Mit diesem Satz ist die Aufforderung gegeben die bereits dem Exordium der "Metakritik" implizite Idee einer "Sakramentalen Semantik" weiterzuverfolgen, deren Grundzüge ich hier habe andeuten wollen.\textsuperscript{18}

It is no exaggeration to say that the deepest theoretical problems of the medieval theory of syntax are semantic. The first such problem has to do with a felt tension between the objective of explaining construction in terms of the rules of a deep structure and the need to explain at least some constructions in terms of the lexical meanings of expressions. For the modist grammarian, the relationship between language and reality is expressed by the story of a "double imposition." A sound is first tied to what it signifies by way of a form (ratio significandi) which corresponds to some property of the thing or things signified; the vox thus becomes an expression with a meaning (dictio). The mechanics of this imposition are not often discussed, its particulars being lexical and thus not of much interest to the study of syntax as the modists conceive it.

The dictio is then associated with the things signified in a particular way or ways and becomes a part of speech with a distinctive mode of signifying (modus significandi). In the case of the inflected parts of speech, the dictio is now susceptible to a determinate set of grammatical accidents —its inflection—with their associated modes of signifying.¹

Ideally, the decision about whether a construction is grammatical or not is given in terms of the modes of signifying of its constituent ex-

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pressions. 'Mulier pulcher' is ungrammatical because the concatenation of a noun, whose mode of signifying substance via a general quality is absolute, and an adjective, whose mode of signifying that same substance via another quality is adjacent or dependent, lacks the agreement in gender which is one of the signs of the union of the dependent and what it depends on. The aim of the theory is to define grammaticality in terms of general classes of expressions (partes orationis) defined in terms of their functions or modes of signifying and the combinatorial requirements of these general classes of expressions. The reason for avoiding recourse to the particular meanings of individual expressions is obvious. Even if the notion of an expression is successfully freed from its connection to specific words which vary from language to language, and the potential threat to the universal validity of grammatical theory thus disarmed, recourse to the meanings of particular expressions constitutes a threat to significant generality. To descend to individual meanings must either reduce grammar as a science to triviality or save significant universality by reducing the status of the whole enterprise to that of a mere art, which has instead of general laws rules of thumb or strategic generalizations. Yet what of verbs which require no object, e.g., 'esse' and 'stare'? What of verbs like 'interest' and 'refer', which—sometimes—require no subjects to complete them? and of verbs which take non-accusative objects like 'miseri'? How are such cases, found in only some verbs, related to a general theory of the verb which requires for the verb a nominative subject in which the action of the verb resides and stipulates that the object which terminates that action be in the accusative—if not by the specific lexical meanings of the words involved? It is among the modest grammarians that we find the challenge of manipulating the modes of signifying of general classes of expressions so as to obviate recourse to the specifically lexical meanings of individual expressions in the explanation of constructional requirements self-consciously taken up. Absence of this programme or inconsequence in pursuing it is one important feature of pre-modist théories.

This problem is so obvious and is regarded as so exigent by these theorists themselves that it tends to mask a far more serious and pervasive underlying problem: If the modes of signifying of the parts of speech and the consequent rules of construction are not simply an elaborate system of conventions, then how are they to be justified? For the medieval theorist, this is tantamount to asking what further level of reality these
structures of human artifice are grounded in. One of the most important points of difference between full-fledged modists and their pre-modist predecessors is the way in which they deal with this question.

To some extent a theorist can be classified as modist by the characteristic way in which the relation between the mode of signifying, the mode of understanding and mode of being is worked out. On the one hand, there is a relation of signification and consignification between the word with its modes of signifying and the thing signified with its modes of being. Modist theorists talk of an active and a passive mode of signifying which are formally identical, though the active mode is in the word as a subject and the passive mode is a property of the thing signified. Despite its much attacked ontological peculiarities, this view has the virtue of stressing the very exact isomorphism between the structural features of language and the reality it mirrors. On the other hand, it is recognized that it is the intellect which connects word and thing, and that it does so by means of modes of understanding which parallel the modes of signifying and the modes of being. Indeed some theorists propose an active mode of understanding in the intellect as in a subject and a passive mode of understanding, which is the corresponding real property of the thing.

Among modist theorists we thus find, albeit with differing terminology and re-

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2. Again, this position emerges gradually. Boethius of Dacia seems in general to take the conceptus mentis as the proximate significate of the expression; cf. ibid., pp. 56-7. Yet at another point, he merely relates the modes of being, understanding and signifying thus: "Unde cum res per suas proprietates sibi determinat modos intelligendi, ita quod non possit intelligi sub modis intelligendi, qui repugnant suae proprietati, intellectus enim intelligendo sequitur rem in essendo, et per suos modos intelligendi determinat sibi tales modos significandi, qui sunt similes illis intelligendi; modi enim significandi sequuntur modos intelligendi et sine illis non sunt possibles, ut de se patet -ergo proprietates rerum sibi determinant modos significandi." ibid., pp. 64-5. Radulphus Brito says explicitly: "... quidam est modus significandi activus et quidam passivus. Modus significandi passivus dicitur essentia rei ut consignificatur per vocem. Sed modus significandi activus dicitur ratio consignificandi per quam vox consignificata illum modum essendi." op.cit., p. 153. Cf. also Thomas of Erfurt, op.cit., I.2, pp.134-6. The earliest known occurrence of the distinction between active and passive modes of signifying is in succinctus Auctores, Quaestiones super Sophisticos Blenchoes (CPhilD VII) p.122; cf. S. Ebbesen, 'Is "canis currit" ungrammatical', Historiographia Linguistica vii.1/2 (1980) 53-68.

3. According to Radulphus Brito, "... modus significandi passivus est ipsam proprietis rei ut consignificata est per vocem. Et modus intelligendi passivus est ipsa proprietis rei ut apprehensa est ab intellectu ... modus intelligendi activus est ratio cointelligendi per quam intellectus referitur ad rei proprietatem." op.cit., pp. 153-5. Cf. also Thomas of Erfurt, op. cit., III.7, p. 140.
finements of theory, a constant picture of a threefold isomorphism: mode of being, mode of understanding, mode of signifying.

This picture offered by the modist theorist emerges gradually. Even after the grammatical tradition has ceased to reiterate Priscian and Donatus, there are still at least two identifiable variants in pre-modist theorizing. In the first of these, we find a hesitant and inconstant conception of the role of the intellect. Naturally, grammarians who have commented on Priscian are bound to be cognizant of the importance of the order of the intellect. They have, after all, commented on the text:

... ex singulis dictionibus paratur sensibile, id est intelligibile... est enim oratio comprehensio dictionum aptissime ordinatarum...

They thus contrast the vox, the literal spelled-out item, with the dictio, which is something else again—an "intelligible", and the sort of stuff out of which sentences are made. But for theorists of this first type, the dictio is usually conceived of in terms of a particular lexical meaning, and the mode of understanding is associated with the dictio in this sense. There is thus a natural tendency to ground grammatical rules of construction whenever possible in first order meanings and their correlates in the way the forms of things interrelate in reality. The sense in which language is held to picture reality is literal and lexical.

In the second variant, we find an emphasis instead on the intellect as the proximate ground of the rules of construction. But the fully modist programme of a full parallel between the modes of understanding and the properties of things is lacking. Indeed, we often find an appeal to the order of the intellect to block undesirable inferences from the order of reality. It is tempting—and I think ultimately correct—to point to a parallel emphasis in theology and metaphysics on the modal character of the intellect's approach to reality as a source of indirection or lack of isomorphism, e.g., in Bonaventure and Aquinas. Pinborg suggests, too, that the modist programme is facilitated by the currency of an Avicennan ontology, which posits an unrestricted substantial quality then successively qualified and ultimately particularized by "ways of being." He dates this

6. Pinborg, Entwicklung, p.44.
currency in the arts faculties to the 1260's. However the precise history of the interrelation of the stream of metaphysics and theology and the grammatical tradition goes, by the time of Scotus, we have a well accepted insistence that if the intellect understands things in ways they are not, then it understands them incorrectly. And we have in modest grammar, e.g., in the work of Thomas of Erfurt, a parallel insistence on the triadic isomorphism: mode of being, mode of understanding, mode of signifying.

In a developing tradition, a rigid division into stages or variants is invariably procrustean. Still, I want to argue that both the commentary on Priscian Minor attributed to Jordan of Saxony and the Priscian Minor commentary by Robert Kilwardby are pre-modist, and that the former is typical of one strand of pre-modist theory, the latter of the other. Both authors tend to use the notion of the mode of signifying prolifically and to offer an elaborate taxonomy of modes without ever really discussing what the modes are or to what they are to be referred. As I have argued elsewhere, Jordanus' notion of the dictio is often psychological and refers to the actual lexical meanings of expressions. Thus Jordanus will, if he can, trace rules of construction to the interactions of first order predicates with reality. Kilwardby, by contrast, does recognize the importance of the intellect as a connection between language and reality; but in his grammatical works, as elsewhere, he stresses the active "modal" character of the intellect and tends in consequence to use the intellect to justify discrepancies between language and reality as much as to lift the language/reality correspondence to a more abstract or structural level. Kilwardby is comfortable with the proto-modist view that 'excito', 'excitatio' and 'O' signify the same thing under different modes; but he offers a grammatical theory in which the functioning elements are general and specific modes of signifying associated with the parts of speech and their inflected forms—and, if need be, the lexical meanings of individual expressions. Thus, though the kind of theory Kilwardby offers is in some sense a transition to full-fledged modest theory, he is with respect to the role of the intellect as far from modest theory as Jordanus.

8. Robert Kilwardby, Sophismata Grammaticalia, ms. Erfurt 4º 220 f.15ra: Ad aliud dicendum est quod excitatio potest significari tripliciter: ut substantia, et sic per hoc nomen //15rb// 'excitatio'; vel ut est affectus, ut patet per hoc quod est 'O'; vel ut est actus, ut patet per hoc verbum 'excito'.
Kilwardby's discussion of the question: Quare in constructione possessionis cum possessorre magis exigit possessio possessorum quam econverso? when compared with Jordanus' parallel discussion of: An nomen significans possessionem ratione possidendi exigit genitivum significantem possessorum? provides a good test case for the differences between the two commentaries. The discussion revolves around constructions like 'cappa Sortis', where the nominative 'cappa' refers to something which is possessed by the person referred to by the genitive 'Sortis'. Traditional grammar has it that it is the noun which signifies the possession which requires the genitive signifying the possessor and not the other way around. And the question is why.

Both Kilwardby and Jordanus discuss what it is for one expression to require another. Jordanus says:

Exigere est ... trahere dictionem in constructionem ad perfectionem orationem ex respectu transitivo. Vel sic: exigere est desiderare aliam dictionem ad perfectionem orationis; exigentia est tractio vel desiderium alterius dictionis ad perfectionem orationis; et dicitur exigere quasi extra se egere ... Per iam dicta differt regere et exigere in hoc quod exigere refertur ad impotentiam dictionis: ex eo enim dictio exigit quod secundum eius intellectum dependet ex alio sine cuius auxilio non faceret intellectum perfectum.  

Kilwardby is briefer:

/88vb/ Nota etiam quod idem a in re est regere et exigere. Sed pars dicitur regere transsumptive propter principalitatem quam habet in oratione b respectu alterius partis. Sic enim dicitur verbum regere partes casuales. Exigere autem dicitur pars propter dependentiam repertam in ea propter quam vult alia parte determinari.  

a idem: om. 0. b oratione: ratione 0.

9. At the precise point of Priscian's text on which Kilwardby and Jordanus comment, he says simply: "Nominativus igitur casus nominum genitivo adiungitur quando possessor aliqua et possessor significatur. et nominativo quidem possessionem, genitivo autem possessorum proferimus, ut 'Hector filius Priami' ..." op.cit., XVIII.9, p. 213. An earlier discussion, however, makes it clear that it is precisely the requirement of the oblique form by the nominative which is at issue here: "Nominibus quidem exigentibus obliquis necesse est substantivum verbum vel participium consequi, ut 'filius Herculis sum' ..." op.cit., XVIII.5, p. 212. Petrus Helias, Summa Super Priscianum, ed.J. Tolson, CIMAGL 27, says simply: "Et vide quod tunc nominativus exigit genitivum casum quando nominativus significat possessionem, genitivus autem significat possessorem, ut cum dico 'filius Herculis' ...", p.131.


11. Robert Kilwardby, Commentary on Priscian Minor. The text follows that of Oxford, Corpus Christi College ms. 119 (=O); variants from Cambridge, Peterhouse College ms. 191.2 (=P) are not noted except where the readings of P are preferred to those of O.
The case of a noun Jordanus calls "an interior accidental mode of signifying" (modus significandi accidentalis ab intra). Kilwardby defines case as a property of a part of speech of signifying a substance in relation to something else (proprietas [i.e., partis] significandi substantiam in comparatione ad alium.)

The question, then, is by virtue of what kind of dependency 'cappa' requires or needs to be completed by a word which signifies a substance as it stands in some kind of relation to something else, i.e., 'Sortis' - and by virtue of which 'Sortis' does not need completion. Clearly the answer must involve some factor beyond the parts of speech involved and their accidents. For it cannot be by virtue of its general mode of signifying as a noun that 'cappa' requires 'Sortis'; unlike 'percutit', which if a personal verb, invariably requires a subject in a specific case, 'cappa' merely can and sometimes does require a genitive. Nor can it be the case of 'cappa' in which the dependency is grounded, since 'cappam Sortis' in 'Video cappam Sortis' similarly requires the genitive. Moreover in the surface grammar, the dependency would seem to run from 'Sortis' to 'cappa', since an unattached genitive at least looks more incomplete than a free nominative. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the dependency is grounded in what the phrase means. Two possibilities for an analysis of the dependency thus suggest themselves. Either it is something about the relationship between the putative things referred to, hood and person, which directly grounds the construction, or it is something in the way the intellect refers to the hood and its possessor which is the proximate ground of the construction.

Kilwardby's and Jordanus' discussions are similar to a point. Indeed, if Jordanus is the earlier writer, then Kilwardby seems to have appropriated a section of his text almost verbatim. Both writers, for example, consider the objection that transition or motion runs from the prior to the posterior, that the possessor is prior to the possession, and hence that the expression designating the possessor requires the expression designating the possession. Both answer that the "transition" of a transitive construction is rather a dependency than a motion, and that since dependency runs from the posterior to the prior, and the possession is posterior,

12. Jordanus, Notulae, p. 76.
the expression designating the possession requires or depends on the expression designating the possessor. Neither author here offers a further analysis of priority and posteriority in this sense or of dependence.

More significantly, both Kilwardby and Jordanus reject the argument: the possessor needs the possession more than the other way around, hence the genitive signifying the possessor requires the nominative signifying the possession. With nearly identical wording, they answer that "construction does not follow things themselves, but the modes of things and the way they are understood," then go on to argue that because "the noun signifying the possession does so under a common quality which is made more specific by a reference to the substance of the possessor, the dependency attaches to the name of the possession, and not to that of the possessor."

It is thus tempting to say that Kilwardby and Jordanus share the view that the modes of signifying and rules of construction are to be grounded in the order of the intellect proximately. For surely the point of their common response is that the kind of need Socrates has for his hood, i.e., his dependence on it to keep out the cold, is a matter of fact and not the kind of need or dependence which grounds grammatical constructions, whereas the "dependence" of possession on possessor is the kind of dependence relevant to grammar because it is logical and has to do with the way things are understood. The reasoning must be that the notion of being a possession is logically posterior to the notion of being a possessor just as the notion of accident is logically posterior to the notion of substance, because it makes no sense to talk of something's being a possession without its being someone's possession, just as it makes no sense to talk of an accident which is not an accident of something. That this is the line of reasoning our authors have in mind is confirmed by the fact that they both give, with slight variations in wording, the additional argument that in every ordering of things, what is referred to another is second or posterior and requires what is absolute or first.

Yet the appearance of unanimity is deceiving. Jordanus goes on to offer another argument. "As it is in being," he says, "so it ought to be in signifying; and in the order of being the possessor is the principle of generation and conservation of his possession, and thus ought to be

15. Appendix pp. 114, 120.
signified in this way." 17 He concludes that the expression signifying the possessor should thus be in the genitive case. Jordanus' omission of a reference to the intellect is conspicuous. Moreover, the placement of the argument is peculiar. Whether the possessor should be signified in the genitive case is not really at issue. The question is why the nominative requires such a genitive for its completion. Clearly Jordanus is thinking that 'cappa' signifies a thing possessed, and that that signification requires completion by an expression which indicates whose possession it is.

Kilwardby, who appears to be following Jordanus where he sees fit, omits this passage, though as we shall see, he agrees about how a noun in the genitive case signifies. Instead he takes up an obvious objection to the previous argument which turns on logical priority and posteriority. Possession and possessor, runs the objection, are related as correlatives; surely then, one requires the other as much as vice versa. 18 The point is obvious. If it makes no sense to talk or think of a possession without reference to a possessor, it equally makes no sense to talk or think of a possessor without reference to some possession or other. Thus the talk of "what is referred to another" and "what is absolute" is unwarranted.

Kilwardby's answer, i.e., that a pair of correlatives may be asymmetrical and exhibit priority and posteriority with respect to the understanding, is filled out with a series of analogies. "Sense and the sensible, knowledge and the knowable, measure and the measured," 19 are correlative pairs which are interdefined, yet manifest priority and posteriority. Kilwardby does not ground this asymmetry in the order of reality.

In the discussion which Kilwardby gives, we thus note two things. First, obviously Kilwardby does not think that the way in which the genitive case affects signification is involved at this point in explaining how 'cappa' requires 'Sortis'. Secondly, and very significantly, Kilwardby has stopped with his appeal to the order of understanding and has not gone on to anchor his conclusion in the order of reality. Surely this is not because the issue is too elementary to belabor—but because Kilwardby thinks his appeal to the order of the intellect is sufficient.

The differences already apparent between Jordanus' and Kilwardby's views leads one to suspect that their agreement about the centrality of

17. Appendix p.120.
18. Appendix p.113.
the modes of things and the way they are understood may be merely verbal. And closer examination reveals that they do understand the crucial claim that "the noun signifying the possession does so under a common quality which is made more specific by a reference to the substance of the possessor," very differently. They have thus a different understanding of the dependency relationship which grounds the construction 'cappa Sortis'. By this crucial claim, Jordanus clearly means simply that such a noun signifies a putative thing, one of whose properties is to be a possession, and that the genitive by signifying the possessor limits and determines the reference to that property. 'Sortis' in 'cappa Sortis' thus tells the hearer whose possession the hood is. This is a view which Kilwardby rejects in the more general question: De constructione nominis cum obliquo. There he rejects the view that it is a sort of accident of the thing, e.g., being someone's, which causes the noun signifying it to require the genitive signifying the possessor; his reason is that such an accidental property as being a possession is a property of the substance possessed and ought therefore to legitimate a construction of any expression referring to that putative substance with the genitive, even a proper name or pronoun. 20 The obvious conclusion for Kilwardby is that it is the common quality by which a common noun or an adjective signifies which is specified by the genitive signifying the possessor. 'Sortis' in 'cappa Sortis' tells the hearer whose hood, just as 'illa' in 'illa cappa' tells the hearer with a suitable gesture which hood. Kilwardby's instinct, then, is to trace the dependence of 'cappa' on 'Sortis' to a propensity for further specification in the way 'cappa' signifies its object to the intellect, and not to the hood's property of being a possession. He thus bars pronouns and proper nouns which refer to the hood from a construction with the genitive. Jordanus is surely aware that only expressions which signify by a property which can be further specified can be modified by a genitive signifying a possessor, as he claims that, "proper names even if they signify something which is possessed, do not require a genitive; and this is because they do not signify in the mode of something which can be delimited or contracted." 21 But he does not make the connection Kilwardby does.

Kilwardby's account is not finished at this point. Having argued that the general quality by which a noun signifies has a propensity to

21. Appendix p. 120.
be determined, he argues that some determinations of the general quality are according to propensities for determination with respect to something else. It is this kind of propensity which grounds constructions with oblique forms. It is specifically a propensity to be determined "as by another possessed" by which 'cappa' can require 'Sortis', just as the propensity to be determined by that to which it is harmful or beneficial would ground a construction with the dative. Like Jordanus, Kilwardby accepts the claim that a noun in the genitive case signifies something "as principle of being"; it is this relation to a putative significate which explains how the genitive can be required by a noun like 'cappa': A noun in the genitive case signifies in such a way that it can make actual the corresponding potential of 'cappa' to be thus determined. Kilwardby could thus supply an explanation of why an unattached genitive is peculiar, and a free nominative is not, though he does not extend his discussion in this way: The genitive, because of the way it signifies its putative thing, is an actually specifying expression and requires something to specify; the nominative is complete in itself, but further specifiable in any of a number of ways.

It is clear that even charity cannot justify attributing this sophisticated view to Jordanus, whose final word on the matter runs:

... constructio obliqui cum nomine non sequitur modum significandi, sed significacionem; et ita sicut significatio totius inflexionis est una, ita constructio.

Vel posset dici aliter quod modus significandi est duplex: substantialis et accidentalis. Accidentalis adhuc duplex: quidam ab intra, quidam ab extra. Ab intra sicut casus, genus et similia quae dicuntur intelligi per ipsam vocem; et talem modum significandi nomen non exigit. Est autem alius modis significandi ab extra securum quod dicimus quod accidit nomini significare rem prout est possisio vel prout est conferens abio vel aliquo abio tali modo; et gratia talis modi fit exigentia, ut 'cappa Sortis'...

For this difference there are two principle reasons. Kilwardby has a much more consequent control of the machinery of act and potency and a clearer sense of the requirements for a scientific explanation on the Aristotelian model. Perhaps more importantly, because of his literal conception of the relationship between language and reality, Jordanus turns immediately to the fact that a putative thing is possessed to explain the whole construction 'cappa Sortis'. Kilwardby because of his much greater awareness of

22. O: 92va.
24. Jordanus, Notulae, p.76.
the role of the intellect is drawn instead first to the way in which a common noun presents its object to the intellect. He is thus able to find a more convincing explanation of how 'cappa' requires 'Sortis', though 'Sortis' is the more incomplete-looking expression on the face of it.

TEXTS

I. ROBERT KILWARDBY ON PRISCIAN MINOR


The text follows 0 when not otherwise stated. Whenever a reading from P has been preferred, this is noted in the apparatus. Thus 'quod: quo 0' means that P has 'quod' like the text, whereas 0 has 'quo'. P readings not accepted in the text are not noted when they are trivial errors or of no consequence for the sense. The orthography has been normalized.

<QUARE IN CONSTRUCTIONE POSSESSIONIS CUM POSSESSORE
MAGIS EXIGIT POSSESSIO POSSESSOREM QUAM ECONVERSO>

/O: 94rB, P: 194rB/ Habito quod nomen exigat ratione possessionis, quae in constructione possessionis ab possessore magis exigat possessionem quam converso.

<1.> Videtur enim quod magis debeat possessor exigere possessionem, quia propter indigentiam ex parte possessoris est possessio magis quam conversa.

<2.> Adhuc, omnis transitio et motus fit a priori in posteriori naturaliter; sed possessor prior est possessione, quare debeat transitus fieri a possessore in possessionem; sed illud a quo est transitio exigere illud in quod est, quare possessor debeat exigere possessionem.

<3.> Adhuc, cum possessor et possessio correlativa sunt, qua ratione unum exigat alterum et converso.

Sed contra: Ut patet ex habitudine casuum, genitivi proprium est significare substantiam ut est principium alterius; sed possessor est ut principium possessionis, quare debeat genitive significari respectu possessionis; et ita exigi debet transitive ab ea et non exigere eam.

10 prior: prius 0. 12 quod: quo 0. 18 ab ea: om. 0. exigere: exigi 0.
Adhuc, in omni ordinatione rerum a posteriori incipit dependentia et comparatio et non a priori —secundum enim semper ponit primum, et non everscro;— sed possessor naturaliter prior possessione; quare a possessione incipit dependentia et non a possessore, quare eodem modo erit et de exigentia.

Adhuc, possessio naturaliter inclinatur ad possessorem tanquam ad regentem et conservantem ipsum et non everscro, quare possessio exigit possessorem et non everscro.

Et iuxta hoc quaeritur quare non est aliqua constructio genitivi ab exigentia possessoris, sicut ab exigentia possessionis, et si sic, quae sit et quomodo fiat.

Et dicendum quod possessio naturaliter est posterior possessore, et ideo ab ipsa est dependentia ad possessorem secundum quod huiusmodi et non everscro; et ideo exigit possessio possessorem potius quam everscro — in omni enim ordinatione rerum secundum est comparatum secundum quod huiusmodi et primum absolutum secundum quod huiusmodi.

1. Ad primum obiectorum dicendum quod constructio non sequitur ipsas res, sed modos rerum et intellectus earum, quare licet possessio requiratur propter indigentiam possessoris, tamen quia nomen significat substantiam cum communi qualitate specificanda per substantiam possessoris, et quia possessio posterior est possessor, ideo concomitatur dependentia nomen possessionis etsi non possessoris; et ideo exigit possessio magis quam possessor.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod motus et transitio naturae est a priori in posterius ut a principio in principiatum: sed aliter est de transitione et motu rationis quae dicitur constructio transitiva —haec enim transitio non est nisi propter inclinationem et dependentiam inven- tam cum altero constructibilium, unde quia dependentia concomitatur id quod posterius est secundum naturam et non id quod prius est, ideo transitio rationis in construendo debet fieri ab eo quod est posterius ad id quod est prius et non everscro.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod correlativorum se habentium secundum prius et posterius, posterius essentialiter ad primum refertur, sed primum

non nisi per accidens ad posterius, ut in hiis scilicet: sensu et sensilibi, scientia et scibili, mensura et mensurato, et huiusmodi. De numero autem talium sunt possessor et possesso, ut possesso essentialiter habet relationem et dependentiam ad possessorum, sed non everso nisi per accidens /O: 94rB/ et ideo possessio in ratione possessionis potius exigit quam possessor ratione possessoris.

Ad id quod iuxta hoc quaerebatur, dicendum forte secundum quosdam quod sicut prima constructio genitivi est ab exigentia possessionis secundum quod talis est, sic secunda constructio genitivi est ab exigentia possessoris. Sed puto quod hoc non sit verum. Quamvis enim in secunda constructione nomen exigens designet possessorum, ut hic 'mulier egregiae formae', non tamen exigit ex vi possessoris; et ideo potest dici quod nulla constructio genitivi fit ab exigentia possessoris secundum quod possessor est, quia dependentia quae est inter possessorum et possessionem incipit a possessione et non a possesso. secundum quod prius determinatum est ...
alium ab extra, sicut nos dicimus quod accidit nomini significare illud quod est alterius possessio vel adquisitum vel huissmodi, et gratia talis accidentis fit exigentia, quia cum dico 'cappa Sortis', haec dictio 'cappa' significat rem possessam a Sorte; et ideo exigit genitivum designantem possessorem, scilicet 'Sortis'.

Sed contra: contingit illam rem cui accidit quod sit possessio demonstrari per pronomem sicut significari potest per nomen. Si igitur nomen significans talem possessionem propter habitudinem possessionis exigeret obliquum, similiter et pronomem significans et demonstrans eandem eundem obliquum exigeret -utroque enim rei significatae accidit habitu do possessoria; quare sicut bene dicitur 'cappa Sortis', sic bene dicetur 'illa Sortis' demonstrando cappam, quod falsum est. Relinquitur igitur ex his quod nomen non exigit obliquum praecise ratione accidentis; videtur igitur quod ratione significations. Et hoc confirmatur a simili per hoc quod omnia alia exigentia obliquum -scilicet et verba et participia, - gratia significations exigit, et quia talis constructio est ex parte post cum obliquo et nos invenimus omnes partes exigentes ex parte post a liquem casum, seu transitive seu intransitive, exigere per naturam significations.

Deinde procedatur sic: Si nomen exigit obliquum ratione suae significations, cum non significet nisi substantiam aut qualitatem, aut erit haec exigentia primo et per se ratione substantiae aut ratione qualitatis. Et haec est divisio sufficiens, /O: 92rB/ quia quamvis dicatur quod nomen exigit ratione utriusque, hoc erit ita quod primo sit ibi exigentia propter alterum scilicet propter substantiam aut qualitatem. Quod non exigit ratione substantiae videtur per hoc quod tunc communicaret tam pronomem quam participium illam constructionem cum nomine, et hoc est quia omnia tria significant substantiam.

Adhuc, substantia per se non habet respectum neque dependentiam ad alterum secundum quod huissmodi, sed ab ipsa dependent alia; ergo cum nomen exigens obliquum exigat ipsum propter respectum et dependentiam quam habet ad alterum, videtur quod non exigit ratione substantiae.

Adhuc, substantia non exigit substantiam. Cuius signum est, quod dictum est in primo huius, quod verba substantiva quia significant substantiam uniuscuiusque, ideo relictis pronominisbus, quae significant sub-
stantium uniuscuiusque, applicant se ad nomina. Sed obliquum, ut videtur, 
exigitur ratione substantiae; cuius signum est, quod nomen indifferenter 
exigit obliquum nominis et pronominis et participii sic: 'cappa Sortis... 
ilius ... legentis'. Ergo nomen exigens non exigit ratione substantiae. 

5 Videtur igitur quod ratione qualitatis; aut igitur ratione qualitatis simpliciter aut ratione qualitatis specialis. Sed quod non ratione qualitatis 
simpliciter patet per hoc quod nomen proprium non exigit obliquum sicut 
nec pronomens non enim bene dicitur 'Burnellus Sortis', sicut bene dicitur 
'asinus Sortis' —, quare sequitur quod ista exigentia debatur qualitati 

10 communi. Et quia qualitas communis quandoque designatur substantiae et 
quandoque adiective, et utraque construatur cum obliquo exigendo ipsum — 
bene enim dicitur 'sapiens illius rei' et 'commodus illi' et 'albus pedem' 
et 'albus colore', et iterum bene dicitur 'sapientia Sortis' —, propertia 
on attribuenda est haec exigentia /P: 192vA/ qualitati substantivae no-

15 minis tantum neque qualitatis adiectivae tantum, sed qualitati communi sim-
pliciter. Sic igitur videtur haberi causa exigentiae ex parte nominis 
exigentis quare obliquum exigit. 

Sed modo dubitatatur super hoc. Videtur enim quod haec causa non sit 
vera; videmus enim pronomens construit cum genitivo cum tamen nullam signi-

20 ficet qualitatem, ut 'hoc horum', 'ego meorum' et 'hi horum albi sunt, 
illi nigri'. 

Adhuc, videtur quod proprium nomen possit obliquum exigere sic: pro-
pria qualitas dupliciter potest significari: aut enim significatur per 

25 significationem eius in materia propria, et sic significatur nomine uno 
ut per hoc nomen 'Sortes' aut per hoc nomen 'Plato'; aut per contraction-
em formae communis ad materiam, et tunc dicitur per circumlocutionem 
sicut 'ille homo', demonstrato Sorte vel quocumque alio. Cum igitur hoc 
duplici modo significata potest exigere obliquum, videtur quod ipsa primo 
modo significata poterit ipsum exigere; ergo sicut bene dicitur 'ille asin-

30 nus Sortis', demonstrato Burnello, sic bene dicitur 'Burnellus Sortis'; 
et ita non solum nomen commune exiget obliquum sicut prius dictum est. 

Deinde iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum nomen exigat obliquum quare non exi-
git rectum. Adhuc, si nomen exigit solum obliquum, quare solum commune 
hoc facit, non autem proprium. 

1 uniuscuiusque: om. O. 5-6 videtur - specialis: om. 0. 7 non: om. 0. 
sicut: om. 0. 12 rei: om. P. pedem: pedum 0. 14 non: enim 0. 
15 tantum: om. 0. 20 horum!: orum 0. horum: hominum P (?) 8 

30 fort. O a.c. 23 significari: considerari 0. significatur: signifi-
cabitur 0. 25 ut: aut 0. 27 sicut: sic 0. 28 quod: om. 0.
Ad primum dicendum quod pronomen cum genitivo non construuitur nisi ab accidenti -construuitur enim cum genitivo partitive posito ratione nominis subintellecti, scilicet 'pars' vel 'numerus' -; est enim sensus 'ego meorum', id est, ego pars meorum vel de numero meorum, et ita oppositio nulla.

Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dupliciter significetur propria qualitas, tamen per nomen proprium significatur ut propria, per nomen commune contractum ad materiam non significatur ut propria -immo magis significatur ibi qualitas communis ut in supposito determinato. Et cum repreassen
tetur suppositum illud per pronomen et qualitas per nomen commune, adhuc illa qualitas manet significata ut communis. Quia igitur ad modos significandi refertur constructio et non ad significationes, ideo non construi
tur nomen proprium cum obliquo sicut eius circumlocutio facta per nomen commune et pronomen demonstrativum.

Ad primum quaeotortum postea dicendum quod una pars exiguit aliam dup
cipiter: uno enim modo exiguit pars aliud quod non est ommino extrinsecum ab ea, sed quoddammodo intrinsecum secundum intellectum, et sic exigit verbum personale casum ex parte ante; et quia illud quod sic exigitur non est omnino extrinsecum ab exigente, ideo constructio et exigentia talis est intrasitiva. Alio modo exiguit aliud tanquam penitus extrinsecum a se ipso et diversum, sicut verbum exiguit casum obliquum ex parte post; et talis exigentia est semper cum transitione, quia in constructione transiti
tiva sunt constructabilia diversa et extrinsecas respectu sui vel /0: 92va/ ut talia. Nomen autem, cum non habeat in se alterius intellectum quod exigat, patet quod semper exigere debet aliquid extrinsecum respectu sui, quare semper exigere debet tantum transitive et numquam intransitive. Nominativus autem intransitivus est et obliqui sunt transitivi, quare nomen non poterit nominativum exigere, sed obliquum tantum.

Ad alterum dicendum quod omne exigens casum exiguit ipsum propter ali
quem respectum aut dependentiam in se ipso terminandam; sed nomen proprium complete terminatum est et in se finitum et neque habet dependentiam ex parte substantiae neque ex parte qualitatis quia utraque propria est et individua. Nomen autem commune significat communem qualitatem, quare sem
er respectum habet ad substantiam determinatam ipsam; et ideo nomen proprium non exiguit obliquum, sed commune solum.

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1 primum: objectorum add. P. 18 verbum personale casum: verbum personale 0, sed verbum ex corr. 25 quod: quia 0. 26 tantum: om. P. 29 alterum: tertium P.
II. JORDANUS, NOTULAE SUPER PRISCIANUM MINOREM

MSS: L = Leipzig, UB 1291, ff. 1r-96r; M = München, BSB, clm 14476, ff. 17r-62r; V = Venezia, B.Marciana, Lat. XIII.17 (coll. 3912), ff. 1r-52v.

The text is based on L, but occasionally M readings have been preferred. All L and M readings deviating from the printed text are noted in the apparatus. Read 'dicuntur: appellandur M' as 'dicuntur L: appellandurM', 'dicuntur: appellandur L' as 'dicuntur M: appellandur L'.

V readings are noted only when used to emend the text of LM.
The orthography has been normalized.

<AN NOMEN SIGNIFICANS POSSESSIONEN RATIONE POSSIDENDI
EXIGIT GENITIVUM SIGNIFICANTEM POSSESSOREM>

/L: 72vB, M: 51rA/ Hic quaeritur an nomen significans possessionem ratione possidendi exigit genitivum significantiem possessorum.

5 Et videtur quod non.

<1.> Possessiva significant possessionem -significant enim aliquid ex hiis quae possidentur; sed ipsa genitivo non construuntur -nihil enim est dictu 'Euandrius Euandri' /L: 73rA/ vel 'Euandrius istius'; ergo regula praedicta est falsa.

10 Ad idem, si ea quae significant possessionem construuntur ratione possessionis, ergo illa quae significant illud quod primo possidetur et principaliter <***> - commune enim non possidetur nisi in suo singulari; ergo talia nomina primo construuntur genitivo, quod falsum est.

<2.> Item, omnis exigentia est propter indigentiam; sed possessor plus indiget possessione quam e converso; ergo possessor plus exigit possessionem quam e converso.

15 <3.> Ad idem, omnis motus et transitio est naturaliter a priori in posterius; sed possessor prior est possessione sua; ergo transitio est a possessori in possessionem; sed a quo est transitio illud in quod est transitio, quare possessor exigit possessionem et non e converso.


Sed contra: in omni ordine rerum incipit dependentia et comparatio a posteriori et non a priori - posterioris enim semper ponit prius et non e-converso; sed possessor naturaliter prior est possessione; quare a possessione naturaliter incipit dependentia et non a possessori; quare similiter exigentia incipit a possessione, cum exigentia sequitur dependentiam.

Ad idem, sicut est in essendo, sic debet esse in significando; sed sic est in essendo quod possessor est principium generativum et conservans suae possessionis; ergo et sic debet significari; sed genitivus significat per modum principii generantis et conservantis; ergo cum nomine significante possessionem possessor significari debet per genitivum. Et hoc concedo.

<1.> Ad primum in contrarium dicendum quod quaedam eorum quae significat possessionem significant cum possessori, quaedam sine possessori. Cum possessori significant ut 'Euandrius' et consimilia quae dicuntur possessiva. Possessionem sine possessori significant ut 'asinus', 'cappa' et similia. Eorum vero adhuc quae significant possessionem sine possessori, quaedam sunt communia, ut 'asinus', quaedam propria ut 'Burnellus'. Omnia ergo illa quae significant possessionem cum possessori non exigunt genitivum significantem possessori, quia nulla pars exigit in construoendo illud quod est pars suae significatio. Similiter propria, etsi significant illud quod possidetur, non tamen exigit; et hoc ideo quia non significant per modum artabilis et terminabilis. Est ergo regula sic intelligenda: omne nomen commune significans possessionem sine intellectu possessori exigit possessorum ratione possessionem.

<2.> Ad secundum dicendum quod constructio non sequitur ipsas res, sed modos rerum et intellectus earum, quare licet possessor indiget possessione et non e-converso, tamen quia nomen significant possessionem cum communi qualitate specificanda per substantiam possessoris, et quia possessione posterior est possessori, ideo dependentia sequitur nomen posses-

sionis et non possessoris. In omni enim ordine rerum secundum est /L: 73rB/ comparatum inquantum tale et primum absolutum; et ideo exigit possessio magis quam possessor.

3. Ad aliud dicendum quod motus (et transitio) necessarius est a priori in posterius ut a principio in principiatum; sed aliter est de motu et transitione nominis secundum quod dicitur constructio transitiva - haec enim transitio non est nisi propter respectum et dependentiam inventam in altero constructibilium, unde quia dependentia naturaliter concomitatur id quod posterius est et non id quod prius est, ideo nominis transitio debet fieri in construendo ab eo quod posterius est ad id quod prius est et non econverso.

4 aliud: secundum M. dicendum: om. M. quia: quod M. 8-9 con-
comitatur: concomitantur L. id1: ad M. quod2: posterius est add. & del. L. 10 construendo: ab add. (& del. ?) M.
PETER AUREOL ON INTENTIONS AND THE INTUITIVE COGNITION OF NON-EXISTENTS*

Katherine Tauchau

The Franciscan Order has memorialized several of its most prominent early members and supporters in the beautiful inlaid-wood portraits of the fifteenth-century choir-stalls of the upper church of St. Francis at Assisi. In the company of saints, of St. Francis' original companions, and of Franciscan popes, are seven friars whose reputation in the order began with their eminence as theologians at the major late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century studia generalia. The portrait of Peter Aureol (d. 1322) among these theologians remains to remind us of his numerous late-medieval readers' esteem.¹

By contrast, few modern scholars have recognized the quality of Aureol's thought.² In surveys of fourteenth-century intellectual history Aureol is often mentioned merely as a "nominalist" whose teaching proceeded, in general, along the lines John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham laid out. Among Aureol's most sympathetic readers in this century, the late Jan Pinborg took the occasion nearly a decade ago, when analysing Aureol's debate

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1. The portraits on the thirty-nine choir-stalls, which the author examined in June, 1980, include the following scholars: Nicholas de Lyra, Franciscus Meyronnis, Matthaeus de Aquasparta, Petrus Aureoli, S. Bonaventura, Alexander de [H]ales, Johannes Duns Scotus.

2. Important studies include Dreiling; Vignaux; Boehner (1948); Vanni-Rovighi; Prezioso (1950; 1968); Maier (1967); FitzPatrick; Cova (1976); Weinberg; Adams; and Normore (pp. 369-70).