sionis et non possessoris. In omni enim ordine rerum secundum est /L:
73rB/ comparatum inquantum tale et primum absolutum; et ideo exigit pos-
sessio magis quam possessor.

<3.> Ad aliud dicendum quod motus (et transitio) necessarius est a
priori in posterius ut a principio in principiatum; sed aliter est de
motu et transitione nominis secundum quod dicitur constructio transitiva
- haec enim transitio non est nisi propter respectum et dependentiam in-
ventam in altero constructibilium, unde quia dependentia naturaliter con-
comitatur id quod posterius est et non id quod prius est, ideo nominis
transitio debet fieri in construendo ab eo quod posterius est ad id quod
prius est et non econverso.

4 aliud: secundum M. dicendum: om. M. 8 quia: quod M. 8-9 con-
comitatur: concomitantur L. 9 id1: ad M. quod2: posterius est
add. & del. L. 10 construendo: ab add. (& del. ?) M.
PETER AUREOL ON INTENTIONS AND THE INTUITIVE COGNITION OF NON-EXISTENTS*

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The Franciscan Order has memorialized several of its most prominent early members and supporters in the beautiful inlaid-wood portraits of the fifteenth-century choir-stalls of the upper church of St. Francis at Assisi. In the company of saints, of St. Francis' original companions, and of Franciscan popes, are seven friars whose reputation in the order began with their eminence as theologians at the major late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century studia generalia. The portrait of Peter Aureol (d. 1322) among these theologians remains to remind us of his numerous late-medieval readers' esteem.1

By contrast, few modern scholars have recognized the quality of Aureol's thought.2 In surveys of fourteenth-century intellectual history Aureol is often mentioned merely as a "nominalist" whose teaching proceeded, in general, along the lines John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham laid out. Among Aureol's most sympathetic readers in this century, the late Jan Pinborg took the occasion nearly a decade ago, when analysing Aureol's debate

* The present study is greatly indebted to the late Jan Pinborg, who introduced me to Peter Aureol's thought shortly after my arrival at the I. G. L. M. in 1979, and who offered fruitful advice on earlier versions. I am also grateful to the George C. Marshall Memorial Fund in Denmark, and to Pomona College for a La Fetra Summer Fellowship, which funded this research.

1. The portraits on the thirty-nine choirstalls, which the author examined in June, 1980, include the following scholars: Nicholas de Lyra, Franciscus Meyronnis, Mattheus de Aquasparta, Petrus Aureoli, S. Bonaventura, Alexander de [H]ales, Johannes Duns Scotus.

2. Important studies include Dreiling; Vignaux; Boehner (1948); Vanni-Rovighi; Preziosso (1950; 1968); Maier (1967); FitzPatrick; Cova (1976); Weinberg; Adams; and Normore (pp. 369-70).
with Hervaeus Natalis and Radulphus Brito over first and second intentions, to note the "knotting together [in the early fourteenth century] of intentiones, intentional being, the ens rationis, and theory of perception," and to urge further study of this nexus.³ As Pinborg himself suggested, the progressive weaving together of these logical and perceptual strands in the work of three decades of theologians teaching at Paris culminated in Aureol's lectures on the Sentences, which marked a crucial turning point and a major rearrangement of the issues.⁴

Peter Aureol lectured on the Sentences at the Franciscan studia of Toulouse and Bologna, before doing so at Paris during the academic years 1316-18.⁵ Already at the time of Aureol's earliest lectures, the theory of perception worked out most systematically by Roger Bacon, John Pecham, and other "Perspectivists" (Perspectivi), had become the standard technical account. This account depended upon sensible and intelligible species as the causal connection between object and percipient, and as necessary to the cognitive processes of abstraction from sense-


⁴ In addition to Pinborg (1974), esp. p. 59, see Tachau (1982) for the reception of Aureol's views.

⁵ Because Stephen Brown's Louvain dissertation is not easily accessible, scholars have had to rely primarily upon the dating of Aureol's commentaries offered by E. Buytaert in his editorial introduction to Aureol's Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum, prooemium-dist. 8, two vols. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: 1953-56). If we assume minimal stints at each studium lecturing on the Sentences and a year lecturing on the Bible before commencing the Paris lectures in the fall of 1316, then Aureol must have begun his pre-Parisian teaching no later than the fall of 1313. Presumably, then, his years studying theology overlapped with Durand of St. Pourcain's and Hervaeus Natalis' years lecturing on the Sentences and determining Quodlibetal disputes.
experience, memory, reasoning, and imagination. The widespread acceptance of the theory was probably due in no small measure to John Duns Scotus' defense of the perspectivist account against the critiques of Peter John Olivi, and Henry of Ghent. Common to their criticism of the Baconian process of cognition by abstraction was the imagistic nature of the species, for their role in representing objects to the sensitive and intellectual faculties posed a major epistemological difficulty where existential certainty was concerned. If images generated by objects were impressed on the senses or intellect in the course of perception, how was one to know infallibly that one saw a present, existing extramental object, and not merely an image of the object, or an impression remaining in the object's absence? Scotus conceived of an additional mode of cognition -- "intuitive cognition" -- which, as a direct, unmediated contact between a knower and an existent object, Scotus believed provided the existential certainty that abstractive cognition could not.

Although this dichotomy of intuitive and abstractive cognition was widely adopted as the starting point for discussions of epistemology, Scotus had nevertheless underestimated the threat that sense-illusion posed for the analysis of how external reality could be distinguished infallibly from the verisimilitude of reality. The issue remained relatively peripheral in Scotus's epistemology, and although subsequent authors, among them Her-


7. Tachau (1981), ch. 1; more briefly, (1982), pp. 190-193. Henry of Ghent seems to have been the first to raise the issue of perceptual deception.
vaeus Natalis,⁸ focused more acutely upon the problem, it was only made inescapably central by Peter Aureol.

Although overtly and deeply influenced by perspectivist theory -- gleaned chiefly from Alhazen⁹ -- Aureol did not estab-
lish the importance of the issue by any treatment of the perspec-
tivist theory per se. For while he accepted sensible species, he nevertheless did not employ them as an explanatory mechanism in his discussion of cognition,¹⁰ if only because he found them inadequate to account for discrepancies between what is in veritate rei and what appears to be. For this problem he found the notion of intentio much more useful than the species. Moreover, far from treating these discrepancies as anomalous events in the normal process of cognition somehow discernable as such, as had Scotus, Aureol introduced their causal mechanism into all sensation and intellection.

Aureol's position surfaces throughout his Sentences com-
mentaries, but is most extensively elucidated in four sections that, despite disparate contexts, offer internal evidence of consistent purpose on the part of their author. Aureol's medi-
val readers usually linked two of these discussions: the treat-

8. See, for example, Hervaeus' Quodlibet 4, q. 11 (Venice: 1513; repr. Gregg: 1966), ff. 107-08: "Utrum cognitio intuitiva requi-
rat necessario presentiam rei cognite." Glorieux dates this question to 1310-13.

9. In addition to citations in other notes below, references to Alhazen can be found throughout the Sentences commentaries, where Aureol calls him alternatively "Alhazen" and "the Perspectivist." In Buytaert's edition see for example I proem., sect. 4 [I: 283, para. 104]; I, d.1, s. 6 [I: 366-67, para. 102] on identity.

10. See below, Aureol's refutation of Gerard of Bologna; despite this modern scholars (eg. Gál, following Prezioso) have sometimes listed Aureol as among those who rejected species.
ment of intuitive and abstractive cognition in the second ques-
tion of the Prologue (or Prooemium), and the discussion of amor
and notitia Dei in the third distinction of Book I. A third
discussion occurs in distinction 23 of that book, under the
rubric of a treatment of first and second intentions.11

Finally, it is useful to examine the second question of Book
I, distinction 27, where Aureol inquires "whether the created and
uncreated Word emanates as actual intellection does, or just as
an object placed in esse formatum." In the last of these discus-
sions, moreover, Aureol explicitly confirms the implicit internal
evidence of his systematic intent whenever he speaks of concepts,
intentions, the esse apparens, and their formation in intuitive
cognition.12 Not all of Aureol's medieval readers recognized the

11. At least two surviving versions of Aureol's Sentences comen-
tary survive. The question of which represents the Paris lec-
tures of 1316-18, and whether either represents the earlier Bo-
logna and Toulouse lectures has not been advanced in print signif-
ificantly beyond the discussion offered in Buytaert's introduction
to his edition of the version in Vatican Borghese lat. 329. When
we quote from this edition or directly from this manuscript (for
questions Buytaert did not reach), we hereafter refer to the com-
mentary as Aureol's Summa. Boehner (1948) edits a question
from an earlier commentary, using Vatican Borghese latin 123.
This commentary we shall refer to as Sent. Among the many indi-
cations that this commentary is earlier is the presence in the
question Boehner edited (Prol., q. 2) of the arguments that, in
the Summa are divided between prooemium and distinction three.
This, as well as cross references in I Sent., d. 3, p. 2, q. 4 (ff.
37rb-38ra) are unequivocal internal evidence of Aureol's intent
that the arguments treated separately be construed as complemen-
tary. For I Sent., d. 23, Jan Pinborg kindly supplied his tran-
scription of Borgh. 329, ff. 258v-264r; portions are published in
Pinborg (1980). See also Vanni-Rovighi and Prezioso for perti-
nent sections of Aureol's Summa which supplement our discus-
sion below.

12. Aureol, I Summa, d. 27, q. 2 (ff. 298vb-303r): "Utrum
verbum creatum et increatum emanet ut intellectio actualis vel
sicut objectum positum in esse formatum." The cross-reference is
on f. 300vb: "Prima, quod in omni intellectione emanat et proce-
dit non aliquid aliud sed ipsamet res cognita in quodam esse ob-
jectivo secundum quod habet terminare intuitum intellectus. Hoc
connection among these passages, although those who did so, even when familiar only with part of Aureol's commentary (as was sometimes the case in English studia), were justified in inferring an underlying unity. In England, Adam Wodeham seems to have been the first to note Aureol's statement in distinction 27, and to have recognized that "in [it] stands the intention of his entire work dispersed throughout the whole opus."\(^{13}\)

I

In the third distinction of Book I, Aureol sets out to argue that "in the act of the intellect, of necessity the thing known is placed in a certain conspicuous and apparent intentional being (esse intentionali conspicuo et apparenti)." Understanding the intellect to be a higher faculty than the sensitive faculties, Aureol derives this claim for intellectio by extrapolation from sensation. Thus, his argument runs, neither the external nor the internal senses are more "formative" powers than the intellect; but "the act of the exterior sense puts the thing in 'intentional being' (esse intentionali), as is clear from many experiences."\(^{14}\)

\(^{13}\) _autem efficaciter declaratum est superius multis viis nam octo experientiis et rationibus multis sumptis a priori et a posteri- ri, dist. 3 in quostione de ymagine <d. 3, s. 14> articulo primo et tertio; et declaratum est etiam auctoritatibus multis . . . d. 20, q. prima . . . ."

13. Adam Wodeham, _Lectura secunda_, prol., q. 4 (Cambr., Gonville and Caius Ms. 281/674, f. 116rb): "... in qua responsione stat intentio totius operis sue disperse per totum opus suum, quod si- ve res sit presens sive absens, visus immediate unitur realitati sui obiecti quam ponit in esse formato..."

14. I _Scriptum_, d. 3, s. 14, a. 1 (II: p. 696, #31); also I, d.9, a.1 (quoted in Vanni-Rovighi p. 678); n. 12 above; and, in _Sent._, d. 3, pars 2, q. 4 (Borgh. 123, f. 37rb-va).
This argument was not immediately clear to an audience who took as their starting point Scotus's discussion of cognition. It may be easiest to discover what Aureol means by "intentional being", by first recapitulating the eight "experiences" that Aureol proposes. The first was historically to prove the most significant:

When one is carried [by ship] on the water, the trees existing on the shore seem to move. Therefore, this motion, which is objective in the eye, cannot be posited to be vision itself; otherwise, vision would be the object [of the sense] of vision, and a vision would be seen; thus, the sense of sight would be a reflexive faculty. Nor can [the motion] be posited to be really in the trees or in the shore, because then they would really move. Nor can [the motion] be posited to be in the air, as it is not attributed to the air, but to the trees. Therefore, it is only intentionally, not really, in esse viso and in esse iudicato. 15

The second experience that Aureol proposes is of a circle which to a viewer appears to be produced in the air when a stick is spun in a rapid circular motion. Third, Aureol alludes to the fact that a stick partly submerged in water appears to be broken. Fourth, he refers to an experience of double vision, whereby one sees two candles in "apparent being" (in esse apparenti) where in fact there is only one in "real being" (in esse reali). The fifth example of an esse apparen is of the colors that a dove's neck appears to have.16

15. I Scriptum, d. 3, s. 14 (II: 696, #31, lin. 8–16). Cf. Scotus, De anima, q. 9 (Vives III: 517) and q. 10 (III: 525), who cites this experience as evidence of the storage of species. For its significance see Tachau (1982).

16. I Scriptum, d. 3, s. 14 (II: 696, lin. 16–697, lin. 29). The second experience is treated by Avicenna and Scotus (above, n. 15); the third is considered by Scotus in responding to Henry of Ghent on error (Tachau [1981], ch. 1, n. 90); Aureol adduces the fifth again to the same purpose in d. 23 (below, n. 32), and had already used it in Sent., prol., q. 2 (Boehner, p. 413).
Aureol describes at greater length the sixth experience, which displays his interest in Alhazen, and consists "in the images which seem sometimes to be behind a mirror, sometimes in the mirror's surface, and sometimes in the air between mirror and viewer, according to the different places of the image, with which the Perspectivist concerns himself in books four, five, and six [of the De aspectibus]."¹⁷ What is this image? Suppose it to be a species which has penetrated the mirror subiective, i.e. which has become a real part of the mirror. Aureol's argument against this solution is an explicit paraphrase of Alhazen's own disproof. Next, Aureol suggests that the image might be posited to be itself a true thing (res), having real essence; this solution he also discounts. Nor can the image be either vision or anything else existing in the eye, Aureol continues, again citing Alhazen to show that the virtual image appears behind the mirror and in a different site than the eye. "It therefore remains," he concludes, "that the image is only an appearance of the thing, or that it is a res having esse viso iudicato et apparenti."¹⁸

The final two experiences are drawn from Augustine's De trinitate: that of seeing an afterimage when looking at the sun, and of the afterimage of red seen when, after staring at crimson, one looks at letters of another color.¹⁹ These experiences, like each of the preceding six, can only be explained, according to

¹⁷. I Scriptum, d. 3, s. 14 (p. 697, lin. 29-33).
¹⁸. ibid., lin. 33-50.
¹⁹. ibid., lin. 50-57; cf. also Sent, prol., q. 1, "secundo prob idem" (Boehner). Aureol may have known the first of these from Scotus's remarks against Henry of Ghent, and from Hervaeus Natalis' quodl. 4, q. 11 (n. 8 above). Augustine: De trinitate, XI, ch. ii (Corpus Christianorum, ser. lat. 50, p. 337).
Aureol, by hypothesizing that what is seen has only an "apparent or intentional being."

Several significant features of this argument should be remarked. In the first place, Aureol explicitly rejects the already traditional identification of the "thing in intentional being" and the sensible species (species sensibilis). Elaborating on this departure from the Baconian theory, he argues that since the external sense is a formative power, "such that it puts the thing (res) in intentional being, which same [intentional being] the imagination has... this cannot be a species. For if it were, then the imagination would not focus upon (cadere super) the thing, but upon the species only; thus, it would be a reflexive power, from which many awkward consequences would follow."  

Second, as this implies, like Scotus -- but for entirely different reasons -- Aureol is committed to the active role of sensitive and intellectual powers in cognition: he insists that they are "formative" powers, i.e. that they create the esse intentionale. Third, and concomitantly, he distinguishes the


21. I Scriptum d. 3, s. 14 (697-98): "Cum igitur sensus exterior formativus sit, sic quod ponat res in esse intentionali, et simili-liter imaginatio idem habeat,—nam pater meus imaginatus a me est ipsemet positus in esse intentionali; non enim est species, quia tunc imaginatio non caderet super rem, sed super species tantum, et esset potentia reflexiva et multa alia inconvenientia sequentur..."

22. The perspectivist theory assumed passive external senses, acted upon by object-generated species. The advantage of the theory was the correspondence of the image received by the sense to the object which generated that image; further, what was the case for the senses was also, mutatis mutandis, the case for the intellectual faculties of the soul, on the general late medieval understanding of Aristotelian psychology. On that same understanding, however, the operations of the will were conceived as
res cognitae as a strictly cognitive entity, from extramental reality. This is a point he reiterates:

Nor is it valid if one should say that these appearances derive from impressions made in the eye or in the disposition of the medium, or from motions of the [inner] spirits, or from any other causes. However that may be, it remains that these appearances are neither the act of vision, nor have they any being except cognized, intentional, and apparent [being]. Some imagine that the images are in the mirror, and that the appearances are in the medium, whether or not they are seen; but both these [views] are false. Otherwise, it would follow that [the appearances] had true, real being. 23

Committed to the position that sensation and intellection involve the formation of an "apparent being," or intention,24 by the knower, Aureol is careful to demonstrate that this is not the case solely in erroneous visions. Not only does the process occur in all sensitive and, by extension, intellectual vision, but it occurs especially (maxime) in "true vision," because this is more perfect than erroneous vision and should not, therefore,

precisely parallel to those of the intellect. For that reason, Scotus had shared with such critics of the Baconian account as Olivi the conviction that, since serious theological difficulties attended the assumption of the will's passivity vis-à-vis its objects, it could not be true that the intellect was entirely passive in cognition. Hence, in intuitive cognition Scotus prescribed an active mode of cognition. This concern was, at least tangential to Aureol's own, as his consideration of the "formative" powers of the cognitive faculties within an analysis of amor del indicates.

23. I Scriptum, d. 3, s. 14 (II: 698, lin. 86-94): "Non valet etiam si dicatur quod illae apparentiae proveniunt ex impressio-nibus factis in oculo vel dispositione medii, vel ex motibus spirituum vel ex quibuscumque aliis causis. Quomodocumque enim sit, constat quod illae apparentiae non sunt actus visionis, nec habent aliquod esse nisi cognitum intentionale et apparem; quod enim aliqui imaginantur quod imagines sint in speculo et apparentiae in medio, sive videantur sive non videantur, hoc utique falsum est. Tunc enim sequeretur quod haberent verum esse reale."

24. See n. 32 below.
be less able to create cognitive reality than less perfect vision is capable of doing. Unlike the latter, however, in true vision "the image or res in apparent being is not distinguished [by the viewer] from the real thing, since they coincide at the same time." That is, in true visions both the external thing itself and the corresponding esse apparens are seen.

One might suggest that, at least in "true" visions, the esse apparens is superfluous. If Aureol were primarily concerned to explain only optical illusions, it would be surprising that he accepted the perspectivist theory of the multiplication of species but considered it inadequate to account for phenomena that most proponents of the theory deemed it uniquely able explain. Why did he introduce in addition the notion of the formation of an esse apparens? The great advantage Aureol saw in positing the necessary creation of intentional beings in cognition was that this permitted him to explain the formation of first and second intentions, while divesting them of the ontological ambiguity in which they had hitherto paraded.

This ambiguity seems to derive originally from Roger Bacon's employment of the term intentio as a synonym for the visible species. Bacon evidently assumed that Avicenna's definition of

25. I Scriptum, d. 3, s. 14 (II: 698, lin. 68-83); cf. also I Scriptum, d. 1, s. 6, par. 120, where Alhazen's authority is mustered to this end; and I Scriptum, d. 27, q. 2 (fol. 302rb): "Et idcirco res cui videtur cum hoc quod realiter existit, habet etiam esse iudicatum et visum, quod quidem non ponit varietatem aliquam aut distinctionem vel numerum cum realitate illa quantum (MS: quintum) ad aliquod absolutum, sed addit respectum illum intrinsecum et indistinguibilem, qui dicitur 'apparentia objectiva.' Non igitur terminatur visus ad rem objectivam mediante aliquo absoluto quasi sit aliquo pallium vel medium inter visionem et parietem qui videtur..." This is the passage Wodeham knows (above n. 13).

logic as the study of "second intentions in connection with first intentions" concerned the same intentiones to which Avicenna referred in his De anima commentary, when arguing that objects impart intentiones which are apprehended by the internal apprehensive faculties. Moreover, Bacon took Avicenna's intentiones to be the intentiones of Averroes' De anima and Alhazen's De aspectibus. The problematic notion that concepts have a diminished being called esse intentionale probably derived from Bacon's reading of Averroes who, at least once, seemed to contrast the intention with corporeal existence. Bacon understood from these authorities an inseparable link between logic and psychology, provided by the object-generated species or intentiones that, by virtue of the mechanism of their causation, were the natural signs taught by Augustine in the De doctrina christiana. An advantage Bacon's adherents saw in his theory was, therefore, a causally explicable correspondence between concepts and extramental reality.

Nevertheless, many of Bacon's late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century readers were perplexed by the ontological status of the extramental species: were they physically of the same nature (eiusdem nature) as the objects which generated them,

27. At the outset of I Scriptum d. 3, s. 14 (II: 696, lin. 4-5), and again in, e.g. I, d. 7, s. 18 (II: 832, par. 68: "impossibile est enim rem intelligi nisi ponatur in esse apparenti et cognitione objective") and I, d.9, a. 1 (Vanni-Rovighi, p. 678), Aureol insists that their creation is necessary (or that the alternative is impossible). This claim has the strength of notions of necessity in perspectivist discussions of the preconditions of sight (e.g. claims that light is necessary); see Lindberg (1970).

28. Tachau (1981), ch. 1; the insight here is Jan Pinborg's. See also Sabra.

or did they only have a "diminished being" (esse diminutum) or "intentional being?" Scotus may have been the first to recognize the equivocal use of intentio that had crept into the discussion, but the clearest attempt at Paris to unravel the confusion in the years during which Aureol was developing his own view was probably Durand of St. Pourcain's:

Esse intentionale can be accepted two ways. [It can be understood] one way as distinct from real being (esse reale), and in this way those things are said to have intentional being which do not exist except through an operation of the intellect, such as 'species,' 'genus,' and logical intentiones [i.e. first and second intentions]. And this is the proper way of accepting 'intention' and 'intentional being;' and [understood] this way, light (lumen) in the medium or the species of color do not have intentional being, because those things which have real origins independently of any operation of the intellect have real and not intentional being; and light (lumen) and the species of color in the medium are such things. . . . In another way something is loosely (large) said to have intentional being because it has a weak being (esse debile). . . .

It may have been Durand's distinction that helped to clarify the issue for Aureol who, in his discussion of first and second intentions in distinction 23, echoes Durand:

30. In II Sent., d. 13, the locus classicus for discussing whether light (lumen), has intentional being in medio; cf. Tachau (1981), ch. 1; on the distinction between lux and its species, lumen, see Lindberg (1976) 113.

31. Durand, II Sent., d. 13, q. 2, "Utrum lumen habeat esse reale an intentionale in medio" (Venice ed. 1571) f. 155rb-va: "6. Responsio. Esse intentionale potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo prout distinguitur contra esse reale, et sic dicuntur habere esse intentionale illa que non sunt nisi per operationem intellectus, sicut genus et species et logicae intentiones. Et iste est proprius modus accipiendi intentionem et esse intentionale; et isto modo lumen in medio vel species coloris non habent esse intentionale, quia que sunt a principiis realibus circumscripta operatione intellectus habent esse reale et non intentionale; sed lumen et species coloris in medio sunt huiusmodi, ergo etc. Alio modo dicitur aliquid habere esse intentionale large, quia habet esse debile. Sed habere esse debile adhuc tripliciter..."
Furthermore, just as the intentio or esse intentionale behaves in its characteristic way in the sense, so does it also in the intellect. But those who ask concerning the colors which are in a dove's neck, an image which appears in a mirror, or a candle appearing somewhere other than its location, whether these have real being or only intentional being, mean to ask whether they have only esse objectivum and ficticium or apparenus, or whether they have real and fixed being externally in the nature of things, independent of any apprehension. From which it is clear that [in the senses] intentional being is nothing other than objectiva vision or appearance; hence, in the intellect it must be nothing other than an objectivus concept.32

This concept or first intention -- upon which second intentions are founded -- Aureol calls objectivus to indicate that it functions as the object of cognition, and to distinguish it from activity, here specifically the act of the intellect or sense which forms it.33

At the heart of this distinction, which seconds Scotus's distinction between the acts of the intellect and its "contents", were difficulties Aureol found in Radulphus Brito's and Hervaeus Natalis' doctrine of first and second intentions, as Pinborg has shown.34 Hervaeus' theory of knowledge remains too little studied to permit a thorough assessment of the relationship between

32. Pinborg (1980), 133 lin. 27 -134 lin. 2. N.b. these examples are the experiences 5, 6, and 4 in d.3, s.14 (n. 16-17 above).

33. Pinborg (1980), 137 "prima affirmativa propositio;" and para. 112 of the same question, quoted in Pinborg (1974), pp. 58-59. See also the earlier I Sent., d. 3, p. 2, q. 4 (f. 37rb): "Prima propositio est ista: in omn\:actu intelligendi (MS: intelligenta) objectum quod per actum intelligitur in illius actus emanunt et procedunt in quodam esse intentionali...et quia aliqui <i.e. Radulphus> volunt dicere quod ante res intelligitur non oportet ibi esse aliud ab intellectum preter actum intelligendi et quod objectum tantummodo capit quandam denominationem per illud actum...ideo hanc conclusionem probo....(37va) nam ens rationis est illud quod tantum habet esse objectivum per obici actui potentie."

his views and Aureol's, but it seems that despite their disagreements, Aureol may also have been positively influenced by Hervaeus.\textsuperscript{35} Aureol's dispute with Radulphus, who holds that the intellectual act, the cognition, the \textit{species intelligibilis}, and the \textit{intentio} are identical, is more fundamental, and stems evidently from Aureol's notions of truth and falsity, which he defends in I \textit{Scriptum} d. 2, s. 10.

There Aureol asserts that the proper object of the intellect is what is true, for "just as what is visible is the object of sight, so for the intellect is what is intelligible. It happens, however, that in the intellect there are erroneous acts, which do not retain the name of intellecions, but rather, [are named] deceptions, for being in error concerning something is not called 'understanding' it, but rather 'being deceived concerning' it."\textsuperscript{36} Aureol then reminds his audience of his claim that the senses and, by extension, the intellect necessarily place the object in conceptual, intentional being, a being characterized by its ca-

\textsuperscript{35} A study of Hervaeus' theory of knowledge remains a desideratum as when Pinborg suggested it (1974; 1980 p. 58). One of the few studies is in Gelber (esp. p. 48). Aureol's use of the term \textit{esse apparens} as a synonym for \textit{intentio}--an identification Aureol's contemporaries treat as an innovation on his part--may have been inspired partly by Hervaeus' discussion of apparentia. Either may, in turn, have inferred this from Alhazen, who linked \textit{intentiones quœ apparent} with the terminology of \textit{intuitio}; see Tachau (1981), ch. I, n. 18. Aureol evinces familiarity with this passage in I \textit{Scriptum} d. 2, s. 10 (II: 556-57, par. 118). On "apparens" see also Roos.

\textsuperscript{36} I \textit{Scriptum} d. 2, s. 10 (II: 547, par. 88): "Secunda vero propositio est quod obiectum denominative dictum respectu intellectus est verum. Ubi considerandum quod, sicut visibile est obiectum visus, sic intelligibile intellectus. In intellectu autem contingit esse actum erroneum, qui non retinet nomen intellecions, sed potius deceptionis; errans enim circa aliqua non dicitur illa intelligere, sed potius decipi circa ea. Alius autem actus est rectus et ille retinet sibi hoc nomen...Et per consequens nihil aliud est esse falsum quam intelligibile actu deceptionis, et esse verum non aliud quam esse intelligibile actu recto."
pacity to serve as the object of thought and by its apparent conformity to external reality. 37 Truth, Aureol states, "is nothing other than what the intellect takes from the [extramental] thing (res)," namely the concepts, or esse apparentes of objects. After all, he insists, "we are said to 'speak' or 'conceive the truth' concerning things;" but speaking mentally or conceiving consists in forming the esse apparens of the external object. Truth, Aureol concludes, "is nothing other than a conformity relation," that is, the kind of relation that exists between an object and its exact likeness (similitudo) or image. It is, of course, precisely such an image, that the intention, or reș placed in formed being (in esse formato posita) is. 38

To return to Radulphus Brito's identification of concepts with intellectual acts, it is clear that on Aureol's view of truth and falsity, if there were such an identity, then intellectual acts themselves would be true or false, a position that Aureol believes would entail severe difficulties. What, for example, would it mean to say that a simple intellectual act is false? 39

If truth is a relation of conformity, falsity by parity of reasoning is the absence of conformity, as occurs when an esse apparens exists without a corresponding extramental entity. 40

This reason for insisting upon the esse apparens vel intentionale

37. ibid., p. 548, par. 91.

38. ibid., p. 548, par. 92-94.

39. See, e.g. ibid., pp. 549-550, par. 98-99; Holcot later argues cogently against Chatton who identifies concepts with intellectual acts; see Courtenay (1971).

40. See, e.g. ibid, p. 548-9, par. 95-96.
Aureol's reader had already encountered in distinction three; "for universally," he claims there,

he who denies that many things have solely an intentional and apparent being, and who thinks that everything that is seen has being externally in the nature of things, [thereby] denies any illusion (judificatio), and falls into the error of saying that all things exist which appear [to exist]. 41

As he interprets the "experiences" he has adduced as evidence of an esse apparens, therefore, Aureol so analyses them to establish either the non-existence or non-presence of the external object. Thus, for example, of the first experience Aureol inquires where this motion -- conceived, obviously, as a res rather than as a relation -- exists. After listing some of the obvious possibilities, he concludes that in this instance the motion has no extra-mental existence. Similarly, the second experience offers a flaming circle which appears to exist but which, Aureol claims, in fact does not. The experiences of afterimages depend upon non-present objects. In short, for Aureol these examples constitute evidence of naturally occurring cognition of an object either not present or non-existent. It should be noted, in fact, that such a distinction is not clearly inferable from Aureol's arguments; rather, he seems to conflate non-existence and non-presence.

II

The cognition of such non-existent or non-present objects is a topic Aureol treats most extensively in the second question of the Prologue to his Sentences commentary. There, he explicitly

41. I Scriptum, d. 3, s. 14 (p. 697 lin. 57-61).
raises the issue of intuitive cognition, to which he only refers obliquely in the third distinction.⁴² Aureol assumes with Scotus that there are two modes of cognition, intuitive and abstractive, in the senses and intellect alike.⁴³ But if Scotus is one of Aureol's sources, another is perspectivist theory,⁴⁴ and an attempt to reconcile the two theories of perception seems to underlie his dissent from the Subtle Doctor. For according to Aureol, intuitive cognition occurs most identifiably in sensitive vision, and it is from such vision that the name has been transferred to intellectual vision; thus, one might more descriptively refer to "ocular" cognition.⁴⁵ On the other hand, abstractive cognition, which is most evident in imagination, would be more properly and less equivocally termed "imaginary" than abstractive.⁴⁶

With these facts laid out, Aureol argues that "everything that is visible is imaginable; for just as color, direction, distance, presence, and existence can be observed ocularly (oculari-ter aspici), so they can be apprehended imaginarily." Hence the defining difference between intuitive and abstractive, or imaginary, cognition must not lie in the presence or absence of the object as, according to Aureol, Scotus's distinction assumed. Rather, intuitive and abstractive cognition differ solely in the manner of knowing; that is, "four conditions, lacking in the man-

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⁴². That is, in d. 3, s. 14 Aureol does not specify that he is discussing intuitive cognition; but see n. 11 above.


⁴⁴. This is especially evident in the derivation of notitia intuitiva as ocular vision, which is more true to Alhazen than Scotus's use of intuitio; see Lindberg (1976) and Sabra.

⁴⁵. I Scriptum proem., s. 2 (I: 204, par. 103-104).

⁴⁶. ibid.
ner in which imaginary notitia grasps (transit super) the object, coincide in ocular cognition.\textsuperscript{47}

The first condition or characteristic which distinguishes ocular from imaginary cognition, is that the former acts directly and immediately, rather than discursively (arguive).\textsuperscript{48} The second condition, Aureol continues, is "presentiality;" that is, imagination, insofar as it grasps the presentiality of an object, nevertheless imagines that the object is absent. "Ocular cognition, however, bears upon the present object as present; moreover, it bears upon the absent object as present, as is clear in the case of illusions and in all the experiences [I have] adduced. . . . For although the [external] objects themselves are absent, if the vision remains in the eye, it bears upon them as present."\textsuperscript{49} Third, ocular cognition is able to actualize its object. This is a puzzling claim. Aureol's example does not seem to make the condition less opaque: the imagination, Aureol proposes, can imagine an eclipse, but it cannot bring about the actual occurrence of an eclipse. Ocular vision, however, according to Aureol does make an object actually appear -- which leads him to the final distinguishing characteristic of ocular vision, namely, that "it makes [external] things that do not really exist, appear as really existing."\textsuperscript{50} Mutatis mutandis, the same

\textsuperscript{47} ibid.; also p. 205, par. 109.
\textsuperscript{48} ibid., par. 105; pp. 208-09, par. 119.
\textsuperscript{49} ibid., p. 204, par. 106.
\textsuperscript{50} ibid., ppp. 204-05, par. 107-108.
criteria distinguish intellectual intuitive from intellectual abstractive cognition. 51

Leaving aside the obvious problem in the argument for the third condition, 52 one may inquire where Aureol derived this approach to intuitive and abstractive cognition, and what he thought to be the advantages it presented? While at first glance this treatment of intuitive and abstractive cognition seems remote from Scotus's, in fact the warrant for such a delineation of abstractive and intuitive cognition lies in Scotus's own description of them in his Quodlibeta:

I distinguish between the operations: one cognition is per se of existence, which attains the object in its own actual existence. An example is vision of color and, commonly, exterior sensation. The other also is cognition of an object, but not as an existent in se, for either the object does not exist, or at least the cognition is not of it as actually existing: an example is the imagination of color . . . 53

If Scotus had intended in this passage not merely to describe by analogy, but in fact to identify intuitive and abstractive cognition as, respectively, perception and imagination

51. ibid., pp. 205-06, par. 110-111. Note esp. Aureol's statement that "sed una apparitione apparent res presentialiter et actualiter et existenter in rerum natura, sive sit sive non sit; et hoc est intuitio." Some of Aureol's reliance on Alhazen, overt in the question edited by Boehner, had been edited out by the time Aureol produced this version.

52. I.e. there are two ways of explaining Aureol's statement about the imagination: (1) that the imagination—of an astronomer for example—imagines that there will be an eclipse, which does not suffice to make it occur in veritate rei extra animam, in which case Aureol's distinction fails, because he nowhere claims that intuitio creates any extramental object, but only an internal esse apparent as an object; (2) that the imagination imagines an eclipse, in which case Aureol has conceded that it creates an intramental esse apparent vel ficticium, a concession he wants to avoid, as that creative act is designated intuitive.

53. Quoted in Tachau (1982), n. 16.
(imaginatio), he was by no means either explicit or unequivocal throughout his oeuvre in applying such an understanding of these terms. Nevertheless, this seems to have been Aureol's interpretation of Scotus' distinction, and was in any event the understanding Aureol himself consistently employed. Moreover, he departed further from Scotus in considering intuitive and abstractive cognitions, qua sensitive and intellectual qualities, to be, therefore, not relations but absolute. Hence, neither could be defined ex parte objecti, because neither required, for its occurrence, the presence of an extramental object as one of the termini of a relation.

There was no dispute concerning the possibility of an abstractive cognition in the absence of an extramental object; but Scotus had denied the possibility, by definition, for a notitia intuitiva. To this Aureol responds that there are two ways of showing that, in fact, notitiae intuitivae (i.e. perceptions) can be and are brought about when the external object "is absent or not actually present." First, Aureol claims, there is the evidence of experience, "to which one should adhere more strongly than to any logical reasons, since scientia has its source in experience. . . . Now experience teaches, in fact, that the intuitive cognition which is in the sense -- or intuitive vision -- does not necessarily require the presentiality of a thing

54. On readings of Scotus's intent by other medieval authors, see Tachau (1982).

55. I Scriptum, proem. s. 2 (I: 201-01, par. 94-95); see also below, n. 60.

56. ibid., pp. 197-98, par. 75, 80.
That is, through strictly natural causes man experiences afterimages, dreams, mirages, hallucinations, and illusions. Drawing his description of such experiencie from Augustine, Averroes, and Alhazen, Aureol here concludes, as in his treatment of the third distinction, that "sensitive intuition can be separated from the real presentiality of an object;" so, by extension, can intellectual intuition.

Aureol's second line of argument proceeds, as he remarks, from the a priori principle that God is able to do whatever does not imply a contradiction. If one terminus of a relation is destroyed, then the destruction of the relation is entailed, according to Aureol; but there is, of course, no logical contradiction involved in holding that the other terminus can continue independently to exist. "Now," he argues, "intellectual and sensitive vision -- as well as, universally, all intuitive cognition -- is something absolute, grounding a relation to a thing intuitively known." Hence, if the external res "does not exist in presentiality," the relation is destroyed; but there is no logical contradiction involved in holding that the intuitive cognition, as the other terminus, can continue to exist. Thus, Aureol concludes, "God could conserve such an absolute intuition when

57. ibid., p. 198; compare to Boehner (pp. 411-413) in which Aureol's a priori and experiential appeals are reversed.

58. ibid., pp. 198-99, par. 82-86. Of these experiences, the first, second, and fourth are described in the earlier prologue (Boehner, pp. 412-13) which had a further experience from Alhazen, the camera obscura (Boehner's text needs to be corrected from the ms., f. 4vb). Experiences 1 and 5 correspond to 7 and 8 of d. 3 (n. 19 above).

59. Scriptum, prooem. s. 2 (I: 199, par. 87).
the relation has been destroyed and the res does not exist in presentiality.\textsuperscript{60}

Once having refuted what he considered the errors in Scotus's treatment of intuitive and abstractive cognition -- by which, it will be recalled, Aureol understood perception and imagination -- he paused briefly to attack the "incompetently offered definition" of his Carmelite contemporary, Gerard of Bologna.\textsuperscript{61} According to Aureol, Gerard defined intuitive cognition as "that cognition by which the thing is known altogether immediately; not by the mediation of species, or exemplar images, or by any object terminating in the thing, other than the thing itself."\textsuperscript{62}

Gerard's position is historically interesting not least as the step for which among succeeding scholastics Ockham would receive almost exclusive credit. Aureol takes issue with the elimination of species in sensu\textsuperscript{63} on two counts. In the first place, he argues,

\begin{quote}
the vision, or intuitio, that happens in dreams occurs by the mediation of species which are drawn from the imagination to the eye; and this vision does not, in actual fact, terminate in the presentiality of a thing, since the objects are absent. Nevertheless, as copiously declared above from the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{60} ibid., p. 201 (par. 93), buttressed p. 202, par. 95; see also d. 27, q. 2, ff. 298vb, 302rb; and Boehner, pp. 394-95, 412: "Arguo contra eam primo, quia impossibile est quod sit visio et quod nihil videatur; esset enim visio sine obiecto. <Instantiae:> Sed si res non sit presens, nihil videtur, Et confirmatur, quia secundum hoc, Deus posset facere quod viderem preteritum et futurum" (my corrections of Boehner's text).

\textsuperscript{61} ibid., p. 206, par. 112.

\textsuperscript{62} ibid.

\textsuperscript{63} Aureol is not explicit, but the context makes clear that these, rather than intelligible species, are those that concern Aureol here.
states of the Commentator and Augustine, this is truly intuitive cognition. 64

In the second place, even if one were to deny species in the case of sight, "it does not appear that they can be denied in imagination," that is, in "imaginary," or abstractive cognition. 65

Whatever other problems Aureol's discussion of cognition raised, since he defines intuitive cognition as perception and nowhere claims that it is unmediated, the conflict between the theory of cognition by abstraction and intuitive cognition latent in Scotus's theory does not arise in Aureol's. Hence, he is able to dismiss Gerard's arguments for the immediacy of intuitive cognition with dispatch. Nevertheless, it is difficult to reconcile this argument supporting the positing of species sensibiles with Aureol's repeated assertion that the "apparent or intentional being" is not to be identified with those species, especially as the evidence offered for the latter is by Aureol's own admission offered elsewhere for the former. Indeed, if Aureol accepts both the species and the esse apparens as distinct causes for the same phenomena, then one would seem to be redundant.

This brings one to a second difficulty with Aureol's theory, namely his insistence that all intuitive cognition necessarily involves the formation of an esse apparens, intentionale, obiectivum, conspicuum, fictici um, visum, or intuitum -- to catalog the synonyms he prefers. 66 They imply the fundamental motivation for Aureol's commitment to this view: for despite the advantages

64. Scriptum, prooem., s. 2 (I: 206, par. 112).
65. ibid., pp. 206-07.
66. See also Maier, pp. 425-27; Dreiling, 143-44; and, on the significance of terming this an esse fictici um, see Tachau (1982), 203 ff., and Pinborg (1974).
it offered in explaining the formation of concepts, the claim arose from his theory of sense-perception. That he took vision as the paradigm of perception was, of course, neither unusual nor controversial; but the role he assigned to such phenomena as illusions, afterimages, mirages, dreams, and hallucinations, was both. Rather than treating these as instances of aberrant perception -- which the account of the primary phenomena for which a theory of perception is structured must also explain -- Aureol instead derived his theory of perception from a consideration of these phenomena. Moreover, admitting this to have been his procedure, Aureol foresaw and attempted to answer the objection to it:

Perhaps it will be said against these experiences first that such visions are false, deceptive, and erroneous; and that one should not argue from errors and deceptions to true visions. Second, it may be argued that these are not visions [at all], but judgments made by the sensus communis as a result of which we judge that we are seeing.

That is, reversing the order of objections, it must be established that these experiences are among the phenomena that a theory of perception must consider; then, that one can legiti-

mately proceed as Aureol had, in fact, done.

To the first objection, Aureol responds that whether true or false, these phenomena are in any event real visions, since "in the faculty of vision, there is no act that does not participate

67. Pinborg (1974; 1980), and Aureol, I Scriptum, d. 27, q. 2; Aureol is himself explicit about a further motivation, namely, "avoiding Plato's opinion;" cf. Dreiling, p. 82, n. 2 (and note 37 above).

68. I Scriptum prooem., s. 2 (I: 200, par. 89); see also Boehner, p. 413.
in the specific nature (ratio) of vision." Moreover, the same perception (notitia) can be either true or false, as truth or falsity depends not on the perception but on the condition of the [extramental] res. "Consequently," Aureol concludes, "the reality of a vision does not require the real presence of an existent object, although the truth of a vision does, inasmuch as truth adds to the reality of a vision the relation of conformity to the [extramental] thing." Even to the reader familiar with Aureol's explication elsewhere of his view of truth, this response implies another question: how is one to distinguish a true vision? Given Aureol's persistent claim that "science has its origin in experience," which always involves the creation of an esse apparens as an object of vision, any claim that there is a relation between scientia and truth requires a resolution of this question. No less significant was Aureol's second hypothetical objection, which expressly introduced the consideration of whether such experiences ought properly to be considered not instances of perception per se, but rather as errors of judgment. This was, in effect, to shift the difficulty but not to remove it, as the object of judgment remained to be established. If, unlike Aureol, one were to consider such experiences the result of faulty judgment, the difficulty of establishing correct existential

69. ibid., par. 90.
70. ibid., par. 91; compare to the earlier version in Boehner, pp. 413-14; and recall Aureol's discussion of truth and falsity, above at nn. 36-40.
71. In addition, see d. 2, s. 9 (II: 514-15); Dreiling, pp. 192-202, and Cova, esp. p. 231.
72. I Scriptum, proem. s. 2 (I: 201-02, par. 92); this differs considerably from the earlier text in Boehner, p. 414.
judgments remained. Taken together, then, these issues implicitly presented grounds for a skeptical epistemological stance vis-a-vis natural cognition, at the levels of perception and judgment. Further difficulties were posed by the possibility of divine intervention invoked in Aureol's a priori argument for intuitive cognition of a non-existent.73

Although implicit, the appositeness of the discussion to the problem of certitude was not, in Aureol's commentary, explicit. He seems not to have noted that, by positing the necessary creation of an esse apparentes, he had raised the issue of whether certitude in the normal course of natural cognition can be established. Nor does he mention the issue in his a priori argument. Here, at least, the reason for what several of his medieval readers construe as an omission is inferable from Aureol's line of reasoning: the argument is introduced to show that intuitive cognition is not a relation but an absolute. To this end, he simply applied a standard criterion74 for determining whether there was any identity (formal, real, intentional) between two things -- here intuitive cognition and its relation to an extra-mental object -- such that the destruction of one destroyed the other.

Whatever Aureol intended, however, his contemporaries and succeeding generations of scholastics understood him to have argued that, even if one could dispose of the indications that there occur intuitive cognitions of non-existents naturally, one

73. See Boehner's discussion, pp. 403-10; Cova, 228-36; and Tachau (1982).

74. Scotus and Ockham each used the tool in establishing identity or non-identity; see also Weinberg, p. 39.
must nevertheless grant the possibility of their supernatural causation. Thus, if Aureol was insouciant with regard to the difficulties he had posed for an analysis of the grounds of human certainty in this life (in via), the existence of which certitude he assumed, his fourteenth-century readers found his discussion extremely provocative.75

75. See Tachau (1982), 203-17.

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