George Pachymeres and the Topics

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Volume 5 of *Philosophi Byzantini*, edited by D.Z. Nikitas in 1990, is a major scholarly achievement. It contains the medieval Greek translations of Boethius’ *De topicis differentiis*, one by Manuel(?) Holobolos (with the translator’s scholia), and another by Prochoros Kydones. The conscientious editor has earned the gratitude of historians of logic by "prefacing" the translations with a critical edition—the first ever—of the Latin text itself, so that we can finally stop using the uncritical edition printed in Migne’s *Patrologia Latina* 64. An appendix contains a text described as Γεωργίου πρωτεδίκου καὶ δικαιοφύλακος τοῦ Παχυμέρη ἡ διαίρεσις τῶν τόπων τῶν διαλεκτικῶν, καθὼς διείλεν αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἰταλῶν τις καλούμενος Βοήτιος, οἱ δὲ καὶ μετηνέχθησαν πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διαλεκτον. Elsewhere in this issue of *Cimagi* Christos Terezis provides an interpretation of the text, based on the assumption that it is an original work by Pachymeres. In this paper I shall cast doubt on that assumption.

1 Is the attribution to Pachymeres justified?

The attribution to Pachymeres rests on shaky foundations. The "title" reproduced above is the editor’s conflation of the one given by ms *E*

Γεωργίου πρωτεδίκου καὶ δικαιοφύλακος τοῦ Παχυμέρη ἡ
diаίρεσις ὄρων φιλοσοφίας

and that of the rest of the ms tradition:

ἡ διαίρεσις τῶν τόπων τῶν διαλεκτικῶν, καθὼς διείλεν αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἰταλῶν τις καλούμενος Βοήτιος, οἱ δὲ καὶ μετηνέχθησαν πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διαλεκτον.

*E* is an Escorial ms from 1570 and should be given no weight. The *inscriptio* is obviously not appropriate to the text about the *topoi*, but owes its origin to the fact that this text shares its manuscript tradition with Pachymeres’ *Φιλοσοφία*. The correct *inscriptio* is the one given by the majority of the mss, the oldest of which (*A = Athos, Ἰβήρων 191*) antedates *E* by some three centuries (Nikitas 1990: cxl).

Of course, the rejection of *E*’s testimony does not necessarily imply rejecting Pachymeres’ authorship. There just is no good argument for the attribution. Moreover, Nikitas (1990: cxl-cxli) informs us that in the
oldest ms (A) our text occupies ff. 1v-4r, while f. 5 is a type of paper found nowhere else in the ms with the recto blank and an irrelevant note on the verso. Pachymeres’ *Philosophia*, written by the same hand as our text, starts only on 6v. To me this suggests that our text and the *Philosophia* were copied from different sources and only joined when the gathering containing our text was bound with the bigger work.

2 Did the author use Holobolos’ translation of Boethius?

Nikitas assumed that the author of the text used Holobolos’ translation of Boethius with the translator’s scholia, but in good philological manner he drew attention to some cases of terminological disagreement between Holobolos and "Pachymeres". Thus the former contrasts *loci ἀπ’ αὐτῶν* with ἔξωθεν or ἐκτὸς τούτων, while the latter uses ἐντόσθως and ἔξωτοκός1. This disagreement is significant. For while Holobolos just translates Boethius, the "Pachymeres" terminology matches the medieval Latin technical terms *locus intrinsicus*, *locus extrinsecus*.

I therefore submit the hypothesis that the "Pachymeres" text is a translation from the Latin, possibly somewhat revised by the translator.

Since the oldest ms of the Greek text is from the late thirteenth century2 the hypothetical Latin model can be no younger. I propose to date it to the mid- or late thirteenth century.

In the following sections of this paper I shall test that hypothesis. First I shall provide my own annotated translation into Latin, then I shall analyze the work and draw conclusions.

3 Latin translation

I use my own paragraphing. Nikitas’ is marked with "{§1}" through "{§6}". The purpose of the translation being to see whether the Greek may be a rendition of a Latin text from the 13th century I have aimed at producing scholastic Latin of that period while deviating as little as possible from the principle of translating *verbum ex verbo*.

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2. Nikitas 1990: cxl just says "saec. XIII", but also on p. cxlii provides the information that the copy of Pachymeres’ *Philosophia* contained in the ms was written by the same hand. This excludes a date in the first half of the century.
3.1 Inscriptio: Divisio locorum dialecticorum sicut eos divisit quidam Italus nomine Boetius, qui quidem translati sunt in græcum idioma.¹

3.2 {§1} Notabile: Sciendum quod cum quattuor sint prædicata, genus, proprium, definitio et accidens, unicumque idem loci conveniunt, modo arguendi² tantum differentes. Neque enim locus ex oppositis eodem modo ad omnia praedicata argumenta præbet neque aliorum quis.

3.3 {§2} Tres sunt species generaliter loci generalissimi, aut enim a rebus sumitur (a subiecto sc. et prædicato), et appelletur intrinsecus; aut ab eis quæ sunt extra rem, et appelletur extrinsecus; aut ex mediis et nuncupetur medius.

3.4 Schema:³

3.4.0 locus
3.4.1 intrinsecus
3.4.1.1 a substantia
3.4.1.1.1 a definitione
3.4.1.1.2 a descriptione
3.4.1.1.3 a nominis interpretatione
3.4.1.2 ab eis quæ circa substantiam considerantur⁴
3.4.1.2.1 a toto
3.4.1.2.1.1 universali
3.4.1.2.1.2 ex partibus composito⁵
3.4.1.2.1.3 in quantitate
3.4.1.2.1.4 in modo
3.4.1.2.1.5 in loco
3.4.1.2.1.6 in tempore

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1. A Latin text might have had "Divisio locorum dialecticorum secundum Boetium", but all the rest of 3.1 can only have been written by a Greek.
2. arguendi] τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως. A more straightforward translation into Latin would be 'argumentationis', but a Greek would be likely to choose the noun to render the gerund. Cf. τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως = 'modus essendi-in / modus inhaerendi' in 3.6.
3. I here use decimal notation to represent the tree-structure of the table of loci. The table follows the pattern of Latin handbooks of logic. It is almost straight out of Peter of Spain's Tractatus (henceforward "PH").
3.4.1.2.2 a parte¹
3.4.1.2.2.1 particulari
3.4.1.2.2.2 parte
3.4.1.2.2.3 in quantitate
3.4.1.2.2.4 in modo
3.4.1.2.2.5 in loco
3.4.1.2.2.6 in tempore
3.4.1.2.3 a causa
3.4.1.2.3.1 efficienti
3.4.1.2.3.2 materiali
3.4.1.2.3.2.1 permanenti²
3.4.1.2.3.2.2 transeunti
3.4.1.2.3.3 formali
3.4.1.2.3.4 finali
3.4.1.2.4 ab effectu
3.4.1.2.4.1 efficientis³
3.4.1.2.4.2 materialis
3.4.1.2.4.2.1 permanentis
3.4.1.2.4.2.2 transeuntis
3.4.1.2.4.3 formalis

1. The first two subdivisions ought to be a parte subiectiva, a parte integrali. The Greek text has τῶν μερικῶν, τῶν μέρους, which hardly makes sense. The person who introduced τῶν μερικῶν must have done so because this is the traditional antonym of τῶν καθόλου, which is the term found at the corresponding place of the subdivision of locus a toto. Similarly τῶν μέρους may have been introduced to match τῶν ἐκ μερῶν τελειομένου. Cf. section 4.2, below.

2. Strictly speaking, the adjectives permanens and transiens ought to modify materia, not causa materialis. See PH 5.20 (67.22 ff.). This subdivision of locus a causa materiali does not occur in Boethius.

3. efficientis renders τῶν ποιητικῶν. Nikitas’ text has τῶν ποιητῶν, which ought to render ‘efficibili(s)’, but this is no technical term, nor would it make sense. The whole subdivision of locus ab effectu (ὁ ἐκ τῶν αἰτητῶν) is confused in a way that suggests that the translator did not quite understand his model. What we should have here is a division of ab effectu into ab effectu causae efficientis / materialis / formalis / finalis. On the most natural reading, the Greek divides it into ab effectu efficibili / materiali / formali / efficibili efficienti, but it is also possible to interpret the Greek division as follows: ab effectu <causae> efficibilis / materialis / formalis / efficibilis efficientis. Cf. the note on 3.4.1.2.4.4, below.
3.4.1.2.4.4 finalis
3.4.1.2.5 a generatione
3.4.1.2.6 a corruptione
3.4.1.2.7 ab usu
3.4.1.2.8 a consequentibus
3.4.2 mediūs
3.4.2.1 a coniugatis
3.4.2.2 a casibus
3.4.2.3 a divisione
3.4.2.3.1 per negationem
3.4.2.3.2 per affirmationem
3.4.2.3.2.1 per se
3.4.2.3.2.1.1 genus in species
3.4.2.3.2.1.2 totum in partes
3.4.2.3.2.1.3 a voce aëquivoca in diversa significata
3.4.2.3.2.2 per accidens
3.4.2.3.2.2.1 ab accidentibus in substantias
3.4.2.3.2.2.2 a substantia in accidentia
3.4.2.3.2.2.3 ab accidentibus in accidentia

1. finalis] The text has the nonsensical ποιητοῦ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ. In his apparatus Nikitas correctly notes "τοῦ τελικὸν legendum existimandum". Cf. the preceding footnote.
2. ἀπὸ τῆς χρήσεως. The standard Latin form is ab usibus.
3. For the subdivisions of locus a divisione see PH 5.40: "Divisionum alia est per negationem [...] Alia est divisio que non est per negationem. Et hec fit sex modis: tribus per se et tribus per accidens. Primo generis in species [...] Secundo totius in partes integrales [...] Tertio vocis in significaciones [...] Trium per accidens una est subjeci in accidentia [...] Secunda accidentis in subjeccta [...] Tertia accidentis in accidentia". Most of this system is presented in Boethius, Top. Diff. 2.9, but he does not there use the per se/per accidens distinction. See further in section 4.2, below.
4. The correct subdivisions of the locus a divisione per se are: a divisione (1) generis in species, (2) totius in partes, (3) vocis in proprias significationes.
5. Standard for the three subdivisions are: subjeci in accidentia, accidentis in subjeccta, accidentis in accidentia. The Greek text has ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότων eis οὖσιας, ἀπὸ οὖσιας eis συμβεβηκότα, ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότων eis συμβεβηκότα.
3.4.3 extrinsecus
3.4.3.1 ab oppositis
3.4.3.1.1 a relativis
3.4.3.1.2 a contrariis
3.4.3.1.2.1 immediatis
3.4.3.1.2.2 mediatis
3.4.3.1.3 a privatione et habitu
3.4.3.1.4 a contradictione
3.4.3.2 ab eo quod est magis et minus
3.4.3.3 a similibus
3.4.3.4 a similiter se habentibus
3.4.3.5 a transumptione
3.4.3.6 ab opinione [aut] alicuius sapientis

3.5 {Notula incertae sedis} Argumentorum unumquodque videre oportet unde trahitur et quid monstrat et quomodo, i.e. locum, conclusionem et formam rationis. Modi demonstrativi sunt 4: syllogismus, inductio, enthymema et exemplum. Amplius, si sophistication arguat, quomodo. Hae autem manifesta resolventibus.

1. The subdivision of extrinsic loci follows the order of PH, with ab auctoritate last, as against that of Boethius.
2. The standard formulations of the subspecies of locus ab oppositis are a relative oppositis, a contrariis, a privative oppositis, a contradictorie oppositis.
5. ἀπὸ δέξις ἡ τινὸς σοφὸν. The η serves no function. It is probably an intruder; loss of a second disjunct — e.g., ἡ <κρίσεως> — is less likely. The Latin standard name is ab auctoritate, but cf. PH 5.36: "Auctoritas, ut hic sumitur, est iudicium sapientis in sua scientia."
6. In the mss after loci medii. See apparatus in Nikitas 1990: 234
7. trahitur] ὀρμᾶται. The Greek text uses a term which had been traditional in this context since antiquity. Latin texts use ‘trahitur’, ‘sumitur’ and other words.
8. demonstrativi] ἀποδεικτικοί. This does not make sense; the word needed is argumentationis or arguendi. Cf. PH 5.3: "Argumentationis quatuor sunt species: syllogismus, inductio, entimema, exemplum."
9. Amplius — quomodo] ἦτι δὲ, εἰ σοφίζεται, τίνι τρόπῳ. This makes no sense in the context, but sense can be restored if it is made to continue the first period ("Argumentorum — formam rationis"). Properly, the misplaced note about the four types of argument ought to precede the one about what to look for in an argument.
10. Haec — resolventibus] This is a desperate attempt to guess at the sense behind the nonsensical δῆλα δὲ ταυτὶ ἀναλυομένων.
3.6 {§3} Unumquodque quattuor prædictorum et inesse debet subiecto et taliter inesse, ut genus non solum inesse oportet subjecto sed et ut genus; et sic de aliis. His ita se habentibus oportet locos in duo divisos esse et hos simpliciter inesse aut non monstrare, qui quidem communes essent ad omnia prædicta, hos iterum in quattuor divisos esse et unamquamque partium modum essendi-in uniuscuiusque prædictorum monstrare. Oportet etiam locos fortasse secundum divisionem procedere, sed non ita indefinite.

{§4} Quare videretur fortasse Aristoteles dupliciter peccasse:

(I) primo quia locos ad accidens quandoque proprios dicit assignare, ut cum dicit "propria autem ad unumquodque determinatorum generum assignata metodo facile ex his quæ circa unumquodque convenientibus exitus propositi fiet," quandoque eosdem iterum communes esse dicit ad omnia prædicta, tum cum dicat "Non lateat autem nos quoniam quæ ad proprium et genus et accidentes omnia et ad diffinitiones conventi dici" etc., tum cum dicit in libro de definitione "Utrum autem inest genus

1. inesse ὑπάρχειν. This is a standard equivalence. An alternative Latin equivalent would be inhaerere.
3. dicit] ϕησίν. This is probably an error for docet, the latter word having been misread by a Latin scribe or by the translator himself.
4. facile — fiet] ῥῆον — γένοιτο καὶ. I have followed Boethius’ translation (Aristoteles Latinus 5.1-3: 12.8-10 Propria autem in unoquoque determinatorum generum assignata metodo facile ex his quæ circa unumquodque convenientibus exitus propositi fiet). But the Greek version is not a re-translation of Boethius into Greek. If it were, facile fiet would surely have become ῥῆος γενῆται, and one would also expect ἐν ἔκαστοτι for in unoquoque instead of the τρὸς ἔκαστον actually found. The formulations used in the quotation presuppose acquaintance with the original text of Aristotle. The only deviation from Aristotle (Top. 1.5.102b38-103a1) is τρὸς ἔκαστον for καθ’ ἔκαστον.
5. Arist. Top. 1.6.102b27-29. The Greek text faithfully reproduces the Aristotelian original, following a branch of the tradition that mentions γένοις before δένων, whereas the branch followed by Boethius in his Latin translation has the opposite order: Non lateat autem nos quoniam quae ad proprium et genus et accidentes omnia et ad diffinitiones conventi dici (Aristoteles Latinus 5.1-3: 11.22-23).
6. inest] ὑπάρχειν. The infinitive is just tolerable in the Greek, assuming that πότερον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν τὸ γένος τῷ εἶδεν ἐκ τῶν τρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκός τῶν ἐπισκεπτέων is indirect speech, governed by ὅτιν πάντων. But ὑπάρχει would be preferable.
speciei ab his qui sunt ad accidens locis considerandum.\footnote{This is a false quotation. The formula occurs in Aristotelian topoi. It is rendered by Boethius in his Latin translation of Aristotle's Ethics.}

(2) Item, peccatum videtur non a divisione de necessitate ad multitudinem locorum venisse, sed simpliciter sic editos esse sine omni ordine.\footnote{I use ordo to render tāxis, consecutio or consequentia. The plural makes little sense; it may represent a ‘videtur’ misread as ‘videtur’.

3. the translator was capable of picking different Greek words for one Latin term according as the context demanded.

4. negotiantur προγματεύονται. It is not entirely clear to me which Latin word might correspond to the Greek.

5. disputant] διαλέγονται. The Latin sounds unidiomatic, the Greek less so.}

Hæc duo maxime Aristotelii obicere videretur quis.

§5 (Ad I) Ad primum eorum dicimus quod loci ad accidens inesse solum aut non in subiecto prædicatum negotiantur; qui vero ad reliqua sunt quod inest nullo modo disputant, utrum autem genus ut genus, aliud ut proprium, aliud ut definitio assignata sint, hoc monstrare volunt aut contrarium, i.e. non sic inesse.

Sed iterum deficere viderentur qui sunt ad accidens, i.e. qui modum essendi-in accidentalis manifestant.

Sed nullo modo. Nam et probato quod accidens inest subiecto, dubitato vero quod ut accidens inest, loci qui sunt ad alia prædicata utiles sunt, destructivi scilicet; si demonstretur inesse subiecto per eos qui sunt ad accidens, non autem ut genus neque ut proprium, neque vero ut definitio, demonstratum erit quod ut accidens inest. Nam hoc dicebatur
accidens esse, quod neque definitio neque genus neque proprium est, inest autem rei. Ut secundum hoc bene se haberent.

(Ad 2) Inordinatio vero eorum quae videtur quippe nullum ordinem1 de necessario manifestans et continuationem minime est fortuita et ex automato, quamquam videtur. Nam quod Philosophus via quadam usus ad inventionem horum venerit manifestat in prima incisione eiusdem libri2 quando de propositione tractans dicit "utrum autem secundum veritatem sic se habeat vel non in his quae de contrario dicuntur dice-
tur".3 Quare manifestum est quod antequam scripserit quae scripturus esset clare scivit. Hoc etiam manifestius fecit in fine septimae incisionis4 sic dicens: "Loci ergo per quos ideonei erimus ad singula problematum argumentari, pæne sufficenter enumerati sunt".5 Nam si non ad definitos locos spectaret, non intelligeret eos sufficenter enumeratos esse. Quod vero ratione divisiva eos scripserit manifestum est. Quod autem hanc methodum non in his quae scripsit edidit, manifestum et illud. Non autem alienum a suo more faciebat. Nam etiam præter alia quae scriptis eius obscuritatem ingerunt, illud maximum efficiens obscuritatis, omnino non revelare rationem divisionis et ordinis, quam ille quidem optime noverat et qua utens scribebat, apud se vero occultam servabat nullo

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1. nullum ordinem] μηδεμίαν ἀκολουθίαν. For my use of ordo for ἀκολουθία as well as for τάξις, see an earlier footnote.

2. in prima incisione eiusdem libri] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τμήματι τοῦ αὐτοῦ βιβλίου. The Greek text raises the following problems: (1) The reference is to Book I, not to Chapter I of the Topics. Subdivisions of Peri hermeneias and Prior Analytics were traditionally called τμήματα (Lat.: incisiones), but it does not seem to have been Byzantine custom to call the books of the Topics τμήματα, nor are they ever called incisiones in Latin. (2) The phrase τοῦ αὐτοῦ βιβλίου presupposes that the Topics has already been named, but in fact it has not been mentioned. Perhaps the Greek represents the translator’s difficulty with how to render the Latin idiom in primo huius = "in Book I of the work we are commenting on." If so, the dubitatio derives from a scholium or commentary on the Aristotele’s Topics.

3. The Greek text presupposes acquaintance with the original’s (Arist. Top. 1.10.104a31-33) ἡθόπεται for Boethius’ ostendetur (Aristoteles Latinus 5.1-5: 16.17).

4. incisionis] τμήματος. The reference is to the end of Topics Book VII, and the use of the word τμήματα thus raises the same problem here as a few lines earlier.

5. Arist. Top. 7.5.155a37-38. My text above is Boethius’ translation (Aristoteles Latinus 5.1-3: 155.11-12). The Greek text of the quotation (Nikitas 1990: 238.4-6) is a verbatim reproduction of Aristotle’s words.

§6 Verumtamen, etsi Aristoteles hoc occultavit, nullo modo viros sapientes latere potuit, nedum Boethium, cuius divisio antea scripta est. Si vero hic unicumque prædicatorum propria assignat methodum, Boethius autem unam omnibus quattuor convenientem, non propter hoc oportet dicere quod non sunt idem. Tantum autem plus Aristoteles facit ut et ad genera prædicatorum unumque locum aplicat et magis particulariter unumque certificat definitione et exemplo.

4 Analysis of the text

The text printed by Nikitas consists of three main parts: a note about arguments, a table of loci, and a dubitatio about Aristotle’s division of loci.

4.1 The note about arguments.

My item 3.5 is a note that in the manuscripts follow the table’s section on middle loci. Nikitas does not print it in his main text but only in the apparatus (1990: 234–5). The note falls in two parts, with the following contents:

a. (1) Concerning any argument one should try to determine its locus, its conclusion, and its formulation. (2) Besides, if presented with a

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1. considerationum [θεωρημάτων. conclusionum might also be considered.
2. opere] συγγράμματι. It is not obvious which Latin word the Greek one is most likely to render.
3. nullo modo - Boethium] ἄλλως τε σοφοῖς ἀνδραῖς, ἄλλῃ δὴ καὶ τὸν Βοήθιον. The Greek is idiomatically correct and can scarcely be a word-by-word translation from Latin.
4. convenientem] ἐφαρμοδότουσαν
5. applicat] ἐφαρμότητι; adaptat would be a closer Latin equivalent, but while not impossible it seems less idiomatic.
6. magis particulariter] λεπτομερέστερον. There is nothing strange about the Greek, but it is not obvious which Latin word or phrase it may render.
7. definitione] λόγῳ.
sophistical argument, one should analyse it to pinpoint exactly how it is sophistic.

b. There are four types of argument: syllogism, induction, enthymeme and example.

As preserved, the text is in disorder, (b) having been squeezed in between (a1) and (a2). In some — Greek or Latin — ancestor of the archetype of the Greek mss the logically independent, though thematically related notes (a1) and (a2) must have been written in a way that misled a reader.

Nikitas (l.c.) suggests that 3.5 originated as a scholium on the word ἐπιχειρήματα in the Greek translation of Boethius’ De topicis differentiis 1.2. This is not impossible, but a Latin origin is quite as plausible. Ultimately a note of this sort, at least (a1), is occasioned by the Boethian term argumentum/ἐπιχείρημα, but it does not belong more to De topicis differentiis than to Aristotle’s Topics or to a summulistic tractatus de locis. Cf. in particular the beginning of Peter of Spain’s treatise De locis (PH 5.2-3).

It is easy to translate both parts of the note into idiomatically correct scholastic Latin, containing the technical term forma rationis "the form(ulation) of the argument". There are only three difficulties: (i) ὑμᾶται, (ii) τρόποι ἀποδεικτικοί and (iii) ἀναλυμένων. (i) makes good sense, but it is not obvious what Latin word it might render. (ii) makes no sense. The text is not about types of demonstration but about types of argument. The parallel text in PH 5.3 says Argumentationis quattuor sunt species. Another acceptable Latin term would be modi arguendi, which has no standard Greek equivalent. The nonsensical Greek may represent a translator’s unsuccessful attempt to render this term. (iii) is barely comprehensible. Incomplete understanding of a Latin text is one possible cause of the problem.

I conclude that 3.5 is probably a translation from the Latin, done by a man with an imperfect knowledge of scholastic logic but with a good knowledge of traditional Greek terminology (ὑμᾶται).

4.2 The table of loci.

§2 (= 3.3 - 3.4 in my Latin translation) is a table of loci derived from Peter of Spain or some similar source. It contains terms and divisions characteristic of the summulistic tradition of mature Latin scholasticism and not obtainable from Holobolos. I am not aware of any Greek translation of Peter of Spain (or of any other similar work) before that
by George Scholarios (= Gennadios) from the early fifteenth century. ¹ "Pachymeres" does not depend on Scholarios, for (a) the oldest mss of his text antedate Scholarios, (b) his rendition of Latin terminology differs considerably from Scholarios'. Hence we are left with two possibilities: either the table was composed by a Greek as a result of his reading a summulistic Tractatus de locis, or it is simply a translation of a Latin table.

The table contains a number of errors and infelicities some of which could hardly have been committed by anybody who was working with the Tractatus de locis of a Summulae at his elbow. They rather suggest that all the translator looked at was a Latin table of the loci. This may have had some flaws, but the translator added new ones because he simply did not know all the Latin technical terms. It is not impossible to imagine a Latin table with a causa materiali permanenti instead of the correct a causa materiali in materia permanenti. But it is very hard to imagine a Westerner who would commit the sort of error that occurs in "Pachymeres'" division of locus a toto and locus a parte. The Latin model probably divided as follows:

3.4.1.2.1 A toto
3.4.1.2.1.1 universali
3.4.1.2.1.2 integro (ex partibus composito)

3.4.1.2.2 A parte
3.4.1.2.2.1 subiectiva
3.4.1.2.2.2 integrali

The translator, I submit, did not know the terms totum universale / integrale (or: integrum) and pars subiectiva/integralis, but he assumed that the differentiae of totum and pars must be antonyms. So he introduced "particular" to match "universal" and "part" to match "whole = composed of parts", the result being as follows:

3.4.1.2.1 ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου
3.4.1.2.1.1 τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ καθόλου
3.4.1.2.1.2 τοῦ ἐκ μερῶν τελειουμένου

3.4.1.2.2 ἐκ τοῦ μέρους
3.4.1.2.2.1 τοῦ μερικοῦ
3.4.1.2.2.2 τοῦ μέρους

The table’s treatment of locus a divisione also calls for comments. The first subdivision into per negationem / per affirmationem is based on Boethius’ remark that "omnis divisio vel negatione fit vel partitione" (Top. Diff. 2.9, Nikitas 1990: 42.7-8), but partitio (μεριμός in Holobolos’ translation, Nikitas 1990: 124) has disappeared in favour of affirmatio. Peter of Spain says per negationem / non per negationem,

¹. Scholarios’ translation of Peter of Spain’s Summulae was edited by Jugie in 1936. The Tractatus de locis is found in Jugie 1936 at pp. 317-331.
which is superior both to Boethius’ and to the table’s formulation. The latter seems to be yet another case of selecting an antonym of the term used in the first leg of the division.

The subdivision of the second type of division into *per se* and *per accidens* does not occur in Boethius *l.c.*, but it does occur in Peter of Spain [ultimate source: Boethius, *De divisione*, PL 64: 877B].

The tables shares the three subdivisions of *divisio per se* with Peter of Spain. They come from Boethius’ *Top. Diff.*, but the table uses somewhat strange names for them. The correct formulation is *a divisione* (1) *generis in species*, (2) *totius in partes*, (3) *vocis in proprias significations*. The Greek text has *ἀπὸ τῆς διαφέρεσις* (1) *τὸ γένος εἰς εἰδὴ*, (2) *τὸ δῆλον εἰς μέρη*, (3) *ἀπὸ ὅμων ὁμοίως εἰς διάφορα σημαίνομενα*. Neither the use of the nominative instead of the genitive in (1) and (2), nor the addition of *ἀπὸ ὅμων* in (3) stems from Holobolos’ translation, which also faithfully renders Boethius’ *proprias* with *οἰκεῖα* (Nikitas 1990: 124.23).

The three subdivisions of *divisio per accidens* come from Boethius’ text, and also occur in Peter of Spain. Once again the table is somewhat strange in that substance (*ousía*) has replaced Boethius’ *subiectum*, but this time the table agrees with Holobolos (Nikitas 1990: 124.24-25). He, however, cannot be held responsible for the table’s (*διαφέρεσις* *ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότων* and *ἀπὸ ousia* instead of the expected (*διαφέρεσις*) *συμβεβηκότων/ousía*).

Most of the peculiar formulations in the six types of division also occur in Nicephorus Blemmydes’ *Epitome Logica* 2.1 (PG 142: 701):

Πάν πράγμα ἡ διαφερέτων ἐστιν ἡ ἀδιαφερέτων. Τὸ δὲ διαφερέτων ἡ καθ’ αὐτὸ διαφερέται ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. καὶ τὸ μὲν καθ’ αὐτὸ διαρούμενον ἡ ὡς πράγμα διαφερέται ἡ ὡς φωνή. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ὡς πράγμα, γίνεται ἀπὸ γένους εἰς εἴδη διαφέρεσις, καὶ ἀπὸ εἴδους εἰς ἀτομικά, καὶ ἀπὸ δῆλον εἰς μέρη, καὶ ἀφ’ ἐνός καὶ πρὸς ἕν. Ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς πράγματα διαφοροῦνται. Εἰ δὲ ὡς φωνή, γίνεται ἡ διαφερέσις ἀπὸ ὅμων ὁμοίως εἰς διάφορα σημαίνομενα. Τὸ μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὐτὸ διαρούμενον τοιαύτην ἐπιδέχεται διαφερέσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡ ὡς ἀπὸ ousiaς εἰς συμβεβηκότα ἔχει τὴν διαφερέσιν, ἡ ὡς ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότων εἰς συμβεβηκότα, ἡ ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότων εἰς συμβεβηκότα.

Blemmydes’ logic has a peculiar structure, in the main as follows: (a) Definition, (b) Division, (c) Isagoge, (e) Categories, (f) Peri Hermeneias, (g) Analytica Priora, (h) Sophistici Elenchi. (c-h) are based
on the reduced Organon to which most Greeks confined their attention. The surprise is the occurrence of items (a-b). I used to think that Blemmydes drew on the same late ancient tradition that inspired Marius Victorinus' De definitionibus and Boethius' De divisione. I now think it merits investigation whether he may not simply have had some knowledge of the two Latin opuscula.

Anyway, Holobolos and the table join Blemmydes in talking about division of substance into accidents and vice versa rather than of subject into accidents. The table diverges from Holobolos but joins Blemmydes in using ἀπὸ-phrases, in including the word ὑμοφυςον, and in having διάφορα for the expected οἰκεῖα. It looks as if the table was produced from a Latin model, but by someone who looked up the relevant place in Blemmydes (or some Greek work related to his) and picked some formulations from there. The same source may have seduced Holobolos into translating subjectum by οὕσια.

I conclude that the table is a translation from the Latin, done by a person who was more familiar with Greek than with Latin logic.

4.3 The dubitatio.

Nikitas’ §§1 and 3-6 (3.2 & 3.6 in the Latin translation above) form another unity. It is a dubitatio about the division of loci in Aristotle’s Topics. Two objections are raised against Aristotle:

Objection 1. There are four types of predicate (genus, proprium, definition, accident). Each type of predicate must (i) belong simpliciter to its subject and (ii) belong taliter to it (i.e. as its genus or species etc.). This would seem to call for two main types of loci, and a fourfold subdivision of the second sort, as follows

1. Loci helpful for proving that a predicate belongs simpliciter to some subject.
2. Loci helpful for proving that a predicate belongs taliter to some subject.
   2.1 That it belongs as the subject’s genus
   2.2 That it belongs as the subject’s proprium
   2.3 That it belongs as the subject’s definition
   2.4 That it belongs as the subject’s accident

Any locus of type 1 would be "common" in the sense of being applicable no matter which of the four types of predicate one is asking about, whereas a locus of type 2 would be "proper" to one type of predicate.
Aristotle, however, does not consistently observe the distinction between type 1 and type 2. On one occasion he characterizes *loci ad accidens* as common, on other occasions as proper.

Objection 2. Aristotle presents no reasoned division to show the *sufficiencia* (exhaustivity and non-redundancy) of his set of *loci*. But, if there is no system there is no scientific knowledge. Hence the *scientia de locis* is an illusion.

Refutation of 1. *Loci ad accidens* can be used to show whether some predicate belongs at all to the subject. If a predicate has passed the test and one also wants to know in which way it belongs, no special test by means of accident-loci is needed. Testing with the *loci* for genus, proprium and definition will suffice; if the predicate fails all three types of test, it is an accidental predicate. So, Aristotle's fourfold division is sound.

Refutation of 2. There is an underlying system of which Aristotle was perfectly aware, but true to his habitual obscurity he did not reveal what the system was. This did not prevent Boethius from discovering it. Admittedly, Boethius neglects the four-predicate approach, but this only means that his system is less detailed than Aristotle's, not that it is radically different.

The general structure of the *dubitatio* is one well known from Western scholastic literature, but not current among Byzantine students of Aristotle. At the beginning of a course on some authorial text doubt is raised about some fundamental classification of the work. Is Porphyry's list of exactly five predicables really justified? Is Aristotle really right in operating with exactly ten categories? — and so on. Reasons are given for rejecting the author's classification, only to be rebutted immediately afterwards. In objection (2) of our *dubitatio* the attack on Aristotle's classification is connected with another typical scholastic question: "Is it possible to have scientific knowledge about the subject dealt with by the auctor?"

The translation into Latin yields some typical scholastic idioms and technical terms, such as *videretur dupliciter pecasse*, *Ad primum istorum dicimus/dicendum* and *modus essendi in*, but sometimes it is difficult to guess what Latin may underlie the Greek and in a few cases the Greek certainly cannot be a *verbatim* rendition of a Latin text. This is notably the case with some quotations of Aristotle.
I conclude that the dubitatio is probably a somewhat free translation from the Latin done by a Greek so well acquainted with the Organon that he knew how to check the Aristotelian quotations of his Latin model against the Stagirite’s Greek text.

5. General Conclusion.

All three ingredients of the text edited by Nikitas show signs of being translated from the Latin. At the end of the dubitatio (Nikitas §6) there is a reference to the table (τὸν Βοηθόν, οὐ γέγραπται ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν). No reference links the note about arguments to the other two items, but it fits into the context, and so the translator probably found all the material in one manuscript. This may have been a book whose main content was Peter of Spain or some similar sum of logic, but it is equally possible that the translator used a Latin manuscript of the Organon in which a couple of — originally blank — pages before the beginning of the Topics had been used to list the types of argument, sketch the "Boethian" system of loci, and raise the dubitatio about Aristotle’s systematics as compared to Boethius'. The ms may have been messy (little logical notes are often transmitted in a less than tidy way), but the intended order probably was:

i) The note about arguments (my 3.5), first part (a), then part (b).
   Cf. PH 5.2-3.
ii) The table
iii) The dubitatio.

The organization, contents and terminology of the text is consistent with a thirteenth-century origin. I find nothing redolent of the twelfth century, and nothing points to a time after 1300, though the text could in principle be a conservative product from the early decades of the fourteenth century. But this mere possibility gives no reason do doubt the dating of the earliest Greek manuscript to the late thirteenth century.

The translator was not very well acquainted with scholastic logic, but he knew the terminology of Greek logic and he knew how to look up things in Aristotle’s Organon. Whoever the translator was, he was one of those late Byzantines whose eyes had been opened to the riches of Latin scholasticism and who tried to transcend the traditional isolation of Greek scholars from those of other language-areas.
Literature


