'Incipit' and 'desinit' in a thirteenth-century *sophismata*-collection

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The importance and the role of *sophismata* in the arts curriculum of medieval universities is becoming more and more apparent.[1] They have been recently described as "one of the most dynamic factors in the development of this discipline" (i.e. logic), since the practice of higher-level logical exercises seems to have given rise to most of the literary genres now considered as peculiar to medieval logic[2].

As a matter of fact, there is an obvious link between this practice and the literature of *Syncategoremata*, *Abstractiones* and *Distinctiones*, where the most commonly debated *sophismata* are catalogued according to the syncategorematic terms involved in them or according to the rules and distinctions applied in their solutions[3]. But also the treatises *De obligationibus*, *De modo opponendi et respondendi* and, from the XIVth century on, *De consequentiis* were intended as sourcebooks of technical rules and arguments for the students and masters engaged in the daily practice of *sophismata*[4].

Hence, it turns out that the logical disputation or *sophisma*, where rules and techniques of argumentations were tested by discussing logically puzzling sentences, was one of the major concerns and duties of a medieval logician, the other one being the *lectio*, in the course of which the same rules and techniques served as exegetical tools for the interpretation

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2. See Maierù forthcoming.

3. See Braakhuis 1979 and 1981 on **Syncategoremata**, de Libera 1985a and 1985b on **Abstractiones**, Lewry 1982 and de Rijk 1988 on **Distinctiones**.

4. On **De obligationibus** see de Rijk 1974-76 and Stump and Spade 1982; for the treatises De **modo opponendi et respondendi** cf. de Rijk 1980. Finally on **De consequentiis**, see Green Pedersen 1984: 265-295 and 1985: 290-291.

of authoritative texts[1]. It is not surprising, then, if we find the practice of sophisms reported in the logical and grammatical literature from the late XIIth to the end of the XIVth century, that is to say during the whole creative period of the history of medieval logic[2]. But it is less obvious why the sophisms disputed by one or different masters appear to be regularly collected and circulating within the university milieu only from, roughly speaking, the last quarter of the XIIIth century on. We know of very few *sophismata*-collections prior to those of Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and Peter of Auvergne, and none of them is safely attributable to a known master[3].

Our knowledge of the preceding period, then, as far as logical disputations are concerned, has to rely almost entirely on the material contained in the sourcebooks mentioned, and above all in the *Syncategoremata* and *Distinctiones*. But the sophisms collected there are not the (more or less direct) records of actual disputations. Due to the function they have to serve in the manuals, they are intended rather as models of possible disputations. They are, so to speak, type-, not token-*sophismata*[4]. Hence, while important as witnesses of the logical teaching of the period, they can be considered only with some caution as historical documents of the logical exercises at the Faculty of Arts.

Until now, to my knowledge, only four collections of sophisms dating before ca. 1270 have been mentioned in the relevant literature. The pioneering work of Martin Grabmann focused attention on three of them, namely those contained in Vat. lat. 7678, Erfurt WAB 4° 328 and Paris, Bibl. Nat. 16135 (first collection)[5]. In 1986 Alain De Libera pointed to the one in Paris, Bibl. Nat. 16618[6]. To these two other collections can be added dating approximately from the 1270s: Worcester, Cath. Libr. Q. 13 and Paris, Bibl. Nat. 16135 (second collection)[7].

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1. On methods of teaching in the Faculty of Arts see Maierù 1978 and forthcoming and Fletcher 1984.

2. In general on medieval sophismata literature see Grabmann 1941 and Kretzmann 1982.

3. Siger's sophisms are edited in Siger de Brabant, Écrits de logique: 43-59. For a list of Boethius' and Peter's sophisms see Ebbesen and Pinborg 1970.

4. This is particularly evident in the section dedicated to the sophism's solutio. At least two alternative solutions are usually listed as tenable, together with the corresponding refutations of the sophism's proof or disproof. See e.g. Nicholas of Paris, Syncategoremata, Hervaeus Sophista, Abstractiones and Matthew of Orléans(?), Distinctiones.

5. See Grabmann 1941. On Vat. lat. 7678 see additions and corrections to Grabmann's description in Braakhuis 1979 I: 33-65 and 420-422 (n. 61). On the collection in Erfurt WAB 4° 328, doubtfully attributed to Robert Kilwardby, see Braakhuis 1979 I: 83-87 and 1985. The first collection in Paris, Bibl. Nat. 16135 is described and analysed in de Libera 1986.

6. For a description of the ms. and a list of the sophisms see de Libera 1986: 213-215.

7. On Worcester Q. 13 see Lewry 1981 and 1985 and Ebbesen 1987. A list of sophisms of the second collections in Paris Bibl. Nat. 16135 is in de Libera 1986: 216. A grammatical sophism from this collection has been edited by Rosier 1988.

My aim in this paper is to present a new pre-1270 collection of *sophismata*, which is contained in ms. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellonska 649, ff. 253r-272v. I will first describe the contents of this collection and examine the evidence for its approximate date and origin. Then I will analyse the structure and doctrine of one sophism dealing with the syncategorematic term *desinit*, whose text will be edited in full. An appendix will follow with a complete list of the sophisms.

1. *The sophismata-collection in ms. Kraków BJ 649*
1.1 *Description and date*

Ms. 449 of the Jagellonian Library[1] is a composite codex of 272 + II leaves, consisting of four parts of different sizes and materials, written by different hands at different times. Parts 1-2 (ff. 1-170, 171-230) are paper. Parts 3 (ff. 231-252) and 4 (ff. 253-272) are vellum and date from the late 13th or early 14th century; the leaves of part 3 measure mm. 285x198, those of part 4 mm. 278x205. Part 3 contains anonymous questions on *Priscianus Minor*[2]. Part 4 contains our collection of sophisms on ff. 253r-271v, with the following incipit:

> Queritur de hoc sophisma 'Infinita sunt finita'. Probatio et improbatio patent. Circa hoc sophisma possunt tria queri principaliter[3]

This work occupies three fascicles (originally quaternions, it would seem): 253-258, 259-265, 266-271. On ff. 253, 259 and 266 a list of the sophisms contained in each fascicle has been supplied by the same hand that wrote the text of the last sophism, while on f. 271v, at the end of the text, there is a general list of all the *sophismata*. From these lists we learn that one of the sophisms is entirely missing, while the text of four other sophisms is only fragmentary. The explanation is that in the first fascicle two leaves have been lost (between the present ff. 254-255 and 256-257)[4], and the same holds for another leaf at the end of the second fascicle (after the present f. 265)[5]. After f. 271 a leaf would appear to have been cut out, but it was probably a blank one; the present f. 272 is a

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1. Description of the ms in Kowalczyk et al. 1988: 398-406; cf. Markowski & Wlodek 1974: 27-28. My description is based on the one in Kowalczyk et al. and on observations done by Sten Ebbesen, who examined the ms in Kraków in November 1989. My conclusions about the present and original composition of part 4 of the codex were reached from inspection of a microfilm, but have been confirmed by Ebbesen's autopsy of the ms.

2. Item A 74 in Pinborg 1967: 322. N° 132.14 in Bursill-Hall 1981: 98 (where this grammatical text is erroneously said to continue until f. 271v).

3. I owe to Sten Ebbesen the suggestion to study this collection.

4. These leaves have left no material traces in the ms. Notice that I refer to leaves by their modern numbers, for there are two foliations, a modern one in pencil and a somehat older one in ink. Modern ff. 253-272 = former ff. 254-273).

5. Traces of this leaf still visible.

secondary addition. Moreover, ff. 255 and 256 have been inverted, so that the correct order of reading should be: 254, [missing leaf], 256, 255, [missing leaf], 257.

As apparent from the list published in the Appendix, the sophisms are not ordered according to a systematic principle. This is a feature that separates our collection from those gathered in *Syncategoremata* and *Distinctiones*, but also, for instance, from the collection in ms. Erfurt WAB 4° 328[1]. More evidence of its being a (more or less direct) record of a series of actual disputations can be gathered from the mention of a *respondens* in the incipit of *sophisma* 2 (see Appendix) and from a passage in *sophisma* 11 where somebody is mentioned who performs the role of the *opponens* in the disputation[2]. In addition to this, one can notice the frequent use of past tense expressions like *querebatur, primum fuit, obiciebatur* etc[3].

On the other hand, there is also evidence that the text has been revised by someone (probably the master himself) in order to bestow a uniform structure on each sophism. As a matter of fact, each disputation rigidly follows the same pattern, according to which, after the presentation of the *sophisma* (or *prima propositio*) with its own proof and disproof (*probatio et improbatio*), a number of sub-questions (*quesita* or *problemata*) are posited whose answers are meant to concur to the general solution. The questions are discussed with arguments pro and contra, then in most cases the solution of the *sophisma* (consisting also of a refutation of either the proof or the disproof) is introduced by a discussion of alternative solutions. Finally, the master gives his answer to the questions, following their order of presentation and either solving or accepting each single argument advanced in the discussion.

Hence, the textual evidence suggests that our work is the written report of a series of logical disputations actually held by a master of arts in fulfilment of his teaching duties, and that the report was subsequently revised, probably for publication.

Unfortunately, the manuscript bears no explicit indications about the identity of the master who held the disputations nor about their chrono-

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1. See Braakhuis 1979 I: 85-87.
2. Ms. Kraków BJ 649, f. 265ra14-27: "Ad quintum dicendum quod hec est uera 'aliquod animal non fuit in archa Noe' in omni differentia temporis preteriti, ut patet per supradicta de piscibus et de aliis. Et ideo hec propositio 'omne animal fuit in archa Noe' falsa est pro qualibet differentia temporis; et ideo male exponebat contradictoriam eius in opponendo".
3. The respective part that the respondens and the opponens took in the disputation can be easily reconstructed in sophisma 8 ('Nichil est verum nisi in hoc instanti'), where a debate on tempus confusum is recorded: see ms. Kraków BJ 649, f. 258va15-vb10. Unfortunately, the text of this sophism seems to be rather corrupt.

logical and geographical origin[1]. We are forced, then, to turn again to the text himself, trying to collect some clues about the circumstances of its composition.

From a first cursory reading of the whole work one can notice that the author frequently refers to the non-logical works of Aristotle. It turns out from the following sample of citations that the author is familiar with the Arabo-Latin corpus of Aristotelian translations.

Metaphysics:

1) (f. 262va49) quia magis uidetur quod contrarietas est horum que sunt sub eodem genere **completa** (!) distantia, sicut scribitur in libro Prime philosophie (Met. X.4, 1055a28-29).

tr. Anonyma sive Media (A.L. XXV.2: 192,23-24): et in eodem genere plurimum differentia contraria sunt (maxima namque differentia horum est finalis).

tr. Arabo-latina sive Nova (ed. Venetiis 1562, fol. 262 A): Et quod maxime diversa in uno genere sunt contraria, diversitas enim maxima in istis est diversitas **completa**[2].

2) (f. 262va54) quoniam heedem sunt **dispositiones** entis et ueri, sicut scribitur in primo Philosophie prime (Met. II.1, 993b30).

tr. Anonyma sive Media (A.L. XXV.2: 37,9-10): quare unumquodque sicut habet esse ita et veritatem.

tr. Arabo-latina sive Nova (ed. Darms: 58,9-10; ed. Venetiis 1562, fol. 29 M): Quapropter necesse est ut **dispositio** cuiuslibet rei in esse sit sua **dispositio** in rei veritate[3].

3) (f. 264va15) minor patet per Aristotilem in X Methaphisice dicentem quod Callias est **sermo** cum materia (Met. X.9, 1058b10).

tr. Anonyma sive Media (A.L. XXV.2: 202,11): Callias vero est ratio cum materia.

tr. Arabo-latina sive Nova (ed. Venetiis 1562, fol. 274 E): Callias vero est **sermo** cum materia.

De caelo:
(see the text edited below, *apparatus fontium*, d).

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1. The only possible clue I was able to trace so far in the collection is the mention of a 'Johannes' in an example of **sophisma** 11: "Si uero distribuat pro indiuiduis sic est falsa, et est sensus 'omne animal etc.', id est 'Johannes fuit in archa Noe et Sortes et Plato' et sic de singulis indiuiduis cuiuslibet speciei animalis" (ms. Kraków BJ 649, f. 264va47-49). But this is admittedly only the weakest evidence for a possible authorship.
2. On this **auctoritas** see Gauthier 1982: 353-354.
3. Cf. Gauthier 1982: 372.

Moreover, he cites the *Physics* and the *De anima* according to the *trans-latione veteres*:

Physics:

1) (f. 254va33) Item. Dicit Aristotiles in libro Phisicorum quod sub-stantia **cum forma** est causa accidentium que in ea sunt (Phys. I.9, 192a13-14)

tr. Vetus (Alberti Magni Physica, ed. Colon. 1987, 71,68-69): Sub-iecta quidem materia **cum forma** causa est eorum que fiunt, sicut mater.

tr. Scoti (ed. Venetiis 1562, fol. 45 F): quoniam illa natura permanet, et est amplexa cum creatione, qua creantur generabilia, ut mater.

2) (f. 256vb23) Minor patet: forma est principium intelligendi mate-riam in unoquoque, sicut uult Aristotiles in primo Phisicorum dicens quod materia sit sensibilis (*pro* scibilis) **secundum anologum** (!) et per attributionem ad formam (Phys. I.7, 191a8-9).

tr. Vetus (Alberti Magni Physica, ed. Colon. 1987, 53,62-64): Sub-iecta autem natura scibilis est **secundum analogiam**

tr. Scoti (ed. Venetiis 1562, fol. 40 H): Natura autem subiecta cog-noscitur per comparationem.

De anima:

(f. 264va18) minor patet per Aristotilem dicentem quod ob hoc data est generatio indiuiduorum (siue in indiuiduis) ut saluetur **diuinum esse**, in libro De anima (*De an.* II.4, 415a26-b1; cf. also *Auct. Ar.* 6, 57-58)

tr. Vetus (Alberti Magni De anima, ed Colon. 1968, 82,63-66; cf. *Anonymi Magistri Artium Lectura*, ed. Gauthier 1985, 204 *cum apparatu*): quam generationem per se variam habent, facere alterum, sicut est ipsum, et animal quidem animal, planta autem generat plantam, quatenus ipso es-se semper **divino** participent, secundum quod possunt; omnia enim illud appetunt, et illius causa agunt, quaecumque agunt secundum naturam.

Divinum esse is not mentioned in Moerbeke's translation (see Thomas Aquinas *Sent.l. De Anima*, ed. Gauthier 1984, 95).

Finally the citations of the *Ethica* provide us with a reliable *ter-minus post quem*:

(f. 264va26) Ad idem. Omne quod est principium et fundamentum al-terius ducit in cognitionem eiusdem, set singularia inductione sunt princi-pium et fundamentum uniuersalium; ergo singularia ducunt in cognitio-nem uniuersalium. Quare singularia inferunt uniuersale. Minor patet per

Aristotilem in VI Eticorum noue translationis, ubi dicit quod inductio est principium et fundamentum et tota **credulitas** (crudelitas *ms.*) uniuersalis (Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1139b27).

tr. Lincoln. rec. pura (A.L. XXVI.3: 250,1-2): Induccio quidem utique principium est et **credulitas** uniuersalis (in the *rec. recognita*, an anonymous revision of Grosseteste's translation composed in 1260-70, **credulitas** is omitted; see A.L. XXVI.4: 480,22-23)[1].

Since the *translatio Lincolniensis* was not available before 1246/47, our work must have been composed after this date[2]. On the other hand, such an extensive use of the *Corpus Vetustius* together with the Arabo-Latin translations is not likely to have occurred after ca. 1265, when new translations began to circulate in the university milieu[3]. Thus, considering also the character of the logical doctrines presented in our collection (to which I will briefly refer in the following), I would argue for a period of composition between 1250 and 1260[4].

Closer inspection of the content of some sophisms is required in order to ascertain doctrinal links and, hence, to obtain some clues about the place where the collection originated.

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1. Other interesting references are the following: a) "Preterea. Termino semel sumpto non est utendum equiuoce, ut expresse dicit Boetius in commento libri Elenchorum" (f. 264vb35-36). This quotation of a supposed Boethian commentary on the **Elenchi** is until now a **unicum** in medieval logical literature; see Ebbesen 1981b I: 254. b) "Et si queratur utrum sit ibi <aliquis modus restrictionis> [aliquorum modorum] qui determinatur a Boetio [aliquis modus restrictionis] et qui explanatur a Summulis, dicendum quod non. Et sciendum quod duplex est restrictio. Quedam (quoddam K) est quod est quantum ad partes integrales (268rb), et non est proprie restrictio, set potius resecacio. Et tali modo restringitur 'X' cum dico 'X preter V sunt V', et talis restrictio non est de genere restrictionum quas dicit Boetius. Est autem alia restrictio que est quantum ad partes subiectiuas uel quantum ad significata, que est proprie restrictio. Et istius restrictionis modus determinatur a Boetio et a Summulis explanatur" (f. 268ra-b). The reference is generic, so that it is not possible to point to a determinate **Summule**-tract as the source which the author is referring to. But it is altogether historically important to note that knowledge of the **Summule** was presupposed in the sophistical disputation even after the middle of the XIIIth century.

2. See Callus 1947 and Gauthier 1974: cci.

3. On the year 1260 as the approximate date when the **translatio Media** of the **Metaphysics** began to replace the **arabo-latina** see Vuillemin Diem 1976: xxv-xxxiv. According to Brams and Vuillemin Diem 1986: 274-276 Moerbeke's revision of the **Physica vetus** in his first redaction was composed in the early '60s. On the period of utilization of the **Vetus** of the **De anima** (until ca. 1265) see Gauthier 1984b: 235 ff.

4. The **terminus post quem** could be placed some years later, since in the sophism edited below our author quotes an adage which does not appears literally neither in Book II of Aristotle's **Physics** nor in Averroes' commentary. Instead it is collected as item 2, 83 in the **Auctoritates Aristotelis** and (contrary to the reference given by the editor of the **florilegium**) it appears to be drawn from Albert the Great's commentary (see below apparatus fontium, c). If it could be shown that no previous commentary (such as, for instance, the one by Adam of Buckfeld) has the adage in the relevant place, then the collection should be considered posterior to Albert's commentary. The latter was composed between 1251/52 and 1257 (see Albert the Great, **Physica. Prolegomena**, 1: v-vi).

1.2 *Some doctrinal points in the collection*

When looking for doctrinal influences in a logical collection of sophisms from the middle of the XIIIth century, it is only natural to focus attention on the theory of supposition. From a passage in *sophisma* 18 ('Impossibile potest esse verum') we learn that our author is familiar with the concept of natural supposition[1]:

> (f. 269va-b) Quod distinctio nulla sit in proposito (269vb) probo. Duplex est suppositio in termino: accidentalis et naturalis. Naturalis enim suppositio est in termino cum per se sumitur, accidentalis vero cum sumitur cum alio, ut cum dicitur 'homo' et 'homo currit'. Naturalis autem (?) suppositio est in terminis accidentalibus et in substantialibus (naturalibus *ms.*). Ergo cum hoc quod dico 'impossibile' sit terminus accidentalis, duplicem habet suppositionem, uel potest habere: naturalem uel accidentalem. Cum uero habet naturalem suppositionem, sumitur per se et est in plus quam cum habet accidentalem. Set cum 'impossibile' habet suppositionem naturalem, dicit priuationem respectu cuiuslibet differentie temporis. Ergo cum habet accidentalem, non dicit uel non significabitur per ipsum priuatio respectu cuiuslibet differentie temporis, cum terminus sit restrictus et [non] cohartatus in accidentali suppositione respectu naturalis suppositionis. Ergo cum hoc quod dico 'impossibile' in proposito habeat accidentalem suppositionem, non poterit accipi pro impossibili per se. Et sic distinctio nulla.

Moreover, in *sophisma* 8 ('Si Sortes necessario est mortalis, Sortes necessario est immortalis') he reports the view that the terms occurring in an antecedent proposition have natural supposition, a doctrine commonly held in Paris after the teaching of John Le Page[2].

> (f. 261rb9) Dicendum quod aliter supponunt termini in propositione sumpta per se et in propositione relata ad aliam ut ipsam inferens uel antecedens. Quia termini accepti in propositione prout est inferens uel antecedens alteram retinent (-ens *ms.*) suam suppositionem naturalem, et ideo indifferenter supponunt pro hiis que sunt <et fuerunt> et erunt. Sed in propositione accepta secundum se supponunt termini secundum exigentiam temporis uerbi. Et propter hoc non oportet quod si hec sit uera 'si Cesar est, homo est', quod hec sit uera 'Cesar est homo'.

In *sophisma* 5 ('Tantum unum est') simple supposition is ascribed to a term when it stands *ratione sue forme communis* and this may happen in two cases, according to our author:

> (f. 257vb11) Ad aliud argumentum, quod terminus communis stans ratione sue forme communis potest accipi in quantum participat, ut cum

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1. On the doctrine of natural supposition see de Rijk 1971-73 and de Libera 1981.
2. See de Libera 1984: 203 and 1986: 227-229.

dicitur 'homo est species' aut in quantum participatur, ut cum dicitur 'homo est animal'. Et utroque modo habet simplicem suppositionem, sed differenter. Quia primo modo stat ratione forme communis ut est unum preter multa et secundum quod abstrait (abstant *ms.*) a tota multitudine singularium. Secundo modo stat ratione forme communis ut est unum in multis et de multis. Et quia unitas talis forme non repugnat suppositis, ymmo est idem cum illis, ideo sequitur 'omnis homo est animal; ergo quoddam animal est homo'. Sed non sequitur 'omnis homo est species; ergo quidam homo est species', et causa dicta est prius.

This passage may be coupled with the one edited below (*Sophisma 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum'*, ad 4), where other cases of a term having simple supposition are listed: a) when it follows a *dictio exceptiva*, like 'preter'; b) when it stands for a simple essence; and c) when it stands indifferently for present and future beings. The pivotal role attributed to simple supposition in our author's semantics brings him nearer to the Parisian tradition at the middle of the XIIIth century[1].

The much debated question of the truth of present-tense sentences whose subject-term fails to have extra-mental bearers is dealt with by the author in the fifth *quesitum* of *sophisma* 8 :"Quintum erat utrum tales propositiones sint (sit *ms.*) uere 'Sortes est mortalis', 'Sortes est homo' Sorte non existente; et sic de homine non existente et de animali" (f. 260ra)[2]. In the solution two positions are reported as equally tenable. According to the first,

(f. 261ra43) Hec autem, siue homo sit siue homo non sit, 'homo est animal' est uera. Sed ad eius euidentiam notandum quod uniuscuiusque est duplex diffinitio: una secundum materiam, altera secundum speciem et formam. Et secundum hoc duplex est esse: esse uidelicet logicum et esse naturale (siue esse quod est rei esse et esse logicum, siue esse quod est intentio siue diffinitio). <Diffinitio autem> que <est> secundum speciem et formam <unum esse significat>, alterum esse significat altera diffinitio. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum forte, Sorte mortuo siue destructo, destructum est esse primum, quod est sicut esse et ueritas, cum alterum esse, quod est esse ordinis, remanet. Et quantum ad illud esse potest ista esse uera.

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1. Compare the passage quoted above with Lambert of Auxerre's definition: "Simplex suppositio est illa secundum quam tenetur terminus pro se vel pro re sua, non habito respectu ad supposita sub se contempta. Dicitur autem illa suppositio simplex que est in termino ratione forme sue ... Sed notandum quod non habere respectum ad supposita potest esse ita quod nullo modo nec determinate nec indeterminate sit respectus ad illa; vel ita quod non determinate sit respectus ad illa, sed indeterminate". As example of the first case Lambert gives 'homo est species', while 'piper venditur hic et Rome' is an example of the second case. See Lambert of Auxerre, **Logica** VIII: 209.

2. See Ebbesen 1987 for an orientative bibliography on this topic.

But, our author reports, other logicians claim that present-tense propositions whose subject term fails to refer to existent things are absolutely false. Nonetheless, they are able to grant the truth of an inference like 'si Sortes est, homo est' (even in the case of a non-existent Socrates) by resorting to the above-mentioned doctrine of the natural supposition of terms occurring in inferential contexts, which is linked to the name of John Le Page.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that in *sophisma* 5 a question is raised about the existence of a *forma prima*, in analogy with that of *materia prima*. The treatment of this problem turns out to be remarkably similar to parallel discussions contained in Roger Bacon's Parisian courses on the *Physics* and on the *Metaphysics*. One opinion (also reported by Bacon), according to which the first form is light, is refuted. Then the view is mentioned that there is a first form which gives being to composite substances. At the end, the author seems to endorse the position of those who deny the existence of a first form[1].

From this quick survey of some points of interest no indisputable evidence emerges concerning the origin of our *sophismata*-collection. However, the above-mentioned themes join to form the doctrinal profile of a master who is inclined to resorting to natural and simple supposition in solving semantic problems and who is acquainted with Le Page's doctrine of the natural supposition of terms in inferential contexts and with Baconian discussions on the first form. One cannot help noticing that this doctrinal profile has a markedly Parisian look.

2. The sophism 'SORTES DESINIT ESSE ALBISSIMUS HOMINUM'
2.1 The structure of the sophism

To allow the reader some direct acquaintance with the formal and doctrinal characteristics of this collection, I have decided to edit the ninth sophism 'Sortes desinit albissimus hominum'. This choice has been suggested by the recognition that relatively little is known about the early stages of the discussions on 'incipit' and 'desinit', a subject which was to become so important in the *sophismata*-literature of the XIVth century.
Moreover, this sophism appears to be a good representative of that class of problems which, having been debated for almost a century in the schools, seem to have suddenly ceased to attract interest in the last period

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1. Compare ms. Kraków BJ 649, f. 257va37-vb4 with Roger Bacon **Quaest. s. l. quattuor Phys.**: 41-42 and **Quaest. alterae s. l. Prime philos.**: 65-68. Here the opinion according to which light is the first form is attributed to the **De intelligentiis** of Adam Pulchrae Mulieris .

of the XIIIth century. As a matter of fact, I know of only two collections containing this sophism that could be posterior to the Cracovian one and both probably date from the 1270's. One has then to wait till the time of Albert of Saxony to find our sophism discussed again[1].

In dealing with the puzzling sentence 'Socrates ceases to be the whitest of men', the disputation follows the usual pattern already described above, with one deviation only, viz. that before introducing the disputed sentence (*prima propositio*), the conditions are laid down (*positio* or *casus*) that have to be fulfilled if the truth of the sentence is to be judged. The conditions are the following:

> i) Socrates is the whitest of men in the present instant and his whiteness will not lessen nor will the others' whitenesses increase;
> ii) in the next-to-present instant a man is generated who is whiter than Socrates.

The problem is then whether, under these conditions, it is true to say that Socrates ceases to be the whitest of men or not.

The proof and disproof of the sophism are omitted, probably because the participants in the disputation are considered sufficiently acquainted with them. For the sake of completeness, I give here a presentation of the two arguments in the formulations that can be found in contemporary treatments of the sophism[2]:

> *Proof* (A):
> (A1) Socrates is now the whitest of men
> (A2) From the next instant on he will not be the whitest of men; hence
> (A3) Socrates ceases to be the whitest of men.

(A1) and (A2) are true by (i) and (ii), respectively; and from them (A3) follows by virtue of the following rule of translation (*expositio*): "An A ceases to be X, if and only if (A is now X and, from now on, it will not be X)".

> *Disproof* (B):
> (B1) Socrates ceases to be the whitest of men.
> (B2) Then, either Socrates ceases to be the whitest of existing men or of non-existing (future) men.
> (B3) But he does not cease to be the whitest of existing men.

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1. The sophism appears in ms. Worcester, Cathedral Library Q. 13, ff. 34ra-35vb and in ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat. 16135 (first collection), ff. 23ra-24ra. Albert of Saxony deals with the problem of Socrates ceasing to be the whitest of men (in a very traditional way) in the CXXXVI of his **Sophismata**.

2. See for instance Nicholas of Paris, **Syncategoreumata**: 265,3-11.

(B4) Nor does he cease to be the whitest of non-existing (future) men; hence
(B5) Socrates does not cease to be the whitest of men.

The passage from (B1) to (B2) holds by virtue of the Law of Non-Contradiction (in the loose formulation derived from *Met.* IV.3, 1005b19-20: "de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio et de nullo simul"; see *Auct. Arist.* 1, 97, ed. Hamesse: 123). (B3) is true by (i), since the ratio of Socrates' whiteness to existing whitenesses will not change; while (B4) is true by (ii), since even now Socrates is not the whitest of non-existing (future) men. Hence, (B5) follows by *modus tollens*.

The problem set by these conflicting arguments is then subdivided in five related problems (*quesita*), respectively dealing with

a) the truth of the puzzling sentence,
b) the validity of the proof,
c) whether the terms following the verbs 'incipit' and 'desinit' have ampliated supposition,
d) whether they have simple supposition, and
e) the validity of the disproof.

The core of the sophism lies in the two questions concerning the supposition of the predicate-term in an *incipit-* or *desinit*-sentence. The problem posed by the first puzzling sentence is, in fact, a problem of reference, which can be concisely expressed in the question: Who are the men of whom Socrates ceases to be the whitest? And, in general, which are the referents of the predicate-term in an *incipit-* or *desinit*-sentence ?

But before turning to this problem of supposition, it is necessary to consider the general framework of the doctrine of the syncategorematic words 'incipit' and 'desinit' in the first half of the XIIIth century.

2.2 *The exposition of 'incipit' and 'desinit'*

According to Norman Kretzmann, the problem of beginning and ceasing can be broadly described as "the problem of assigning temporal limits to a process of change measured against a continuum"[1]. A medieval logician found the terms of such a problem theoretically defined in the *Physics*, particularly in Book VI ch. 1-5 and Book VIII ch. 8, where Aristotle deals with the nature of motion, time and change in relation to the Zenonian

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1. In what follows I rely mainly on Kretzmann 1976. See also Kretzmann 1982: 270-274, Nielsen 1982, Feltrin and Parodi 1983 and especially Knuuttila 1986. An alternative analysis of the Aristotelian solution to the problem of change is in Sorabji 1983: 403-421. On the implications of this problem in fourteenth century theology see Knuuttila and Lehtinen 1979, Kretzmann 1982 and Spade 1982. The quotation is from Kretzmann 1976: 102.

paradox. The Aristotelian analysis provided then the basic ingredients which are common to all medieval discussions on 'incipit' and 'desinit'. These ingredients are, to quote Kretzmann again, "the theory of time as a continuum, the notion of indivisible instants, the doctrine of the instantaneous acquisition of the changed state, intrinsic or extrinsic temporal limits (first and last instants), and different analyses of change associated with different subjects of change".[1]

Accordingly, if time is a continuum infinitely divisible into instants and if change happens instantaneously, the problem of assigning temporal limits to a process of change can be formulated as the problem of identifying the instant of change with either the last instant before or the first instant in which the thing is in the changed state, depending on the different kinds of things and changes. Obviously, time being a continuum, it is to a certain extent arbitrary to identify the beginning of change with a particular instant, since each point dividing a continuum is common to the two segments into which it divides the continuum[2]. But such a decision is altogether necessary since, by virtue of the law of contradiction, the same instant cannot be *both* the last instant of the thing's not being (in the changed state) *and* the first instant of the thing's being (in the changed state). Hence, limit decisions must observe the following rule: if a first instant of being is assigned, then a last instant of not being cannot be assigned, and vice versa.

The physical problem of making limit decisions has, in turn, its own effects upon the semantical problem of reinterpreting the sentences containing 'incipit' and 'desinit' in order to avoid paralogisms. It follows from what has been said above that if a first instant of being is assigned and a sentence like 'Socrates begins to be white' is interpreted as meaning 'Socrates is now white and immediately before he was not white', then a sentence like 'Socrates ceases to be not white' should be rendered as 'Socrates now is not not white and immediately before he was not white'. Vice versa, if a last instant of not being is assigned and *incipit*-sentences are considered equivalent to a negative in the present tense and an affirmative in the future tense, then *desinit*-sentences should be considered equivalent to an affirmative in the present tense and a negative in the future tense.

For a deeper analysis of the Aristotelian background and of the main lines of the medieval interpretation of 'incipit' and 'desinit' we may refer

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1. Kretzmann 1976: 103.
2. Phys. VIII.1: 231a20ff.

to Kretzmann's and Knuuttila's brilliant essays and to Lauge O. Nielsen's detailed discussion in his introduction to the edition of Thomas Bradwardine's *De incipit et desinit*. However, since more texts elucidating the early stages of the theory have recently been made available, it is worthwhile to try to sketch a more detailed picture of the state of the problem in the first half of the XIIIth century[1].

Even before becoming acquainted with the *Physics*, medieval logicians were able to recognize the problematic nature of the sentences containing 'incipit' and 'desinit'. As a matter of fact, many of the texts edited by De Rijk in his *Logica Modernorum* describe paralogisms which depend on the fact that such verbs covertly involve both negation and a different time reference, hence affecting the supposition of the predicate-term[2]. But, as far as I know, the earliest treatments explicitly dedicated to 'incipit' and 'desinit' are to be found in some recently edited *Syncategoremata*- and *Distinctiones*-tracts, such as the tract attributed to Robert Bacon and the *Tractatus vaticanus de multiplicitatibus*, both dating approximately from the first decades of the XIIIth century[3]. They exhibit the feature, which is common also to the preceding works, of focusing on these verbs mainly as a source of fallacies and invalid inferences. There is no sign of acquaintance with the *Physics*, but they present an exposition of the two verbs which appears to be the first of a series of alternative solutions to the problem of interpreting *incipit*- and *desinit*-sentences.

In the *Tractatus vaticanus* we read that 'incipit' signifies *primum in motu* and is a syncategorematic word since "primum in motu comparationem habet ad ea respectu quorum est primum"; hence a sentence containing 'incipit' means the same as a sentence containing *nunc et non prius*. On the other hand, 'desinit' signifies *ultimum in motu* and is the same as *nunc et non post*[4]. Robert Bacon has the same doctrine, asserting as he does that 'incipit' and 'desinit' "in parte conveniunt, quia utrumque est

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1. Altough brilliant and penetrating, Kretzmann's interpretation of the medieval theories on 'incipit' and 'desinit' (which is followed by Nielsen and Knuuttila) suffers from relying on an inauthentic work for the presentation of Peter of Spain's position, which is considered as paradigmatic of the majority view on the two syncategorematic terms. In what follows I intend to show that the variety of opinions concerning these terms in XIIIth century logic was richer than Kretzmann believed. A more thorough investigation would be needed (along the lines indicated by Knuuttila 1986) in order to deal with the XIIIth century approach to the physical problem of beginning and ceasing. The true text of Peter's **Syncategoremata** concerning 'incipit' and 'desinit' is partially edited in Braakhuis 1979 I: 282-285 (the same author is currently preparing an edition of the whole text).

2. See the references in Kretzmann 1976: 105-107 and nn. 13-17. To these Knuuttila 1986: 264 has added Giusberti 1982: 43.

3. See Braakhuis 1979 I: 115 and de Rijk 1988: xxiv.

4. Anonymus **Tractatus vaticanus**, 148: 43.

positivum presentis, et in parte differunt, quia unum est privativum preteriti, alterum privativum futuri, sicut patet ex interpretatione eorum"[1]. This is also the *expositio communis* referred to in the *Syncategoremata* of John Le Page; it amounts to assigning a first and a last instant of being to all kinds of things and can be schematized as follows[2].

	past	pres.	fut.
incipit	-	+	
desinit		+	-

To this kind of exposition John Le Page objects that it does not take into account the important exception represented by those things whose being is not permanent, like motion and time. Due to the fact that they possess being only in succession (or *in fluxu*), this sort of things cannot have being when they are in their limits: at the beginning of time there is not (yet) time, and at the end of motion there is no (more) motion. Accordingly, *successiva* cannot have a first nor a last instant of being, but only a last and a first instant of non-being. Hence the exposition of *incipit-* and *desinit*-sentences in the case of successive things is, respectively, 'non est sed erit' and 'non est sed fuit'[3]. Le Page's proposal can thus be rendered as follows

	past	pres.	fut.	
incipit	-	+		permanent things
desinit		+	-	
incipit		-	+	successive things
desinit	+	-		

A sentence like 'Socrates begins to run' then has the following exposition, 'Socrates is now not running and immediately after this he will run'; while 'Socrates ceases to run' is rendered as 'Socrates is now not running and immediately before he was running'.

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1. Robert Bacon, Syncategoremata: 99.
2. See John Le Page, Syncategoremata: 198.
3. See John Le Page, Syncategoremata: 198-199. According to Knuuttila 1986: 256 the key-distinction between res permanentes and successivae was introduced in the debate through Averroes' commentary on the Physics.

This interpretation of 'incipit' and 'desinit' seems to have become common among logicians in the next period, adopted as it is by Peter of Spain and Nicholas of Paris in their *Syncategoremata*, and also by the *Distinctiones*-tract called by De Rijk *Sophistaria Toledana*[1]. But there are some exceptions. The most important one is represented by William of Sherwood, who in his *Syncategoremata* adopts a different approach to the problem of beginning and ceasing. Leaving aside the consideration of the different sorts of things which are subjects of change, he faces the problem from the point of view of the transition from one state to another[2]. If the change is to a permanent state, then, according to William, we may assign a first instant of being and, correspondingly, a last instant of non-being. 'Incipit' is then to be rendered with an affirmative in the present and a negative in the past tense and, conversely, 'desinit' with a negative in the present and an affirmative in the past tense. On the other hand, if the change is to a successive state, then we have a first instant of non-being and a last instant of being. Consequently, 'incipit' requires a negative in the present and an affirmative in the future tense, while 'desinit' needs an affirmative in the present and a negative in the future tense[3]. Here is a model of William's interpretation:

		past	pres.	fut.	
inc.	esse	-	+		change into a
des.	non esse	+	-		permanent state
inc.	esse		-	+	change into a
des.	non esse		+	-	successive state

Another exception to the common interpretation of 'incipit' and 'desinit' can be found in the *Syncategoremata*-tract doubtfully attributed to Henry of Ghent. Here the author reacts against the assignment of a last instant of being to the permanent things, claiming that it is contradicted

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1. See Peter of Spain, **Syncategoremata**: 284; Nicholas of Paris, **Syncategoreumata**: 251-252; Anonymus **Sophistaria Toledana**, ms. Cambridge, f. 250va8-19, ms. Erfurt, f. 49ra22-33. On the latter text see de Rijk 1988: xiv. In addition to the mss. listed there, the work is handed down without beginning and end also in the Cambridge ms.; according to Braakhuis 1981: 152, n. 13 the text of the Cambridge ms. is to be dated "from the middle or second half of the 13th century".

2. For an analysis of William's position see Nielsen 1982: 11-15. William's different viewpoint accounts for his focusing not simply on the relation between 'beginning' and 'ceasing', but more precisely on the one between 'beginning to be (so and so)' and the corresponding 'ceasing not to be (so and so)'.

3. William of Sherwood, **Syncategoremata**: 76-77.

by the authority of Aristotle (probably referring to *Physics* VIII 8, 263b12 ff.). Accordingly, a variant exposition for *desinit*-sentences is proposed in the case of permanent things[1]:

	past	pres.	fut.	
incipit	-	+		permanent things
desinit	+	-		
incipit		-	+	successive things
desinit		+	-	

Finally, a peculiar position is adopted in the *Distinctiones*-tract attributed to Matthew of Orléans, where every beginning and ceasing is apparently considered to be a successive state and, consequently, the following is proposed as the universal exposition of the two verbs[2]

	past	pres.	fut.
incipit		-	+
desinit	+	-	

Summing up, we have found that different solutions were proposed in the first half of the XIIIth century to the problem of interpreting *incipit*- and *desinit*-sentences. But according to all of them, the two verbs have to be translated with a conjunction containing a negative sentence and a sentence in a tense different from the present. This is because the meaning of the two verbs involve both covert negation and a covert reference to a time different from the one indicated by the verbal tense. This peculiarity of 'incipit' and 'desinit', in turn, is responsible for their role as

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1. See Henry of Ghent(?), **Syncategoremata**: 370-371.
2. See Matthew of Orléans(?), **Syncategoremata**, ms. Barcelona f. 301vb: "Unde non pono has expositiones huius uerbi 'incipit' et huius uerbi 'desinit', quamuis communes sint et possent sustineri, immo pono (sicut ostensum est in opponendo) quod hoc uerbum 'desinit' incipit ab ente et terminatur in non ens. Unde dico quod hoc uerbum 'desinit' a parte post priuat se in presenti et ponit in preterito semper. Similiter hoc uerbum 'incipit' priuat semper in presenti et ponit semper in futuro, et ista expositio sibi generalis est in omnibus terminis. Unde sicut cum (c. s. **ms.**) aliquid generatur erit, sic est dicere quoniam non est set erit. Sicut uult Aristotiles, quia si fit non est. Quia sicut <cum> aliquid est album, non est dicere quoniam fit album (quia si sit, iam non primo esset albus) set est dicere 'non est albus'. Similiter cum aliquid corrumpitur, est dicere 'non est, set fuit'. Et cum <aliquid> desinit esse album (neque **ms.**), possum dicere quoniam non est albus, set fuit. Unde dico quod semper habent eandem expositionem huiusmodi uerba 'incipit', 'desinit' in permanentibus et in successiuis, et non uariatur sua expositio in terminis permanentibus et in (permanentibus **add. sed exp. ms.**) aliis, quia aliter esset ponere ipsa equiuocari, quod mihi non uidetur". For a list of mss. containing this tract attributed to a **magister Matheus** see de Rijk 1988: xii-xiii.

sources of paralogisms, since, e.g., it blocks universal instantiation in a universally quantified sentence. Thus, each treatment of the two syncategorematic words, after the section on exposition, usually deals with the most common *sophismata* arising from their occurrence in a proposition.[1] And it is in this context that one can find the problem of Socrates ceasing to be the whitest of men, through the discussion of which attention is focused on the supposition of the predicate term in a *desinit*-sentence. To this problem we may now return.

2.3 'Incipit'/'desinit' and supposition

The case presented by the sentence

(1) Socrates ceases to be the whitest of men

is, admittedly, rather eccentric from the point of view of the Aristotelian theory of change. It is not easy to subsume it under one or the other of the different kinds of change, since in this case nothing properly changes in the subject but one of his relations to other subjects. Nonetheless - or rather, by virtue of this very fact - medieval logicians considered this case as paradigmatic of the problem of the reference of the predicate-term in *incipit*- or *desinit*-propositions.

Due to the covert time reference involved in the two verbs the predicate in this sort of proposition refers not only to its actual bearers, but also to not actualized (past or future) bearers of the term. Hence the problem of knowing in which way this multiple reference occurs in such sentences. But in our sophism this problem is further complicated by the presence of the superlative 'albissimus', which functions as a syncategorematic term in causing a universal quantification (*distributio*) of the comparison relationship with respect to all of its terms. Adding the force of *desinit* to that of the superlative results in blocking universal instantiation of the term occurring within the range of the two *syncategoremata*. From (1) it is not possible to infer

(2) Socrates ceases to be whiter than Callias

nor

(2') Socrates ceases to be whiter than Plato

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1. The sophisms most commonly dealt with are: 'Sortes desinit esse non desinendo esse', 'Sortes desinit scire quicquid scit', 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum'. See e.g. Peter of Spain. **Syncategoremata**: 286 and Matthew of Orléans(?) **Distinctiones**, ms. Barcelona ff. 299vb-302vb.

for in the next instant, either Socrates will be still whiter than Callias, as he is now, or Socrates will not be whiter than Plato (who will be generated in the next instant), as he is not even now. It follows that when he ceases to be the whitest of men, Socrates is changing his relationship with respect to all other men without changing it with respect to each one of them taken separately.

As it is apparent from the above, our sophism presents a typical problem of opacity of reference. It is not surprising, then, if medieval logicians attempted to solve it in terms of the theory of supposition. (As a matter of fact, this and related sophisms were expressly designed to test the working of supposition theory in such problematic contexts). Here again, a full appreciation of the solution advanced by our anonymous author calls for a brief survey of parallel treatments in the *sophismata*-literature.

The solutions proposed to this sophism divide the medieval logicians into two groups. The first, and smallest, consists of those who deny the truth of (1). The proof (A) (see above 2.1) is then refuted because, according to these authors, in (A2) the term 'men' supposits for non-existing (future) men (due to the restriction effected on it by the future tense of the verb), while in (A3) it supposits only for present men. Hence (A) commits the fallacy of figure of speech (variation from one mode of supposition to another) or the fallacy of univocation ('men' is wrongly taken univocally in the premises). This kind of solution, which is adopted by the *Tractatus vaticanus de multiplicitatibus* and mentioned by Hervaeus Sophista and the supposed Matthew of Orléans, is reported and refuted by the author of our sophism before he introduces his own solution (see below *Solutio, Opinio cum refutatione*)[1].

The second group consists of the authors who concede the truth of (1). This group can be subdivided according to the way in which its members choose to invalidate the disproof (B). Most of them contend that the passage from (B1) to (B2) is illicit since in (B1) 'men' supposits *indifferenter* (*Tractatus florianus de solutionibus sophismatum,*) or *communiter* (Hervaeus Sophista, Vat. lat. 7678) or *simpliciter* (Nicholas of Paris, the tract attributed to Henry of Ghent) or *confuse tantum* (William of Sherwood, *Sophistaria Toledana*, Walter Burleigh) for *both* existing *and* non-existing men, while in (B2) its reference is restricted to existing men only *or* to

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1. See Anonymus, **Tractatus vaticanus** 149: 43; Hervaeus Sophista, **Abstractiones**: 211; Matthew of Orléans(?), **Distinctiones**, ms. Barcelona f. 302rb.

non-existing men only[1]. Hence we have a fallacy of figure of speech (variation from ampliated to restricted supposition) or of consequent (from a generic term to a more specific one). This solution is adopted also by our anonymous master, who holds that 'men' in (B1) has simple supposition and in (B2) has personal supposition (*Ad propositum*, a-b).

Moreover, as it is briefly mentioned in our sophism (*Ad propositum*, c), some authors consider also the case in which (B2) is taken *in sensu compositionis*, i.e. as meaning the same as

(B2') Socrates ceases to be the whitest of either existing men or non-existing men.

The author of the sophism in Vat. lat. 7678, Richardus Sophista and the author of the sophism in Worcester Q. 13 contend that (B) is valid only if (B2) is taken as equivalent to (B2')[2]. By contrast, according to John Le Page, Nicholas of Paris and the supposed Matthew of Orléans (who reports this position as *communis*) the passage from (B1) to (B2') is illicit too, incurring as it does the fallacy of consequent[3]. This claim is substantiated by the assertion that in (B1) 'men' supposits primarily (*primo, actualiter*) for existing men and only secondarily (*ex consequenti, potentialiter*) for non-existing men, while in (B2') it supposits primarily for existing and non-existing men. Hence the reference-class of 'men' in (B2') is more comprehensive than that of 'men' in (B1). But it is known as a rule that 'incipit' and 'desinit' block the ascent from a sentence containing a specific predicate to a sentence with a generic one, when the predicate is a concrete accidental term[4]. Hence (B) commits the fallacy of consequent (this line of argument is subscribed by our anonymous author in his response *ad 5.2*).

As a matter of fact, it is a common doctrine (first introduced in Le Page's *Syncategoremata*) that a concrete accidental term like 'albus', when functioning as a predicate in an *incipit*- or *desinit*-sentence, refers pri-

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1. See, Anonymus, **Tractatus florianus** 130: 81; Hervaeus Sophista, **Abstractiones**: 211; Anonymus, **Sophismata 'de incipit et desinit'**, ms. Vat. lat. 7678, f. 57vb; Nicholas of Paris, **Syncategoremata**: 265,18-266,3; Henry of Ghent(?), **Syncategoremata**, ms. Brugge 510, f. 235rb; William of Sherwood, **Syncategoremata**: 77; Anonymus, **Sophistaria Toledana**, ms. Cambridge f. 251vb; ms. Erfurt f. 50va; Walter Burleigh, **De puritate tr. long.** III.4: 195.
2. See Anonymus, **Sophismata 'de incipit et desinit'**, ms. Vat. lat. 7678, f. 57vb; Richardus Sophista, **Abstractiones**, soph. 210; Anonymus, **Sophisma 'Sortes desinit...'**, ms. Worcester Q. 13, f. 35ra.
3. See John Le Page, **Syncategoremata**: 200; Nicholas of Paris, **Syncategoreumata**: 266,4-12; Matthew of Orléans(?), **Distinctiones**, ms. Barcelona f. 302rb-va.
4. See e.g. John Le Page, **Syncategoremata**: 200 and Henry of Ghent(?), **Syncategoremata**, ms. Brugge 510, f. 235va.

marily to its actual bearers and secondarily to its potential bearers. If this were not the case, a sentence like

(3) Socrates ceases to be white

would be true even in the case when Socrates ceases to be white today, but will be white again tomorrow. Thus, 'white' in (3) must refer not only to Socrates' actual whiteness, but to his potential (future) whitenesses as well. This twofold supposition, however, has no effect when the predicate is a concrete substantial term, for substantial forms cannot inhere in the same subject more than once (so that e.g. when Socrates ceases to be a man or an animal, he ceases to be Socrates as well).

In building his own solution to the sophism (see below *Opinio propria*), our anonymous master resorts to this theory of the twofold supposition of the predicate-term in an *incipit*- or *desinit*-sentence, which is commonly held by Parisian masters such as John Le Page, Nicholas of Paris and the supposed Henry of Ghent, but also by logicians whose origin is at present unknown, like the supposed Matthew of Orléans and the author of the *Sophistaria Toledana*[1]. On the basis of such a theory the master asserts that the puzzling sentence (1) is true and that its disproof (B) is invalid, since it commits the fallacy of figure of speech letting the predicate-term vary from simple to personal supposition or from ampliated to restricted supposition.

Being affected by the twofold temporal reference of 'desinit', the predicate-term has in fact ampliated supposition, standing for both present and future men. It has also simple supposition since (due to the combined force of 'desinit' and the superlative) it stands for them indifferently (*sub quadam indifferentia*), i.e. not definitely for this nor for that man[2]. It follows that when functioning as a predicate in an *incipit*- or *desinit*-sentence a concrete accidental term acquires an intensional value. As a matter of fact, we learn from the answer to the second *quesitum* that

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1. See John Le Page, **Syncategoremata**: 199-200; Nicholas of Paris, **Syncategoreumata**: 263,12-264,22; Henry of Ghent(?), **Syncategoremata**, ms. Brugge 510, f. 235rb-va; Matthew of Orléans(?), **Distinctiones**, ms. Barcelona f. 302rb; Anonymus, **Sophistaria Toledana**, ms. Cambridge f. 251vb, ms. Erfurt f. 50va.

2. See below **Solutio. Ad propositum**. Note that in the relevant text **confusam** is a lectio **incerta** not only on paleographical grounds but also from the point of view of the theory of supposition, since it is opposed to the following **personalem**. Nontheless, I have chosen this reading on the basis of a passage in Peter of Spain's **Tractatus** 6.10: 84: "Suppositio enim confusa mobiliter non potest simul esse cum simplici, neque secundum idem neque secundum diversa, sed suppositio confusa immobiliter potest simul esse cum simplici, non secundum idem sed secundum diversa, ut dictum est". On the other hand, also the alternative reading **communem**, which could receive support from the **communiter** present in Hervaeus Sophista and in ms. Vat. lat. 7678 (see p. 79, above), seems not suitable as an opposite of **personalem**.

the predicates of the (affirmative and negative) sentences through which the exposition of 'incipit' or 'desinit' is performed need not refer to numerically the same individuals, but only to individuals which are the same *secundum formam* (see below *Solutio. Ad 2*). Hence according to the solution adopted by our author (which probably was the common one in his times), the opacity of reference causing the puzzle in a sentence like (1) is to be imputed to the intensional value lent to the predicate-term by the syncategorematic verb 'desinit'[1].

3. *Conclusion and rules of edition*

This treatment of the sophism 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum' is of relevance not only to the history of the interpretation of 'incipit' and 'desinit' in the XIIIth century, but to that of more general theories as well. Our master's theory of appellation, for instance, is quite traditional, based as it is on the distinction between *tempus consignificatum* and *res significata per verbum* (see below *Solutio. Ad 3*, d). Apparently he was not aware of the developments that were to lead to the theory, widely held by modist logicians, that not only ampliation but also restriction is due to the *res verbi*[2]. Moreover, his notion of simple supposition seems to be so wide as to cover also cases in which other logicians made use of the concept of *suppositio confusa tantum* or *confusa et immobilis*, as in propositional contexts where descent under the predicate is not allowed. Peter of Spain took a similar stance concerning the problem of the supposition of the predicate in a universal affirmative proposition[3].

In general, however, this sophism bears witness to a period when supposition theory was still considered a useful tool for a logician dealing with semantic puzzles. The eclipse of this theory in favour of a more signification-oriented approach to the problem of meaning apparently caused the long neglect of problems like that of Socrates ceasing to be the whitest of men, at least in the Parisian tradition[4].

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1. In his **In Physicam Aristotelis**, fol. 176-177, dealing with the problem of reconciling the indivisibility of instants with the divisibility of time, Walter Burleigh resorts to the concept of **suppositio confusa tantum**: see Sylla 1982 and Normore 1982. On the opposition between **suppositio simplex** and **suppositio confusa tantum** as the suitable semantical tool for interpreting intensional contexts see Read 1985.

2. Cf. de Libera 1986: 221-224 where the new theory is described according to the formulation of the author of the first collection in ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat. 16135.

3. See Peter of Spain, **Tractatus** 6. 10-11: 83-86.

4. On the fate of supposition theory in Paris logical teaching during the XIIIth century see Ebbesen 1981a and 1985.

The text of Kraków BJ 649 is substantially correct and has been subjected only to mild emendation. The answer to the argument (g) of the first *quesitum* is missing, either due to the process of copying or to the author's inaccurate revision. I have followed the manuscript in matters of orthography but not of punctuation or paragraphing. A word is needed to explain my seemingly bizarre use of single quotation marks. It is typical of medieval logicians (at least until the middle of the XIIIth century) not to distinguish carefully between the mention and the use of an expression. Thus throughout the sophism our author talks of 'esse albissimus' not only when quoting the predicate of the *prima propositio*, but also when he is speaking of the corresponding property of 'being the whitest (of men)'. I have decided not to correct all the occurences of 'esse albissimus' into 'esse albissimum', for I think the author's intention in these cases is to refer to Socrates' property of being the whitest of men, i.e. to the individual relative accident inhering in Socrates according to the sophism's 'casus'. Hence I have put this expression between single quotation marks also in cases when it is ambiguously used to refer to itself or to its significate.

The following sigla are used in the text or in the apparatus:

[album]	album *delendum censeo*
<album>	album *addendum censeo*
⁺album ac⁺	*verba* album ac *corrupta esse puto*
\album/	album *secundario (inter lineas vel in mg.) inseruit scriba*
K	*codex Kraków Biblioteka Jagiellonska 649*
K*ac*	*codex* K *ante correcturam*

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<Sophisma 9>

Queritur de hoc sophismate:

SORTES DESINIT ESSE ALBISSIMUS HOMINUM

<Positio>

Facta tali positione, quod sint multi homines albi, quorum Sortes sit albissimus in presenti et semper erit, et unus nascatur inmediate post hoc instans qui sit albior eo,

<Propositio. Probatio et improbatio>

proponatur hec 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum', cuius probatio et improbatio satis patent.

<Quesita>

De[1] isto sophismate quinque queruntur:

1. primum fuit de ueritate et falsitate illius;

2. secundum est de argumento probationis;

3. tertio fuit de suppositione terminorum apponentium[2] istis uerbis 'incipit' et 'desinit', utrum scilicet habeant[3] ampliatam suppositionem;

4. quarto quam suppositionem habeat iste terminus 'hominum' in proposito, scilicet an simplicem an personalem;

5. ultimum utrum tenet argumentum improbationis, hoc scilicet 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum; aut ergo hominum qui sunt aut hominum qui non sunt'.

1.

Quod autem prima propositio sit falsa ostenditur nouem rationibus. Quarum prima talis est.

a. Omnis forma que corrumpitur in aliquo aut corrumpitur per aduentum forme contrarie aut per corruptionem illius in quo est. Set 'albissimus' dicit formam existentem[4] in Sorte. Ergo si corrumpitur, hoc

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1. De : inde queritur **add. sed exp.** K.
2. supponentium K.
3. habeatur K.
4. existente K.

erit aut per aduentum forme contrarie aut per corruptione illius in quo
est. Non per aduentum forme contrarie, quia ad huc erit Sortes albissimus,
nec per corruptionem illius in quo est, quia Sortes non corrumpitur. Et sic
'esse albissimus' nullo modo corrumpitur; ergo si desitio corruptio est,
Sortes non desinit esse albissimus hominum.

Forte dicetur quod 'esse albissimus' in Sorte non corrumpitur per ad-
uentum forme contrarie nec per corruptionem subiecti, set per mutatio-
nem termini, quia post hoc instans augebitur numerus hominum respectu
quorum non erit albissimus.

Set contra hoc sic obicitur. Idem est terminus numero finis generationis
qui[5] est principium corruptionis; ergo cum inceptio sit quedam generatio
et desitio sit quedam corruptio, idem erit terminus desitionis et incep-
tionis. Ergo si Sortes <non> incepit esse albissimus nisi respectu hominum
qui sunt, non desinet esse albissimus nisi respectu hominum qui sunt. Set
non mutatur numerus hominum qui sunt, quare 'esse[6] albissimus' in Sorte
non corrumpitur per mutationem termini.

b. Ad idem. Nihil quod per se est terminus alterationis est per se
terminus generationis uel corruptionis. Sicut enim motus differunt, sic
termini motus differunt et econuerso. Set 'esse albissimus' est terminus
alterationis; ergo non erit terminus corruptionis, sicut substantia non est
terminus alterationis. Set desitio corruptio est, ergo 'esse[7] albissimus' non
erit terminus desitionis. Quare hoc est falsum 'Sortes desinit esse albis-
simus hominum'.

c. Ad idem. In quibuscumque est diuersitas secundum substantiam, ad
generationem factam in uno non sequitur corruptio in altero, ut patet in
homine et asino. Set Sortes et Uergilius, qui cras nascetur[8], diuersi sunt
secundum substantiam, et ad generationem factam in uno non sequitur
corruptio in alio. Et ita, siue nascatur alius siue non, semper erit Sortes
albissimus.

d. Ad idem. Quorumcumque Sortes est albissimus, semper erit albissi-
mus; set hominum Sortes est albissimus; ergo semper erit albissimus. Ergo
hec est falsa 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum'.

e. Ad idem. Quecumque sunt eadem secundum substantiam, quicquid
desinit esse unum desinit esse alterum. Set Sortes et 'albissimus hominum'
sunt eadem secundum substantiam et conuertibilia; ergo si Sortes desinat

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5. que **K.**
6. est **K.**
7. est **Kac.**
8. nascentur **K.**

esse albissimus hominum, desinit esse Sortes. Et minor patet, quia quic-
quid est albissimus hominum est Sortes et econuerso.

f. Ad idem. Sicut uult Priscianus in minori uolumine in secundo[a],
[quod] inter nomina exigentia obliquos necesse est hoc uerbum 'est' - uel
suum participium, scilicet 'ens' - subintelligi[9]. Set 'albissimus' est nomen
exigens oblicum; ergo necesse est inter ipsum et oblicum hoc uerbum 'est'
intelligere, uel 'ens', sicut medium. Quare sensus erit: 'Sortes desinit etc.',
id est 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum entium'. Set hec est sim-
pliciter falsa; quare prima[10]. /261va/

g. Ad idem. Cuiuscumque propositionis equipollens est falsa, ipsa est
falsa. Set iste due equipollent 'Sortes desinit etc.' et hec 'Sortes desinit
omnes homines excedere in albedine'; ergo cum hec sit falsa 'Sortes desi-
nit omnes homines excedere in albedine' ergo et prima. Quod autem equi-
pollent <patet> per Priscianum in maiori uolumine[b], quod superlatiuum
est quod comparatum[11] ad res sui generis superponitur[12]; et ita excedet
omnes res sui generis. Et ita probatur minor.

h. Item. Formarum quedam sunt respectiue, quedam absolute. Absolute
ut albedo, nigredo et alie que nihil requirunt preter subiectum in quo
sunt. Respectiue ut duplum et dimidium et alie quecumque requirunt
preter[13] subiectum in quo sunt aliud. Et harum duplex est genus, quia
quedam sunt forme[14] relatiue secundum esse et ueritatem, ut duplum et
dimidium, quedam secundum dici solum, ut uirtus et scientia. Item forme
relatiue secundum ueritatem habent duplicem terminum, unum per se, re-
licum per accidens. Quod patet, Sortes enim est pater Platonis et Sortes est
pater [et] filii. Dicitur enim pater ad Platonem per accidens, ad filium au-
tem per se; uera est hec per accidens 'Sortes est pater Platonis', per se au-
tem 'filii'. Set omnis ueritas enunciationis uere per accidens reducitur ad
ueritatem enunciationis uere per se, quia per accidens ad[15] per se redu-

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9. subiectum intelligi **K**.
10. Scribitur in De morte et uita: omne quod corrumpitur, corrumpitur aut quia habet
    contrarium aut quia compositum ex contrariis aut quia est in habente contrarium; sed
    albedo que inest Sorti non corrumpitur sic uel sic; ergo **alia manu in imo folio habet K**.
11. comparatur **K**.
12. supponitur **K**.
13. preter : quod in **K**.
14. forme : cor[e] **K**.
15. per accidens ad: ad per accidens **K**.

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a. **Prisc. Inst. XVIII.1 (ed. Hertz: 212,1-2):** Nominibus quidem exigentibus obliquos necesse est
   substantivum verbum vel participium consequi.
b. **Prisc. Inst. III.18 (ed. Hertz: 94,15-17):** Superlativum est, quod vel ad plures sui generis
   comparatum superponitur omnibus vel per se prolatum intellectum habet cum 'valde'
   adverbio positivi.

citur, sicut dicit Aristotiles in II Phisicorum[c], quare ueritas per accidens reducetur ad ueritatem per se. Set ueritas enunciationis causata a forma relatiua respectu termini ad quem dicitur per se est per se ueritas; ergo hec ueritas ad illam reducitur[16]; ergo et falsitas ad falsitatem. Ergo si est oratio falsa cum forma relatiua dicitur ad extremum per se, erit falsa cum dicitur ad extremum per accidens. Set 'albissimus' est forma relatiua dicta ad hunc terminum 'hominum' per accidens, ad hunc autem terminum 'minus alborum' per se; ergo cum hec sit falsa 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus minus alborum', hec erit falsa 'Sortes desinit esse alissimus hominum'.

Forte dicetur quod hoc quod dico 'minus alborum' non est extremum ad quod 'albissimus' dicitur per se, set 'alborum' solum.

Set contra. Sortes excedit homines; aut ergo quia albos aut quia minus albos. Non quia albos, quia qua ratione excederet homines quia albos, excederet se ipsum; ergo excedit quia minus albos. Et ita hoc totum 'minus alborum' est extremum ad quod dicitur per se.

i. Ad idem. Omne illud quod recipitur in alio est in illo per modum recipientis et non per modum recepti, set albissimus hominum recipitur in Sorte; ergo per modum recipientis recipitur et non per modum recepti. Ergo si 'Sortes' stat pro presenti, et hoc totum 'albissimus hominum' stabit pro presenti. Set pro presentibus est falsa, quare hec est falsa 'Sortes etc.'

j. Item. Quecumque se habent ut excedentia et excessa sunt actu essentia, set Sortes et alii homines a Sorte se habent ut excedentia et excessa; ergo sunt actu essentia. Quare iste terminus 'hominum' supponit pro hominibus qui sunt actu, set illorum non desinit esse albissimus; quare Sortes non desinit esse albissimus hominum.

Ad oppositum.

a. Omne quod conuenit Sorti et de cetero non conuenit Sorti desinit esse[17] [conuenit Sorti]. Set 'esse albissimus' hominum Sorti conuenit et de cetero non conuenit ei; quare desinit esse albissimus hominum.

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16. reducitur : et add. sed exp. K.
17. desinit esse iter. sed exp. K.

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c. Cf. Auct. Arist. 2, 83 (ed. Hamesse: 147): Omne per accidens reducitur ad aliquod per se. Idem adagium refert Albertus Magnus Physica, II.2.19 (ed. Colon. 1987: 126,5-13) ad Phys. II.6, 198a8-9 : Quoniam vero casus et fortuna causae quidem sunt efficientes, quorum est utique natura vel intellectus vera causa, et casus et fortuna sunt circa naturalia et intellectualia, cum fiant secundum accidens, nihil autem eorum quae fiunt secundum accidens potest esse prius eo quod per se est, eo quod omne per accidens reducitur ad aliquod per se, sicut supra (II.2.15: 121,25-33) ostendimus, manifestum est, quod causa secundum accidens oportet, quod habet ante se priorem, quae est causa per se".

b. Ad idem. Si Sortes desinit esse albissimus, ergo aliquorum; non asinorum neque aliorum nisi hominum; ergo desinit esse albissimus hominum.

c. Ad idem. Aut Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum aut non. Si desinit esse albissimus hominum, habeo propositum. Si non desinit et est albissimus, ergo ad huc erit albissimus hominum. Set positum fuit quod post hoc instans nasceretur aliquis albior eo, cuius ille non erit albissimus, et est nunc albissimus hominum. Ergo desinit esse albissimus hominum.

d. Ad idem. Omne comparatum ad aliquid ut excedens, termino augmentato cuius erat excessus, non amplius est excedens respectu illius comparantis secundum quod prius exced<eb>at. Quod patet: senarius numerus excedit ternarium in duplo, set si addatur unum ternario iam corrumpitur illa proportio, ita quod dupla fiet sex<qui>altera. Set 'albissimus' dicit excessum albedinis in Sorte respectu hominum, set talis nascetur albior illo, quare non erit tunc albissimus hominum.

e. Item. Sequitur quod si Sortes est albissimus hominum, est albissimus hominum licet non in illo instanti in quo nascetur albior Sorte. Tunc arguatur sic. Quisquis est albissimus albiore[18] est albius[19] minus albo, set Uergilius, qui iam natus est, est albior Sorte; ergo est albior quolibet minus albo. <Cum> ergo Sortes est albissimus hominum; ergo Uergilius est albissimus omnium hominum. Set quod per superhabundantiam dicitur uni soli conuenit, set albissimus dicitur per superhabundantiam; ergo uni soli conuenit; ergo conuenit tantum Sorti aut tantum Uergilio. Non tantum Sorti; ergo tantum Uergilio. Set ante hoc instans erat[20] Sortes albissimus hominum, quare tunc desinebat esse albissimus hominum.

2.

Secundo queritur de argumento probationis, utrum teneat.

a. Et uidetur quod non, quia enunciationes que propositionem exponunt in qua ponitur hoc uerbum 'desinit' sunt contradictorie, hoc solum retento, quod non sunt pro eodem tempore. Est enim[21] affirmatio pro presenti, negatio pro futuro. Ut patet, si dicatur 'Sortes desinit esse homo': 'Sortes est homo et de cetero non erit homo'. Unde debent esse affirmatio et negatio de eodem et respectu eiusdem, aut aliter non essent expositiue

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18. albisssimo albior **fort. scribendum**
19. albius : albissimus **Kac** albior **fort. scribendum**
20. erit **K**.
21. enim : quia **K**.

huius uerbi 'desinit'. Non enim sequitur 'Sortes est albus[22] et de cetero non erit niger; ergo desinit esse albus'.

Ex hiis sic potest argui. Quandocumque proceditur ex affirmatiua et negatiua ueris respectu diuersorum ac si essent respectu eiusdem fit paralogismus secundum elenchi ignorantiam. Set sic est in proposito; ergo in argumento probationis est elenchi ignorantia. Probatio minoris[23]: in hac 'Sortes est albissimus hominum' iste terminus 'hominum' supponit pro hiis qui sunt, in hac uero 'de cetero non erit albissimus hominum' non supponit pro hominibus[24] tantum qui sunt, quia tunc esset falsa ut patet per positionem; ergo supponit pro hiis qui non sunt. Et sic non pro eisdem fit affirmatio et negatio; quare patet conclusio.

3.

Item, queritur circa tertium.

a. Et uidetur quod termini apponentes hiis uerbis 'incipit' et 'desinit' habeant ampliatam suppositionem, quia omnis terminus supponens uel apponens alicui uerbo habenti in se duas differentias temporis uel plures supponit secundum exigentiam illius uerbi - ut patet: 'album fuit disputaturum' -; set hoc uerbum 'desinit' est uerbum habens in se duas differentias temporis, ut /261vb/ patet exponenti; ergo terminus apponens illi subponet secundum exigentiam illorum temporum, et sic pro presentibus et futuris. Et sic habet ampliatam suppositionem.

b. Preterea. Nisi terminus communis apponens huic uerbo 'desinit' haberet ampliatam suppositionem, tunc hec esset uera 'Sortes desinit esse coloratus', posito quod esset albus et inciperet esse niger. Hec enim est uera 'Sortes est coloratus colore qui[25] nunc est', quia albedine, 'et de cetero non erit coloratus colore qui nunc[26] est', quia erit coloratus nigredine. Et sic esset uera 'Sortes desinit esse coloratus'. Quod cum sit falsum, relinquitur quod iste terminus 'coloratus' non supponit pro eodem[27] in affirmatiua et negatiua, set pro colore qui est in affirmatiua, pro colore communiter qui est uel qui non est in negatiua. Quare habet ampliatam suppositionem.

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22. albius K.
23. minoris : me^e K.
24. omnibus K.
25. quia K.
26. qui nunc : quia tunc K.
27. eodem : et add. et exp. K.

Ad oppositum sunt rationes communes[28].

a. Regula est quod "terminus communis supponens uel apponens uerbo presentis temporis restringitur ad supponendum pro presentibus". Set hoc uerbum 'desinit' est presentis temporis; ergo terminus sibi apponens restringetur ad supponendum pro presentibus. Et sic erit sensus 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum qui sunt'. Set hec est falsa simpliciter; ergo et prima. Et ex hoc concluditur quod non habet ampliatam suppositionem.

b. Item. Omne uerbum habens uirtutem ampliandi significat rem que indifferenter conuenit enti et non enti, ut patet in uerbo 'potest' et 'laudatur' etc., set hoc uerbum 'desinit' non significat rem que indifferenter conuenit enti et non enti, set enti[29] solum, quia solum ens desinit esse; ergo non habet uirtutem ampliandi. Set <si> sic, tunc non ampliatur iste terminus 'hominum' ad supponendum pro hominibus[30] qui sunt et qui non sunt, quare stat pro hominibus[31] qui sunt solum. Et sic habet[32] restrictam suppositionem, et concluditur ex hoc prima esse falsa.

c. Item. Nullum inferius ampliat ad ea ad que restringit superius, ut 'album' non ampliat[33] ad ea ad que restringit 'coloratum'; set desinere esse idem est quod nunc ultimo esse, quod est inferius ad esse. Sequitur enim 'hoc est nunc ultimo, ergo hoc est', et non conuertitur; quare est inferius. Ergo desinere [est] esse similiter est inferius[34] ad esse. Ergo non ampliat ad ea ad que restringit hoc uerbum 'esse'. Set hoc uerbum 'esse' restringit[35] ad ens; ergo hoc uerbum 'desinit' multo fortius, et ita non ampliat ad ens et ad non ens.

d. Item. Omne compositum trahitur ad naturam dominantis[36] in illo, ut scribitur in principio Celi et mundi[d]; set in hoc uerbum 'desinit' est

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28. continues K.
29. enti s.l. : erit Kac.
30. omnibus K.
31. omnibus K.
32. habent K.
33. ampliatur K.
34. \in/ferius K.
35. restringitur K.
36. dominantis : durantis K.

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d. **Arist. De coelo** I.2, 269a1-2, 4-5, 28-30 (transl. M. Scoti, ed. Venetiis 1562, fol. 6E, K, 9K): et motus corporum simplicium simplices, et motus corporum compositorum erunt diuersi: sed tamen mouentur secundum motum corporis simplicis in eis dominantis ... si ergo in corpore composito inueniatur motus simplex, erit ille motus corporis simplicis dominantis in illo ... et iam diximus superius quod corpora composita sunt secundum corpus simplex, existens, et dominans in eis. Cf. **Averrois comm. 7 ad hunc locum (fol. 6G):** Dixit: & motus corporum compositorum erunt diuersi: sed tamen mouentur secundum motum corporis simplicis dominantis ita quod motus eorum erunt secundum naturam corporis simplicis dominantis. Cf. **etiam Auct. Arist. 3, 7 (ed. Hamesse: 160):** Mixto non competit motus, nisi

duplex intellectus temporis: presentis et futuri; ergo trahitur ad naturam dominantis[37] in illo. Set presens[38] tempus dominatur[39] in illo; ergo erit presentis temporis tantum. Et si sic, tunc terminus supponens supponet tantum pro presentibus.

e. Item. Terminorum quidam sunt substantiales, quidam accidentales. Et assignatur differentia inter illos, secundum quod apponunt illis uerbis 'incipit' 'desinit', quod termini accidentales quantum ad primam suppositionem supponunt[40] pro eis qui sunt, quantum ad secundam pro hiis qui non sunt; termini uero substantiales quantum ad utramque suppositionem supponunt pro hiis qui sunt. Et appellatur[41] prima[42] suppositio quam habent termini ratione temporis consignificati per uerbum; secunda suppositio appellatur[43] quam habent termini ratione temporis subintellecti. Ex hoc sic arguitur. Termini substantiales quantum ad utramque suppositionem supponunt pro hiis qui sunt apponentes istis uerbis 'incipit' et 'desinit'; set iste terminus 'hominum' est terminus substantialis; ergo supponet tantum pro eis qui sunt.

<center>4.</center>

De quarto. Sic potest ostendi quod habet simplicem suppositionem.

a. Impossibile est eundem terminum simul et semel supponere pro presentibus et futuris actualiter - et hoc dico propter hoc uerbum 'potest'. Queritur ergo: in hac propositione 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum' iste terminus 'hominum' aut supponit pro hiis qui sunt tantum aut pro hiis qui non sunt <tantum>. Neque pro hiis neque pro illis. Nec pro hiis qui sunt tantum, hoc supposito per expositorias, neque pro hiis qui non sunt tantum; ergo tenet medium et omnis talis habet simplicem suppositionem. Quare habebit iste terminus 'hominum' simplicem suppositionem.

Ad oppositum.

a. Simplex suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro sua simplici essentia; set iste terminus 'hominum' non stat pro sua simplici essentia; ergo non habet simplicem suppositionem.

37. dominantis : durantis **K**.
38. presens : plures **K**.
39. denominatur **K**.
40. supponit **K**.
41. ampliatur **K**.
42. primo **K**.
43. ampliatur **K**.

ratione elementi praedominantis in ipso.

b. Item. Nullus terminus significans formam multiplicatam per materiam⁴⁴ habet simplicem suppositionem, quia contraxio ad materiam repugnat simplici suppositioni. Set iste terminus 'hominum' est huiusmodi, quia significat formam communem in plurali que est multiplicata per materiam: numerus enim sequitur materiam. Ergo non habet simplicem suppositionem.

c. Item. Nullus terminus significans formam communem numeratam habet intentionem speciei uel generis - homines non sunt species neque animalia sunt genus -, set iste terminus 'hominum' significat formam communem numeratam; ergo non habet intentionem speciei uel generis uel alicuius alterius uniuersalis. Ergo iste terminus 'hominum' non habet simplicem suppositionem.

5.1

Ultimo queritur utrum sequatur 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum, ergo hominum qui sunt'.

a. Quod sic uidetur, quia bene sequitur 'Sortes desinit esse homo, ergo desinit esse homo qui est'.

b. Similiter bene sequitur 'Sortes desinit uidere hominem, ergo desinit uidere hominem qui est'. Ergo similiter sequitur 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum, ergo desinit esse albissimus hominum qui sunt'.

5.2

a. Item. Quod sequitur 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum, ergo hominum qui sunt uel qui non sunt' uidetur sub disiunctione, quia esse et non esse opponuntur sicut affirmatio et negatio, set de quolibet affirmatio uel negatio; ergo de quolibet dicetur esse uel non esse. Ergo pari ratione 'homines qui sunt uel qui non sunt', et ita sequitur 'desinit esse albissimus hominum, ergo hominum qui sunt uel qui non sunt'.

b. Item. In hac oratione 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum' sunt affirmatio et negatio, set ratione utriusque sequitur. Sequitur enim 'est albissimus hominum, ergo est albissimus hominum qui sunt uel qui non sunt'. Similiter sequitur 'de cetero non erit albissimus hominum, ergo de cetero non erit albissimus hominum qui sunt uel qui non sunt'. Quare sequitur 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum, ergo desinit esse albissimus hominum qui sunt uel qui non sunt'.

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44. naturam **K**.

Solutio
<Opinio cum refutatione>

Quidam dicunt quod prima falsa est simpliciter et concedunt quasdam rationes que facte fuerunt ad falsitatem huius 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum' et respondunt ad argumentum probationis per fallaciam figure dictionis uel per fallaciam ignorantie elenchi. Per fallaciam figure dictionis ex uariato modo supponendi huius termini 'hominum' in affirmatiua et negatiua propositione: cum enim dicitur 'est albissimus hominum et de cetero non erit', quia in prima supponit iste terminus 'hominum' pro presentibus in alia pro futuris, tunc mutatur eius suppositio. Et ex hoc assignant elenchi[45] ignorantiam, sicut ostendebat ratio facta ad argumentum probationis.

Set qui sic ponunt[46] uidentur destruere expositionem orationum in quibus ponitur hoc uerbum 'desinit' et eius naturam et suppositionem terminorum eis apponentium.

Item, et hoc accideret, quod in omni argumento facto per locum ab expositione huius uerbi 'desinit' esset[47] fallacia pari ratione.

<Opinio propria>

Item, duplex est terminus: quidam substantialis et quidam accidentalis, et duplex suppositio terminorum apponentium /262ra/ hiis uerbis 'incipit' et 'desinit': una prima et alia ex consequenti habita, sicut dictum est superius. Dicendum est ergo quod termini accidentales apponentes istis uerbis 'incipit' et 'desinit' quantum ad primam suppositionem <supponunt> pro hiis qui sunt, quantum ad secundam pro hiis qui non sunt.

Et ratio huius est, quia forma accidentalis est circa subiectum transmutata manente subiecto, forma substantialis non. Unde si ita sit quod Sortes sit modo albissimus et incipiat esse niger et deinde iterato erit albus, hec est falsa 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus', quia altera exponentium est falsa, hec scilicet 'de cetero non erit albus', quia si iste terminus 'albus' supponeret tantum pro albedine que nunc est, uera esset. Quare patet quod terminus accidentalis apponens hiis uerbis 'incipit' et 'desinit' non supponit tantum pro hiis qui sunt.

Set termini substantiales quantum[48] ad utramque suppositionem supponunt [eis] pro eis qui sunt. Et causa huius est, quoniam terminus substan-

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45. elenchi: c add. sed exp. K.
46. sic ponunt : supponunt K.
47. esse K.
48. tantum K.

tialis inponitur[49] a forma substantiali, que non potest transmutari circa subiectum subiecto manente neque forma opposita[50] introduci et iterato eadem introduci. Ideo sequitur 'desinit esse homo, ergo homo qui est'. Et ideo terminus substantialis quantum ad utramque suppositionem supponit pro hiis qui sunt.

Ita apparet diuersitas suppositionum istorum terminorum secundum quod apponunt istis uerbis. Et quia iste terminus 'hominum', licet non sit accidentalis, ratione sue obliquitatis sortitur rationem accidentis, ideo modum supponendi habet terminorum accidentalium. Et sic non supponit quantum ad utramque suppositionem pro hiis qui sunt, set quo ad primam suppositionem pro eis qui sunt, in negatiua uero stat sub quadam indifferentia pro eis qui sunt uel qui non sunt.

<center><Ad propositum></center>

Ideo aliter dicendum est, quod prima propositio simpliciter est uera et concedende sunt rationes ad hanc partem adducte.

Ad argumentum improbationis potest responderi per fallaciam figure dictionis, quia iste terminus 'hominum' in prima habet simplicem suppositionem siue confusam[51], unde stat sub[52] quadam indifferentia ad supponendum pro eis qui sunt uel qui non sunt, ita quod nec pro hiis qui sunt nec pro eis qui non sunt. Concluditur autem ac si haberet personalem suppositionem.

b. Aliter potest dici quod proceditur ab ampliata ad restrictam huius termini 'hominum'.

c. Dicitur autem a quibusdam quod hec conclusio duplex est 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum, ergo hominum qui sunt uel hominum qui non sunt', eo quod potest esse disiunctio inter terminos uel inter propositiones. Si primo modo uera est, si secundo modo falsa est. Et tunc possunt assignari predicte fallacie.

<center><Ad rationes></center>
<center><Ad 1></center>

a. Ad primum argumentum dicendum quod esse albissimus in Sorte corrumpitur non per aduentum forme contrarie nec per corruptionem subiecti, set per mutationem termini sicut dice<ba>tur.

49. inponitur : in potentia **K**.
50. apposita **K**.
51. confusam : 9ᵐ **K** communem legi poterit, sed vide supra p. 81, n.2
52. sub : pro **K**.

Ad obiectum in contrarium dicendum quod, "generationis et corruptionis est idem terminus numero": dicendum quod hoc est uerum secundum formam et non secundum materiam. Unde eadem est forma significata[53] numero per hunc terminum 'hominum' in hac 'Sortes est albissimus hominum' et in hac 'de cetero non erit albissimus hominum' et in hac 'Sortes incipit esse[54] albissimus hominum' et 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum'. Et sic patet solutio ad primum obiectum, quoniam non est necesse quod desinat esse albissimos istorum hominum, set hominum. Similiter quia non est inceptio et desitio respectu eiusdem termini in respectu ad materiam, set solum secundum formam.

b. Ad aliud dicendum quod duplex est generatio et corruptio: quedam simpliciter[55] et hec est substantiarum, et alia secundum quid, et hec est accidentium. Dicendum ergo "<nihil> quod est terminus alterationis est per se terminus generationis uel corruptionis" simpliciter, tamen potest esse terminus generationis et corruptionis secundum quid. Et sic 'albissimus'[56] potest esse terminus desitionis in Sorte.

c. Ad aliud dicendum quod rerum quedam sunt absolute, quedam respectiue. Absolute quarum esse finitum est in se nec dependet ab altero, sicut homo et asinus, respectiue sicut omnis forma relatiua[57]. Et dicendum quod, "in eis que sunt diuersa secundum substantiam ad mutationem in uno non sequitur mutatio in altero": hoc est uerum quantum ad esse absolutum quod inesset, tamen quantum ad esse relatiuum non est uerum. Quod patet: generato filio generatur pater in altero, corrupto domino desinit esse seruus. Et quia 'albissimus' dicit formam relatiuam, ideo corrumpitur <non> facta mutatione illius in quo est secundum substantiam, sicut uisum est.

d. Ad aliud dicendum quod non debet sic inferre, scilicet quod 'hominum semper erit albissimus', set quod 'hominum quorum est albissimus semper erit albissimus'. Set non sequitur 'hominum est albissimus quorum semper erit albissimus, ergo hominum semper erit albissimus', ymmo est ibi fallacia figure dictionis a restricta ad ampliatam.

e. Ad aliud dicendum quod ydemptitas secundum substantiam est multiplex. Uno modo nomine uel diffinitione, proprio uel accidente. Dicendum est ergo quod "quicquid desinit [desinit] esse aliquid horum que sunt eadem secundum substantiam" nomine uel diffinitione uel proprio, desinit

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53. significatiua **K.**
54. est **K.**
55. similiter **K.**
56. albissimum **K.**
57. relatiue **K.**

esse alterum, set non modo tertio. Et si obicitur quod sunt conuertibilia, dicendum quod duplex est conuertibilitas: quedam secundum omne tempus, alia secundum aliquod tempus. Dicendum est ergo quod in conuertibilibus predicabilibus secundum omne tempus quicquid desinit esse unum, desinit esse relicum, set non in conuertibilibus secundum aliquod tempus; et talia sunt 'Sortes' et 'albissimus hominum'. Nunc enim sunt conuertibilia et non semper erunt conuertibilia.

f. Ad aliud dicendum quod intelligitur participium medium, scilicet "entium", et est[58] [et est] sensus 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus entium hominum', et est idem quod prius. Quia potest probari sic et etiam improbari sic, dicendo 'Sortes est albissimus entium hominum et de cetero non erit albissimus entium hominum', quia plures erunt entes quam modo sint. Uel dicendo quod intelligitur ratione compositionis et non ratione actus, et quia ista compositio non ponit ens actu, set potentia solum, ideo non sequitur quod desinat esse albissimus hominum qui sunt actu.

h. Ad aliud dicendum, sicut dice<ba>tur, quod hoc totum 'minus alborum' non est totum ad quod[59] dicatur 'albissimus' per se, set hoc quod dico 'alborum'.

Ad obiectum in contrarium, quod in hoc quod dico 'albissimus' sunt duo: natura partitionis et natura[60] excessus. Et concedendum quod ex<c>edit homines albos, quia minus, non quia albos; set non est partituum hominum minus alborum, set alborum solum. Et quia debet[61] esse partitio eorum respectu quorum denotatur fieri desitio, non tamen est pars 'minus alborum', set 'alborum' solum, ideo non desinit esse albissimus minus alborum, set alborum solum.

i. Ad aliud dicendum est quod Sortes potest dupliciter considerari: aut in quantum est actualiter excedens aut in quantum est potentialiter excessus. Primo modo stat li 'hominum' pro hiis qui sunt, secundo pro hiis qui non sunt potest stare, a quibus Sortes potentialiter exceditur.

j. Ad ultimum dicendum quod excedens et excedi dupliciter possunt accipi: aut actualiter aut potentialiter. Primo modo uerum est quod quecumque se habent ut excedentia[62] et excessa sunt actu essentia, set non secundo modo.

58. est : entium add. sed exp. K.
59. quod : quantum K.
60. natura : et add. sed exp. K.
61. dicet K.
62. excedentia : excedat K.

<Ad 2>

a. Ad argumentum quod fiebat contra probationem dicendum est quod respectu eiusdem secundum formam debet esse negatio et affirmatio que exponunt hoc uerbum 'desinit', et non respectu eiusdem secundum materiam ⁺et apud materiam⁺, <sci>licet formam concretam siue suppositum. Non enim ualet 'Sortes est albissimus albedine que nunc est et de cetero non erit albissimus albedine que nunc est; ergo desinit esse albissimus', facta positione quod sit nunc albus et incipit esse niger et iterato incipiat esse albus. Unde non habet completam rationem contradictionis cum terminis accidentalibus ad minus. /262rb/

<Ad 3>

Ad tertio quesitum possumus dicere quod termini accidentales apponentes istis uerbis 'incipit' et 'desinit' habent ampliatam suppositionem. Et concedende sunt rationes.

a. Posset respondi ad primam illarum quod si ille differentie temporis essent ex primo⁶³ et ex principali intellectu, uerum esset; set non sic est, propter hoc non est necesse quod termini apponentes eis amplientur.

a. Ad argumenta que sunt ad oppositum dicendum est quod intelligenda est regula quando illud uerbum non habet uirtutem ampliandi, set hoc uerbum 'desinit' habet, ut uisum est. Uel dicendum quod termini apponentes illis uerbis habent duplicem suppositionem: unam primo et aliam ex consequenti. Quantum ad primam suppositionem restringuntur ad supponendum pro eis qui sunt, quantum ad secundam non, ideo supponunt pro eis qui non sunt.

b. Ad aliud dicendum quod in hoc uerbo duo sunt, scilicet positio in presenti et priuatio futuri. Primo modo conuenit enti solum, secundo modo conuenit non enti. Et sic ad huc potest habere rationem ampliandi.

c. Ad aliud dicendum similiter quod hoc uerbum 'desinit' quantum ad id quod significat positionem in presenti est inferius ad ens, et sic non <habet> uirtutem ampliandi. Set quantum ad hoc quod significat priuationem in futuro est inferius ad <non> ens, et sic potest ampliare.

d. Ad aliud dicendum quod uerum est quod in hoc uerbo 'desinit' est intellectus duplicis temporis: unius principaliter, alterius ex consequenti. Et concedendum est quod hoc uerbum 'desinit' est presentis temporis tantum, set <ex> hoc non <sequitur> quod terminus sibi apponens non

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63. primo : equo **K.**

possit ampliari, quia non fit ampliatio ratione temporis consignificati - quia si sic numquam fieret ampliatio -, set ratione rei significate. Et quia significat positionem in presenti primo et ex consequenti priuationem in futuro, ideo potest habere quodammodo uim ampliandi.

e. Ad aliud argumentum solutum est superius quod licet iste terminus 'hominum' sit substantialis, tamen in ratione obliquitatis sortitur naturam accidentis.

<Ad 4>

Ad quarto quesitum potest dici[64] quod iste terminus 'hominum' habet simplicem suppositionem.

Set multipliciter est simplex suppositio. Una que fit per indeterminationem partis, et talem simplicem suppositionem habet terminus communis post dictionem exceptiuam, sicut hic 'omne animal preter hominem est irrationale'. Alia est simplex suppositio acceptio termini communis pro sua simplici essentia, sicut hic 'homo est species'. Terta est simplex suppositio acceptio termini communis sub quadam indifferentia pro presentibus et pro futuris. Et talem suppositionem dicitur habere iste terminus 'hominum' in proposito.

a-c. Ad argumenta que sequuntur respondendum est quod obicit de simplici suppositione secundo modo dicta et non tertio modo dicta, quia multiplicatio forme communis per materiam non repugnat simplici suppositioni tertio modo dicta.

<Ad 5.1>

Ad quintum dicendum est quod non sequitur 'desinit esse albissimus hominum, ergo hominum qui sunt'.

a. Ad obiectum contra hoc dicendum quod non est simile in hac 'Sortes desinit esse homo qui est' <et> de hac 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum', quoniam in hac 'Sortes desinit esse homo' iste terminus 'homo', cum sit terminus [sit] substantialis, quantum ad utramque suppositionem supponit pro hiis qui sunt. Set in hac 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum' iste terminus 'hominum' non supponit quantum ad utramque suppositionem pro hominibus qui sunt, set quantum ad primam suppositionem supponit pro hiis qui sunt, quantum ad secundam suppositionem pro hominibus qui non sunt, cum habeat modum supponendi termini accidenta-

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64. dicere **K**.

lis, ut dictum est. Et ideo non sequitur 'desinit esse albissimus hominum, ergo hominum qui sunt'.

b. Ad aliud quod ponebatur similiter dicendum quod non est simile, quoniam[65] iste actus 'uidere' tantum[66] transit materialiter supra actum existentem unde[67] sequitur 'desinit uidere hominem, ergo hominem qui est'; set 'esse albissimus' potest conuenire rei actualiter[68] enti et potentialiter enti. Et ideo non est simile.

<center>*<Ad 5.2>*</center>

Ad illud quod queritur utrum sequatur 'desinit esse albissimus hominum, ergo hominum qui sunt uel qui non sunt' posset distingui sicut superius dicebatur secundum compositionem et diuisionem, et sic uno modo sequitur, alio modo non.

Set sustinendo quod sit ibi fallacia figure dictionis ab ampliata ad restrictam, dicendum quod non sequitur, ymmo est fallacia consequentis a minus communi[69] ad magis commune, quia in hac 'Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum' quantum ad primam suppositionem supponit iste terminus 'hominum' pro eis qui sunt, quantum ad secundam pro eis qui non sunt et actualiter pro eis qui sunt et potentialiter[70] pro eis qui non sunt. In conclusione uero quantum ad utramque suppositionem pro eis supponit qui sunt <et qui non sunt> actualiter et potentialiter. Unde actualiter supponit pro eis qui sunt et potentialiter, et actualiter et potentialiter pro eis qui non sunt, uirtute implicantium. Set minus est supponere actualiter pro eis qui sunt et potentialiter pro eis qui non sunt quam actualiter et potentialiter supponere pro eis qui sunt et actualiter et potentialiter pro eis qui non sunt. Ideo fit[71] fallacia consequentis a minus communi ad magis commune, sicut dictum est, et sequitur econuerso, ut patet intuenti.

a. Ad argumenta in contrarium dicendum, ad primum, quod esse et non esse opponuntur ut affirmatio et negatio siue contradictorie quando sunt de eodem, et sic dicuntur de quolibet; set iste due 'homines qui sunt' 'homines qui non sunt' non sunt de eodem; ideo non est necesse quod de quolibet dicantur. Uel dicendum quod differt predicari et sequi, quia pre-

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65. quoniam : e add. sed exp. K.
66. tantum quando K.
67. unde : non K.
68. actualiter : a add. sed exp. K.
69. commune K.
70. potentialiter : q add.sed exp. K.
71. sit K.

dicari est secundum ydemptitatem substantialem, quia nihil est cui non sit substantiale esse uel non esse siue affirmatio et negatio, ideo affirmatio et negatio predicantur de quolibet; set sequi non est secundum ydemptitatem substantialem, set secundum causalitatem aliquam. Hoc per se patet, quia antecedens dicitur esse causa consequentis. Et quia aliquod antecedens non est causa alicuius affirmationis et negationis (quod patet: non enim[1] sequitur quod si Sortes currit quod Plato disputet uel non disputet, tamen hec est uera 'Sortes currens est Plato disputans [est] uel non est Plato disputans'), ideo non est necesse sequi, si Sortes desinit esse albissimus hominum, quod desinit esse albissimus hominum qui sunt uel qui non sunt.
Ad ultimum patet solutio per ea que dicta sunt.
Et hec sufficiant de isto sophismate[2].

APPENDIX

A List of Sophisms in ms. Krakow BJ 649

I will give here a complete list of the *sophismata* collected in ms. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellonska 649, ff. 253ra-271vb. Since the incipits, when still existing, are informative about the structure of the sophism, I will report them rather at length. However, due to their formulaic nature, incipits are hardly sufficient to identify *sophismata*, hence, I will also report the initial lines from the *solutio* of each sophism.

1. INFINITA SUNT FINITA, 253ra
inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate 'infinita sunt finita'. Probatio et improbatio patent. Circa hoc sophisma possunt tria queri: primum est de distinctione; secundum est de ueritate et falsitate; tertium de improbatione. Circa primum sic proceditur...

Solutio. De hoc sophismate tria queruntur, propter hoc respondendum est primo in generali ad illa tria. Primo dico quod distinctio preassignata, quamuis in se bona sit, tamen non ualet ad propositum...

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1. tamen K.
2. sopiae Kac.

exp. Ad ultimum dico quod quia infinitum in plurali numero significat multitudinem, multitudo est discreta quantitas. Ideo possunt sufficenter <...> hic queruntur de hoc sophismate.

2.   ALIQUA IN EO QUOD CONUENIUNT DIFFERUNT, 254ra

inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate 'aliqua in eo quod conueniunt differunt'. Probatio: aliqua in eo quod conueniunt sunt ... Circa istud sophisma possumus tria querere: primum est de quadam distinctione; secundum est de ueritate et falsitate prime; tertium est de ueritate et falsitate probantium. De primo sic dicebat respondens primam esse duplicem ex eo quod hec reduplicatio 'in eo quod' potest fieri ratione materie uel forme...

Solutio. Dicimus quod prima est falsa, cum fiat reduplicatio ratione essentie uel forme, que est conuenientia(!). Cum forma est repugnans ipsi predicato...

exp. (*mutil.*) primam esse falsam. Et secundum hoc ibi demonstratur fieri reduplicatio ratione opposite forme...

3.   <QUOTIENSCUMQUE FUISTI PARISIUS FUISTI HOMO>, 256ra

inc. (*mutil.*) Et(?) hoc interrogatiuum 'quotiens' est interrogatiuum incertitudinis, quod satis patet; ergo factum distribuere distribuet pro eis. Ad oppositum sic. Quod non contingit simul esse, non contingit simul distribuere...

Ad primum dicendum quod prima simpliciter est falsa et etiam quelibet illarum singularium, scilicet 'ista uice' et 'illa uice' et hec est falsa omni uice...

exp. Et propter hoc sunt aduerbia que significant numerum temporis et non sunt aduerbia que significant numerum aliorum generum.

4.   SI TANTUM PATER EST NON TANTUM PATER EST, 256va

inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate 'si tantum pater est, non tantum pater est'. Circa istam orationem quattuor principaliter queruntur: primum est de distinctione utrum sit bona in se; secundo queritur utrum sequatur 'si tantum pater est, pater est' uel non; tertio queritur utrum sequatur 'filius est, non ergo tantum pater est'; quarto queritur de ueritate, utrum sit uera uel non. Circa primum sic proceditur...

[the text continues on f. 255ra: see above 1.1]

Solutio. Ad predicta secundum ordinem dico. Et ad primum primo quod distinctio data secundum primum modum distinguendi est competens. Et hoc est quia forma et materia ut unum significantur...

exp. (mutil.) dicendum quod hoc non est ratione cuiuslibet predicati subicibilis, set solum subicibilis quod inest uni per alterum, et respectu talis predicati...

5. <TANTUM UNUM EST>, 257ra

inc. (mutil.) Item dictio exclusiua addita principio non excludit principiata; set unum est principium multitudinis; ergo dictio exclusiua addita...

Solutio. Quidam dicunt quod hec propositio 'tantum unum est' falsa est; et respondunt ad probationem per fallaciam figure dictionis, quia in hac 'quidlibet est unum'...

exp. dictio exclusiua addita consequenti predicabili non excludit antecedens; set addita consequenti non predicabili bene excludit antecedens. Sequitur enim 'tantum paries, non ergo domus'.

6. DUO PATRES ET DUO FILII SUNT TRES ET NON PLURA, 257vb

inc. 'Duo patres et duo filii sunt tria et non plura'. Circa istam orationem quattuor queruntur. Et tria prima sunt de tribus primis distinctionibus in(!) positis; quartum et ultimum est de ueritate et falsitate. Circa primum sic fuit processum...

Solutio. Dicunt quidam quod prima simpliciter est falsa et resistunt probationi per fallaciam accidentis, quia unum quod est medium in argumentatione...

exp. et ita non oportet quod ponant necessario. Et ita hoc patet quod obicitur. Et per hoc patet solutio omnium oppositorum.

7. NICHIL EST VERUM NISI IN HOC INSTANTI, 258vb

inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate 'nichil est uerum nisi in hoc instanti'. Probatio et improbatio satis patent. Circa hoc sophisma quattuor principaliter querebantur: primum fuit de hac distinctione, quod hec coniunctio 'nisi' potest teneri exceptiue uel consecutiue; secundum de ueritate et falsitate; tertium de probatione; quartum de improbatione. Circa primum primo quarebatur an aliqua dictio possit teneri equiuoce; secundo an hec dictio 'nisi' possit illa duo significare; tertio an in proposito possit teneri exceptiue uel non. Quod nulla dictio possit teneri equiuoce probatio...

Ad sophisma dicendum quod prima duplex est ex eo quod hec dictio 'nisi' potest teneri exceptiue uel consecutiue. Si teneatur exceptiue, uera est...

exp. et sic procedit ratio ad utramque partem, sicut patet intuenti. Sic potest dici probabiliter de hoc sophismate, et in tam difficili re sufficiat probabilitas. Sufficit sophismati.

8. SI SORTES NECESSARIO EST MORTALIS, SORTES NECESSARIO EST IMMORTALIS

inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate 'si Sortes necessario est mortalis Sortes necessario est immortalis'. Probatio et improbatio satis patent. Dicebatur quod prima est duplex ex eo quod hec dictio mortalis potest accipi ut differentia uel ut passio. Si ut differentia, sic dicebat ipsam esse falsam; si ut passio sic dicebat ipsam esse ueram. Circa istam orationem quinque queruntur: primum erat de distinctione predicta; secundum erat de distinctione quam ponebat quod li 'necesario' poterat determinare potentiam que est in hoc quod dico 'mortale' uel actum; tertium erat de consequentiis (conclusionis K) probantibus ipsam, quartum erat de ueritate et falsitate prime, quintum erat utrum tales propositiones sint (sit K) uere 'Sortes est mortalis', 'Sortes est homo', Sorte non existente; et sic de homine non existente et de animali. Circa primum sic proceditur...

Solutio. Ad primum dicendum quod hoc nomen 'mortale' potest accipi dupliciter: ut differentia uel ut passio. Si accipiatur ut differentia sic est falsa, et sic sequitur oppositum ad oppositum...

exp. Aliam rationem concedo quod secundum quod est comparatio partis ad totum est uera, et hoc est secundum esse rationis. Et hoc sufficiat de isto sophismate 'si Sortes etc.'

9. SORTES DESINIT ESSE ALBISSIMUS HOMINUM
[see the text edited above]

10. TANTUM VERO OPPONITUR FALSUM

inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate 'tantum uerum opponitur falso'. Probatio et improbatio satis patent.Circa istam orationem possunt queri quattuor principaliter: primum est de quadam distinctionem que contra maiorem ponitur sophismatis; secundum de ueritate et falsiatet prime; tertium de argumento probationi, scilicet 'tantum uerum opponitur falso, ergo etc.' et de quadam distinctione posita in conclusione illius argumenti; quartum est de argumento 'tantum uerum et falsum opponuntur, ergo nulla alia opponuntur'. Circa primum sic dicunt(?) sophiste...

Solutio. Dicendum quod hec oratio 'tantum uerum opponitur falso' est uera simpliciter. Et per se loquendo de oppositione, quicquid falso opponitur, hoc non est nisi per naturam ueri reperta in illo...

exp. nec idem est dicere 'tantum uerum et falsum opponuntur uero et falso' et iterum 'uerum et falsum opponuntur'.

11. OMNIS ANIMAL FUIT IN ARCHA NOE, f. 264ra

inc. 'Omne animal fuit in archa Noe'. Probatio et improbatio satis patent. Circa hoc sophisma queritur primo trum distinctio ualeat; secundo de ueritate et falsitate; tertio de modo probandi inductiue; quarto de modo improbandi et de loco sophistico soluente hoc sophisma. Circa primum dicunt sophiste hanc esse duplicem...

Ad istud sophisma diuersi diuersimode respondent. Dicunt enim quidam quod prima est duplex ex eo quod hoc signum 'omne' potest distribuere hunc terminum 'animal' pro speciebus uel pro indiuiduis materialibus uel formalibus...

exp. Unde nec probatio nec improbatio predicta sophismatis ualet. Natura autem falsitatis incidentium in ipsa probatione in fine huius distinctionis assignabimus.

12. OMNIS HOMO DE NECESSITATE EST ANIMAL, 265ra

inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal'. Probatio et improbatio satis patent. De isto sophismate quattuor queruntur: primum est de tribus distinctionibus que solent hic assignari; secundum est de ueritate et falsitate; tertium est de improbatione, utrum hoc argumentum ualeat 'Sortes de necessitate est animal, ergo Sortes de necessitate est'; quartum utrum hec sit uera, nullo homine existente, 'omnis homo est animal'. Circa primum sic proceditur communiter...

Iuxta hoc soluendum est ad sophisma, cuius solutio multis modis potest patere. Primo modo sic. Quidam dicunt quod prima est duplex...

exp. (*mutil.*)set necessarium additum propositioni necessarie non destruit necessitatem, ymmo potius augmentat, sicut affirmatio affirmationi...

13. <TOTUM SORTES EST MINOR SORTES>
[missing]

14. NULLUS HOMO LEGIT PARISIUS NISI IPSE SIT ASINUS, 266ra

inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate: 'nullus homo legit Parisius nisi ipse sit asinus', cuius probatio et improbatio satis patent. De isto sophismate queruntur tria: primum est de quadam distinctione que solet hic assignari; secundum est de ueritate et falsitate; tertium est de improbatione. Circa primum sic proceditur...

Solutio ad sophisma. Dicunt quidam, sicut prius dicebatur, quod prima est duplex ex eo quod negatio intellecta in hoc quod est 'nullus' potest negare consequentiam uel consequens...

exp. dico tamen quod differunt secundum modum essendi: una enim predicatione sicut categorica et altera conclusione sicut ypotetica et conditionalis. Et hec de isto sophismate sufficiant.

15. OMNIS PROPOSITIO UEL EIUS CONTRADICTORIA EST UERA, 266vb

inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate 'omnis propositio uel eius contradictoria est uera'. Cuius probatio talis est: hec propositio 'tu es asinus' uel eius contradictoria est uera... De isto sophismate quattuor queruntur: primum est de quibusdam distinctionibus que solent hic assignari; secundum est de ueritate et falsitate; tertium est utrum signum uniuersale possit addi toti disiuncto; quartum et ultimo est de improbatione. Circa primum sic proceditur...

Solutio. Ad hoc sophisma diuersi diuersimode respondent. Quidam dicunt quod prima est duplex ex eo quod potest esse categorica uel ypotetica...

exp. eo quod ipsum medium pro alio et alio accipitur in relatione ad maiorem (minorem K) extremitatem <et> ad minorem. Et sic patet solutio omnium obiectorum.

16. DECEM PRETER QUINQUE SUNT QUINQUE, 267va

inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate 'decem preter quinque sunt quinque', cuius probatio et improbatio satis patent. Circa istud sophisma quattuor queruntur: primum est de quadam distinctione; secundum est de ueritate et falsitate prime; tertium est de probatione; quartum est de modo improbandi. Circa primum sic dicitur quod prima est duplex ex eo quod 'preter' potest teneri exceptiue uel diminutiue...

Solutio. Quidam dicunt quod prima est duplex <ex eo> quod li 'preter' potest diminutiue <teneri>, et sic est uera...

exp. ideo dicimus quod non sequitur 'quinque, ergo aliquod quinque'; set sequitur 'homines, ergo aliquod homine'.

17. OMNIS HOMO EST ANIMAL ET ECONVERSO, 268va

inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate 'omnis homo est animal, et econuerso', cuius probatio et improbatio satis patent. Dicebatur quod prima est duplex ex eo quod li 'econuerso' potest dicere conuersionem simplicem aut per accidens. Primo modo falsa, secundo modo uera. Primo uidetur quod ista distinctio non sit bona in se; secundo quod non sit bona ad propositum. Primum (primo K) ostenditur tali ratione...

Soluunt autem diuersi diuersimode orationem predictam.

Dicunt(?) enim primam sicut distinguebatur. Alii dicunt primam simpliciter esse falsam et li 'econuerso' semper dicit conuersionem simplicem...

exp. ideo non sequitur quod 'animal' conuertatur cum 'homine' neque tenet, perempto homine, quod perimatur animal. Ista querebantur de hoc sophismate.

18. IMPOSSIBILE POTEST ESSE VERUM, 269va

inc. Queritur de hoc sophismate 'impossibile potest esse uerum', cuius probatio et improbatio satis patent. Circa istud sophisma possunt queri tria: primum est de distinctione communi que imponitur, utrum ualeat in se; secundo utrum ualeat ad propositum; tertio de ueritate et falsitate prime. Circa primum sic distinguitur. Ista oratio duplex ex eo quod hoc quod dico 'impossibile' potest accipi pro impossibili per (pro K) se uel pro impossibili per accidens...

Solutio. Dicendum ad primum quod prima oratio? simpliciter falsa est; quoniam, ut ostensum est per predicta argumenta, sensus orationis est 'impossibile est etc.', id est quod est impossibile, dum est impossibile potest esse uerum posterius. Quod falsum est...

exp. set falsum non est accidens impossibili, set genus; et propter hoc non ualet ratio illa. Et sic patet solutio ad omnia.

19. SI TU SCIS TE ESSE LAPIDEM TU NESCIS TE ESSE LAPIDEM, 270va

inc. <Queritur> de hoc sophismate 'si tu scis te esse lapidem, tu nescis te esse lapidem'. Probatio et improbatio patent. Circa istud sophisma quinque querebantur. Primum erat de fallacia accidentis a (ad K) respondente assignata. Secundum erat de ueritate et falsitate. Tertium erat de consequentiis intermediis. Quartum erat utrum in consequente (concedente K) includantur opposita. Quintum de quadam alia solutione imposita. Circa primum sic proceditur. Dicebat respondens...

Solutio. Ad hoc sophisma diuersimode respondetur. Dicuntenim primam esse falsam; ad probationem respondent per fallaciam accidentis ex diuersificatione huius medii 'quod est lapis'... Reuertor et sustineo ibi esse fallaciam accidentis. Ad opposita respondeo. Et primo ad primum, dico quod...

exp. aut ratione sue proprie nature, et sic te esse lapidem ponit te nihil scire. Et per hoc patet quomodo (quando K) diuersificetur illud medium. Hec querebantur de isto sophismate. (f. 271vb).