

Resurgent entia rationis
Matthaeus de Augubio on the object of logic.¹

Roberto Lambertini

0. INTRODUCTION

The first studies devoted to the group of philosophers active at the University of Bologna at the end of the 13th century and during the 14th century, known as *Averroisti bolognesi*, were not concerned primarily with their production in the field of logic. Scholars like Bruno Nardi and Martin Grabmann² focused their attention mainly on the theories that linked such thinkers as Thaddaeus de Parma or Angelus de Aretio to the "Averroistic" tendency of the scholastic thought. The contributions of Sofia Vanni Rovighi³ and Zdzislaw Kuksewicz⁴ shared these interests. Vanni Rovighi has edited Thaddaeus' *quaestiones* on the Third Book of *De Anima*⁵, while the Polish scholar made available to the reader a great number of texts concerning the theory of intellect⁶, and tried to trace the development of the Averroistic ideas from Siger to Jacobus de Placentia. In addition, the recent edition by Alessandro Ghisalberti⁷ of the *quaestiones* on *De Anima* attributed to Matthaeus de Augubio aims at providing the specialists with more materials concerning the Bolognese discussions about the nature and functions of the intellect. Anneliese Maier⁸ and Charles Ermatinger⁹, on the other hand, were particularly interested in the Bolognese masters for their physical and metaphysical doctrines. To these two scholars, we owe basic philological results regarding the manuscript tradition of the works of the "Bolognese school".

-
1. The present work is the result of research carried out during a stay of four months at the Institute of Greek and Latin Medieval Philology (IGLM), University of Copenhagen, which was made possible by a scholarship from the Danish Ministry of Education. I am grateful to all the people working at IGLM for their kindness and helpfulness, and in particular I wish to thank Sten Ebbesen for his precious help and most valuable advice. I am also indebted to Carlo Dolcini, Ovidio Capitani and Dino Buzzetti for their constant encouragement; and to Andrea Tabarroni and Costantino Marmo for the long discussions devoted to Matthaeus and the other Bolognese philosophers.
 2. Nardi [1917], [1949]; Grabmann [1936].
 3. Cfr. Vanni Rovighi [1969].
 4. Cfr. Kuksewicz [1965].
 5. in Vanni Rovighi [1951].
 6. Cfr. Kuksewicz [1965].
 7. Ghisalberti [1981].
 8. Maier [1944], [1949a], [1955c] [1964].
 9. Cfr. especially Ermatinger [1954].

Jan Pinborg was the first to draw the attention of scholars to the grammatical and logical theories held by the Bolognese masters. In his earlier writings he focused on Gentilis' activity as author of *Quaestiones super Priscianum*¹ and of a Commentary on Martinus de Dacia's *Modi significandi*²; afterwards he presented the Bolognese school as an important component of the trend of thought he himself defined as *Logik der Modistae*³. Recently his suggestions have found echo in the studies that Alfonso Maierù is conducting about Jacobus de Placentia⁴ and also in the activity of a group of Bologna University⁵, devoted to the study of Gentilis de Cingulo's commentaries on the *ars vetus*, considered to be the link between the Parisian tradition and the Bolognese school⁶.

A particular interest in metalogical problems regarding the nature of the object of logic has been identified as one of the key-features of the school, which pays special attention to the theory of intentions. The "modistic paradigm" has emerged as the framework in which the Bolognese "Averroists" developed their theories⁷. But much remains to be done and, especially, a deeper knowledge of the context and of the cultural atmosphere is needed before we can evaluate correctly the meaning of their positions. In particular, we need to gain a better insight into their attitude towards the tendencies which animated the cultural debate in other universities in the first decades of the 14th century.

Matthaeus de Augubio's *Determinatio de ente rationis*, discovered by Pinborg in an Erfurt manuscript⁸, can be very useful in order to take a step in that direction. Matthaeus de Augubio is certainly an important personality in the context of the development of the school of Bologna⁹. He was the adversary of Burley in a famous discussion about the *proposi-*

1. Now edited by R. Martorelli Vico, Pisa 1985.

2. Pinborg [1967], pp.95-99; 126-129.

3. Pinborg [1975a].

4. Cfr. for example Maierù [1988].

5. This group, led by Dino Buzzetti, is affiliated to the national research group about the history of medieval and modern logic.

6. Cfr. Tabarroni [forthcoming] and Lambertini [forthcoming a, b].

7. Pinborg [1975a], p.43: Dagegen scheinen sich "modistische" Theorien an Bologna vermittelt zu haben. Die logischen Schriften der Bologneser Averroisten sind aber noch kaum untersucht. Cfr. also Maierù [1988] p.19: il commentatore utilizza normalmente strumenti concettuali propri della logica modista, e se pensiamo che in area tedesca a partire dagli anni Trenta del Trecento è avviata una critica serrata della dottrina modista, bisogna riconoscere che qui non spira aria di critica.

8. Pinborg [1965].

9. Cfr. the chapter Eine italienische Averroistenschule aus der ersten Hlfte des 14. Jahrhunderts in Maier [1949a], pp.251-278. For his biography cfr. Piana [1948], at pp.226-236 and the overview in Ghisalberti [1981], pp.41-52. For the bibliography regarding Matthaeus see Lohr [1971] p.338.

*tiones de preterito*¹ and probably the teacher of other representatives of the school as, for example, Anselmus de Cumis². We find his opinions cited often, and not only in the Bolognese circles³. The *Determinatio*, however, acquires particular importance not only because it is a witness, among others, to the activity of a Bolognese master, but also because it deals with the heated question of the nature of *entia rationis*, a problem which captured the interest of many of the outstanding philosophers of the first half of the XIVth century. Referring repeatedly to it in many of his writings, Pinborg⁴ had already pointed at the key-role that this text can play in our reconstruction of Matthaëus' thought, but also of his cultural environment. The present edition, besides enlarging the materials available about Matthaëus' logical thought, aims at corroborating that judgement.

For this purpose, in the first section of the present paper I give basic information about the texts by Matthaëus involved in my analysis.

In the second part, I list the positions about the object of logic criticized in Matthaëus' texts devoted to this issue, trying - when possible - to identify the upholders of these theories.

In the third part, I will outline Matthaëus' doctrine, pointing out some difficulties in his position, at least as expressed in the texts in question.

In the last part I compare Matthaëus' position with that of other Bolognese Averroists. In the conclusion I will locate him in the epistemological discussion of the first decades of the XIV century, suggesting that Matthaëus' work can be viewed as a defence of a paradigm of thought which had found in Radulphus Brito one of its most brilliant supporters.

1. MATTHAEUS' "DETERMINATIO DE ENTE RATIONIS"

Matthaëus' *Determinatio de ente rationis* was known until now in only one manuscript, the *codex* Erfurt, Wiss. Bibl., Ampl. 4° 276, studied by Pinborg and described in detail in his *Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter*⁵. A small portion of the text, about a fourth of the whole, is also contained, although with a different *incipit*, in the ms. Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr., I.III.6. f.57rb-va, where it bears the title

1. Cfr. Maier [1955a].

2. Cfr. Maier [1955b] p.263.

3. Cfr. for example Pinborg [1976], p.81, regarding the authors quoted in ms. Göttingen, Niedersächsische Universitätsbibliothek, Cod. Lüneb. 63, and Pinborg [1982], pp.138, 141, 155, 157 and 163-167, where texts from the ms. Kraków, Bibl. Jag., 742 are edited.

4. Cfr. e.g. Pinborg [1975b], p.295, n.19 and Ebbesen-Pinborg [1982] p.112.

5. Pinborg [1966], pp.152-157.

*Questio est numquid entia rationis formaliter sint nihil*¹. There is no cogent reason to doubt the authorship of Matthaeus de Augubio, accepted since Pinborg's discovery. Nevertheless, a list of available evidence can be useful here.

a) In the Erfurt manuscript the *Determinatio* is attributed in the *explicit* to a *magister Matheus*.

b) In the Firenze manuscript the incomplete copy is not attributed to anyone, but follows three questions which are most probably attributed to Matthaeus de Augubio through the initials

M. M. d. Au.", "M. D. Ag.", "M.D.A."².

c) The text of the *Determinatio* shows, as we shall see, very close connections to two series of *quaestiones*, one contained in the same manuscript of the *Determinatio* at ff.155ra-158rb, the other in the ms. Kraków, Bibl. Jag. 737, ff.133vb - 139rb. The latter is attributed to Matthaeus in the *explicit* and is connected to a *Reportatum super Porphyrium*, contained in the same Kraków manuscript and attributed to Matthaeus de Augubio³.

d) The Anonymous of the ms. Kraków, Bibl. Jag. 742, edited in Pinborg [1982] refers to Matthaeus' opinion in terms which correspond to those in the *Determinatio* and in the questions⁴.

The question of authorship should not raise doubts, but the situation of the chronology is not as favourable. The text itself offers few elements and, moreover, the conclusions we can draw from them are very vague. As Pinborg⁵ had already noticed, the author of the *Determinatio* refers to another work of his, whose title could be reconstructed as follows: *qua unitate sit unum <apparens> a quo sumitur unitas generis*⁶. We know of a *quaestio* attributed to Matthaeus which bears this title and has already been edited by Kuksewicz from the Ottob. Lat. 318, ff.182r-183r⁷. Un-

1. For a first, sketchy description of this ms. see M. Grabmann [1936], pp.241-260; Vanni-Rovighi [1951] edited from this ms. Thaddaeus de Parma's questions on the third book of De anima; an excellent description of this ms. is now available in Del Punta-Luna [1989], pp.122-132.

2. Cfr. Ermatinger [1954], p.42.

3. For a partial description of the manuscript, cfr. Markowski-Wlodek [1974], pp.53-54; but see Lohr [1971], p.340. At f.120ra a short note connects the literal expositio to the following questions: et quale sit illud universale postea apparebit in dubitatione. The text of the first question confirms that connection (f.134vb): Quia dicebatur superius quod universale esset subiectum in libro porphirii.

4. Cfr. Pinborg [1982] at pp.138, 141, 154, 155, 157, as far as the text is concerned, but see also the points in common with Matthaeus' works suggested by the editor at pp.163-166.

5. Pinborg [1965], p.90.

6. See Det., c.II, iv, 0.

7. Kuksewicz [1965] pp.228-229.

fortunately, the *quaestio*, dated 1334¹, does not discuss the point referred to in the *Determinatio*, where Matthaeus asserts to have refuted, on that occasion, Gerardus de Senis'² opinion about the *ens rationis*³. As it will appear later there are strong reasons to believe that Matthaeus is here referring to what the Augustinian theologian had asserted in the third distinction of his *Commentary on the Sentences*. The only evidence that we can obtain from this reference is, therefore, that Matthaeus' work was composed after Gerardus had expressed his views about this issue. Adolar Zumkeller dates Gerardus' *Commentary* "um 1325"⁴, so that we are left with a *terminus a quo* which is not very informative, if we consider the fact that the first evidence of Matthaeus' teaching activity is dated 1327⁵ and seems to indicate that his career as a philosopher had started some years before. One could try to argue that the *Determinatio* must be subsequent to Gerardus' arrival in Bologna, since it is probable that Matthaeus made acquaintance with the doctrine of the Augustinian friar when the latter was active in Bologna; but we possess very vague information about Gerardus' possible stay in Italy (and in Bologna) after 1330, so that this cannot be much more than a hypothesis, although not an unlikely one⁶. As far as the *terminus ad quem* is concerned, it seems that we shall have

1. Cfr. Kuksewicz [1965], p.231: Explicit quaestio disputata per magistrum Matheum de Eugubio 1334 de mense Madii[!] in Bononia.
2. About this Augustinian theologian cfr. Aubert [1984], but also Trapp [1956] especially at pp.160-3 and 172-5 and Zumkeller [1964] at pp.174, 208-210. For the complex issue of the erroneous attribution to him of a tract by Olivi, cfr. Pacetti [1953] and Todeschini [1980], pp.46-49. For his works cfr. also Glorieux [1935] pp.97-98 and Stegmüller [1947], pp.115-116. An articulus from his *Commentary on the Sentences* has been edited in Gutierrez [1947/50]. Interesting references to his ideas in Tachau [1988], p.321.
3. In the question of the Ottob. lat. 318 one of the criticized opinions, which asserts that "apparens est unum privative" (cfr. Kuksewicz [1965], pp.228-9) could, in fact, have a certain affinity with Gerardus' idea according to which unitas et communitas universalis est per privationem and universalitas is quid privativum. But this resemblance is too weak to allow us to conclude that Matthaeus is really discussing Gerardus' ideas. Moreover, in the *Determinatio* Matthaeus hints at the fact that he has refuted Gerardus' opinion about the *ens rationis*. Now, what is contained in the text edited by Kuksewicz is just a sketch of a criticism and regards only an aspect of the theory of *ens rationis*, which does not appear, in the *Determinatio*, as characteristic of the position of the Augustinian theologian. 1334 could be accepted as *terminus a quo* only if we could assume that the text we possess now is a shorter version of the actual *quaestio* discussed by Matthaeus.
4. Cfr. Zumkeller [1964], p.174.
5. Cfr. Piana [1966], pp.7-8.
6. This impression has been confirmed also by Benedict Hackett, who has studied the Augustinian studium generale of Bologna in the XIV century. In a kind letter of 25.5.1989 Hackett pointed out to me that the assumption of Gerardus' activity in Bologna relies only on Perini's [1935, p.187] statement, for which no evidence has emerged yet. Nevertheless, he suggested that Gerardus could have been active in Bologna as lector before 1325 or as magister regens between 1330 and the 19th of March 1333: at that date, in fact, there was, according to Pope John XXII, no master to teach theology at the Augustinian Studium in Bologna. See *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II/1, p.404.

to content ourselves with the rather obvious indication of the date of Matthaeus' death, which is usually placed around 1347¹.

The text of the *Determinatio* that can be reconstructed from its rather poor manuscript tradition, consists of three major parts. In the first one we find 7 arguments for the opinion the author wants to criticize. The refutation, which makes up the second part, is again divided into 4 sections: the last one presents the opinion of the author. The third main part consists then of the answers to the arguments *in contrarium*. The *Determinatio* itself provides the reader with short descriptions of this *modus procedendi*. At first glance the text shows a well organized structure which could hint at a careful editing of the whole². A closer scrutiny of the text, however, reveals that in some points the symmetry of this framework is interrupted by portions of text that show a different shape and also a somewhat different style.

The first and longest of these sections³ consists of the refutation of suggestions which try to put aside the objections raised by the author. Here the form is not that of a structured argumentation, but rather of a rapid succession of "answers", sketching the opponent's attempts to save his theory, immediately followed by arguments presented by the author which aim at showing that even those variants of the theory are untenable. The "answers" are usually introduced by expressions such as *dicebat*, *respondebat* and the like, and are followed by a refutation which begins with the formula *sed contra sic arguo*. Another, shorter section of the same kind is introduced with the following words: *Sed antequam ad quartum accedam, circa primum contra me clamabat alta voce*⁴. Such juxtaposition of portions of text which are closely related in content but very different in style is common to both manuscripts, so that the text of the *Determinatio* that we are entitled to reconstruct contains in itself parts which take the form of - at least partial - reports of a discussion that really took place. Moreover, some expressions as *contra me clamabat* hint at a direct participation of the author in the debate.

Many hypotheses concerning the relation between our text and that discussion can be formulated and probably also the genesis of this heterogeneous text could be explained in various ways. I would be inclined to

1. Cfr. Piana [1948], pp.226-232 and Maier [1960], p.395.

2. This would be in line, at least in principle, with what we know of "determinatio" as a technical term regarding the methods of teaching in the universities; about this issue see Bazan [1985] and Maierù [forthcoming].

3. Det., c.II, ii, 1.2.1-4.

4. Det., c.II, iii, 5.

see in the extant text the result of later reflection on a discussion, *i.e.* the author trying to give a "proper" form to the materials available to him (notes or what he remembered). For uncertain reasons this "editing" has not been brought to conclusion, so that some passages still conserve the flavour - but also some of the carelessness - of a real debate. Once more, Bologna's Faculty of Arts emerges as a center of lively debate about some of the most interesting philosophical topics in the first half of the 14th century¹.

In addition to the *Determinatio*, we know of other texts by Matthaheus in which he discusses positions about the nature of the *entia rationis* and their relationship to logic. In the present paper I will refer to some that provide information about the debate in which Matthaheus was involved and are, moreover, essential to a better understanding of his own position. I list them here together with the abbreviations I shall use.

"Er1"= *Est dubitatio utrum universale sit subiectum in libro porphirii*, in ms. Erfurt, Wiss. Bibl., Ampl. 4° 276, ff.155ra-156rb².

"Er7"= *Est dubitatio quid hic diffiniatur cum dicitur "genus est quod predicatur de pluribus"*, in ms. Erfurt, Wiss. Bibl., Ampl. 4° 276, ff.155vb-156ra.

"Er11"= *Est dubitatio utrum sit dare tales habitudines per quas actus intelligendi refertur ad rem intellectam et que sunt entia rationis*, in ms. Erfurt, WAB, Ampl. 4° 276, f.156va.

"Er12"= *Est dubitatio utrum habitudines vel entia rationis sint aliquid vel nihil*, in ms. Erfurt, WAB, Ampl. 4° 276, f.156va-b .

"Kr1"= *Quia dicebatur superius quod universale esset subiectum in libro porphirii, ideo fit dubitatio quid sit illud vel quod et quale universale sit subiectum in libro porphirii*, in ms. Kraków, Bibl. Jag., 737 ff.133vb-134ra³.

"Kr11"= *Est dubitatio quid hic diffiniatur cum dicitur "genus est quod predicatur de pluribus"*, in ms. Kraków, Bibl. Jag., 737, f.134va-b.

-
1. Besides the debate between Burleigh and Matthaheus cited above, cfr. Maier [1949b] about the discussions caused by Alnwick's Bolognese questions against Averroism. See also Prezioso [1966].
 2. For a list of the quaestiones of this manuscript attributed to Matthaheus, see Pinborg [1965].
 3. For a first description of this manuscript see Kuksewicz [1961]. Part of this text is edited in Pinborg [1982], pp.165-166.

"Kr16"= *Est dubitatio utrum habitudines quas ponit porphirius seu entia rationis sint formaliter aliquid vel nihil*, in ms. Krakow, Bibl. Jag., 737 ff.135vb-136rb.

"Fi1"= *Queritur utrum universale sit subiectum in libro porphirii*, in ms Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. I.III.6, ff.55ra-va¹.

2. VOICES IN THE DEBATE

The *Determinatio* offers rather convincing evidence of the existence of a discussion about the status of the *entia rationis*. Things are not so easy when it comes to identifying the main features of the position that Matthaeus was so determined to refute. Neither the Erfurt manuscript nor the Firenze *codex*, which show major textual differences only in the title and in the *incipit*, present the opinion the author wants to criticize. In the Erfurt manuscript an exposition of a *positio cuiusdam opinionis* is announced, but the promise is not fulfilled, as the text simply offers a series of *rationes* which are presented as the ways in which the upholder of that *opinio* tries to corroborate it. The Firenze manuscript, on the other hand, starts immediately with the same *rationes*, without attributing them to a particular opinion and adding after them *sed ista positio non valet*. These seven *rationes*, rather long and well organized, are therefore the main source from which we can reconstruct, at least partially, the opinion Matthaeus wants to attack. All the *rationes* have in common the conclusion that *entia rationis sunt formaliter nihil*, i. e., that in order to avoid unresolvable problems at the ontological level, one must admit that they do not possess any degree of existence, either as independent entities, or *subiective in intellectu*. They must be interpreted, then, as *habitudines per quas res refertur ad actum intelligendi*, which are *nihil*, because they are founded on a *natura privata differentiis suppositorum*. It also emerges that these *rationes* presuppose the opinion that such *entia rationis* are the object of logic in its proper sense².

Further information can be gained from the part of the *Determinatio* that seems to be directly connected to the discussion that really did take place, although we are not entitled to assume *a priori* that the same person who is the source of the arguments presented as *rationes* at the beginning of the *Determinatio* is also the interlocutor whose responses are included in the corpus of Matthaeus' *impugnatio*. It is clear, however, that

1. See Ermatinger [1954] p.42. This text is usually attributed to Matthaeus on the basis of the abbreviation which can be read in the explicit: Q. M. M. d. Au.

2. Det., c.I, 1-7.

Matthaeus rejects both the *rationes* and the suggestions which emerge from the discussion, evidently viewing them as a whole, or at least as a possible development of the criticized opinion. In fact, in this section several interpretations of the *habitudines* are suggested by his interlocutor, who - pressed by Matthaeus' counter-arguments - tries to define them as *privationes condictionum materialium*, or as "something similar to *privatio* which can be founded *tam in ente quam in non ente*" then as *reducibiles ad privationem* or *consimiles privationi*. The text refers to the interlocutor as a real person, who expressed his views on different occasions, as the words *quadam alia die dicebat* suggest; Matthaeus rejects each of these definitions as untenable¹.

Is it possible to ascertain who actually held the opinion attacked in the *Determinatio* ? The Erfurt manuscript attributes the arguments presented at the beginning of the *Determinatio* to a *magister Erveus*, while the other manuscript does not give any indication of authorship. In 1965 Pinborg suggested the identification of Erveus with the famous Dominican master Hervaeus Natalis who is known to have held in his III *Quodlibet*², that *entia rationis* are *nihil*³. Moreover, in his *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*⁴, Hervaeus defines *entia rationis* as *intentiones ex parte rei intellectae*, which exist in the intellect only *objective*, not *subjective*. Hervaeus also maintains that such intentions are *habitudines* and precisely *habitudines rei intellectae ad intellectum sive ad actum intelligendi*, not positive entities, but "something" *quod consequitur rem ut est objective in intellectu*⁵.

Although I have not succeeded in establishing any textual connection between the arguments attributed by the *Determinatio* to Hervaeus and the texts in which, to my knowledge, Hervaeus deals with *entia rationis*, I am convinced that there is no decisive reason for revising Pinborg's position. Although Hervaeus' theory is presented in a very sketchy way and some relevant features of his theory are not even taken into consideration, his main tenets are indicated very clearly: the intentions that constitute the object of logic are *habitudines* which are not real, but *entia rationis* existing *objective* in the intellect. On the other hand, one should not disregard the fact that Hervaeus does not seem inclined to identify his *habitudines* with *privationes*⁶. There is, therefore, no evidence, at the pre-

1. Det., c.II, ii, 1.2.1-4.

2. Cfr. Hervaeus Natalis, Qdl. III, q.1 (ed. 1513 ff.67vb-70ra).

3. Cfr. Pinborg [1965] p.90. About Hervaeus' life and doctrine see Roensch [1964], Decker [1967] and recently Weber [1984] and Tachau [1988] at pp.86-89.

4. Cfr. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus* q.1, a.3 and q.2, a.3 (ed. Parisius 1489, f.3ff. and f.50ff.).

5. Hervaeus, *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*, q.5, a.2 (ed. Parisius 1489, f.180).

6. Cfr. Hervaeus, *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus* q.1, a.4 (ed. Parisius 1489, f.24 ff.).

sent, that Matthaeus was directly acquainted with Hervaeus' text¹. It cannot be excluded that he was arguing about the opinion which was known to be "Herveian", but in the form in which it was defended by somebody else, perhaps active in Bologna. In this perspective it would not be unlikely that the source of the seven arguments in favour of the thesis *entia rationis sunt formaliter nihil* is the same person who intervenes in the debate reported in some sections of the *Determinatio*, although it has not yet been possible to identify him.

Bologna was thus the centre of heated confrontation regarding different interpretations of the *entia rationis* in which not only Matthaeus and his "Herveian" interlocutor took part. In fact, Mattheus' *Determinatio* also refers to another opinion - appraised by him as *subtilis* - about the nature of the *entia rationis*, that of Gerardus de Senis. According to Matthaeus, Gerardus had maintained that *ens rationis* should be equivalent to *esse in multis quod est ultimata forma universalis et id erat nihil*². An examination of Gerardus' Commentary on the Sentences reveals, in fact, that in the third Distinction the Augustinian theologian held that three aspects should be distinguished in the universal: a *fundamentum remotum*, a *fundamentum immediatum* and a *complementum formale*³. While the two *fundamenta*, respectively a *natura* and the abstraction operated by the intellect, are real, the *complementum formale*, defined as *esse unum in multis*, is considered as *ens rationis* as opposed to *ens reale*⁴. As one can easily see, there is substantial agreement between the short description of Gerardus' position contained in the *Determinatio* and what he actually thought; *complementum formale* and *ultimata forma* can, in fact, be con-

1. In 1321 (cfr. Roensch [1964], p.109) Hervaeus, who died in 1323, was in Bologna for a heresy-trial against the Este, but it seems too early a date for a contact with Matthaeus, who was probably in Perugia that year, cfr. Piana [1948] and Maierù [1988], p.2, n. 5.

2. Det. c.II, iv, 0.

3. Gerardus de Senis, In I Sent., d. 3, q. 3, art. 2 (ms. Perugia, Bibl. Com. Augusta, 87, f.53ra): ...tria videntur concurrere necessario ad ipsum universale. Primum est illud quod est quasi fundamentum remotum universalitatis et hoc est aliqua natura distinguibilis et plurificabilis per aliquem gradum additum ... appello autem illud fundamentum remotum universalitatis, quia quantumcumque talis natura sit distinguibilis et plurificabilis per aliquod additum, quia tamen non sufficit ad fundandum universalitatem immediate, alioquin prefata natura esset universalis antequam [[esset]] intellectus eam intelligeret... Secundum quod concurret ad rationem universalitatis est aliquid quod est fundamentum immediatum universalitatis, scilicet abstractio eiusdem nature ab hic et nunc nec non ab omnibus hiis per que habet dividi et plurificari... Tertium vero quod concurret ad rationem universalis est esse comune in multis per quamdam indifferentiam et carentiam divisionis et in illo tertio completur ratio universalis.

4. Gerardus de Senis, In I Sent., d.3, q.3, art.3 (ms. Perugia, Bibl. Com. Augusta, 87, f.54ra): Concludo ex omnibus istis quod universale quantum ad suum fundamentum tam remotum quam propinquum et immediatum est quid reale, quantum tamen ad suum formale complementum est quid rationis contradivisum[?] contra ens reale.

sidered as equivalent expressions. The universality as *ens rationis* is viewed by Gerardus as an *indifferentia ad plura* which is equivalent to a *privatio*¹; this is the main reason why, according to him, the universal cannot be a real being. This idea of *entia rationis*, already outlined in the Prologue, is confirmed in the 19th distinction, where the nature of truth is discussed. Here Gerardus defines them as *quaedam derelicta ex nostro modo intelligendi circa res intellectas*². According to him, a certain way of understanding causes in the thing conceived by the intellect a certain *indifferentia ad plura* which becomes its universality³. This universality does not possess any reality nor does it belong in any of the Aristotelian categories⁴. On the other hand, he dissented from the thesis which maintained that these *entia rationis* can be considered the object of logic⁵, as the "Herveian" opinion did⁶. For Gerardus the real object of logic is the *ens reale prout est fundamentum entis rationis*.

In the intellectual *milieu* in which Matthaëus' theory was formulated we recognize a trend towards the definition of *entia rationis* as "non-

1. Gerardus de Senis, In I Sent., d.3, q.3, a.3 (ms. Perugia, Bibl. Com. Augusta, 87, f.53vb): ipsa universalitas, cum non sit aliud quam prefata unitas et communitas, erit quid privativum et per consequens non quid reale sed rationis.
2. Gerardus de Senis, In I Sent., d.19, q.unica, a.4 (ms. Vat. lat. 2141, f.137va): ...est intelligendum quod entia rationis sunt quedam derelicta ex nostro modo intelligendi circa res intellectas sicut potest patere ex his que declarata fuerunt in 3a distinctione et etiam aliquid in prologo... /138ra/ ...dicta entia non habent alicam naturam positivam nec sunt in alico predicamento .../138rb/ Apparet etiam ex hiis que dicta sunt quod opinio superius improbat in isto articulo quantum ad aliquid est rationabilis, scilicet quantum ad hoc quia dividit ens rationis [[q]] contra ens reale.
3. Gerardus de Senis, In I Sent., Prol., q.1, a.3 (Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, Biblioteca Albornoziana 38, f.4rb): tertio ut dicebatur est dare aliam veritatem que ex nostro modo intelligendi relinquitur et rebus intellectis tribuitur et ista est veritas entium rationis que consequitur res intellectas ex nostro modo intelligendi eas, puta quia intelligimus veritatem [pro: quiditatem?] abstractam modo confuso et potentiali, idcirco ex tali modo intelligendi necessario relinquitur quedam indifferentia ad plura et per consequens et universalitas. Et hinc est etiam quod ex maiori et minori potentialitate que est in nostro modo intelligendi attribuimus rei intellecte maiorem /4va/ et minorem universalitatem.
4. Gerardus de Senis, In I Sent., d.19, q. unica, a.4, (Vat. lat. 2141, f.138ra): dicta entia non habent alicam naturam positivam nec sunt in alico predicamento.
5. Cfr. Gerardus de Senis, In I Sent., d.19, q. unica, a.4 (Vat. lat. 2141, f.138rb): ...dicendum est quod non solum entia rationis que constituuntur per actum intellectus simplicem non dicunt alicam naturam positivam, sed etiam illa <que> constituuntur per actum intellectus complexum sicut enumptiatio vel etiam sillogismus, quia eadem ratio est de utroque. Nec tamen ex hoc potest inferri quod loyca sit de non entibus tamquam de subiecto quia nec ens rationis est ibi subiectum sed ens reale prout est fundamentum entis rationis. Et ista videtur intentio Aristotelis in 4o metaphisice ubi vult manifeste quod dyalecticus versatur circa totum ens sicut et metaphisicus quamvis alio modo, qui quidem alius modus considerandi non videtur posse melius intelligi quam si dicatur quod loyca considerat de toto ente reali prout fundat ens rationis, secundum quem modus non considerat de eo metaphisicus. Vel possemus dicere quod subiectum in loyca est actus rationis secundum quod per ipsum constituuntur entia rationis.
6. This is Hervaeus' opinion as it emerges from his Tractatus de secundis intentionibus, q.5 a.2 (ed. Parisius 1489, f.181ff). As a matter of fact, a note in the margin of the manuscript Perugia, Bibl. Com. Augusta, 87, f.104rb attributes this opinion to Hervaeus and Durandus.

entities". This trend of thought was shared by several people who supported it in different ways, sometimes in conflict among themselves. This is confirmed by the fact that further opinions emerge, if we also extend our research to other texts by Matthaëus.

This is the case, for example, with the *quaestiones* on Porphyry "Er1" and "Kr1"¹. In both texts the discussion about the subject-matter of Porphyry does not follow the usual pattern of the *quaestio*; it begins, in fact, straightforwardly with the presentation of an opinion and consists, then, in its refutation. Matthaëus presents this opinion in the following way:

1) It defines *universale reale* as *quidditas sive essentia rei intellecta simplici intellectu preter unitatem numeralem et actualem multiplicationem in suppositis*.

2) It maintains that this *universale reale primo movet intellectum*.

3) It defines *universale intentionale* as a *habitus*, *consequens rem intelligibilem obiective in intellectu existentem*. This *habitus* is *in sua formalitate nihil*.

4) In the Erfurt version he attributes to this opinion the view that the subject-matter of Porphyry is the *universale reale prout est ordinatum ad cognitionem istius habitudinis*.

Pinborg remarked that the criticized opinion should be Hervaeus', "even if somewhat imprecisely expressed". As a matter of fact, one could also consider it as another version of what we have called the "Herveian" theory, which is slightly different from the opinion which is attacked in the *Determinatio*. Matthaëus completely rejects this version as well, and not only because of the thesis that the *habitudines* are "nothings". He also observes that a *quidditas intellecta* cannot be the departure point of the process of knowledge because this would involve a contradiction, for the simple reason that in this way the *quidditas* would be at the same time cause and effect of the activity of the intellect².

-
1. They bear very similar titles, and their contents are very close, although there are some differences in the form. Besides that, the Kraków version contains a rather long section, introduced by the words "Sed dicis tu: que est differentia inter universale loycum et universale reale naturale?" consisting of further explanations of Matthaëus' theory, which is missing in the Erfurt version. The author of the anonymous text edited in Pinborg [1982], pp.135-162 knows the Kraków version (of which Pinborg himself publishes some extracts) because he quotes passages which are missing in the Erfurt one; cfr. p.141.
 2. "Er1", f.155ra: primo quod universale reale sit ipsa quidditas et essentia rei intellecta simplici actu intelligendi, et subdunt quod primo movet intellectum. Contra, si ita esset, sequeretur quod ante primum actum intelligendi esset dare [[primum]] actus [pro: actum] intelligendi, quod est impossibile; sed consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis nota est quia per eos universale reale (...) quod primo movet intellectum est quidditas et essentia rei intellecta simplici intellectu et sic res intellecta est causa ad actum

The *quaestio* "Fil" presents us with another position regarding the object of logic. Here, after a long series of arguments *quod non*, an opinion is presented, according to which:

1) *universale reale est vera quidditas et essentia rei intellecta preter multiplicationem unitatis numeralis in suppositis.*

2) *universale intentionale est aptitudo multiplicandi in plura.*

3) the second type of universal is the subject-matter of Porphyry.

4) one of the properties of second intentions is to be predicated *de pluribus*¹.

This position, which is presented in the text as if it were actually defended by somebody², is similar only in part to the one which is criticized in the other *quaestio*. In particular, the definition of *universale intentionale* avoids any reference to the fact that the *aptitudo* should be considered as *nihil*. That the absence of such indication is not a simple matter of inaccuracy is confirmed by the fact that in the same *quaestio*, among the *argumenta quod non* we find two which identify *intentio* with *nihil*, but are not presented as connected with the opinion held by the *quidam*³. As a matter of fact, Matthaëus himself, presenting his criticism of this solution, does not mention at all the problems connected with the assertion that *habitudines* are *nihil*.

Thus the *quaestio* contained in the Firenze manuscript presents another voice in the debate in which Matthaëus intervened with his solution.

intelligendi, sed causa preedit suum effectum, et sic res intellecta naturaliter sit [pro:erit] prior actu intelligendi, cum res intellecta includat intellectum; ergo ante primum actum intelligendi dabitur actus intelligendi. Cfr. the edition of "Kr1" in Pinborg [1982] p.165.

1. "Fil", f.55ra: universale reale - ut dicunt - est vera quidditas et essentia rei intellecta preter multiplicationem unitatis numeralis in supposita. Sed intentionale est aptitudo multiplicandi in plura, vel habitudo ad plura, et cetera. Dicunt ergo de secundo universali quod est hic subiectum, quod probant: quia illud est hic subiectum de quo probantur passionibus, sed de tali probantur, quare et cetera. Maior est nota. Minor declaratur, quia de eo probatur hec passio, que est predicari de pluribus, et predicari de pluribus est proprietas intentionis.
 2. After the usual list of rationes quod non, the author introduces the opinion with the words "ad istam questionem respondent quidam et dicunt"(f.55ra).
 3. "Fil", f.55ra: Arguitur quod non, quia aut esset universale pro fundamento universalitatis, aut pro forma, vel pro aggregato; sed nullo istorum modorum, ergo et cetera. Maior est nota per divisionem, sed minor probatur: non potest dici quod per formam, quia sic est idem quod intentio. Sed probo quod non intentio, quia quod est vere nihil non est [[scientia]] subiectum in aliqua scientia; sed intentio est talis, quare et cetera. Minor probatur: quia quod fundatur in ente et non ente est nihil; intentio est huiusmodi, quare et cetera. Maior est nota: quia saltem cum fundetur in non ente non potest aliquid esse positive. Minor apparet quia fundatur in nihil<o>, ut "nihil est distributum"; similiter in ente ut "homo est animal".
- Item quod non sit aliquid, quia aut esset aliquid in anima aut extra animam, sed nullo modo, quare et cetera...

The opinion discussed in that *quaestio* is neither in agreement with the various versions of the "Herveian" theory nor with the views of Gerardus de Senis.

Although we do not possess any direct evidence the identity of the *quidam* whose opinion is described in the Firenze manuscript, a very likely candidate is Thaddaeus de Parma¹, who is known to have been criticized by Matthaeus on other matters² as well, or somebody who held an opinion very similar to his. In one of his unpublished *quaestiones de Anima*, contained in the same Firenze manuscript, discussing at f.59rb-va *utrum universale sit posterius singulari*, he suggests a classification of the term *universale* similar to that which can be reconstructed from Matthaeus' text. The most striking agreement can be seen in the definition of *intentio secunda*. For Thaddaeus it is an *aptitudo rei per quam est potens in multa plurificari differentia sic et sic*³ and the definition criticized by Matthaeus runs *aptitudo multiplicandi in plura, vel habitudo ad plura*. On the other hand, one should keep in mind that Thaddaeus and the criticized opinion agree that the real universal is the object proper of the intellect. In addition Thaddaeus, even though he does not define *universale pro re* in an explicit way, uses in this context the expression *quidditas* referring to the real universal⁴. Considering the fact that this certainly is

1. For a brief biographical sketch see Chevenal [1988], pp.178-179. For the edition of some of his texts see, besides Vanni Rovighi, Ermatinger [1954], for his *quaestio* "Per quam causam contingat magis scire"; Imbach [1981], pp.330-331 and 334-337, for the *quaestio* "Utrum esse et essentia sint idem vel differant"; and Chevenal [1988] pp.179-191, for *Utrum omnia eveniant de necessitate*.
 2. Cfr. Kuksewicz [1965], p.298, where Thaddaeus' opinion about the agent intellect is criticized, on this critique see also Vanni Rovighi [1978], p.236. As Ermatinger [1954] p.42 has already pointed out, Thaddaeus is probably the target also in the *quaestio disputata* "Utrum conceptus speciei sit compositus" contained in the manuscript Vat. lat. 6768 f.202ra-203vb and in the fragment 3 of the Bibl. del Seminario Arciv. S. Caterina f.1ra-va. At least, this is suggested by a note on the left margin of the f.203v in the Vatican manuscript.
 3. Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr., I.III.6, f.59rb: ...intentio prima, sive sit species rei intelligibilis, sive intellectio - non curando ad presens numquid sit distinctio inter speciem et actum intelligendi - abstracta est per intellectum agentem... Resumens ergo divisionem universalis <dico>, quia aut sumitur pro intentione, et tunc aut prima aut secunda, et quid per primam intellexi iam dictum est. Per secundam autem intelligo aptitudinem rei per quam est potens in multa plurificari differentia sic et sic. Aut pro re, et tunc aut pro re absolute, et hoc est universale in potentia quod est res extra, et hoc est obiectum intellectus, unde Commentator in 3^o huius: "intentiones ymagnate sunt moventes intellectus non mote"; sed hec non est nisi res cuius est intentio; hec enim est imprimens rem [fortasse pro: intellectum] primo. Aut pro re ut per speciem est intellectam aut pro re ut est sub aptitudine predicta.
- It should be noticed that Thaddeus differs on this point from Jandunus, who is acknowledged to be one of his most important sources in this commentary (Vanni Rovighi [1951]); see Jandunus, *Quaestiones super libros de Anima*, I, q. 8, (ed. Venetiis 1587, especially at coll.36-37).
4. Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr., I.III.6, f.59rb: Si pro re absolute, non est ordo eius ad singulare, quia una est eorum quidditas.

not the text in which Thaddaeus dealt primarily and *in extenso* with the problem¹ (while Matthaueus seems to refer to a text which deals directly with the problem of the object of logic²), this hypothesis possesses some probability. Besides that, it should be noted that Thaddaeus also shows some acquaintance with the thesis that *universalia* are *habitudines* which are *nihil*, although he himself does not accept this theory. In the same question, in fact, he presents one *ratio in contrarium*, which aims at demonstrating that *universale est posterius singulari*. This *ratio* assumes that universals are non-entities, because they are *habitudines rei intellecte*³. When, after his own answer to the question, we arrive at the *responsiones ad rationes*, Thaddaeus refutes this assertion with more than one argument, siding with Matthaueus on this point⁴.

Thus, at least four different positions have emerged, as far as the object of logic is concerned. For brevity's sake, they can be given the following names: "Herveian₁", "Herveian₂", "Gerardus" and "Thaddaeus".

Herveian₁:

a) the object of logic are *habitudines per quas res refertur ad actum intelligendi*.

b) These *habitudines* are "nothings".

Herveian₂:

a) the object of logic (in particular of Porphyry) is the *universale reale*, that is the *quidditas sive essentia rei*, as far as is *ordinatum ad cognitionem habitudinis*.

1. Another example of division of the different meanings of "universale" by Thaddaeus is in his quaestio "Utrum genus predicetur per se de differentia", Vat. lat. 6768, ff.230vb-233rb; also in that context he maintains that "predicare de pluribus" is a property of second intentions (f.231rb): "...genus et differentia possunt dupliciter accipi, uno modo pro intentione, alio modo pro re. Sed pro intentione, hoc est dupliciter: vel pro prima vel pro secunda; et <quod> sic possit accipi patet per dicta communiter in loyca, ubi maxime in porphirio dicitur quod diffiniendo genus sic "quod predicatur et cetera" et suo modo de aliis predicabilibus, sumitur ibi genus pro intentione secunda generis et suo modo de aliis...
2. Cfr. the expression in "Fi1" (f.55ra): ad istam questionem respondent quidam et dicunt; the title of the question is Utrum universale sit subiectum in libro porphirii.
3. Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr., I.III.6, f.59rb: Item: ens prius est quam non ente, 9^o metaphisice; sed [[universale]] \singulare/ est ens, ut constat, universale autem non ens quia est habitudo rei intellecte ut finit actu<m> intelligendi: habitudo autem nihil est.
4. Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr., I.III.6, f.59va: ...in hoc tu ponis in re esse repertum aliquid per quod terminet actum intelligendi, quod est expresse contra intentionem Philosophi. Vult enim quod intelligibile per aliquid sui ad intellectum non referatur, sed in tantum refertur in quantum intellectus ad ipsum; unde in predicamentis scientia refertur ad scibile et non e converso; in tantum enim refertur ad scientiam in quantum scientiam ad ipsum; propter hoc dicebatur scibile non esse simul natura cum scientia. Item quomodo potes dicere illud esse non ens, quia - cum sit <habitudo> rei intellecte ut terminat actum intelligendi - habet productionem aliquam per se...

In the Determinatio there is a passage which is parallel to the first argument: Det. c.II, i, 1.

b) This *habitus* is "nothing" and is said to be a consequence of the presence of the *res intelligibilis* in the intellect.

Gerardus:

a) the object of logic is the *ens reale prout est fundamentum entis rationis*.

b) The *ens rationis* is "nothing" and is the effect of the action of our *modus intelligendi* on the *res intellectae*.

Thaddaeus:

a) the object of logic (in particular of Porphyry) is the second intention.

b) The second intention is an *aptitudo multiplicandi in plura* and is "something".

As one easily sees, Thaddaeus' differs from all the other positions because he does not have recourse to "non-entities" in order to define the object of logic. But the others do not agree as far as the role of the *res* is concerned: Herveian₁ seems to exclude them, while Herveian₂ and Gerardus assert that they are object of logic, if considered in a particular way. The use of the concept of *habitus* is common only to the "Herveians", who on the other hand disagree on the role such *habitudes* can play in logic. At the present stage of research it is difficult to evaluate the doctrinal relevance of such agreements and disagreements. However, even the simple "mapping" of the different opinions which emerge from Matthaeus' text is essential for a better understanding of his own position.

3. MATTHAEUS' POSITION

Matthaeus' *Determinatio* attacks what we call the "Herveian" theory, focusing especially on the ontological status of *habitudes*: it should not be assumed that they exist and, even in case they should be admitted, they would not be *nihilitates*. Moreover, they cannot, in any case, be viewed as the proper object of logic. According to Matthaeus, taking the existence of such *habitudes* for granted would cause difficulties in the theory of the relations existing among the elements which are involved in the process of knowledge. In particular, this assumption would transform the relation existing between the act of the intellect and its object, traditionally viewed as being *per accidens*, into a relation *per se*¹. On the

1. Matthaeus seems therefore to disagree with Jandunus on this issue: cfr. Pinborg [1975b], p.293.

other hand, the claim that they are "nothings" seems to make them completely useless: if they are to play some role in the epistemological process, connecting the *res intellecta* with the *actus intelligendi*, they should be "something".

Moreover, he finds the idea itself of *habitudines* which are *nihil* untenable. His position is corroborated with an articulated refusal of a long series of possible interpretations of such "things", in which he shows the incompatibility with the traditional ontological paradigm. The core of Matthaeus' opposition is apparently the belief that the introduction of a new realm of "non-entities" creates more problems than it can actually solve.

But what kind of alternative does he suggest? First of all, he asserts that the interpretation of the *ens rationis* as opposed to *ens reale* must be challenged. Following the example of Thomas Aquinas in his *Commentary on Metaphysics*, *ens rationis* should be viewed as real, and distinguished from the *ens naturale*, not opposed to the *ens reale*. Both kinds of *entia*, *realia* and *rationis*, constitute the realm of *ens reale*, as opposed to *nihil*. From Aquinas he also takes the identification of *ens rationis* with *intentio secunda*¹. After this long quotation, which could contain a veiled critique aimed at the Master General of the Dominican Order, Matthaeus offers his interpretation of this description of *ens rationis*: first of all, a second intention can be taken in a twofold sense, as it happens for the *modus intelligendi* according to the *liber modorum significandi*²— he remarks. It can signify the *apparens*³ from which a *secunda cognitio* of a thing is derived, or this second cognition itself. In both cases, what is signified can only be a "psychological entity" because, as Matthaeus explains, even the *apparens* "*predicare de pluribus*", for example, belongs to the thing as abstracted by the intellect⁴. The features of being *communis*, *divisibilis*, *multiplicabilis* can be attributed to the "thing" only thanks to the activity of the intellect. Matthaeus interprets in this sense Aquinas' assertion that the intellect recognizes intentions *in rebus consideratis*: in his opinion such *res* are things as conceived by the intellect. The first *ratio* in favour of the "Herveian" opinion stated that the *ens rationis* cannot be a *modus intelligendi* derived from a real property of the exter-

1. Det., c.II, iv, 0.

2. Even though the quotation is not ad litteram, it seems reasonable to assume that Matthaeus is referring here to Martinus de Dacia's *Modi significandi* c.1, where we read (ed. Roos, p.4): *Modi autem intelligendi sunt eadem proprietates rei secundum quod res est in intellectu et ut eadem proprietates cum re sunt intellectae*.

3. About the history and the meaning of this term cfr. Roos [1974].

4. Det., c.II, iv, 1-3.

nal object¹. Matthaeus answers that this kind of *modus intelligendi* is not an *ens rationis* proper, but rather a *prima intentio*². This should mean that a *cognitio* can be viewed as an *ens rationis* in its proper sense only when it is derived from properties which are attributed to the objects only as conceived by the intellect, while other *cognitiones*, which are connected with so-called *proprietates verae et reales*, cannot be considered *entia rationis* in the same way.

Thus Matthaeus inserts his position in a complex explanatory model of the process of knowledge, involving the *species intelligibilis*, the *actus intelligendi*, and at least two kinds of *apparentia* and *modi intelligendi* (differentiated according to the kind of *apparens* from which they are derived). Only a comprehensive study of all the published and unpublished sources will allow us to give a satisfactory description of Matthaeus' theory of knowledge³. A first, brief reconstruction based on the *Determinatio* would suggest that *entia rationis* are second intentions which result from second-level reflection of the intellect on the intelligible species. At the first level - that of *primae intentiones* - the "thing" is understood according to some properties pertaining to it apart from its being understood, while at the second level it is understood according to some other properties (like the *apparens commune respectivum "aptum natum predicari de pluribus"*) which result from the fact that it has been conceived by the intellect. In the *quaestio* "Fi1" Matthaeus also adds that the second intention is the sign of the *apparens* and should not, therefore, be confused with the *apparens* itself⁴.

In the effort to gain deeper insight into Matthaeus' views, which are only outlined in the *Determinatio*, one has to turn to other texts dealing with similar problems. At first glance the *quaestiones* "Er11" "Er12" and "Kr16" seem to be the most promising sources in this respect. The titles of these questions show a direct connection with the *Determinatio*, and, in fact, their contents are very similar.

Although it bears the title *utrum sit dare tales habitudines...*, "Er11" consists of a short demonstration of Matthaeus' thesis that the *habitudines*

1. Det., c.I, 1.

2. Det. c.III, ad I, 2.

3. One should not only refer to the texts published in Kuksewicz [1965] and Ghisalberti [1981] but also to other as yet unedited stray questions and to the Commentary on Posterior Analytics, I, which is contained in the manuscript Praha, Metr. Knih., 1324.

4. "Fi1", f.55rb: Peccant tertio [pro:quarto], quia dicunt quod predicari de pluribus est proprietas intentionis secunde: falsum est, ymmo hoc quod est esse signum, vel representare obiectum sub tali proprietate. For "esse signum" as a property of second intentions cfr. also the *quaestio* "Utrum universale sit genus ad quinque predicabilia" contained in the same Firenze manuscript as "Fi1" at ff.55va-56ra and usually attributed to Matthaeus on the basis of the abbreviation in the explicit: cfr. Ermatinger [1954].

of the "Herveian" theory cannot avoid being "something"¹. Not only the argument *quod non*, but the three *rationes quod sic* as well, have parallel passages in the *Determinatio*. The situation does not change substantially if we take into consideration "Er12". The author wants to demonstrate firstly that "there is no thing like" *habitudines rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi*, and, secondly, that, if the contrary were the case, they would be something. These *habitudines* are very similar to *privationes*, but every *privatio* implies a sort of loss of entity in the object to which it refers. From the premises it would follow that every act of knowledge, which creates such an *habitus*, will also imply a loss of entity in the object which is known. This, of course, is not acceptable².

Quaestio "Kr16", then, shows important similarities both to "Er11" and "Er12" and to the major work. Despite the fact that some *rationes*, to which the extant text makes reference, are missing, it can be stated that all the arguments except two can also be found in the *Determinatio*; of these two, one has a parallel passage in "Er12"³.

The comparison of these three texts leads to interesting textual results, and makes it even more likely that all these works stem from the same author. It is somewhat disappointing, however, as far as doctrine is concerned, since only one point receives a deeper treatment here than in the *Determinatio*, namely, that of the refutation of an argument directed against the assumption of the reality of the *habitudines*. The argument, which is repeatedly quoted by Matthaeus in his works, runs as follows:

1) If the *habitudines* were something, they would be either causes or something caused.

2a) They cannot be only a cause, because they would be either God or first matter.

2b) If they are something caused, then they can have either a *causa realis* or a *causa rationis*.

1. "Er11", f.156va: dicendum quod tales habitudines sunt aliquid, quod probatur tribus rationibus.

2. "Er12", f.155vb: tunc sequeretur quod quanto magis aliquid intelligeretur, tanto plus diminueretur; sed hoc est falsum, quia propter nostrum affirmare vel negare res non aliter se habet. Sed consequentia probatur: quia supposito quod quodcumque aliqua nihilitas fundatur de novo in aliqua re, hoc non fit nisi propter abiectionem alicuius nove realitatis vel entitatis de illa re; sed cum res intelligitur, causatur ibi habitudo, que habitudo fundatur in illa re et habitudo illa per adversarium est nihil, ergo oportet quod fundetur per abiectionem alicuius nove entitatis de illa re.

A very similar argument can be read also in "Kr16" (f.136va) in "Kr1" (Pinborg [1982], p.166) and in "Er1" (f.155ra).

3. The first is the argument quoted in the preceding footnote; the second sounds (f.136ra): illud quod excluditur a metaphisico est aliquid, entia rationis sunt huiusmodi, ergo. Maior est nota quia illud quod est nihil non excluditur, sed de se exclusum est; sed minor apparet per Aristotelem, 6^o metaphisice...

3a) They cannot have a *causa realis* because in that case they would be real effects, which is false.

3b) They cannot have a *causa rationis*, because this would cause a *progressus in infinitum*.

4) Therefore, they are "nothings".

In the *Determinatio* Matthaeus challenges this argumentation, concentrating on the step 3a), asserting that sometimes it is possible that a not real effect is derived from a real cause¹. In "Er11" and in "Kr16" he questions the validity of the passage 3a), but on another basis. There he asserts that a real cause can be active either *realiter* or *spiritualiter vel intentionaliter*. A real cause can therefore have a "spiritual" effect. The example adduced by Matthaeus sheds light on what he considers *spirituale*: he asserts that the sun produces a real effect in the mud, by drying it, and a spiritual effect in the mirror, where it projects its own image. As a matter of fact, - Matthaeus observes - the image does not exist *realiter* in the mirror, but *spiritualiter*².

Turning to the *quaestiones* "Er1" and "Kr2", we find a complement to the information obtained from the *Determinatio*, because here Matthaeus does not confine himself to criticism, but presents his own solution of the problem. While accepting the basic distinction between *universale reale* and *universale intentionale*, he suggests drawing a further distinction between a *universale reale naturale* and a *universale reale logicum*. In this way, he can avoid the difficulty which he had pointed out in the *pars destruens* of the same *quaestio*. The first kind of universal results from the activity of agent intellect, which illuminates the *quidditas* contained *potentialiter* in the *phantasma*. The second kind of universal, on the other hand, is caused by the activity of the *intellectus possibilis*. The *universale reale logicum* originates from the intellect which understands the *quidditas* according to a certain characteristic, common to its *supposita*³.

-
1. Cfr. Det., c. III, I, 2. In "Kr1" Matthaeus adds that the same refutation would apply also to the *habitudines*.
 2. Such an interpretation of "spirituale" is of particular relevance if one considers that, according to him, the role of the agent intellect consists primarily in the transformation of something real into something spiritual. Cfr. his opinion about the function of the agent intellect in Ottob. lat. 318, f.173ra (Kuksewicz [1965], p.305): *intellectus agens ponitur propter fieri transitum de esse materiali ad spirituale*.
 3. "Kr1", 133vb: *...duplex est universale, scilicet reale et intentionale. Sed reale duplex est, scilicet universale reale naturale et universale reale loycum: universale reale naturale est nihil aliud quam vera quidditas et essentia rei illustrata et irradiata per intellectum agentem; sed universale reale loycum est ipsamet quidditas rei intellecta sub quadam proprietate communi in qua sua supposita conveniunt, dimittendo proprietates in quibus differunt*.

The *universale intentionale* can also be recognized as having two aspects, namely the *intentio prima* and *intentio secunda*, which are considered by Matthaëus as different kinds of *modi intelligendi*. The difference between the two kinds of intentions consists in the fact that the first *modi* are derived from a real characteristic of the thing, while the second ones originate from an *apparens commune et respectivum*¹. Matthaëus does not comment upon the relationships existing between real universals and intentions, but limits himself to defining Porphyry's subject as *universale reale loycum, non absolute, sed in relatione ad intentionem 2am, vel cui applicatur intentio 2a, et e converso intentio 2a pro universali reali loyco, cui applicatur intentio secunda*². This solution is confirmed in "Er7", where Matthaëus has to establish which sense of the term *genus* is intended by Porphyry. Criticizing the view that Porphyry deals with *genus* as *secunda intentio*, Matthaëus maintains that the subject of that book - and of all of logic - is the *res cui est applicabilis intentio secunda*³.

The present reconstruction of Matthaëus' position is not, however, meant to obscure the fact that his assertions are not always completely consistent. It can be useful to list the most relevant examples:

1) The reader will have noticed that Matthaëus introduces his division of the four senses of the universal only in "Er1" and "Kr1". In "Fil" he confines himself to differentiating *universale realiter* from *universale intentionaliter*, adding that only the latter can be the subject of the *Isagoge*⁴. In the *Determinatio* we read that the logician deals with *ens acceptum sub apparenti communi et respectivo*; the *apparens* in question is nothing other than the *aptitudo* of being predicated of more things⁵.

1. "Kr1", f.133vb: Sed universale intentionale est duplex, quia quedam est intentio prima et quedam secunda. Prima intentio est quidam modus intelligendi acceptus a proprietate vera et reali, per quam intellectus manuducitur in cognitionem quidditatis; sed intentio secunda est quidam modus intelligendi acceptus a proprietate communi et respectiva, per quam intellectus manuducitur in cognitionem rei.

2. "Kr1", f.133vb-134ra. The Erfurt version does not reveal substantial differences as far as these definitions are concerned.

3. Cfr. the question "Er7", f.156ra: ... dicendum est aliter quod genus diffinitur pro re cui applicabilis est intentio secunda, id est res stans sub intentione secunda. Et causa est quia illud hic diffinitur cui competunt particule posite in diffinitione generis, ergo et cetera. Maior est nota, sed minor apparet per diffinitionem generis, cum dicitur "genus est quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie": exponendum est, id est de pluribus rebus quibus applicabilis est intentio secunda, et non debet exponi pro pluribus intentionibus.

Cfr. also "Kr12", for a similar version of the same argument

4. "Fil", f.55rb: Ad questionem istam dico cum distinctione, quod universale potest accipi dupliciter: vel realiter, vel intentionaliter. Dico ergo quod universale intentionaliter est hic subiectum.

5. Det., c.II, iv, 4.

2) While the *Determinatio* asserts that second intention can signify both the *apparens* and the cognition which is derived from it, in "Fil" Matthaeus explicitly denies the possibility of identifying second intention and *apparens* and criticizes Thaddaeus on this basis.

3) "Fil" rejects the definition of *universale reale* as *quidditas*, while "Er1" and "Kr1" accept it, defining *universale reale naturale* as *quidditas vel essentia rei illustrata et irradiata per intellectum agentem*.

As of now, it is difficult to determine whether such disagreements in the works by Matthaeus should be attributed to internal difficulties of the theory and related to different stages of his production, or considered as due to a certain lack of accuracy. Once again it proves necessary to be extremely cautious in reconstructing the doctrines of the Bolognese Averroists, as the studies about their theories of the intellect have already shown¹. I am convinced, however, that what has emerged from the present investigation provides us with a sufficient basis for a first attempt at locating Matthaeus in the tradition.

4. SOME REMARKS FROM AN HISTORICAL POINT OF VIEW.

The materials are still too few and not sufficiently investigated - even at a simply philological level - to allow a thorough evaluation of Matthaeus' theory of intentions. The purpose of the present investigation is to give a contribution in this direction, avoiding premature judgements and providing scholars with materials which can be useful for future research.

Even at this initial stage of knowledge some partial results have come to light. It has emerged, for example, that Matthaeus' problems and solutions owe much to a tradition initiated in Bologna by Gentilis de Cingulo and then continued by Angelus de Aretio.

Gentilis de Cingulo had defined the subject-matter of logic as *entia facta ab intellectu*². e had also suggested a distinction between the different meanings of the term *universale*, distinguishing the universal as *res vera existens extra animam* from the universal as *secunda intentio*. The universal considered as "real thing" is the result of the abstraction of a *quidditas* from its *principia individuantia*, which owes only its *esse abs-*

1. About the attribution of some texts to Matthaeus, see the discussions in Ghisalberti [1981], Alichniewicz [1986] and Kuksewicz [1986].

2. Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., I.X.30, f.1rb (I base myself on the transcription by Andrea Tabarroni, who kindly allowed me to make use of it): *loyca proprie et per se non est scientia, quia non est de ente extra animam, sed de modis entis factis ab anima...est sciendum quod tota loyca est de entibus factis ab intellectu secundum quod concedunt communiter loquentes de ipsa*.

tractum to the intellect¹. On the other hand, according to Gentilis, the universal as *secunda intentio* is a *modus intelligendi* which originates from the activity of the intellect, when it conceives the real universal according to some of its properties such as its predicability of many objects which differ from one another only accidentally. What we call *species* is nothing other than the way of understanding something according to that characteristic². The subject matter of Porphyry is, according to Gentilis, the universal as second intention; in some texts he adds that the second intention is considered here *in comparatione ad res*³.

According to Angelus de Aretio, as well, the main distinction should be drawn between *universale* as *res* and as *intentio*, but he introduces some changes. First of all, he prefers the expression *res subiecta* to Gentilis' *res vera*⁴; moreover, he specifies that this first kind of universal can exist both in the real world (the case of God) and in the mind (as is the case for "man", "goat", "ox", which are conceived by the intellect on the basis of some characteristic common to their *supposita*⁵). This kind of universal can be understood in two ways, by itself (signified by an

1. Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. I.X.30, ff.1va-b: quando intellectus intelligit quiditatem ut est abstracta a principis individuantes, tunc talis essentia dicitur esse universale. Ut puta, quando intellectus intelligit quiditatem hominis secundum quod est abstracta a principis individuantes eam, tunc illa essentia sic abstracta dicitur esse universale, quia est reperibilis in pluribus et predicatur de eis. Et tale universale est /1vb/res vera: non enim est factum ab intellectu (satis enim posset intelligere intellectus quod faceret unum hominem !), sed solum per intellectum illa essentia habet esse abstractum.
2. Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., I.X.30, f. 1vb: Videt enim intellectus, quando sic abstrahit quiditatem aliquam (ut puta quiditatem hominis), quod non solum est abstracta et predicabilis, sed etiam quod non predicatur nisi de hiis que solum differunt per quedam accidentia et in quid. Et tunc ab ista proprietate in illa quiditate reperta fundat intentionem secundam que est species. Quia modus intelligendi istud universale quod est res sub illa proprietate dicitur "species", et talis modus intelligendi est secunda intentio. Modo species est quoddam universale, non quod sit res existens extra animam, sed solum habet esse in anima.
3. In his Commentary on Porphyry Gentilis writes (Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., I.X.30, f.1vb): Modo tale universale dicitur esse subiectum in libro isto quod est intentio secunda causata ab intellectu. In the short tract contained in the manuscript Firenze, Bibl. Med.-Lauren., Stroz. 99, f.55r we read: De istis autem secundis intentionibus est porfirius, non absolute de eis sed in comparatione ad res. For Gentilis' theories cfr. Tabarroni [forthcoming] and Lambertini [forthcoming a, b].
4. I refer here to Angelus' Scriptum libri Porphirii according to the manuscript Vat. lat. 4472, f.4va : dico ergo quod - ut dictum est - nomine universalis possunt importari duo, res subiecta, sive sit extra animam existens, cuiusmodi est deus, celum, intelligentia, sive in anima existentes cuiusmodi est homo, capra et bos et singula talia...universale autem quod est intentio secunda est modus quidam intelligendi rem subiectam comparatam ad supposita ut est principium eam cognoscendi.
5. Vat. lat. 4472, f.4va: nam hec universalis fiunt per hunc modum: videt enim intellectus sor<tem> et pla<tonem> et alios homines differ<re>e; videt etiam eos communicare in quadam proprietate communi, nam omnes ratiocinantur. Intelligendo quiditatem hominis abstractam ab omnibus particularibus hominibus, intellectam sub ista proprietate communi, que est ratiocinari, factura[pro: factum] est universale quod est res.

abstract term like *humanitas*) or as related to its *supposita* (signified by a concrete term like *homo*)¹. Focusing on this second way of conceiving the universal and comparing it to its *supposita* the intellect generates that *modus intelligendi* which is the second intention². Second intention, defined as *modus quidam intelligendi rem subiectam comparatam ad supposita ut est principium eam cognoscendi*³, is the real subject-matter of Porphyry⁴. Jacobus de Placentia⁵ too, will deal with this problem, drawing a distinction between an *universale reale* and an *universale intentionale* and describing the latter as *modus intelligendi sumptus a proprietate ista que est predicari de pluribus*. According to him *universale intentionale in habitudine ad rem* is the *subiectum* of logic⁶.

Since Matthaeus considers the second intention, the *universale intentionale*, as a *modus intelligendi*, and sees such a mode as derived from a characteristic of the thing, he can be placed in the wake of Gentilis and Angelus, together with Jacobus. Maierù has already noticed that Jacobus' commentary on Peter of Spain lacks any criticism of modistic theories⁷; the present analysis confirms Pinborg's judgement that this whole group seems to owe much to the modistic paradigm. The features which distinguish Matthaeus' proposal from the other exponents of the school do not seem to imply revolutionary changes in the modistic approach to the discussion about the foundation of logic. His division of *universale reale* in

1. This is explained more clearly in the version of Angelus' Commentary which is contained in the manuscript Padova, Bibl. Univ. 933. This version shows a complete doctrinal agreement with the version witnessed by the manuscripts Vat. lat. 4472; Firenze, Bibl. Med.-Lauren., Stroz. 99 and Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. D.VI.2649 but is surely more accurate at the stylistic level. At the f.2ra of the Paduan manuscript we read: ...universale autem potest dupliciter accipi: uno modo significatur hoc nomine quod est "humanitas" per modum precisi a[d] suppositis, alio modo ut intelligitur per modum habentis habitudinem ad sua supposita, ut sic significatur nomine hominis...
2. Vat. lat. 4472, f.4vb: Universale autem quod est intentio secunda per hunc modum generatur: intelligendo enim rem illam subiectam non ut precise est abstracta, nam ut sic imponitur hoc nomen "humanitas", sed eam intelligendo ut habens habitudinem [et] tunc generata est materia intentionis secunde, sed intelligendo rem illam comparatam ad supposita ut sic <et sic> sunt differentia, tunc generata est intentio secunda. Per hoc enim quod scio rem illam comparatam \esse/ ad supposita differentia numero solum cognosco eam esse speciem; per hoc autem quod scio eam comparatam esse ad supposita differentia specie cognosco eam esse genus.
3. Cfr. Vat. lat. 4472, f.4va.
4. Vat. lat. 4472, f.4vb. Dico ergo quod subiectum istius libri est universale quod est intentio secunda, non autem universale quod est res.
5. About Jacobus cfr. Kuksewicz [1967] and Maierù [1988], p.12 ff.
6. I refer to his Commentary on Porphyry which is contained in the manuscript Venezia, Bibl. Naz. Marc., lat. VI 97 (2594), ff.1ra-28ra. At f.3ra one reads: Ad istam questionem dico quod universale duplex est: quoddam est universale reale; quoddam est universale intentionale. Universale reale est ut natura animalis, sed universale intentionale est modus [[sumptus]] a proprietate ista que est de pluribus predicari... Secunda conclusio est quod universale intentionale in habitudine ad rem est subiectum in hoc libro.
7. Cfr. Maierù [1988], pp.18-20.

naturale and *logicum*, as is explained in "Kr1", seems mainly to have the function of avoiding an epistemological complication which can arise in the explanation of the process of knowledge, if one defines the *universale reale* simply as *quidditas*. Matthaeus himself points out this problem in more than one text, remarking that in this way the same thing would be cause and effect of the activity of the intellect. He tries to find a solution by referring to the distinction between the agent and the possible intellect¹. The function of abstracting the *quidditas* from the *phantasma* (in which it is *virtualiter* contained) is attributed to the former. Consequently, the possible intellect, conceiving - according to some properties common to the different *supposita* - the *quidditas* offered to him by the agent intellect, generates the *universale reale logicum*. This universal seems to be the counterpart of Gentilis' *res vera*, fitted in a theory of knowledge which clearly echoes the debate existing among the Averroists regarding the roles of the two intellects². Thus one should not interpret Matthaeus as if, by drawing a distinction between four meanings of *universale*, he were maintaining that at least four kinds of universal concepts exist in our intellect, independent one from the other and resulting from successive operations of the intellect. This is the way in which the Anonymous of the manuscript Kraków, Bibl. Jag. 742 interprets Matthaeus and of course has difficulty understanding the distinction between *universale reale logicum* and *intentio prima*³. One should rather focus on the fact that intentions are viewed not as independent concepts, but as *modi intelligendi*. They must be understood, therefore, as modalities according to which the *universale reale logicum* is conceived. We can imagine the *universale logicum* as possessing - according to Matthaeus - a certain number of properties, among which some pertain to the thing in itself, others are attributed to the *res* as a result of the activity of the intellect. The intellect can "understand" this *universale* in different ways, which correspond to these properties. As Matthaeus himself remembers in "Fil", the *universale intentionale* cannot be identified with an *actus intelligendi*, because it is rather a *coaptus*, a sort of "act of understanding" of a different level,

1. It is worth noting that Gerardus de Senis had refuted this kind of explanation. Cfr. In I Sent., d. 3, q.3, art. 2 (ms. Perugia, Bibl. Com. Augusta, 87, f.53rb: Nec valet si dicatur quod talis abstractio fit per intellectum agentem et non per intellectum possibilem et ideo potest preexistere actui intelligendi...intellectus possibilis est ille qui facit universalitatem in rebus et non intellectus agens.

2. Cfr. Kuksewicz [1968], pp.24-39 and 315 ff.

3. Cfr. Pinborg [1982], pp.141-2.

which accompanies the *actus intelligendi* proper and depends on it¹.

If compared to Gentilis, Matthaeus reveals a particular shift of accent concerning the exact definition of the subject matter of Porphyry. Gentilis speaks of second intentions, adding, in some contexts, "as they are related to their *supposita*". Angelus had inserted the *comparatio ad supposita* in his definition of second intentions as well. Matthaeus acknowledges the importance of the second intention for the definition of the subject-matter of Porphyry, but also underlines the role of the *universale reale logicum*. Second intentions are the object of logic not in themselves, but in so far as they are applied to the *res*; presenting this definition, Matthaeus adopts an opinion which had been rejected by Gentilis, at least in his *quaestiones* on Porphyry².

It is not always easy to evaluate precisely what these sometimes subtle changes of terminology can really imply. To what extent are we confronted, here, with competing solutions or only with different versions of a theory, which are not necessarily incompatible with one another? Yet, we can notice at least that while Gentilis and Angelus used the distinction *universale reale* vs. *universale intentionale* in order to circumscribe the subject of Porphyry, identified more or less precisely with the second member of the distinction, Matthaeus defined the *subiectum Porphirii* as an *aggregatum* of the two members of the traditional distinction.

In his essay *A Note on Some Theoretical Concepts of Logic and Grammar*, Jan Pinborg traced the lines of the discussion about the *entia rationis* after Radulphus Brito, whose theory he thought to reveal some difficulties of the earlier epistemology:

From this impasse the 14th century found three ways: the acceptance of an *esse obiective*, different from both object and concept; the refusal to admit any relation of similarity between concept and object as we find it in Ockham and especially in Robert Holkot, who only admit a relation of causality and find it impossible to believe that a *modus considerandi* can affect the object in any way; the third way is that of Jandunus who believes in universal forms in the objects which are conform with the concepts of the mind³.

-
1. "Fi1", f.55rb: dico quod est quidam actus intelligendi, largo modo sumendo, sed non est actus proprie sumptus, sed coaptus. Et ideo in 3^o de Anima dicitur de actu intelligendi ut se extendit ad proprie dictum et improprie; nam actus proprie accipitur a quiditate, sed modus a proprietate.
 2. Cfr. ms. Palermo, Bibl. Com., 2 Qq.D.142, f.76ra: nec valeret si aliquis diceret quod hic esse<n>t subiectum res ut sunt sub intentione, quia hoc modo determinatur de ipsis in predicamentis...
 3. Pinborg [1975b], p.294.

What we can understand of Matthaëus from the texts studied so far suggests that he does not belong to any of these trends. He strongly opposes the idea of an *esse obiective*, at least in the form upheld by Hervaeus Natalis, and does not agree with Gerardus de Senis' position. Nor does he seem even aware of the solutions suggested by Ockham and other "nominalists". There is no evidence of dependence on Jandunus: on the contrary, Matthaëus is favourable to theories, such as the genesis of the concepts from the *apparentia* of the objects, which were refuted by Jandunus¹. A fourth trend, therefore, can be recognized in the philosophy of logic of the first half of the 14th century: it is represented by the attempt, made by some of the most famous Bolognese logicians, to remain faithful to the modistic legacy.

As a matter of fact, Matthaëus' theory shows affinity with Radulphus Brito's views², rather than with the later developments roughly sketched above. Both maintain that *entia rationis* exist *realiter* in the mind, and they use the machinery of *proprietaes* and *apparentia* in order to explain the genesis of a plurality of concepts from the one essential form. Their opposition to the *esse obiective*, too, is justified in a very similar way³. But another affinity can be recognized if one recalls the main features of Radulphus' solution. He had drawn a distinction not only between *res*, *intentio prima* and *intentio secunda*, but also between *intentiones in concreto* and *intentiones in abstracto*, where the latter were to be viewed as *rationes intelligendi* and the former as things *qua* understood under a *ratio intelligendi*. Asserting that the object of logic should be identified with the *intentiones in concreto*, he had tried to define what we could call a "third" level, different both from that of *res extramentales* and that of concepts⁴. He maintained, however, that this "semantical" level had no counterpart in the ontology. In the world only things and their concepts exist, even though the words signify the things *via* the modes according to which the objects are conceived by the intellect. The difficulty to grasp

1. Cfr. Pinborg [1975b], p.293.

2. About Radulphus see Fauser [1974], pp.3-25 for some biographical notes and Enders, Pinborg [1980] as well. As far as his doctrines are concerned see Pinborg [1974] [1975a], pp.49-59; [1975b]; [1975c]; [1980], but also Roos [1974a], [1974b] and [1978]. Also Maierù's [1984] overview about the theories of intentions can be very useful in locating Radulphus' position.

3. Cfr. the short quaestio by Radulphus contained in Vat. Pal. lat. 1086, f.205rb, which bears the title: *Utrum esse obiectale sit aliquod medium quod non sit in intellectu subiective nec extra*: *Ideo dico quod nullum tale ens est, sed de re nihil est extra esse reale nisi cognitio eius vel species eius, ita quod cognitio que est in intellectu denominat rem intellectam.*

4. About this problem see Pinborg [1975a], especially at p.54 and also Lambertini [forthcoming b].

the exact status of those *intentiones in concreto*, opened the way, as Pinborg has shown, to criticism that led directly, as in the case of Hervaeus Natalis and Aureolus, to the idea of postulating an *esse obiective*¹. With his firm opposition to the "Herveian" theory and his definition of the object of logic as a "complex" which consists of the application of a *modus intelligendi* to a *universale reale*, Matthaheus seems to share Radulphus' basic concerns.

Pleading for the "resurrection" of the *entia rationis*, Matthaheus does not simply oppose what he considers to be a wrong interpretation of the ontological status of the proper object of logic, but expresses his nostalgia for a paradigm of thought which had been challenged and nearly dissolved by new developments. Further research will show whether this attitude was simply the barren product of some epigones or did exert some influence on the further developments in Bologna and, probably, in East European universities. In any case Matthaheus' awareness of being the champion of an old, fading tradition, his consciousness of an historical development, together with the decision to contrast it, lend him a certain charm, which captures the interest of the historian of later medieval thought.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

a: Sources

- Angelus de Aretio, *Scriptum libri Porphyrii*, ms. Vat. lat. 4472, ff.4ra-14rb.
Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, edd. H. Denifle, E. Chatelain, Paris 1981
 Gentilis de Cingulo, *Scriptum super Porphyrii Isagoge*, ms. Firenze, Bibl. Naz., Conv. Soppr., I X 30, ff.1ra-16va
 Gerardus de Senis, *Super I Sententiarum*, ms. Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, Bibl. Albornoz, 38; ms. Perugia, Bibl. Com. Augusta, 87 (B.31); ms. Vat. lat. 2141.
 Gentilis de Cingulo, *Quaestiones super Porphyrium*, ms. Palermo, Bibl. Com., 2 Qq.D. 142, ff.73vb-77rb
 Gentilis de Cingulo, *Quaestiones super Priscianum minorem* (ed. R. Martorelli Vico), Pisa 1985.

1. Cfr. Pinborg [1974], p.59. Schon Radulphus Brito hat die alte Formel "res subiecta intentioni" verlassen und spricht statt dessen von "intentio in concreto" als einem Aggregat aus Gegenstand und Begriff oder Akt des Intellektes. Bei Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli wird dieses Aggregat indessen als einen besonderen modus essendi, das esse obiective, gedeutet, das den Inhalt des Begriffes vom Akt des Intellektes unterscheidet.

- Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*, Paris 1489
- Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibeta*, Venetiis 1513 (reprint Ridgewood N.J. U.S.A. 1966)
- Jacobus de Placentia, *Quaestiones super Porphyrium*, in ms. Venezia, Bibl. Marciana, VI 97, (2594), ff.1ra-28ra.
- Jacobus de Placentia, *Lectura cum quaestionibus super tertium de anima*, in Kuksewicz [1967]
- Johannes de Janduno, *Super libros Aristotelis de Anima subtilissimae Quaestiones*, Venetiis 1587 (reprint Frankfurt a/M. 1966)
- Matthaeus de Augubio, *Quaestiones super Porphyrium*, ms. Krakow, Bibl. Jag., 737, ff.133vb-139rb (partially also in ms. Erfurt, WAB, Ampl. 4^o 276, ff.155ra-158rb)
- Matthaeus de Augubio(?), *Quaestiones de Anima*, in Ghisalberti [1981]: 53-227.
- Matthaeus de Augubio, *Quaestiones variae*, in Kuksewicz [1965]: pp.217-316.
- Matthaeus de Augubio, *Quaestiones de universalibus*, in ms. Firenze, Bibl. Naz., Conv. Soppr., I.III.6, ff.55ra-57va.
- Thaddaeus de Parma, *Quaestiones super tertium de Anima*, in Vanni-Rovighi [1951]: 3-174.
- Thaddaeus de Parma, *Quaestiones super primum de Anima*, in ms. Firenze, Bibl. Naz., Conv. Soppr., I.III.6, ff. 58ra-60vb.

b: Modern literature

- Alichniewicz A. 1986, *Matthew of Gubio's "Commentary on De Anima" and its Date*, "Med. Phil. Pol." XXVIII(1986): 21-25.
- Aubert R. 1984, *Gérard de Sienne*, in *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de Géographie ecclésiastiques*, t. 20, coll.799-801.
- Bazàn B.C. 1985, *Les question disputées, principalement dans les facultés de théologie*, in B.Bazan, J. Wippel, G. Fransen, D. Jacquart *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, Turnhout
- Chevenal F. 1988, *Utrum omnia eveniant de necessitate. Textedition und Studie der gleichnamigen Quaestio von Thaddeus von Parma (Cod. Vat. Lat. 6768)*, in "Freiburger Zeitschrift für Phil. und Theol." 35(1988): 175-199.
- Decker B. 1967, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Domenikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts*, Münster/W.
- Del Punta F. and Luna C. 1989, *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, I, Catalogo dei Manoscritti (96-151), 1/2**, Italia (Firenze, Padova, Venezia), Firenze

- Ebbesen S. and Pinborg J. 1982a, *Gennadios and Western Scholasticism. Radulphus Brito's Ars Vetus in Greek Translation*, "Classica et Mediaevalia" 33(1982): 263-319
- Ebbesen S. and Pinborg J. 1982, *Thott 581 4^o or "de ente rationis", "de definitione accidentis" "de probatione terminorum"*, in *English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries*, ed. by A. Maierù, Napoli: 111-146
- Ermatinger C. J. 1954, *Avveroism in Early Fourteenth Century Bologna*, "Mediaeval Studies" 16(1954): 35-56.
- Fausser, W. 1974, *Der Kommentar des Radulphus Brito zu Buch III De anima. Radulphi Britonis Quaestiones in Aristotelis librum tertium de Anima*, Münster.
- Ghisalberti A. 1981, *Le "Quaestiones de anima" attribuite a Matteo da Gubbio*, Milano
- Glorieux P. 1935, *La littérature quodlibetique*, II, Paris.
- Grabmann M. 1936, *Studien über den Averroisten Taddeo da Parma (ca. 1320)*, in *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, II, 241-260
- Grabmann M. 1936, *Der Bologneser Averroist Angelo d'Arezzo*, in *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, II, München: 261-271.
- Gutierrez G. 1947/50, *Magistri Gerardi Senensis O.E.S.A. (+1336) articulus de reali distinctione inter esse et essentiam*, "Analecta Augustiniana" 21(1947/50): 266-281.
- Hissette, R. 1979, *Note sur Gentile da Cingoli*, "Rech. Théol. anc. et méd." 46 (1979): 224-228.
- Hissette, R. 1980, *Note complémentaire sur Gentile da Cingoli*, "Rech. Théol. anc. et méd." 47(1980): 281-282.
- Imbach R. 1981, *Averroistische Stellungnahmen zur Diskussion über das Verhältnis von Esse und Essentia*, in *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, edd. A. Maierù-A. Paravicini-Bagliani, Roma: 299-339.
- Kuksewicz Z. 1961, *Les oeuvres de Mathieu de Eugubio dans le ms. 737 de la Bibliothèque Jagellone*, "Med. Phil. Polonorum" X (1961): 40-45.
- Kuksewicz Z. 1965, *Averroisme bolonais au XIV^e siècle. Edition de textes. Anselmus de Cumis, Cambiolus Bononiensis, Jacobus de Placentia, Jordanus de Tridentia, Matheus de Eugubio, Petrus de Bonifaciis*, Wroclaw-Warszawa-Krakow 1965.
- Kuksewicz Z. 1967, *Jacobi de Placentia Lectura cum quaestionibus super tertium de anima*, Wroclaw-Varsovie-Cracovie 1967.
- Kuksewicz Z. 1968, *De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance. La théorie de l'intellect chez les averroistes latins de XIII^e et XIV^e siècles*, Wroclaw-Varsovie-Cracovie 1968.
- Kuksewicz Z. 1984, *Un texte intermédiaire entre Taddeo de Parme et Jean de Jandun?*, "Med. Phil. Pol." 27(1984): 3-24.
- Kuksewicz Z. 1986, *Un commentaire averroiste bolonais du XIV^e siècle sur le De anima*, "Studia Mediewistyczne" 24, 2 (1986): 61-99.

- Lambertini R. forthcoming a, *Logic as a Science and Its Object According to Gentilis de Cingulo*, in the *Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy* (Helsinki, August 24-29 1987)
- Lambertini R. forthcoming b, *Utrum genus possit salvari in unica specie. Problemi di semantica dei termini universali tra Gentile da Cingoli e Radulphus Brito*, in *Atti del Congresso di Storia della Logica della Società Italiana di Logica e Filosofia della Scienza* (San Gimignano, December 5-8 1987)
- Lohr, Ch. H., *Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors Johannes de Kanthi-Myngodus*, "Traditio" 27(1971): 251-351.
- Maier A. 1944, *Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des italienischen Averroismus im 14. Jahrhundert* "Quellen und Forsch. aus ital. Arch. und Bibl." 33 (1944): 136-57.
- Maier A. 1949a, *Eine italienische Averroistenschule aus der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts*, in *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, Roma 1949: 251-278
- Maier A. 1949b, *Wilhelm von Alnwicks Bologneser Quaestionen gegen den Averroismus (1323)*, "Gregorianum" 30(1949): 265-308; now also in *Ausgehendes Mittelalter*, I, Roma 1964: 1-40.
- Maier A. 1955a, *Ein unbeachteter Averroist des 14. Jahrhunderts: Walter Burley*, in *Medioevo e Rinascimento*, Studi in onore di Bruno Nardi, Firenze 1955: 477-499; now also in *Ausgehendes Mittelalter*, II, Roma 1964: 101-121.
- Maier A. 1955b, *Verschollene Aristoteleskommentare des 14. Jahrhunderts*, in *Autour d' Aristote*, Recueil d'études offert a Msgr. A. Mansion, Louvain 1955: 515-541, now also in *Ausgehendes Mittelalter*, I, Roma 1964: 237-264.
- Maier A. 1955c, *Die Bologneser Philosophen des 14. Jahrhunderts*, in *Studi e Memorie per la Storia dell'Università di Bologna*, n. I(1955):297-310; now also in *Ausgehendes Mittelalter*, II, Roma 1967: 335-349.
- Maier A. 1960, *Die "Quaestio de velocitate" des Johannes von Casale*, "Arch. Franc. Hist." 53(1960): 276-306, now also in *Ausgehendes Mittelalter*, Roma 1964:381-411.
- Maier A. 1974, *Die italienischen Averroisten des Codex vat. lat. 6768*, "Manuscripta" 8(1964):68-82; now also in *Ausgehendes Mittelalter*, II, Roma 1967: 351-366.
- Maierù A. 1987, *Influenze arabe e discussioni sulla natura della logica presso i latini fra XIII e XIV secolo*. in *La diffusione delle scienze islamiche nel Medio Evo europeo* (Conv. Intern. Roma, 2-4 ottobre 1984), Roma 1987: 243-267.
- Maierù A. 1988, *L'insegnamento della logica a Bologna nel secolo XIV e il manoscritto Antoniano 391*, in *Rapporti tra le università di Padova e Bologna*, Padova 1988: 1-24.

- Maierù A. forthcoming, *Methods of teaching logic during the period of the universities*.
- Markowski M. and Wlodek S. *Repertorium Commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem Latinorum quae in Bibliotheca Jagellonica Cracoviae asservantur*, Wroclaw et alibi 1974.
- Nardi B. 1917, *Noterelle polemiche di filosofia dantesca*, "Nuovo Giornale Dantesco" 1(1917): 123-136.
- Nardi B. 1949, *Note per una storia dell'averroismo latino*, V, *L'averroismo bolognese nel secolo XIII e Taddeo Alderotto*, "Rivista di Storia della Filosofia" 4(1949): 11-22.
- Pacetti D. 1953, *Un trattato sulle usure e le restituzioni di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi, falsamente attribuito a Fr. Gerardo da Siena*, in "Arch. Franc. Hist." 46 (1953): 448-457.
- Perini D. 1935, *Bibliographia Augustiniana - Scriptores Itali*, Firenze
- Pinborg J. 1965, *Eine unbeachtete Handschrift mit Texten des Matheus von Augubio*, "Bull. Phil. Méd." 7(1965): 88-91.
- Pinborg J. 1967, *Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter*, Münster/W.-København 1967
- Pinborg J. 1974, *Zum Begriff der intentio secunda. Radulphus Brito, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli in der Diskussion*, "CIMAGL" 13 (1974): 49-59.
- Pinborg J. 1975a, *Die Logik der Modistae*, "Studia Mediewistyczne" 16(1975): 39-97
- Pinborg J. 1975b, *A Note on Some Theoretical Concepts of Logic and Grammar*, "Révue Internationale de Philosophie" 29/113 (1975): 286-296.
- Pinborg J. 1975c, *Radulphus Brito's Sophism on Second Intentions*, "Vivarium" XIII(1975): 119-152.
- Pinborg J. 1976, *Nochmals die Erfurter Schulen im XIV. Jahrhundert*, "CIMAGL" 17(1976):76-82
- Pinborg J. 1980, *Radulphus Brito on Universals*, "CIMAGL" 35(1980): 56-142.
- Pinborg J. 1982, *Anonymi Quaestiones in tractatus Petri Hispani I- III Traditae in codice Cracoviensi 742 (anno fere 1350)*, "CIMAGL" 41 (1982): 1-170.
- Prezioso F.A. 1966, *Il problema dell'unione tra anima e corpo in G. Alnwick*, Napoli
- Roensch F.J. 1964, *Early Thomistic School*, Dubuque, Iowa.
- Roos H. 1974a, *Zur Begriffsgeschichte des terminus apparens in den logischen Schriften des ausgehenden 13. Jahrhunderts*, in *Virtus politica*, Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag von A. Hufnagel, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1974: 323-334.

- Roos H. 1974b, *Die Kontroverse zwischen Bartholomaeus von Brügge und Radulphus Brito über die Frage: utrum genus possit salvari in unica specie.* in *Sapientiae procerum amore*, Mélanges en honneur de Dom J.P. Müller, *Studia Anselmiana*, 63, Roma 1974: 335-342.
- Roos H. 1978, *Zwei Quaestionen des Radulphus Brito über das "significatum generis"*, "CIMAGL" 24(1978): 65-120.
- Stegmüller F. 1947, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sent. Petri Lombardi*, Würzburg
- Tabarroni A. forthcoming, *Teoria delle intentiones e predicazione essenziale secondo Gentile da Cingoli*, in the *Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy* (Helsinki, August 24-29 1987)
- Tachau K. 1988, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundation of Semantics*, Leiden et alibi.
- Todeschini G. 1980, *Un trattato di economia politica francescana, il "De emptionibus et venditionibus, de usuris, de restitutionibus" di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi*, Roma 1980
- Trapp D. 1956, *Augustinian Theology in the XIV century*, "Augustiniana" 6(1956): 145-274.
- Vanni-Rovighi S. 1951, *Le quaestiones de anima di Taddeo da Parma*, Milano
- Vanni-Rovighi S. 1969, *Gli averroisti bolognesi*, in *Studi di Filosofia Medioevale*, II, Milano 1978: 222-244 ; but originally in *Oriente ed Occidente nel Medioevo: Filosofia e scienze* (Atti del Conv. Inter., 9-15 aprile 1969), Roma: 161-179.
- Weber E. 1984 *La démonstration de l'existence de Dieu chez Hervé de Nedellec et ses confrères precheurs de Paris*, in Z. Kaluza-P. Vignaux (edd.), *Preuves et raisons à l'université de Paris. Logique, Ontologie, Théologie au XIVe siècle*, Paris: 25-41
- Zumkeller A. 1964, *Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters: Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre* "Analecta Augustiniana" 27(1964): 167-262.

THE EDITION

The main purpose of the present edition is to make a reasonably sound text of the *Determinatio* available to the reader. The edition is based on the text of the only extant copy which is complete (that is E = Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek, Ampl. 4° 276, ff.141vb-143rb), using the fragment F (= Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr., I.III. 6, ff.57rb-57va) to correct E when its readings seem to be worse. All variants except simple inversions are indicated in the apparatus. For the long part which is witnessed only by E the text has been subjected to emendation in many passages. In emending I have attempted to reconstruct Matthaeus' thought where it seemed possible by means of cautious interventions. In some cases I found it wiser to surrender to the consequences of sloppy copying and phrasing than to rewrite complete sentences.

While the orthography has been substantially respected, punctuation and paragraphing are mine. The boldface numbers of sections are my additions.

Conspectus siglorum in editione et in introductione adhibitorum:

[...]	=	expungenda censeo
<...>	=	addenda censeo
<add.>	=	notulae transcriptoris
(...)	=	vox quam vel litterae quas legere nequeo
[?]	=	de lectione vocis praecedentis dubitare licet
[]	=	deleta habet codex.
<<...>>	=	haec codice nondum corrupto extitisse puto
\.../	=	secundario inseruit scriba.
+album ac+	=	verba "album ac" corrupta esse puto
<***>	=	lacuna subesse mihi videtur
...	=	quaedam omisi
E	=	Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek, Ampl. 4° 276, ff.141vb-143rb
F	=	Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr., I.III. 6, ff.57rb-57va

Matthaeus de Augubio
Determinatio de ente rationis

E 141vb; F 57rb

<Titulus et modus procedendi>

Queritur utrum ens rationis formaliter sit nihil et¹ non ens.

In ista questione sic procedam, quod primo recitabo positionem cuiusdam opinionis, puta reverendi magistri Ervei, qui se ad alta volare credidit; secundo impugnabo eam reverenter; 3° solvam motiva eius, 4° verbis² finem inponam concludens propositum principale.

<c.I: Opinio Ervei>

<***>

1. Dictam conclusionem probat predictus magister³ primo sic:

Si ens rationis esset aliquid, aut esset species intelligibilis subiective existens in intellectu, aut⁴ verus et proprius modus intelligendi sumptus a vera proprietate et reali, aut esset aliquid in se ipso reale, apprehensum tamen per intellectum, aut esset actus intelligendi, aut intellectio⁵ aut forma substantialis⁶ alicuius materie⁷; sed nullo istorum modorum est possibile, ergo⁸ et cetera. Maior est evidens⁹ per locum a sufficienti divisione, quia ens rationis non videtur pluribus modis posse dici ens, cum distinguatur contra ens reale.

Sed minor probatur: nam non potest dici quod sit species intelligibilis, quia species est idem cum ente reali extra animam existente ut vult Averroes super¹⁰ secundo de anima^a quod¹¹ visus recipit¹² colorem quem

1. nihil et] s. l. E

2. verbis] s. l. E

3. Queritur...magister] Questio est numquid entia rationis formaliter sint nihil. Quod non[!] arguitur multiplici medio F

4. aut] esset add. F

5. intellectio] intellectus E

6. substantialis] in materia add. sed del. F

7. alicuius materie] actus E

8. ergo] quare F

9. evidens] nota F

10. super] om. F

11. quod] om. F

12. recipit] eundem add. E

a. Averroes, In De anima, II, c.138 (ed. Stuart-Crawford, p. 340): Visus itaque recipit colorem quem recipit corpus extra animam.

corpus recipit extra animam et in 7^o¹ metaphisice^b dicit quod sanitas que est in anima est sanitas simpliciter, que autem² est extra animam est sanitas secundum quid; modo, sicut est de specie sensibili, sic etiam est³ de specie⁴ intelligibili.

Nec⁵ potest dici quod sit verus⁶ modus intelligendi. Nam omnis effectus habens causam realem est ens reale, secundo phisicorum^c, sed talis est huiusmodi.

Nec⁷ potest dici quod sit aliquid reale in se, apprehensum tamen per intellectum, quia minus differunt que cadunt in differentias mediatas alicuius divisi quam ea que cadunt in differentias immediatas eiusdem; sed nihil unum et idem⁸ diversificatum per rationem potest esse animatum et inanimatum, ergo multo fortius nihil⁹ unum et idem ratione diversificatum poterit esse ens reale et ens¹⁰ rationis.

Nec etiam¹¹ potest dici quod sit actus intelligendi, quia tunc sequeretur quod totum genus humanum esset ignobilius¹² toto genere formicarum. Nam perfecta operatio arguit perfectam formam; modo operatio formice, cum sit realis, erit perfectior quam operatio intellectus - cum per te sit ens rationis -, cum enim¹³ ens reale perfectius sit ente rationis.

Sed de aliis duobus ultimis est notum quod non sunt entia rationis:¹⁴ relinquitur ergo quod entia rationis sint¹⁵ nihil, et sint¹⁶ quedam habitudo per quam res¹⁷ refertur ad actum intelligendi.

1. 7^o | 2^o F

2. que autem] sed que F

3. est etiam] om. F

4. specie] om. F

5. Nec] Neque F

6. verus] om. E

7. Nec] neque F

8. idem] inanimatum add. sed del. E

9. nihil] nec E

10. ens] om. F

11. Nec etiam] neque F

12. ignobilius] vilis F

13. enim] om. F

14. sed de aliis duobus ultimis est notum quod non sunt entia rationis] om. (hom.) E

15. entia rationis sint] ens rationis est F

16. sint] sit F

17. res] om. E

b. Averroes, In Met., VII, c.23, (ed. Venetiis 1562, f. 173 K): sanitas, que est in anima, est sanitas simpliciter, et que est extra animam, est posterior.

c. Cf. Aristoteles, Phys., II, 3, 195b 21-28

2. Secunda ratio¹: si ens rationis aliquam entitatem includeret, tunc inter contradictoria esset dare medium.

Consequentia probatur: quia neutra partium² contradictionis est³ contradictio, sed habitudo media, que est ens rationis.⁴

3. Tertia ratio⁵: omnis natura entitatis secundum totum suum⁶ ambitum est comprehensibilis sub aliqua parte contradictionis, sed habitudo que est ens rationis non est huiusmodi⁷.

Maiores patet⁸ de se⁹; minor probatur: nam contradictio non est contradictorium, sicut vehementia non est vehemens.

4. Quarta ratio: nihil fundabile immediate in privativa natura includit formaliter aliquam entitatem; sed ens rationis est huiusmodi¹⁰. Maior est evidens; minor probatur:¹¹ quia accipiam¹² secundam intentionem speciei que fundari potest in homine. Tunc arguo: species dicta aut /142ra E/ fundatur in natura humana secundum se¹³ aut ut contracta per differentias¹⁴ suppositorum aut,¹⁵ ut est privata differentiis omnium suppositorum. Non primo modo¹⁶, quia, cum nihil nature humane positive accepte sit extra¹⁷ Sor<tem> vel Plato<nem>, tunc species fundaretur in individuis, quod falsum est; nec secundo modo, quia humana natura contracta per differentias suppositorum est idem cum suppositis, et sic fundaretur in suppositis, quare relinquitur¹⁸ ut fundetur¹⁹ in ea ut est privata²⁰.

5. Quinta ratio: omne illud quod per se comprehenditur sub non ente est non ens, sed ens rationis est huiusmodi²¹.

1. ratio] est add. F

2. partium] extremarum add. F

3. est] esset E

4. rationis] ergo relinquitur quod entia rationis sint nihil add. F

5. ratio] est add. F

6. totum suum] sui [[habitu]] F

7. huiusmodi] quare et cetera add. F

8. patet] est nota F

9. se] sed add. F

10. huiusmodi] quare et cetera add. F

11. minor probatur] sed probatur minor F

12. accipiam] accipio F

13. se] sumpta add. F

14. ut contracta per differentias] per differentias contracta E

15. aut] om. E

16. modo] om. F

17. sit extra] om. E

18. relinquitur] intelligitur F

19. fundetur] fundatur F

20. est privata] privativa est F

21. huiusmodi] ideo et cetera add. sed del. E

Minor probatur per Commentatorem, 6° Metaphisice, commento 4°,^d ubi sic¹ dicit: "prima divisio entis est talis, aut esse, aut non esse, quod est falsum² +post+³ esse aut essentialiter aut accidentaliter et esse essentialiter dividitur⁴ in x predicamenta", sed falsum⁵ nihil aliud est quam habitudo consequens rem intellectam⁶ intellectu complexo cui rei⁷ intellectus immediate⁸ non adequatur.

6. Sexta ratio: omnis relatio per quam aliquid refertur ad aliud, non nisi quia illud⁹ aliud refertur ad ipsum, nihil ponit in fundamento relato; sed habitudo que est ens rationis est huiusmodi.

Maior patet¹⁰ quia non habet principium referendi in se ipso, quia tunc referretur per se¹¹; minor etiam patet¹² quia sicut scibile refertur ad scientiam per accidens, sic¹³ res refertur per accidens ad actum intelligendi¹⁴.

7. Septima ratio: si est aliquid¹⁵, aut est¹⁶ causa solum¹⁷ aut causatum; non causa solum quia¹⁸ esset¹⁹ deus, nec²⁰ causatum quia²¹

1. sic] om. F

2. quod est falsum] quod falsum est E

3. +post+] Sed cf. Averroes, In Met., VI, c. 4, (ed. Venetiis 1562, f. 147 L-M): Prima enim divisio est talis, aut esse, aut non esse, quod est falsum et possibile, aut essentialiter aut accidentaliter: quod autem est essentialiter, dividitur in decem predicamenta.

4. dividitur] om. F

5. falsum] esse accidentaliter E

6. intellectam] et add. E

7. rei] intellecte add. F

8. immediate] om. F

9. illud] om. E

10. patet] om. F

11. per se] in per se ipsum E

12. etiam patet] om. F

13. sic] emend. ex sed E

14. intelligendi] ergo relinquitur quod dicantur esse nihil add. F

15. aliquid] nihil F

16. est] om. F

17. solum] om. F

18. quia] tunc add. F

19. esset] est F

20. nec] non F

21. quia] tunc add. F

d. Averroes, In Met., VI, comm. 4, (ed. Venetiis 1562, f. 147 L-M): Prima enim divisio est talis, aut esse, aut non esse, quod est falsum et possibile, aut essentialiter aut accidentaliter: quod autem est essentialiter, dividitur in decem predicamenta.

/57va F/ habebit¹ causam realem aut rationis; non realem, quia tunc esset reale, non rationis, quia tunc² esset³ processus in infinitum.

<c.II: Impugnatio opinionis>

<I pars>

0. Sed ista opinio⁴ est falsa, ut opinor. Idcirco sic procedam⁵: primo ostendam quod tales habitudines non sunt ponende; secundo ostendam quod si ponantur non sunt nihil; 3° ostendam quod si ponantur et⁶ sunt aliquid vel nihil⁷, quod non sunt entia rationis de quibus est loyca, 4o ostendam que sunt illa que proprie debent⁸ appellari entia rationis de quibus est loyca.⁹

1. Primum probatur sic¹⁰: si talis habitudo poneretur, aut poneretur ut res referatur ad¹¹ actum intelligendi ut res¹², aut ut¹³ res intelligibilis ut intelligibilis, aut ut res intellecta ut intellecta. Non primo modo¹⁴, quia solum refertur per accidens et sic sufficit respectus in altero extremorum¹⁵ - ut testatur Averroes 5° Metaphisice, capitulo de relativis^e. Non secundo modo¹⁶ quia res intelligibilis ut intelligibilis refertur per se ad intellectum et sic habet subiective respectum sicut actus intelligendi seu¹⁷ intellectio¹⁸, qui respectus est accidens, cum habeat subiectum, et non solum fundamentum; et¹⁹ si referretur²⁰ per accidens sufficeret²¹ respectus

1. habebit] habet F

2. tunc] om. F

3. esset] erit F

4. opinio] positio F

5. procedam] circa eam add. F

6. et] om. E

7. nihil] om. E

8. proprie debent] debeant proprie F

9. 4° ostendam que sunt illa que proprie debent appellari entia rationis de quibus est loyca] in marg. sup. E

10. sic] om. F

11. ad] intellectum add. sed del. E

12. ut res] om. E

13. ut] om. F

14. modo] om. F

15. extremorum] extremo F

16. modo] om. F

17. seu] sive F

18. intellectio] intellectus F

19. et] vel F

20. referretur] referatur F

21. sufficeret] sufficit F

in altero extremorum. Nec 3° modo¹, quia res intellecta² per se refertur ad actum intelligendi.

2. Amplius, si poneretur talis habitudo, tunc poneretur frustra; probo consequentiam: nam tu non ponis eam nisi ut per ipsam res referatur; sed per ipsam referri non potest, cum per te formaliter sit nihil, et per nihil nihil referatur³.

3. Amplius si ponitur⁴, tunc relativa⁵ per accidens essent relativa⁶ per se; consequentia probatur: nam res et actus intelligendi referuntur per accidens, sed si pones respectum, non solum in actu⁷ intelligendi sed alium respectum in re, tunc erunt relativa per se, ut vult Averroes⁸ 5° Metaphisice, capitulo de relativis⁹.

<II pars>

1. Tunc ulterius probo secundum, scilicet quod, si ponantur¹⁰, non sunt¹¹ nihil, et arguo sic et assumo¹² Averroem in¹³ 12° Metaphisicorum¹⁴, 11° commentog¹⁵, ubi dicit quod non ens dicitur tribus modis; uno modo dicitur¹⁶ non ens quia nullo modo ens; 2° modo non ens quia est¹⁷ privatio in subiecto apto nato; 3° modo non ens quia est¹⁸ in poten-

1. modo] **om. F**

2. intellecta] ut intellecta est **add. F**

3. Amplius...referatur] **om. (hom) E**

4. ponitur] ponetur **F**

5. relativa] relatio **F**

6. essent relativa] esset relatio **F**

7. in actu] actum **F**

8. Averroes] Aristoteles **F**

9. capitulo de relativis] **om. F**

10. ponantur] ponatur **F** quod **add. E**

11. sunt] sit **F**

12. et assumo] assumendo **F**

13. in] **om. F**

14. 12° metaphisicorum] 12 metaphisice **F**

15. 11° commentog] commento primo **E**

16. dicitur] **om. F**

17. est] **om. F**

18. est] **om. F**

f. Averroes, In Met., V, c. 20 (ed. Venetiis 1562, f.129 H-K).

g. Averroes, In Met., XII, c. 11 (ed. Venetiis, f. 297 D-E): Non ens enim dicitur tripliciter. Et intendit, quorum unum est non ens simpliciter, quod non habet esse, neque imaginationem. Secundum est non esse, quod est in materia, scilicet privatio formarum. Tertium est ens in potentia.

tia solum¹. Tunc arguitur: si² talis habitudo esset non ens, aut esset³ non ens primo modo, aut secundo aut 3° modo⁴, sed nullo istorum modorum est possibile⁵, ergo⁶ et cetera. Maior est evidens per Commentatorem in loco preallegato, sed probo minorem.

1.1 Non potest dici quod sit non ens, quia nullo modo ens, quia de tali nulla est mentio facienda, etiam quia est⁷ negatio pura et non est⁸ ens, +ut est fundamentaliter⁹, nec¹⁰ alio modo, quod est contra eos+.

1.2 Nec¹¹ potest dici quod sit privatio, quod sic probatur: illud non est privatio¹² cui¹³ non preexistebat habitus, sed in re extra¹⁴ intellecta non preexistebat habitus, quare¹⁵ et cetera. Maior patet, quia¹⁶ privatio est consequens¹⁷ habitum, sed¹⁸ minor patet¹⁹. Nam quis erat ille habitus, non poteris dare²⁰.

1.2.1 Nec aliud dicebat nisi conditiones²¹ materiales. Sed contra hoc sic arguo: si sic²² esset²³, tunc circa potentiam cogitativam essent entia rationis, cum ibi sit abstractio a sensibilibus communibus et propriis, ut patet²⁴ per Averroem, secundo de anima, 63²⁵ commento^h.

-
1. solum] modo add. F
 2. si] ens rationis et add. F
 3. esset] est F
 4. modo] om. F
 5. istorum modorum est possibile] om. F
 6. ergo] quare F
 7. est] om. E
 8. est] om. E
 9. ut est fundamentaliter] om. F
 10. nec] neque F
 11. nec] neque F
 12. privatio] alicuius add. F
 13. cui] in quo F
 14. extra] om. F
 15. quare] om. F
 16. patet quia] nam F
 17. consequens] contra[?] F
 18. sed] om. F
 19. patet] om. F
 20. poteris dare] poteras dicere E
 21. conditiones] contradictiones F
 22. sic] hoc F
 23. esset] tunc potentia add. sed del. E
 24. patet] apparet F
 25. 63] 6° et 3° E

h. Averroes, In De anima, II, c.63 (ed. Stuart-Crawford, pp.225-6): Et ista intentio individualis est illa quam distinguit virtus cogitativa a forma ymaginata et expoliat eam ab eis que fuerunt adiuncta cum ea ex istis sensibilibus communibus et propriis, et reponit eam in rememorativam.

Amplius, essent entia rationis circa visivam potentiam, cum abstrahat in lacte albedinem a dulcedine.

Fortius¹: numquam est privatio² alicuius in alico nisi prius corrumpatur in illo³ habitus, sed quis corrumpit istas⁴ condiciones ?

Amplius: privatio debet reduci ad illud genus in quo est habitus; sed habitus est in genere qualitatis⁵ et sic de aliis, ergo non⁶ in genere relationis.

Amplius: tunc deberent⁷ dici privationes reales et non rationis, cum privent dispositiones reales.

Amplius: tunc solum de illis deberet⁸ determinare naturalis⁹ qui considerat illas condiciones, cum ad eundem spectet determinare de habitu et privatione.¹⁰

Amplius: tunc in¹¹ mathematica¹² essent entia rationis, cum abstrahant. Amplius: tunc via nature entia rationis¹³ essent prius quam actus intelligendi, cum maxime intellectus agens¹⁴ abstrahat, et abstrahere precedit recipere.

Amplius: abstrahere vel est illustrare, et illud non est privatio quia +sunt¹⁵ principiata[?]+ intellectus agentis, vel est intelligere hoc non intelligendo hic et nunc: <et illud> non est privatio quia hoc nihil aliud est quam intelligere absolute aliquid.

1.2.2 Sed ipse respondit quod non talis privatio que privat habitum vel fundamentum, sed solum dicitur privatio quia potest fundari tam in ente quam in non ente.

Sed contra hoc sic arguo: talem modum privationis numquam ponit Aristoteles discurrendo per cetera significata /142rb E/ que secundum philosophum sunt posita 5° metaphisice capitulo de privationeⁱ;

1. fortius] forsan **E**

2. privatio] om. **E**

3. corrumpatur in illo] in illo corrumpitur **F**

4. istas] illas **F**

5. qualitatis] vel quantitatis add. **E**

6. non] est add. **F**

7. tunc deberent] debent **F**

8. deberet] debet **F**

9. naturalis] cum add. sed del. **F**

10. privatione] dispositione **F**

11. in] s. l. **E**

12. mathematica] mathematicis **F**

13. via nature entia rationis] entia rationis saltem via nature **F**

14. agens] hic terminatur **F** incompletus

15. sunt] posita add sed del. **E**

i. Cfr. Aristoteles, *Met.*, V, 22, 1022b21-1023a8

Preterea: tunc erit¹ privatio² et non erit, cum nihil privet.

Preterea: tunc actus intelligendi ut sic dicitur privatio, cum possit fundari tam in ente quam in non ente.

Preterea: ista privatio privabit: aut respicit aliquem habitum aut nullum. Si nullum, tunc erit privatio et non privatio et tunc habens privationem non esset mutatum, <sed> sicut prius. Non est dicendum [secundum] aliquem: aut rationis aut reale<m>; non rationis quia tunc privatio privaret³ privationem, cum ille habitus rationis sit et etiam privatio per te⁴; non privat reale<m> quia tunc esset realis privatio.

1.2.3 Quadam alia die dicebat aliter quod non privatio sed⁵ [sed] reducibilis ad privationem.

Sed contra hoc arguo sic: aut reduceretur sicut initium[?] ut punctus et sicut unitas ad genus quantitatis aut sicut principium sicut materia et forma ad genus substantie, aut sicut via, ut motus <ad esse> aut sicut privatio, ut cecitas ad visum, aut sicut negatio, ut negatio⁶ ad substantiam, aut sicut effectus ad causam, aut sicut casus[?] et concretum ad abstractum, aut sicut consimile privationi.

1.2.4 Dicebat sicut consimile privationi, quia aliis modis non poterat dicere - ut est notum intelligentibus ut pluribus, discurrendo per totum 5^{um} metaphisice, ubi semper docet reducere significata unius vocabuli ad unum.

Sed contra hoc arguo: si assimilatur privationi et reducitur ad privationem, aut hoc est quia privat aut quia fundatur tam in ente quam in non ente, aut quia causam positivam habet, aut quia modice en<tita>tis existit, aut quia consequitur actum intelligendi, aut quia per viam mutationis acquiritur aut quia negat, aut quia multum accedit ad naturam materie prime.

Non primo modo quod privet <***>; non secundo quia sic diceremus de actu intelligendi vel ymaginandi, qui fundatur tam in ente quam in non ente, ut vult Averroes 5° Metaphisice, capitulo de falsoj; nec 3° modo, quia ut sic omnis effectus esset privatio; si 4° conceditur quod

1. tunc erit] s.l.; ista add. sed del. E

2. privatio] privabit add. sed del. E

3. privaret] in marg. sup. E

4. per te] in fine l. E

5. quadam...sed] in marg. sup. E

6. negatio] in fine l. E

saldem alicam entitatem habebit. Non 5° modo quia ut sic omnis relatio que fundatur in actu intelligendi <assimilaretur privationi>, quod falsum; Non 6° modo, quia ut sic ymago que apparet in speculo assimilaretur privationi. Non 7° modo quia nihil essent fundamentaliter; non octavo modo, quia materia aliquam entitatem includit.

Sed arguo fortius: si assimilaretur privationi, et ad privationem reduceretur, aut esset non ens magis, aut non ens¹ essentialiter, aut non magis non ens, <non> tamen magis accedens ad ens quam ad privationem. Non primo modo quia tunc negatio; non secundo quia tunc privatio²; 3° habeo propositum quia tunc aliqualem entitatem habebit aliam a fundamento, quia da per quod non magis accedet, +quia per quid et unde[?]+.

Sic ergo apparet quod non sit non ens quia privatio.

1.3 Nec etiam potest dici quod sit non ens quod est in pura potentia, quia tunc esset materia prima, quod est penitus falsum.

2. Preterea probo quod sit aliquid, quia quocienscumque ad antecedens sequitur consequens necessitate naturali, si antecedens est aliquid, et consequens est aliquid; sed sequitur per te "res [ut]³ est actu intellecta, ergo de necessitate⁴ sequitur habitudo"; sed antecedens est aliquid, ergo et cetera.

<III pars>

1. Tunc ultra probo 3um, quod si ponantur iste habitudines, quod sive sint nihil vel aliquid, quod non sunt entia rationis de quibus est loyca, et maxime si sint formaliter nihil. Quia si de illis est loyca, aut finaliter aut effective; non effective, quia quod non est non contingit sciri, ut quia dyametros sit⁵ symetros⁶. Nec finaliter, quia aut finis loyce essent entia rationis, aut cognitio entium rationis. Non primo modo quia⁷ finis habet rationem boni, sed non ens non habet rationem boni, ergo et cetera.

1. ens] accidentaliter add. sed del. E

2. privatio] non add. sed del. E

3. Cfr. Matthaeus de Augubio, Quaest. in Por., q.1 (Kraków BJ 737, f.133va; ed. Pinborg [1982], p.166): Sed B apparet quia fiat talis consequentia: res est intellecta, ergo sequitur habitudo rei intellectae ad rem intellectam. Sed antecedens est aliquid scilicet "res est intellecta"; ergo consequens erit aliquid. Sed consequens est habitudo, ergo erit aliquid.

4. necessitate] ergo add. sed del. E

5. sit] s. l. E

6. dyametros sit symetros] Cfr. Aristoteles, Met., V, 29, 1024b 19-20 (Transl. M. Scoti, ed. Venetiis 1562, f.141 F): aut impossibile, sicut dicimus, quod diameter est symeter costae.

7. entia rationis] add. sed del. E

Nec cognitio entium rationis quia 12° metaphisice, ubi movet questionem de intellectione divina dicit "qui curat speculari vilis est stultus"^k, modo nihil est vilius privatione, ergo et cetera.

2. Preterea: illud non est finis quod nullius utilitatis et bonitatis existit, sed cognitio istarum habitudinum est huiusmodi, ergo et cetera, cum iste sint entia rationis.

3. Amplius, de illis non est loyca per que loyca non est via in querendo verum, sed per istas habitudines sive per cognitionem istarum habitudinum loyca non est huiusmodi, quare et cetera.

Maior est Averrois 5° Metaphisice, circa finem^l, sed minor patet quia cognitio nihileitatum non ducit nos in cognitionem rerum et aliarum scientiarum speculativarum. Nam scribitur 6° Topicorum^m quod per habitum cognoscimus privationem, et non e converso.

4. Amplius: de illis non est loyca per que intellectus non dirigitur in scientiis speculativis, sed per istas habitudines sive nihileitates intellectus non dirigitur in scientiis speculativis, ergo et cetera.

Maior patet: nam pro tanto loyca dicitur scientia rationalis, quia est de hiis que dirigunt intellectum. Nam sicut gramatica est inventa ne erret lingua in loquendo, sic loyca ne erret in ratiocinando; sed minor probatur: nam quomodo per nihileitates intellectus formaliter dirigitur et manuducitur in singula speculanda ?

5. Sed antequam ad quartum accedam, circa primum contra me clamabat alta voce: "tu negas habitudines tales"; "certe omnino nego illas". Sed contra hoc sic arguebat: "quicumque negat tales habitudines negat totam loycam; nam nonne Porfirius ponit tales habitudines generum et specierum? Sic etiam certe non est dare locos dyalecticos, qui sunt habitudines quedam".

Ad hoc respondeo quod habitudines sunt /142va E/ alter<0> duorum modorum, saltem connumerando unum modum <fictum>. Nam quedam sunt per quas una res intellecta refertur ad aliam rem intellectam, ut genus ad speciem et inferens ad illatum, et tales non nego, ymmo tales infallibiliter pono et dico quod sunt aliquid. Et probatur: id est aliquid quod est immediata causa veritatis, sed talis habitudo est huiusmodi.

k. Cfr. Averroes, In Met., XII, comm. 51 (ed. Venetiis 1562, f. 336 A): quasi dicat respondendo quod ignorare vilis est melius quam scire.

l. Locus non inventus

m. Cfr. Aristoteles, Topica, VI, 6, 147b5-10

Maior est evidens, quia nihil nullatenus est causa veritatis; sed probo minorem. Nam hec est vera, "homo est animal" et hec est falsa, "homo est animalitas"; sed prima non est vera solum ratione rei et quia intrinseca, sed quia animal habet habitudinem ad hominem, et non animalitas.

Amplius: illa habitudo est aliquid, cuius extrema sunt aliquid, sed talis habitudo est huiusmodi, quare et cetera.

Alie autem sunt habitudines, per quas res referuntur ad actus intelligendi - ut aliqui volunt: tales autem nego.

<IV pars: opinio propria>

0. Sed adcedo ad quartum et ultimum, et est quid proprie debeat appellari ens rationis.

Ad cuius intellectum decet scire quod quidam alii, ut frater Gerhardus de Se<n>is qui de hac multa pulchre et subtilius est locutus, posuit quod ens rationis esset esse in multis quod est ultimata forma universalis et id erat nihil. Sed id non credo et ad presens non recito et non improbo suam pulchram opinionem quia iam ipsam improbavi in questione illa qua queritur qua unitate sit unum <apparens> a quo sumitur unitas generis, etiam quia questio esset nimis longa propter ea que habeo dicere.

Sed accedo ad principalem propositum et dico, sicut dicit frater Thomas super 4^o metafisice super illo capitulo *et philosophi est de omnibus* et cetera, quia ens rationis - ut distinguitur contra ens nature et non contra ens reale, quia ut probabo unum et idem potest dici ens rationis et ens reale - intentio secunda est, quam invenit ratio¹ considerans in rebus, que intentio non invenitur in rerum natura sed considerationem primam rationis consequitur; et hoc ens rationis proprie est subiectum in loyca.ⁿ Et sicut in predicta notificatione quatuor tanguntur, quorum primum est quid sit intentio secunda, secundum est² quod intellectus eam invenit; 3^{um} est quod non reperitur in rerum natura sed considerationem primam rationis consequitur, 4^{um} est quod huiusmodi ens rationis proprie est subiectum in loyca, sic illa 4^{or} declarabo per ordinem.

1. ratio] in rebus add. sed del. E

2. est] s.l. E

n. Thomas de Aquino, In Met., IV, l.IV, (ed. Cattala- Spiazzi, p.160): Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intencionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae.

1. Propter primum est¹ sciendum quod intentio secunda potest dicere duo, scilicet apparens a quo accipitur cognitio secunda et potest dicere ipsammet secundam cognitionem, sicut dicitur in libro modorum significandi^o, quod modus intelligendi dicit proprietatem cointellectam vel similitudinem decisam ab illa proprietate.

1.1 Modo si dicatur apparens, per id [non] non intelligimus aliud², saltem in universalibus, nisi aptitudinem predicandi de pluribus differentibus sic et sic et tale est ens rationis. Ratio est: nam sicut se habet ens naturale ad naturam³ et ens artificiale ad artem, sic ens rationis ad rationem et intellectum; sed ens naturale sic se habet ad naturam quod appellatur naturale quia a natura dependet et quia actum nature consequitur, ergo ens rationis sic se habet ad rationem quod appellatur ens rationis quia a ratione dependet et actum rationis consequitur.

Tunc ultra apparens de<pend>et a ratione et <act>um rationis consequitur⁴, quod probatur: nam illud aut est ex⁵ natura rei aut consequitur et accidit rei iam abstracte. Non primo modo, nec actualiter nec potentialiter. Non actualiter: nam illud quod de natura rei determinatur necessario ad unum ex natura rei non est in potentia ad reliquum; sed quidditas rei materialis est in potentia ad esse divisum in multis; nec potentialiter ex natura solum, quia id quod non est in potentia nisi mediante actu intelligendi, sic se habet quod non est in potentia⁶ ad illud <solum> ex natura rei; sed ita est, quare et cetera. Sed probo minorem: nam ante actum intelligendi nihil est in re quod possit esse immediatum fundamentum istius apparentis et consequentis Si autem accadat rei abstracte et iam intellecte per primam intentionem habeo propositum.

1.2 Si autem intentio secunda dicat secundam cognitionem, iterum est ens rationis distinctum contra ens nature acquisitum per verum motum et veram transmutationem phisicam et naturalem et non contra ens reale, cum sit res⁷ de transcendentibus; et ratio est: iste effectus <magis> debet

1. est] s. l. E

2. aliud] quam add. sed del. E

3. naturam] emend. ex: naturalem E

4. Tunc...consequitur] in marg. E

5. ex] ex: a emend. E

6. potentia] ex add. sed del. E

7. res] s. l. E

o. Cfr. Martinus de Dacia, *Modi significandi*, c.1 (ed. Roos, p. 4): Modi autem intelligendi sunt eadem proprietates rei secundum quod res est in intellectu et ut eadem proprietates cum re sunt intellectae (in apparatu: intellectae] cointellectae).

dici rationis, cuius causa productiva immediate est ens rationis quam cuius causa receptiva est ratio; sed talis intentio secunda est huiusmodi, ideo et cetera.

Maiores patet per ea que dicta sunt; sed minor probatur: nam causa productiva est illa habitudo¹, sed receptiva intellectus; tunc oportet intelligere quod illud apparens non appellatur secundum quia sit secunda proprietas solum, quia una proprietas realis et naturalis potest dici secunda respectu² alterius proprietatis realis et naturalis, sed appellatur <sic> quia est post omnem proprietatem realem naturalem et phisicam.

2. Sed adcedo ad secundum declarandum, scilicet quod intellectus eam invenit in rebus et quomodo. Propter quod oportet intelligere quod sicut intellectus antequam recipiat speciem intelligibilem ab intellectu et antequam intelligat eam, non assimilatur rei intellecte³, sed recepta specie <ab> intellectu et re intellecta, tunc assimilatur rei intellecte ut dicit Philosophus 3^o De anima et Averroes in commento 54^{to} P - et cum similitudo sit relatio equiparantie et mutua, cum sit primo modo relativorum, in quo est relatio in utroque extremorum -, cum res intellecta et intellectus assimilantur, e converso <res> similis intellectui efficitur actualiter intelligenti ipsam; et sic in re intellecta subiective est similitudo, quod probatur: nam nihil simile alicui est nisi illud sit simile sibi, quia nihil est simile illi quod est sibi dissimile.

Si ergo intellectus actualiter /142vb E/ intelligens est similis rei intellecte, oportet e converso⁴ rem assimilari intellectui et subiective habere similitudinem. Tunc ultra sicut per actum intelligendi accidit rei intellecte similitudo, sic, quia a simili, per actum intelligendi accidit rei abstracte et intellecte aptitudo et accidit quod <fiat> divisibilis et communis et sic multiplicabilis in plura.

1. habitudo] fortasse pro: aptitudo

2. respectu] tamen scripsit E

3. intellecte] intellectui scripsit E

4. converso] intellectum add. sed del. E

p. **Locus non inventus. Sed cfr. Averroes, In De anima, II, comm. 54 (ed. Stuart Crawford, p.213):** Deinde dixit "Et ideo pati quandoque est a simili etc.", id est, et quia esse virtutum passivarum est admixtum ex potentia et actu, passivum enim antequam patiat, est contrarium agenti et, cum passio completur, est simili agenti et dum patitur est admixtum ex simili et contrario; non enim cessat, dum movetur, corrumpi in eo pars contrarii et fieri pars similis.

Et quod ista aptitudo sit aliquid est notum quia sue cause immediate sunt aliquid; etiam quia aptitudo ista[?] est immediata causa effectus positivi, ut actus predicandi et conceptus et veritatis propositionis.

3. Tunc circa dicta insurgere posset dubium, tamen obmicta[n]tur 3^m; et iam apparet ex primo et secundo, scilicet quod non reperiatur in rerum natura, sed actum rationis consequitur et idcirco obmictatur.

4. Sed accedo ad quartum et ultimum declarandum, videlicet quod sit illud de quo est loyca formaliter: nam scribitur 4^o Metaphisice^q quod circa idem versantur dyalecticus et metaphisicus et sophista; sed metaphisicus circa ens, ergo et loycus. Modo tunc ultra: si versatur circa ens, aut circa ens¹ in eo quod ens, quod falsum est, quia tunc non differret a methaphisico, aut circa ens acceptum sub vera proprietate naturali: sic non differret a naturali, quod falsum est, aut acceptum sub illa habitudine, quod falsum est, sicut iam probatum fuit supra, ergo acceptum sub illo² apparenti communi³ respectivo, quod est aptum natum⁴ predicari de pluribus saltem in universalibus.

<c.III: SOLUTIONES AD RATIONES>

<Ad primam>

3^o accedo ad solvenda motiva; primo ad primam rationem, sive ad primum membrum rationis.

1. Cum dicitur "aut esset⁵ species intelligibilis", dicendum quod est visum (...), quia ad apparens non est species intelligibilis, licet quo ad cognitionem possit esse species intelligibilis, saltem secundum ponentes quod species intelligibilis et actus intelligendi sint idem.

Nec valet ad probationem suam, cum dicatur quod species⁶ et vera[?] similitudo rei est eiusdem essentie cum re a qua desciditur et eiusdem speciei; quod probatur multipliciter:

1. ens] acceptum sub vera add. sed del. E

2. illo] ex: illa emend. E

3. communi] quod est add. sed del. E

4. aptum natum est] scripsit E

5. esset] in fine l. E

6. species] intelligibilis add. sed del. E

q. Aristoteles, Met. IV, 4, 1004 b 17-25.

1.1 Primo sic: illa quorum unum est eternum et alterum generabile et corruptibile non sunt [sunt] eiusdem speciei; sed sol et similitudo eius causata in speculo sive in (...) est huiusmodi.

Maior est Aristotelis primo Metaphisice^r; sed minor probatur: nam sol et totum corpus celeste est eternum, ut probatum est primo Celi et mundi;^s et species intelligibilis est corruptibilis, cum de novo acquiratur ab intellectu, ut patet per Averroem 3° De anima commento quinto^t.

Amplius, que habent diversum modum generationis non sunt eiusdem speciei, ut patet per Philosophum primo De generatione animalium^u, de animalibus <qui> generantur per viam coitus et per viam putrefactionis; sed capra et similitudo capre sunt huiusmodi¹: nam capra <generatur> per verum motum phisicum et naturalem, sed similitudo per viam cuiusdam +proventus+ et immutacionis.

Amplius, que habent diversum modum essendi proprium secundum speciem non sunt eiusdem speciei, sed res et similitudo intelligibilis sunt huiusmodi: maior et minor patent intelligentibus.

Amplius: que non² possunt in eandem operationem³ secundum speciem non sunt eiusdem speciei, sed capra et similitudo sua sunt huiusmodi: nam capra caprizat, similitudo sua non.

Amplius: si sic, tunc due forme substantiales essent in eadem portione materie. Nam (...) (...) est anima cogitativa que est forma substantialis. Item similitudo substantie que per te [[est]] +est substantia cogitativa dist(...)ant per (...) (...) cathegoricarum+, ut vult Averroes secundo De anima, commento 63°.^v

Amplius que differunt genere non sunt eiusdem speciei; sed scientia sive cognitio sive similitudo rei et res sunt huiusmodi; maior est nota, sed minor est Aristotelis, 4° Metaphisice^w, qui reddens causam quare inter

1. huiusmodi] ideo et cetera add. sed del. E

2. non] sunt add. sed del. E

3. operationem] opinionem E

r. Potius Aristoteles, Met., X, 10, 1058b25-30.

s. Aristoteles, De coelo, I.10, 279b5-280a30.

t. Cfr. Averroes, In De anima, III, c. 5, (ed. Stuart Crawford, pp.391-392): Et ideo necesse est, si iste intentiones que sunt in anima fuerint generabilium et corruptibilium, ut ille etiam sint generabiles et corruptibiles.

u. Cfr. Aristoteles, De generatione animalium, I, 1, 715b1-7.

v. Locus non inventus

w. Cfr. potius Aristoteles, Met. X, 7, 1057a35-1057b1

relativa per accidens non est medium, dicit quod non sunt in eodem genere, ut scientia et scibile.

1.2. Tunc ad auctoritates commenti; cum dicit quod visus recipit colorem quem corpus extra animam recipit, dico quod debeat exponi quod¹ recipit visus similitudine colorem solum. Quod patet: nam dicit Averroes 2° De anima, commento 138°, ^{2x} quod visus recipit colorem et subdit quod differt in hoc, quod receptio rei sentientis non est materialis et receptio coloris extra animam est materialis; tunc arguo: si receptio differt secundum speciem, et cetera.

Item subdit: cum sensibilia fiunt abstracta a materia, efficiuntur in sensibus sensus et ymaginationes, et non³ colores sensibiles nec sapes.

Preterea: Averroes 2° De anima, commento 62°, ^y dicit quod visus natus est perfici per⁴ intentiones rerum sensibilibus et non per res sensibiles, et si hoc non esset, tunc esse coloris in corpore et in visu esset idem; sed hoc est falsum, ut⁵ subdit, quia tunc esse eius in visu non esset comprehensio.

Preterea: Averroes 2° De anima, commento 121°, ^z dicit quod intentio colorum alia est et cetera.

Ad secundam auctoritatem commenti 7ⁱ <Metaphisice>^{aa} respondeo quod sanitatem esse in anima potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo obiective, secundo modo subiective. Modo Averroes loquitur de sanitate que est in anima obiective et non subiective, et ratio est: quia si hoc non esset, tunc effectus esset maioris entitatis quam sua causa. Probatur consequentia:

1. quod] visus add. sed del. E

2. 138°] 13 scripsit E

3. non] s. l. E

4. per] s. l. E

5. ut] dicit add. sed del. E

x. Averroes, In De anima, II, c. 138 (ed. Stuart Crawford, p. 340): Visus itaque recipit colorem quem recipit corpus extra animam; sed differunt in hoc quod receptio sentientis est non materialis et receptio corporis extra animam est materialis. Deinde dixit: quidlibet quodlibet. Idest, sentiens enim recipit sensibile non materialiter, quilibet sensuum quodlibet sensibilibus. Et quia sensus recipiunt sensibilia quoquo modo, dicuntur etiam de eis quoquo modo. Deinde dixit: et ideo, cum fuerint sensibilia abstracta etc. Idest, et quia sensus recipiunt sensibilia extra materiam efficiuntur in sentientibus sensus et ymaginationes, non colores sensibiles neque sapes.

y. Averroes, In De anima, II, c. 62 (ed. Stuart Crawford, p. 223): ...idest illud quod innatum est perfici per intentiones rerum sensibilibus, non per ipsas res sensibiles. Et si non, tunc esse coloris in visu et in corpore esset idem, et si ita esset, tunc esse eius in visu non esset comprehensio.

z. Averroes, In De anima, II, c. 121, (ed. Stuart Crawford p. 317): intentio enim coloris alia est a colore.

aa. Vide adnotationem "b"

nam similitudo sanitatis que est in anima subjective deciditur a sanitate que est in re extra.

2. Tunc iterum (...) ad secundum membrum prime rationis vado; cum dicitur quod non potest esse verus modus intelligendi acceptus a vera proprietate reali, dico sine dubio quod talis intentio prima non potest dici ita proprie ens rationis sicut secunda; tamen bene potest dici ens rationis ut distinguitur contra ens acquisitum per motum verum et proprium et phisicum. Nec valet probatio; cum dicitur "effectus habens causam realem est ens reale, quia omne quod fit, fit a sibi simili", dicendum quod aliquid esse ens reale potest¹ sumi² dupliciter.

Uno modo reale quod aliquam entitatem includat et ut distinguitur contra nihil, et ut sic propositio est vera, quia effectus habens ut[?] sic causam et cetera, et isto modo ens rationis potest dici ens reale, ut infra patebit.

Alio modo dicitur ens reale quia est phisicum, materiale et naturale et omnino distinctum contra opus intellectus, et isto modo propositio non est vera, nisi conditio nature sit habens causam realem, realiter agentem. Et ratio: nam sicut dicit Averroes secundo De anima, 121° ³ commento et Aristoteles in eodem loco, quod visum pati a colore /f.143ra/ et auditum pati a sono potest intelligi dupliciter, uno modo secundum quod color et sonus, alio modo secundum naturam passi, ut visus et auditus. Primo modo non est verum, quia tunc quod reciperet ipsum esset coloratum, quod est falsum; sed secundo modo est verum; sic in proposito dico quod si obiective ageret secundum intellectum secundum sui naturam et phisice et non secundum naturam passi et intellectus, bene iste effectus esset naturalis et phisicus.

Et cum dicitur "omne quod fit, fit a sibi simili", dicendum quod istud debet sane intelligi sicut dicit Philosophus 7° Metaphisice^{bb} et id debet sic exponi, quod effectum assimilari principio productivo potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo in forma, alio modo in virtute.

Si in forma, tunc dicitur uno modo in forma tota aut in parte forme. Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter: aut in forma et modo essendi forme, aut in forma solum. Si in forma et modo essendi forme, sic est sicut homo generat hominem et solum asinus asinum. Si in forma solum, sic est sicut

1. potest] s. l. E

2. sumi] ex: sumitur emend. E

3. 121 °] 12 scripsit E

bb. Cfr. Aristoteles, Met., VII, 7, 1032a12-1033a23.

cultellus qui est extra assimilatur cultello qui est in mente artificis obiective vel subiective secundum similitudinem. Si in parte forme, sic est sicut quando caliditas causat sanitatem et intelligendum est in concreto.

Si autem in virtute, hoc est dupliciter: quia aut in virtute tota, aut in parte virtutis. Si primo modo, sic est sicut quidam piscis qui appellatur¹ stupor: stupefacit manum piscantis. Si in parte virtutis, sic est sicut quando motus causat sanitatem; dicendum quod propositio predicta potest sumi variis modis que sic absolute profertur.

2.1.1 Sed contra quoddam dictum sic insto probando quod causa realis qualiscumque sumatur producit effectum <realem> et non intentionalem.

Primo sic: quia tunc non esset proportio inter causam et effectum, quod est contra Philosophum secundo Phisicorum.^{cc}

Preterea: si effectus procedens a causa reali esset intentionalis aut haberet intentionalitatem a se ipso aut a causa; non a se ipso, quia nondum est, nec a causa, quia intentionalis non est.

Preterea: tunc unum et idem diceretur reale et non reale respectu eiusdem, ut causa non dicitur realis nisi quia producit effectum realem; si ergo effectus est intentionalis, causa non erit realis, sed ponebatur realis.

Preterea: sicut se habet causa intentionalis ad effectum realem, ita causa realis ad effectum intentionalem; sed causa intentionalis non producit effectum realem, quia effectus non est maioris entitatis quam sua causa.

Preterea: tunc non poneremus aliquem effectum esse realem nisi per esse intentionale.

Preterea, omnis causa realis aut agit realiter, aut intentionaliter. Si realiter, habeo propositum. Si intentionaliter, hoc non est possibile, quia omne quod agit, agit secundum modum essendi sue nature et sue forme, cum modus rei sequatur rem. Sed sua natura est realis, ergo eius modus agendi.

2.1.2 Ad ista omnia breviter dico quod intelligenti levia sunt.

Ad primum dicendum quod est proportio ratione passi.

Ad secundum dicendum quod habet intentionalitatem a passo.

Ad 3um dicendum quod ille effectus non habet intentionalitatem ratione cause productive, sed ratione cause receptive.

1. appellatur] emend. in marg. ex vocatur E

cc. Cfr. Aristoteles, *Physic.*, II, 3, 195b 21-28.

Ad quartum dicendum quod intentionalis causa virtute alterius producit effectum realem, ut species calidi calefacit, ut dicit Philosophus in *De motu animalium*.^{dd} Ad quintum et <ad> ultimum dicendum quod agit intentionaliter. Et cum dicitur quod omne agens agit secundum suam naturam et modum essendi sue forme, dicendum quod hoc semper non est verum, sed aliquando ratione passi et secundum dispositionem passi.

3. Tunc iterum accedo ad rationem principalem¹ primam, sed quo ad tertium² membrum. Quando dicitur "nec potest et cetera"; dico quod sit aliquid in 'se' reale, apprehensum tamen per intellectum.

Dico quod ymmo, nec valet probatio; cum dicitur "minus differunt que cadunt in differentias mediatas quam que cadunt in differentias immediatas", conceditur; et cum dicitur "nihil³ unum et idem diversificatum ratione⁴ potest esse animatum et inanimatum", conceditur. Et cum dicitur "ergo nihil unum et idem diversificatum ratione potest esse ens reale et ens rationis", nego; ad probationem quod reale et rationis sint differentie immediate ipsius entis, nego; et tu probas quia dicis quod Philosophus 5° et 6° Metaphisice, capitulo de ente <dicat hoc>. Nego - quia satis poteris volvere et revolvere - quod Philosophus in 5° et 6° Metaphisice dividat sic ens: aliud reale, aliud rationis.

Sed dicis: "hec est divisio famosa". Dico quod si ista divisio sic intelligatur, quod entis aliud reale, naturale, materiale, phisicum et extra <animam> realiter, et aliud rationis, id est, spirituale, intentionale, intellectuale et subiective in anima, seu consequens actum anime, sic dividit ens immediate et tales differentie[?] non coincidunt. Si sumatur reale ut entitatem includit omnem, nego et pervertat qui pervertere poterit.

4. Sed tunc accedo ad quartum membrum prime rationis. "Nec potest esse actus intelligendi"; nego, saltem improprie. Nec valet probatio cum dicit: "totum genus hominum esset vilius toto genere formicarum", nego; ad probationem: "nam perfecta operatio arguit perfectam formam", dico ad hoc sumendo dictum Averrois 12° 5 Metaphisice 18 commento, circa

1. principalem] ad add. sed del. E

2. tertium] primum scripsit E

3. nihil] s. l. E

4. ratione] non add. sed del. E

5. 12°] 9 scripsit E

dd. Cfr. Aristoteles, *De motu anim.*, 7, 701b17-19.

principium commentii^{ee}, ubi sic ait: "Et nota quod magis mirum est de scientia operantis aliquid de luto, quam de scientia eius in faciendo ex auro". Ex quibus verbis habeo quod nobilitas potentiarum et formarum potius ex nobilitate modi operandi quam ex operatis et operationibus arguitur. Sicut patet in tribus potentiis visivis, scilicet in potentia visiva lincea et humana et aquilina - nam una non est nobilior alia quia videt et habet actum videndi vel quia videat hoc obiectum vel illud, sed quia una¹ formaliori modo et limpidiori videt quam alia -, sic est de intellectu et formica, quia intellectus intelligit recipiendo modo spirituali et modo perfectissimo, sed formica comedit modo² materiali, modo alterativo et modo trasmutativo. Est ergo quod operatio formice sit nobilior operatione intellectus, tamen modus est vilior. /143rb E/

Vel aliter: dicendum quod comparatio debet esse intra ea que sunt eiusdem generis, ut scribitur 7° Phisicorum^{ff}; sed operatio intellectus est in genere passionis et operatio formice in genere actionis.

Vel aliter ut dicit Averroes, 6° Metaphisice^{gg}, quod ens rationis est de genere entis diminuti, quod hoc est verum ratione obiecti et sue cause productive et non ratione intellectus et sue cause subiective. Et ratio: nam immediata causa productiva actus intelligendi est similitudo fantastica sive cogitativa que deficit in obiecto a quo deciditur, sicut similitudo solis deficit a sole, cum sol illuminet et sua similitudo non. Et hoc est quia res materialis non vadit ad intellectum per sui essentiam.

Vel aliter quod in virtutibus passivis quibusdam non sumitur nobilitas ex receptione causarum sed ex entitate et incorruptibilitate ipsarum et reflexione et abstractione ipsarum. Vel aliter: quod Averroes loquitur de ente rationis secundo quod sequitur actum rationis primum, et non de primo actu.

Vel aliter: quod loquitur de ente rationis secundum quod est in intellectu obiective et sit (...) sicut ircocervus et chimera, de quo Aristoteles secundo Peri ermeneias^{hh} <dicat> quod non sequitur "est in anima, ergo

1. una] unum scripsit E

2. modo] naturali add. sed del. E

ee. Averroes, In Met., XII, c. 18 (ed. Venetiis 1562, f. 303 H): Cogita quod maius mirum est de scientia operantis aliquid de luto, quam de scientia eius in faciendo aliquid ex auro.

ff. Cfr. Aristoteles, Physic. VII, 4, 248b20-249b14.

gg. Averroes, In Met., VI, c.8 (ed. Venetiis 1562, f. 152 HI): Ens enim quod est per accidens non habet causam determinatam et quod est veridicans, non habet etiam causam nisi animam et ideo utrumque numeratur in genere entis diminuti.

hh. Locus non inventus. Sed cfr. Aristoteles, De int., 11, 21a21-33

est". Nam Averroes 6^{to} Metaphisice, ultimo commentoⁱⁱ<dicit> quod pro tanto tam ens per accidens quam ens in anima numeratur in genere entis diminuti, quia ens per accidens non habet causam determinatam et ens in anima non habet nisi animam; et loquitur de ente veridicante quod non ponit, quia sic diminutum: sic non ens nullam causam habebat.

Vel aliter quod Averroes vult quod sit ens diminutum in comparatione ad ens extra animam non quodcumque, sed quod est absolutum a motu et materia secundum rem et secundum rationem, vel in comparatione ad ens extra animam, quod est de genere substantie.

5. Ad alia membra rationis non vado quia de illis concedo; sic ergo patet quod prima ratio peccavit per locum ab insufficienti divisione et etiam in probatione membrorum. Sic igitur sit soluta prima ratio.

<Ad secundam>

Ad secundam: cum dicitur: "si ens rationis aliquam entitatem includeret, tunc intra contradictoria esset dare medium", dicendum quod est dare medium rationis. Sed tunc ulterius tu probas quod non sit medium rationis. Nam si esset medium positivum rationis, tunc de illo medio non verificabitur altera pars contradictionis non facte sed fiende, et sic non erit¹ extremum prime sed secunde.

Sed aliquis sic instabit: si non extremum prime contradictionis, nec etiam secunde; nam extrema prime contradictionis iam facte dicendo "ens videtur[?] et non ens videtur[?]" evacuant totum ens; dicendum quod evacuant ens quod est, sed illa habitudo media non est nisi cum intellectus concipit extrema contradictionis comparative. Quia[?] diceret: "hoc non valet, quia ego dicam in contradictione ens seu presens, seu preteritum, seu futurum, et non ens, seu presens, seu preteritum, seu futurum"; dicendum quod intellectus <in> entibus rationis utitur uno ut duobus, propter quod non valet, nec stare² potest.

<Ad tertiam>

Ad 3am rationem: "omnis natura entitatis comprehensibilis sub aliqua [[entita]] parte contradictionis est", conceditur; tu dicis: "contradictio que

1. erit] medium add. sed del.; extremum s. l. E

2. stare] emend. ex: instare E

ii. Vide adnotationem "gg".

est ens rationis sub nulla parte contradictionis comprehenditur". Dico hic dupliciter, primo quod ista ratio nulla est: nam per istam rationem, si ita concedatur, bene probaretur quod non sit non ens et aliquid; et¹ arguam sic: "omnis natura entitatis sub aliqua parte contradictionis comprehenditur; sed talis habitudo que est contradictio sub nulla parte contradictionis comprehenditur, cum contradictio non sit contradictorium, sicut vehementia non est vehemens".

Vel aliter ad formam rationis; ad minorem, cum dicitur "contradictio et cetera", verum est facte, non fiende.

Vel aliter quod falsum est, quia intellectus utitur uno ut duobus.

<Ad quartam>

Ad 4am: "nihil fundabile immediate in privativa natura formaliter aliquam entitatem includit", conceditur, si est natura privativa in se et in comparatione ad alterum et fundatur in virtute propria. Sed ad minorem: "intentio speciei est huiusmodi", nego; ad probationem: "quia fundatur in natura privativa in differentiis suppositorum", dico quod licet illa natura sit privativa in comparatione ad illas condiciones, tamen in se est aliquid, quia aggregatum ex materia et substantiali forma, conceptum sub aliquo <apparenti> quod est aptum natum esse universaliter[?] dici de pluribus.

<Ad quintam>

Ad 5am cum dicitur[?] "illud quod per se sub non ente comprehenditur est non ens", conceditur; "sed ens rationis est huiusmodi", nego; ad probationem: "Averroes 6to Metaphisice dicit quod hec est prima divisio entis: ens aut esse, aut non esse, quod falsum est"^{jj}, conceditur; "sed per falsum intelligit ens rationis et habitudinem consequentem rem intelligibilem,"² nego propter multa[?]. Primo nam <est extra> universale significatum falsi quod Philosophus posuit 5° Metaphisice, capitulo de falso,^{kk} discurrendo per significata falsi.

Et etiam propter aliud: nam illa divisio entis quam posuit Averroes est divisio entis accepti largo modo, ut extendit se ad ens verum et ad ens fictum, seu verum seu falsum, et videtur ad omne illud quod aliquialiter

1. et aliquid et] s. l. E

2. intelligibilem] fortasse pro: intellectam

jj. Vide adnotationem "c".

kk. Aristoteles, Met., V, 29, 1024b17-1025a13.

est ens; tamen nego ut non ens ad ens reducat, ut patet 4° Metaphisice^{ll}.
Sunt ergo non esse et falsum pro figmento et negatione.

<Ad sextam>

Ad 6am: "omnis relatio per quam aliquid refertur ad aliud non nisi quia alterum refertur ad ipsum nihil ponit in fundamento", conceditur; "sed ens rationis est huiusmodi", nego, et supra negabatur omnino.

<Ad septimam>

Ad¹ 7^{am}: dico quod est causatum et cum dicitur "aut habebit causam realem aut rationis", dicendum quod visum est quod habet causam realem, non agentem secundum sui naturam, sed potius secundum naturam et dispositionem passi, vel quod habet pro causa actum rationis qui sumitur a vera quiditate.

<CONCLUSIO>

Resurgant ergo entia rationis. Resurgant et puros² loycos amplius non for<mi>dent[?], que de premissis ploratu magno adeo ploraverunt, et a cunctis intelligentibus oportet eis rationabiliter indulgeri.

Explicit determinatio magistri mathei.

1. Ad] a add. sed del. E

2. puros] conieci ex: putos E

ll. Cfr. Aristoteles, Met. IV, 2, 1006a28-31.