Ockham in SL I,75 did not explicitly allow of exceptions to the exposition given it would seem unlikely that he agreed with the 'two-states-approach'.

and naturally Bradwardine made this assumption in his criticism. If, in this respect, Ockham agreed with Peter of Spain at the time of writing SL I,75 - and this *is* the natural assumption - then he certainly did not after having accepted Bradwardine's presupposition that the predicate term in the unexpounded 'incipit' or 'desinit' proposition has the same kind of supposition as in the affirmative 'propositio exponens'. Retaining Peter of Spain's expositions and adopting Bradwardine's presupposition would in fact mean adopting Bradwardine's conclusion that in every affirmative 'incipit' and 'desinit' proposition (those dealing with the beginning of permanent objects being excepted) the predicate term cannot possess supposition as the continuous character of time and motion prevents the existence of entities which could serve as 'denotata' for such a predicate term. Consequently, Ockham was forced to expound 'incipit' and 'desinit' in a way that would make all affirmative 'propositiones exponentes' into statements about the present.⁵³ In response to this necessity Ockham made the second move of assigning internal limits to the beginning and ceasing of all kinds of objects. This second move he defended on the grounds that the assigning of limits or ways in which to expound 'incipit' and 'desinit' is only a matter of convention. In doing this he reveals himself as sharing Peter of Spain's and Bradwardine's conception of the logical task of making limits decisions as secondary to the continuous essence of time. On the other hand, at the same time this move drives him into taking a unique stand since neither Peter of Spain nor Bradwardine would agree that the fact of a dividing-point being common to both segments of the continuous entity divided implies the complete arbitrariness of assigning either external or internal limits to the two segments. Possibly Ockham would argue in favour of adopting this stance by pointing out that if making limit decisions is purely a matter of logical consideration and as such without

53. With Ockham giving pre-eminence to the 'propositio exponens affirmativa' becomes identical to giving pre-eminence to the 'propositio exponens de presenti'. In the 'De Puritate Artis Logicae' Walter Burley has taken over this doctrine of giving pre-eminence to the 'propositio exponens de presenti'. At the same time he retains Peter of Spain's expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit', and on this basis he concludes that the predicate term of all 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions has 'suppositio confusum tantum' (cf. Walter Burley (1955), pp. 195-196). Apart from the fact that this conclusion is odd as regards propositions about the beginning of permanent things, by combining his sources in this way Burley exposed himself to justified criticism from Bradwardine as well as from Ockham.

impact on the understanding of the flow of time as continuous, then the logician should feel free to expound 'incipit' and 'desinit' without taking into consideration how physical objects relate to continuous time. In other words, if all time-segments fit together in continuous time irrespective of the limits assigned to them, then the continuous essence of time and its implications for the physical entities that are measured against time should be of no concern to the logician in his task of making limit decisions.

In order to ensure the validity of his exposition of the predicate term's supposition in 'incipit' and 'desinit' propositions Ockham had to make a third move. Against endowing the predicate term with any known kind of supposition he had in SL I,75 advanced the objection that this would entail acceptance of an inference such as 'Sortes incipit esse albus ergo Sortes incipit esse istud album, vel illud album, etc.' In SL II,19 Ockham accepts this kind of inferences and he argues in favour of its validity by denying the legitimacy of using the rule 'ab uno convertibilium ad reliquum est bona consequentia' in cases where the term in question has 'suppositio determinata'.⁵⁴ By arguing along these lines Ockham clearly nullifies his own previous objection and expresses full agreement with Bradwardine's rebuttal of the objection, *viz.*, that propositions equivalent to hypothetical propositions cannot without further ado be used as antecedents in inferences, and that for this sort of propositions the 'syllogismus expositorius' does not hold good.

Summing up we may say that there is a very high degree of probability that Ockham has revised his exposition of 'incipit' and 'desinit' after becoming acquainted with Bradwardine's treatise. All instances of significant change in Ockham's views from SL I,75 to SL II,19 can be explained on the basis of this assumption. Thus Ockham follows Bradwardine closely in his first and third moves as well as in his introducing modifications into his previous definitions of the different kinds of 'suppositio personalis communis'.⁵⁵ On this basis Ockham is in a position to accept the first part of Bradwardine's conclusion, *viz.*, that the predicate term in 'incipit' propositions dealing with permanent things has 'suppositio determinata'. However, as accepting the second part of Bradwardine's conclusion, i.e., that in all other cases the predicate term can have no supposition at all, would be totally ruinous to Ockham's logical system he is

54. William Ockham (1974), p. 314/113 ff.

55. Cf. William Ockham (1974), pp. 210/18 ff., and *idem*, pp.313/85 ff.

forced to find a solution of his own. This he does by assigning internal limits to all cases of beginning and ceasing, and this is, of course, not paralleled in Bradwardine's treatise. However, it is important to remember that Ockham has been forced to adopt this solution by his acceptance of the legitimacy of Bradwardine's criticism and the validity of all but one of Bradwardine's basic principles.

V.4 *The Place of Bradwardine's Treatise in the Medieval Tradition of 'Incipit' and 'Desinit'*

Our present knowledge of the medieval tradition of 'incipit' and 'desinit' is strictly limited. This is due primarily to the circumstance that much of the literary output of scholasticism dealing with this subject has not yet been systematically catalogued or exhaustively described.⁵⁶ It is equally true that nearly all sources which have been verified still await editing. Furthermore, a matter complicating the charting of this part of the scholastic tradition is the fact that expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' appear in the most diverse contexts. Thus the medieval schoolmen not only composed separate tracts on these two terms or devoted separate chapters in their logical manuals to the treating of this subject, but they also included a large number of sophisms containing these terms in their voluminous collections of 'sophismata'. In view of the Aristotelian background to the tradition of beginning and ceasing the fact that 'incipit' and 'desinit' are also dealt with in commentaries on the *Physics* is quite as could be expected. However, surprisingly enough 'incipit' and 'desinit' found their way even into commentaries on Peter the Lombard's four books of sentences.⁵⁷

56. For lists of medieval writings on this subject see Wilson (1956), pp. 29ff.; and Kretzmann (1976a), pp.131ff. To the sources mentioned in these works one may add the three anonymous treatises preserved in Codex Dominicanorum Vindobonensis 187 (153), fols.218v-219r; fols.219v-223r; fols. 223v-226r. Cf. below, note 57. A highly suggestive attempt at characterizing the late medieval tradition of which the literature on 'incipit' and 'desinit' forms part is to be found in Murdoch (1975).

57. Thus in his commentary on the four books of sentences the so-called 'Monachus Niger' devotes the whole of question four to the problem 'Utrum posito quod Beata Virgo fuisset in originali per instans potuerit Deus immediate post illud instans eam mundasse ab originali'. In the three articles constituting question four (MS Fribourg, Cordeliers 26, fols.105va-111va) he submits a complete treatment of the problems involved in expounding 'incipit' and 'desinit' (for this work see Trapp (1956), pp.207ff., as well as Trapp (1965), pp.241ff.) Applying the doctrine of 'to begin' and 'to cease' to theological problems was also attempted by Thomas Buckingham. In the fourth question of his sentence commentary (ed.Paris, 1505, fols. 54va-62rb) he asks the question 'Utrum sit dare primum instans meriti vel demeriti'.

Endeavouring to place Bradwardine's treatise in the medieval tradition of 'incipit' and 'desinit' it is thus important first of all to stress the highly provisional character of such a determination. It should be evident that Bradwardine's treatise belongs to that branch of the tradition of which Peter of Spain is the first advocate known at present, and which we have labelled the 'one-state-approach'. This affiliation is brought out by a number of distinctive features in Bradwardine's way of treating this subject. First of all Bradwardine does not believe that the expositions of 'to begin' and 'to cease' should explain transitions from one kind of state or object to another, and possibly different, kind of state or object. In fact, Bradwardine espouses the view that such transitions pose no problems, and this second feature aligns him equally with Peter of Spain, since in this he shows himself to share Peter's understanding of the Aristotelian conception of time's continuity. In the third place Bradwardine is persuaded that some expositions of 'incipit' and 'desinit' are obligatory inasmuch as the definition of, e.g., successive objects prevents one from assigning internal limits to their beginning and ceasing. In this respect Bradwardine is also in agreement with Peter of Spain.

As we know, in early scholasticism 'incipit' and 'desinit' had found their way into logic by way of sophisms. At present it appears that in later logical treatises on these two verbs sophisms retained their place as an important part of the exposition. The reason for this is that the solving of sophisms involving these terms provided a touchstone for the validity of the general rules laid down for expounding these 'syncategoremata'. In this respect Bradwardine's treatise is unique inasmuch as it does not contain any sophisms at all. However, it is probably well-advised not to stress this circumstance since many of Bradwardine's conclusions may be conceived of as test cases for his general rules, and as several of these conclusions possess the same general features as sophisms and their ability to rouse the reader's curiosity.

Coming to the relationship of Bradwardine's treatise with the fourteenth-century development of this tradition we must once more recognize that the limitation of our present knowledge prevents us from making any well-founded estimate of either Bradwardine's position among his contemporaries or of his influence on succeeding logicians. However, it is incontestable that Bradwardine's treatise belongs to the very early reaction to William Ockham's system of logic and, consequently, it should be viewed

together with Ps.-Richard Campsall's 'De Logica Reali contra Ockham'.⁵⁸ Furthermore, as we hope to have shown, Ockham must have been quite impressed with Bradwardine's exposition, and it is far from unreasonable to suggest that Bradwardine's treatise may have been one of the foundations on which later logicians such as Richard Kilvington and William of Heytesbury composed their highly intricate sophisms involving 'incipit' and 'desinit'.⁵⁹ However, until such time as the critical edition of Kilvington's collection of sophisms is published⁶⁰ and we have obtained a general interpretation of William of Heytesbury's rather unwieldy logical system, the precise nature of Bradwardine's influence on the most significant of his successors in Oxford must remain a subject reserved for future research.

58. Ed. by Edward A. Synan: *The Works of Richard of Campsall*. Vol. 2. *Studies and Texts* 58. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1982, pp. 75-420.

(1977) to which may be added Knuuttila (1979). For literature on Heytesbury see the references provided in Spade (1979) to which may be added Murdoch (1979); Murdoch (*Anal.Char.*); as well as Sylla (1981).

60. Barbara and Norman Kretzmann are preparing a critical edition and a translation of Kilvington's collection of 'Sophismata'; see Kretzmann (1977), pp. 12-13.

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THOME^a BRALDVARINI ANGLI DE INCIPIT ET DESINIT^bA 50^v_aB 15^v_aC 24^r_bD 215^v_a

1.1

Ad clariorem¹ igitur² notitiam istarum³ duarum dictionum⁴ 'incipit' et 'desinit' habendam in⁵ primis⁶ taliter⁷ procedimus⁸: primo aliquas suppositiones supponendo⁹, secundo aliquas distinctiones adiungendo¹⁰, tertio^{11,12} conclusiones ad¹⁴ materie¹⁶ declarationem¹⁵ cum aliquibus obiectionibus et solutionibus adiungendo^{13,17}.

Prima suppositio est hec¹⁸ quod "positio de presenti" vocatur una¹⁹ propositio affirmativa²⁰ de presenti²¹, et "remotio de²² presenti" vocatur²³ una propositio²⁴ negativa de²⁵ presenti²⁶. Et "positio²⁷ de preterito" vocatur una propositio affirmativa de preterito, et "remotio de preterito"²⁹ vocatur una propositio negativa de preterito. Item, "positio de futuro" vocatur una propositio affirmativa de futuro, et "remotio³⁰ de futuro" vocatur³¹ una³² propositio negativa de futuro²⁸.

Secunda suppositio est hec³³ quod non est dare ultimum instans³⁴ rei permanentis in esse³⁵, et quod est dare primum³⁶ instans³⁷ rei permanentis in esse.

Distinctio premittenda est hec³⁸ quod aliqua nomina vel alique dictiones sunt signa³⁹ rerum permanentium, et aliqua⁴⁰ sunt signa rerum successivarum. Dictiones sive termini rerum permanentium dicuntur non quia⁴¹ non⁴² significant res⁴³ successivas, sed quia significant aliquas res quamvis iste res⁴⁴ non moveantur⁴⁵, et⁴⁶ huiusmodi⁴⁷ dictiones⁴⁸ sunt⁴⁹.

a-b *om.* AB; incipit tractatus de incipit et desinit magistri Thome Maulfeld D. 1 clariorem A; plenior B; maiorem et clariorem C. 2 *om.* BCD. 3-4 istorum duorum verborum B; illorum terminorum C. 5-6 *om.* D. 7 sic D. 8 procedamus B. 9 *om.* B. 10 *om.* B. 11 et tertio A. 12-13 *om.* C. 14-15 *om.* D. 16 maiorem A. 17 inferendo D. 18 *om.* C. 19 *om.* C. 20-21 2-3-1 CD. 22 a C. 23-24 *om.* C. 25-26 *om.* C. 27-28 similiter de preterito C; sic de aliis, scilicet de preterito et de futuro D. 29 presenti B. 30 negatio A. 31-32 *om.* B. 33 illa C. 34 *om.* C. 35 octo Physicorum *add. i.m.* A (263 b 10 ff.). 36 *add. i.m.* A. 37 *om.* C. 38 ista C. 39 verbi gratia C. 40 alia A; alique dictiones B. 41 quod B. 42 ideo A; *om.* C. 43 res permanentes vel B. 44 *om.* AB. 45 moventur AD. 46 quod autem B; *om.* D. 47 cuiusmodi D. 48 *om.* C. 49 *om.* B.

'homo', 'animal', 'albedo',⁵⁰ 'album', 'quantitas',⁵¹ 'quantum', et⁵³ sic de aliis^{52,54}. Dictiones sive termini rerum successivarum dicuntur non quia⁵⁵ non⁵⁶ significant res⁵⁷ permanentes, sed⁵⁸ quia non significant res⁶⁰ permanentes^{59,61} nec aliquas⁶² alias res⁶³ nisi ille⁶⁴ res⁶⁵ moveantur⁶⁶. Et⁶⁷ huiusmodi⁶⁸ vocabula⁶⁹ sunt ista⁷⁰ 'motus', 'tempus', 'movere', 'acquirere', 'pertransire',⁷¹

Istis premissis⁷² iam⁷³ ponende sunt aliquae conclusiones, primo⁷⁴ circa⁷⁵ hanc⁷⁶ dictionem⁷⁷ 'incipit', secundo circa⁷⁸ hanc⁷⁹ dictionem⁸⁰ 'desinit'. Iterum^{81,83} ponende sunt aliquae conclusiones⁸² in terminis rerum permanentium, secundo in⁸⁴ terminis rerum⁸⁵ successivarum.

2.1

PRIMA⁸⁶ CONCLUSIO⁸⁷ est hec⁸⁸: quicquid⁸⁹ incipit esse in⁹⁰ rebus permanentibus hoc⁹¹ nunc est et prius non fuit⁹². Istam⁹³ conclusionem⁹⁴ probabo sic, et⁹⁵ sit ista⁹⁶ res permanens⁹⁷ que incipit⁹⁸ esse a, tunc sic⁹⁹: /C 24^va/ cuiuscumque rei permanentis est dare primum instans¹⁰⁰ sui esse, a est res permanens, igitur est¹⁰¹ dare primum instans¹⁰² sui¹⁰³ esse¹⁰⁴. Maior patet¹⁰⁵ per secundam¹⁰⁶ suppositionem¹⁰⁷. Minor patet¹⁰⁸ per casum, et¹⁰⁹ discursus¹¹⁰ patet¹¹¹ in¹¹² darii¹¹³. Sequitur igitur¹¹⁴ conclusio^{115,117}. Tunc¹¹⁸ sic: a rei permanentis est dare primum instans sui¹¹⁹ esse^{116,120}, sit illud instans¹²¹ gratia exempli nunc¹²² presens¹²³; hoc instans presens¹²⁴ est primum instans esse¹²⁵ a¹²⁶, igitur in isto instanti presenti a est et prius non fuit. Antecedens est verum, igitur¹²⁷ et¹²⁸ consequens. Veritas¹²⁹ antecedentis¹³⁰ patet per casum. Consequentia¹³¹

50 altitudo B; om. C. 51-52 om. C. 53-54 similia B. 55 quod B.
56 om. C. 57 om. B. 58-59 om. B. 60-61 eas C. 62 om. B.
63 om. AC. 64 aliquae BD. 65 om. C. 66 movantur A. 67 om. D.
68 talia A; cuiusmodi D. 69 om. D. 70 signa talia sicut B; om. D.
71 et similia add. B. 72 prehabitis B; visis C. 73 om. BCD.
74 et primo C. 75 de D. 76-77 om. D. 78 de D. 79-80 om. D.
81-82 primo D. 83 item B; in primo C. 84-85 om. B. 86 et primo C.
87 igitur conclusio D. 88 illa A; ista C. 89 quod quicquid CD.
90 de B. 91-92 debet exponi per positionem presentis et remotionem preteriti C. 93 ista C. 94 om. B; conclusio C. 95 om. CD. 96 nec A; illa C. 97 om. C; add. i.m. D. 98 incipit nunc B. 99 om. A.
100 om. C. 101 a est B; erit C. 102 diu C. 103 in A; om. C.
104 esse ipsius a A. 105 nota est D. 106-107 regulam suppositam B.
108 om. C; nota est D. 109 om. AB. 110 discurrendo B; discursum C.
111 om. C. 112 unde B. 113 dari B. 114 tunc B. 115-116 om. B.
117 tunc conclusio A. 118 igitur tunc A. 119-120 om. A.
121 om. AD. 122-123 a tunc sic inferitur minor sed ACD. 124 om. ACD.
125 om. B. 126 rei A; rei permanentis a D. 127 om. D. 128 etiam B; et similiter D. 129-130 antecedens B. 131 et consequentia CD.

patet, quia¹³² oppositum consequentis nullo¹³³ modo potest stare cum antecedente¹³⁴, quia illa duo non stant simul 'a prius'^{135,137} fuit vel a nunc non est', et¹³⁶ cum¹³⁸ hoc quod¹³⁹ hoc¹⁴⁰ instans presens sit¹⁴¹ primum instans esse¹⁴² a.

2.1.1

Ex¹⁴³ ista conclusione sequitur generaliter quod omnis propositio affirmativa composita ex terminis rerum permanentium, in qua ponitur hoc verbum 'incipit', debet exponi per positionem de¹⁴⁴ presenti et per¹⁴⁶ remotionem de preterito^{145,147}. Verbi gratia sic¹⁴⁸ dicendo¹⁴⁹ 'Sortes incipit¹⁵⁰ esse' ista propositio¹⁵¹ debet sic¹⁵² exponi¹⁵³ 'Sortes¹⁵⁴ est in¹⁵⁵ hoc¹⁵⁷ instanti¹⁵⁶ vel¹⁵⁸ nunc¹⁶⁰ est¹⁵⁹ et¹⁶¹ ante¹⁶² illud¹⁶⁴ non fuit¹⁶³, quarum¹⁶⁵ duarum propositionum exponentium¹⁶⁷ una¹⁶⁸ est affirmativa et vocatur "positio de presenti", alia¹⁶⁹ est¹⁷⁰ negativa et vocatur "remotio de preterito", sicut¹⁷¹ patet¹⁷² per primam¹⁷³ suppositionem¹⁶⁶.

2.1.2

Secundo¹⁷⁴ ex dicta¹⁷⁵ conclusione¹⁷⁶ sequitur¹⁷⁷ quod omnis propositio affirmativa¹⁷⁸ composita¹⁷⁹ ex terminis rerum permanentium, in qua ponitur hoc¹⁸⁰ verbum¹⁸¹ 'incipit', convertitur cum una copulativa composita ex exponentibus, quia¹⁸² exponentes tales sunt quod ab una ad aliam¹⁸³ est bona consequentia et¹⁸⁴ e converso. Verbi gratia ista¹⁸⁶ propositio¹⁸⁷ 'Sortes incipit esse' convertitur cum ista copulativa¹⁸⁸ 'Sortes nunc est et Sortes¹⁸⁹ prius non fuit'. Et¹⁹⁰ ideo¹⁹¹ sequitur¹⁹² 'Sortes incipit esse¹⁹³, igitur Sortes nunc est et prius non fuit'. Similiter¹⁹⁵ sequitur e converso^{194,196}. Ex istis sequitur quod semper a¹⁹⁷ tali¹⁹⁸ propositione¹⁹⁹

132 per B. 133-134 repugnat antecedenti C. 135-136 nunc est et prius fuit C. 137 ipsius B. 138 tamen quod A; habet cum C. 139-140 om. ABC. 141 est B. 142 etiam C. 143 et ex C. 144-145 etc. C. 146 om. AB. 147 futuro B. 148-149 om. C. 150 nunc incipit D. 151 oratio B. 152 om. A. 153 esse C. 154 Sortis C. 155-156 nunc C. 157 primo B. 158-159 om. AC. 160 Sortes nunc D. 161 et Sortes A. 162-163 immediate ante non fuit vel Sortes ante illud instans non fuit D. 164 illud instans A; hoc C. 165-166 om. C. 167 om. D. 168 prima B. 169 secunda B; et alia D. 170 om. BD. 171 illud A; om. D. 172 om. D. 173 secundam B. 174 om. C. 175 eadem B; qua C. 176 correlarium C. 177 om. C. 178 om. D. 179 sequitur composita C. 180-181 om. D. 182-183 talis propositionis in quod ab una ad alteram B; et ab una ad aliam C; quia ab illa ad exponentes D. 184-185 om. C. 186-187 om. B. 188 om. D. 189 om. A. 190 ergo B. 191-192 om. B. 193-194 om. B. 195 item D. 196 Sortes nunc est et prius non fuit igitur Sortes incipit esse D. 197 ad AB. 198 talem AB. 199 propositionem AB. 200 affirmativam AB.

affirmativa²⁰⁰, in qua ponitur²⁰¹ hoc²⁰² verbum²⁰³ 'incipit', ad quamlibet
eius²⁰⁴ exponentem est /D 215^v/ bona consequentia, sicut^{205,207} patet de
se^{185,206}.

2.2

SECUNDA CONCLUSIO est ista²⁰⁸ quod omnis propositio affirmativa com-
posita ex terminis rerum successivarum, in qua ponitur hoc²⁰⁹ verbum²¹⁰
/A 50^v/ 'incipit', debet²¹¹ exponi per /B 15^v/ remotionem de presenti et
positionem de futuro. Verbi gratia ista²¹² propositio²¹³ 'motus incipit
esse' debet sic exponi 'motus nunc²¹⁴ non est et immediate²¹⁵ post hoc
erit²¹⁶, . Istam^{217,219} conclusionem²¹⁸ proba²²⁰ sic: si aliquis motus
in²²¹ illo²²² instanti, in quo incipit esse, esset²²³, in rerum natura
sequitur²²⁴, quod esset dare primum instans²²⁵ alicuius motus²²⁶. Conse-
quens est impossibile, ergo et²²⁷ antecedens. Impossibilitas consequentis
patet ex²²⁸ hoc²²⁹ quod²³⁰ nullius continui est²³¹ dare simpliciter²³²
primum. Sed²³³ omnis²³⁴ motus est de numero²³⁵ continuorum, ergo nulli-
us^{236,238} motus est²³⁹ dare simpliciter²⁴⁰ primum instans^{237,241}. Tam²⁴²
maior quam²⁴³ minor patet²⁴⁴ sexto²⁴⁵ et²⁴⁶ septimo²⁴⁷ Physicorum in²⁴⁸
pluribus²⁴⁹ locis²⁵⁰. Consequentiam²⁵¹ proba²⁵², quia si²⁵³ nunc aliquis
motus primo²⁵⁴ esset²⁵⁵, ergo²⁵⁶ prius non fuit motus. Tunc sic: motus²⁵⁷
nunc est et²⁵⁸ prius non²⁵⁹ fuit, et ante istum²⁶⁰ motum non²⁶¹ fuit motus,
igitur iste²⁶² est primus²⁶³ motus²⁶⁴. Consequentia²⁶⁵ patet de se.

2.2.1

Ex istis²⁶⁶ sequitur quod omnis propositio²⁶⁷ affirmativa composita²⁶⁸
ex terminis rerum successivarum, in qua²⁶⁹ ponitur hoc verbum 'incipit',

201 sequitur ponitur A. 202-203 om. D. 204 om. A. 205-206 om. A.
207 illud D. 208 om. C. 209-210 om. C. 211 in qua ponitur debet
C. 212-213 om. BC. 214 om. A; incipit nunc C. 215 motus C; motus
immediate D. 216 motus immediate C. 217-218 om. D. 219 ergo
istam C. 220 probatur D. 221 esset in B; per D. 222 hoc A;
aliquo C. 223 om. B. 224 sequeretur C. 225 om. AC.
226 moti B. 227 om. D. 228 de AC. 229 eo A. 230 quia C.
231 instans est D. 232 om. C. 233 om. C. 234 om. AC.
235 genere C. 236-237 etc. A. 238 om. C. 239 non est C.
240 om. C. 241 om. BC. 242 om. C. 243 et C. 244 istius ra-
tionis patent B. 245 per Aristotelem in C. 246-247 om. C.
248 et in B; om. D. 249 multis C; om. D. 250 om. AD. 251 con-
sequentia C. 252 ego proba B; patet C. 253 om. B. 254 prius B.
255 erit B. 256 tunc D. 257 iste motus B; et sit motus D.
258 nec D. 259 om. D. 260 omnem C. 261 om. C. 262 iste
motus D. 263 om. C. 264 om. B. 265 consequentiam A.
266 illo A; quo C; isto D. 267 om. C. 268 que componitur C.

convertitur cum una copulativa composita²⁷⁰ ex una negativa de presenti et una²⁷¹ affirmativa de futuro, et²⁷² quod²⁷³ ab²⁷⁴ una²⁷⁵ ad aliam est bona consequentia. Illud^{276,278} patet de^{279,281} ista propositione²⁸⁰ 'motus incipit esse'²⁷⁷, que^{282,284} convertitur cum una copulativa 'motus nunc non est et immediate post hoc erit'²⁸⁵. Et consimiliter^{286,288} patet ut prius²⁸⁷ quod^{289,290} a²⁹² tali propositione /C 24^vb/ ad quamlibet eius exponentem est bona consequentia^{283,291,293}.

2.3

Istis²⁹⁴ prehabitis^{295,296} TERTIA CONCLUSIO est²⁹⁷, quod²⁹⁸ hec²⁹⁹ propositio³⁰⁰ est impossibilis 'motus incipit esse'. Istam³⁰¹ conclusio- nem³⁰² proba³⁰³ sic: ista propositio est³⁰⁴ necessaria 'omnis motus est'³⁰⁵, igitur sua³⁰⁶ opposita simpliciter³⁰⁷ est impossibilis, videlicet³⁰⁸ 'aliquis motus non est', et per consequens ista³⁰⁹ est³¹⁰ impossibilis³¹¹ 'motus non est'. Consequentia³¹² est bona³¹³, ergo³¹⁴ ista copulativa est impossibilis 'motus nunc non est et immediate³¹⁵ post hoc erit'. Sed ista copulativa³¹⁶ - ut³¹⁷ prehabitu est - convertitur cum ista propositione³¹⁸ 'motus incipit esse', igitur³¹⁹ ista propositio³²¹ 'motus incipit esse'³²⁰, est impossibilis. Primam³²² propositionem³²³ assumptam³²⁵ proba^{326,328}. Quod³²⁴ hec est³²⁹ necessaria 'omnis motus est'³²⁷, proba³³⁰ sic³³¹ physice^{332,334} loquendo: ista propositio³³³ 'omnis³³⁵ motus est'³³⁶, non potest³³⁷ nec³³⁸ potuit nec poterit esse falsa sine mutatione significationis terminorum postquam³³⁹ fuit imposita³⁴¹ ad significandum³⁴⁰, igitur ista³⁴² propositio³⁴³ est necessaria. Consequentia patet, quia arguitur³⁴⁴ a³⁴⁵ diffinitione³⁴⁶ ad diffinitum³⁴⁷. Antecedens^{348,350} patet de se³⁴⁹.

269 quo A. 270 om. AB. 271 una propositione B. 272 in B.
273 om. C. 274 ex C. 275 uno B. 276-277 om. C.
278 sicut B; om. D. 279-280 hic B. 281 ex D. 282-283 om. A.
284-285 om. C. 286-287 probatur sicut prius D. 288-289 om. C.
290-291 om. D. 292 ex C. 293 ut motus incipit esse ergo nunc non
est et immediate post hoc erit add. C. 294-295 om. B. 296 preliba-
tis C. 297 sequitur D. 298 om. A. 299 ista AD. 300 om. C.
301 om. BD; quod C. 302 om. BCD. 303 probatur D. 304 prima
est A. 305 om. B. 306 si una C. 307 om. A; si sic B; sic C.
308 si sic ergo ista A; scilicet B; ista C. 309 ista indefinita B.
310 om. C. 311 om. C. 312-313 tunc ista est impossibilis motus non
est B. 314 quia D. 315 motus immediate B. 316 om. C.
317 sicut A. 318 om. BC. 319-320 om. B. 321 om. C.
322 primo primam C. 323-324 scilicet istam B. 325 videlicet istam
omnis motus est C; per assumptam D. 326-327 om. C. 328 proba sic A.
329 sit D. 330-331 om. D. 332-333 3-4-1-2 C. 334 et hoc sophis-
tice B. 335-336 est necessaria quia C. 337-338 om. C.
339-340 om. C. 341 impositam B. 342 om. A; ipsa C. 343 om. AC.
344 arguit B. 345 ad B. 346 diffinitionem B. 347 diffinitione B.
348-349 om. D. 350 et antecedens C. 351 arguo sic B. 352 om. A.

Contra istam conclusionem arguitur³⁵¹: motus Sortis potest incipere esse³⁵², motus³⁵³ Sortis est motus³⁵⁵, igitur motus³⁵⁶ potest incipere esse³⁵⁴. Discursus³⁵⁷ patet³⁵⁹ quia est sillogismus expositivus³⁵⁸. Maior³⁶⁰ patet de³⁶¹ se³⁶² quia³⁶³ notum³⁶⁵ est³⁶⁶ quod³⁶⁷ Sortes potest incipere se moveri³⁶⁴. Minor patet³⁶⁸ quia ibi³⁶⁹ ponitur³⁷⁰ superius³⁷¹ de inferiori affirmative^{372,373}.

Item³⁷⁴, motus Sortis potest incipere esse³⁷⁶, igitur motus³⁷⁷ potest incipere esse³⁷⁸. Consequentia est³⁷⁹ bona, [quia]³⁸¹ antecedens est verum, igitur et³⁸² consequens. Quod consequentia sit bona³⁸⁰ patet quia arguitur ab inferiori ad superius³⁸³ sine³⁸⁴ distributione³⁸⁵. Veritas³⁸⁶ antecedentis patet de³⁸⁸ se^{375,387}.

Item, quicquid potest non esse et postea³⁸⁹ esse, potest³⁹⁰ incipere esse. Sed³⁹¹ motus potest³⁹² non esse et postea esse, ergo motus potest incipere esse. Discursus patet de se, et maior similiter³⁹³. Minor³⁹⁴ patet^{395,396} quia est una³⁹⁷ indefinita³⁹⁸ cuius quilibet singularis³⁹⁹ est vera, quia non est aliquis motus quin⁴⁰⁰ per⁴⁰¹ potentiam⁴⁰² convenientem⁴⁰³ possit⁴⁰⁴ non esse et postea⁴⁰⁵ esse, et hoc⁴⁰⁶ precipue tenendo⁴⁰⁷ quod motus non sit res distincta a rebus⁴⁰⁸ permanentibus.

Ad primum istorum dico⁴⁰⁹ quod⁴¹⁰ cum⁴¹¹ dicitur⁴¹² 'motus Sortis⁴¹³ potest⁴¹⁴ incipere esse⁴¹⁵, illam⁴¹⁶ concedo, et⁴¹⁷ ad minorem cum^{418,419} dicitur^{420,421} 'motus Sortis est motus' dico quod⁴²² si Sortes nunc⁴²³ non⁴²⁴ moveatur, illa est⁴²⁵ falsa, et si Sortes⁴²⁶ nunc⁴²⁷ moveatur, illa⁴²⁸ est vera, sed⁴²⁹ tunc non /C 25^r/a/ stat⁴³⁰ in veritate cum maiori. Vel breviter

353-354 om. B. 355 Sortes C. 356 motus Sortis C. 357-358 om. A.
359 valet C. 360 et maior C. 361-362 om. AD. 363-364 om. B.
365 ita C; om. D. 366-367 om. D. 368 etiam patet C. 369 hic A;
om. CD. 370 proceditur C. 371-372 affirmative ab inferiori ad
superius est bona consequentia C. 373 om. B. 374-375 om. A.
376 om. B. 377 motus Sortis C. 378 om. B. 379-380 om. C.
381 om. B. 382 om. D. 383 suum superius C. 384-385 affirmative D.
386-387 om. C. 388 ex D. 389 potest D. 390 hoc potest D.
391 om. D. 392-393 est huiusmodi igitur etc. A; est huiusmodi ergo motus
Sortis potest incipere esse C; est huiusmodi igitur. Discursus patet et
maior etiam patet de se D. 394-395 discursus patet et maior et minor C.
396 declaratur B. 397 om. C. 398 affirmative indefinita D.
399 om. B; pars singularis C. 400 quod C. 401 om. C. 402 divinam
potentiam C. 403 prime cause B; aliquam D. 404 potest B.
405 possit D. 406 om. D. 407 retinendo B. 408 om. D.
409 motus Sortis est motus dico A; om. B; dicendum D. 410 om. BD.
411 om. AD; quando B. 412-413 om. A; dico motus Sortis D.
414-415 etc. B; possit non esse D. 416 om. AB. 417 om. AD.
418 quando B. 419-420 om. D. 421 dico C. 422 om. D.
423-424 om. C. 425 tunc B. 426-427 om. C. 428 om. BC.
429 et CD. 430 et non stat C. 431 dicendum D. 432 dici ad dis-

potest⁴³¹ dici⁴³² quod in talibus propositionibus equipollentibus⁴³³ pro-
positionibus⁴³⁴ ypotheticis non oportet discursum⁴³⁵ valere.
Ad aliud⁴³⁶ argumentum⁴³⁷ dico⁴³⁸ negando consequentiam. Ad probati-
onem quando⁴³⁹ dicitur⁴⁴⁰ quod⁴⁴¹ arguitur ab inferiori ad superius⁴⁴²
affirmative⁴⁴³, dico^{444,446} istam⁴⁴⁷ negando^{445,448}.
Et si ita⁴⁴⁹ dicatur⁴⁵⁰ contra quia⁴⁵¹ ambe⁴⁵² propositiones⁴⁵³,
tam⁴⁵⁴ maior quam minor⁴⁵⁵, sunt⁴⁵⁶ affirmative, /D 216^ra/ igitur⁴⁵⁷ ar-
guitur⁴⁵⁸ affirmative⁴⁵⁹, dico istam⁴⁶⁰ consequentiam negando, quia⁴⁶¹
ad hoc quod arguitur⁴⁶² affirmative non tantum⁴⁶³ requiritur⁴⁶⁴ quod propositio-
nes⁴⁶⁵ sint⁴⁶⁶ affirmative, sed ulterius⁴⁶⁷ requiritur⁴⁶⁸ quod quelibet
propositio exponens tales affirmativas⁴⁶⁹ vel⁴⁷⁰ saltem⁴⁷¹ necessario⁴⁷²
requisita⁴⁷³ ad expositionem⁴⁷⁴ talium⁴⁷⁵ propositionum⁴⁷⁶ sit affirmativa.
et quia⁴⁷⁷ sic⁴⁷⁸ non est⁴⁷⁹ in proposito /B 16^ra/ eo⁴⁸⁰ quod⁴⁸¹ una⁴⁸²
exponentium istarum⁴⁸⁴ propositionum⁴⁸⁵ est negativa⁴⁸⁶, ideo non⁴⁸⁷ argu-
itur affirmative⁴⁸³.
Ad aliud⁴⁸⁸ quando⁴⁸⁹ dicitur quod⁴⁹¹ quicquid potest non esse et⁴⁹²
postea⁴⁹³ esse potest⁴⁹⁴ incipere esse^{490,495}, dico⁴⁹⁶ istam⁴⁹⁷ conceden-
do⁴⁹⁸. Et⁴⁹⁹ ulterius quando dicitur⁵⁰⁰ quod⁵⁰¹ motus potest⁵⁰² non⁵⁰³
esse et⁵⁰⁴ postea⁵⁰⁵ esse⁵⁰⁶, dico⁵⁰⁷ istam⁵⁰⁹ negando⁵⁰⁸, quamvis per
potentiam prime cause possit⁵¹⁰ verificari⁵¹¹, de qua potentia⁵¹² nihil⁵¹³
loquor⁵¹⁴ ad presens, sed tantummodo⁵¹⁵ physice⁵¹⁶.

cursum B; om. D. 433 equivalentibus D. 434 et propositionibus C.
435 distributionem C. 436 secundum BC. 437 om. BC. 438 dicitur B.
439-440 om. D. 441 quia BD. 442 suum superius C. 443 om. C.
444-445 consequentia est neganda B. 446-447 om. D. 448 nego D.
449 om. D. 450 dicitur C. 451 om. B; quod C. 452 om. C.
453 om. C. 454-455 om. B. 456 sint D. 457 om. C. 458 om. AC.
459 om. C. 460 om. B; etiam C. 461 om. C. 462 arguitur C.
463 om. C. 464 negatur B. 465 ille propositiones C; ambe propositio-
nes D. 466 sunt B. 467 etiam C. 468 negatur B; om. C.
469 propositiones C; om. D. 470 om. C. 471 scilicet C. 472 om. A.
473 requisitas C. 474 exponentes A. 475-476 talem propositionem B.
477 autem C. 478 om. C. 479 om. C. 480 om. CD. 481 quo C;
quia D. 482-483 om. C. 484 talium B; om. D. 485 om. D.
486 necessaria B. 487 om. B. 488 tertium BC. 489-490 om. C.
491 om. BD. 492 om. A. 493 post A; potest D. 494-495 om. BD.
496 om. AC. 497 ad istam B; maior C. 498 concedo A; conceditur C.
499-500 ad minorem A; sed minor est falsa C. 501 om. AD. 502 possit
C. 503 om. C. 504 om. A. 505 potest D. 506 non esse C.
507-508 om. C. 509 om. B. 510 breviter posset A; poterit B.
511 ista verificari B. 512 om. BC. 513 non C. 514 loquitur C; om. D.
515 tantum C. 516 physice quod dicimus sive in illo tractatu intendo
complere B; physice loquendo dico ista D. 517-518 quarta conclusio

2.3.1

Ulterius⁵¹⁷ sequitur ex premissis⁵¹⁸ quod tales consequentie 'a incipit esse, igitur a erit⁵¹⁹, tam in terminis rerum permanentium quam in⁵²⁰ terminis⁵²¹ rerum⁵²² successivarum sunt omnino⁵²³ necessarie⁵²⁴, et⁵²⁵ hoc ponendo in distinctis⁵²⁷ terminis⁵²⁶.

2.3.1.1

Primo⁵²⁸ hoc⁵²⁹ proba⁵³⁰ in terminis rerum permanentium. Et⁵³¹ proba⁵³² hanc consequentiam esse bonam 'Sortes incipit esse, igitur Sortes erit' quia - sicut ex predictis patet - illa consequentia est bona 'Sortes incipit esse, igitur Sortes nunc est'; igitur⁵³³ quicquid sequitur⁵³⁴ ad consequens sequitur ad antecedens. Sed ad hoc⁵³⁵ consequens⁵³⁶ 'Sortes nunc est'⁵³⁸, sequitur quod⁵³⁹ Sortes erit; ergo⁵⁴⁰ ad⁵⁴² hoc⁵⁴³ antecedens 'Sortes⁵⁴⁴ incipit esse' sequitur quod⁵⁴⁵ Sortes erit^{541,546}. Et⁵⁴⁷ quod ista consequentia sit bona 'Sortes nunc est, ergo Sortes erit' proba sic, quia si⁵⁴⁸ Sortes nunc sit, et⁵⁴⁹ cum⁵⁵⁰ per secundam suppositionem non sit⁵⁵¹ dare ultimum instans rei⁵⁵² permanentis in⁵⁵³ esse⁵⁵⁴, igitur hoc⁵⁵⁵ instans⁵⁵⁶ non est ultimum instans⁵⁵⁷ esse⁵⁵⁸ Sortis. Et si⁵⁵⁹ hoc^{560,562} instans non sit⁵⁶³ ultimum instans⁵⁶⁴ esse⁵⁶⁵ Sortis⁵⁶⁶, sequitur quod post hoc instans⁵⁶⁷ Sortes necessario erit, quia si Sortes post hoc instans non esset et⁵⁶⁸ nunc⁵⁶⁹ esset⁵⁷⁰, sequitur⁵⁷¹ quod hoc instans esset⁵⁷² ultimum instans sui⁵⁷³ esse⁵⁶¹. Habeo igitur⁵⁷⁴ probatum quod⁵⁷⁵ ista consequentia est⁵⁷⁷ bona 'Sortes nunc est, igitur Sortes erit' et per consequens hec⁵⁷⁸ erit⁵⁷⁹ bona consequentia⁵⁸⁰ 'Sortes⁵⁸¹ incipit esse, igitur Sortes⁵⁸² erit⁵⁷⁶,'.

Contra istam conclusionem⁵⁸³ arguo⁵⁸⁴ sic: si ista⁵⁸⁵ propositio⁵⁸⁶ esset⁵⁸⁷ vera sequitur⁵⁸⁸ quod de⁵⁸⁹ futuris contingentibus esset⁵⁹⁰ de-

est B.	519 est B.	520 om. BCD.	521 om. BCD.	522 om. BC
523 om. BC.	524 bone C.	525-526 om. C.	527 dictis D.	
528 om. D.	529-530 om. B.	531 om. BC.	532 om. C.	533 sed C.
534 om. B.	535 hec B.	536 consequentia B.	537-538 om. B.	
539 om. D.	540-541 om. D.	542 et ad C.	543 om. C.	544 vide-
licet Sortes C.	545 om. B.	546 est A.	547 autem B.	548 cum B.
549 om. C.	550 tamen AD.	551 est AC.	552 esse rei A.	
553-554 om. A.	555 om. AC.	556 om. A.	557-558 rei permanentis	
in esse scilicet Sortis D.	559 sic C.	560-561 om. C.	562 om. A.	
563 est A.	564 om. A.	565-566 om. AD.	567 om. AD.	568 om. B.
569 tunc B.	570 esse B.	571 sequeretur D.	572 esse A.	
573 esse Sortis vel sui B.	574 propositum C.	575-576 om. C.		
577 sit A.	578 om. AD.	579 est D.	580 om. D.	581 om. B.
582 om. A.	583 propositionem C.	584 arguitur D.	585 om. D.	
586 conclusio B.	587 est B.	588 sequeretur B.	589 in B.	
590 erit C.	591 declarata C.	592 om. C.	593 possunt C.	

terminata⁵⁹¹ veritas, et quod⁵⁹² futura contingentia possent⁵⁹³ determinate
 sciri⁵⁹⁴. Sed⁵⁹⁵ hoc est⁵⁹⁶ contra⁵⁹⁷ Aristotelem⁵⁹⁸ primo⁵⁹⁹ Pery Ermenei-
 as, igitur⁶⁰⁰ illud ex quo sequitur⁶⁰¹. Contrarium⁶⁰² proba⁶⁰³ et⁶⁰⁴ arguo
 sic⁶⁰⁵: 'Sortes nunc⁶⁰⁶ est, igitur Sortes⁶⁰⁷ erit'. Ista⁶⁰⁸ consequentia
 est bona, et⁶⁰⁹ antecedens est scitum a te esse⁶¹⁰ verum⁶¹¹, igitur con-
 sequens⁶¹² est⁶¹³ scitum a te esse verum⁶¹⁴, quia qui scit premissas esse
 veras et scit⁶¹⁵ discursum esse⁶¹⁶ verum⁶¹⁷ et⁶¹⁸ bonum⁶¹⁹, scit⁶²⁰ con-
 clusionem esse⁶²¹ veram⁶²², quia aliter demonstratio⁶²³ numquam⁶²⁴ face-
 ret⁶²⁵ scire⁶²⁶ nec^{627,629} esset⁶³⁰ sillogismus faciens scire^{628,631}. Ex
 quo sequitur quod sicut⁶³² scis⁶³³ istam propositionem⁶³⁴ 'Sortes⁶³⁵ est'
 ita scis⁶³⁷ istam 'Sortes erit'⁶³⁶. Sed⁶³⁸ clarum est quod distincte⁶³⁹
 et⁶⁴⁰ determinate⁶⁴¹ scis⁶⁴² istam 'Sortes est' quia⁶⁴³ tu⁶⁴⁵ vides⁶⁴⁶
 manifeste quod Sortes est⁶⁴⁴, igitur tu⁶⁴⁷ scis⁶⁴⁸ distincte⁶⁴⁹ et⁶⁵⁰
 determinate⁶⁵¹ istam 'Sortes erit'. Sed⁶⁵² ista⁶⁵⁴ /C 25^rb/ propositio⁶⁵⁵
 'Sortes erit'⁶⁵⁶, est futurum⁶⁵⁷ contingens, igitur aliquod futurum contin-
 gens distincte⁶⁵⁸ et⁶⁵⁹ determinate⁶⁶⁰ scitur^{653,661}. Sed non est maior⁶⁶²
 ratio de uno futuro⁶⁶³ contingentia⁶⁶⁴ quam de alio⁶⁶⁵, igitur videtur quod
 omne futurum contingens potest determinate⁶⁶⁶ sciri.

Ad illud⁶⁶⁷ respondeo⁶⁶⁸; pro cuius solutione notandum⁶⁶⁹ est⁶⁷⁰ quod
 futurum contingens duplex est, quia⁶⁷¹ quoddam⁶⁷² est⁶⁷³ futurum contin-
 gens⁶⁷⁴ quod pro illo⁶⁷⁵ pro quo est verum nullo modo potest esse⁶⁷⁶ fal-
 sum, et tale futurum contingens est 'nunc⁶⁷⁷ futurum contingens', quod⁶⁷⁸
 sequitur necessario ex propositione vera et⁶⁷⁹ mere⁶⁸⁰ de presenti. Aliud

594 et sciri A. 595-596 consequens est falsum et C. 597 impossibile
 B; inconsequens D. 598 patet B; om. D. 599 secundo B.
 600-601 om. C. 602 consequentiam BC. 603 probatur D. 604-605 om.
 D. 606 non C. 607 nunc C. 608 om. B. 609 sed tunc et D.
 610 om. AC; et D. 611 om. AC. 612 et consequens C. 613-614 om. D.
 615 dat C; om. D. 616 om. D. 617 om. CD. 618 om. BCD. 619 om.
 D. 620 om. B. 621 om. C. 622 om. C; bonam et scitum veram D.
 623 demonstrative B. 624 non B. 625 om. B. 626 om. B.
 627-628 om. A. 629 om. B. 630 om. C. 631 om. B. 632 om. D.
 633 tu scis B; scit D. 634 om. CD. 635-636 om. D. 637 tu scis B.
 638 et D. 639 om. B. 640 om. BC. 641 om. C. 642 scit D.
 643-644 om. C. 645 om. D. 646 vides istam B; videt D. 647 om. CD.
 648 scit D. 649 om. A. 650 om. AC. 651 om. C. 652-653 om. D.
 654 clarum est quod ista B. 655-656 om. C. 657 om. B.
 658-659 om. B. 660 indeterminate A. 661 erit scitum A. 662 alia
 B. 663 om. BC. 664 om. B. 665 alio contingentia B; reliquo D.
 666 distincte et determinate B. 667 illud argumentum B. 668 respon-
 detur BC. 669 sciendum B; nominandum C. 670 om. CD. 671 quidem
 D. 672 quod quoddam C; om. D. 673-674 om. BD. 675 futuro C.
 676 est C. 677 omne B; non C; verum D. 678 quia C. 679 om. B.
 680 mediata C. 681 om. A. 682 in C. 683-684 om. C. 685 om.

est futurum contingens quod⁶⁸¹ pro illo instanti pro⁶⁸² quo est verum pro⁶⁸³
eodem⁶⁸⁴ instanti⁶⁸⁵ potest esse falsum; et ista veritas vocatur "veritas
indeterminata" quia non est necessario determinata ad unam partem, et talia
contingentia sunt huiusmodi⁶⁸⁶ 'Sortes bibit'⁶⁸⁷, 'Sortes⁶⁸⁸ comedet'⁶⁸⁹,
etc.⁶⁹⁰

Per⁶⁹¹ hoc⁶⁹³ dico⁶⁹² ad argumentum⁶⁹⁴ concedendo⁶⁹⁵ quod de⁶⁹⁶ primis
futuris⁶⁹⁷ contingentibus⁶⁹⁸ potest esse determinata veritas et⁶⁹⁹ deter-
minata⁷⁰⁰ et distincta scientia⁷⁰¹ sicut de propositionibus mere de presen-
ti ex quibus talia contingentia sequuntur⁷⁰². De⁷⁰³ futuris⁷⁰⁴ secundis⁷⁰⁵
contingentibus⁷⁰⁶ nulla⁷⁰⁷ est veritas⁷⁰⁸ determinata nec certa scientia
et⁷⁰⁹ de talibus⁷¹⁰ loquitur⁷¹¹ /D 216^r/ Aristoteles in⁷¹² loco sepius⁷¹⁴
allegato⁷¹³.

2.3.1.2

Hoc idem ostendo⁷¹⁵ in terminis rerum successivarum, videlicet⁷¹⁶ quod
tales consequentie sunt bone⁷¹⁷ 'Sortes incipit moveri, igitur Sortes mo-
vebitur'. Istam⁷¹⁸ consequentiam⁷¹⁹ proba⁷²⁰: a⁷²¹ propositione exposita⁷²²
ad quamlibet exponentem⁷²³ est bona consequentia, sicut ex habitis⁷²⁴ est
manifestum. Sed ista propositio 'Sortes movebitur' est una⁷²⁵ exponens⁷²⁶
istius⁷²⁷ 'Sortes incipit moveri' sicut⁷²⁸ etiam⁷³⁰ patet ex predictis⁷²⁹,
igitur ista⁷³¹ consequentia est bona 'Sortes incipit moveri, igitur Sortes
movebitur'⁷³².

Ulterius sequitur⁷³³ declaratio⁷³⁴ istius⁷³⁵ consequentis⁷³⁶ 'Sortes
movetur'⁷³⁷, igitur Sortes movebitur⁷³⁸. Istam consequentiam /B 16^r/ b/
probo⁷³⁹, et primo de motu locali, secundo de aliis motibus⁷⁴⁰.

BC. 686 om. C. 687 curret A; sedet D. 688 om. AB. 689 om. A.
690 et sic de aliis C; om. D. 691-692 om. C. 693 consequens B.
694 argumenta A. 695 om. B; concedo C. 696 a C. 697 om. B.
698 om. BC. 699-700 om. C. 701 om. B. 702 sequitur B.
703 sed de C. 704 om. BC. 705 aliis B. 706 autem contingentibus
B. 707 nullo modo B; om. C. 708-709 impossibile C. 710 quibus C.
711 intelligitur B; monstrat D. 712-713 om. C. 714 prius B.
715 concedo etiam D. 716-717 om. B. 718 hanc C. 719 propositio-
nem A; conclusionem C. 720 proba sic B. 721 ab omni B; quia a C.
722 exceptiva B. 723 suam exponentem B; eius exponentem C.
724 predictis B; prehabitis C. 725 unam D. 726 exponentium D.
727 illam D. 728-729 om. A. 730 om. B. 731-732 etc. C.
733 etiam sequitur B. 734 pro declaratione B. 735 huius C.
736 istam consequentiam esse bonam B; consequentie D. 737 movebitur B.
738 localiter movetur B. 739 proba sic C. 740 om. A.

2.3.1.2.1.1

De^{741,743} motu⁷⁴⁴ locali⁷⁴⁵ arguo⁷⁴² sic: Sortes movetur⁷⁴⁶ localiter,
 igitur Sortes⁷⁴⁷ est in loco, vel⁷⁴⁸ igitur si⁷⁴⁹ Sortes sit⁷⁵¹ in loco⁷⁵⁰
 habebit⁷⁵² aliquem⁷⁵³ alium⁷⁵⁴ locum⁷⁵⁵ quam⁷⁵⁶ nunc habet⁷⁵⁷ vel⁷⁵⁸ non⁷⁵⁹.
 Si Sortes^{760,762} habebit alium⁷⁶³ locum quam⁷⁶⁴ nunc habet^{761,765}, igitur
 Sortes⁷⁶⁶ movebitur⁷⁶⁷. /A 51^ra/ Si⁷⁶⁸ non habebit⁷⁷⁰ aliquem alium locum
 quam nunc habet⁷⁷¹, igitur Sortes⁷⁷² non movetur⁷⁶⁹ localiter⁷⁷³, quia ha-
 bito ultimo⁷⁷⁴ loco cessat motus localis⁷⁷⁵.

Idem⁷⁷⁶ potest probari⁷⁷⁷ de motu locali circulari⁷⁷⁸ uno corpore exi-
 stente in⁷⁷⁹ eodem loco⁷⁸⁰ movendo⁷⁸¹ tamen⁷⁸² circulariter. Sed⁷⁸³ tunc
 debet fieri probatio respectu⁷⁸⁵ partium illius corporis quod sic movetur⁷⁸⁴,
 quia quacumque parte capta⁷⁸⁶ illius⁷⁸⁷ corporis vel⁷⁸⁸ illa⁷⁸⁹ pars⁷⁹⁰
 habebit alium⁷⁹¹ locum quam nunc⁷⁹² habet, et⁷⁹³ sic ulterius movebitur
 localiter, vel⁷⁹⁵ ista⁷⁹⁶ pars⁷⁹⁷ non habebit⁷⁹⁸ alium locum⁷⁹⁹ quam nunc⁸⁰⁰
 habet, et sic non movebitur⁸⁰¹ localiter⁷⁹⁴, quia⁸⁰² moveri localiter non⁸⁰⁴
 est aliud quam⁸⁰⁵ acquirere⁸⁰⁶ locum post locum. Patet igitur quod illa consequentia est
 bona 'Sortes movetur localiter, igitur Sortes⁸⁰⁷ movebitur localiter' quia
 ex opposito⁸⁰⁸ consequentis⁸⁰⁹ simpliciter⁸¹⁰ sequitur oppositum anteceden-
 tis⁸¹¹; nam⁸¹² sequitur 'Sortes non movetur⁸¹³ localiter⁸⁰³, igitur⁸¹⁴
 Sortes⁸¹⁵ non habebit alium locum quam nunc habet' et per consequens 'Sor-
 tes⁸¹⁶ non movetur localiter', igitur⁸¹⁷ de primo ad ultimum⁸¹⁹ sequitur
 'Sortes non movebitur localiter, ergo Sortes non movetur localiter⁸¹⁸'.

Contra istam conclusionem arguo sic: /C 25^va/ si ista consequentia
 sit⁸²⁰ bona 'Sortes movetur localiter⁸²¹, ergo Sortes movebitur localiter',

741-742 primo B. 743 et C. 744-745 om. C. 746 movere C.
 747 om. C. 748 om. D. 749-750 om. C. 751 sit B. 752 vel
 habebit D. 753 om. AC. 754 om. B. 755 locum primum B.
 756-757 om. C. 758-759 om. B. 760-761 sic C. 762 om. BD.
 763 primum B; aliquem alium D. 764-765 om. A. 766 om. C.
 767 non movebitur B; movebitur localiter D. 768-769 om. B.
 770-771 om. AC. 772 om. C. 773 om. C. 774 ultimo D.
 775 localiter B; localis igitur non movebitur C; et per contra non movetur
 quod est contra casum D. 776 item idem A; idem etiam C. 777 impro-
 bari A; haberi D. 778 circuli A. 779-780 om. C. 781 moto CD.
 782 om. C. 783-784 om. C. 785 secunda A; rerum B. 786 accepta B.
 787 om. B. 788-789 om. B. 790 om. BC. 791 proprium B; illum C.
 792 non C. 793-794 vel non etc. A. 795 aut C. 796-797 om. CD.
 798 habet D. 799 om. B. 800 non C. 801 movetur D.
 802-803 om. C. 804 nihil B. 805 nisi quam B. 806 accipere A.
 807 om. A. 808 opposita A. 809 om. BD. 810 etiam B. 811 om.
 BD. 812 enim A. 813 movebitur B. 814 igitur Sortes non movebitur
 igitur D. 815 om. A. 816 om. C. 817-818 om. AC. 819 penul-
 timum B. 820 est B. 821 om. AC. 822 tunc B; et C. 823 dicit

cum⁸²² illud consequens sit⁸²³ de futuro contingenti de⁸²⁴ quo⁸²⁵ non est aliqua⁸²⁶ determinata veritas, sequitur etiam⁸²⁷ quod de isto antecedente 'Sortes⁸²⁸ movetur localiter⁸²⁹, non erit⁸³⁰ aliqua⁸³¹ determinata veritas⁸³² quia in omni bona consequentia si consequens sit⁸³³ alicui dubium et antecedens erit⁸³⁴ eidem⁸³⁵ dubium. Et⁸³⁶ si consequens sit⁸³⁷ indeterminate verum vel⁸³⁸ falsum⁸³⁹, et antecedens erit indeterminate⁸⁴⁰ verum⁸⁴¹ vel⁸⁴² falsum⁸⁴³. Et per consequens sequitur quod aliqua propositio⁸⁴⁴ mere^{845a} de presenti non erit^{845b} determinate vera vel falsa.

Item⁸⁴⁶ ulterius^{847a} sequitur^{847b} quod⁸⁴⁸ si⁸⁴⁹ illa⁸⁵⁰ consequentia sit⁸⁵¹ bona 'Sortes movetur, igitur Sortes movebitur', cum impossibile sit⁸⁵² scire hoc⁸⁵³ consequens⁸⁵⁴ 'Sortes movebitur', igitur^{855,857} impossibile erit scire hoc antecedens 'Sortes movetur',⁸⁵⁶ quod videtur⁸⁵⁸ maxime⁸⁵⁹ absurdum⁸⁶⁰, precipue⁸⁶¹ cum videmus⁸⁶² expresse aliqua⁸⁶³ moveri⁸⁶⁴, et⁸⁶⁵ cum⁸⁶⁶ secundum Aristotelem⁸⁶⁷ motus sit⁸⁶⁸ sensibile commune⁸⁶⁹. Item sequitur⁸⁷⁰, si ista⁸⁷¹ consequentia⁸⁷² sit bona 'Sortes⁸⁷³ movetur, ergo⁸⁷⁵ Sortes movebitur⁸⁷⁶, igitur⁸⁷⁷ sequitur⁸⁷⁴ quod aliqua propositio de preterito erit⁸⁷⁸ ita indeterminate vera sicut quecumque⁸⁷⁹ propositio⁸⁸⁰ de futuro contingenti, quod videtur⁸⁸¹ esse⁸⁸² contra istam propositionem⁸⁸³ communem⁸⁸⁴ 'omnis propositio de preterito vera est necessaria'. Assumptum probo et capio hanc⁸⁸⁵ propositionem de futuro 'Sortes movebitur' que propositio⁸⁸⁶ vocetur⁸⁸⁷ 'a'. Et capio hanc propositionem⁸⁸⁸ de preterito 'a fuit⁸⁸⁹ verum'. Tunc⁸⁹⁰ sic: a potest⁸⁹¹ numquam fuisse verum, igitur hec propositio 'a fuit⁸⁹² verum⁸⁹³, potest numquam fuisse vera⁸⁹⁴. Consequentia patet de⁸⁹⁵ se⁸⁹⁶ ex hoc, quod veritas istius propositionis⁸⁹⁷ 'a fuit verum' dependet⁸⁹⁸ totaliter⁸⁹⁹ ex veritate a.

C. 824 a B; et C, 825 quo futuro B; econverso C. 826 om. AD.
 827 om. C. 828-829 om. C. 830 est AC. 831 om. A. 832 veritas
 Sortes movetur C. 833 est A; dicit C. 834 est C. 835 om. D.
 836 et sic B. 837 dicit C. 838-839 om. C. 840 tale D.
 841 om. D. 842-843 om. CD. 844 om. D. 845a media A; om. B.
 845b est BC. 846 om. B. 847a om. A; si ulterius D. 847b om. A.
 848 om. AC. 849 etiam B. 850 om. A. 851 dicit C. 852 scit
 A; dicit C. 853 hoc quia A; illud CD. 854 contingens D.
 855-856 om. B. 857 om. A; quod C. 858 nunc A. 859 om. CD.
 860 asserendum A. 861 precise B; om. CD. 862 videamus BD.
 863 quod aliqua BCD. 864 moventur BD; movere C. 865 et etiam B;
 om. D. 866 quia D. 867 philosophum D. 868 sit unum B; est D.
 869 om. C. 870 om. BCD. 871 om. A. 872 esset C. 873-874
 om. A. 875-876 etc. C; om. D. 877 om. B; consequentia C.
 878 vera est B. 879 illa A; aliqua BC. 880 om. AD. 881 est C.
 882 om. C; esse impossibile et D. 883 secundam vel propositionem C.
 884 om. A; communem scilicet C. 885 istam A; illam C. 886 om. BC.
 887 vocetur B. 888 om. CD. 889 sit C. 890 et tunc B.
 891 potuit C. 892 sit C. 893 om. B. 894 verum BC.
 895-896 om. C. 897 om. B. 898 dependeat B, 899 om. C.

Ad primum istorum⁹⁰⁰ respondeo; pro⁹⁰¹ cuius solutione et aliorum argumentorum⁹⁰² subsequentium⁹⁰³ est sciendum quod aliqua⁹⁰⁴ propositiones⁹⁰⁵ de presenti et de⁹⁰⁶ preterito sunt huiusmodi⁹⁰⁷ quod veritas illarum⁹⁰⁸ propositionum⁹⁰⁹ dependet⁹¹⁰ totaliter /D 216^v/a/ ex veritate propositionum contingentium⁹¹¹, de quibus nulla est determinata veritas vel falsitas, et^{912,914} saltem si⁹¹⁵ tales propositiones de presenti et de preterito⁹¹⁶ debeant⁹¹⁷ exponi ita⁹¹⁸ quod⁹¹⁹ una istarum⁹²⁰ exponentium⁹²¹ erit⁹²² propositio de contingenti de qua nulla⁹²³ est⁹²⁴ determinata veritas vel falsitas⁹¹³. Verbi⁹²⁵ gratia⁹²⁶ exponentes istius⁹²⁷ propositionis⁹²⁸ de⁹²⁹ presenti⁹³⁰ 'Sortes movetur⁹³¹, sunt⁹³² iste due⁹³³ propositiones⁹³⁴ 'Sortes⁹³⁵ immediate ante hoc⁹³⁶ fuit in alio loco quam nunc est⁹³⁷, et⁹³⁸ 'Sortes⁹⁴⁰ immediate post hoc erit in alio⁹⁴¹ loco quam nunc^{939,942} est⁹⁴³, que propositio est mere⁹⁴⁴ de futuro contingentis⁹⁴⁵ et reddit⁹⁴⁶ totam⁹⁴⁷ istam copulativam mere⁹⁴⁸ de⁹⁴⁹ contingentis⁹⁵⁰. Et per consequens ista propositio de presenti 'Sortes⁹⁵¹ movetur⁹⁵², cui⁹⁵³ equivalet⁹⁵⁴ copulativa⁹⁵⁵ predicta⁹⁵⁶, est⁹⁵⁷ contingens simpliciter⁹⁵⁸. Alie sunt propositiones de presenti⁹⁵⁹ /C 25^v/b/ et de preterito in⁹⁶⁰ quarum⁹⁶¹ expositio-
ne⁹⁶² non^{963,965} ponitur aliqua⁹⁶⁶ propositio⁹⁶⁴ de futuro contingentis indeterminate⁹⁶⁸ vera⁹⁶⁹ vel falsa, cuiusmodi⁹⁷⁰ sunt⁹⁷¹ tales⁹⁷² propositiones⁹⁷³ in quibus ponuntur⁹⁷⁴ termini⁹⁷⁵ rerum permanentium⁹⁷⁶ ut^{967,977} 'Adam fuit homo', 'homo est animal'.

900 om. C. 901 quod pro C. 902 om. D. 903 sequentium BD.
904 aliqua ACD. 905 propositio ACD. 906 aliqua propositio de D.
907 huius A. 908 earum A. 909 om. AC. 910 dependeat B.
911 dependentium C. 912-913 om. B. 914 vel D. 915 om. D.
916 futuro preterito C. 917 debent D. 918-919 om. AC. 920 om. CD.
921 om. C. 922 est A. 923 non C. 924 erit C. 925 ut D.
926 om. D. 927 illam istius D. 928 om. A. 929-930 om. C.
931 movetur localiter B. 932 que est de presenti sunt C. 933 om. C.
934 om. C. 935 quod B. 936 hoc instans B. 937 om. AB; alia est
quod D. 938-939 om. B. 940 om. A. 941 aliquo AD. 942 prius D.
943 om. D. 944 veram C. 945 de contingentis A. 946 reddidit C.
947 om. C. 948 om. C. 949 om. B. 950 contingentem B; futuro
contingenti C. 951 om. C. 952 movetur localiter B; om. C. 953 cuius
D. 954 equibus vel equilibris C. 955 illa copulativa C. 956 supra-
dicta A; contingens B. 957 erit BD. 958 simpliciter contingens D.
959 futuro presenti C. 960 que D. 961 non habent D. 962 exposi-
tioni B; exponentes D. 963-964 om. D. 965 om. B. 966-967 aliquis
terminus rerum successivarum vel etiam que non significant aliquas proposi-
tiones in quibus ponuntur aliqui termini rerum successivarum cuiusmodi sunt
tales propositiones B. 968 nec D. 969 veram A; valet B.
970 cuius A; ut D. 971 sint D. 972 termini A; om. D.
973 om. C; iste D. 974 componuntur C. 975 termini vel aliquis ter-
minus C. 976 successivarum C. 977 cuius sunt tales C. 978 et

Per⁹⁷⁸ hoc ad⁹⁷⁹ argumenta.

Ad primum concedo⁹⁸⁰ conclusionem⁹⁸¹ quod⁹⁸² aliqua propositio /B 16^v/a/
de presenti, scilicet⁹⁸³ illa⁹⁸⁴ in cuius expositione ponitur aliquod⁹⁸⁵
futurum contingens indeterminate⁹⁸⁶ verum vel falsum⁹⁸⁷, est indeterminate
vera vel falsa sicut⁹⁸⁸ illud⁹⁸⁹ contingens quod ponitur in eius expositi-
one.

Ad secundum dico⁹⁹⁰ concedendo⁹⁹¹ conclusionem quod impossibile est
scire hanc propositionem de⁹⁹² presenti⁹⁹³ 'Sortes movetur'. Immo dico
quod hec⁹⁹⁴ 'Sortes⁹⁹⁵ movetur⁹⁹⁶, est ita⁹⁹⁷ dubia sicut ista⁹⁹⁸ 'Sortes
movebitur'. Quod potest demonstrari⁹⁹⁹ per copulativam¹ compositam² ex³
eius⁴ exponentibus cum qua ista propositio⁵ convertitur, quia illa copula-
tiva - sicut de se patet - ratione unius⁶ partis⁷ est simpliciter⁸ contin-
gens. Et ad hoc quod⁹ dicitur¹⁰ quod nos videmus manifeste¹¹ aliqua¹² mo-
veri¹³, dico quod¹⁴ - sicut argumenta expresse¹⁵ probant - hoc¹⁶ est im-
possibile, sed hoc apparet nobis¹⁷, scilicet^{18,20} quod aliqua²¹ res movea-
tur^{19,22}, ex hoc quod immediate²³ ante hoc instans²⁴ illa²⁵ res²⁶ moveba-
tur²⁷ quia quod²⁸ prope est²⁹ nihil distare videtur.

Ad aliud³⁰ quod³¹ dicitur³² de Aristotele qui ponit motum esse³³ sensibile³⁴
commune³⁵, hoc ideo dicit³⁶ non quia sentimus aliquid moveri, sed quia
pluribus sensibus³⁷ percipimus³⁸ quod³⁹ aliquid movebatur. Quia sicut
nos⁴⁰ non possumus⁴¹ percipere per⁴² sensum vel per⁴³ intellectum quod⁴⁴
aliquid⁴⁵ movebitur⁴⁶, ita etiam⁴⁷ non possumus percipere per^{48,50} sensum
vel per⁵¹ intellectum⁴⁹ quod aliquid movetur.

Ad ultimum⁵² argumentum⁵³ dico concedendo conclusionem quod aliqua
propositio vera de preterito⁵⁴ est ita⁵⁵ bene⁵⁶ contingens et⁵⁷ indetermi-
per C. 979 respondeo ad C. 980 dicatur concedendo C; dico concedendo
D. 981 om. D. 982 scilicet quod C. 983-984 om. AD. 985 om. A;
propositio de contingenti vel aliquod D. 896-897 om. BD. 988 de
aliqua non sunt D. 989 illud futurum C. 990 om. B. 991 concedo B.
992 om. C. 993 om. C. 994 illa C. 995-996 om. C. 997 om. A.
998 om. D. 999 declarari A. 1 eius copulativam C. 2 expositam C.
3 et C. 4 om. B. 5 om. AC. 6 huius C. 7 om. B. 8 dupli-
citer C. 9 om. B; quando C. 10 om. B. 11 om. A. 12 aliquando
C. 13 movere B. 14 om. C. 15 om. B. 16 quod hoc B. 17 om.
D. 18-19 om. A. 20 om. BC. 21 alique B. 22 moveantur B;
movetur C. 23 om. C. 24 om. C. 25 ille ABC. 26 om. A.
27 movebantur ABC. 28 illud quod C. 29 om. C. 30 illud B.
31 quando A; om. C; etiam quod D. 32 dictum C. 33 om. B. 34 sen-
sibilem C. 35 communem C. 36 habet D. 37 sensibilibus C.
38 precipimus C. 39 quid C. 40 om. C. 41 percipimus nec possumus
C. 42 propter C. 43 om. CD. 44 om. C. 45 om. C. 46 move-
batur A; om. C. 47 om. A; nos B; ita C. 48-49 om. A. 50 propter
C. 51 om. CD. 52 aliud C. 53 om. C. 54 lacuna in A.
55 om. A. 56 vera AD; om. C. 57-58 om. A. 59 indeterminata C;

nate⁵⁹ vera vel falsa⁵⁸ sicut aliqua⁶⁰ propositio⁶¹ de futuro contingenti. Et tales propositiones⁶² de preterito⁶³ sunt ille in quarum⁶⁴ expositione⁶⁵ ponitur aliquod futurum contingens indeterminate verum vel falsum; et⁶⁶ talis est hec propositio⁶⁷ 'a fuit verum'. Et ulterius ad hoc⁶⁸ quod dicitur⁶⁹ quod illa⁷¹ propositio est communis quod⁷⁰ omnis⁷² propositio de preterito vera est necessario, dico quod illa simpliciter est⁷³ falsa propter⁷⁴ rationes predictas.

2.3.1.2.1.2

Alia conclusio est ista que⁷⁵ etiam⁷⁶ sequitur⁷⁷ ex predictis⁷⁸, videlicet⁷⁹ quod illa consequentia⁸⁰ est bona 'Sortes incipit moveri localiter, igitur immediate /C 26^a/ post hoc aliquod spatium erit pertransitum⁸¹. Istam consequentiam⁸² proba sic⁸³: Sortes incipit moveri⁸⁴ localiter, igitur immediate post hoc movebitur localiter. Consequentia patet per⁸⁵ predicta⁸⁶ quia⁸⁷ arguitur ab exposito⁸⁹ ad exponens^{88,90}. Et ulterius⁹¹: immediate⁹² post hoc movebitur⁹³, igitur immediate post⁹⁴ hoc⁹⁵ erit⁹⁶ in alio loco quam⁹⁷ nunc est⁹⁸; igitur immediate post hoc aliquod spatium erit pertransitum.

Item⁹⁹, adhuc¹⁰⁰ proba istam¹⁰¹ consequentiam et¹⁰² arguo¹⁰³ sic: immediate post hoc Sortes movebitur localiter, igitur nullum medium erit¹⁰⁴ antequam aliquod spatium sit¹⁰⁵ pertransitum¹⁰⁶. Istam consequentiam proba¹⁰⁷, quia si consequentia¹⁰⁸ non sit¹⁰⁹ bona, igitur¹¹⁰ oppositum consequentis potest¹¹¹ stare cum antecedente. Stabunt igitur ista duo simul 'immediate post hoc Sortes movebitur localiter' et 'aliquod medium erit, antequam aliquod spatium erit pertransitum'. Capi¹¹² illud¹¹³ medium et

ita indeterminate D. 60 illa A. 61 om. A. 62 om. AC. 63 de futuro contingenti non A; de futuro contingenti et de preterito C. 64 quorum A. 65 om. C. 66 vel etiam que verificantur pro talibus propositionibus in quarum expositione ponitur aliquod futurum indeterminate verum vel falsum et B. 67 om. C. 68 illam conclusionem C. 69-70 om. C. 71 hec A. 72 om. A. 73 om. D. 74 per C. 75-76 om. C. 77 sequens C. 78 premissis C. 79 om. BD. 80 conclusio A. 81 pertransitum a Sorte C. 82 om. D. 83 enim sic D. 84 movere B. 85 om. C; ex D. 86 om. C; predictis D. 87-88 om. A. 89 exponente B; exponentibus C. 90 exposita C. 91 ultra BC. 92 igitur immediate B. 93 Sortes movebitur localiter B. 94-95 om. C. 96 Sortes erit B; movebitur Sortes erit D. 97 in quo C. 98 non est C; om. D. 99-100 prima A; primo C. 101 eandem C. 102-103 om. C. 104 est AD. 105 erit B; et C. 106 pertransitam C. 107 proba sic BC. 108 ista consequentia B. 109 est B. 110 om. AB. 111 poterit D. 112 et capio B. 113 om. A. 114 medium illud a A. 115 sicut C. 116 om. C.

sit a¹¹⁴, tunc sic¹¹⁵: immediate post hoc Sortes movebitur localiter¹¹⁶, igitur ante medium¹¹⁷ a temporis erit aliquod /D 216^vb/ spatium pertransitum - sicut¹¹⁸ de se patet¹¹⁹ - et per consequens¹²⁰ a tempus totum¹²¹ non erit antequam¹²² aliquod¹²³ spatium¹²⁴ erit¹²⁵ pertransitum. Patet igitur quod illa¹²⁶ prima¹²⁷ consequentia est bona 'Sortes¹²⁸ incipit moveri¹²⁹ localiter, igitur immediate post hoc aliquod spatium erit¹³⁰ pertransitum'.

Contra istam conclusionem¹³¹ arguo¹³² sic: antecedens istius consequentiae est¹³³ possibile, et consequens impossibile¹³⁴, igitur consequentia non valet. Quod antecedens sit¹³⁵ possibile patet de se. Impossibilitatem consequentis¹³⁶ probo sic: nullum spatium erit immediate post hoc pertransitum, igitur non immediate post hoc erit aliquod spatium¹³⁷ pertransitum. Consequentia videtur plana quia - ut videtur - oppositum consequentis non potest stare cum antecedente. Ista¹³⁸ enim¹³⁹ - ut¹⁴⁰ videtur¹⁴¹ - non stant¹⁴² simul 'nullum spatium immediate post hoc erit pertransitum' et 'immediate¹⁴³ post hoc aliquod spatium erit pertransitum¹⁴⁴, quia¹⁴⁵ ista¹⁴⁷ sunt contradictoria, ut patet de se. Sed ista¹⁴⁸ videntur¹⁴⁹ equivalere¹⁵⁰ 'aliquod¹⁵¹ spatium erit pertransitum immediate post hoc' et 'immediate post¹⁵² hoc¹⁵³ aliquod spatium erit pertransitum¹⁴⁶, /B 16^vb/ Antecedens¹⁵⁴ prime consequentiae patet inductive, videlicet quod¹⁵⁵ nullum spatium erit¹⁵⁶ pertransitum immediate post hoc¹⁵⁷, quia quocumque spatio dato¹⁵⁸ tempus¹⁵⁹ erit antequam illud¹⁶⁰ spatium¹⁶¹ erit¹⁶² pertransitum, ut¹⁶³ de se patet.

Item, immediate post hoc aliquod spatium erit pertransitum, igitur sine medio aliquod¹⁶⁴ spatium¹⁶⁵ /C 26^rb/ erit pertransitum. Et¹⁶⁶ ultra¹⁶⁷, igitur sine tempore aliquod /A 51^rb/ spatium erit pertransitum. Et^{168,170} ultra¹⁷¹, in^{172,174} nullo¹⁷⁵ tempore aliquod spatium erit pertransitum, ergo¹⁷³ in¹⁷⁶ non-tempore aliquod spatium erit pertransitum¹⁶⁹, igitur¹⁷⁷ motus erit sine¹⁷⁸ tempore. Consequens est impossibile, igitur illud¹⁷⁹ ex quo sequitur¹⁸⁰.

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|-----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| 117 medium instans C. | 118-119 om. C. | 120 casum B. | 121 om. BC. |
| 122 om. B. | 123 om. A. | 124 tempus vel spatium D. | 125 om. B |
| 126 om. B. | 127 om. AC. | 128 scilicet Sortes C. | 129 movere B. |
| 130 post hoc est C. | 131 consequentiam AC. | 132 arguitur D. | |
| 133 om. B. | 134 est impossibile D. | 135 dicit C. | 136 consequentiae |
| B. | 137 om. C. | 138 ita B. | 139 om. A; cum B. |
| 142 stent B. | 143-144 4-5-6-7-1-2-3 B; | 4-5-1-2-3-6-7 D. | 145-146 om. |
| A. | 147 om. C. | 148 ille D. | 149 videretur C. |
| omnino C. | 151 non aliquod B. | 152-153 om. B. | 154 et antecedens A. |
| 155 om. A. | 156 est C. | 157 om. A. | 158 signato A; capto B. |
| 159 temporis C. | 160 illum C. | 161 om. C. | 162 est C. |
| B. | 164-165 om. B. | 166 sed C. | 167 ulterius D. |
| 170 om. B. | 171 om. B; | ulterius D. | 168-169 om. C. |
| 175 om. A. | 176-177 om. B. | 178 et sine C. | 174 sine A. |
| B. | 181 nullus C. | 182 movetur C. | 183 om. A. |
| | | | 184 et non C. |

Item, nullus motus erit immediate post hoc, igitur nihil¹⁸¹ movebitur¹⁸² localiter¹⁸³ immediate post hoc. Et ultra, igitur non¹⁸⁴ immediate post hoc erit aliquod¹⁸⁵ spatium pertransitum. Consequentia videtur¹⁸⁶ plana¹⁸⁷ quia si nihil¹⁸⁸ movebitur¹⁸⁹ localiter immediate post hoc¹⁹⁰ instans¹⁹¹, cum¹⁹² omne¹⁹³ spatium pertranseat¹⁹⁴ per motum localem, sequitur quod Sortes non immediate post hoc pertransibit¹⁹⁵ aliquod spatium. Primum antecedens proba, videlicet illud¹⁹⁶ 'nullus motus erit immediate post hoc', quia¹⁹⁷ si hec est falsa, tunc sua opposita est vera, scilicet ista 'aliquis motus est immediate post hoc¹⁹⁸'. Sed¹⁹⁹ hoc est impossibile²⁰⁰ quia capto quocumque motu medietas illius²⁰¹ motus erit²⁰² antequam²⁰³ totus motus²⁰⁴ erit²⁰⁵, et per consequens totus iste motus non erit immediate post hoc.

Ad primum argumentum²⁰⁶ quando²⁰⁷ dicitur²⁰⁸ "nullum²⁰⁹ spatium²¹⁰ erit pertransitum²¹¹ immediate²¹² post hoc²¹³", dico istam²¹⁴ simpliciter concedendo quia sua opposita est²¹⁵ impossibilis. Sed²¹⁶ ultra nego consequentiam, videlicet illam²¹⁷ "igitur²¹⁸ non immediate post hoc aliquod²¹⁹ spatium erit pertransitum". Et ad probationem²²¹ quando dicitur "hoc^{222,223} est impossibile²²⁴ 'aliquod spatium immediate post hoc erit pertransitum, etc.²²⁵", dico illam²²⁶ consequentiam²²⁸ negando; et quando dicitur "ille²²⁹ equivalent" dico²²⁷ quod ille²³⁰ propositiones²³¹ 'aliquod²³² spatium immediate post hoc erit pertransitum' et 'immediate post hoc aliquod spatium erit pertransitum' nullo modo equivalent^{233,234}, quia²³⁵ una est impossibilis²³⁷ et alia possibilis^{236,238}. Et tota²³⁹ causa est quia in ista²⁴⁰ propositione 'aliquod²⁴¹ spatium immediate²⁴³ erit pertransitum²⁴⁴, subiectum supponit determinate, et²⁴⁵ in ista 'immediate post hoc²⁴⁶ erit aliquod

185 aliud C. 186 videtur esse C; est D. 187 bona C. 188 nullus C. 189 movetur C. 190 om. D. 191 om. CD. 192 om. A; et C. 193 om. A; tamen hoc D. 194 pertransitur C. 195 pertransivit D. 196 om. C. 197-198 om. ACD. 199-200 om. AC. 201 om. C. 202 prius erit C. 203 quam C. 204 ille motus A. 205 om. C. 206 istorum C. 207-208 om. D. 209 si nullum B. 210 om. C. 211 om. B. 212-213 om. AD. 214 simpliciter istam D. 215 om. B. 216 om. B; et D. 217 om. AC. 218 om. C. 219-220 om. B. 221 propositionem C. 222 quod hoc C; om. D. 223-224 om. D. 225 om. C. 226-227 om. A. 228 om. C. 229 quod illa C. 230 illa A. 231 om. A; due D. 232-233 16-17-18-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-8-1-2-6-3-4-5-7 A. 234 equipollent A. 235-236 om. A. 237 possibilis D. 238 impossibilis D. 239 om. A. 240 prima A. 241-242 iste terminus aliquod spatium supponit confuse tantum et in secunda supponit determinate A. 243-244 etc. D. 245 autem C. 246-247 etc. D. 248 erit pertransitum C. 249 om. C. 250 termi-

spatium pertransitum^{247,248}, ille idem²⁴⁹ terminus²⁵⁰ supponit²⁵¹ confuse tantum²⁴². Unde²⁵² ista stant²⁵³ simul 'nullum spatium erit pertransitum immediate²⁵⁴ post hoc²⁵⁵, et 'immediate post hoc²⁵⁶ aliquod spatium erit pertransitum²⁵⁷.

Et si dicatur quod²⁵⁸ ista consequentia est bona 'immediate²⁵⁹ post hoc aliquod spatium erit pertransitum, igitur pertransitum erit aliquod spatium immediate post hoc^{260,261}, per conversionem simplicem dico quod non debet sic converti, sed²⁶² potius²⁶⁴ sic: 'igitur²⁶³ immediate post hoc pertransitum erit aliquod spatium', ita semper²⁶⁵ quod²⁶⁶ in una propositione et²⁶⁷ in alia ponatur²⁶⁸ ly²⁶⁹ 'pertransitum' et²⁷⁰ ly 'aliquod spatium²⁷¹, post totum illud 'immediate /C 26^va/ post hoc²⁷².

Ad aliud argumentum²⁷³ quando dicitur²⁷⁴ "immediate post hoc aliquod spatium erit pertransitum, etc.²⁷⁵" dico²⁷⁶ istam²⁷⁷ consequentiam²⁷⁸ concedendo²⁷⁹. Et ulterius concedo²⁸⁰ quod sine tempore post hoc aliquod spatium erit pertransitum. Sed²⁸¹ ulterius nego consequentiam illam²⁸² quod aliquid movebitur in non-tempore.

Et si dicatur contra²⁸³ quod²⁸⁴ ad²⁸⁵ omnem motum requiritur tempus, igitur²⁸⁶ ad motum qui erit immediate post hoc requiritur²⁸⁸ etiam tempus²⁸⁹, concedo²⁹⁰ istam²⁹¹ propositionem²⁹² quod ad omnem motum requiritur tempus²⁸⁷, et tamen nullum tempus requiritur ad motum ad^{293,295} aliquem locum²⁹⁴. Et ulterius nego²⁹⁶ istam propositionem 'ad motum qui erit immediate post hoc /D 217^ra/ requiritur tempus' quia implicat²⁹⁷ falsum²⁹⁹, videlicet²⁹⁸ quod aliquis motus erit³⁰⁰ immediate post hoc.

Ad aliud argumentum³⁰¹ dico³⁰² negando³⁰³ istam consequentiam 'nullus motus erit immediate post hoc, igitur nihil movebitur localiter immediate post hoc', cum quo³⁰⁴ tamen stat quod immediate post³⁰⁵ hoc³⁰⁶ aliquid³⁰⁷ movebitur localiter. Ulterius^{308,310} dico negando istam consequentiam³¹¹ 'igitur³¹² aliquod spatium potest pertransiri sine motu³⁰⁹.

nus spatium C. 251 om. C. 252 ideo A; unde dico D. 253 stare D.
254-255 etc. D. 256-257 etc. D. 258 om. C. 259-260 om. D.
261 om. A. 262-263 om. D. 264 possumus C. 265 om. C. 266 om. A.
267 om. D. 268 ponendo A; om. D. 269 om. A. 270-271 om. C.
272 hoc instans A. 273-274 om. D. 275 om. D. 276 om. AC.
277 om. C. 278 consequentia C. 279 concedo A; conceditur C.
280 conceditur C. 281 et C. 282 om. A; videlicet C. 283 om. C;
dico D. 284 quia A. 285 om. C. 286-287 om. D. 288-289 om. A.
290 dico quod concedo C. 291 ista A. 292 om. C. 293-294 om. D.
295 vel ad C. 296 dico negando D. 297-298 illa est implicativa
falsum implicat enim D. 299 unum falsum C. 300 est C. 301 om. C.
302 om. A. 303 concedo A. 304 om. C. 305 om. C; postea D.
306 om. CD. 307 aliquis C; non D. 308-309 om. A. 310 et ulterius C.
311 om. C. 312 om. C. 313 om. A. 314 isto motu A.

2.3.1.2.1.2.1

Ex istis sequitur³¹³ ulterius quod sine motu³¹⁴ potest aliquod spatium pertransiri. Istam³¹⁵ consequentiam³¹⁷ probo sic: sine illo motu potest aliquod spatium pertransiri³¹⁶, et sine illo motu³¹⁸, et sic de singulis, igitur³¹⁹ sine³²⁰ motu potest³²² aliquod spatium pertransiri^{321,323}. Consequentia^{324,326} patet de se, et etiam antecedens, quia si³²⁷ aliqua singularis³²⁸ sit falsa, videlicet illa³²⁹ 'sine motu potest³³⁰ aliquod spatium pertransiri' aliquo singulari³³² motu capto³³¹, tunc³³³ in contra³³⁴: sit ille motus singularis a, igitur sine a motu non potest aliquod spatium pertransiri. Sed hoc est manifeste falsum quia ab aliquo mobili³³⁵ et³³⁶ sine a motu locali³³⁷ - etiam³³⁸ cum aliquo motu³³⁹ - potest aliquod spatium pertransiri³²⁵, sicut³⁴⁰ patet manifeste³⁴¹. Cum illo³⁴² tamen stat quod nullum spatium potest pertransiri sine motu.

2.3.1.2.1.3

Alia conclusio est hec³⁴³ quod³⁴⁴ illa consequentia est bona 'Sortes incipit moveri localiter³⁴⁵, igitur Sortes immediate³⁴⁶ post hoc²²⁰ erit in duobus locis'. Istam³⁴⁷ consequentiam probo sic: Sortes incipit moveri localiter, igitur Sortes erit in duobus locis³⁴⁸, et³⁴⁹ nullum³⁵⁰ tempus erit antequam Sortes erit³⁵¹ in duobus locis. Et³⁵² ultra³⁵⁴, igitur³⁵⁵ Sortes immediate post hoc erit in duobus locis³⁵³. Prima³⁵⁶ consequentia³⁵⁷ quantum³⁵⁸ ad istam partem³⁵⁹ 'Sortes incipit moveri localiter, igitur Sortes erit³⁶⁰ in duobus locis' patet de³⁶¹ se eo³⁶² quod³⁶³ nihil³⁶⁴ potest moveri localiter nisi pertranseat multa loca. Item, eadem³⁶⁵ consequentia³⁶⁶ quantum ad secundam partem³⁶⁷, scilicet 'Sortes incipit moveri localiter, igitur nullum tempus erit antequam /C 26^v b/ Sortes erit³⁶⁹ in duobus locis', ostenditur³⁷⁰ sic quia³⁷¹ si^{372,374} ista consequentia non

315-316 om. A. 317 conclusionem D. 318 om. A. 319 et sic C.
 320-321 4-5-3-1-2-6 D. 322-323 om. C. 324-325 antecedens patet
 inductive quia quocumque motu dato sine illo potest spatium pertransiri
 ab aliquo mobili et sic cum aliquo motu locali ut de se patet A.
 326 igitur consequentia C. 327 sine D. 328 singulariter D.
 329 quod C. 330-331 5-7-8-1-2-3-4 C. 332 om. C. 333-334 ponitur
 C. 335 motu D. 336-337 om. D. 338-339 et ab aliquo C.
 340 et consequens A; satis D. 341 de se D. 342 illo toto C.
 343 om. C; iste D. 344 om. D. 345 om. A. 346 erit immediate A.
 347-348 om. CD. 349 om. C. 350 tamen nullum CD. 351 sit C.
 352-353 om. AC. 354 om. D. 355 om. D. 356 primam B; ista C.
 357 consequentiam B; conclusio C. 358 om. D. 359 particulam BD.
 360 immediate post hoc erit C. 361-362 om. C. 363 quia C.
 364 nullus D. 365 om. D. 366 conclusio C; om. D. 367 particulam
 BD. 368 movere B. 369 sit C. 370-371 om. C. 372-373 om. A.
 374 si dicatur quod C. 375 non potest A. 376-377 quia quocumque

sit bona, igitur²⁷³ oppositum consequentis potest³⁷⁵ stare cum antecedente;
 igitur³⁷⁶ illa³⁷⁸ stant³⁷⁹ simul vel³⁸⁰ saltem³⁸¹ possunt stare simul 'Sortes incipit moveri'³⁸² localiter' et 'aliquod tempus erit²⁸³ antequam³⁸⁴ Sortes erit in duobus locis³⁸⁵. Capiō tunc illud aliquod³⁸⁶ tempus, et vocetur³⁸⁷ 'a'. Tunc³⁸⁸ sic^{377,389}: ante³⁹⁰ medium instans³⁹¹ a³⁹² temporis Sortes³⁹³ erit in duobus locis, sicut³⁹⁴ de se patet; igitur³⁹⁶ totum illud³⁹⁷ tempus³⁹⁸ non erit antequam Sortes erit in duobus locis³⁹⁵. Et³⁹⁹ sic potest argui de quocumque tempore⁴⁰¹ dato vel dando antequam⁴⁰² Sortes erit in duobus locis. Patet igitur quod illa consequentia est bona 'Sortes incipit moveri localiter, igitur⁴⁰³ immediate post hoc erit in duobus locis^{400,404}.

Sed⁴⁰⁵ contra istam conclusionem arguo⁴⁰⁶ sic⁴⁰⁷ et⁴⁰⁸ pono istum⁴⁰⁹ casum⁴¹⁰ quod omnia loca⁴¹¹ in rerum natura vocentur 'a' vel⁴¹² 'b', et quod⁴¹³ nullus locus⁴¹⁴ qui⁴¹⁵ vocatur 'a' vocetur 'b' nec⁴¹⁶ e converso. Et pono⁴¹⁷ quod iste locus in quo nunc est Sortes⁴¹⁸ vocetur⁴¹⁹ 'a', et quod Sortes incipiat moveri⁴²⁰ localiter. Tunc sic: Sortes incipit moveri⁴²¹ localiter, igitur Sortes⁴²² immediate post hoc erit in duobus locis. Et ultra, igitur immediate post hoc Sortes⁴²³ erit⁴²⁴ in a et in b. Et ultra, igitur Sortes erit simul⁴²⁵ in duobus locis. Consequens est impossibile, sicut⁴²⁶ patet de se, igitur illud⁴²⁷ ex quo sequitur.

Istam ultimam consequentiam⁴²⁸, videlicet 'Sortes immediate post hoc erit in a et in⁴²⁹ b, igitur Sortes⁴³⁰ simul erit in⁴³¹ a et in⁴³³ b', probō sic quia Sortes immediate post hoc erit in a et in b, igitur Sortes erit in a et in b, et⁴³⁴ Sortes non prius erit^{432,436} in a quam in b⁴³⁷, igitur Sortes erit in a et b⁴³⁵ simul. Consequentia patet de se. Assumptum⁴³⁸ probō, scilicet quod⁴³⁹ Sortes non prius erit in a quam in b⁴⁴⁰,

tempore signato A. 378 om. D. 379-380 om. C. 381 duo C; om. D.
 382 movere B. 383 illud C. 384-385 etc. C. 386 om. C.
 387 sit C. 388 et tunc D. 389 om. CD. 390 a non erit B.
 391 om. D. 392 illius A. 393 per quod Sortes B. 394-395 om. D.
 396 patet igitur A. 397 a B. 398 temporis B. 399-400 om. AB.
 401 om. D. 402 quod desinit esse antequam D. 403-404 etc. D.
 405 om. B. 406 arguitur D. 407 duobus modis D. 408 om. C.
 409-410 om. B. 411 loca que sunt D. 412 et CD. 413 om. C.
 414 om. A; motus B. 415 quod qui B. 416 et non B. 417 volo B.
 418 om. B. 419 vocatur B. 420 movere B. 421 movere B.
 422 om. C. 423 om. C. 424 erit simul B. 425 om. C. 426 ut
 CD. 427 om. B. 428 om. B. 429 om. A. 430 om. AC.
 431-432 om. B. 433 om. A. 434-435 dtg. i. A. 436 om. C.
 437 b nec e converso C. 438 et assumptum D. 439 quia D. 440 b
 nec e converso C. 441 hoc C; om. D. 442-443 om. C. 444-445 econ-

quia si Sortes⁴⁴¹ prius⁴⁴² erit in a quam in b vel in⁴⁴⁴ b quam in a^{443,445},
 vel igitur⁴⁴⁶ prius⁴⁴⁷ erit⁴⁴⁸ per tempus vel per instans. Non⁴⁴⁹ per
 tempus⁴⁵⁰ quia per nullum tempus Sortes⁴⁵¹ erit prius in a quam in b, sic-
 ut⁴⁵² de se patet⁴⁵³. Nec etiam per aliquod⁴⁵⁴ instans⁴⁵⁵ quia inter que-
 cumque duo instantia cadit tempus medium, sicut⁴⁵⁶ patet per Aristotelem
 et Commentatorem in⁴⁵⁷ quarto Physicorum. Et per⁴⁵⁸ consequens si⁴⁵⁹ Sor-
 tes foret⁴⁶⁰ prius per instans in a quam in b⁴⁶¹ vel⁴⁶² econverso, sequitur
 etiam⁴⁶⁴ quod⁴⁶⁵ per tempus foret⁴⁶⁶ prius in a quam⁴⁶⁷ in b vel econver-
 so⁴⁶³. /D 217^rb/

Preterea⁴⁶⁸, si Sortes immediate post⁴⁶⁹ hoc erit in duobus locis,
 vel igitur⁴⁷⁰ Sortes^{472,474} immediate post hoc⁴⁷¹ erit in⁴⁷⁵ duobus lo-
 cis^{473,476} simul vel successive. Non⁴⁷⁷ simul, ut de⁴⁷⁸ se⁴⁷⁹ patet.
 Nec successive quia si⁴⁸⁰ successive⁴⁸², igitur^{481,483} prius foret⁴⁸⁴
 /C 27^ra/ in uno loco⁴⁸⁵ quam in alio, vel⁴⁸⁶ igitur⁴⁸⁷ per tempus vel per
 instans, et redit⁴⁸⁸ primum argumentum. /B 17^ra/

Preterea⁴⁸⁹, per casum Sortes nunc est⁴⁹⁰ in a loco, igitur Sortes⁴⁹¹
 prius erit in b loco quam iterum erit⁴⁹² in a loco, et per consequens Sor-
 tes⁴⁹³ non⁴⁹⁴ immediate post hoc erit in a loco⁴⁹⁵ et in⁴⁹⁶ b loco⁴⁹⁷.
 Primam consequentiam proba⁴⁹⁸, videlicet illam 'Sortes nunc est in⁴⁹⁹ a
 loco, igitur Sortes⁵⁰¹ prius⁵⁰² erit in b loco quam⁵⁰³ iterum erit⁵⁰⁴ in
 a loco⁵⁰⁰, proba⁵⁰⁵ sic quia⁵⁰⁶ Sortes⁵⁰⁷ nunc est in a loco⁵⁰⁸ et non
 simul erit in a⁵⁰⁹ loco⁵¹⁰ et b⁵¹¹ loco⁵¹², igitur Sortes⁵¹³ prius erit
 in b loco quam in a loco⁵¹⁴. Consequentia patet⁵¹⁵ quia supposito⁵¹⁶ per
 casum quod Sortes semper moveatur⁵¹⁷ de a⁵¹⁸ loco⁵¹⁹ in b⁵²⁰ locum⁵²¹, et
 de⁵²³ b⁵²⁵ loco⁵²⁶ in a⁵²⁷ locum^{524,528}, et sic in infinitum.

verso D. 446 om. C. 447 hoc D. 448 om. C. 449-450 om. C.
 451 om. A. 452 ut B. 453 om. C. 454 om. AC. 455 consequens
 C. 456 ut BD. 457 om. BD. 458-459 om. C. 460 fuit B; non
 foret C; fuerit D. 461 a b B. 462-463 om. C. 464 om. A.
 465 om. B. 466 fuerit B. 467 vel quam A. 468 item B; prima C.
 469 prius C. 470-471 om. A. 472-473 om. C. 474 om. D.
 475-476 om. A. 477 nec C. 478-479 om. C. 480-481 vel A. 482 sic B.
 483 tunc B. 484 fuerat B; erit D. 485 om. C. 486-487 om. A;
 et si hoc ergo prius B; vel erit igitur prius D. 488 reddidit D.
 489 item B; prima C. 490 erit CD. 491 om. C. 492 est A; om. C.
 493 om. D. 494 om. C. 495 om. C. 496 et non B. 497 locis C.
 498 om. C. 499-500 etc. D. 501 om. AC. 502 om. B.
 503 antequam B. 504 sit B; om. C. 505 et arguo C. 506 om. CD.
 507 om. A. 508 loco ergo Sortes erit in b loco antequam iterum sit
 in a loco, proba sic quia Sortes nunc est in a loco et B. 509 b BD.
 510 om. C. 511 in a D. 512 locis C. 513 om. D. 514 om. C.
 515 patet de se B. 516 hoc supposito BC. 517 movebitur C; movetur
 D. 518 b C. 519 om. C. 520 a C. 521 om. C. 522 iterum
 A. 523-524 econverso D. 525 a C. 526 om. C. 527 b C.
 528 om. C. 529 secundum B. 530 argumentum A. 531 ad hoc est B;

Ad primum⁵²⁹ istorum⁵³⁰ respondeo, et dico quod illa consequentia
 est⁵³¹ bona 'Sortes incipit moveri⁵³² localiter, igitur Sortes⁵³³ immedi-
 ate post hoc erit in duobus locis'. Et ultra concedo quod⁵³⁴ isto casu
 posito⁵³⁵ Sortes⁵³⁶ immediate post hoc erit in a et in b loco⁵³⁸. Sed⁵³⁹
 ulterius nego istam consequentiam 'igitur Sortes immediate post hoc⁵³⁷ erit
 in a⁵⁴⁰ et in b⁵⁴¹ simul'. Et ad probationem quando⁵⁴² dicitur⁵⁴³ quod⁵⁴⁴
 Sortes erit in a⁵⁴⁵ et⁵⁴⁶ in b loco⁵⁴⁷, et Sortes⁵⁴⁸ non prius erit in
 a⁵⁴⁹ loco⁵⁵⁰ quam in b⁵⁵¹ nec e converso, igitur Sortes erit in a et in b
 simul, dico⁵⁵² concedendo⁵⁵³ illam consequentiam, et nego⁵⁵⁴ istam⁵⁵⁵
 particulam antecedentis⁵⁵⁶ 'Sortes non prius erit in b⁵⁵⁷ quam⁵⁵⁸ in a⁵⁵⁹
 loco⁵⁶⁰. Et^{561,563} ad⁵⁶⁴ argumentum in oppositum, quando dicitur "si⁵⁶⁵
 Sortes prius erit in b loco quam in a loco^{562,566}, igitur⁵⁶⁷ per tempus
 erit prius⁵⁶⁸ vel per⁵⁶⁹ instans⁵⁷⁰" dico⁵⁷¹ quod nec erit⁵⁷³ prius⁵⁷⁴ per
 tempus nec per instans^{572,575} sicut satis⁵⁷⁶ manifeste demonstrari potest.
 Sed bene dico⁵⁷⁷ quod Sortes erit prius in b⁵⁷⁸ loco per tempus quam in⁵⁷⁹
 a loco⁵⁸⁰, et hoc ideo⁵⁸¹ quia in illa propositione 'Sortes per tempus e-
 rit prius in b⁵⁸² loco quam in a⁵⁸³ loco⁵⁸⁴, ly⁵⁸⁵ 'tempus' supponit de-
 terminate, et oportet quod supponat⁵⁸⁶ pro⁵⁸⁷ aliquo⁵⁸⁸ tempore⁵⁸⁹ singu-
 lari⁵⁹⁰ dato⁵⁹¹ vel⁵⁹² dando⁵⁹³. Sed⁵⁹⁴ in illa propositione^{595,596}
 'Sortes prius /A 51^v/a/ erit in b⁵⁹⁷ loco quam⁵⁹⁸ in a⁶⁰⁰ loco⁶⁰¹ per tem-
 pus⁵⁹⁹, ly⁶⁰² 'tempus' supponit confuse tantum, et per consequens non⁶⁰³
 contingit⁶⁰⁴ descendere ad⁶⁰⁵ aliquod⁶⁰⁷ suum⁶⁰⁸ singulare⁶⁰⁶ vel⁶⁰⁹ copu-
 lative vel⁶¹⁰ disiunctive.

Et si dicatur "Sortes erit prius in b⁶¹¹ loco quam in a⁶¹² loco⁶¹³,
 igitur aliqua prioritate Sortes⁶¹⁴ erit prius⁶¹⁵", dico⁶¹⁶ istam conse-
 adhuc est D. 532 movere B. 533 om. AB. 534 om. C. 535 po-
 sitio quod CD. 536-537 om. C. 538 om. D. 539 et D. 540 b A.
 541 a A; b loco B. 542 cum D. 543 om. A. 544 om. BD.
 545 a loco B. 546 vel B. 547 locis C. 548 om. A. 549 b B.
 550 om. A. 551 a loco B. 552 concedo AC. 553 om. AB.
 554 om. C. 555 ista B; om. C. 556 om. C. 557 a C. 558 quam
 erit A. 559 b C. 560 om. C. 561-562 om. C. 563 om. B.
 564 om. A. 565 om. B. 566 om. D. 567 igitur vel B.
 568 om. C. 569 om. A. 570 om. A. 571-572 om. B. 573 om. AD.
 574 om. D. 575 instans prius A. 576 om. B; satis patet et C.
 577 dicitur B; sequitur illud D. 578 om. C. 579 om. C. 580 om.
 C. 581 om. C. 582 a D. 583 b D. 584 om. CD. 585 hoc B.
 586 verificatur B; significetur D. 587 om. D. 588 alio C; aliquod
 D. 589 tempus D. 590 determinate C; singulare D. 591 datum D.
 592 om. B. 593 om. B; dandum D. 594-595 om. B. 596 om. C.
 597 a D. 598-599 5-6-1-2-3-4 C. 600 b D. 601 om. C. 602 hoc
 B. 603 nec B. 604 contingeret AB. 605-606 om. C. 607 om. D.
 608 om. A. 609 nec C. 610 nec C. 611 a CD. 612 b CD.
 613 om. CD. 614 erit Sortes B; om. C. 615 prius etc. D.

quantiam negando⁶¹⁷, sed concedo istam "igitur"⁶¹⁸ Sortes prius erit⁶¹⁹ in⁶²⁰
 b⁶²¹ loco⁶²² quam in a⁶²³ loco⁶²⁴ aliqua prioritatem, et hoc tantum prop-
 ter⁶²⁵ causam⁶²⁶ predictam⁶²⁷.

Per^{628,630} /C 27^r/b/ ista patet⁶²⁹ ad⁶³¹ secundum argumentum⁶³². Quan-
 do⁶³³ dicitur⁶³⁴ "Sortes"⁶³⁵ erit in diversis locis vel^{636,637} Sortes⁶³⁸
 erit in duobus locis⁶³⁹ simul vel successive", dico quod successive⁶⁴⁰ et
 nullo modo simul. Et ulterius⁶⁴¹ dico quod prius erit in uno loco⁶⁴² quam
 in alio per⁶⁴³ tempus, sed per nullum tempus prius erit^{644,645}, et hoc⁶⁴⁶
 propter dictionem⁶⁴⁷ 'prius' que⁶⁴⁸ habet⁶⁴⁹ virtutem⁶⁵⁰ confundendi ter-
 minum.

Ad aliud⁶⁵¹ argumentum patet quod⁶⁵² idem, videlicet quod Sortes non
 simul erit in a et⁶⁵³ in b, sed quod⁶⁵⁴ Sortes⁶⁵⁵ prius erit in b⁶⁵⁶ quam
 in a⁶⁵⁷, et tamen immediate⁶⁵⁸ post hoc Sortes erit⁶⁵⁹ in b⁶⁶⁰ et⁶⁶¹ imme-
 diate⁶⁶³ post⁶⁶⁵ hoc erit Sortes^{664,666} in a⁶⁶².

Et si dicatur quod ista propositio est vera de futuro quod⁶⁶⁷ Sortes
 erit in a et in b, et⁶⁶⁸ Sortes erit in duobus locis, igitur aliquando⁶⁶⁹
 habebit vel saltem habere potest⁶⁷⁰ aliquam propositionem veram⁶⁷¹ de pre-
 senti, sed non aliam⁶⁷² - ut⁶⁷³ videtur - quam⁶⁷⁴ istam 'Sortes erit'⁶⁷⁵ in
 a et in b'. Sed⁶⁷⁶ hoc est impossibile, igitur et prima.

Ad⁶⁷⁷ illud⁶⁷⁹ dico⁶⁷⁸ quod ista⁶⁸⁰ propositio est⁶⁸¹ vera de futuro,
 et ista⁶⁸² habebit⁶⁸³ vel⁶⁸⁴ potest habere aliquam⁶⁸⁵ veram⁶⁸⁶ de presenti
 vel⁶⁸⁷ aliquas veras de presenti, pro quo est⁶⁸⁸ sciendum quod non semper
 propositioni vere⁶⁸⁹ de futuro⁶⁹⁰ correspondet vel⁶⁹¹ correspondebit una
 propositio vera⁶⁹² de presenti, quia quando propositio vera^{693,695} de futu-
 ro⁶⁹⁴ equivalet⁶⁹⁶ pluribus propositionibus veris /B 17^r/b/ vel exponitur

- | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| 616 nego C. | 617 om. C. | 618 om. C. | 619 erit in a C. |
| 620 quam in C. | 621 a D. | 622 om. CD. | 623 b D. |
| 624 om. CD. | 625 per AC. | 626 casum C. | 627 predictum C. |
| 628-629 om. D. | 630 per per C. | 631 solutio ad C. | 632 om. BD. |
| 633-634 scilicet C. | 635-636 om. B. | 637 vel igitur C. | 638-639 om. C. |
| 640 Sortes erit in duobus locis successive B. | 641 ultra B. | 642 om. B. | 643-644 om. C. |
| 645 om. B; erit etc. D. | 646 om. B. | 647 istam dictionem B; dictum vel dictionem C. | 648 om. C. |
| 649 ha-
bentem C. | 650 veritatem A; vim C. | 651 tertium B. | 652 per B. |
| 653 quam C. | 654 om. C. | 655 om. C. | 656 a C. |
| 657 b C. | 658-659 2-3-4-1-5 C. | 660 a B. | 661-662 om. C. |
| 663-664 2-3-5-1-4 D. | 665-666 om. B. | 667 om. BD. | 668 vel B; et sic C. |
| 669 aliquis A; om. C. | 670 poterit C. | 671 om. CD. | 672 alium A. |
| 673 et A; nec B. | 674 quod A; nec D. | 675 est C. | 676 et AB. |
| 677-678 om. B. | 679 aliud C; istam D. | 680 hec B. | 681 sit B. |
| 682 om. C. | 683 habet D. | 684 et AD. | 685 aliquam propositionem B; om. C. |
| 686 om. CD. | 687 om. C. | 688 om. A. | 689-690 om. C. |
| 691 una vel D. | 692 vera precise B; om. C. | 693-694 om. C. | 695 om. B. |
| 696 equipollet A; duabus B. | 697 tales plures B. | | |

per plures⁶⁹⁷ propositiones veras, tunc illi⁶⁹⁸ propositioni vere⁶⁹⁹ de futuro correspondebunt plures propositiones vere⁷⁰⁰ de presenti. Verbi gratia, isti propositioni vere de futuro 'Antichristus et dies iudicii erunt' /D 217^va/ non potest correspondere precise⁷⁰¹ una propositio vera de presenti quia hec semper⁷⁰² est⁷⁰³ falsa 'Antichristus et dies iudicii sunt'. Sed sufficit ad⁷⁰⁴ veritatem istius⁷⁰⁵ de futuro quod⁷⁰⁶ sibi⁷⁰⁷ possint⁷⁰⁸ correspondere due⁷⁰⁹ vere de presenti, et hoc non⁷¹⁰ simul sed successive, videlicet⁷¹¹ iste⁷¹² 'Antichristus est' et 'dies iudicii est', que⁷¹³ non erunt simul vere sed successive⁷¹⁴. Et sic dico⁷¹⁵ quod⁷¹⁶ ad veritatem istius de⁷¹⁷ futuro⁷¹⁸ 'Sortes erit in a et in b' non requiritur quod hec⁷¹⁹ erit⁷²⁰ aliquando vera 'Sortes est'⁷²¹ in a et in b', sed sufficit quod iste⁷²² erunt vere 'Sortes est in a' et 'Sortes est in b', et⁷²³ hoc⁷²⁴ non simul sed successive.

2.3.1.2.1.4

Alia conclusio est ista⁷²⁵ quod⁷²⁶ ista⁷²⁷ consequentia est bona⁷²⁸ 'Sortes incipit moveri'⁷²⁹ localiter, igitur Sortes non movebitur localiter antequam sit in alio⁷³⁰ loco quam nunc est⁷³¹. Istam consequentiam proba sic: Sortes /C 27^va/ incipit moveri localiter, igitur Sortes⁷³² nullum spatium pertransibit antequam erit⁷³³ in alio loco quam nunc est. Istam consequentiam proba⁷³⁴ quia oppositum consequentis non potest stare cum antecedente. Ista⁷³⁵ enim⁷³⁶ non stant simul 'Sortes incipit moveri localiter'⁷³⁷, et 'Sortes'⁷³⁸ aliquod spatium pertransibit antequam erit⁷³⁹ in alio loco quam nunc est', quia capto quocumque⁷⁴⁰ spatio, antequam Sortes veniat ad medium punctum illius spatii, Sortes erit in alio loco quam nunc est, et per consequens illud spatium non⁷⁴¹ erit⁷⁴² pertransitum a Sorte antequam⁷⁴³ Sortes erit⁷⁴⁵ in alio loco quam nunc est⁷⁴⁴. Igitur Sortes non movebitur localiter antequam erit⁷⁴⁶ in alio loco quam⁷⁴⁷ nunc est. Tunc⁷⁴⁸ sic: nullum spatium erit pertransitum a Sorte antequam Sortes

698 om. C. 699 om. C. 700 om. D. 701 om. CD. 702 om. CD.
 703 erit B; esset D. 704-705 quod isti veritati C. 706 om. C.
 707 om. BC. 708 possunt B; potuerunt D. 709 due propositiones C.
 710 non solum C. 711 sicut B. 712 om. B. 713-714 om. C.
 715 dico in proposito B. 716 om. D. 717-718 om. C. 719-720 om.
 C. 721 erit BCD. 722 hec C. 723-724 om. AC. 725 om. AD.
 726 om. A. 727-728 om. AD. 729 movere B. 730 alia C.
 731 om. C. 732 om. C. 733 sit BD. 734 proba sic C.
 735 quia ista C. 736 om. C. 737 om. D. 738 om. C. 739 sit
 BD. 740 quodcumque C. 741 om. C. 742 est B. 743-744 om. C.
 745 est D. 746 Sortes erit D. 747 in quam C. 748-749 om. ACD.

erit in alio loco quam nunc est, ergo Sortes non movebitur localiter antequam erit in alio loco quam nunc est⁷⁴⁹. Antecedens istius⁷⁵⁰ ultime consequentie patet per predicta⁷⁵¹. Consequentia patet quia⁷⁵² arguitur ab uno⁷⁵⁴ convertibili ad aliud convertibile^{753,755} quia idem est moveri localiter et pertransire aliquod spatium, et⁷⁵⁶ non pertransire aliquod⁷⁵⁸ spatium⁷⁵⁹ et non moveri localiter⁷⁵⁷. Patet igitur ista consequentia 'Sortes incipit moveri localiter, igitur Sortes non movebitur localiter⁷⁶⁰ antequam Sortes⁷⁶¹ erit in alio loco quam nunc est'.

Contra istam conclusionem⁷⁶² arguo⁷⁶³ sic⁷⁶⁴: si⁷⁶⁵ Sortes non movebitur localiter antequam sit⁷⁶⁶ in alio loco quam nunc est, igitur⁷⁶⁷ Sortes erit in alio⁷⁶⁸ loco antequam movebitur localiter, et⁷⁶⁹ cum Sortes non possit⁷⁷⁰ esse in alio⁷⁷¹ loco nisi⁷⁷² moveatur⁷⁷³ localiter videtur⁷⁷⁴ sequi quod Sortes movebitur localiter⁷⁷⁵ antequam movebitur⁷⁷⁶ localiter. Sed⁷⁷⁷ hoc⁷⁷⁸ est⁷⁷⁹ falsum⁷⁸⁰ et⁷⁸¹ impossibile, ergo⁷⁸² illud ex quo sequitur⁷⁸³.

Item, Sortes non potest exire locum in quo nunc est, nisi per motum localem, igitur motus localis erit⁷⁸⁴ antequam Sortes⁷⁸⁵ erit in alio loco quam⁷⁸⁶ nunc est. Et⁷⁸⁷ ultra, igitur Sortes movebitur localiter antequam Sortes⁷⁸⁸ erit in alio loco quam⁷⁸⁹ nunc est⁷⁹⁰.

Ad primum istorum respondeo⁷⁹¹. Quando dicitur "si⁷⁹² Sortes non movebitur⁷⁹³ localiter antequam⁷⁹⁴ erit in alio loco quam⁷⁹⁶ nunc est, etc.⁷⁹⁸", dico⁷⁹⁷ istam^{795,799} consequentiam negando⁸⁰⁰ quia nec Sortes movebitur⁸⁰¹ localiter antequam erit in alio loco quam nunc est, nec Sortes erit in alio loco quam nunc est antequam movebitur localiter. Et ulterius concedo illam⁸⁰² propositionem⁸⁰³ quod Sortes non potest esse in⁸⁰⁴ alio loco quam nunc est nisi moveatur localiter. Et^{805,807} ulterius nego istam consequentiam⁸⁰⁶ "igitur Sortes movebitur /C 27^v/ localiter antequam⁸⁰⁸ movebitur⁸¹⁰ localiter^{809,811}".

750 huius C. 751 predicta quia arguitur a convertibili ad convertibile C. 752-753 om. C. 754 om. B. 755 om. D. 756-757 om. A. 758-759 illud C. 760 om. D. 761 om. BC. 762 consequentiam AB. 763 arguitur BD. 764 om. D. 765 sicut B. 766 erit B. 767 sic B. 768 aliquo alio D. 769 om. C. 770 potest BD. 771 aliquo alio C. 772 antequam D. 773 movetur D. 774 quasi videtur D. 775 om. C. 776 moveatur C; Sortes movebitur D. 777 om. A. 778 quod A. 779 videtur A; om. D. 780-781 om. AB. 782-783 om. A. 784 est B. 785 om. BC. 786 in quo C. 787 sed C. 788 om. BD. 789-790 om. BD. 791 om. C. 792 quod si B. 793 movetur D. 794-795 om. B. 796-797 etc. D. 798 om. A. 799 om. C. 800 nego D. 801 movetur D. 802 om. A. 803 om. A; consequentiam C. 804 ulterius in C. 805-806 om. C. 807 sed A. 808-809 om. B; etc. C. 810 Sortes movebitur D.

Ad aliud⁸¹² argumentum⁸¹³ quando⁸¹⁴ dicitur⁸¹⁵ "Sortes non potest exire locum in quo nunc⁸¹⁶ est nisi per motum localem" concedo⁸¹⁷. Et ulterius⁸¹⁸ nego istam⁸¹⁹ consequentiam⁸²⁰ "igitur motus localis erit antequam Sortes exhibit locum⁸²¹ in quo nunc est" quia iste due⁸²² propositiones stant simul in veritate 'nullus motus localis⁸²³ erit antequam Sortes exeat⁸²⁴ locum in quo nunc⁸²⁵ est' /B 17^va/ et 'Sortes non potest exire locum in quo nunc⁸²⁶ est nisi per motum localem'. Et⁸²⁷ iste⁸²⁸ similiter⁸²⁹ stant simul in veritate 'per nullum⁸³⁰ motum localem Sortes exhibit⁸³¹ locum in quo nunc est' et⁸³² 'Sortes exhibit⁸³⁴ locum in quo nunc⁸³⁵ est per⁸³⁶ motum localem'. Et tota causa est quia in istis duabus propositionibus 'Sortes exhibit locum in⁸³⁷ quo nunc est⁸³³ per motum⁸³⁸ localem' et 'Sortes non potest⁸³⁹ exire⁸⁴⁰ locum in quo nunc⁸⁴¹ est nisi⁸⁴² per motum localem' ly 'motum localem'⁸⁴³, supponit⁸⁴⁴ confuse tantum.

2.3.1.2.1.5

Alia conclusio est ista⁸⁴⁵ quod ista consequentia est bona 'Sortes incipit moveri⁸⁴⁶ localiter, igitur Sortes immediate post hoc instans⁸⁴⁷ pertransibit aliquod spatium quod non immediate post hoc instans⁸⁴⁸ /D 217^vb/ pertransibit'. Istam consequentiam⁸⁴⁹ proba sic⁸⁵⁰: Sortes⁸⁵² incipit moveri⁸⁵³ localiter⁸⁵⁴, igitur nullum tempus erit antequam Sortes⁸⁵⁵ pertransibit aliquod spatium quod non immediate post hoc⁸⁵⁶ pertransibit. Istam⁸⁵⁷ consequentiam⁸⁵⁸ proba⁸⁵¹ quia⁸⁵⁹ oppositum consequentis non potest⁸⁶⁰ stare⁸⁶¹ cum antecedente. Illa enim non stant simul 'Sortes incipit moveri localiter' et 'aliquod tempus erit antequam Sortes pertransibit aliquod⁸⁶² spatium⁸⁶³ quod non immediate post hoc instans⁸⁶⁴ pertransibit' quia⁸⁶⁵ capto quocumque tempore ante⁸⁶⁶ medium instans illius temporis⁸⁶⁷ Sortes pertransibit aliquod spatium quod non immediate post hoc pertransi-

811 localiter etc. A. 812 secundum BD. 813 om. B. 814 om. C.
815 dico quod C. 816 om. A. 817 concedo istam propositionem B;
dico istam concedendo D. 818 om. C. 819 om. AB. 820 om. A.
821 a loco A; locum suum C. 822 om. C. 823 loci motus localis C.
824 exhibit C. 825 om. A. 826 om. A. 827 quia D. 828 ista B. 829 etiam
C; due D. 830 om. B. 831 exit B. 832-833 om. B. 834 non
exhibit D. 835 om. A. 836 nisi per D. 837-838 om. C.
839-840 exhibit C; *i.m.corr.ex* exhibit D. 841 om. A. 842 om. C.
843 om. C. 844 stat C. 845 om. AC. 846 movere B. 847 om.
AC. 848 om. BC. 849 om. B. 850-851 om. B. 852 si Sortes C.
853-854 om. A. 855 om. D. 856 hoc instans D. 857-858 om. C.
859 sic C. 860-861 stat C. 862-863 om. B. 864 om. B.
865 et C. 866-867 om. D. 868 aliquod BD; illud aliquod C.

bit. Quod - ut magis pateat - vocetur illud⁸⁶⁸ tempus 'a', quod tempus erit antequam Sortes pertransibit aliquod spatium quod non immediate post hoc pertransibit. Tunc⁸⁶⁹ vocetur medium instans a temporis 'b'. Tunc⁸⁷¹ ante b⁸⁷² Sortes pertransibit aliquod spatium quod non immediate post hoc pertransibit⁸⁷⁰ quia⁸⁷³ totum illud⁸⁷⁵ spatium /C 28^ra/ quod Sortes pertransibit ante b instans non⁸⁷⁶ immediate post hoc pertransibit⁸⁷⁴, igitur totum a tempus non⁸⁷⁷ erit antequam Sortes pertransibit aliquod⁸⁷⁸ spatium quod⁸⁷⁹ non immediate post hoc pertransibit, et sic potest argui de quocumque alio⁸⁸⁰ tempore dato vel dando. Est igitur ista consequentia probata 'Sortes incipit moveri localiter, igitur nullum tempus erit antequam Sortes pertransibit aliquod spatium quod non /A 51^vb/ immediate post hoc pertransibit'. Tunc^{881a} sic^{882a}: nullum^{881b} medium erit antequam Sortes pertransibit aliquod spatium quod non immediate post hoc pertransibit^{882b}, igitur sine medio Sortes pertransibit aliquod spatium quod non⁸⁸³ immediate post hoc pertransibit. Et⁸⁸⁵ ultra: igitur immediate post hoc Sortes⁸⁸⁷ pertransibit aliquod spatium quod non immediate post hoc pertransibit. Et hoc fuit consequens⁸⁸⁴ probandum⁸⁸⁶.

Contra istam conclusionem⁸⁸⁸ arguo⁸⁸⁹ sic: Sortes⁸⁹⁰ immediate post hoc pertransibit aliquod spatium quod non immediate post hoc pertransibit, igitur immediate post hoc Sortes pertransibit aliquod spatium, et illud non immediate⁸⁹¹ post hoc a Sorte erit pertransitum. Et⁸⁹² sic⁸⁹⁴ illud⁸⁹⁵ idem spatium non⁸⁹⁶ immediate post hoc a⁸⁹⁷ Sorte⁸⁹⁸ erit pertransitum et^{899,901} immediate post hoc⁹⁰² a Sorte erit pertransitum^{893,900}, que videntur esse⁹⁰³ contradictoria.

Ad illud⁹⁰⁴ dico⁹⁰⁵ negando⁹⁰⁶ istam⁹⁰⁷ consequentiam 'Sortes immediate post hoc pertransibit aliquod spatium, et illud non immediate post hoc pertransibit⁹⁰⁸, igitur aliquod⁹⁰⁹ spatium immediate post hoc⁹¹⁰ erit⁹¹¹ pertransitum a Sorte⁹¹², et illud⁹¹³ idem spatium⁹¹⁴ non immediate post hoc erit pertransitum a⁹¹⁵ Sorte⁹¹⁶, quia⁹¹⁷ dico ista⁹¹⁸ simul stare⁹¹⁹

869-870 om. B. 871 om. A. 872 b instans D. 873-874 om. D.
 875 om. B. 876 nullo modo B. 877 nunc non B. 878 hoc C.
 879 quia B. 880 om. C. 881a-882a et ultra A; om. BC.
 881b-882b om. ABC. 883-884 fuit C. 885-886 om. A. 887 om. D.
 888 consequentiam C. 889 arguitur D. 890 si Sortes C. 891 immediate post hoc, et ultra Sortes ut videtur quod aliquod spatium immediate B.
 892-893 om. A. 894 om. B. 895 om. C. 896 om. C.
 897-898 om. B. 899-900 om. B. 901 quod non C. 902 om. D.
 903 om. D. 904 om. C. 905 om. AC; dicit D. 906 nego A; om. C.
 907 om. BD. 908 erit pertransitum A. 909-910 3-4-5-1-2 C.
 911-912 om. D. 913 om. A. 914 om. C. 915-916 ab eodem A.
 917 om. C. 918 istas B; quod ista C. 919 stant CD. 920-921 2-3-

in veritate 'Sortes immediate post hoc pertransibit aliquod spatium' et
 'nullum spatium pertransibit' ⁹²⁰ Sortes immediate post hoc ⁹²¹, quia quocum-
 que spatio dato ⁹²² clarum ⁹²³ est quod illud ⁹²⁵ non erit pertransitum a
 Sorte immediate post hoc ⁹²⁶, quia ⁹²⁷ quocumque spatio dato ⁹²⁴ medium erit
 pertransitum ⁹²⁹ antequam illud ⁹³⁰ sit ⁹³¹ pertransitum a ⁹³² Sorte ^{928,933}.

2.3.1.2.1.6

Ex predictis potest patere qualiter ⁹³⁴ predicatum ⁹³⁵ et subiectum ⁹³⁶ sup-
 ponunt ⁹³⁷ in propositione affirmativa in qua ponitur hoc ⁹³⁸ verbum ⁹³⁹ 'in-
 cipit'. Sed quia ⁹⁴⁰ circa hoc sunt ⁹⁴¹ diverse opiniones, primo ⁹⁴² unam
 opinionem unius moderni recitabo, secundo eandem ⁹⁴³ improbabo ⁹⁴⁴, et ⁹⁴⁵
 tandem ⁹⁴⁶ veritatem declarabo.

Una opinio ⁹⁴⁷ unius ⁹⁴⁸ moderni ⁹⁴⁹ fratris ⁹⁵⁰ Guillelmi ⁹⁵¹ dicti ⁹⁵²
 Ockam ⁹⁵³ est ⁹⁵⁴ quod in omnibus ⁹⁵⁵ talibus ⁹⁵⁶ propositionibus ^{957a,957b}
 'Sortes bis fuit ⁹⁵⁸ albus ⁹⁵⁹', 'Sortes bis bibit /C 28^r/ vinum', 'Sortes ⁹⁶⁰
 ter ⁹⁶² comedit panem ⁹⁶¹', 'Sortes incipit esse grammaticus ⁹⁶³, predicata ⁹⁶⁴
 supponunt suppositione innominata. Istam opinionem ⁹⁶⁵ predictus ⁹⁶⁶ doctor ⁹⁶⁷
 declarat sic: clarum est quod predicata predictarum ⁹⁶⁸ propositionum ⁹⁶⁹ non
 supponunt simpliciter quia non supponunt ⁹⁷⁰ pro intentione ⁹⁷¹ anime ⁹⁷², nec
 materialiter quia non supponunt ⁹⁷³ pro voce vel ⁹⁷⁴ pro ⁹⁷⁵ scripto ⁹⁷⁶ sicut ⁹⁷⁷
 de se patet ⁹⁷⁸. Relinquitur igitur quod supponunt personaliter. Tunc sic:
 omnis suppositio personalis ⁹⁷⁹ nominata ⁹⁸⁰ vel est ⁹⁸¹ suppositio ⁹⁸² discre-
 ta ^{983,985} vel determinata ⁹⁸⁶ vel confusa ⁹⁸⁷ et distributiva ⁹⁸⁸ vel confusa ⁹⁸⁹
 tantum ⁹⁸⁴. Sed ⁹⁹⁰ nulla predictarum ⁹⁹¹ suppositionum ⁹⁹² supponunt ⁹⁹³ pre-

- 1-4-5 C. 922 om. A. 923-924 om. C. 925 illud spatium B.
 926 om. A. 927-928 om. A. 929 om. B. 930 illud spatium B.
 931 erit D. 932-933 om. C. 934 quo modo C. 935 subiectum B.
 936 predicatum B. 937 supponant B. 938-939 om. C. 940 cum C.
 941 sint C. 942 primus C. 943 eam CD. 944 reprobabo B.
 945 om. B. 946 tertio BD. 947 opinio est C. 948-949 om. D.
 950 scilicet B; om. C. 951 om. B; Angelini C. 952 om. B.
 953 Ockam B; Okkam D. 954 et est C; est hec D. 955 om. B.
 956 om. C. 957a istis C. 957b apud Ok. tractatu (?) primo capitulo
 79 (re vera 75) i.m. D. 958 sit C. 959 asinus A; album B.
 960-961 etc. A; om. D. 962 bis C. 963 grammaticus et similibus A.
 964 predicata et A. 965 cum B. 966 predictum B; om. D.
 967 doctor Gillelhelms C; om. D. 968 talia C; istarum D. 969 om. C.
 970 om. AC. 971 conceptu C. 972 om. C. 973 om. C. 974 nec
 BC. 975 om. A. 976 scripto aliquo B. 977-978 om. C.
 979 om. C. 980 innominata C. 981 om. B. 982 om. A; supponit B.
 983-984 confusa et determinata, determinata distributiva vel confusa tan-
 tum vel determinata vel discreta C. 985 discrete B. 986 determi-
 nate B. 987 confuse B. 988 distributive B. 989 confuse B.
 990 si B. 991 om. C. 992 suppositione C. 993 supponit B.

dicta⁹⁹⁴ predicata predictarum⁹⁹⁵ propositionum⁹⁹⁶ igitur relinquitur⁹⁹⁷
 quod supponunt suppositione innominata⁹⁹⁸. /B 17^vb/ Assumptum⁹⁹⁹ declarat²
 sic: predicata³ predicta⁴ non supponunt discrete quia non sunt⁵ nomina⁶
 propria nec⁷ nomina communia⁸ sumpta⁹ /D 218^ra/ cum pronomibus demonstra-
 tivis, nec supponunt¹⁰ determinate¹¹ quia sub¹² illis¹³ non contingit de-
 scendere per unam¹⁴ disiunctivam, non¹⁵ enim sequitur 'Sortes bis bibit
 vinum, igitur Sortes bibit hoc vinum vel¹⁷ hoc vinum' et sic de singulis,
 quia quolibet pars disiunctive est falsa¹⁶. Item, non sequitur 'Sortes
 incipit esse grammaticus, igitur Sortes¹⁸ incipit esse iste¹⁹ grammaticus
 vel²⁰ iste vel²¹ iste²², et sic de singulis quia - sicut ipse²³ dicit -
 quolibet pars²⁴ disiunctive est falsa. Nec etiam supponunt predicta²⁵
 predicata²⁶ confuse et²⁷ distributive quia sub illis²⁸ non contingit descen-
 dere per unam copulativam, ut²⁹ de se patet³⁰. Nec etiam³¹ supponunt con-
 fuse tantum quia sub illis³² non contingit descendere per propositionem³³
 de³⁴ disiuncto³⁵ extremo³⁶, non enim sequitur 'Sortes incipit esse gramma-
 ticus, igitur incipit³⁷ esse ille grammaticus³⁸ vel ille vel³⁹ ille⁴⁰, et
 sic de singulis. Relinquitur⁴¹ igitur⁴² per sufficientem divisionem⁴³ quod
 predicata⁴⁴ predicta non⁴⁵ supponunt aliqua⁴⁶ suppositione nominata⁴⁷.

994 talia C; om. D. 995 om. AB; dictarum C. 996 om. AB.
 997-998 etc. A. 999-1 *versio alia in A*: Assumptum patet de se quia
 sub illis terminis dictis non licet descendere per propositionem disiunc-
 tivam nec (*corr. i. m. ex* vel) copulativam nec de disiuncto extremo nec sunt
 nomina communia vel propria cum pronomibus demonstrativis ut patet mani-
 feste, igitur supponunt suppositione innominata. Contra idem arguo sic et
 capio istam propositionem 'Sortes bis bibit vinum'. In illa propositione
 predicatum nullo modo supponit, igitur non supponit suppositione innomi-
 nata. Assumptum patet quia nec supponit simpliciter nec materialiter ut no-
 tum nec significative quia pro nullo significato supponit ut patet induc-
 tive, igitur non supponit significative. Antecedens istius ultime con-
 sequentie patet quia est una universalis cuius⁹⁹⁴ quolibet singularis est
 vera. Idem arguitur de ista 'Sortes incipit esse grammaticus' si ly 'in-
 cipit' exponitur per negationem de presenti et positionem de futuro. Si
 autem exponatur per positionem de presenti et negationem de preterito tunc
 supponit determinate quia contingit descendere sub predicato ipso per pro-
 positionem disiunctivam, etc., quia una singularis verificabitur pro illo
 grammatico qui est nunc Sortes. 2 ipse declarat B; probat D.
 3 om. D. 4 om. CD. 5 nisi C. 6 om. C. 7 sed B.
 8 om. C. 9 om. D. 10 etiam supponunt B; om. C. 11 determinata
 C. 12 de B; om. C. 13 om. C. 14 om. C. 15-16 om. C.
 17 igitur Sortes bis bibit D. 18 om. D. 19 vel iste C.
 20 et D. 21-22 om. C. 23 ille C. 24 particularis C.
 25-26 om. C. 27 om. D. 28 illo C. 29-30 om. C. 31 om. C.
 32 illo C. 33-34 om. D. 35 disiunctivum D. 36 predicato C;
 extremum D. 37 Sortes incipit B. 38 om. D. 39-40 grammaticus D.
 41 et sic relinquitur C. 42-43 om. C. 44-45 om. C. 46 om. C.
 47 innominata C. 48 expositionem C; om. D. 49 arguitur B.

Contra istam opinionem⁴⁸ arguo⁴⁹ sic, et capio primo⁵⁰ istam propositionem⁵¹ 'Sortes bis bibit vinum', et probo quod hoc predicatum⁵² non supponit suppositione innominata. Et arguo sic: iste terminus qui nullo modo supponit, non⁵³ supponit⁵⁴ suppositione innominata, sed⁵⁵ ille terminus 'vinum' predicta propositione nullo modo supponit, ergo non supponit suppositione innominata⁵⁶. Maior nota⁵⁷ est⁵⁸ de se. Minor probatur⁵⁹ quia non⁶⁰ supponit materialiter nec simpliciter nec significative. Quod non supponit⁶¹ simpliciter nec⁶² /C 28^va/ materialiter, de se patet. Quod non significative probo⁶³, quia pro⁶⁴ nullo significato supponit, igitur non supponit⁶⁵ significative. Consequentia patet⁶⁶ quia idem⁶⁷ est supponere significative et pro suo significato. Antecedens patet inductive⁶⁸ quia est quedam⁶⁹ universalis⁷⁰ cuius⁷¹ quilibet singularis est vera, sicut⁷² de se patet.

Item arguitur⁷³ de ista⁷⁴ 'Sortes incipit esse grammaticus'⁷⁵, si ly⁷⁶ 'incipit' exponatur per remotionem de presenti et positionem de futuro. Si autem exponatur per positionem de presenti et remotionem de preterito tunc⁷⁷ etiam clarum⁷⁸ est quod predicatum⁷⁹ supponit determinate sicut in ista propositione⁸⁰ 'Sortes incipit esse grammaticus', si sic⁸¹ exponitur⁸² 'Sortes nunc⁸³ est grammaticus et immediate⁸⁴ ante⁸⁵ hoc non fuit grammaticus'. Tunc⁸⁶ dico⁸⁸ quod⁸⁷ hic⁸⁹ 'grammaticus' supponit determinate quia sub⁹⁰ illo^{91,92} contingit descendere per disiunctivam, sequitur⁹³ enim⁹⁴ 'Sortes incipit esse grammaticus, igitur Sortes incipit esse ille⁹⁵ grammaticus vel⁹⁶ ille⁹⁷' et sic de singulis quia⁹⁸ quilibet⁹⁹ una istarum verificatur pro illo grammatico¹⁰⁰ qui¹⁰¹ nunc¹⁰² est Sortes¹.

Et si dicatur contra¹⁰³: Sortes incipit esse iste¹⁰⁴ grammaticus, et¹⁰⁵ iste grammaticus est Sortes, igitur Sortes incipit esse Sortes, dico¹⁰⁶ negando¹⁰⁷ istam¹⁰⁸ consequentiam quia in talibus propositionibus¹⁰⁹

50 om. C. 51 om. C. 52 predicatum vinum B. 53 om. C.
 54 om. BC. 55-56 sed vinum est huiusmodi ergo etc. C; iste est huiusmodi igitur D. 57-58 patet B. 59 probatur sic C. 60 nec B.
 61 supponat C; om. D. 62 vel B. 63 patet de se C. 64 om. B.
 65 om. D. 66 patet de se C. 67 aliud C. 68 om. C. 69 om. B.
 70 una vera B. 71 et C. 72 aliud si C. 73 arguitur etiam B.
 74 ista propositione B. 75 albus vel grammaticus D. 76 quoque B.
 77-78 planum C. 79 predicatum eius C. 80 om. C. 81-82 dicit C;
 sic exponatur D. 83 non C. 84 om. D. 85 postquam ante C.
 86-87 om. C. 88 dicitur B. 89 ly C. 90-91 om. C. 92 illo
 termino D. 93-94 quia sequitur C. 95 om. C. 96 et C.
 97 Sortes incipit esse iste grammaticus D. 98 et D. 99 om. CD.
 100 significato B. 101 quod B; que C. 102 non primo B.
 103 contra hoc A. 104 om. CD. 105 om. C. 106 ad hoc A; om. B.
 107 nego AB. 108 om. AB. 109 om. C. 110 om. C. 111 propo-

equivalentibus¹¹⁰ ypotheticis¹¹¹ non valet¹¹² consequentia de¹¹³ primo ad ultimum nec etiam¹¹⁴ tenet¹¹⁵ sillogismus¹¹⁶ expositivus¹¹⁷.

Ad¹¹⁸ argumentum igitur in oppositum¹²⁰ quando dicitur¹²¹ "tales termini non supponunt discrete¹²² nec¹²³ determinate nec¹²⁵ confuse nec materialiter nec simpliciter¹²⁶, igitur supponunt suppositione innominata¹²⁴", dico¹²⁷ negando¹²⁸ consequentiam¹²⁹, et causa est quia - sicut¹³⁰ superius probatum¹³¹ est - tales¹³² termini¹³³ nullo modo supponunt precise si ly 'incipit' exponatur¹³⁴ per remotionem de presenti et positionem de futuro.

Restat igitur declarare¹³⁵ /B 18^ra/ qualiter termini supponunt¹³⁶ in predictis¹³⁷ propositionibus pro¹³⁸ quo¹³⁹ breviter est sciendum quod in talibus propositionibus 'Sortes bis bibit vinum', 'Sortes¹⁴⁰ ter comedit¹⁴² panem¹⁴¹', 'Antichristus¹⁴³ erit¹⁴⁴ homo', 'Sortes¹⁴⁵ incipit habere albedinem' predicata nullo modo supponunt, sicut¹⁴⁶ manifeste patet¹⁴⁷ per rationem¹⁴⁸ superius positam¹⁴⁹.

Item, in¹⁵⁰ talibus propositionibus¹⁵¹ 'Sortes incipit esse albus', 'Sortes¹⁵² incipit esse grammaticus¹⁵³, si ly 'incipit' exponitur¹⁵⁴ per remotionem de presenti et positionem de futuro predicata¹⁵⁵ nullo /C 28^vb/ modo supponunt. Si autem ly¹⁵⁶ 'incipit¹⁵⁷, exponatur per positionem de presenti et remotionem de preterito tunc¹⁵⁸ predicata¹⁵⁹ supponunt determinate¹⁵⁹.

De suppositione autem¹⁶⁰ subiectorum¹⁶¹ predictarum¹⁶² propositionum affirmativarum in quibus ponitur hoc¹⁶³ verbum 'incipit' omnino¹⁶⁴ dicendum est¹⁶⁵ sicut de aliis propositionibus categoricis, videlicet¹⁶⁶ quod secundum quantitatem propositionis supponunt¹⁶⁷ vel¹⁶⁸ discrete¹⁶⁹ vel¹⁷⁰ determinate vel¹⁷¹ confuse¹⁷².

sitionibus ypotheticis B; om. C. 112 tenet C. 113 a C. 114 debet B; om. C. 115 fieri B. 116 sillogismus consequentia a primo ad ultimum C. 117 expositivus et hoc si equivalent propositionibus ypotheticis C. 118-119 et ideo dico breviter quod in talibus propositionibus predictis et similibus predicata nullo modo supponunt A. 120 oppositum respondetur B. 121 om. C; arguitur D. 122 discrete D. 123-124 etc. D. 125-126 etc. C. 127 om. C. 128 negatur C. 129 consequentia C; istam consequentiam D. 130 om. BC. 131 dictum C. 132 quod tales C. 133 om. C. 134 exponitur D. 135 videre C; dicere D. 136 supponunt D. 137 dictis C. 138 et B. 139 dico quo B; quo si D. 140-141 om. D. 142 comedat B. 143 et Antichristus D. 144 est B. 145 om. C. 146 sed C. 147 patuit D. 148 rationes C. 149 predictas C; om. D. 150 de B. 151 nominibus B. 152-153 om. D. 154 exponatur B. 155 tunc C. 156 hoc B; om. C. 157 om. C. 158 om. D. 159 om. C. 160 om. AD. 161 om. C; subiectis D. 162 om. AB. 163 om. D. 164 modo C. 165 om. B; esse C. 166 om. D. 167 supponunt subiecta B. 168 om. A. 169 om. D. 170 om. A. 171-172 et sic de singulis B; etc. D. 173 de C. 174 ita B; consequenter C. 175 de C.

2.3.1.2.2

Ulterius est sciendum quod sicut prius argutum est in¹⁷³ illa materia de motu locali, consimiliter¹⁷⁴ potest argui in¹⁷⁵ quacumque alia¹⁷⁶ specie motus quia eadem difficultas /D 218^rb/ est in istis duabus¹⁷⁷ propositionibus¹⁷⁸ 'Sortes incipit pertransire¹⁷⁹ aliquod spatium' et 'Sortes incipit acquirere¹⁸⁰ aliquam albedinem', et sic de aliis speciebus motus¹⁸¹.

3.1

Post predicta restat dicere¹⁸² expositionem¹⁸³ istius¹⁸⁴ verbi 'desinit'. Est igitur breviter¹⁸⁵ sciendum¹⁸⁶ quod omnis propositio affirmativa¹⁸⁷ in¹⁸⁸ qua¹⁸⁹ ponitur hoc verbum 'desinit' que est composita¹⁹⁰ ex terminis rerum permanentium - vocando res permanentes illas que per aliquod tempus manent¹⁹¹ - exponitur per remotionem de presenti et positionem de preterito, sicut ista propositio¹⁹² 'Sortes desinit esse animal'¹⁹³, debet¹⁹⁴ sic exponi¹⁹⁵: Sortes nunc non est animal¹⁹⁶ et immediate ante hoc fuit¹⁹⁷ animal¹⁹⁸.

Quod autem ista¹⁹⁹ propositio²⁰⁰ debeat²⁰¹ sic exponi probatur sic, nam ista consequentia est bona 'Sortes desinit esse animal'²⁰², igitur Sortes nunc²⁰³ non est²⁰⁴ animal²⁰⁵, quia²⁰⁶ oppositum consequentis²⁰⁸ non potest²⁰⁹ stare²¹⁰ cum antecedente²¹¹. Ista²¹² non stant simul 'Sortes nunc est animal' et 'Sortes desinit esse animal'. Quod²¹³ autem ista non stant simul probatur sic²¹⁵: Sortes desinit esse animal²¹⁴, igitur²¹⁶ Sortes ulterius non erit animal. Ista²¹⁷ consequentia plana est^{207,218}. Si^{219,220} igitur Sortes nunc sit animal²²² et Sortes ulterius non erit animal, sequitur quod hoc²²³ esset²²⁴ ultimum instans esse Sortis, sed²²⁵ hoc²²⁶ est impossibile per secundam suppositionem superius²²⁷ positam²²⁸, ergo²²⁹ illud ex quo sequitur²³⁰. Consequentia^{231,233} assumpta²³⁴, scilicet ista²³⁵

- | | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|---|
| 176 om. CD. | 177 om. C. | 178 om. BC. | 179 transire C. |
| 180 transire C. | 181 etc. A; ipsius motus B; motus tam de alteratione quam de aliis C. | 182 disserere B. | 183 de expositione D. |
| 184 huius C. | 185 om. B. | 186 dicendum D. | 187 affirmativus D. |
| 188-189 ubi C. | 190 ypothetica C. | 191 permanent C. | 192 om. B. |
| 193 albus B. | 194 om. C. | 195 exponitur C. | 196 albus B. |
| 197 fit C. | 198 albus B. | 199-200 om. B. | 201 debet B. |
| 202 albus B. | 203 om. C. | 204 om. C. | 205 albus et immediate ante hoc fuit albus B. |
| 206-207 om. D. | 208 antecedentis A. | 209-210 staret C. | 211 antecedente in veritate B. |
| 212 ista enim B. | 213-214 om. C. | 215 om. B. | 216 et C. |
| 217-218 om. B; patet de se planum enim est C. | 219 quod C; autem si D. | 220-221 om. C. | |
| 222 om. B. | 223 sit D. | 224 est A; dare D. | 225 om. A. |
| 226 quod A. | 227-228 om. BD. | 229-230 om. A. | 231-232 om. A. |
| 233 contra B. | 234 sumpta B. | 235 om. D. | 236 om. B. |

'Sortes desinit esse animal, igitur Sortes²³⁶ ulterius non erit²³⁷ animal',
 patet de se: clarum enim est²²¹ /C 29^a/ quod²³⁸ si²³⁹ Sortes ulterius erit
 animal quod²⁴⁰ Sortes²⁴¹ non desinit esse animal²³². Patet²⁴² igitur quod
 necessarium²⁴³ sit²⁴⁴ sic²⁴⁵ exponere²⁴⁶ ly^{247,249} 'desinit' in²⁴⁸ termi-
 nis²⁵⁰ rerum permanentium per²⁵¹ remotionem de presenti et positionem de
 preterito²⁵². Ex²⁵³ quo sequitur quod omnes tales consequentie sunt²⁵⁵
 bone 'Sortes desinit esse animal, ergo Sortes²⁵⁶ immediate ante hoc fuit
 animal'. Item²⁵⁷ sequitur²⁵⁸ 'Sortes desinit esse animal, ergo Sortes²⁵⁹
 nunc²⁶¹ non est animal'. Item 'Sortes desinit²⁶² esse animal, igitur²⁶⁰
 immediate ante hoc Sortes²⁶³ fuit²⁶⁴ animal, et²⁶⁵ nunc non est animal'.
 Et tenent omnes²⁶⁶ tales consequentie per hanc²⁶⁷ regulam²⁵⁴: a²⁶⁸ propo-
 sitione exposita ad²⁶⁹ propositiones²⁷⁰ exponentes simul sumptas vel²⁷¹ ad
 quamlibet illarum²⁷² per²⁷³ se sumptam²⁷⁴ est²⁷⁵ bona²⁷⁶ consequentia.

3.2

Alia²⁷⁷ conclusio est ista²⁷⁸ quod²⁷⁹ omnis²⁸⁰ propositio composita²⁸¹
 ex terminis rerum successivarum in qua²⁸² ponitur hoc²⁸³ verbum 'desinit'
 debet similiter²⁸⁴ exponi per²⁸⁵ remotionem de presenti et positionem de
 preterito; sicut ista 'Sortes desinit moveri' debet²⁸⁷ sic exponi²⁸⁶: Sor-
 tes nunc non movetur et^{288,290} immediate ante hoc movebatur. Ista exposi-
 tio²⁹¹ probatur sic: Sortes desinit moveri, igitur Sortes nunc²⁹² non mo-
 vetur²⁸⁹. Ista²⁹³ consequentia patet quia oppositum consequentis non stat²⁹⁴
 cum antecedente²⁹⁵, igitur²⁹⁶ prima consequentia est bona. Quod autem
 oppositum consequentis non stat²⁹⁸ cum antecedente patet quia repugnans²⁹⁹
 opposito consequentis³⁰⁰ stat cum antecedente³⁰¹, igitur³⁰² oppositum an-
 tecedentis^{303,304} non stat cum antecedente²⁹⁷. Assumptum probatur: ista

237 desinit esse D. 238 om. B. 239 om. C. 240 et quod C; om. D.
 241 om. B. 242 ut patet C. 243 non C. 244 est A. 245 om.
 AB. 246 exponitur C. 247-248 omnes propositiones in quibus sunt A.
 249 om. B. 250 termini A. 251-252 om. C. 253-254 om. A.
 255 semper C. 256 om. B. 257 et C. 258 arguitur B; om. D.
 259-260 om. B. 261 om. C. 262 nunc desinit C. 263 om. B.
 264 est C. 265 et Sortes D. 266 om. D. 267 illam C.
 268 et a A. 269 om. A. 270 om. A; suas B. 271 et A.
 272 exponentium A. 273-274 om. AC. 275 om. D. 276 videlicet D.
 277 secunda B. 278 om. BC. 279 om. D. 280 om. C.
 281 exposita B. 282 quo A. 283 om. D. 284 consimiliter C; sic
 D. 285-286 om. D. 287 om. B. 288-289 om. B. 290 om. C;
 et Sortes D. 291 conclusio C. 292 om. C. 293 om. C.
 294 potest stare B. 295 consequente A; antecedente corr. i. opposito
 antecedentis C. 296-297 om. AC. 298 stet D. 299-300 oppositum
 antecedentis non B; i. m. corr. ex oppositum consequentis non D.
 301 consequente (?) B. 302-303 ad antecedens ad antecedens igitur B.
 304 corr. ex consequentis D. 305 conclusio C. 306 om. B.

consequentia³⁰⁵ est bona 'Sortes desinit moveri, igitur Sortes³⁰⁶ ulterius non movebitur', sed ista non stant simul³⁰⁷ 'Sortes nunc³⁰⁸ movetur' /B 18^rb/ et 'Sortes³⁰⁹ ulterius non movebitur' ut^{310,311} patet de se³¹², igitur³¹³ nec ista stant³¹⁵ simul 'Sortes³¹⁶ nunc movetur' et³¹⁷ 'Sortes desinit moveri'. Patet igitur quod ista consequentia est bona 'Sortes desinit moveri, igitur Sortes³¹⁸ nunc non movetur'. Quod autem ista non stent simul 'Sortes nunc³¹⁹ movetur' et 'ulterius non movebitur' de se patet³¹⁴, /A 52^ra/ quia sic³²⁰ esset dare ultimum instans³²¹ motus³²² quod est impossibile, et omnia illa³²³ patent³²⁴ per predicta.

Contra istam conclusionem³²⁵ arguitur³²⁶ sic: si³²⁷ illa propositio sic exponeretur, tunc ista consequentia³²⁸ foret³²⁹ bona 'Sortes desinit moveri, igitur Sortes³³⁰ immediate³³¹ ante hoc³³² movebatur' sicut³³³ patet per regulam predictam³³⁴, sed³³⁵ consequens³³⁶ est impossibile³³⁷, ergo³³⁸ illud ex quo sequitur³³⁹. Impossibilitas^{340,342} consequentis³⁴¹ probatur sic³⁴³: Sortes immediate ante hoc movebatur, igitur³⁴⁴ Sortes³⁴⁶ sine medio ante³⁴⁷ hoc³⁴⁸ movebatur. Et³⁴⁹ ultra: igitur Sortes sine tempore movebatur^{345,350}. Et ultra: igitur³⁵¹ motus fuit sine tempore quod est impossibile, sicut^{352,354} patet per³⁵⁶ Aristotelem³⁵⁷ quarto et sexto Physicorum et³⁵⁸ pluribus aliis locis^{355,359}.

Item, Sortes³⁶⁰ immediate ante hoc movebatur localiter, igitur Sortes immediate ante hoc pertransivit aliquod spatium. Et³⁶¹ ultra: igitur sine tempore pertransivit aliquod spatium. Et³⁶² ultra³⁶³: igitur sine medio Sortes^{364,366} pertransivit aliquod spatium, igitur³⁶⁷ aliquod spatium, etc.^{365,368}. Consequens impossibile³⁶⁹ sicut³⁷⁰ patet per Aristotelem in predictis³⁷¹ locis, ergo³⁷² et antecedens^{353,373}.

Ad primum³⁷⁴ illorum dico concedendo³⁷⁵ hanc³⁷⁶ propositionem³⁷⁷ 'Sortes sine tempore movebatur³⁷⁸'. Et ulterius /C 29^rb/ concedo quod sine

307 etc. B. 308 om. C. 309 om. AD. 310 om. B. 311-312 om. D. 313-314 om. BC. 315 stabunt D. 316-317 lacuna in A. 318 om. D. 319 nunc non A. 320 tunc D. 321 om. AC. 322 motum C. 323 om. C. 324 patent plane D. 325 responsionem A. 326 dico A; arguo D. 327 quia si B. 328 conclusio C. 329 fuit B; esset C. 330 om. BC. 331 om. C. 332 om. A. 333-334 om. A. 335 om. C. 336 consequentia A; hoc C. 337 falsum D. 338-339 om. A; ergo etc. C; igitur antecedens D. 340-341 om. A. 342 falsitas D. 343 om. D. 344-345 om. B. 346 om. AC. 347-348 om. CD. 349-350 om. C. 351 om. B. 352-353 om. A. 354-355 om. C. 356-357 om. B. 358-359 om. D. 360 om. C. 361-362 om. BC. 363 om. C. 364-365 om. C. 366 om. D. 367-368 om. B. 369 est impossibile B. 370 ut D. 371 multis D. 372-373 om. CD. 374-375 istud concedo A. 376 istam CD. 377 consequentiam quod C. 378 movebitur C; movetur D. 379-380 om. C. 381-382 om. A.

tempore potest esse motus, quia³⁷⁹ sine hoc tempore³⁸¹ potest esse motus³⁸²
 et sine hoc³⁸³ et sic de singulis, igitur sine³⁸⁴ tempore potest esse mo-
 tus^{380,385}. Consequentia³⁸⁶ patet³⁸⁷ quia arguitur³⁸⁸ inductive a singula-
 ribus ad universale³⁸⁹.

Item, ista est universalis vera³⁹⁰ cuius quolibet singularis est vera,
 igitur³⁹¹ ipsa est³⁹² vera³⁹³. Quod autem quolibet singularis sit vera
 /D 218^v/ ostenditur sic, quia hec³⁹⁴ est vera 'sine hoc tempore fuit mo-
 tus' quia^{395,397} clarum est quod sine³⁹⁹ hoc tempore³⁹⁶ fuit motus³⁹⁸ in
 alio⁴⁰¹ tempore, quia⁴⁰⁰ sine hoc tempore⁴⁰² presenti⁴⁰³ et⁴⁰⁴ futuro⁴⁰⁵
 fuit⁴⁰⁶ motus in⁴⁰⁷ tempore⁴⁰⁸ preterito, et sic potest argui de quocumque
 alio singulari⁴⁰⁹. Sed ultra dico⁴¹⁰ negando⁴¹¹ hanc⁴¹² propositionem
 'motus fuit⁴¹³ sine⁴¹⁴ tempore' quia nullus motus⁴¹⁵ fuit⁴¹⁶ sine tempore,
 et tota⁴¹⁷ causa istius⁴¹⁸ diversitatis est quia in ista propositione⁴¹⁹
 'sine tempore fuit⁴²⁰ motus' ly 'motus' in⁴²¹ ista propositione universa-
 li⁴²² supponit confuse tantum, et in ista⁴²³ propositione⁴²⁴ 'motus fuit⁴²⁵
 sine⁴²⁶ tempore⁴²⁷, ly⁴²⁸ 'motus⁴²⁹, supponit⁴³⁰ determinate, et per con-
 sequens oportet⁴³¹ quod⁴³² verificetur⁴³³ pro aliquo⁴³⁴ singulari, sicut⁴³⁵
 in illa propositione 'animal fuit homo' oportet⁴³⁷ quod⁴³⁸ ly 'animal' sup-
 ponit determinate, et⁴³⁹ per consequens oportet⁴⁴⁰ quod⁴⁴¹ hec propositio
 indefinita⁴⁴² verificetur⁴⁴³ pro aliquo⁴⁴⁴ singulari animali. Sed⁴⁴⁵ sic
 non oportet in illa propositione 'omnis homo fuit animal' quod 'animal'
 verificetur pro aliquo singulari animali^{436,446}.

Ad⁴⁴⁷ aliud⁴⁴⁹ argumentum⁴⁵⁰ dico concedendo hanc⁴⁵¹ propositionem
 'sine⁴⁵² tempore fuit aliquod spatium pertransitum', et nego⁴⁵³ illam
 'aliquod spatium fuit pertransitum sine tempore'. Et⁴⁵⁴ hoc totum⁴⁵⁵
 propter⁴⁵⁶ causas⁴⁵⁷ predictas^{448,458}.

383 hoc tempore B; isto D. 384-385 etc. A. 386 antecedens patet
 de se consequentia B. 387 declaratur B. 388 arguo A; est B.
 389 universalis C. 390 om. BC. 391 sed quolibet singularis etc.
 igitur D. 392 et A; erit B. 393 om. A. 394 ista AD.
 395-396 quando A. 397-398 om. C. 399-400 om. B. 401 aliquo C.
 402 om. D. 403 de presenti C. 404 vel B. 405 de futuro C.
 406 fit C. 407 de C. 408 om. C. 409 singulari etc. D.
 410 om. AD. 411 nego A. 412 illam C; istam D. 413 fit C.
 414 absque C. 415 om. A. 416 fit C. 417 om. A; ratio B; bona D.
 418 om. AC. 419 om. A. 420 fit C. 421-422 om. AC. 423 iste
 C. 424 om. AC. 425 fit C. 426 om. B. 427 om. B.
 428-429 om. D. 430 stat C. 431 relinquitur C. 432 om. A
 433 verificari A; supponit C. 434 aliqua D. 435-436 sed sic non
 oportet quando supponit confuse tantum A; om. C. 437-438 om. B.
 439-440 om. B. 441 quia B. 442 om. B. 443 verificatur B.
 444 aliquo alio B. 445-446 om. B. 447-448 om. A. 449 illud B.
 450 om. C. 451 illam C. 452 quod sine B. 453 negando B.
 454 om. C. 455 om. D. 456 patet per C. 457 casus C; rationes D.
 458 predictas C. 459 tertia B. 460 om. C. 461 res aliq. C.

4.1

Alia⁴⁵⁹ conclusio est ista⁴⁶⁰ quod si sint aliquae⁴⁶¹ res⁴⁶² que tantum⁴⁶³ manent⁴⁶⁴ per instans⁴⁶⁵, tunc in omni propositione affirmativa⁴⁶⁶ composita ex terminis supponentibus⁴⁶⁷ pro⁴⁶⁸ talibus⁴⁶⁹ rebus⁴⁷⁰ ly⁴⁷¹ 'incipit' et 'desinit' debent⁴⁷² exponi opposito⁴⁷³ modo. Verbi gratia, ista⁴⁷⁴ propositio 'forma specularis⁴⁷⁵ incipit esse' debet exponi⁴⁷⁶ per positionem de⁴⁷⁷ presenti⁴⁷⁸ et remotionem de preterito⁴⁷⁹, et^{480,482} ista propositio 'forma specularis⁴⁸³ desinit esse' debet exponi per positionem⁴⁸⁴ de presenti et remotionem de futuro^{481,485}, ita quod semper⁴⁸⁶ positio⁴⁸⁷ de presenti debet poni⁴⁸⁸ in⁴⁸⁹ expositione⁴⁹⁰ utriusque⁴⁹¹. Consimiliter dicendum⁴⁹² de istis propositionibus⁴⁹³ 'lux incipit esse', 'lux desinit esse', 'instans⁴⁹⁴ incipit esse', 'instans desinit esse⁴⁹⁵'. Ex illis⁴⁹⁶ sequitur manifeste⁴⁹⁷ quod eadem res potest incipere esse⁴⁹⁸ et desinere esse in⁴⁹⁹ eodem instanti.

5.1

Et⁵⁰⁰ ulterius est⁵⁰¹ sciendum quod⁵⁰² predicatum propositionis⁵⁰³ affirmative, in qua ponitur hoc verbum 'incipit' vel 'desinit', vel⁵⁰⁴ simpliciter [supponit]⁵⁰⁵ [vel]⁵⁰⁶ /C 29^va/ non supponit vel supponit determinate.

Item, predicatum propositionis⁵⁰⁷ negative, in qua ponitur hoc⁵⁰⁸ verbum⁵⁰⁹ 'incipit' vel 'desinit', semper supponit confuse et distributive.

Et subiecta omnium⁵¹⁰ talium propositionum sive⁵¹¹ affirmatarum sive negativarum supponunt diversimode⁵¹² secundum⁵¹³ diversitatem⁵¹⁴

462 res permanentes sive C. 463 om. C. 464 maneant C. 465 instans tantum C. 466 om. B. 467 componentibus B. 468 om. B. 469-470 talium rerum B. 471 si tales termini supponant B; si sint tales termini ly D. 472 om. C. 473 predicto C. 474 sicut ista B. 475 specifica B; sub aliis C; *i.m. corr. in* specifica D. 476 sic exponi C. 477 om. C. 478 presentis C. 479 preterito et ista propositio 'forma substantialis incipit esse' debet sic exponi per positionem de presenti et remotionem de preterito C. 480-481 om. A. 482 ut B. 483 specifica B; substantialis C; *i.m. corr. in* specifica D. 484 remotionem C. 485 preterito C. 486 per D. 487 propositio C; positionem D. 488 esse C; exponi D. 489 om. D. 490-491 utrumque istarum D. 492 dicendum est B; dicitur dici C. 493 om. A. 494-495 om. A. 496 hoc C. 497 om. C. 498 om. A. 499 et in C. 500 om. BC. 501 om. D. 502 om. B. 503 istius propositionis D. 504 supponit personaliter vel B; om. C. 505 om. B. 506 om. B. 507 om. C. 508 illud A; om. D. 509 om. D. 510 om. A. 511-512 supponunt diversimode sive sint affirmative sive negative C. 513 sive C. 514 quantitatem diversitatem A; quantitatem C.

quantitatum⁵¹⁵ propositionum, sicut per⁵¹⁶ superius⁵¹⁷ dicta⁵¹⁸ clarius
 patet⁵¹⁹ intuitu. Et⁵²⁰ hec dicta sufficiant rudibus⁵²². Amen⁵²³. A-
 men⁵²¹.

Explicit tractatus de istis⁵²⁴ duabus dictionibus 'incipit' et 'de-
 sinit' editus⁵²⁵ a Thoma⁵²⁶ Bradwardino⁵²⁷ Anglico⁵²⁸ excellenti⁵²⁹ phi-
 losopho⁵³⁰. Amen⁵³¹. Amen⁵³².

515 *om.* CD. 516 *om.* BC. 517 *om.* C. 518 *om.* BC. 519 poterit
 patere C. 520-521 *om.* B; explicit C. 522 istis verbis incipit et
 desinit Deo gratias D. 523 *om.* D. 524 *om.* CD. 525 compositum ut
 dicitur A; *om.* C. 526 magistro Thoma BD; Thome C. 527 dicto Manlo-
 vel B; *om.* C; Manlovel D. 528 Anglici C; *om.* D. 529-530 *om.* BD;
 egregii doctoris C. 531 *om.* BD. 532 *om.* BCD.

