

**Andreas de Novo Castro (fl. 1358) on Divine Omnipotence and the Nature of the
Past: I *Sentences*, Distinction Forty-Five, Question Six**

Text and Introduction*

Russell L. Friedman

One of the major tasks that theologians set for themselves in the later Middle Ages was to define as exactly as possible the way that an immutable, omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good God interacts with creation. For God to be truly transcendental, as Christian dogma affirms, seems to require that God remain not just unlimited, but unaffected by the existence of creation. Human beings, however, have some basic intuitions about the way that both the natural world and salvation work, and these intuitions appear to entail that creation does in some way affect God. Out of the clash of these two values — Christian doctrine on God's nature and human intuitions about creation — arose a complex of problems having to do with the issue of order: theological and natural. Indeed, God's freedom raises the question of the very possibility of a natural or a theological order upon which human beings can rely, for if God is completely free, how can there be any order to limit such freedom? During the fourteenth century, when commentaries on the *Sentences* became smaller and touched on fewer topics, one matter theologians did continue to investigate on a regular basis was the mutual impact of the created world's temporal order and God's atemporality. Their inquiries took the form of questions on God's knowledge of future contingents, and — more to the point here — on God's ability to make not to have been what to us in the temporal world is past.¹

*This work originated as a master's essay submitted in 1991 to the University of Iowa's Department of History. I would like to thank the readers of that essay, Katherine Tachau, Scott MacDonald, and Dwight Boseman, for their helpful comments. Since that time, Sten Ebbesen, Scott MacDonald, Paul Mayer, Lauge Nielsen, Fritz S. Pedersen, Chris Schabel, Katherine Tachau, and J.M.M.H. Thijssen have helped me with comments specific to this text of Andreas, and with more general advice. Much of the present paper was written at the University of Copenhagen's Institute for Greek and Latin, while I was supported by a Fellowship from the American-Scandinavian Foundation; it is a pleasure to express my thanks to both of these institutions.

¹ For explicit statements concerning the relation between the topics of future contingents and God's power over the past, see: Calvin Normore, "Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Future Contingents: An Overview" in *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy* (Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster, 1985), ed. T. Rudavsky, pp. 3-22; idem "Future Contingents" in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge UP, 1982), ed. N. Kretzmann, et. al., pp. 358-81; William J. Courtenay, "John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo The Past" *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 39 (1972), pp. 224-256 and 40 (1973), pp. 147-174 (also in his *Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought* [London: Variorum reprints, 1984]), esp. pt. 2, pp. 165-166; Christopher D. Schabel, "The Quarrel with Aureol: Peter Aureol's Role in the Late-Medieval Debate on God's Foreknowledge and Future Contingents" (Unpublished

Two specific sets of values collide in the question of God's ability to make a thing that has already existed never to have existed: on the one hand is God's omnipotence, immutability, and atemporality; on the other is the human intuition that, once a thing has existed, its existence is fixed and cannot be changed. The fixity of past events and the very temporal order of past followed by present followed by future seem to be incompatible with the things that God can do (i.e. everything not implying a contradiction); they also seem to be in conflict with God's atemporality and immutability, if God has the ability to bring things about otherwise before they occur, but not after. To make matters still more complex, in order not to jeopardize human and divine free will, two different types of necessity must be carefully distinguished: a limited necessity that fixes a past thing's existence after it has already existed, and an absolute necessity that determines the existence of all things and events whether they be past, present, or future. It seems obvious that the past's remaining forever fixed entails some type of necessity, but is the necessity of the past also shared by the present and future — a position inimical to human and divine freedom — or is there some special characteristic that makes what is actually past fixed, and thereby different from the contingent present and future? Thus, the question of God's power with respect to the past is a referendum on what divine omnipotence and immutability entail, on our intuitions concerning the nature of time, and on the possibility of human and divine freedom.

This forms the general background to Andreas de Novo Castro's question on whether God could make never to have existed what already has existed: question six of distinction 45 of his mammoth commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, the lectures of which were delivered in the academic year 1358-59. The name of this Franciscan from Neufchâteau is by no means a standard one even in specialist literature on medieval philosophy and theology, although in the twentieth century his thought has received some attention, especially from historians of logic.² Before this century, sporadic mentions of his name by a number of historically significant figures — including Francis Suarez (1548-1617), Cardinal Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621), and the Cambridge Platonist Ralph

Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Iowa, 1994), esp. chs. 6-7. Schabel's dissertation is probably the most thorough investigation yet on the topic of the medieval discussion of future contingents.

² The most recent published work on Andreas that I am aware of is K. H. Tachau's "The *Quaestiones in primum librum Sententiarum* of Andreas de Novocastro" in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* (= AHDLM) 59 (1992), pp. 289-318. In this article, Tachau both reports her discovery of two manuscripts of Andreas' commentary on the first book of the *Sentences* and establishes that he was a *socius* of Bonsembiante Badoar, an Augustinian Hermit known to have read the *Sentences* in 1358-59. For further literature on Novo Castro, see Tachau's article, especially n. 5; for early references to Andreas, see Hubert Elie, *Le Complexe significable* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1936), 'bio-bibliography', pp. 239-45.

Cudworth (1617-88) — and the involvement of a number of prominent Parisian theologians in the publication of his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences* in 1514, attest to Andreas' continuing significance.³

For the modern historian, Andreas' work provides an excellent gauge of the state of logic and of logical discussion in the Parisian theological faculty of the mid-fourteenth century, and a measure of the ongoing impact of the quantified 'New English Theology', nearly twenty years after it was first introduced to Paris.⁴ It is, however, his many citations of articles taken from the Parisian lists of condemned propositions — those of 1277, and those promulgated against Nicholas of Autrecourt, and against John of Mirecourt — that seem most characteristic of Andreas' work as a whole.⁵ Not only does Novo Castro cite these articles often, but he even frames whole questions around them. His citations reveal a deep and broad study of the *articuli Parisienses*. Thus, to historians of academic freedom and of the university, Andreas' work offers evidence of the continuing influence of these condemnations.

Andreas' use of the condemned articles also gives us a perspective on his thought in the text below. One of the concerns in each of these condemnations was about our ability to know things with certitude. Is there any way that human beings can be certain of what they believe they know? A number of the propositions from 1277 concerned this issue, and this was certainly a major concern of those reviewing the works of John of Mirecourt and, especially, Nicholas of Autrecourt.⁶ If the broad background to the question edited here is

³ For Cudworth, see Francis Oakley, "Christian Theology and Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of the Laws of Nature" *Church History* 30, no. 4 (1961), pp. 433-57, esp. p. 447; for Suarez, see F. Copleston *A History of Philosophy*, v. 3 (London, 1960), p. 390; it is fairly clear that Cudworth lifted Suarez' words verbatim. For Bellarmine — most famous for his part in Galileo's censure of 1616 — see *De gratia et libero arbitrio* in *Opera Omnia* VI (Paris, 1873); Bellarmine here actually cites Ruard Tapper (1487-1559) a prominent theologian at the University of Louvain and at the Council of Trent, who referred to Andreas' distinction 45. On the circle of Parisian masters and the printing of Andreas' commentary, see Elie's "Quelque maîtres de l'université de Paris vers l'an 1500" *AHDLM* 18 (1950-51), pp. 193-243.

⁴ For an overview of the English contribution to logic, physics, and theology in the fourteenth century, see William J. Courtenay, "The Role of English Thought in the Transformation of University Education in the Late Middle Ages" in *Rebirth, Resilience, and Reform: Universities in Transition 1300-1700*, (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1984), eds. James M. Kittelson and Pamela J. Transue, pp. 103-62.

⁵ See the appendix below for a list of Andreas' citations from these condemnations. For my understanding of the *articuli Parisienses*, I have benefitted from discussion with J.M.M.H. Thijssen, who has made available to me information contained in his book, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1378* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Forthcoming). NB: when dealing with a work as massive as Andreas', it would be unreasonable to expect to have found every citation of the condemned articles. This list is, however, very comprehensive.

⁶ For propositions that touch on this matter in these three condemnations see (for references see below, n. 32): 1277, n. 3 (CUP = 151), n. 4 (CUP = 37) in Hissette; Mirecourt, "Prima Apologia", nn. 5, 7, 44, in F. Stegmüller "Die zwei Apologien des Jean de Mirecourt", pt. I, *Recherches de théologie*

late-medieval speculation on the relation between atemporal creator and temporal creation, the specific background lies in this issue of certitude. Andreas' intense preoccupation with epistemology and particularly with the status of propositions *per se nota* bears witness to the general late-medieval concern about the foundation and acquisition of knowledge; it also clearly shapes the way that he approaches the problem of God's ability to make something that has already existed, not to have existed, and helps to reveal just how complex problems on this issue had become.

The Structure and Content of Andreas' Discussion⁷

Andreas' contribution to the debate over divine power and temporality takes the form of a query into the specific difference (*differentia*) of past time as opposed to present and future time: what indeed is specific to the past, and concomitantly what makes the existence of a past thing different from that of present and future things?⁸ If, as our intuitions lead us to believe, once a state-of-affairs has transpired, it is fixed and no longer like states-of-affairs in the contingent present and future; what changes about it when it goes from being future to being past? It might seem, as Andreas makes us aware (ll. 5-6) that there should be symmetry between future things with respect to their coming to be and past things with respect to their having been; that is, if the future is contingent, then the past must also be so. What, then, is the feature of past states-of-affairs that make them now fixed? Also, granted that the past is fixed, what does this entail for God's omnipotence and immutability?

All of these questions can also be asked on the level of propositions: how can propositions, identical except for the tense of their verb, change in modality? Supposing that Socrates actually is in the Agora on Monday, then it appears to us that the proposition 'Socrates will be in the Agora on Monday', when it is uttered on Sunday, is contingently true or false; yet 'Socrates was in the Agora on Monday', when uttered on Tuesday, seems necessarily true. What accounts for their having different modal status? The only discernible difference between these propositions is the changed temporal vantage point of the utterer and the corresponding change in verb form. If, however, all tensed propositions are leveled to the same modal status, then either one must accept that both future-

ancienne et médiévale (= RTAM) 4 (1932), pp. 40-78; "Apologia altera", nn. 26, 27 in Stegmüller, pt. 2 RTAM 5 (1933), pp. 192-204. Autrecourt: "Articuli in cedula 'Ve Michi' contenti" nn. 9-11, 15-30, 32-34, "Articuli missi de Parisius", n. 57, all in de Rijk.

⁷ All references in parentheses are to line numbers in the edition below.

⁸ Whereas modern philosophers normally only speak about modalities, such as necessity, when referring to either states-of-affairs or propositions describing states-of affairs, Andreas often refers to the necessity of things. I have tried to avoid the medieval language when possible.

tensed propositions and the future itself are determined (a position repugnant to both human and divine freedom) or that past-tensed propositions and states-of-affairs already past are not fixed (a position repugnant to our intuitions of temporal order). How, then, can the passage of time change the modality of tensed propositions?

After Andreas' initial comments and setting out of authoritative texts for both sides of the issue, he presents two conclusions that frame his discussion. Andreas uses the same basic proposition in each of the conclusions (ll. 17-18; 91-92): 'it is impossible for some thing that has already existed never to have existed'.⁹ The analysis of this proposition as presented in the two conclusions appeals to a logical distinction commonly used in the Middle Ages in contexts like this one: that between the compounded and divided senses. By means of this distinction, medieval scholars separated out two senses of the same proposition made ambiguous by the presence of some sort of logical operator, in this case the modal term 'impossible'. Now, the compounded sense of this proposition — namely, 'it is impossible that A both was and was not at the same time' — seems so straightforwardly true that Andreas does not even bother to prove it, instead claiming in each of the conclusions that the proposition is true "even in the divided sense", the sense more difficult to prove. The divided sense of this proposition is equivalent to saying that 'it is impossible for A not to have existed, even setting aside the fact that A ever had existed'. That is, without assuming the existence of A (as the compounded sense of the proposition does), with the proposition taken in the divided sense it is still impossible for A not to have existed.¹⁰ Accepted in the divided sense, however, the proposition can be taken in two ways yet again: as describing a sort of physical impossibility that arises because of relations between things in the world, and as describing logical impossibility. Andreas' two conclusions are interesting not just because they are crucial for understanding his whole discussion, but also because each conclusion makes use of the divided sense in a different way: the first conclusion arguing for

⁹ The differences between the way that Andreas words this propositions in each of the two conclusions will be dealt with below.

¹⁰ This logical distinction is also known as a *de dicto/de re* distinction. That is, the compounded sense of the proposition takes the logical operator to range over propositions (*de dicto*) about the thing in question, whereas the divided sense takes the operator as applying to the thing itself. Thus in the example at hand, the conclusion is true *de dicto*, because the impossibility ranges over the conjunction of 'A exists' and 'A does not exist'; *de re*, however, impossibility is taken as applying to the thing itself, as though it were a characteristic of it, thus, if the *de re* sense of the proposition above is true, then A has no possibility of not existing. For more on the compounded and divided senses of a proposition, see Norman Kretzmann, "Sensus compositus, sensus divisus, and Propositional Attitudes" in *Medioevo: Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 7 (1981), pp. 195-229, and the literature referred to there. Andreas gives a nice description of the meaning of the *dicto/de re* distinction while dealing with the modal term 'necessary' below, ll. 495-508.

the physical necessity of past things, the second conclusion arguing — untenably according to Andreas — for the logical necessity of all past states-of-affairs.

The first conclusion (ll. 16-89) contains the more peculiar usage of the divided sense; it says: "it is impossible for what has existed not to have existed, and it is impossible for what has not already existed to have existed now, even in the divided sense" (ll. 17-18). While some of the quotations and arguments that Andreas chose to support his position might also seem to address the compounded sense of the original proposition (e.g., ll. 28-30), most are directed at the physical impossibility of the past's not having been.¹¹ The authoritative passages that Andreas uses have to do with the fixity of past things: that once a thing (or an event) is past it cannot be made not past. The Anselm quotation from *De concordia* is especially telling in this regard (ll. 34-37): Anselm claims that there is a certain thing (*quoddam*) in past things, but not in present or future things, and this 'thing' makes it impossible for a past thing to be made not past. Thus, this first conclusion asserts that there is a real, physical necessity to be associated with past things, and you cannot just set aside the existence of the past, like you can set aside the existence of the present or the future.

The reasoned arguments Andreas gives for this conclusion center on God's inability to make only (*precise*) one past thing not be past. Even setting aside the existence of some past thing, A, if God were to bring it about that A had not been, any relations that A had to other things in the world entail that those other things must also be changed; therefore God has not made only A not to have been past. For example, if God made Judy, the mother of Janet, not to have been, then Janet would have no mother. This is a true *reductio ad absurdum*: given that you could isolate one past thing and make it so that it was never past, absurdities — like a daughter with no mother — would result; therefore the original assumption was false. The fact that this is not a true Aristotelian demonstration seems to be one reason that Andreas concedes that the conclusion does not admit of demonstrative proof: he gives arguments only because "some can be found trying to deny it and demanding its evident demonstration." (ll. 18-22). A second and more weighty reason for Novo Castro to admit that this conclusion is not amenable to demonstration is that, if it were, then the future would be no less necessary than the past (ll. 46-47, 88-89; again at ll. 196-201).¹²

¹¹ There is another possible reading of this conclusion: that the text should be emended from (l. 18) "etiam in sensu divisionis" to "in sensu compositionis". I initially favored this other reading of the text, but as Chris Schabel and Sten Ebbesen pointed out to me, the reading that I have left in the text is the superior in that it both accounts for the arguments and authorities Andreas uses and it allows us to keep the text presented by both manuscript copies of this question.

¹² Andreas does not deal in this text with the ontological status of the future (or, for that matter, that of the past), which is of considerable importance in the related problem of future contingents

Propositions that are known demonstratively are true for all time, and the states-of-affairs they describe cannot be otherwise. Thus, if it were **demonstrable** that God cannot make Judy the mother of Janet not to have been (because that would entail Janet's having no mother), then it would also be demonstrable that God cannot make Janet's as yet unborn daughter, Clara, not to be in the future because that would also affect Clara's still unborn daughter. The relations that bind physical objects together hold not just in the past, but in the future, and the arguments apply equally to the past, present, and future. The determinism entailed by the fixity of the future being unacceptable, Andreas gives up the demonstrability of the conclusion. Thus Andreas admits that he has not given a demonstrative proof for the first conclusion: the conclusion is a proposition *per se nota*, known in-and-of itself, because there are no more basic propositions on which its proof can rest. Andreas returns to the epistemological ramifications of this concession in a number of places: the basic propositions upon which our knowledge is built are unprovable, and any proposition both true and unprovable is known *per se* (ll. 46-49, also ll. 370-79, ll. 441-45).¹³

The second conclusion (ll. 90-132) uses the divided sense in a more traditional way, but it presents a highly controversial position on the necessity of the past — one that Andreas will reject. The proposition that we are given is "it implies a contradiction for A that exists and existed not to have been, and even in the divided sense." As we have seen, the compounded sense of this same proposition is obviously true: it is a contradiction that A both exist and not exist at the same time; the divided sense, on the other hand, sets aside A's original existence, and thus is less straightforward. By the use of the term 'contradiction' here, it is apparent that the kind of divided sense Novo Castro is talking about involves logical possibility and impossibility, not merely physical. In fact, the truth of this conclusion implies fatalism, or the predetermination of all events. That is, God's inability to make a past thing not to have been in the divided

and also would have an impact on the present discussion at this point. For a very brief account of Andreas' theory of future contingents see Schabel, "the Quarrel with Aureol", pp. 306-07.

¹³ I would suggest on the basis of his use of the term 'evident proof', and from the arguments that he uses (see below "Andreas and His Sources"), that in this conclusion Novo Castro is referring to the debate between Thomas Buckingham and Thomas Bradwardine on this issue, and perhaps to the more nearly contemporary expositions on this topic found in the texts of Gregory of Rimini and John of Mirecourt. Buckingham gave arguments apparently intended to demonstrate the fixity of the past, in opposition to what he took to be Bradwardine's rejection of this claim. Like Buckingham, Andreas argues in this conclusion that a physical necessity attaches to the past, and it is impossible for what is already past to not have been. Unlike Buckingham, however, and like John of Mirecourt, Andreas makes explicit statements that this position is not subject to evident demonstration. For the conflict between Buckingham and Bradwardine, cf. Courtenay, "Mirecourt and Rimini", pt. 2, pp. 149-54; Jean-François Genest, *Prédétermination et liberté créée à Oxford au XIV^e siècle: Buckingham contre Bradwardine* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1992), esp. pp. 106-09, 261-73.

logical sense, entails that nothing could have come about in another way than it did.¹⁴ The arguments that are used to prove the conclusion center on the claim that all impossibility is of one type: formal and absolute impossibility. Thus, if the past's not having been is now impossible, then it is absolutely impossible and could never have been possible: all events are determined. Andreas himself counters this argument by pointing out that before past thing A existed, it (obviously) did not exist, therefore it cannot be the case that A's non-existence is formally impossible, because then A's non-existence would never have been possible. Andreas clearly thinks that those who argue for the second conclusion have misunderstood their own argument.

Andreas' replies to the two conclusions (ll. 133-354) set up a conundrum: using a battery of twelve central and many more ancillary arguments, he contends that there is no special status that should be applied to the past distinguishing it from the present or the future. In the two conclusions, Novo Castro gave arguments for the necessity of the past: in the first conclusion a limited, physical necessity that he himself argued for, and in the second conclusion a strong, logical necessity that he rejected. In the replies to the two conclusions, Andreas argues that the past is still within God's power to make it not to have been. That is, there is no special characteristic of the past that makes it fixed after it has already existed. The arguments presented here work from the same basic premiss as that used in the second conclusion — that the only type of impossibility is formal, absolute impossibility —, and from Andreas' own response to the second conclusion in which he showed that the impossibility of making a past thing not to have been is not a formal impossibility. The arguments in the replies to the two conclusions finish the circle: given only the one type of impossibility and given that this does not apply to the past, then it cannot be impossible to make a past thing not to have been. Thus (e.g., ll. 134-146): take a past thing, A; before A existed, A's not having existed obviously did not involve a contradiction, and in fact was the case; thus at that time it was not necessary that A had existed. This modal status cannot have changed, so A's not having existed is still a possibility. Therefore, God still has power with respect to the past.

Through the extreme positions argued for in the second conclusion and the principal arguments against the two conclusions, Andreas has effectively carved a niche for his own solution to the problem. In the second conclusion, it was suggested that a formal contradiction was implied by the past not having

¹⁴ Perhaps this is what led Courtenay to erroneously claim that Andreas "seems to have had Averroistic leanings and advocated a determinism with regard to the past that limited divine action before events took place" in "Mirecourt and Rimini", pp. 172-73, n. 176.

been past: that the past is and always has been absolutely necessary, and that not even God could have brought things about differently. In the arguments against the conclusions, Andreas argued that the past — like the future — is still contingent. What both of these positions share is a leveling of the modal status of past, present, and future: in the one position all are determined, in the other all are contingent. In order to preserve the fixity of the past, after it is the past, while still leaving room for the future to be contingent, Andreas must find a contradiction that is not absolute or formal, yet is still a contradiction: he must find a contradiction indexed to the passage of time.

Andreas' own solution to the problem of God's ability to make the past not to have been can be divided into two basic components. The first component is an investigation of the logical and metaphysical characteristics of the necessity that applies to what is actually past; here Andreas gives a much more elaborate version of the position found in the first conclusion: a physical necessity applies to the past once it is past. This discussion of the nature of the past is propaedeutic to Andreas' second major topic: what the past's necessity entails for God's omnipotence.

By far the most significant and the largest part of Andreas' solution is his discussion of pastness or preterition (ll. 355-475). Here Andreas lays out just what he thinks distinguishes a past thing from a present or future thing. Andreas' exposition relies upon two different types of contradiction and two different types of accidents that correspond to them. On the level of logic, a contradiction can arise in two ways (ll. 356-64). The first way is through an absolute contradiction arising from a proposition's formal signification; a proposition contradictory in this way can never be true. The second way a contradiction can arise, however, is through an *ut nunc* or as-of-now contradiction; this comes about not from any formal contradiction intrinsic to the proposition itself, but from considering the proposition along with some condition or circumstance impossible with it.¹⁵ Andreas refers to this second type of contradiction as *per accidens* (l. 363), thus is he led to discussing the metaphysics of accident (ll. 446-64). The accident that now imposes necessity on what is actually past is not an ordinary type of accident, i.e. an accident that can both come into being and pass away. The accident adjoined to a thing once it has become past is *irrevocably* adjoined. It is not an essential property, as the contradiction that we would infer in that case would be *per se*, not *per accidens*. It is a genuine accident, but inseparably adjoined to the past

¹⁵ Andreas in fact mentions the *ut nunc* contradiction in the replies to the two conclusions, cf. ll. 154-62; he also draws a distinction between two types of *ut nunc* contradictions (ll. 395-403): one in which the contradiction can come into being and pass away contingently, and another in which, once the contradiction arises, it remains immutably.

thing in question. Thus this notion of an irrevocably annexed accident has some resemblance to the notion of properties, like 'risible' in a human being. Andreas maintains here (ll. 362-76, 433-44), just as he did in the first conclusion, that the *per accidens* contradiction and the limited necessity of the past that follows from it is undemonstrable: this kind of contradiction, unlike the *per se* and formal contradiction, is known *per se*, and not amenable to demonstrative proof.

This constitutes Andreas' solution to his initial question about the specific difference of past time as compared to present and future time: the adherence of an irrevocably adjoined accident, namely preterition, makes the past fixed after it has already existed. With this set out, Novo Castro's solution to the necessity of the past becomes clear. The contradiction involved in such propositions as 'Socrates who was, was not', is an *ut nunc* contradiction, not a formal one. That is, before Socrates existed no contradiction was entailed by Socrates' never having existed. Because, however, the accident adjoined to Socrates now that he has existed — the accident that now makes it a contradiction for Socrates not to have existed — is inseparably adjoined, the '*nunc*' in '*ut nunc*' signifies 'from the time that Socrates became past and forever more'. Thus, Andreas' solution is an attempt to preserve the contingency of the past *before* becoming past, while also preserving the fixity of the past after it becomes past. Pastness itself is an accident that is irrevocably adjoined to any particular past thing, but its accidentality means that a past thing was not necessary or determined before it became past and gained that irrevocable accident.¹⁶

Andreas next turns to the implications his solution has for divine freedom, immutability, and power. It would seem to imply that God is limited, if it is true that God has no power with respect to the past. After all, if before event A took place, God could have prevented its taking place, then it would appear that to deny God this same ability after A took place implies God's power has diminished (e.g., ll. 286-88). What does divine omnipotence entail, and what role does God's immutability play?

Andreas denies that this is a problem. Without using his terminology, the Franciscan relies on Anselm's distinction between preceding or antecedent necessity, and subsequent necessity, and Novo Castro concludes that the case at

¹⁶ One interesting feature of Andreas' discussion is that it avoids any appeal to the distinction between *potentia Dei absoluta et ordinata*, one method employed by medieval theologians to safeguard both the contingency of the future and the fixity of the past. Andreas does mention God's absolute power in the text below once (ll. 3-4), from which we can conclude that his whole discussion works on that plane. Whether this is indicative of a rejection of this distinction by Andreas, or merely that he did not find it useful in this context will require more research. On the distinction, cf. William J. Courtenay, *Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power* (Bergamo, 1990).

hand involves only subsequent necessity.¹⁷ Anselm had recognized a difference between the type of necessity that follows from a given situation and the type of necessity that precludes any other kind of situation from obtaining. Thus, the kind of necessity involved in 'Socrates is sitting, therefore Socrates is sitting' is subsequent necessity: Socrates is free to sit or stand, but given that he is sitting, necessarily then it is the case that he is sitting. This is opposed to the kind of absolute or preceding necessity involved in 'man is an animal'. For Andreas too, God's will precedes the necessity of the past, therefore the only necessity imposed on God by the past's necessity is the necessity of his own nature, in particular the immutability of his will. Andreas' words bear quotation:

...speaking broadly, if someone asks the reason and cause of this new necessity is none other than the divine will, which put A into being, from which it afterwards follows that A has been....the necessity, according to which it is formally necessary for God to will A to have existed, is the cause of the necessity according to which A's having been is necessary, rather than the reverse. (ll. 591-96)

Thus, Andreas claims, the ultimate reason that the existence of some past thing is fixed after it has already existed is **because** God willed that thing to exist in the first place. God freely chose to put the past thing into being and hence chose the necessity of its having been past, and God could have chosen otherwise in eternity. In fact, Andreas claims that imperfection arises not from God's being unable to will A's not having been, rather imperfection would only arise if God **could** will A not to have been (ll. 509-16, 550-54). This is simply to say that God's immutability, not to mention his atemporality and simplicity, would be violated if he could nil what he had already willed.

Although the fate of Andreas' thought on this issue in the later fourteenth century and beyond remains to be traced, it seems likely that medieval scholars might find it lacking on at least three accounts. First, Novo Castro's appeal to God's will as the ultimate source of all events in order to safeguard God's freedom is reminiscent of Scotus' solution to the problem of future contingents and suffers from the same problems.¹⁸ Once the divine will is made the ultimate source of contingency or necessity, very little room appears to remain for human free will, an issue of grave concern to medieval theologians. If the

¹⁷ Cf. *Cur Deus homo* II, 17 (*Opera Omnia*, v. 2, p. 125); see on this William J. Courtenay, "Necessity and freedom in Anselm's conception of God" in *Analecta Anselmiana* 4.2 (Frankfurt/Main, 1975) (also in *Covenant and Causality*), pp. 39-64, esp. pp. 57-59.

¹⁸ Cf. Scotus, *Lectura d. 39* in *Opera Omnia*, v. 17 (Vatican City, 1966), pp. 481-510; Andreas makes explicit the notion of divine causality (i.e. that the divine will is first cause of the entire order of causes) only assumed in Scotus' discussion cf.: below ll. 453-54 with Scotus, *ed. cit.*, pp. 488-92).

solution to the problem of pastness limiting God's freedom lies in God's being responsible for putting every past thing A into being, then how are human actions to be explained? Does God put them into being as well? Andreas' solution, like Scotus', appears to jump from the frying pan into the fire: giving up human free will to ensure God's transcendent freedom.¹⁹

Second, Andreas' solution is based on the fact that after its existence, everything gains a new accident — the thing's pastness — which is irrevocably attached to the thing and fixes its past existence for all time forward. Although Andreas never elaborates on what it is that bears this accident of pastness, there are at least two potential problems with regard to this.²⁰ First, and perhaps most troubling, is the question whether past things that no longer exist are the kinds of things that can bear accidents at all. Given past things that remain still in existence in the present, it is at least arguable that the thing itself can bear its preterition. That is, if Socrates still exists, then there is a substance (Socrates) that can bear the accident of preterition that makes Socrates' having existed necessary now. What is the effect, however, if Socrates died over two thousand years ago? What is there to bear that accident now?²¹ A second problem arises in the case of states-of-affairs having to do with more than the bare existence of some past thing: what is there for the accident to inhere in, for example, a book's falling from a table or Socrates' being in the Agora?

The third criticism is that it seems unlikely that a medieval reader (or a modern one for that matter) would find Andreas' solution particularly satisfactory because it skirts the very issue that it was supposed to address. That is to say, in answer to the question why is a past thing's existence fixed after it has already become past, Andreas clearly claims that the past thing gains an irrevocably affixed accident in virtue of its being past. This at the very least smacks of begging the question: it is fixed in its pastness, because it gains the fixed accident of pastness. If the question was to explain what it is about the past that makes it in some sense necessary, Novo Castro does not seem to have answered it. To be fair, however, Andreas' epistemological concerns make it clear that he is

¹⁹ Andreas could perhaps appeal to some sort of permissive willing on God's part. For this very objection to Scotus' notion of causality and divine freedom, see Peter Aureol in his *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, d. 38, q. 1; cf. ed. Rome, 1596, pp. 875a-879b, esp. 876bD; for a critical edition of this text see Schabel, "The Quarrel with Aureol", appendix one, pp. 444-49, esp. p. 449, ll. 273-79. Note, however, that many medieval authors did accept Scotus' notion of divine causality.

²⁰ Lauge Nielsen first suggested this criticism of Andreas' theory to me.

²¹ Thomas Bradwardine raises objections of this kind stemming from the ontological status of past things: "Item, res praeterita nihil est, ergo nihil causat, ergo nec divinam necessitat voluntatem." *De causa Dei* (London, 1618; reprint Minerva, 1976), p. 748E (cf. Genest, *Prédétermination*, p. 54, n. 253). Again: "Item praeteriti ad voluntatem divinam non est aliqua relatio, quia non est extremum reale in quo possit fundari, quia praeteritum jam transiit in non esse" *De causa Dei* p. 749E (cf. Genest, *Prédétermination*, p. 55, n. 265).

very conscious of the way that *per se note* propositions definitively settle matters without proof, and that solutions that rely on them can thus appear to be begging the question. Part of what makes Andreas' presentation interesting is his recognition of this problem and his attempt to deal with it.

Andreas and his Sources

As William Courtenay has suggested, Andreas is rather reticent about the post twelfth-century sources for his work.²² His use of ancient sources is strictly in line with the standard 'must quotes' that appears in the literature on God's ability to change the past: Augustine and Lombard, Agathon from Aristotle's quotation in the *Nichomachean Ethics*. As with many of his contemporaries in this context, however, Andreas' most significant named source by far is Anselm: not only does Andreas cite him more often than anyone else in this text (even more than Augustine), but the solution that Novo Castro gives is fundamentally Anselmian in nature.

Andreas' implicit citation of authors nearly contemporary with himself is rather a more interesting matter. A review of scholars who took up this question in the years preceding Andreas' reading of the *Sentences* allows us to make a few tentative judgements concerning the state of the discussion. An examination of the first question in Gregory of Rimini's I *Sentences*, distinction 42-44, reveals that Andreas' knew Rimini's text and perhaps had it close at hand as he composed his own commentary. Furthermore, as Courtenay has shown, there is a link between Rimini's treatment of this problem and that of John of Mirecourt, the common denominator being Thomas of Buckingham's attack on Thomas Bradwardine's claim that it is still within God's power to make what is past not to have been. Andreas' question, written some 15 years after Rimini and Mirecourt wrote, is still clearly influenced by the fascination both these authors had with Bradwardine and especially Buckingham. In fact, Novo Castro's close

²² For the remark, see *Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His Life and Writings* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), p. 139. Courtenay is on the whole correct, but Andreas does, in fact, mention a number of scholars who worked after the twelfth century (citations to the 1514 edition of Andreas' work): Gregory of Rimini (f. 2^{ra}), Bonaventure (f. 154^{vb}, 162^{ra}), Alexander of Hales (f. 162^{ra}), William of Auxerre (f. 162^{ra}), Robert Kilwardby (f. 226^{rb}), Thomas Bradwardine (f. 226^{ra}, 227^{ra}, 230^{rb}, 240^{vb}, 249^{rb}), and John Duns Scotus (f. 48^{va}, 82^{rb}, 84^{va-b}, 128^{rb} ["secundum Platonicos vel Scotum"], 154^{ra}, 162^{ra-b}, 172^{vb}). The marginal notation in the 1514 edition is also accurate in at least one case: f. 51^{vb}, where the marginalia claims there to be an "opinio Johannis de Ripa" corresponds nearly verbatim to a passage from Ripa's *Determinationes* (p. 106, ed. A. Coombes [Paris, J. Vrin, 1957]).

paraphrases of texts in which Rimini quotes Buckingham suggest that Andreas came into contact with the thought of the English scholar through Rimini.²³

Andreas de Novo Castro
(below, ll. 62-71)

Preterea, si A (quod fuit et est)
faceret Deus nec esse nec fuisse,
aut igitur per aliquam causalitatem
effectivam aut per alicuius
causalitatis effective subtractionem
et cessationem aut sine hoc et illo.
Si primum vel secundum, igitur
aliquid producendo vel
corrumpendo, et <tunc habeo>
propositum. Si tertium, contra,
quia tunc non minus possem
quam Deus facere A numquam
fuisse, quia ad hoc nulla virtus
requiritur nec alicuius causalitatis
exercitium vel subtractio; et quia
purum non-esse non est obiectum
nec terminus alicuius potentie nisi in
respectu ad aliud esse precedens vel
sequens, per modum termini a quo
vel ad quem, alioquin convenienter
diceretur quod Deus ab eterno et in
eternum semper facit non esse nec
fuisse ea que <non> fuerunt

Gregory of Rimini, d. 42-44, q. 1²⁴
(p. 375.1-14)

Si deus posset facere rem
praeteritam non fuisse, aut
hoc posset positive, scilicet
efficiendo eam aut aliquid circa
eam, aut negative scilicet nihil
efficiendo vel agendo. Non
primo modo, quia esto quod
eam denuo faceret aut aliquid
aliud, non tamen ex hoc ipsa
prius non fuisset. Nec secundo
modo, quia cum nunc sit verum
ipsam fuisse, si deus nihil agat
vel immutet circa eam, semper
verum erit ut nunc est. Igitur
nullus modus apparet, quo deus
possit eam facere non.

Secundo sic: "**Nulla
privatio et nullum non-ens potest
esse obiectum potentie divinae,
nisi secundum hoc quod ipsum
respicit aliquod ens et sequitur
ad positionem vel destructionem
alicuius entis. Sed id quod
praeteritum est non fuisse, est
unum privativum et aliquod
non-ens, quod non sequitur
positionem vel destructionem
alicuius entis. Ergo id, quod
praeteritum est numquam fuisse,
non potest esse obiectum potentiae
divinae.**"

²³ This is not to say that Andreas might not have had access to Buckingham's work directly, merely that the way Andreas structures his arguments in the following quotations seems to indicate that the English scholar's thought was filtered first through Rimini.

²⁴References are to Gregorii Ariminensis, OESA, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*, ed. A. Damasus Trapp et Venicio Marcolino, v. 3 (Berlin/New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1984). NB: words in bold are identified by the editors as Thomas of Buckingham's

Andreas de Novo Castro
(below, ll. 55-61)

Item, cum A sit et fuerit, impossibile est Deum facere A non esse nec fuisse sine omni mutatione et varietate in omni re presenti, preterita, vel futura, igitur quin A sit vel fuerit. Antecedens patet, quia non potest facere de non-ente ens sine omni mutatione et varietate, igitur nec econtra, quia eque videtur contradictionem includere; et quia <tunc> Deus posset sine omni mutatione de me albo facere nigrum, et de me existente Parisius existere Rome sine omni mutatione et varietate.

Gregory of Rimini, d. 42-44, q. 1
(p. 375.28-34)

si deus posset etc, "posset consimiliter facere nihil fuisse et nihil esse et nihil futurum esse. Et, cum hoc non possit facere per aliquam mutationem, sine omni mutatione praesenti, praeterita et futura posset facere ista." Sed hoc consequens est falsum; quod probatur: "Secundum hoc deus posset de patre meo facere esse non-patrem meum sine omni mutatione et de albo nigrum sine mutatione" et me, qui sum Parisius, esse in coelo vel Romae sine omni mutatione.

Andreas de Novo Castro
(ll.324-331)

. . . si Deus non potest habere velle respectu huius quod est A numquam, aut igitur defectus est ex parte divinae voluntatis, aut ex parte ipsius obiecti A, scilicet quia non natum est esse obiectum terminans actum volendi, sicut si visus non potest videre A obiectum, aut hoc erit ex defectu potentie visive, aut quia A non est natum esse obiectum visionis terminativum. Sed in proposito non est defectus ex parte voluntatis divinae, quia est omnipotens et aliquando potuit sic velle; nec ex parte obiecti, quia A non fuisse potest esse obiectum volitionis create — immo aliquando fuit obiectum volitionis increate.

John of Mirecourt,
In Primum Sententiarum, q. 39²⁵

. . . quia si Deus non posset de isto velle mundum vel aliquid praeteritum numquam fuisse, vel hoc est quia illud quod praeteritum est non potest esse obiectum divinae voluntatis, ita quod defectus est ex parte obiecti, vel hoc est quia voluntas divina non potest illud velle, ita quod sit defectus ex parte divinae voluntatis. Non secundo modo, quia tunc voluntas divina non foret omnipotens. Si dicatur quod hoc sit primo modo, quia illud quod praeteritum est non esse praeteritum non potest esse obiectum divinae voluntatis, ita quod defectus sit ex parte obiecti,

²⁵ Cf. Courtenay, John of Mirecourt, p. 249, n. 62; "Ille.... obiecti" is from my own transcription of this question as it is found in Paris, BN lat. 15882. Courtenay calls this question 39 of Mirecourt's commentary, Genest ("La bibliothèque anglaise de Jean de Mirecourt" in *Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert* [Amsterdam, 1988], ed. Olaf Pluta, cf. p. 299) question 38, the difference is one of differing redactions (according to Courtenay, "Mirecourt and Rimini", pt. 1, p. 246, n. 49).

contra: aliquid est praeteritum
 quod non esse praeteritum est
 bene et rationaliter in casu
 obiectum creatae voluntatis,
 igitur praeteritum potest esse
 obiectum divinae voluntatis,
 igitur non est defectus ex parte
 obiecti cum eodem modo se
 habeat nunc et prius. Ille
 modus arguendi videtur esse
 bonus in omni materia, ut si visus
 non potest videre obiecta vel est
 defectus ex parte visus vel
 ex parte obiecti. . .

It is fairly clear on the basis of the above comparisons, that Andreas, like Rimini and Mirecourt, still felt the impact of the Oxford *Sentences* lectures of Thomas Bradwardine and Thomas Buckingham. As Courtenay has shown, both Rimini and Mirecourt were operating within a framework for interpreting God's power with respect to the fixity of the past that was indebted to the debate between Buckingham and Bradwardine. Mirecourt entered into this debate in 1344-45, and specific texts in his question on God's ability to will the world never to have existed provoked the censure of the faculty of theology at Paris in 1347. It appears that he was not primarily censured for holding heretical, or even incorrect, views, but rather because he did not make sufficiently clear his own position on God's inability to make what is past not be past. Indeed, a number of statements taken from this part of Mirecourt's *Sentences* commentary and originally considered suspect were dropped by the investigating committee once Mirecourt had adequately explained in what sense it is proper to say that God cannot make the past not to have been past. Courtenay says of the commission examining Mirecourt's question:

Most of their objections seem to stem from the conviction that Mirecourt should have been able to demolish the arguments of the *adversarius* better than he did....one can imagine that the commission might have felt that Mirecourt was not as precise or as complete in his answers as he might have been. The distinction between God's power over events before they happen and God's power over events after they happen, although implicit throughout his earlier discussion and stated succinctly in his first apology, is nowhere mentioned directly or recalled at this crucial juncture...²⁶

²⁶ Courtenay, "Mirecourt and Rimini", p. 255.

Andreas de Novo Castro seems to have learned much both from Mirecourt's positive statements about God's ability to make the past not to have been and from his censure.²⁷ Like Mirecourt, Novo Castro structures much of his question on the inability to demonstratively prove that God cannot make a past thing not to have been even in the divided sense of that statement, taken to be referring to physical impossibility. Mirecourt, unconvinced by Buckingham's attempts to demonstrate this point, claimed that it could not be proven and that it was a proposition *per se nota*, like the principle of non-contradiction itself. Andreas makes use of just this tactic: he claims that the arguments of those who say that no necessity whatsoever is to be associated with the past and that God's power still ranges over it cannot be proven incorrect. The absurdities that could arise if this were the case are no more or less provable than is the principle of non-contradiction. What Andreas apparently learned from Mirecourt's trouble was to repeat over and over the distinction between an *ut nunc* and a formal contradiction, and to make clear that an *ut nunc* contradiction was the source of the necessity that surrounds the past now that it is past. In the unfolding of time, God certainly could have brought things about in another way, there is no formal contradiction in a past thing not having been, but now that the past is actually past an '*ut nunc*' contradiction results because of a past thing's actual preterition.

Of course, having observed that Andreas uses some of the ideas and arguments of Buckingham, Rimini, and Mirecourt, the potential presented by this text for tracing the development of late-medieval philosophy and theology is not exhausted. Andreas was obviously influenced by those who produced 'the new English theology'; the faculties of arts may also have provided some of the material for his questions;²⁸ finally there may well be Parisian traditions from the relatively unstudied teens and twenties of the fourteenth century at work here.²⁹ The task of tracking down arguments and discovering connections, however, must await further research and, especially, more critical editions.

²⁷ Mirecourt even appeals to the '*ut nunc*' contradiction at one point in his discussion, cf. Paris BN1a t 15882, f. 157rb. This manuscript (at least on microfilm) is extremely difficult to read, thus my transcription is of little use for comparing Mirecourt's text with Andreas'; but on the basis of that transcription, Courtenay's more complete one as presented in the notes to "Mirecourt and Rimini", and Andreas' citations of condemned articles taken from Mirecourt's work, it is clear that Mirecourt was an important source for Novo Castro.

²⁸ Cf., for instance the thirteenth-century *sophismata* contained in the *Abstractiones Hervaai Sophistae* (ed. Alain de Libera, AHDLMA 52 [1986], pp. 163-230). In particular cf. n. 258, "impossibile fuit possibile" (p. 226) with below, ll. 95-104; and *Abstractiones* nn. 27 and 85, "Deus erit in quolibet instanti non existens" (p. 187), and "Deum esse erit verum in A, si A non erit" (p. 196) with below, ll. 152-156. I am grateful to Sten Ebbesen for pointing out the resemblance between these standard *sophismata* as they are found in Hervaeus' text and in Andreas' work.

²⁹ Schabel, in the appendices to "The Quarrel with Aureol", has given preliminary editions of questions from a number of Parisian scholars from this period on the topic of the interaction of atemporal creator and temporal creation. These include Aureol, Francis of Marchia, Landulphus

The Edition

The edition below is based on the only two extant copies of distinction 45, question 6 of Andreas' commentary on the *Sentences*. The sigla used are:

P = Paris, B.N. lat. 15908, pt. 3 (text below found on ff. 225^r -230^r)

X = Incunabulum (Paris, 1514. Text below found on ff. 215^{vb}-218^{vb}, f. 216 misfoliated as 215 = 215bis below)

The only other known manuscript of Andreas' commentary on the first book of the *Sentences* (Paris, B.N. lat 15909) does not contain this text.

The text of both incunabulum and manuscript are rough, often reading far more like a *reportatio* than the *ordinatio* that Tachau and I both suppose it to be.³⁰ In a number of cases the text will only make good philosophical sense with the addition or substitution of words.

On the whole, X gives the more complete text, and the text that it gives is better than that found in P; yet P does provide a number of useful variants and is by no means superfluous. Inasmuch as this is the first edition of Andreas' work using the newly-discovered manuscript, I have reported all variants, except those in which the original scribe was obviously correcting his own mistakes.³¹

Standard medieval orthography has been used throughout, thus, 'ae' has been left as 'e' as found in both copies of Andreas' text. I have mapped the argument.

In the footnotes and apparatus I have used the following abbreviations and symbols:

- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| x/y <u>add.</u> | = addidit (scribe added word y after word x) |
| x <u>corr. ex</u> y | = correxit ex (scribe corrected word x from word y) |
| x/y <u>del.</u> | = deleuit (scribe added word y after word x, and then deleted it) |
| x <u>iter.</u> | = iteravit (scribe wrote word x twice) |
| x <u>lac.</u> | = lacuna (scribe left blank space in place of x) |
| <u>lec. inc.</u> | = lectio incerta (the abbreviation cannot be read) |
| (?) | = (reading is not certain) |
| x <u>mg.</u> | = in margine (scribe wrote word x in the margin) |
| x <u>om.</u> | = omisit (scribe has omitted word x from the text) |

Carraciolo, and the anonymous Franciscan author of the *Sentences* commentary found on the first 50 ff. of Vienna, Palat. Lat. 1439 (on which see Friedman and Schabel, "The Vitality of Franciscan Theology at Paris in the 1320's: The Evidence of Manuscript Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Codex Vindobonensis Palatinus 1439" [Forthcoming]). Over the next few years, Schabel and I intend to edit more texts on this general subject from *Sentences* commentary dating from this fertile and interesting, but relatively neglected, period in Parisian scholasticism.

³⁰ Cf. Tachau, "The *Quaestiones*", pp. 306-07.

³¹ With the exception of words deleted by the original scribe, yet included in the text below.

xy <u>inv.</u>	= invertit (scribe has written word y before word x, instead of x before y)
< x >	= word x was meant here by the author, but is not in the text
[x]	= word x was in all mss., but not meant by the author
x/y	= word y is in place of word x
x ²	= refers to the second word x in the line
x...y	= supply every word between x and y inclusive
+...+	= corruptela latet (editor suspects the text is corrupt)
PL	= Patrologiae latinae cursus completus, ed. J.-P. Migne.
CCL	= Corpus Christianorum series latina.

Appendix: Andreas' Citation of Condemned Articles³²

- f. 1^{va} Preterea: articulus domini Cardinalis vicesimus tertius est iste: "quod significabile complexe per istud complexum

³² Wherever possible in what follows I have made an exact match of the article cited by Andreas with one of those recorded in the standard literature (see below, this note). When a precise match was not possible, I have referred the reader to the probable reference with 'cf.' (confer). In those cases in which I was unable to identify the source of Andreas' citation, I have noted the article as "fons incertus". In all cases, I preface the reference note with the general source of the condemned article, be that 1277, Autrecourt, or Mirecourt.

I have used the following abbreviations to describe the condemned articles: de Rijk = L. M. de Rijk, ed. and trans., *Nicholas of Autrecourt: His Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), esp. pp. 167-207. References are to the latin text, article number, and page number.

I have cross-referenced de Rijk to: Lappe = Joseph Lappe, *Nicolaus von Autrecourt, Sein Leben, Seine Philosophie, Seine Schriften in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* 6,2 (Münster, 1908), pp. 1*-48*: references are to the latin text (when differing from de Rijk), article number, page and line number; and *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, v. II (Paris, 1891), eds. H. Denifle et A. Chatelain.

Stegmüller = "Apologia altera" in F. Stegmüller, "Die zwei Apologien des Jean de Mirecourt", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 5 (1933), pp. 192-204: references are to (Stegmüller's) proposition number, page and line number, and crossreferences to the actual list of condemned articles as found in CUP II, pp. 610-13.

Hissette = *Enquête sur les 219 Articles condamnés à Paris le Sept Mars 1277* (Louvain/Paris, 1977). Hissette uses Mandonnet's reorganization of the articles' original order as found in CUP, v. I (Paris, 1882), pp. 543-55 (cf. Hissette, p. 8), thus references are to Hissette's article number and Hissette's page, but I also provide the original article number and the page number of CUP where the article in question can be found.

"Novo Castro" refers to the Paris 1514 edition of Andreas' commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, as do all of the folio reference numbers included in the appendix.

I have not had available to me Franz Ehrle's *I più antichi statuti della Facoltà teologica dell' Università di Bologna*, to compare the condemned articles listed here with those from Hugolino of Orvieto's list of Bolognese statutes.

'Deus et creatura distinguuntur' nihil est, revoco tamquam falsum et scandalosum."³³

- f. 1^{va} secundum articulum Parisiensem potest Deus se solo immediate in effectum cause secunde sine ipsa causa secunda.³⁴
- f. 3^{vb} Duos articulos qui sunt domini Cardinalis quorum unus est 22 dicens "quod 'Deus et creatura non sunt aliquid' reputo et assero falsum et scandalosum prout verba sonant";³⁵ et tricesimus sextus dicit: "quod 'Deus et creatura non sunt aliquid' revoco tamquam falsum."³⁶
- f. 4^{ra} articulus dicens "quod complexe significabile per illud complexum 'Deus et creatura distinguuntur' nihil est, revoco tamquam falsum et scandalosum."³⁷
- f. 6^{va} contra articulum superius allegatum. . .³⁸
- f. 6^{vb} Deus enim non vult hominem peccare nec peccantem esse, secundum articulum Parisiensem.³⁹
- f. 10^{rb} Dices: ex hiis videtur quod signa contradictoria significant omnino idem, licet aliter et aliter, <contra> articulum dictum Cardinalis.⁴⁰
- f. 13^{va-b} hec est necessaria 'angelus est angelus' non minus quam ista 'homo est animal', que tamen ponitur necessaria secundum articulum domini Cardinalis.⁴¹

³³ Autrecourt, "Articuli missi de Parisius", de Rijk, p. 202, n. 60 = Lappe, n. 55, p. 41*.24-26 = CUP II, p. 583; The domini Cardinalis referred to is Cardinal Curti or Court who presided over the Avignon process against Nicholas of Autrecourt.

³⁴ Cf. 1277, n. 69, Hissette, p. 128 = CUP I, p. 547, n. 63.

³⁵ Autrecourt, , "Articuli in cedula 'Ve Michi' contenti", de Rijk, p. 182, n. 36 = Lappe, "Prima cedula", n. 32, p. 34*.14-15 = CUP II, p. 578.

³⁶ Autrecourt, "Articuli missi de Parisius", de Rijk, p. 200, n. 59 = Lappe, n. 54, p. 41*.22-23 = CUP II, p. 583.

³⁷ Autrecourt, "Articuli missi de Parisius", de Rijk, p. 202, n. 60 = Lappe, n. 55, p. 41*.24-26, = CUP II, p. 583.

³⁸ Cf. Novo Castro f. 4^{ra}.

³⁹ Cf. Mirecourt, n. 7, p. 195 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 12; n. 4, p. 194.12-195.2 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 10

⁴⁰ Cf. Autrecourt, "Ve Michi", de Rijk, p. 170, n. 4 = Lappe, "Alia Cedula", n. 3, p. 37*.14-15 = CUP II, p. 580.

⁴¹ Cf. Autrecourt, "Ve Michi", de Rijk, p. 170, n. 5 = Lappe, "Prima Cedula", n. 4, p. 31*.8-10 = CUP II, p. 576.

- f. 14^{rb} Ad probationem diceretur quod articulus condemnat "quod hec non sit necessaria secundum fidem: 'homo est animal'."⁴²
- f. 28^{rb} remoto Petro per annihilationem adhuc manet Petrum esse hominem cum sit verum necessarium, et similiter remoto asino manet asinum esse animal iuxta determinationem domini Cardinalis.⁴³
- f. 51^{vb} negatur quod celum sit animatum vel vivum proprie et univoce, sicut animal dicitur animatum; est etiam error Parisiensis condemnatus: "quod corpora celestia moveantur per animam et per virtutem appetitivam, sicut animal."⁴⁴
- f. 53^{va} ⁴⁵ secundum Boetium in omni creatura differt quo est et quod est, et pro hoc est articulus "quod aliquid citra Deum sit ita simplex quod non habeat quo et quod est, error."⁴⁶ Item, alius articulus "quod substantie separate sunt sua essentia, quia in eis idem est quod est et per quod est, error."⁴⁷ . . . impossibile esset unam animam intellectivam esse nobiliorem alia in substantialibus et naturalibus; consequentia patet quia in his que sunt eiusdem rationis, si quodlibet sit simplex et indivisibile, unum non est essentialiter perfectius alio, ut unus punctus alio puncto; consequens est falsum, quia secundum articulum Parisiensem: "quod anima Christi non esset nobilior anima Jude, error."⁴⁸
- f. 66^{va} Non est transitus de contradictorio in contradictorium sine mutatione reali, ut dicit articulus domini Cardinalis.⁴⁹
- f. 67^{va} diceretur quod articulus supradictus conditus est contra aliquos qui ponebant quantitatem esse idem cum substantia, et cognitionem et dilectionem esse idem cum anima. Et ideo

⁴² Autrecourt, "Ve Michi", de Rijk, p. 170, n. 5 = Lappe, "Prima Cedula", n. 4, p. 31*.8-10 = CUP II, p. 576. Cf. J.M.M.H. Thijssen, The "semantic" Articles of Autrecourt's Condemnation. New proposals for an Interpretation of the Articles 1, 30, 31, 35, 57, and 58" AHDLM 57 (1991), p. 163, n. 33.

⁴³ Cf. Autrecourt, "Ve Michi", de Rijk, p. 170, n. 5 = Lappe, "Prima Cedula", n. 4, p. 31*.8-10 = CUP II, p. 576.

⁴⁴ 1277, n. 73, Hissette, p. 130 = CUP I, p. 548, n. 92.

⁴⁵ Discussion of the three articles in this quotation continues from Novo Castro, ff. 53^{va}-54^{ra}.

⁴⁶ Fons incertus.

⁴⁷ 1277, n. 46, Hissette, p. 91. = CUP I, p. 548, n. 79.

⁴⁸ Cf. Mirecourt, Prima Apologia, n. 46, Stegmüller pt. I = RTAM 4 (1932), pp. 40-78, pp. 68.35-69.6. NB: This article is not found in the CUP because it was dropped from the initial list of suspect propositions.

⁴⁹ Cf. Autrecourt, "Articuli missi de Parisius", de Rijk, p. 202, n. 61 = Lappe, n. 56, p. 41*.27-28 = CUP II, p. 583.

diceretur quod articulus intelligitur de transitu contradictionis secundum predicationem de predicamento absoluto, non pure respectivo; <quia> specialiter de pure respectivo ad quod et secundum quod non est motus neque mutatio et respectu potentie Dei absolute supernaturalis. Et quod hec sit intentio articuli videtur quia articulus dicit sic: "quod sit transitus contradictionis sine reali mutatione cuiuscumque intrinsece, error."⁵⁰

- f. 84^{rb} Preterea, habet vim productivam illius concurrente aliqua causa secunda, igitur et sine illa. Probo consequentiam per articulum: "quod Deus non potest in effectum cause secundarie sine ipsa causa secundaria, error."⁵¹
- f. 85^{va} ad hoc videtur articulus Parisiensis dicens sic: "quod in causis secundis efficientibus cessante prima non cessat secunda ab operatione sua, dum tamen secunda operetur secundum naturam suam, error."⁵²
- f. 88^{ra} ad hoc videtur articulus Parisiensis dicens: "quod omnes motus voluntarii reducuntur in primum motorem, error."⁵³
- f. 89^{va} in articulis Parisiensibus: "quod Deus aliquid reprobatur quod ipse vult voluntate beneplaciti, error."⁵⁴
- f. 89^{vb} in articulis Parisiensibus dicitur sic: "quod Deus facit quod aliquis peccet et quod sit peccator et vult voluntate beneplaciti quod ille sit peccator, error."⁵⁵ Item: "quod quemlibet peccantem Deus vult peccare voluntate beneplaciti et facit eum peccare et quod ille peccet, error."⁵⁶
- f. 90^{rb} contra hoc sunt articuli supra allegati...⁵⁷
- f. 91^{vb} Quod enim non sit concedendum Deum velle huiusmodi voluntate beneplaciti patet per articulum 16 in posterioribus dicentem sic: "quod Deus aliquid reprobatur quod ipse vult voluntate beneplaciti, error."⁵⁸

⁵⁰ Autrecourt, "Articuli missi de Parisius", de Rijk, p. 202, n. 61 = Lappe, n. 56, p. 41*.27-28 = CUP II, p. 583.

⁵¹ 1277, n. 69, Hissette, p. 128 = CUP I, p. 547, n. 63.

⁵² 1277, n. 100, Hissette, p. 171 = CUP I, p. 554, n. 199.

⁵³ 1277, n. 152, Hissette, p. 235 = CUP I, p. 555, n. 209.

⁵⁴ Mirecourt, n. 6, Stegmüller, p. 195.5-12 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 13.

⁵⁵ Mirecourt, n. 4, Stegmüller, p. 194.12-195.2 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 10.

⁵⁶ Mirecourt, n. 7, Stegmüller, p. 195.13-15 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 12.

⁵⁷ Cf. Novo Castro, ff. 89^{va-b}.

⁵⁸ Mirecourt, n. 6, Stegmüller, p. 195.5-12 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 13.

- f. 92^{va} Preterea, ad hoc sunt articuli in posterioribus condemnati. Articulus quartus: "quod Deus facit quod aliquis peccet et quod sit peccator et vult voluntate beneplaciti quod ille sit peccator, error."⁵⁹ Articulus quintus: "quod nullus peccat volendo aliquo aliter quam Deus velit eum velle, error."⁶⁰ Articulus septimus: "quod quemlibet peccantem Deus vult peccare voluntate beneplaciti, error."⁶¹ Ad idem sunt articuli decimus et undecimus.⁶² Illi autem qui sunt contrarie opinionis concedunt Deum velle huiusmodi voluntate beneplaciti, ideo contra eos sunt conditi articuli.
- f. 93^{rb} Preterea, ad hoc sunt plures articuli in posterioribus: "quod Deus facit quod aliquis peccet, et quod sit peccator, error."⁶³ Item: "quod Deus facit malum esse et peccatum esse, error."⁶⁴ Item: "quod Deus est causa aliquo aliter actus demeritorii ut est demeritorius, error."⁶⁵ Item: "quod Deus est causa et actor peccati ut peccatum est, et mali in quantum malum est, error."⁶⁶ Item: "quod a Deo est quod actus demeritorius sit in quantum demeritorius est, error."⁶⁷ Item: quidam alii ut infra tangetur.
- f. 98^{ra} Articulus enim Parisiensis dicit sic: "quod Deus est causa maxima et immediata privationis iustitie in actu, error."⁶⁸
- f. 98^{rb} nam articulus Parisiensis dicit sic: "quod qualitercumque voluntas causat aliquid causat taliter in virtute prime cause, error."⁶⁹
- f. 155^{va-b} Ex dictis conclusionibus sequitur quod falsum est dicere quod hec propositio 'A est' et hec propositio 'A non est' significant penitus idem, sed alio modo; et ad hoc est articulus 4 in posterioribus per Cardinalem condemnatus, ubi dicitur sic: "quod iste propositiones 'Deus est' et 'Deus non est' penitus idem significant, licet alio modo, revoco tamquam

⁵⁹ Mirecourt, n. 4, Stegmüller, p. 194.12-195.2 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 10.

⁶⁰ Mirecourt, n. 5, Stegmüller, p. 195.3-4 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 11.

⁶¹ Mirecourt, n. 7, Stegmüller, p. 195.13-15 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 12.

⁶² Mirecourt, nn. 10-11, Stegmüller, p. 196.9-22 = CUP II, p. 611, nn. 16-17.

⁶³ Mirecourt, n. 4, Stegmüller, p. 194.12-195.2 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 10.

⁶⁴ Mirecourt, n. 8, Stegmüller, p. 195.16-17 = CUP II, p. 611, n. 14.

⁶⁵ Mirecourt, n. 30, Stegmüller, p. 202.7-10 = CUP II, p. 612, n. 33.

⁶⁶ Cf., Mirecourt, n. 31, Stegmüller, p. 202.11-13 = CUP II, p. 612, n. 34.

⁶⁷ Mirecourt, n. 36, Stegmüller, p. 203.4-7 = CUP II, p. 612, n. 37.

⁶⁸ Mirecourt, n. 33, Stegmüller, p. 202.20-25 = CUP II, p. 612, n. 38.

⁶⁹ Mirecourt, n. 32, Stegmüller, p. 202.14-19 = CUP II, p. 612, n. 35.

falsum";⁷⁰ et articulo 35 dicitur sic "quod contradictoria adinvicem idem significant revoco tamquam falsum."⁷¹

- f. 158^{ra} ...igitur significatur omnino idem per contradictoria, sed alio et alio modo, quod est contra articulum.⁷²
- f. 160^{rb} Item contra hanc responsionem videtur articulus Parisiensis capite (?) 4 ubi dicitur: "quod multe veritates fuerunt ab eterno que non fuerunt ipse Deus, error."⁷³
- f. 181^{vb} Item ad hoc sunt tres articuli Parisienses in posterioribus quorum unus sic dicit: "quod propter opera alicuius futura bona Deus predestinavit aliquem ab eterno, error";⁷⁴ alius est: "quod aliquis est predestinatus ab eterno propter bonum usum liberi arbitrii quem Deus prescivit eum habiturum, error"⁷⁵; alius est: "quod non sicut gratis et misericorditer Deus predestinavit illum quem predestinavit, quin etiam pro omnibus bonis futuris ipsius vel alterius, error."⁷⁶
- f. 186^{vb} Hic supponitur quod aliquis de numero reproborum aliquando est in charitate <187^{ra}> et gratia, ut determinatur tertio libro *Sententiarum*, distinctione XXXI. Opinio quorundam fuit ad questionem aliquando quod non, sed illa opinio per magistros Parisienses fuit condemnata et revocata.⁷⁷
- f. 215^{bis}^{ra} Item: in posterioribus articulis Parisiensibus sic dicitur: "quod Deus potest facere omnem rem preteritam non fuisse ut quod potest facere Magdalenam non peccasse, error."⁷⁸
- f. 224^{vb} Preterea, modo est articulus Parisiensis. . . sic: "nulla propositio de futuro contingenti est nunc de presenti determinate vera; conclusionem sic generaliter positam in sensu quem facit revoco tanquam erroneam et assero quod cuiuslibet contradictiones de futuro contingenti altera pars est determinate vera."⁷⁹

⁷⁰ Autrecourt, "Quattuor articuli confessati, de Rijk, p. 170, n. 4 = Lappe, "Alia cedula", n. 3, p. 37*.14-15 = CUP II, p. 580.

⁷¹ Autrecourt, "Ve Michi", de Rijk, p. 182, n. 35 = Lappe, "Prima cedula", n. 33, p. 34*.12-13 = CUP II, p. 578.

⁷² Cf. Novo Castro, ff. 155^{va-b}. Cf.: Autrecourt, "Quattuor articuli confessati", de Rijk, p. 170, n. 4 = Lappe, "Alia cedula", n. 3, p. 37*.14-15 = CUP II, p. 580.

⁷³ Fons incertus.

⁷⁴ Mirecourt, n. 39, Stegmüller, p. 203.20-25 = CUP II, p. 613, n. 47.

⁷⁵ Mirecourt, n. 40, Stegmüller, p. 204.1-3 = CUP II, p. 613, n. 48.

⁷⁶ Mirecourt, n. 41, Stegmüller, p. 204.4-7 = CUP II, p. 613, n. 50.

⁷⁷ Fons incertus.

⁷⁸ Fons incertus.

⁷⁹ Fons incertus.

- f. 226^{rb} Item ad hoc sunt articuli Parisienses, est enim articulus sub hac forma: "quod Deus non posset movere celum motu recto, error."⁸⁰ Item, alius articulus: "quod Deus non potest irregulariter et alio modo quam movet movere celum, error."⁸¹ Preterea, hanc rem corruptibilem que de facto cras corrumpetur Deus simpliciter posset conservare diutius, immo imperpetuum; et ad hoc sunt articuli, quorum unus est: "quod Deus non potest dare immortalitatem vel incorruptibilitatem rei corruptibili vel mortali, error."⁸² . . . Item, ad hoc est articulus Parisiensis dicens sic: "quod prima causa non posset plures mundos facere, error."⁸³ Preterea, hec opinio directe videtur condemnata per articulum Parisiensem dicens sic: "quod Deum necesse est facere quicquid immediate fit ab ipso, error."⁸⁴ . . . tamen contra eum convenienter allegantur articuli Parisienses interdum pro se interdum contra se. Item contra eundem ut recitat articulus per dominum Robertum archiepiscopum Cantuariensis dicentem "quod omnis propositio de futuro vera est necessaria, error".⁸⁵
- f. 227^{ra} Quod scilicet prescientia non imponat necessitatem futurum, etiam articulus Parisiensis dicens "quod prima causa non habet scientiam futurorum contingentium propter ordinem cause ad causatum, prescientia enim divina est causa necessaria prescitorum, error."⁸⁶
- f. 227^{vb} Decimo, ad hoc videtur articulus Parisiensis dicens sic: "quod ad hoc quod effectus omnes sint necessarii respectu cause prime, non sufficit quod ipsa prima causa non sit impedibilis, sed exigitur quod cause medie non sint impedibiles, error."⁸⁷
- f. 228^{vb} Ad decimum, nec est intentio articuli quod. . .⁸⁸
- f. 234^{rb} Item, articulus Parisiensis in posterioribus talis est "quod satis erat possibile quod per volitionem creatam Christus aliquid voluerit et numquam sic debuit evenire, error."⁸⁹ Item, alius articulus: "quod Christus potuisset dixisse falsum et asservisse assertionem creata tam vocali quam mentali,

⁸⁰ 1277, n. 66, Hissette, p. 118 = CUP I, p. 546, n. 49.

⁸¹ 1277, n. 23, Hissette, p. 56 = CUP I, p. 546, n. 50.

⁸² Cf. 1277, n. 214, Hissette, p. 307 = CUP I, p. 545, n. 25.

⁸³ 1277, n. 27, Hissette, p. 64 = CUP I, p. 545, n. 34.

⁸⁴ 1277, n. 20, Hissette, p. 51 = CUP I, p. 546, n. 53.

⁸⁵ Oxford 1277, CUP I, p. 559, n. 8.

⁸⁶ 1277, n. 15, Hissette, p. 39 = CUP I, pp. 545-46, n. 42.

⁸⁷ 1277, n. 95, Hissette, p. 164 = CUP I, p. 547, n. 60.

⁸⁸ Cf. Novo Castro, f. 227^{vb}.

⁸⁹ Mirecourt, n. 1, Stegmüller, p. 193. 1-16 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 1.

error".⁹⁰ Item, alius articulus: "quod possibile est Christum secundum voluntatem creatam errasse, et forsitan secundum hominem mendacium protulisse, error."⁹¹

- f. 235^{va} Preterea, quicquid Deus potest mediante in causa secunda, potest se solo immediate, secundum articulum Parisiensem.⁹²
- f. 236^{rb} Preterea, contra hoc sunt articuli Parisienses recitati quod Christus non potuit dixisse vel asservisse falsum.⁹³
- f. 241^{ra} Preterea, quintus articulus Parisiensis: "voluntate existente in tali dispositione in qua nata est moveri et manente (*inc*: movente) sic disposito quod natum sit movere, impossibile est voluntatem non velle, error."⁹⁴
- f. 241^{rb} Item, articulus Parisiensis "quod diabolus nunquam habuit unde posset stare nec etiam Adam in statu innocentie, error."⁹⁵
- f. 245^{va} Minor etiam videtur contra articulum Parisiensem: "de voluntate existente in tali dispositione in qua nata est moveri, et manente (*inc*: movente) sic disposito quod natum sit movere, impossibile est voluntatem non movere, error."⁹⁶
- f. 248^{vb} Quarto ad hoc videtur articulus Parisiensis sic dicens ad hoc: "quod omnes effectus sint necessarii respectu prime cause, non sufficit quod ipsa prima causa sit inimpedibilis, sed exigitur quod cause medie sint inimpedibiles, error."⁹⁷
- f. 249^{ra-b} Intentio enim articuli est. . .⁹⁸
- f. 250^{rb} et articuli condemnati sive Parisius sive in Anglia. . .

⁹⁰ Mirecourt, n. 2, Stegmüller, p.193.17-27 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 2.

⁹¹ Mirecourt, n. 12, Stegmüller, pp. 196.23-197.5 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 3.

⁹² Cf. 1277 n. 69, Hissette, p. 128 = CUP, p. 547, n. 63.

⁹³ Cf. above, nn. 90-91.

⁹⁴ 1277, n. 160, Hissette, p. 251 = CUP I, p. 551, n. 131.

⁹⁵ Fons incertus.

⁹⁶ 1277, n. 160, Hissette, p. 251 = CUP I, p. 551, n. 131.

⁹⁷ 1277, n. 95, Hissette, p. 164 = CUP I, p. 547, n. 60.

⁹⁸ Cf. Novo Castro, f. 248^{vb}.

- f. 250^{va} Igitur respondeo quod omne quod est futurum eveniet contingenter simpliciter et absolute quoad Dei potentiam absolutam patet per articulos Parisienses in superioribus allegatos. Item, unus articulus est iste: "quod omnia ex necessitate eveniunt, et quod omnia futura que erunt de necessitate erunt, et que non erunt impossibile est esse, et quod nihil eveniet contingenter considerando omnes causas, error."⁹⁹
- f. 258^{rb} Confirmatur: in articulis Parisiensibus posterioribus dicitur sic: "quod odium proximi non est demeritorium nisi quin prohibitum a Deo, error."¹⁰⁰
- f. 259^{va} Quemcumque effectum potest Deus mediante causa secunda, potest se solo immediate, secundum articulum Parisiensem.¹⁰¹
- f. 260^{rb} Confirmatur omnia ista per articulum Parisiensem in posterioribus dicentem sic: "quod tenentes intellectionem, volitionem, sensationem esse qualitates existentes subiective in anima, habeant dicere et concedere quod Deus potest facere se solo quod anima odiret Deum et proximum et non demeritorie, error."¹⁰² . . . Septimo per articulum Parisiensem in posterioribus dicentem sic: "quod Deus potest precipere creature rationali quod habeant ipsum odio et ipsa obediens plus meretur quod si ipsum diligeret ex precepto, quoniam hoc faceret cum maiori conatu et magis contra propriam inclinationem, reputo et assero falsum, erroneum, et scandalosum."¹⁰³
- f. 261^{ra} Antecedens probatur per articulum Parisiensem, omnem enim effectum et omnem formam quam Deus potest causare mediante causa secunda, potest seipso immediate; et quia omnem rem quam Deus potest adnihilare, potest iterum producere.¹⁰⁴
- f. 261^{va} ad articulum Parisiensem dicitur quod. . .¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ 1277, n. 102, Hissette, p. 172 = CUP I, p. 545, n. 21.

¹⁰⁰ Mirecourt, n. 25, Stegmüller, p. 200.19-23 = CUP II, p. 611, n. 27.

¹⁰¹ Cf. 1277, n. 69, Hissette, p. 128 = CUP I, p. 547, n. 63.

¹⁰² Mirecourt, n. 29, Stegmüller, p. 201.23-202.6 = CUP II, p. 612, n. 30.

¹⁰³ Autrecourt, "Articuli missi de Parisius", de Rijk, p. 202, n. 63 = Lappe, n. 58, p. 41*.31-36 = CUP II, p. 584.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. 1277, n. 69, Hissette, p. 128 = CUP I, p. 547, n. 63.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Novo Castro, f. 261ra.

- f. 261^{vb} aliter diceretur quod articulus loquitur de potentia Dei ordinata. . .vel dicendum quod articulus condemnat opinionem dicentem quod. . .¹⁰⁶
- f. 265^{vb} Dum mali precepto aut consilio Dei resistunt ea faciunt, unde voluntas eius que ipse est impletus que dispositio vel beneplacitum vocatur. Et nota quod forte super dictis istis fundabant se illi qui ponebant errores Parisius condemnatos in articulis posterioribus quorum unus est: "Deus facit quod alios peccet et vult voluntate beneplaciti quod ille sit peccator";¹⁰⁷ alius error: "Deus aliquid reprobatur quod ipse vult voluntate beneplaciti";¹⁰⁸ alius error: "aliquis facit omnino ut Deus vult ipsum facere voluntate beneplaciti, et peccat."¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Novo Castro, f. 261ra.

¹⁰⁷ Mirecourt, n. 4, Stegmüller, p. 194.12-195.2 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 4.

¹⁰⁸ Mirecourt, n. 6, Stegmüller, p. 195.5-12 = CUP II, p. 610, n. 4.

¹⁰⁹ Mirecourt, n. 10, Stegmüller, p. 196.9-17 = CUP II, p. 611, n. 16.

ANDREAS DE NOVO CASTRO
IN PRIMUM SENTENTIARUM, DIST. 45, Q. 6

/P 225^r//X 215^{vb}/

Viso de libertate vel necessitate causalitatis concernendo differentiam presentis temporis, videndum est de eadem concernendo differentiam preteriti temporis. Et quero utrum ea que fuerunt possibile sit per divinam potentiam absolutam nunquam fuisse.

5 Quod sic: quia sicut futura ad fore sic preterita ad fuisse; sed ea que futura sunt possibile est nunquam fore, aliter evenirent de necessitate; igitur.

Item, Anselmus, 2 *Cur Deus homo*, 17:¹ "non recte dicitur impossibile Deo esse ut faciat quod preteritum est, non esse preteritum."

Contra: sexto *Ethicorum*, capitulo 2:² "recte Agaton dicit hoc solo privatur
10 Deus", et cetera. Dices: ex ista auctoritate sequitur quod Deus posset facere hominem esse animal irrationale, quia "illo solo privatur Deus", et cetera; sed hominem esse irrationalem non est facere ingenita esse que fuerunt. Diceretur quod hoc solo sic privatur quod nullo alio nisi quod eandem rationem impossibilitatis habet cum isto, scilicet quod est in se formaliter impossibile et
15 respectu cuius non est potentia, et contradictionem infert.

Prima Conclusio

Illud quod fuit impossibile est non fuisse et illud quod non fuit impossibile est nunc ipsum fuisse, etiam in sensu divisionis. Licet hec conclusio apud philosophos et doctores Catholicos sit communiter concessa ab antiquis tamquam
20 ex se probabilis, tamen quia aliqui inventi sunt conantes eam negare et querentes eius demonstrationem evidentem, ideo primo probatur per auctoritates, deinde persuadebitur ratione.

Quoad primum Augustinus 26 libro *Contra Faustum*, capitulo 3:³ "quisquis dicit 'si omnipotens est Deus, faciat ut hec que facta sunt non fuerint' non videt
25 hoc se dicere: 'si omnipotens est, faciat ut ea que vera sunt, eo ipso quo vera sunt, falsa sint, ut Deus potest facere ut aliquid non sit quod erat.' Hanc autem sententiam, qua dicimus aliquid fuisse, falsam facere Deus non potest."

2 presentis/preteriti X P 2-3 videndum...temporis om. P 6 evenirent/ eveniret P 7 2 om. P
// 17 om. X 10 posset/potest P 11 esse om. P; irrationale/ rationale P 12 facere om. P //
diceretur/dicitur P 13 sic om. P 15 cuius/ eius P // et/ad P // infert/inferri P 18 hec om. P
19 communiter/convenienter X // antiquis/ antiquo X 23 libro om. P 24 hec om. P // facta om. P
25 ea om. P 26 sint, ut/ sunt P; sicut X // Deus potest inv. P // erat/erit X

¹ Anselmus, *Cur Deus homo* II, capitulo 17, *Opera omnia*, ed. F.S. Schmitt (Edinburgh, 1946), v. 2, p. 123.4-5.

² Aristoteles, *Ethica Nichomachea*, VI.1, 1139b8-10.

³ Augustinus, *Contra Faustum* 26,5 (PL 42,481).

Item, Anselmus, 2 *Cur Deus homo*, capitulo 17:⁴ "Cum Deus facit aliquid, postquam factum est, iam non potest non esse factum." Et respondet quod hec
 30 non est potentia, sed impotentia. Et *Proslogion* 6:⁵ "quomodo es omnipotens, si omnia non potes aut si non potes corrumpi aut mentiri? Nec facere verum esse falsum aut quod factum est non esse factum?" Et respondet quod hoc non est potentia, sed impotentia.

Item, *De Concordia*, capitulo 2:⁶ "in re preterita est quoddam quod non est
 35 in re presenti vel futura. Numquam enim fieri potest ut res que est preterita fiat non preterita, sicut res que est presens potest fieri non presens, et res que non /X 215bis^{ra}/ necessarie futura est potest fieri ut non sit futura."

Item, Hieronymus ad Eustachium:⁷ "audaciter loquar, cum possit Deus omnia suscitare, reparare virginem non potest post ruinam." Hoc dicens, non
 40 intelligit quin possit eam facere corpore clausam et integram, sed non potest facere quin fuerit corrupta, et per consequens quod sit virgo, si virgo dicatur illa que non solum est integra, sed que numquam fuit corrupta.

Item, in posterioribus articulis Parisiensibus sic dicitur: "quod Deus potest facere omnem rem preteritam non fuisse ut quod potest facere Magdalenam non
 45 peccasse", error."

Deinde eandem conclusionem nituntur multi persuadere rationibus, sed non evidenter demonstrant, quia multe rationes eque possent reduci de futuro. Hec est autem natura multarum propositionum per se notarum, et probabilium, ut vix probari possunt ex necessariis. Arguitur igitur primo sic:⁸ demonstrato
 50 A (quod est et quod fuit), de A ente nunc, <non> possibile est fieri A non esse nisi destruendo, igitur <non possibile est fieri A non esse> quin A fuerit. Antecedens patet, quia sicut de A non ente non potest Deus /P 225^v/ facere ens nisi produc-

28 2 om. P // homo om. X // capitulo...Deus om. P 29 postquam/ priusquam X P 29-30 factum²...
 impotentia om. P 31 omnia/enim P // non¹...si om. P // mentiri/ moveri X 32 non² om. P 34
 De ... 2/Deus 6° 2° P 36 sicut/sed P 37 necessarie futura est/est necesse futura P // sit om. P
 38 Hieronymus/ Pous P 39suscitare/ sustinere P // dicens om. P 40 intelligit/intelligitur P //
 quin/ quando P 41 quin/ quando P 42 que/quando P // numquam/ quantum P 46 nituntur/
 innittuntur X // multi/multis P 47 possent/posse P 48 hec/hoc P // multarum/ multorum P 49
 primo om. P 50 fieri A/om. P // nisi/non P 51 quin/quando P 52 quia/om. P // nisi/non P

⁴ Anselmus, *Cur Deus homo* II, cap. 17, ed. cit., v. 2, p. 123, 3-4.

⁵ Anselmus, *Proslogion*, cap. 7, ed. cit., v. 1, p. 105.9-11; cf. *Cur Deus homo* II, cap. 17, ed. cit., v. 2, esp. pp. 123.31-124.11.

⁶ Anselmus, *De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio* I (2), ed. cit., v. 2, pp. 249.29-250.2.

⁷ Hieronymus, *Epistolae ad Eustochium* 22,5 (PL 22,397).

⁸ Cf. Thomas de Buckingham, *In Sententiarum* 1-4 q. 3, a. 1 (ed. Parisiis 1505), f. 2^{rab}; cf. Gregorius Ariminensis *In I Sententiarum*, d. 42-44, q. 1 (ed. A. Damasus Trapp and Venicio Marcolino), p. 376.2-6.

endo, ita non videtur quod me nunc existentem potest facere non esse, nisi destruendo esse meum.

55 Item,⁹ cum A sit et fuerit, impossibile est Deum facere A non esse nec fuisse sine omni mutatione et varietate in omni re presenti, preterita, vel futura, igitur quin A sit vel fuerit. Antecedens patet, quia non potest facere de non-ente ens sine omni mutatione et varietate, igitur nec econtra, quia eque videtur contradictionem includere; et quia <tunc> Deus posset sine omni mutatione de
60 me albo facere nigrum, et de me existente Parisius existere Rome sine omni mutatione et varietate.

Preterea,¹⁰ si A (quod fuit et est) faceret Deus nec esse nec fuisse, aut igitur per aliquam causalitatem effectivam aut per alicuius causalitatis effective subtractionem et cessationem aut sine hoc et illo. Si primum vel secundum,
65 igitur aliquid producendo vel corrumpendo, et <tunc habeo> propositum. Si tertium, contra, quia tunc non minus possem quam Deus facere A numquam fuisse, quia ad hoc nulla virtus requiritur, nec alicuius causalitatis exercitium vel subtractio; et quia purum non-esse non est obiectum nec terminus alicuius potentie nisi in respectu ad aliud esse precedens vel sequens, per modum termini
70 a quo vel ad quem, alioquin convenienter diceretur quod Deus ab eterno et in eternum semper facit non esse nec fuisse ea que <non> fuerunt, nec magis facit A numquam fuisse quam B (sit B aliquod possibile quod numquam fuit nec erit).

Preterea, si Deus potest facere A numquam fuisse, igitur potest hoc facere nichil immutando circa alia preterita, sed ceteris que fuerunt remanentibus
75 uniformiter preteritis. Probatio consequentie: quia nullam includit contradictionem magis quam preteritum numquam fuisse, et quia Deus potest creare vel annihilare A nichil immutando circa alia, igitur, pari ratione, facere A non esse preteritum, ceteris uniformiter manentibus preteritis. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia B fuit opus factum ab A; igitur A fuit. Et similiter: C fuit
80 pater A et ipsum genuit, igitur A fuit.

Item, A genuit B filium naturaliter. Si igitur A non fuit, igitur nec B fuit genitus ab A per propagationem naturalem, nec fuit per creationem, ut suppono; igitur B non fuit; igitur non facit A precise non fuisse.

53 non¹ *om.* P // nunc existentem/non P 57 quin/ quando P 60 omni *om.* P 62 Deus *om.* P 68 esse/est P 69 nisi/ non P 71 facit¹/sit P 73 fuisse/quam b sit b *add.* P 74 nichil *om.* P // alia preterita *inv.* P 77 A² *om.* P 78 manentibus *om.* P // preteritis/presentibus P 79 similiter *om.* P 81 non/ nec P 82 A *om.* P 83 precise *om.* P

⁹ Cf. Thomas de Buckingham, *loc. cit.*, f. 2^{rab}; cf. Gregorius Ariminensis, *loc. cit.*, pp. 375.28-34.

¹⁰ Cf. Thomas de Buckingham, *loc. cit.*, ff. 1^{vb}-2^{ra}; cf. Gregorius Ariminensis, *loc. cit.* p. 367.23-30, p. 375.1-27.

Item, possibile esset quod A habuerit patrem naturalem et non matrem, et
 85 econtra, quia Deus poterit facere matrem eius vel patrem tantum numquam
 fuisse, non faciendo alia preterita non fuisse. Et possibile esset quod Sortes fuisset
 damnatus pro homicidio et tamen numquam fecerit homicidium, quia possibile
 esset nullum alium hominem ab eo fuisse. Et multa huiusmodi possent adduci
 que non videntur evidentia, quia possent applicari ad futura.

90 Secunda Conclusio

A quod est et fuit numquam fuisse implicat contradictionem, /X 215bis^{rb}/
 et etiam in sensu divisionis.

Probatur, quia est simpliciter impossibile; igitur. Consequentia probatur
 contra aliquos qui de aliquibus concedunt ipsa esse impossibilia, et tamen non
 95 implicare contradictionem, stante et concessio ipsa esse impossibilia.

Contra hoc arguitur, quia 'impossibile esse possibile' et 'impossibile poni
 inesse' esse positum implicat contradictionem; sed si A numquam fuisse sit
 impossibile antequam fuisset, infert contradictoria. Illud probo, quia A numquam
 fuisse est — per te — impossibile, et tamen sequitur 'A numquam fuit, igitur A
 100 numquam fuisse est possibile, immo actualiter positum'. Igitur sequitur, si A
 numquam /P 226^r/ fuit, quod impossibile est possibile, ut arguitur supposito quod
 A numquam fuisse sic sit simpliciter impossibile; et ex quocumque inferitur quod
 A numquam fuisse est possibile, ex eodem inferitur impossibile esse possibile. Sed
 ad A numquam fuisse, sequitur quod A numquam fuisse est possibile, immo
 105 quod sit actu positum. Igitur.

Dices: per idem arguitur quod propositio falsa contingenter implicat
 contradictionem, ut posito quod 'Sortes sedeat', arguitur sic quod Sortem currere
 implicat contradictionem, quia ex hoc inferitur verum esse falsum et econtra.
 Probo, quia sequitur: Sortes currit, igitur 'Sortem currere' est verum; sed Sortem
 110 sedere ponitur esse verum, et per consequens Sortem currere ponitur esse falsum;
 igitur 'Sortem currere' verum esse falsum infert, vel econtra.

Sed non est similis virtus argumenti hinc et ibi. Sortem enim currere, licet
 sit falsum, non tamen implicat nec infert absolute contradictionem, quia Sortem
 sedere et non currere est contingens, et potest deponi et non est verum. Igitur,

84 esset/est P // habuerit/habuit P 86 et/quia (?) P // fuisset/esset P 88 alium/ album P // hominem om. P 91 contradictionem/ contradictionum P 92 etiam om. P 93 consequentia/ conclusio P 94 esse/esset X 94-95 et...impossibilia om. P 96 et/est P 97 inesse om. X 98 contradictoria om. P // probo/ probatur P // numquam/non P 99 est om. P // te / est add. P 100 A om. P 101-02 ut...sic/vel arguitur sic, si A fuisse P 102 inferitur/ inferatur P 103 eodem/ eadem P 105 quod om. P 108-11 et...econtra om. P 112 Sed/respondendo P // et ibi/ inde P 113 infert/ inferet P

115 non sequitur 'Sortem currere est verum, igitur falsum est verum', quia ponendo
Sortem currere, deponitur primum sine repugnantia. Sed in proposito, A non
fuisse est — per te — impossibile et necessario falsum, et impossibile nec potest
deponi esse possibile. Igitur quicquid infert A non fuisse esse possibile, infert
simpliciter impossibile esse possibile. Arguitur igitur sic: si aliquod predicatum
120 concomitatur inseparabiliter et necessario aliquod subiectum, ad quodcumque
antecedens sequitur possibile dici de illo subiecto, sequitur etiam possibile dici de
illo predicato; sed secundum te, 'impossibile' dicitur inseparabiliter et necessario
de hoc subiecto 'A numquam fuisse', et ad A numquam fuisse, sequitur quod 'A
numquam fuisse' est possibile; igitur ad A numquam fuisse, sequitur impossibile
125 esse possibile. Quod autem A numquam fuisse sit simpliciter necessario
impossibile patet, quia si sit tantum contingenter impossibile, igitur potest non
esse impossibile; igitur potest esse possibile; igitur potest esse verum; igitur est
possibile.

Preterea, si A sit impossibile, igitur includit repugnantiam ad esse et poni;
130 igitur A poni includit repugnantiam, igitur contradictionem, quia includit esse
illud cui repugnat esse.

Preterea, ex impossibili sequitur quodlibet: primo *Priorum*;¹¹ igitur.

Contra Duas Conclusiones

(1) Primo sic: omne illud est Deo possibile quod contradictionem non
135 includit nec est necessarium nec peccatum; sed A non fuisse est huiusmodi, igitur
(sit A nomen proprium absolutum alicuius quod est et fuit). Maior probatur, quia
quicquid est possibile poni vel fieri, est Deo possibile poni, circumscripto malo
culpe; sed quicquid non implicat contradictionem est possibile poni. Probo, quia
impossibile poni implicat contradictionem, scilicet impossibile esse possibile; quia
140 ad B esse positum, sequitur quod B poni est possibile.

Minor principalis probatur multipliciter.

(1.a) Primo sic: A non fuisse aliquando non includebat contradictionem
(immo aliquando erat verum), igitur nec modo. Consequentia probatur, quia
cum hec propositio 'A non fuit' semper idem eodem modo significat, quicquid
145 aliquando sequitur ex illa propositione, semper ex illa sequitur; si enim aliqua
consequentia est necessaria, semper est necessaria.

116 sine/sicut P 118 possibile/ impossibile XP // Igitur/ ideo P 121 antecedens/aliud P // sequitur²/ sequatur P 122 dicitur/dici P 124 igitur/sequitur quod add. P 124-25 sequitur...simpliciter/sit P 126 patet...tantum/si sit impossibile patet quia si P 129 A/D P 132 quodlibet/ impossibile add. P 134 sic om. P // est/ a add. P 137 est²/ a add. P 138-39 est...contradictionem om. P 139 scilicet/sed P 142 sic om. P 144 idem/et add. X

¹¹ Non inveni.

(1.aa) Confirmatur, aut implicat /X 215bis^{va}/ contradictionem ex suo significato, aut ex modo et forma significandi, aut ex aliquo extrinseco. Non primum nec secundum, quia idem semper eodem modo significabit hec
 150^{*} propositio 'A non fuit', et tamen aliquando non implicabat contradictionem. Si tertium, igitur illa contradictio sequitur ratione alicuius accidentalis extrinseci ipsi significato; igitur sine repugnantia potest poni significatum eius, et per consequens veritas eius, sine illo accidentali extrinseco.

(1.ab) Dices: hec propositio 'A non fuit' non includit simpliciter
 155 contradictionem ex suo significato, sed ut nunc: scilicet postquam A sit, infert contradictionem ratione sui significati; sicut non est contradictio 'Deum non esse in C instanti', quia dum C non est, Deus non est in C instanti, /P 226^v/ tamen C existente, contradictionem ut nunc includit 'Deum non esse in C'.

(1.ac) Contra: consimili ratione, hec propositio 'ego sto' includeret
 160 contradictionem, quia infert contradictoria ut nunc. Sequitur enim ut nunc 'ego sto, igitur ego qui sedeo sto', quia ly 'ego' et ly 'qui sedeo' convertuntur ut nunc. Et ultra: igitur, sedeo et sto.

(1.b) Secundo probatur minor principalis, quia complexe significabile per istam 'A non fuit', ut sumptum precise et distincte contra aliud significabile, aut
 165 includit repugnantiam aut non. Si primum, igitur illa propositio ratione sui per se formalis et precisi significati includit contradictionem; igitur et semper. Si secundum, igitur illud significabile precise et distincte sumptum est Deo possibile; igitur illa propositio per Dei potentiam potest esse vera, quia ad eius veritatem sufficit quod eius significabile ponatur et quod ita sit sicut significat.

(1.c) Tertio: aut ex ista propositione precise 'A non fuit' et propter istam
 170 precise sequitur contradictio, aut non, sed etiam ex adiunctione et propter adiunctionem cuiusdam veri, puta quod A fuit. Si primum, contra: quia semper inclusisset contradictionem. Si secundum, igitur pari ratione diceretur hec includere contradictionem, 'Antichristus non erit', adiuncto hoc vero quod
 175 Antichristus est futurus. Ex quo potest argui ad principale sic: quod non fuit, non est necessarium non fuisse; igitur quod fuit (puta Christum), non necessarium est fuisse. Antecedens probatur, quia hec non est necessaria: 'Antichristus non fuit'. Probatur, quia potest esse falsa et aliquando erit falsa, quia ex illa cum isto vero, 'Antichristus est futurus', infert quod Antichristus erit et non erit.

147 implicat/implicabat P 148 forma/enuntiandi add. P // aliquo/ alio X 149 nec/necque P
 150 implicabat/ implicabant P 151 alicuius accidentalis inv. P 155 nunc/tunc X // sit/fuit X
 156 non² s.l. P 159 consimili/simili P 160 contradictoria/ contradictio P 163 complexe/cum
 dico P 166 formalis/formaliter P //precisi significati /precise significabili P 170 aut/a add. P
 172 fuit/fuerit P 174 non om. P 174-78 adiuncto...falsa² om. P 179 infert/ infertur P // erit¹/
 est P

(1.d) Quarto: Antichristum fuisse non includit contradictionem; igitur Christum non fuisse non includit contradictionem. Consequentia patet, quia eque est possibile illud quod non fuit fuisse, sicut illud quod fuit non fuisse. Antecedens probatur, quia propositio includens contradictionem non potest fieri vera, quia non solum est falsa, sed impossibilis.

(1.e) Quinto: nulla propositio pure negativa implicat contradictionem; sed hec est negativa 'A non fuit'; igitur. Maior probatur, tum quia propositio pure negativa et simplex nullam affirmationem includit nec formaliter infert, sed propositio implicans contradictionem, implicat affirmationem et negationem eiusdem, igitur; tum quia ex puris negativis nichil sequitur.

(1.f) Sexto: contradictio que inferretur, foret ista: 'quod fuit, non fuit' vel 'A simul fuit et non fuit'. Sed hec contradictio non potest sufficienter argui. Probo: quia ista contradictio non sufficienter ostenditur sequi que non arguitur nisi per rationem committentem petitionem principii vel fallaciam compositionis et divisionis; sic est hic. Probo, quia argueretur sic: si 'quod fuit, potest non fuisse' ponitur in esse, tunc verum est quod non fuit, et tamen ponitur preteritum et fuisse, igitur fuit et non fuit. Sed hic est petitio principii vel compositio et divisio, sic enim arguitur quod futurum non potest non fore, quia simul erit et non erit. Cum igitur assumis quod A ponitur fuisse, petitur una pars consequentis et est compositio et divisio, quia hec non sunt compossibilia 'quod sit preteritum' et 'quod non fuerit', sicut 'quod sit futurum' et 'quod non erit'. Ponendo igitur quod non fuerit, deponitur ipsum fuisse. /X 215bis^{vb}/

(2) Secundo principaliter: quod non est de essentia ipsius A, sed omnino ei extrinsecum vel accidentaliter conveniens, potest ab eo separari sine repugnantia; et si etiam aliquando ab ipso existente separatur, potest sine contradictione semper ab illo separari. Sed 'fuisse' sic se habet ad A. Probo, quia aliquando sibi non conveniebat, licet etiam A esset actu. Patet in primo instanti sui esse, et quia 'fuisse' et 'fore' sunt respectus ad terminos eiusdem rationis eque extrinsecos ipsi A, secundum tempus preteritum et futurum.

(3) Tertio: aut hec necessitas ad fuisse seu impossibilitas ad non fuisse provenit per se ex natura ipsius A, aut ex natura ipsius divine potentie, aut ex transitu temporis. Non primum nec secundum, quia aliquando non erat huiusmodi necessitas vel impossibilitas, et existente Deo et ipso A. Si tertium,

180 igitur/ nec add. X 181 non¹ om. P 182 eque/econtra P 185 implicat/includit P 189
eiusdem/igitur om. X 189-90 tum...sexto om. P 190 que/ qua P // inferretur/ infertur P 191
Probo/probatio P 192 arguitur/ arguit P 194 sic est hic om. P // Probo/probatio P 195 ponitur¹/
ponatur P // tamen/ cum P // et² om. P 196 hic est/sit P 200 quod³ om. X 202 secundo/tertio P
// A/om. P 204 etiam aliquando inv. X 205 Probo/ probatio P 206 patet/ etiam add. P 208
secundum om. P 210 provenit/prevenit X // aut¹/nec P 212 et/etiam X

contra: quod est extrinsecum ipsi A, nec per se ab eo dependet A, non imponit necessitatem vel impossibilitatem ipsi A. Sed tempus est huiusmodi, quia
 215 continue fluit et variatur, manente ipso A invariato, et A ex sua natura indifferenter respicit omnem differentiam temporis.

(4) Quarto: aut fuisse quod nunc attribuitur ipsi A est aliquod positivum aut /P 227¹/ privativum. Si primum, potest a Deo tolli, quia nichil est positivum extra Deum necessario. Si secundum, igitur suum oppositum est aliquod
 220 positivum; igitur Deus potest nunc ponere illud; igitur tolletur oppositum, scilicet fuisse, et habetur propositum.

(5) Quinto: non necessarium non potest mutari et transire in necessarium, nec possibile in impossibile, nisi mutetur eius natura; sed A fuisse erat aliquando non necessarium et A non fuisse erat tunc possibile; igitur.

(5conf) Confirmatur, quia necessarium mutaretur realiter in impossibile et econtra, quia secundum te A non fuisse erat aliquando necessarium et aliquando non necessarium, et A fuisse erat aliquando impossibile et posse possibile. Consequens est falsum, quia necessarium non potest mutari in possibile contingens, igitur multo minus in impossibile.

(6) Sexto: ubi consequentie sunt vere, si antecedens est possibile, et consequens est possibile; sed iste consequentie sunt vere, prima <ad> Corinthios, <caput> 15,¹² hec consequentia: "si resurrectio mortuorum non est, nec Christus resurrexit," et infra: "si mortui non resurgunt, neque Christus resurrexit." Sed antecedens utriusque est possibile cum intelligatur de futuro; igitur.

(7) Septimo: quod fuit aliquale vel aliquid se habens, potest non fuisse huiusmodi; igitur, pari ratione, quod fuit potest simpliciter non fuisse. Consequentia est nota, si ratio preteriti <non> sit ratio necessitatis. Antecedens patet in multis, quia hec propositio, 'Antichristus erit', fuit vera et potest numquam fuisse vera; et iste qui fuit predestinatus, potest numquam fuisse predestinatus; et Deus
 240 qui scivit et voluit B fore, potest numquam scivisse et voluisse B fore; et etiam divina essentia que representavit hoc, potest numquam representasse; et Petrus qui vidit hoc representari in divina essentia, potest numquam vidisse; et actus qui fuit revelatio vel assertio talis obiecti potest numquam fuisse huius, alioquin

214 impossibilitatem om. P // A/tempus preteritum et futurum add. P 215 invariato/ et variato P
 216 omnem om. P 217 nunc/ non P // aliquod/ quid P 220 Deus om. P 223 nisi/nec P // sed/ si
 P 224 non¹ om. P // non² om. P // possibile/impossibile P // igitur om. P 225-27 Confirmatur...
 possibile om. P 229 in om. P 230 ubi om. P // sunt om. P 231 est/erit P // prima/prime X 231-
 32 iste...15/ prerorum in fine (?) P 233 et infra/quia ista P // resurgunt/resurgent P 234 utriusque
om. P 236-37 Consequentia est nota om. P 239 iste/illic P 241 hoc/ hec P 243 fuisse/et add. P

¹² I Ad Corinthios, 15:13, 15:16.

Christus potuisset dixisse vel asseruisse falsum et indicasse et decepisse aliquem;
 245 consimiliter quod fuit causa alicuius, potest numquam fuisse causa illius, ut si
 quis salvatus est et meruit, quia credidit resurrectionem esse futuram, vel gavisus
 est, quia vidit in Deo representari B fore. Et multa fiunt propter finem futurum et
 propter futurationem alicuius rei, que possunt non fore.

(8) Octavo: sequitur omnia de necessitate evenire. Probo: A non potest non
 250 fuisse; igitur hec est necessaria: 'A fuit productum'. Igitur, modificata modo
 necessitatis, est necessaria et vera; igitur A fuit necessario productum; igitur Deus
 necessario produxit A; igitur non libertate contingentie.

(9) Nono: secundum Magistrum, libro primo *Sententiarum*, distinctione
 42, capitulo 5:¹³ "Manifestum est Deum omnia posse facere preter ea quibus eius
 255 dignitas lederetur eiusque excellentie derogaretur"; sed A /X 217^{ra}/ non fuisse
 <non> derogat dignitati Dei, quia A fuisse nichil addit dignitati Dei: Deus enim
 eque perfectus erat, si A non fuerat.

(9conf) Confirmatur secundum Apostolum, Ad Ephesios 3,¹⁴ et Anselmum
 2 *Cur Deus homo*, capitulo 17:¹⁵ "Deus est plus potens facere quam nostra ratio sit
 260 potens comprehendere"; sed possumus intelligere 'A non fuisse', et aliquando
 etiam ita credimus, licet ita non sit ut sic nobis apparet; nec tamen apparet
 contradictio; igitur.

(10) Decimo: quicquid Deus aliquando potuit, adhuc nunc potest secundum
 Magistrum, libro primo *Sententiarum*, distinctione 44, capitulo 4;¹⁶ et pari
 265 ratione, quicquid Deus aliquando aliquialiter potuit facere, adhuc nunc potest
 taliter facere; probo: aliter non maneret omnipotens et eque potens, sed eius
 potentia minor esset; sed Deo aliquando erat possibile quod A numquam fuisset;
 igitur et nunc est possibile. Deus etiam aliquando poterat taliter creare A ut
 faceret A esse primo et prima vice et primo die creationis mundi; igitur et nunc
 270 potest facere taliter A esse. Patet consequentia, quia taliter eum creare A, erat non
 maioris virtutis quam producere calorem.

244 vel asseruisse om. P 245 quod ... alicuius/cum actus qui fuit P 248 futurationem/signationem
 X // possunt/potest X 249 de necessitate evenire / evenire de necessitate P // Probo/probatio P
 253 libro primo inv. P 256 A/non add. P 257 si/cum X 258 Ad om. P 261 ita¹ om. X // ut sic /
 tamen P // nobis apparet inv. P // nec tamen/ et ita non P 264 *Sententiarum om.* X // 4/10 P 266
 probo/probatio P 270 esse/ lec. inc. P // Patet consequentia om. P // quia/et P // eum/enim XP // A ,
 erat/erat A XP 271 maioris/minoris XP // quam/sit add. X

¹³ Petrus Lombardus, *Sentenitae in IV libris distinctae*, liber 1, distinctio 42, cap. 3/1
 (Grottaferrata, 1971), pp. 295.30-296.1.

¹⁴ Ad Ephesios, 3:20.

¹⁵ Cf. Anselmus, *Cur Deus homo* II, cap. 17, *ed. cit.*, v. 2, p. 126.7-8.

¹⁶ Cf. Lombardus, *I Sent.*, dis. 44, cap. 2/2, *ed. cit.*, p. 305.17-22.

(10conf1) Confirmatur: agens respectu cuius nichil preteriit nec transiit, sed omnia /P 227v/ semper sunt sibi equaliter presentia, si aliquando potuit aliquid et aliquo modo, et semper potest idem et tali modo, nec propter preteritionem temporis redditur sibi noviter aliquid impossibile. Sic est de Deo secundum Augustinum super illud Psalmi "Pulchritudo agri mecum est";¹⁷ et allegatur primo *Sententiarum*, distinctione 35, capitulo 6:¹⁸ "apud Deum nichil preteriit vel futurum est." Hoc etiam ponit Augustinus 15 <De> *trinitate*.¹⁹

(10conf2) Confirmatur: Deus non aliter intelligit et novit preterita quam presentia et futura; igitur nec aliter habet posse respectu horum et istorum, pari ratione. Antecedens patet per Augustinum 10 <De> *civitate Dei* 12,²⁰ et libro 17 capitulo 18.²¹

(11) Undecimo: Deus potest velle A numquam fuisse, igitur A potest numquam fuisse et Deus potest facere A numquam fuisse. Consequentia patet: aliter Deus non vellet rationabiliter et non esset omnipotens.

Antecedens probatur multipliciter. (11.a) Primo, quia potentia et libertas divine voluntatis esset minorata, quia aliquando poterat habere liberum velle respectu huius et modo non potest.

(11.b) Secundo: quicquid Deus vult ad extra, vult libertate contingentie, quia habitudinem ad creaturam non habet necessariam.

(11.c) Tertio: Anselmus, secundo *Cur Deus homo*, capitulo 17:²² "Omnis necessitas subiacet Dei voluntati, et eius voluntas nulli subiacet necessitati."

(11.d) Quarto: aliter Deus intrinsece vellet preterita, presentia, vel futura, quia presentia et futura vellet libere libertate contingentie, et preterita vellet necessario. Consequens est falsum, quia non aliter novit illa, igitur pari ratione de velle.

(11.e) Quinto: sequitur quod creatura infert et imponit novam necessitatem intrinsecam divine voluntati. Probo, quia voluntas divina non necessitabatur prius velle A fuisse, et modo necessitatur; igitur voluntati divine advenit nova necessitas intrinseca; igitur huius nove necessitatis est aliqua causa et ratio: non

273 semper/ sed omnia P 274 propter/per P 275 redditur/ rederetur P 276 agri/agni X 277 nichil/est add. P 278 est del. P 279 non/B add. P 280 istorum pari/illorum in P 284 et om. P 291 secundo om. P 297 imponit/ponit P 298 Probo/probatio P 300 huius/C add. P

¹⁷ Cf. Augustinus, *Enarr. in Ps* 49, 11, n. 18 (PL 36, 577 = CCL 38, 589.27-35).

¹⁸ Cf. Lombardus, I *Sent.*, dis. 35, cap. 9/2, *ed. cit.*, p. 258.15-16.

¹⁹ Cf. Augustinus, *De trinitate*, XV.13 (PL 42, 1070 = CCL 50A, 495.23-33).

²⁰ Cf. Augustinus, *De civitate Dei*, X.12 (PL 41, 291 = CCL 47, 287.30-35).

²¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, XVII.18 (PL 41, 552 = CCL 48, 583.8 - 584.13).

²² Anselmus, *Cur Deus homo* II, ch 17, *ed. cit.*, v. 2, p. 122.26-27.

nisi positio rei extra et transitus temporis. Igitur positio et adventus creature imponit necessitatem novam voluntati divine ad intrinsece volendum. Consequens est inconveniens: tum quia videtur indecens et indignum quod res extra subiciat divinam voluntatem nove necessitati et servituti; tum quia res extra non sunt causa volitionis divine quare Deus sic velit, igitur non necessitant voluntatem divinam ad sic volendum; tum quia preteritio rei non magis participat formaliter et positive esse quam futuritio et non minus nichil est, sed futuritio non necessitat ad sic volendum, igitur nec preteritio.

(11.f) Sexto: hic erunt due necessitates, una ex parte creature secundum quam necesse est A fuisse (que sit B), et alia ex parte Dei secundum quam necesse est Deum velle A fuisse (que sit C). Tunc B et C non sunt eadem necessitas, sicut nec est eadem contingentia futuritionis seu rei future et volitionis divine; aut igitur B est causa C, aut econtra. Si primum, igitur creatura est causa nove necessitatis intrinsece in Deo. Si secundum, igitur erit nova necessitas volendi in Deo et novus transitus de non-necessitate /X 217^{rb}/ sic volendi ad necessitatem sic volendi, non propter mutationem creature; igitur primo erit mutatio in Deo.

(11.fconf) Confirmatur: aut una necessitas reducitur ad aliam, aut ambe ad tertiam (in omni enim genere est resolvere ad aliquod primum). Sed C non reducitur ad B, quia voluntas Dei esset pedisequa respectu creature, quod nephas reputatur primo *Sententiarum*, distinctione 45, capitulo 4;²³ nec B reducitur ad C, quia libertas divina transiret noviter in necessitatem /P 228^f/ ex se, non propter preteritionem rei, et ita mutatio primo in Deo; nec B et C reducuntur ad tertium, quia aliquid antecederet voluntatem Dei.

(11.g) Septimo: si Deus non potest habere velle respectu huius quod est A numquam fuisse, aut igitur defectus est ex parte divine voluntatis, aut ex parte ipsius obiecti A, scilicet quia non natum est esse obiectum terminans actum volendi, sicut si visus non potest videre A obiectum, aut hoc erit ex defectu potentie visive, aut quia A non est natum esse obiectum visionis terminativum. Sed in proposito non est defectus ex parte voluntatis divine, quia est omnipotens et aliquando potuit sic velle; nec ex parte obiecti, quia A non fuisse potest esse obiectum volitionis create — immo aliquando fuit obiectum volitionis increate.

301 positio¹/potentia P // positio²/potentia P 302 voluntati divine *inv.* P 304 nove necessitati *inv.* P 305 velit/vellet P 307 sed/sic est P 309 erunt/erit P // una ex *inv.* P 311 B et C/C et B P 312 futuritionis/ singularitatis P 313 C /igitur P 314 erit *om.* P 315 non *om.* P // sic *om.* P 316 erit *om.* P 317 aliam/ *lec.* *inc.* P 320 reputatur/est dicere P //capitulo/capite X 321 in /et P // non *om.* P 322 ita/illa P // tertium/tertiam P 323 voluntatem Dei *inv.* P 326 natum est *inv.* P // obiectum *om.* P

²³ Lombardus, I *Sent.*, dis. 45, cap. 4/2, *ed. cit.*, p. 308.16-17.

(11.h) Octavo: aliquod preteritum voluntas nostra interdum recte et rationabiliter vult non fuisse; igitur et Deus potest hoc velle. Antecedens patet, quia voluntas vult recte A peccatum non fuisse, quia recte penitet se commisisse
 335 A peccatum.

(11.hconf) Confirmatur minor: peccatum non fuisse foret melius quam fuisse, igitur Deus potest velle illud non fuisse. Consequentia probatur, quia, cum sit summe bonus et omnipotens, potest velle illud quod melius est.

(11.i) Nono: posse velle A non fuisse aut est perfectionis, aut
 340 imperfectionis, aut neutrum et indifferens. Si primum, igitur convenit vel convenire potest Deo. Si secundum, contra, quia aliquando conveniebat Deo. Si tertium, igitur non est inconveniens nec repugnans Deo, quia Deo nichil repugnat, nisi ratione sue perfectionis.

(12) Duodecimo principaliter: voluntas creata non obligatur ad impossibile,
 345 nec ad volendum impossibile; sed obligatur ad non peccasse et ad velle non peccasse, quia obligatur ad penitendum de peccato preterito, quia si non obligatur non peccasse, igitur licitum est sibi peccasse; igitur licitum est sibi velle peccasse; igitur. Maior probatur, quia si posset obligari ad aliquod impossibile, pari ratione posset obligari ad quodlibet, cum omne impossibile sit eque impossibile: et ita
 350 recte obligaretur ad producendum chimeram, et iuste posset sibi dari preceptum super hoc; et quia obligaretur velle impossibilia et contradictoria, et sic teneretur velle impossibile et oppositum impossibilis, quod est necessarium; et sic teneretur velle impossibile et teneretur velle necessarium ei oppositum; et consequenter teneretur velle et nolle idem.

355 <Ad Argumenta Principalia>

(ad 1) Ad primum:²⁴ per idem arguitur quod A actum meum preteritum ego possum facere numquam fuisse, quia me posse hoc non includit contradictionem, quia aliquando fuit hoc michi possibile. Dicendum igitur quod dupliciter potest aliqua propositio importare vel implicare contradictionem. Uno

332 preteritum/obiectum P 337 probatur/patet P // cum/est P 339 posse/potest P 348 si... impossibile *om.* P 349 posset/potest P // cum...sit/impossibile P 349-50 ita...obligaretur *om.* P 350 ad producendum chimeram/ chimeram ad producendum X // posset/potest P 351 contradictoria ...teneretur/contradictio quod teneretur P 352 impossibile et/necesse si P // oppos-itum/illius *add.* P // impossibilis/impossibile X // quod *om.* P // et sic/igitur P // teneretur/ teneretur P 353 teneretur *om.* X; teneretur P 352 teneretur/ teneretur XP 356 quod/stando in lumine naturale et demonstrato A quod est et fuit, possibile A numquam fuisse quia quod non includit contradictionem est possibile actu potentie; probatur ut supra; sed A non fuisse non includit contradictionem probatur ut supra. Per idem item *add.* P 358 hoc michi *inv.* P

²⁴ X *mg.*: "a<lia> l<ittera> h<abet>: et secundum non conveniret huiusmodi et tertium. Contra, quia cadit sub precepto interdum."

360 modo per se et formaliter, ex formali et intrinseca repugnantia significati per
illam, et ex per se formali significatione illius, sive huiusmodi repugnantia sit
nobis evidens sive non, ut si diceretur "Sortes est animal inanimatum." Alio
modo non sic per se, sed per accidens, scilicet ex aliqua condicione et circumstantia
adiuncta.

365 Item, ex aliqua propositione inferri et argui contradictionem contingit
dupliciter. Uno modo, quia ex illa propositione deducitur a nobis contradictio per
aliqua notiora in veritate quam illa propositio sit nota in falsitate, sicut ex ista
'homo est lapis', deducitur enim quod esset /P 228^v/ animatus et inanimatus.
Alio modo deducendo contradictionem coassumendo aliqua vera, licet non
370 notiora quam sit oppositum /X 217^{va}/ illius propositionis. Et hec est condicio
multarum propositionum per se notarum: quod non possunt probari ex
notioribus, et licet oppositum illarum includat contradictionem, tamen hec
contradictio non potest explicari et deduci nisi coassumendo eandem
propositionem vel consimilem et equivalentem. Si enim hec propositio 'omne
375 totum est maius sua parte' vel 'omne continens aliquod et amplius est maius illo'
est sic per se vera quod eius oppositum includit contradictionem et per
consequens includit oppositum primi principii, igitur ex illo principio sequitur
illa propositio; et tamen hec consequentia non potest explicari et ostendi, nisi
assumendo eandem propositionem vel equivalentem.

380 Ad propositum: posito quod A sit et fuerit, hec propositio 'A non fuit vel
potest numquam fuisse' includit contradictionem, licet non per se ex formali
repugnantia terminorum, sed per accidens ex condicione et circumstantia annexa
tamen irrevocabili, scilicet preteritione ipsius A; licet hec contradictio non possit a
nobis evidenter deduci ex notioribus, sed semper oportebit accipere tanquam
385 irrevocabilem quod A fuit. Ad rationem, igitur, negatur minor.

(Ad 1.a) Ad probationem primam: probat solum quod non includit
contradictionem primo modo.

(Ad 1.aa) Ad confirmationem: dicendum quod hec propositio 'A non fuit',
non includit contradictionem ex suo significato per se formaliter, sicut ista 'A
390 quod fuit, potest numquam fuisse'. Tamen prima includit contradictionem ex
suo significato, licet per accidens, quia ex condicione et circumstantia extrinseca
adiuncta, que quamvis aliquando foret accidentaliter et non conveniens ipsi A,

361 sit/in add. X 362 evidens/eudens X 363 aliqua/aliam P 365 inferri et argui/infer et
arguit P // contingit/contingenter P 367 quam/quod P // ista/illa P 369 non s.l. P 373
explicare/applicare P 374 et om. P 376 eius oppositum inv. P 378 hec/illa P 380
posito...fuerit om. P 381 licet om. P 382 terminorum/ex se add. P // et/vel P 383 scilicet
preteritione/licet preteritionem P // hec om. P // non/hec P 384 oportebit/oportebat X 385
fuit/fuerit P 389 ista A/aliam illud P

tamen modo necessario et inseparabiliter concomitatur. Responsio: igitur ibi posita potest concedi.

395 (ad 1.ab) Ad improbationem: dicendum quod aliquam propositionem includere contradictionem ut nunc potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, quia infert contradictionem ex aliqua condicione et suppositione nunc vera, que tamen non necessario stat irrevocabiliter, sed potest tolli et mutari; et propositionem sic includere contradictionem ut nunc non infert eam esse simpliciter impossibilem.
400 Alio modo, quia includit contradictionem ex aliqua condicione nunc vera que non semper fuit vera, nec est per se essentialis nec semper annexa significato illius propositionis, tamen facta est immutabilis et invariabilis; et sic "includere contradictionem ut nunc" infert propositionem esse simpliciter impossibilem.

(Ad 1.b) Ad secundam probationem minoris: dico quod licet illud complexe
405 significabile per istam 'A non fuit' — circumscribendo omne aliud extrinsecum ab eo — non includat contradictionem, tamen simpliciter non potest poni, quia quedam condicio extrinseca est irrevocabiliter ipsum concomitans.

(Ad 1.c) Ad tertiam: dicendum quod hec propositio 'A non fuit' (ipsa sola nunc accepta) includit contradictionem, licet illa contradictio non explicetur nec
410 deducatur nisi assumendo hoc verum immutabile: 'A fuit' vel aliquid equivalens. Et cum arguitur quod similiter diceretur de futuro, negatur, quia illud verum coassumptum erit verum non-necessarium, scilicet 'Antichristus est futurus'.

(Ad 1.d) Ad quartam probationem: negatur antecedens loquendo de
415 inclusione contradictionis per accidens et ut nunc; aliter enim intelliguntur implicare contradictionem ista 'Antichristus fuit' et ista 'Christus non fuit'. Si enim per 'fuisse' in istis propositionibus consignificetur tempus preteritum in generali et confuse, sic secunda includit contradictionem ut nunc et semper in perpetuum a parte post, sed prima includit contradictionem ut nunc et ut
420 immediate post nunc. Si vero consignificetur determinate et distincte tempus preteritum in hoc instanti, distinguendo contra omne preteritum quod erit preteritum in instanti futuro, ut sic utraque equaliter includit contradictionem et numquam fiet verum quod Antichristus fuerit in tempore /X 217^vb/ preterito ab initio mundi usque ad instans presens demonstratum.

393 inseparabiliter/inseparabili habet P // ibi *om.* P 395 dicendum quod *om.* P // aliquam propositionem *inv.* P 398 irrevocabiliter *om.* P 401 semper/ per se P 402 est immutabilis/et mutabilis P 404-05 dico...fuit/licet P 405 omne/esse P 405-06 aliud...eo/extrinsecum P 406 quia/ que *add.* P 407 extrinseca *om.* P 410 immutabile/ mutabile P 411 quod/quia P 412 coassumptum/ assumptum P 414 antecedens *om.* P 415 enim/ tamen X 416 ista¹/scilicet *add.* X //ista² *om.* P // Christus/ Antichristus XP 417 consignificetur/ consignificaretur P 417-420 tempus... consignificetur *om.* P

425 (Ad 1.e) Ad quintam: negatur assumptum. Patet de ista 'nichil est' vel
 'Deus non est', non enim minus implicat /P 229f/ contradictionem quam ista
 'chymera est', quia Deus non minus habet repugnantiam ad non esse quam
 chymera ad esse.

Ad probationem assumpti: per idem arguitur quod nulla pure affirmativa
 430 implicat contradictionem de cuius subiecto vere affirmatur esse. Oppositum
 tamen patet, nam hec propositio 'Sortes est irrationalis' implicat contradictionem;
 et cum dicitur quod ex puris negativis nichil sequitur, verum est sine aliqua
 affirmativa implicita quam convenit accipere explicando et resolvendo
 consequentiam.

435 (Ad 1.f) Ad sextam: negatur minor. Ad probationem: non est fallacia
 compositionis et divisionis, quia quando condicio implicata in subiecto est
 necessaria, tunc sensus compositionis infert sensum divisionis, ut si Sortes
 necessario sit sedens, tunc hec propositio 'Sortes sedens non potest ambulare'
 eque est vera in sensu divisionis, sicut in sensu compositionis. Sic autem est de
 440 ista: 'preteritum potest non fuisse'; non autem de ista: 'A futurum potest non
 fore'. Cum autem dicitur quod non infertur contradictio nisi petendo
 principium, respondeo quod hoc non impedit propositum quin veraciter et
 convenienter deducitur contradictio, quia hec est condicio multarum
 propositionum per se notarum: quod non probantur nisi implicite petendo,
 445 scilicet assumendo idem in simili vel equivalenti.

(Ad 2) Ad secundum principale: committitur fallacia <figurae> dictionis,
 vel potest dici quod quamvis omnis res extrinseca alicui et distincta totaliter ab
 illo possit separari ab illo, non tamen quecumque condicio noviter adveniens
 alicui rei et qualitercumque se habere vel se habuisse. Et licet omne tale posset
 450 dici accidentale, quia non de propria ratione formali illius nec conveniens ei per
 se secundo modo per modum passionis specificæ, tamen non est accidentale, id est
 separabile contingenter.

(Ad 3) Ad tertium: provenit ex natura ipsius A et ex ipso Deo, qui est prima
 causa totius ordinis causarum et totius universi, non tamen absolute et

428 esse/patet quia hec propositio Sortes est irrationalis que propositio sit B, igitur B non esse filium
 implicat contradictionem et tamen est propositio negativa add. P 429 assumpti/argumenti P. 430
 contradictionem/dico igitur quod illa affirmativi includit contradictionem ad cuius subiectum
 sequitur negatio predicati et illa negatio implicat contradictionem add. P // subiecto/necessario
 verificatur esse consequenter oppositum predicati add. P 430-434 vere...consequentiam om. P 438
 tunc/tamen P 439 divisionis/compositionis P // compositionis/ divisionis P 441-443 nisi....
 contradictio om. P 443 condicio/concedenda (?) P 444 quod/que P 445 scilicet/id est P 446
 dictionis/ divisionis P 447 quamvis/quantum P //omnis om. P//extrinseca/rationis add. P 448
 noviter adveniens inv. P 449 alicui om. P 450 propria/ formali add. et del. P // formali om. P //
 ei/et P 451 modum/per se add. P 452 contingenter/ contingens P

455 circumscribendo respectum ad differentias temporis. Et cum dicitur quod tempus,
cum sit extrinsecum rei, non imponit necessitatem rei, dicendum quod proprie
non imponit necessitatem essendi vel non essendi, secundum quam fiat ens
necessarium vel impossibile esse. Non etiam proprie imponit necessitatem per
modum cause formalis vel conservantis, quoniam, secundum philosophos,
460 forma et figura celi imponit necessitatem essendi accidentibus celi, et sol
necessitatem essendi imponit lumini genito in partibus corporis dyaphani.
Tamen improprie dicitur imponere necessitatem secundum quam necesse est A
sic fuisse; et sic imponit necessitatem per modum circumstantie inseparabilis et
irrevocabilis.

465 (Ad 4) Ad quartum: accipiendo 'fuisse' personaliter pro eo pro quo
supponit, dico quod 'fuisse' dicit positivum, scilicet preteritum non presens.
Idem enim dicit 'fuisse' et attribuitur ipsi A quod attribuebatur tempore preterito
dicendo 'A est'. Et concedo quod Deus illud positivum potest nunc tollere, id est
facere quod non sit; sed non potest facere quin fuerit. Ideo secundum
470 communem intellectum non potest tollere A fuisse, quia hoc esset non solum
tollere positivum ut non esset, sed etiam ut non fuisset. Licet etiam quodcumque
positivum quod nunc non est, Deus possit facere seu ponere et facere ens — et per
consequens possit nunc ponere A in esse presenti —, non tamen potest tollere A
non fuisse faciendo A esse, quia hoc non esset solum tollere privativum ponendo
475 positivum, sed faceret positivum non fuisse.

(Ad 5) Ad quintum: est figura dictionis mutando 'quid' vel 'quale quid' in
'quando', et mutando 'esse' in 'fuisse'. Vel potest dici (et in idem redit) quod ens
contingens esse et non esse non potest fieri ens necesse esse vel impossibile esse,
tamen ens contingens esse vel non esse potest noviter se habere necessario ad
480 fuisse, et repugnanter ad non fuisse. Et verum contingens ut nunc non tantum
potest /X 218^{ra}/ fieri falsum, immo impossibile, et econtra.

(Ad 6) Ad sextum: intentio Apostoli non est procedere secundum
huiusmodi consequentiam logicalem, sed quod Deus non preordinasset
resuscitare Jesum, nisi preordinasset resuscitare genus humanum; vel intendit
485 quod si resurrectio hominum foret impossibilis, igitur Christus non resurrexit,
quia erat vere homo consimili humanitate.

456 sit/fit X 459 conservantis/ conservant (?) P // quoniam *om.* P 460 figure/substantia P // celi¹/cele P 461 essendi imponit *inv.* P // corporis/sui P // dyaphani/differenter P 463 necessitatem *om.* P 466 presens/ si A non sit *add.* P 467 'fuisse' et *om.* P // attribuitur/actu P
469 quin/quando non P 472 seu/et P 472-73 et¹...ponere *om.* P 474 non¹ *om.* P // hoc/ hec P // privativum/ privationem P 476 quid/quicquid P 479 ens *om.* P 480 repugnanter/repugnant XP // contingens/ vel *add.* P 480-81 non...immo/ necessarium vel facere est P. 482 intentio/ necesse vero P 484 resuscitare¹/ resuscitatum P // preordinasset/prius ordinasset P // resuscitare²/huiusmodi *add.* P 485 impossibilis/possibilis P // resurrexit/ surrexit P

(Ad 7) Ad septimum: "fuisse aliquale aut aliqualiter se habuisse" contingit dupliciter. Uno modo sic quod fuisse tale non dependet a futuro, nec includit nec exigit vel infert futurum aliquod fore; et sic negatur antecedens. Alio modo quod
 490 fuisse tale dependeat a futuro, vel includat vel inferat aliquod futurum contingens, ita quod quamvis sit preteritum secundum similitudinem et formam enuntiandi, tamen realiter et implicite et equivalenter est futurum secundum quid; et sic negatur consequentia. Et in isto sensu procedunt probationes antecedentis. De hoc magis in sequentibus.²⁵

(Ad 8) Ad octavum: negatur consequentia. Ad probationem, conceditur quod hec propositio est modo necessaria: 'A fuit productum'. Cum autem dicitur quod 'A fuit necessario productum', et conceditur quod debite modificata modo necessitatis erit vera, ut scilicet non notetur alia necessitas per propositionem modificatam quam sit necessitas qua modo est hec necessaria 'A fuit productum'.
 500 Cum autem dicitur quod 'A fuit necessario productum', notatur alia necessitas ab illa secundum quam illa propositio esset necessaria, quia illa erat necessitas presens respectu preteritionis, id est necessitas secundum quam est non necessarium fuisse preteritum; sed in illa modificata notatur necessitas preterita et necessitas actus preteriti pro tempore pro quo erat presens; et notatur quod tunc
 505 erat necessitas secundum quam tunc erat presentialiter /P 229^v/ necessarium A esse. Debet igitur modificari sic: 'necessario vel de necessitate A fuit productum', ut notetur quod nunc est presens necessitas ad sic fuisse, sicut fuisse significat illa propositio.

(Ad 9) Ad nonum: derogat divinitati vel dignitati divine facere vel posse
 510 facere impossibile, quia infert ipsum velle vel attemptare facere quod impossibile est fieri et ita ipsum esse frustrabilem. Infert etiam ipsum facere contradictoria simul stare et hoc infert suam potentiam esse ficticiam et figmentum. Quedam tamen impossibilia magis apud nos evidenter derogare videntur divine dignitati quam alia, Magister autem intendit quod ubi non apparet impossibilitas ex parte
 515 obiecti, nec videtur dissonum illud dignitati divine, concedendum est illud posse a Deo fieri.

487 aut aliqualiter/vel aliquale P 488 sic om. P // includit/includitur X 490 vel inferat om. P
 492 enuntiandi/ enuntiandum (?) P // realiter et implicite/et implicite et realiter P 493 quid/
 aliud (?) P // probationes/ propositiones P 494 antecedentis om. P 495 conceditur/ concedendum
 P 496 fuit/ modo add. P 496-99 Cum..productum om. P 502 non/ modo P 503 modificata/
 necessitate P 504 pro² om. P 505 tunc om. P 506 modificari sic inv. P 507 ut/et P 509
 divine om. P 510-11 impossibile est inv. P 511 et/etiam P // contradictoria/ contradictio P
 512 stare/ lec. inc. P // infert om. P 515 nec/ut P 515-16 posse a Deo/a Deo posse P 516 fieri
om. P

²⁵ Cf. Novo Castro, I *Sent.* (ed. Paris, 1514), d. 45, q. 7, ff. 218^{vb}-224^{va}; d. 45, q. 8, ff. 224^{va}-225^{vb}.

(Ad 9conf) Ad confirmationem: non intelligitur quod Deus possit facere quicquid intelligimus (interdum enim putamus posse fieri quod Deus posset facere repugnantia), sed quod Deus multa potest facere et facit que non possumus
 520 sufficienter cognoscere, nec rem factam nec modum fiendi nec proprietates et causas illius.

(Ad 10) Ad decimum: figura dictionis est, ut declaratur per Magistrum, distinctione 44, capitulo 4.²⁶ Cum autem dicitur quod Deus non posset nunc taliter creare A qualiter potuit aliquando, dicendum quod si ly 'aliqua-
 525 sumatur proprie, ut est determinatio secundum qualitatem absolutam vel secundum denominationem non concernentem respective differentias temporis, negatur illud. Si vero ampliatur ut <sit> generaliter determinatio respectu cuiuscumque predicati — sive de presenti sive de preterito vel futuro — secundum predicationem absolutam sive respectivam, conceditur illud; quia
 530 'producere A' potest aliquando verificari de Deo sine tali specificatione et circumstantia quod numquam poterit verificari de Deo cum tali specificatione, quia nullam perfectionem infert ultra producere absolute.

(Ad 10conf1) Ad confirmationem: "Nichil preteritum vel futurum est ipsi Deo" potest /X 218^{rb}/ intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, quod nullam vel nullius
 535 obiecti notitiam acquirit vel perdit propter novum adventum vel transitum rei; sed omne obiectum intelligibile quod aliquando habet in prospectu, semper habet illud; et sic intelligitur minor, et sic negatur maior. Alio modo, quod intellectus divinus nichil dicit vel affirmat et iudicat fuisse preteritum vel esse futurum; sed quicquid est in suo prospectu obiective, dicit realiter et accidentaliter esse presens;
 540 et sic negatur minor.

(Ad 10conf2) Ad aliam confirmationem: dicendum quod 'non aliter' alietate vera se tenente ex parte Dei formaliter et intrinsece, ita ut nova <notitia> adveniat et prior cedat, sicut in nobis; 'non aliter' etiam secundum magis et minus clare et certitudinaliter; tamen eadem notitia invariata cognoscat res aliter
 545 et aliter se habere. Cognoscere et iudicare de rebus affirmaretur et iudicaretur de Deo uno tempore cum aliqua determinatione et modificatione predicationis, et in

518 enim *om.* P // quod/quia P 519 facit/faciat P 520 nec¹/ut XP 523 Cum autem dicitur/
 conceditur P 524 A *om.* P 527 ut...respectu/ determinatio P 528 predicati/ preteritionis
 secundum aliquod predicamentum (?) P // futuro/sive *add.* P 530 potest aliquando *inv.* P //
 sine/cum X P 531 circumstantia/econtra P 531-32 cum...producere *om.* P 533 preteritum/
 preterire X 534 intelligi dupliciter *inv.* P // quod/per P 535 notitiam *om.* P 536 habet² *om.* P
 537 sic² *om.* P 538 nichil/vel P 542 se/sed P 543 non aliter/rationaliter P 544 et *om.* P
 545 et aliter *om.* P // affirmaretur et iudicaretur/affirmare P 546 aliqua/aliam P // predicationis/
 probationis P 546-47 et²...alia/cum alio modo P

²⁶ Cf. Lombardus, *I Sent.*, d. 44, cap. 2/3, *ed. cit.*, pp 305.26-306.9.

alio cum alia, propter mutationem creature vel transitum temporis, et propter illimitationem sue notitiae; et correspondenter de posse, sicut de nosse.

(Ad 11) Ad undecimum: negatur antecedens.

(Ad 11.a) Ad primam probationem: negatur consequentia, prius enim volebat unam partem contradictionis que erat vera, et nunc vult aliam que facta est vera, et non priorem que facta est impossibilis. Nec ex hoc eius potentia vel libertas est minorata, quia non est potentie et libertatis perfecte velle vel posse velle impossibilia, sed est libertatis defectibilis et frustrabilis.

(Ad 11.b) Ad secundam probationem:²⁷ proprie loquendo Deus extra se nichil vult necessario, quia hoc est velle necessario aliquid esse vel fore; tamen necessario vult aliqua fuisse et ita esse sicut significatur per primum principium vel propositiones formaliter necessarias.

(Ad 11.c) Ad tertium: Anselmus intendit quod nulla necessitas vel impossibilitas <que> est extra Deum est causa necessitatis vel impossibilitatis vel impotentie inexistentis formaliter Deo, quasi mensura et artatio causalis respectu divine potentie. Et ideo proprie non est dicendum quod Deus "non potest hoc facere" aut quod "necessatur sic velle", ut notetur in alio quasi predominatio causalis et artatio respectu divine potentie. Unde dicit sic:²⁸ "Deus improprie dicitur aliquid non posse aut aliquid necessitate facere; omnis quippe necessitas et impossibilitas eius subiacet voluntati; illius autem voluntas nulli subditur necessitati vel impossibilitati. Nichil enim est necessarium vel impossibile, nisi quia ipse ita vult. Ipsum autem velle aut nolle, aut propter necessitatem aut impossibilitatem alienum est a veritate." Hec ille. Vel intelligitur de necessitate causarum naturalium, quia divina voluntas non subiacet cursui et ordini nature, sed econtra.

(Ad 11.d) Ad quartum: non vult aliter intrinsece formaliter volitione formaliter inexistente Deo, sed denominatur 'velle' variis modis enuntiandi secundum varietatem obiectorum, quia vult quedam fore contingenter et quedam fuisse necessario, et vult contradictoria simul non verificari; vult inquam semper invariabiliter etiam ex parte obiecti Filium produci, non autem sic vult esse

546-47 et²...alia/cum alio modo P 552 priorem/prioram P // eius/cuius P 555 secundam/23 P
 556 nichil/nec P 557 per om. P 558 formaliter/simpliciter P 559 tertium/ lac. P // intendit om.
 P // necessitas om. (!) P 560 est² om. P 561 quasi/qua P 562 divine potentie inv. P // hoc/ hec P
 563 predominatio/dominatio P 564 improprie/proprie P 565 et om. P 566 voluntati/
 voluntate P // autem/aut X P 567 enim/autem X 568 quia/quod X // autem/aut P // nolle/posse
 P // aut³/ vel P 572 volitione/ab alietate P 574 varietatem obiectorum/alietatem volitorum P
 576 invariabiliter/ invariatis P // obiecti/et add. P

²⁷ X mg.: "Necessarium simpliciter quid nam (?) sit."

²⁸ Anselmus, *Cur Deus homo*, ch. 17, ed. cit., v.2, p. 122.25-30.

/P 230^f/ creaturam. Velle autem libere contingenter A esse, et velle necessario A
fuisse non est velle aliter et aliter intrinsece formaliter, nisi in quadam
similitudine et proportionem ad voluntatem creatam, sicut Deum semper esse
580 Deum et noviter esse creantem.

(Ad 11.e) Ad quintum: negatur consequentia, quia proprie loquendo
'inferre' vel 'imponere' dicit quandam auctoritatem et predominationem
causalem, tamen ad positionem creature sequitur necessario Deum /X 218^{va}/
velle illam fuisse; nec tamen proprie <loquendo>, advenit Deo nova necessitas
585 intrinseca, quia nulla nova entitas intrinseca, quia nec est necessitas essendi vel
conservandi vel ponendi aliquid in esse. Sed large loquendo, advenire dicitur
Deo nova necessitas — non secundum quam necessario sit ens vel agens vel
volens aliquid esse, sed fuisse quod fuit, sive modo sit aliquid sive non. Et
huiusmodi nove necessitatis nulla est causa et ratio, quia non est aliqua nova
590 necessitas causata, nec est aliqua causa huius quod est Deum velle A fuisse qui
prius non volebat A fuisse. Large autem loquendo, si quis querat rationem et
propter quid huius nove necessitatis, non est alia quam voluntas divina que
posuit A in esse, ad quod postea sequitur A fuisse.

(Ad 11.f) Ad sextum: necessitas secundum quam formaliter est necessarium
595 Deum velle A fuisse, est causa necessitatis secundum quam necessarium est A
fuisse potius quam econtra. Licet non sit ibi vere et proprie causalitas, tamen una
propositio dicitur 'causalis' respectu alterius. Ad improbationem dictum est in
distinctione supra.²⁹

(Ad 11.fconf) Per idem ad confirmationem.

600 (Ad 11.g) Ad septimum: proprie loquendo nec est defectus ex parte eius vel
illius, quia hoc non est ratione imperfectionis huiusmodi vel illius. Non est
enim imperfectionis quod obiectum non potest non fuisse, quia nec Deus potest
non fuisse; illud igitur est ex summa perfectione voluntatis divine que non potest
velle defectibiliter et frustrabiliter, ideo non potest velle impossibilia; sed
605 voluntas nostra <potest>.

(Ad 11.h) Ad octavum: loquendo de 'velle' simpliciter et absolute et quasi
velle cathgorice conformi conceptui verbali indicativi modi, potest negari

577 autem/aut P// et om. P // velle²/ et add. P 578 est om. P // formaliter om. P 579-80 creatam
...creantem om. P 582 predominationem/ quasi add. P 583 tamen om. P 585 quia² om. P
589 aliqua/ alia P 590 aliqua/ alia P 591 A/ non add. P // et om. P 593 quod om. P 594 est
om. P 595 A² om. P 597 'causalis'/causa P // respectu om. P // est om. P 600 nec/ ut P 602-03
nec...non¹/Deus non potest nec P 603-05 que...nostra om. P 607 cathgorice/ artegorice (?) P

²⁹ Cf. supra, ll. 555-93.

antecedens, nisi homo excusetur per simplicitatem ignorantie: ratio enim non
dictat velle simpliciter et absolute impossibile. Sed voluntas nostra vult non
610 peccasse quasi per velle condicionalis et correspondens conformiter conceptui
verbalis in optativo modo: vellet enim quantum est ex se non peccasse, si in
potestate sua esset hoc revocare; et tale 'velle' sufficit ad actum penitentiae et
displicentiae, unde intellectus detestatur preteritum.

(Ad 11.hconf) Ad confirmationem: negatur antecedens stando precise in
615 ratione preteritionis peccati: non enim nunc est malum Sortem peccasse, nec est
bonum Platonem non peccasse, quia Sortem peccasse semper manebit etiam dum
Sortes est iustus et beatus, et Platonem non peccasse stat dum Plato peccat. Sed
malum erat quod Sortes peccabat, et postea malum erat quod stabat in peccato sine
penitentia et remissione.

620 (Ad 11.i) Ad nonum: dicendum quod per se et formaliter non est
perfectionis simpliciter nec imperfectionis, sed, stante quod A non fuerit,
imperfectionis esset non velle A non fuisse, et econtra postquam A fuit; ideo
aliquando Deo convenit, aliquando non.

(Ad 12) Ad duodecimum principale: negatur maior, quia beatus obligaretur
625 ad impossibile et ad velle impossibile, et postquam homo peccavit, ipse obligatur
conteri et penitere et displicere super peccato et veniam querere: et ideo pro tunc
obligatur habere detestationem et quemdam modum nolitionis respectu illius
peccati, licet non nolle absolutum et categoricum; postquam autem dimissum
est peccatum, non amplius obligatur ad penitendum vel ad nolendum ut prius.
630 Nec sequitur: igitur licitum est sibi velle peccasse; conceditur tamen quod licitum
et non illicitum est sibi peccasse, quia convenit beato.

Ad Argumentum in Principio Questionis

Similitudo tenet quoad significare differentias temporales, et quoad
necessitatem consequentiae: sicut enim sequitur 'hoc est preteritum, /X 218vb/
635 igitur fuit,' ita sequitur 'hoc est futurum, igitur erit.' Sed similitudo non tenet
quoad necessitatem extremorum categoricorum, scilicet quoad necessitatem
secundum fuisse et fore.

609 dictat/ non add. P 610 correspondens conformiter/ correspondere formaliter P 612-13
et²...preteritum om. P 615 est¹ om. P 618 erat² om. X 622 et/perfectionis est nec tunc velle A
non fuisse add. P 623 convenit/et add. P 624 maior/minor X 625 et²/sed P 627
nolitionis/volitionis P 628 autem dimissum/aliquid missum P 630 licitum¹/licite X //
licitum²/est add. P 633 significare/consignificare P 634 consequentiae/consequentem P

Ad aliud: intendit³⁰ quod illa impossibilitas non convenienter exprimitur
 640 per modum quo denotetur defectus potentie in Deo tanquam causa et propter
 quid illius impossibilitatis, secundum quam impossibile est preteritum non
 fuisse; et quod convenientius exprimitur huiusmodi impossibilitas loquendo
 passive de impossibilitate obiecti quam loquendo active de impossibilitate faciendi
 circa Deum, et cetera.

641 exprimitur/ exprimit X P // impossibilitas/impossibilitatem XP
 impossibilitate/de impossibilitate active P

642 active de

³⁰ I.e., Anselmus.