

UNIVERSITÉ DE COPENHAGUE

CAHIERS DE L'INSTITUT DU MOYEN-ÂGE GREC ET LATIN
publiés par le directeur de l'Institut

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Karin Margareta Fredborg, The commentary
of Thierry of Chartres on Cicero's
De Inventione. pp. 1-36 (225-260)

Copenhagen 1971

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Printed in Denmark by Knud C. Christensen, Copenhagen.

THE COMMENTARY OF THIERRY OF CHARTRES ON CICERO'S DE INVENTIONE.

Karin Margareta Fredborg

The commentary of Cicero's *De Inventione* by Thierry of Chartres¹⁾ has in the last few years engaged renewed interest. It has been the object of a comparison with Dominicus Gundissalinus' section on rhetoric in the *De Divisione Philosophiae*, carried out by N.M. Haring²⁾ and it has been studied in combination with other rhetorical treatises from the Eleventh and Twelfth centuries by M. Dickey.³⁾ While Thierry's commentary appears to be a careful, scholarly work compared with the contemporary rhetorical treatises,⁴⁾ these very qualities have been subjected to doubt as seen in the study of N.M. Haring.⁵⁾ It is therefore an interesting task to look into these incompatible views and try, again, to give an estimate of the work, by bringing forth some significant points of rhetorical theory and outline the main scope of Thierry's commentary. But before this, it will be convenient to attempt a dating of the work and consider Gundissalinus' and Thierry's claims to originality once again.

1) The commentary, of which I am preparing an edition, is found in:

(A) Brit.Mus.Arund.348 fol.102r-179v, s.XII.

(B) Bruxelles, Bibl.Roy.10057-62, fol.1-31v, s.XIII.

(Ph) Berlin lat.oct.161, (Phillips 9672), fol.1v-36v, s.XII.

Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, Berlin.

(H) Heidelberg, U.L.Salem VII,103, fol.142r-173v, s.XII.

(L) Leyden, U.L., B.P.L.189 fol.42r-47r, s.XIII.

(M) München, lat.3565 fol.174-219, s.XV.

(h) Brit.Mus.Harley, 5060, s.XV.

The only extant edition is from the fragmentary Leyden MS, by W.H.D. Suringar, in *Historia Critica Scholiastorum Latinorum*, Leyden 1834, p.213-253.

I wish to thank Prof. N.M. Haring for the kindness of lending me the microfilms of the MSS Ph., H. and L, and J.O. Ward for directing my attention to the Brit.Mus.Harley 5060.

2) Thierry of Chartres and Dominicus Gundissalinus, *Mediaeval Studies* 26, p.271-86. Toronto 1964.

3) Some commentaries on the *De Inventione* and *Ad Herennium* of the Eleventh and early Twelfth centuries. *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* VI, p.1-41, London 1968.

4) M. Dickey, o.c. in note 3, p.25, 30-32.

5) o.c. note 2, p.278.

The dating.

While some of Thierry of Chartres' theological treatises, the commentaries on Boethius' *De Trinitate*, have been dated on doctrinal grounds, no such attempts have been made on the commentary on the *De Inventione*, no doubt due to our still very slender knowledge of Twelfth century rhetoric.⁶⁾ The commentary itself does, however, offer some suggestions in the more personal sections, the prologues to the two parts of the commentary. Especially the second prologue⁷⁾ is helpful. It is formed as a fictitious dialogue between "Fama" and "Invidia, falso vultu Dialectice", where Invidia or Dialectica complains of Thierry, because her school was suffering a decline, when Thierry got too great a share of Fame. Then the two ladies take action:

Talibus Invidie verbis Fama permota alas concutit,⁸⁾ sonos multiplicat, urbes et nationes, duce Invidia, peragrat, rumoribus implet. Theodoricum ubique accusat, ignominiosis nominibus appellat. Cum vero rudibus et indiscretis loquitur⁹⁾ Boetum crasso tunc vocat in aere natum,¹⁰⁾ quando vero religiosus tunc necromanticum vel hereticum vocat. At inter consocios¹¹⁾ veritatis.

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- 6) Only Anselm of Besate's *Rhetorimachia* has been edited by K. Manitius, M.G. Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte der Mittelalters II, 2, 1958. A few excerpts of mediaeval, rhetorical doctrine can be found in the article of M. Dickey, o.c. in note 3, and more in M. Wisén, *De scholiis Rhetorices Ad Herennium codice Holmiensi traditis*, Uppsala 1905. Adelard of Bath has a chapter on rhetoric in *De Eodem et Diverso*, ed. H. Willner, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* IV, 1, p. 19, Münster 1903. The contributions of J.O. Ward on the commentaries on the *De Inventione*, to appear in a forthcoming volume of O. Kristeller, *Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum*, will be welcomed as a very substantial help for future research.
- 7) The prologues have been edited by P. Thomas in *Un commentaire du Moyen-Âge sur la Rhétorique de Cicéron*, *Mélanges Graux*, Thorin 1884, pp. 41-45. His text is founded on MS B only, my excerpts on MSS A B H M h. Only the more important variants are indicated in the notes.
- 8) quatat A. cf. Virg. Aen. 3, 226: alas quatat.
- 9) loquor M.
- 10) Boetum crasso tunc vocat in aere natum] vocat in om. B. Boetes plurimum sunt duri ingenii. Boethum crasso tum vocat in aere natum A. Boetum crasso tunc iurat in aere natum M.H.h.
- 11) consocios] consocios B.M.

tacet et si¹²⁾ de eo mentio fiat¹³⁾ aliam historiam inceptat. In scolis vero et scolarium conventibus merces¹⁴⁾ commutat ut ignominiam¹⁵⁾ eius lucretur. Platonem ei concedit ut rethoricam auferat. Rethoricam vero vel grammaticam quasi per hypothesim donat ut dialecticam surripiat. Quidlibet¹⁶⁾ vero potius quam dialecticam.....

Ad ultimum cum cetera deficiunt obicit eum legere provectoris, ut novos detineat vel potius corrumpat, ut ulterius non possint apud eum proficere. Hactenus Invidie respondi.

We know too little about Thierry's life¹⁷⁾ to be able to conjecture the precise nature and date of this acid criticism, but the mention of his logical teaching provides a clue. For his logical teaching is mentioned again in another work of his, the *Lectiones on Boethius' De Trinitate*; there Thierry when dealing with some sophisms refers to his *Logica*:¹⁸⁾

More docentis loquitur quod verbis aliis utitur in doctrinis, aliis in disputationibus. Et est haec locutio talis qualis et haec "Homo est animal quod est genus, Socrates est homo qui est species". Et relativum valet "et" ut: "Mulier quae salvavit damnavit", i.e. mulier salvavit et damnavit. Et in praedictis locutionibus eodem modo, "Socrates est homo qui est species". Socrates est homo et est species. "qui" pro "et". Et sunt concedendae omnes istae locutiones: "Socrates est homo et eadem res est species, homo est animal et eadem res est genus". Sed non est concedendum "Socrates est haec res homo quae est species; homo est haec res animal quod est genus". Sed in *Logica* de hoc satis diximus.

12) et si] quia per M.

13) fiat] non fiat H. fuit M.

14) merces] mentes B., Haring, o.c.in note 2,p.278.

15) ignominiam] ignorantiam B.

16) quidlibet] quilibet A. quibuslibet B.

17) Most of the known details of Thierry's life are collected in A. Vernet, *Une épitaphe de Thierry de Chartres, Recueil de Travaux offert a M.C. Brunel*, p.660-670, 1955. More can be found in E. Jeaneau, *Note sur l'École de Chartres, Studi Medievali*, ser. III,V,2,821-839, Spoleto 1964.

18) edited by N.M. Haring, *The lectures of Thierry of Chartres on Boethius' De Trinitate*. A.H.D.L.M.A.25,1958,p.198.

He also quotes the De Inventione commentary and the logical treatise:¹⁹⁾

QUIDAM FINIS inquit (Boethius). Finis cuiuslibet artis, sicut alibi dicitur est id ad quod tendit artifex per officium. Sicut finis rhetoricae est persuadere dictione sicut in Rhetorica dicitur. Finis Logicae est veri et falsi discretio. Et eodem modo unaquaeque ars proprium finem habet.

Thus the De Inventione commentary must, because of the quotation: "Finis rhetoricae", be earlier than the Lectiones, the date of which, sometime around 1148 because of its doctrine,²⁰⁾ then is the Terminus Ante Quem for the De Inventione commentary.

A convenient Terminus Post Quem would be the logical treatise. This is mentioned as an object of vehement opposition in the De Inventione commentary and, if it is the same work, appears to be a treatise dealing with sophisms and maybe with a formal Accessus, as the "Finis logicae est..." does suggest in the Lectiones.

This Logica or Dialectica, however, has not been found and thus provides a very shadowy Terminus Post Quem. I have tried in the appendix to collect the few identification marks, we have, to Thierry's logical teaching in order to suggest some useful approaches for the search of it, but until it has been found or we know more about Thierry's life and logical teaching, we have very little of a Terminus Post Quem for the De Inventione commentary. For, what is left, are the references, found in the dialogue between Fama and Invidia, to Thierry's platonic, rhetorical and grammatical teaching which cannot be dated. The platonic teaching might refer

19) ibidem p.130 cf. the De Inv. Commentary, ed. Suringar, p.221: Finis igitur artis rhetoricae est id, ad quod tendit orator secundum suum officium. Id autem est persuadere dictione.

20) cf. N.M. Haring. Two commentaries on Boethius (De trinitate et De Hebdomadibus) by Thierry of Chartres, A.H.D.L.M.A.27, 1960, p.74-75.

There is no longer a need to suppose that Thierry not openly criticized Gilbert of Poitiers in the Lectiones (o.c. in note 18), p.137: "Trinitas est unitas et unitas est trinitas. Nec est credendum ei (i.e. Gilbert) qui hoc deneget, quia temerarius et imperitus huius rei est". For Thierry was among the very persons who met in St. Bernards house in 1148 in order to form the four sentences which Gilbert had to swear at the council at Reims, cf. N.M. Haring The writings against Gilbert of Poitiers by Geoffrey of Auxerre, Analecta Cisterciantia XXII,1,p.35, Rome 1966.

to the M. Cappella Glosses,²¹⁾ but only single pieces of these are preserved in later treatises.

Various suggestions have been offered by other scholars to the date of the *De Inventione* commentary. N.M. Haring²²⁾ held that it was a very late work, later than the commentaries on the *De Trinitate*. This, as I have shown, cannot be right as the *De Inventione* commentary is quoted in the *Lectiones* and must be earlier than this. On the other hand R.W. Hunt²³⁾ dates it very early, "in all probability his earliest work". This might be true but it is not necessary, as the *Dialogue* between *Fama* and *Invidia* pictures Thierry as a renowned master in several disciplines and a very controversial one in logic, under threats of closing of his school. This might refer to his leaving Paris for Chartres in the late 1130s when he taught John of Salisbury rhetoric.²⁴⁾ Or it could be a hidden reference to Thierry's dispute with Gilbert of Poitiers, around 1148, which might have covered more than the theological dissents which are voiced in the *Lectiones*²⁵⁾. I shall therefore only stress that the *De Inventione* commentary is earlier than the *Lectiones* and maybe the other commentary on the *De Trinitate*, *Aggreditur propositum*,²⁶⁾ and I should with much caution ascribe it to the late 1130s or the 1140s.

21) Traces of these glosses have been found by E. Jeauneau, cf.o.c. in note 17, p.830-833 and 834-837.

22) o.c. in note 2, p.275, 277-278. The dating of N.M. Haring has been suggested to him by the rather unpleasant picture Thierry lets *Invidia* draw of him.

23) The introductions to the *Artes* in the Twelfth century, *Studia Mediaevalia* in Honorem R.J. Martin, Brügge 1948, p.93.

24) cf. *Metalogicon*, II, 10, ed. C.C.J. Webb, Oxford 1929, p.80, 10. Thierry is not mentioned in the charters of Chartres between 1124 and 1141. The date and the place where Thierry (and Guillaume of Conches) taught John of Salisbury is greatly disputed cf. R.L. Poole, *The masters of the schools at Paris and Chartres* 1136-1146, *Engl.Hist.Rev.* XXXV, London 1920 and E. Jeauneau, *Deux rédactions des Gloses de Guillaume de Conches sur Priscian, Recherches de Théol.Anc.et Méd.* 27, 1960, p.231.

25) Loc.cit. in note 20. cf. the supposed heresies of Thierry, ascribed to him in the *dialogue* between *Fama* and *Invidia*. Another supposition would be opposition to Hexaameron (ed. N.M. Haring, *A.H.D.L.M.A.* 22, p.137-226, Paris 1955).

26) cf. o.c. in note 20, p.74-75.

Thierry of Chartres and Dom. Gundissalinus.

The question of originality of the *Accessus* to Thierry's commentary on *De Inventione* was raised in 1942 by R. McKeon,²⁷⁾ who noted that the whole section on rhetoric in Gundissalinus' *De Divisione Philosophiae*²⁸⁾ is more or less identical with Thierry's *Accessus*. He preferred, however, not to make any decisions on the priority as he only had Suringar's edition of Thierry's commentary (printed from the somewhat fragmentary Leyden manuscript), not the rest of the manuscripts. Then R.W. Hunt²⁹⁾ dealt with the matter in his important study of the *Accessus* to the *Artes* and concluded that Thierry's *Accessus* was the original from which Gundissalinus copied his section. Lately N.M. Haring after a careful examination has come to the opposite conclusion.

The similarity between the two is so close - as can be seen in the article by N.M. Haring, who prints, in full, the corresponding paragraphs³⁰⁾ - that the decision of priority can only be reached by studying the differences. While the

Accessus by Thierry has this scheme: Gundissalinus follows this:

Ars intrinsecus/extrinsecus

Genus artis

Quid

Materia artis

Officium

Finis

Partes

Species

Instrumentum

Artifex

Cur sic vocatur

(Ars intrinsecus/extrinsecus)

Quid

Genus

Materia artis

Species

Partes

Officium

Finis

Instrumentum

Artifex

Quare sic vocatur

(Circa librum:)

(Circa divisionem philosophiae:)

Intentio auctoris

Utilitas libri

Quo ordine legenda sit

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- 27) cf. *Speculum* 17, 1942, p. 17, n. 2. W.H.D. Suringar's edition, in *Historia Critica Scholiastorum Latinorum*, Leyden 1834, p. 213-253, covers only the first prologue, the *Accessus* and the commentary to *De Inv.* 1, 1, 1.-1, 5, 7. Unfortunately the Leyden MS has many lacunas, so the text of the *Accessus* should be read from N.M. Haring's edition thereof in *M.S.* 26, p. 281-86.
- 28) ed. L. Baur in *Beiträge z. Geschichte der Philos. des Mittelalters* IV, 2-3, Münster 1903.
- 29) The introductions to the "Artes" in the Twelfth century, *Studia Mediaevalia in Honorem R.J. Martin*, Brügge, 1948, p. 85-112.
- 30) o.c. in note 2, p. 281-86.

The section *Ars intrinsecus/extrinsecus* is in *De Divisione Philosophiae* to be found in the section of grammar, not in that of rhetoric.³¹⁾

The differences of minor importance, such as the heads *Circa librum*, which are only found in Thierry's *Accessus*, and Gundissalinus' "*Quo ordine legenda sit*" are easily explained by the different aims of the two works. Thierry is writing a commentary, Gundissalinus goes systematically through all the sciences, exposing the order in which they should be taught.³²⁾

Other differences are more important. In the section on *Materia artis*³³⁾ Gundissalinus writes: "*Set quid sit circumstantia in Tullio melius dicetur*", where Thierry has: "*Sed quid sit circumstantia in sequentibus melius dicetur*". This passage R. McKeon³⁴⁾ took as an indication pointing to Thierry as the original source, while N.M. Haring³⁵⁾ did not think this section alone could decide the question of priority. I believe that R. McKeon was right. The future "*dicetur*" makes nonsense in Gundissalinus' treatise as he is not going to teach on Cicero, and what is far more important, it is not Cicero, but Thierry of Chartres who develops the theory of *Circumstantiae*. The term "*Circumstantia*" is not found in the *De Inventione* and Cicero's division of topics does not easily conform with the (Hermagorean³⁶⁾) scheme of *Circumstantiae*, as was already felt by Boethius in the Fourth book of *De Differentiis Topicis*.³⁷⁾ But a great part of Thierry's treatise is absorbed with the teaching of *Circumstantiae*. Therefore Gundissalinus' "*in Tullio dicetur*" appears rather to be an incautious slip, when he copied Thierry's passage.

31) ed. Baur, o.c. in note 28, p. 43 and Haring's edition, o.c. in note 2, p. 281.

32) P. Helias, however, treats of "*ordo legendi*", cf. MS München CLM 3515, fol. 1v.

33) Haring's edition, p. 283. Suringar's edition, p. 220. Gundissalinus, Baur's edition p. 66, 2.

34) o.c. in note 27.

35) o.c. in note 2, p. 279.

36) Hermagoras, *Fragmenta* ed. D. Matthes, (B.T.) 1962, fragm. 7, p. 13ff.

37) P.L. 64, 1214A ff. cf. Victorinus, *In Rhet. Ciceronis*, ed. C. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores*, Leipzig 1863, p. 226. This edition is in the following referred to under the name of its editor, Halm.

Another important objection has been raised³⁸⁾ to the different order of *Quid sit ipsa ars* and *Genus artis*. Here Thierry is guilty of a logical error, putting *Genus* first, before defining the *Ars*. Here it must be born in mind that Thierry very openly transferred his commenting on *Genus*, *officium*, *finis* etc. (*De Inv.*I,V,7) from the forthrunning commentary into the *Accessus*:

"Forsitan dicet aliquis quod hic potius ea dici debuissent, que ante proemium dicta sunt. Sed iccirco nos premisimus quia eorum cognitio ad proemium valde est necessaria".³⁹⁾

When transforming the commentary on *Genus* etc. into a mediaeval *Accessus* Thierry starts, as his sources, Cicero and Boethius⁴⁰⁾, with *genus* and, illogically, then has *Quid*. This is only understandable and excusable if Thierry is the source of Gundissalinus, while it would be strange if he committed the error, copying the whole thing from the (more original and logical) Gundissalinus.⁴¹⁾

It should also be noted that Thierry in his commentary on the *Ad Herennium*, which follows the *De Inventione* commentary in the Berlin manuscript, starts his *Accessus* in this way:⁴²⁾

*Circa artem rethoricam hec sunt inquirenda, quid ipsa rethorica sit*⁴³⁾ *que eius materia, quod genus, quod officium,*⁴⁴⁾ *quis finis, que partes, que species, quod instrumentum, quis artifex quare etiam rethorica vocetur; circa librum duo, que auctoris intentio, que libri utilitas. In superiori commentario que super Primam Rethoricam conscripsimus,*⁴⁵⁾ *quid sit ipsa rethorica, que*

38) by N.M. Haring o.c. in note 2, p.275.

39) MS Brit.Mus.Arund.348, fol.111v. There is a lacuna here in Suringar's edition, p.250. Thierry constantly refers to his *Accessus* when dealing with Cicero's *genus*, *officium*, *finis* etc. cf. Suringar's edition, p.247-250.

40) P.L.64, 1207, A.B.

41) cf. N.M. Haring o.c. in note 2, p.279.

42) fol.36vb. The commentary, which has not previously been identified, covers the rest of the Berlin MS, fol.36vb-75vb. The very end, i.e. the commentary to the epilogue is missing. The explicat (ad Her. IV, 55, 68) is: "Defringit signum dando scilicet sociis. Deos incipit precari more sermocinatorum qui sic incipiunt predicationem suam: <Gratia> sancti spiritus adsit nobisque". The incipit of the commentary proper starts thus: "ETSI IN NEGOTIIS. Ingressum facit ad artem in quo captat Gaii Herennii benivolentiam". I propose to edit this commentary with the *De Inventione* commentary.

43) *Rethorica sit rethorica* MS.

44) *officium* MS.

45) *conscripsimus* MS.

eius materia, que etiam cetera que inquirenda prediximus etsi non sufficienter,⁴⁶⁾ pro viribus tamen diligenter expeditivimus, semel autem dicta repetere non est consilium, namque dicta semel fortassis non placuerunt, repetita non laudem scriptori sed potius odium ac vituperationem ab auditore merentur. De intentione tamen auctoris et de libri utilitate, que diverse ab intentione auctoris in primo libro et a primi libri utilitate <sunt>, pro capacitate ingenii et facundie facultate dicemus. Est igitur in hoc libro auctoris intentio plenarie de tota rethorica disputare... etc.⁴⁷⁾

Here the logical Quid is before Genus - maybe because he no longer was pressed by his sources, Cicero and Boethius, to start with Genus. The Accessus then in the two commentaries show that the careful division into the heads Circa artem and Circa librum, which is one of the major merits of this new Accessus scheme, was planned because Thierry wanted to write a corpus of rhetorical commentaries, not only on the De Inventione. That this idea of an Accessus was his own is made clear by the "Que inquirenda prediximus, etsi non sufficienter..." and by the fact that he in the first commentary kept the order of Genus, then Quid, because his sources started with Genus.

Two more questions raised against Thierry's priority should be dealt with before the problem of originality is definitely settled.

1^o The rearrangement of the Ars intrinsecus and extrinsecus, with the other more general headings, i.e. officium cuiuslibet artis, finis cuiuslibet artis etc., which in De Divisione Philosophiae are to be found, not in the rhetoric section but under grammar,⁴⁸⁾ and 2^o the question of the ultimate sources of the Accessus.

The section on Ars intrinsecus and extrinsecus in De Divisione Philosophiae ought, if Gundissalinus had been faithful while copying out Thierry's commentary on De Inventione, to have been put under rhetoric, or, if he had thought it through carefully, to be un-

46) sufficienter MS.

47) For further corroboration of Thierry's authorship compare M. Wiśn, o.c. in note 6, p. 56: (Ad Her. IV, 22, 30, Quid veniam...) "Magister Theodorus dicit quod color est in hoc quod verba sunt subiunctiva. Magister Petr. Hel. dicit esse in hoc quod eadem littera repetitur, sc. q." with this commentary fol. 70r, ad loc.: huiusmodi sc. per eundem verbi modum diversa verba proferuntur hoc modo: Quid veniam etc. Potest etiam hic quedam dictionum similitudo notari qua convenientior ab uno ad aliud sit verborum transitio, ut quis, quid, quare... (Petr. Hel. had studied under Thierry).

48) cf. N.M. Haring o.c. in note 2, p. 279 f.

der the first science which he deals with, as it has a very broad application. This distinction, which goes back to Victorinus,⁴⁹⁾ is however only found under grammar as are the other analogous general headings, maybe because he did not want to repeat himself or thought it unimportant. These general headings are also found in *Summa super Priscianum* by P. Helias, who was a pupil of Thierry's⁵⁰⁾ but the *Summa*⁵¹⁾ does not deal with extrinsecus and intrinsecus Ars. The headings, "Finis cuiuslibet artis etc.", except the distinction "Ars extrinsecus" and "intrinsecus", could have come to Gundissalinus from P. Helias; still it could come from Thierry too, for, as it has been shown, Thierry does not confine himself to speak of these matters in the rhetorical commentaries only. Also the *Lectiones* deal with "Finis cuiuslibet artis". I should therefore suggest that the identical general headings in the *Accessus* found in P. Helias and Gundissalinus goes back to Thierry's teaching generally, not to the rhetorical commentaries alone. It could thus be lecture notes from Thierry's lectures on grammar which are the ultimate sources of Gundissalinus' transplacement of the general headings to the section of grammar. This accounts for including the *Ars intrinsecus* section by Thierry into the grammatical context, which otherwise leans strongly on P. Helias.

If this is the reason for the transplacement, it also accounts for the universal use of Thierry's *Accessus* scheme for all the sciences in the *De Divisione Philosophiae*.⁵²⁾ No doubt the *Accessus* scheme was first used in the rhetorical commentaries⁵³⁾ by Thierry of Chartres, but we have seen that Thierry soon applied it elsewhere, and, what is relevant, his pupil P. Helias used it elsewhere, in grammar. Gundissalinus might well have been a pupil of Thierry's,

49) Victorinus, ed. Halm, p. 170, 23 cf. M. Dickey, o.c. in note 3, p. 8.

50) cf. Guillaume St. Tyr, R.B.C. Huygens, Guillaume de Tyr étudiant, Un chapitre (XIX, 12) de son Histoire Retrouvée, Latomus XXI, 4, p. 811-829, Bruxelles 1962.

51) cf. *Summa super Priscianum*, MS München CLM 3515, fol. 1-1v, and R. W. Hunt, o.c. in note 23, p. 88-91.

52) which was used as the strongest objection from R. McKeon to the originality of Thierry's *Accessus*, loc. c. in note 27.

53) because the *Accessus* scheme goes back to rhetorical treatises, Boethius *De Diff. Top.* IV P.L. 64, p. 1207 A-B, and Victorinus' *Commentary on De Inventione* I, V, 7, ed. Halm p. 170 ff. An interesting echo of this is found in *Summa Sophist. Elench.* ed. R. De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* I, p. 265, 1962 which states the rhetoricians as the inventors of this *Accessus* scheme.

he was much younger and appears elsewhere too to have been in contact with the schools of Northern France.⁵⁴⁾

The last objection I would have to Thierry copying his whole *Accessus* out of the Grammar and rhetoric sections in *De Divisione Philosophiae*, is that the sources for The *Accessus*, Cicero, Victorinus and Boethius, are the very books which have been at the elbow of Thierry when writing the rest of the commentary.⁵⁵⁾ This does not apply to Gundissalinus. Why should Thierry go the crooked way of stealing from Gundissalinus, what was on his desk already? And how and why make the transitions and references between the *Accessus* and the commentary so carefully and lie so blatantly about his theft from the much younger Gundissalinus, when he had the sources to the *Accessus* in front of him?

For these reasons it is very unlikely that Gundissalinus is the source of the famous *Accessus* to Thierry of Chartres' commentary to *De Inventione* and *Ad Herennium*, he was rather his pupil.

The disposition of the commentary on the *De Inventione*.

In his disposition of the commentary Thierry breaks the plan of Cicero's treatise. He takes out the preliminary discussion of Rhetoric as an *Ars* and works it out as an *Accessus*. Then he divides his commentary into two parts, not following Cicero's division into two books, but letting the first part of the commentary deal with *De Inventione* I, I, 1 - I, 14, 19, the second part deal with all the rest of the *De Inventione*.⁵⁶⁾

In doing so Thierry does away with the rather repetitious structure of the second book of *De Inventione* and he gets the advantage of dealing with the theoretical foundation for rhetoric, before teaching rhetoric proper. His reason for lifting out the material

54) cf. N.M. Haring o.c. in note 2, p. 279-80.

55) Boethius as source for most of the *Accessus*, cf. P.L. 64, 1207 A-B, 1208 A, 1208 D, 1210-1211 D. For *intentio et utilitas*, p. 161 B.

56) In MS Brit. Mus. Arund. 348: 1. prologue fol. 102r, *Accessus* fol. 102r-104r, 1. part of the commentary fol. 104r-128r. 2. prologue (dialogue between *Fama* and *Invidia*) fol. 128r-129r. 2. part of the commentary: fol. 129r-179v, (the very end is missing). This MS and MS Bruxelles Bibl. Roy. 10057-62 form the basis of my following excerpts (A=Arundel, B=Bruxelles).

for the Accessus and putting it in the beginning, before Cicero's proemium, is printed above,⁵⁷⁾ and his reason for the rest of the redisposition is found to be very much in line with the Accessus:

In superiori commentario dicta sunt ea que ad prohemium libri et genus artis et officium et finem et materiam pertinebant.

Nunc autem de his dicemus que ad instrumentum artis rethorice pertinent, i.e. de partibus orationis, quarum prima est exordium a quo sumatur tractandi exordium.⁵⁸⁾

The lemma Thierry usually treats in two parts, first giving the main definitions of terms and his own discussion of theory, then dealing in greater detail with Cicero's text. The first part of the treatment he calls "sensus",⁵⁹⁾ to which he sometimes adds a point of controversy in the end, "sed queritur...". The second part he calls "littera". This kind of commentary is what Guillaume of Conches⁶⁰⁾ called "glossae", distinguishing it from the "commentum" which only deals with "sententia". In Guillaume's definition of "glossae" he established three parts, "sententia", "sensus" and "littera", but the distinction between "sensus" and "sententia" is not to be found in Thierry's commentary.

The first part of the treatment of the lemma, "sensus", is of the greatest concern to Thierry. Here he discusses the varying doctrines of the ancient rhetors on controversial points, defines his terms, often in rather complex and closely knit structures, and here he links together the different parts of doctrine. The second part, "littera", deals with Cicero's structure of thought, i.e. the proper "sensus" in Guillaume of Conches' terminology, and with interpretation of single words. In this he shows himself rather dependant of Victorinus and Grillius, copying out definitions of words with similar meanings, like "principium" and "initium",⁶¹⁾ using their

57) page 8, cf. note 39.

58) A fol.129r, B fol.10 rb, ad De Inv.I,15,2o.

59) cf. Suringar's edition p.231 et passim.

60) cf. Glosae Super Platonem, ed.E. Jeauneau, Paris 1965,p.67 and Introduction,p.16,n.2. The distinction is cited by Hugoccio (†1210), printed by N.M. Haring, Two commentaries on Boethius, A.H.D.L.M.A.27, 1960,p.66.

61) cf. Suringar's edition,p.230 et passim.

quotations from classical literature,⁶²⁾ and following their indication of Cicero's way of argumentation.⁶³⁾ The greater importance assigned to the "sensus" shows a development of the commentary away from the old Carolingian kind, dealing mostly with "littera", and approaching the "summa" dealing only with "sententia".

This development as well as the very full *Accessus* is not only an interesting formal development, but, as it can be seen in the *Accessus* of Thierry's commentary on the *De Inventione*, it had clear consequences on the shaping of doctrine, forming an inventory of necessary questions to ask of any *Ars* and determining the scope of treatment of the textbooks, here the *De Inventione* and the *Ad Herennium*.

The doctrine of argumentation.

A good deal of Thierry of Chartres' theory of argumentation is developed around the differences between logic and rhetoric. In his discussion of "genus artis rethorice" he points out that rhetoric is a part of civil science, not of logic:⁶⁴⁾

Maiores vero pars civilis scientie dicitur rethorica quoniam magis operatur in civilibus causis quam⁶⁵⁾ sapientia, etsi sine sapientia eloquentia nichil prodsit. Non est autem dicendum rethoricam aut logicam esse aut eius partem idcirco quod logica circa thesim solam, i.e. circa generaliter proposita tantummodo versatur. Rethorica vero circa ypothesim solam, i.e. circa particulariter proposita tantummodo versatur.

This objection to Isidorus' division of logica (*Nunc partes logices exsequamur. Constat autem ex dialectica et rhetorica*⁶⁶⁾) is founded on the theories of Boethius, who in the *De differentiis Topicis* IV takes pains to distinguish rhetoric from logic. Thierry leans

62) cf. J. Martin, in the Introduction, p. XIX, to his Edition of Grilius, *Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rhetorik, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums*, 14, heft. 2-3, Paderborn 1927.

63) cf. Suringar's edition, p. 243-245, and Victorinus, ed. Halm p. 168-170.

64) A fol. 102v, B fol. 2ra, the passage in Suringar's edition, p. 218, is corrupt. Gundissalinus omitted this passage as he had different views on the "materia" of logic, cf. ed. Baur, p. 71, 5-15.

65) quod A B.

66) *De diff. rer.* P. L. 83, 94 C.

heavily on Boethius for his doctrine on "materia artis" and his discussions of "hypothesis" and the topics are very full of quotations from Boethius, even if Thierry sometimes rejects parts of his doctrine.

Hypothesis.

Cicero's definition of "causa" as "res quae habet in se controversiam in dicendo positam cum personarum certarum interpositione" becomes more complicated in Thierry's commentary:

"Causa igitur, ut supra diximus, est res que habet in se controversiam in dicendo positam de certo dicto vel facto alicuius⁶⁷⁾ certe persone... Ipsam vero controversiam appello litem eorum ex intentione et depulsione constantem⁶⁸⁾ cum rationibus et confirmationibus utriusque partis. Que lis⁶⁹⁾ in iudicialibus placitum dicitur, in deliberativis vero consultatio, in demonstrativis vero contio⁷⁰⁾ vocatur. Hec igitur triplex controversia materia est artis rethorice sive oratoris quoniam orator secundum artem rethoricam tractat ipsam controversiam. Tractare vero controversiam est rationabiliter intendere sive depellere".⁷¹⁾

The complexity of this definition springs from a concern to gather all the important elements of a "causa". It has to be one of the three "genera", deliberative, demonstrative or iudicial and it should have a certain status (ex intentione et depulsione) as a controversia without either an accusation or a defense, lacks status and is a Thema asystaton.⁷²⁾ The interrelationship of these elements in a speech Thierry finds in Cicero's definition:⁷³⁾

67) alius A.

68) coinstantem A.

69) qualis A.

70) conscio B.

71) ad De Inv. I, 8, 10, Omnis res..., A fol. 115r, B fol. 6ra.

72) cf. A fol. 164v and B fol. 24rb: "Nam quedam themata assistata sunt, i.e. sine statu et sine constitutione quando altera pars deficit sive intendentis sive depellentis".

73) A fol. 117r, B fol. 6vb.

"Uno autem compendio et causam et genera causarum et constitutiones in hac littera distinxit; dicendo autem QUE HABET IN SE CONTROVERSIAM removit causas assistatas".

Likewise the defense and accusation must be proved or rejected on the ground of the orators' "rationes et confirmationes". For if not, there can be no "iudicatio", no decision from the audience as to the probability of the defense and accusation.⁷⁴⁾ Thierry agrees with Cicero⁷⁵⁾ that the status coniecturalis lacks iudicatio, but all the other status must give scope for the iudicatio. Thus controversia, status and iudicatio are closely knit together.⁷⁶⁾

Iudicatio vero est auditis et ratione et rationis infirmatione de eisdem iudicium inquisitio.⁷⁷⁾

It springs from the status, set forth in the 5th and 6th parts of speech:

Tamen ex intentione et depulsione est constitutio quoniam res inde aliqua est dubia quod unus intendit et alius depellit. Ex constitutione vero est auditorum dubitatio⁷⁸⁾.... Ad hanc vero dubitationem ab oratoribus et rationes et rationum infirmationes adducuntur, ex quibus nascitur iudicatio ad quam adducuntur confirmatio et reprehensio post quas nichil restat nisi peroratio... Prohemium vero et narratio ac partitio eandem precedunt quoniam sunt quedam preparatio ad constituendam causam.⁷⁹⁾

74) cf. the discussion of thema assistaton: A fol.115v: "Dicimus quod non est causa in qua et ratio rationisque infirmatio aliquid probabilitatis non habent. Immo vero illud dicitur causa assistaton, i.e. sine statu".

75) De Inv.I,13,19.

76) Iudicatio should be carefully distinguished from Iudicium which by Cicero in Top.2,6 is set forth as the counterpart to Inventio, cf.Thierry ad De Inv.I,7,9. A fol.114v, B fol.6ra: Cum autem quinque predicta (that is inventio, dispositio etc.) partes sint artis rethorice, de iudicio queritur utrum extra artem (om.B.) rethoricam sit an in aliqua parte rethorice contineatur, quod verius est. Nam in inventione principaliter continetur etsi in aliis partibus opus sit iudicio.

77) ad De Inv.,I,8,10, Omnis res etc. A fol.115v. B fol.6rb.

78) ad De Inv.,I,8,10, Omnis res etc. A fol.116v. B fol.6va.

79) ad De Inv.,I,8,10, Omnis res etc. A fol.117r. B fol.6va.

So the definition of "causa" incorporates the discussions of "genera", of the relationship between "iudicatio" and "status" and of "partes" ("confirmatio" and "reprehensio"). It also gives a glimpse of the theory of argumentation (rationabiliter intendere et repellere), and of "Materia artis rethorice, Hypothesis". For rhetoric must deal with "particulariter proposita", i.e. not with "causa sine certa persona". This has always been a point of controversy in rhetorical doctrine and Thierry discusses it carefully:⁸⁰⁾

Sed diligenter querendum est utrum causa esse possit sine ea circumstantia que dicitur persona. Et Boetius⁸¹⁾ quidem in quarto Topicorum dicit: "Causarum esse alias⁸²⁾ speciales, alias individuas" et hanc divisionem in omnibus generibus causarum ponit. Grillius⁸³⁾ vero in Commentario super Rethoricam affirmat demonstrativam causam esse non posse sine certa persona. Si vero certa persone non insit non demonstrativum⁸⁴⁾ vocat, sed appellativum quod ipse communem locum esse dicit. Quintilianus quoque in Tertio Institutionum Oratoriarum⁸⁵⁾ dicit non sibi videri vocari proprie causam que a propria persona remota sit.

Hoc ergo dicendum est quod Boetius improprie causas appellavit illa specialia. Alii vero auctores proprie vocabulo usi sunt et extra certam personam causas esse negaverunt.

Thierry's criticism of Boetius here is directed against his use of a division into individual and special in all genera, while Thierry only allows this division for the genus demonstrativum, i.e. to be without "certa persona" when he first discusses this "genus".⁸⁶⁾ Only in the above printed passage, when he approaches the problem principally, he demands a "certa persona". In the discussions of Grillius and Quintilian he seems a bit at loss. For Grillius'

80) ad De Inv. I, 6, 8, A fol. 113r and B fol. 5va.

81) P.L. 64, 1207 B.

82) esse alias] alias esse B.

83) ed. J. Martin, p. 40, 18. cf. his discussion p. 106 ff. o.c. in note 62.

84) demonstrativam B.

85) III, 5, 7.

86) cf. Suringar's edition, p. 251. cf. A fol. 113r: Nam interpositio certarum personarum in causa nichil est aliud quam in causa circumstantiarum inclusio, sive sit specialis causa sive individua.

solution of defining this special genus as a "locus communis", a handy way, but not strictly acceptable, only saves the general definition of "causa cum certa persona" but no more. A locus communis can hardly develop into a "genus causae" and anyhow Thierry himself does not allow a "locus communis" such a scope as he only defines it as an "argumentum commune".⁸⁷⁾ The quotation from Quintilian is mangled and too short, for, after the passage quoted, Quintilian goes on to modify his statement, saying that he would not like to decide on the matter, as Cicero himself in the rhetorical treatises later than the *De Inventione* allows a rhetorical "causa" to be without certa persona.⁸⁸⁾ It seems reasonable here to suppose that Thierry did not know more from Quintilian than what he quoted here and thus only had an abridged edition of Quintilian or knew him from a florilegium.

Circumstantiae.

Thierry demands that a rhetorical Causa, Hypothesis, must be connected with the circumstances of the case, the seven Circumstantiae, which are those from which all argumentation departs. This theory, which goes back to Hermagoras, if Augustinus is right,⁸⁹⁾ became through Cicero's elaboration⁹⁰⁾ the topical canon for the following centuries for most rhetoricians. However, Cicero left this system in his later rhetorical works and shows in the *Partitiones Oratoriae* a topical system,⁹¹⁾ which he says goes back to the 2. Academy,⁹²⁾ and in the *De Oratore*⁹³⁾ and *Topica*⁹⁴⁾ he puts

87) A fol.164r and B fol.24ra, ad *De Inv.* II, 16, 51: Dicit omnes communes locos sumi vel ex attributis negotio vel ex attributis persone et ideo, etsi dicantur communes loci non tamen per se dicuntur loci. Nam communis locus nichil est aliud quam argumentum commune. (Commune argumentum B) cf. Thierry's commentary on the ad *Her.* II, 19, 29, Ph. (Berlin) fol.49ra: Nota communes locos appellamus sententias generales que non ad unum tantum sed aut ad omnes aut ad plures pertinent.

88) *Inst. Orat.* III, 5, 15.

89) Augustinus, *De Rhetorica* 7, ed. Halm, p. 141, 12 = Hermagoras, Fragment 7, ed. D. Matthes.

90) *De Inv.* I, 24, 34 - I, 28, 43.

91) *Part. Or.* 2, 5-7.

92) *ibidem* 40, 139.

93) *De Orat.* II, 39, 162-41, 176.

94) *Top.* 2, 8-4, 25; 5, 26-13, 55.

forth a new list of topics, which he claims to have taken from Aristotle; but the question of sources is far from decided yet.⁹⁵⁾

Later, as Cicero became an authority on Topics, his ambivalent position left its marks on both rhetoric and logic. The dialecticians (Boethius)⁹⁶⁾ used the system from Topica, while the rhetoricians either gave the system from both Topica and the Hermagorean doctrine embedded in De Inventione in an elaborate structure (Quintilian)⁹⁷⁾ or only the one from Topica (Martianus Cappella)⁹⁸⁾ or parts of the system in De Inventione (Fortunatianus).⁹⁹⁾ Finally Victorinus¹⁰⁰⁾ and Boethius¹⁰¹⁾ took over the whole system from the De Inventione, when dealing with rhetoric.

Boethius' division into a rhetorical Topica (from the De Inventione) and a dialectical Topica (from Cicero's Topica) decided the matter for the next centuries and the problems which Boethius encountered are the very problems which raise difficulties for Thierry.

The topical system in the De Inventione is according to Boethius and Victorinus embedded in the seven Circumstantiae, (Who, What, When, Where etc.). But Cicero himself does not mention "Circumstantiae" but deals with them rather loosely in two groups, so that Who covers all the topics from Persona, while the rest, What, When, Where etc., must be found in the topics from Negotium:¹⁰²⁾

E persona:

nomen	consilia
natura	facta
victus	casus
fortuna	orationes
habitus	
affectio	
studium	

E negotio:

I	continentia cum negotio
II	in gestione negotii (locus, tempus, occasio, modus, facultas)
III	adiuncta negotio (maius, minus, par, simile, contrarium, disparatum, genus, pars, eventus)
IV	consequentia negotium (accepted or not)

95) cf. J.J. Klein, De Fontibus Topicorum Ciceronis, Bonn 1844, M. Wallies, De Fontibus Topicorum Ciceronis, Halle 1878, B. Ripsati, Studi sui "Topica" di Cicerone, Milano 1947.

96) P.L. 64, 1173-1216 and In Topica Ciceronis Commentaria, ibid. p. 1039-1174. 97) Inst. Orat., V, 10, 20-100.

98) De Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae V, De Rhetorica, ed. Halm, p. 465 ff. 99) Rhetorica ed. Halm, p. 115, 16 ff.

100) ed. Halm, p. 206, 39 ff and 213, 17 ff. 101) P.L. 64, 1212 A - 1215 A.

102) De Inv. I, 24, 34 - I, 28, 43. This interpretation is given by Boethius, P.L. 64, 1212 C and Victorinus, ed. Halm, p. 220 ff.

It will be clear from this table, 1^o that the seven Circumstantiae are not found in the same, simple way in all groups, 2^o that group III and IV under the topics from negotium are very different from the rest and 3^o that this same group III has a clear affinity to the topical system in Cicero's Topica.¹⁰³⁾

These three sets of difficulties were only halfway solved by Boethius and Thierry takes pains to deal with them, partly with the help from Victorinus, partly by widening the definition of a locus, when he deals with group III among the topics of Negotium.

In the general definitions of rhetorical topics Thierry sets out to distinguish the rhetorical and logical topics:¹⁰⁴⁾

Dicendum est quid argumentum sit, quid argumentatio, quid locus argumenti deinde ad id quod volumus ostendere competenter descendemus. Argumentum igitur est ratio rei dubie faciens fidem¹⁰⁵⁾ i.e. rei dubie probatio. Argumentatio vero explicatio argumenti per orationem,¹⁰⁶⁾ i.e. oratio¹⁰⁷⁾ per quam ordine competenti fit argumentum. Unde Tullius expolitionem argumenti eam vocat.

Locus vero argumenti est sedes ipsius argumenti,¹⁰⁸⁾ i.e. res continens in se argumentum ex¹⁰⁹⁾ qua nascitur et eliciendum est. Nam sicut non in omni loco pisces nascuntur vel aves,¹¹⁰⁾ sed unus locus naturalis sedes est piscibus, alius autem avibus, alius vero ceteris animalibus et horum locorum periti cito et facile inveniunt quod querunt; sicut, inquam, hoc est, ita in ratione disserendi et in rethorica sunt quaedam res ex quibus sunt origines probationum, quasi sedes naturalis argumentorum¹¹¹⁾ et istarum rerum periti cito et facile probatione <m> rei propositae inveniunt. Sunt autem in ratione disserendi loci argumentorum maxime propositiones aut earum differentie.¹¹²⁾

103) cf. P.L. 64, 1216 A ff.

104) ad De Inv. I, 24, 34. A fol. 138r and B fol. 13va.

105) = Boethius, P.L. 64, 1212 B, taken from Cic. Top. II, 8.

106) = " " , 1183 A.

107) ratio A.

108) Cic. Top. II, 8; Boethius P.L. 64 1174 D, et passim.

109) et ex B.

110) a paraphrase of Quintilian, Inst. Orat. V, 10, 21-22.

111) argumentationi A. et istorum... argumentorum om. A.

112) cf. Boethius, P.L. 64, 1185 A.

Nam maxime propositiones prima sunt probationum principia, differentias vero maximarum dico esse quod una earum est a diffinitione alia vero a genere et ita de aliis, que differentie idcirco loci argumentorum dicuntur,¹¹³⁾ quoniam ipsos locos argumentorum continent. Nam plures maxime sunt quarum unaqueque a diffinitione est et ita de aliis. Hi quidem¹¹⁴⁾ loci qui generales¹¹⁵⁾ sunt, ad questionem generalem, i.e. ad thesin pertinent.

In rethorica vero quoniam hypothesis i.e. particularis¹¹⁶⁾ questio que est de certa persona tractatur, idcirco particulares loci, i.e. circumstantie septem reputantur sedes esse argumentorum.¹¹⁷⁾

Circumstantie vero sunt quedam particularia que personis aut negotiis insunt ex quibus argumenta fiunt in causa ut aliquod genus vel aliqua species vel aliqua diffinitio vel aliqua causa et consimilia quibus aliquid ostenditur aut de persona aut de negotio.

In ratione igitur disserendi sedes argumentorum sunt hec maxima propositio unde abest diffinitio et quod diffinitur et hec alia cui adest species et genus et consimiles quarum una ad omnem diffinitionem pertinet, alia vero ad omnem speciem et sic alie generaliter ad multa pertinent.

In rethorica vero sedes argumenti est vel hoc genus¹¹⁸⁾ vel hec species vel hec diffinitio et consimilia que particularia esse quantum ad predictas maximas patet cuilibet.

Nunc de circumstantiis. Sunt igitur duo de quibus in rethorica questione agitur, persona scilicet atque negotium.¹¹⁹⁾ Persona est ille vel illa, qui vel que ducitur in causam, negotium vero est

113) cf. Boethius, P.L. 64, 1186 A, B.

114) Hi quod A. Hic quidem B.

115) generalis B. cf. Boethius, P.L. 64, 1205 C, D.

116) particulares A.

117) cf. Boethius, P.L. 64, 1205 C, D.

118) = Boethius, P.L. 64, 1216 B.

119) = Boethius, P.L. 64, 1212 A.

dictum vel factum persone propter quod ipsa devocatur in causam.¹²⁰⁾ Circumstantie vero sunt res que insunt ipsi persone aut negotio, que iccirco dicuntur circumstantie quoniam circumstant personam¹²¹⁾ aut negotium, i.e. circa illa sunt de quibus questio est; nec sine ipsis rethorica questio staret,¹²²⁾ nisi enim hec circumstent¹²³⁾ nulla dubitatio auditores remoratur. Ista etiam personam atque negotium determinant, unde¹²⁴⁾ civilis questio dicitur esse implicata circumstantiis, quasi¹²⁵⁾ per hec restricta circa certam personam atque negotium. Nam si hec persone atque negotio detrahantur fit ipsa dubitatio thesis. Si vero rei de qua generaliter dubitatur hec adiungantur, fit ipsa dubitatio hypothesis.... Unde circumstantie dicuntur efficere civilis questionis substantiam.¹²⁶⁾

Sed¹²⁷⁾ queritur, cum iste circumstantie sint loci argumentorum quomodo circumstantiis implicata sit civilis questio vel quomodo substantiam eius¹²⁸⁾ ipse¹²⁹⁾ efficiant. Non enim in questione loci argumentorum esse debent.

Ad quod dicimus quod ideo circumstantie dicuntur implicare causam vel eius substantiam efficere, non quod de ipsis in questione queratur, sed ideo quod persona et negotium in causam venire non possunt, nisi ex eorum aliquibus circumstantiis.

Thierry's distinction between the logical and the rhetorical topics is more or less what Boethius says himself in *De Differentiis Topicis*, and so is the theory of *Circumstantiae* of the rhetorical topics. Yet by confining the rhetorical topics to such narrow limits Thierry encounters a difficulty in the end (*Sed queritur...*).¹³⁰⁾ Here the seven circumstantiae are so closely connected with the

120) devocatur in causam] detinetur in causa B. cf. Boethius, P.L. 64, 1212 A.

121) ipsam personam B.

122) = C. Iulius Victor, ed. Halm, p. 374, 35.

123) circumstent] circumstantie A.

124) unde etiam B.

125) quare A.

126) = Boethius, P.L. 64, 1212 C.

127) si A.

128) vel quomodo substantiam eius] vel eius substantiam B.

129) ipse om. B.

130) Boethius deals with the same question, P.L. 64, 1212 B: *Persona igitur et negotium suggerere argumenta non possunt, de ipsis enim quaestio est.*

persona and negotium which are "in questione", that it is objected that the loci themselves are "in questione", i.e. the "sedes certi argumenti", the locus itself is doubtful. Thierry does not understand this as a question of the validity of the locus; thus his answer, that the Circumstantiae are the connecting link between persona and negotium on one side and argumenta on the other, is only partly satisfying.

For he only takes into account the place from which arguments are drawn, not the topic's special ability to provide good, valid arguments, i.e. such which are not tinged of any doubt. This ability in a topic is only hinted at, by Boethius, by the dialectical topics,¹³¹⁾ and first defined by Abailard, who defines (the dialectical) locus as "vis inferentie".¹³²⁾

Later, however, when Thierry treats the topics "ex adiunctis negotio", Cicero's III group, he uses the very word "vis" to prove that these are proper topics, and he maintains that they still are circumstantiae, i.e. circumstantiae from another lawsuit, adduced to prove the present one by comparison or relation (genus, pars, minus, maius, par etc.).

They are Circumstantiae¹³³⁾

Non autem omnia attributa negotio sunt circumstantie ipsius negotii, i.e. non insunt ipsi negotio presenti¹³⁴⁾ de quo agitur sed per quandam relationem ei negotio,¹³⁵⁾ de quo agitur, sunt adiuncta et extrinsecus collocata.

Quedam alia vero cum sint similiter extrinseca nec ad negotium aliquam relationem habentia tamen quoniam sunt quedam auctoritates, quibus probatur negotium, non inconvenienter illa dicuntur esse attributa negotio.

Quamvis autem negotio adiuncta sint extrinseca, tamen secundum circumstantias presentis negotii adducuntur ita ut causa cause aut summa negotii presentis. Et sic alie circumstantie per quandam relationem conferuntur circumstantiis alterius negotii ex qua collatione nascuntur loci illi qui dicuntur adiuncta negotio, ut maius, minus, simile et consimilia.

131) P.L.64,1185 D.

132) Dialectica, ed.De Rijk, Assen 1956, p.253,16.

133) ad De Inv.I,24,34, A fol.139v B fol.144ra.

134) presenti om.B.

135) ei negotio...relationem om.A.

Similiter consequentia negotium, etsi extrinseca sint, tamen quoniam aliquam vim auctoritatis habent ad probandum negotium ideo loci argumentorum dicuntur quamvis neque a persona neque a negotio ducantur, i.e.¹³⁶⁾ neque his inhereant neque ad ea aliquam relationem habeant, sed ad aliquod testimonium pertineant.¹³⁷⁾

And they have a vis:¹³⁸⁾

GENUS EST etc. Cum adiuncta negotio sint extrinseca, genus autem¹³⁹⁾ insit naturaliter partibus suis queritur quomodo ergo genus et pars sint de adiunctis negotio. Dicimus igitur quod esse genus, i.e. continens, et¹⁴⁰⁾ esse partem, i.e. conceptum, relativa¹⁴¹⁾ sunt et quando ab uno eorum ad probandum aliud sumitur argumentum ex vi continentie vel ex eo quod continetur, tunc est argumentum ab adiunctis negotio. Quando autem genus de parte predicatur et non ex vi continentie vel continenti aliquod de toto¹⁴²⁾ predicatur vel de parte, tunc potest fieri argumentum a natura, (one of the topics from Cicero's IV group e negotio).

The transition from "ex Adiunctis negotio" to "consequentia negotium", as shown in the end of the above text, is important for Thierry, mainly because the two sets of topics have a different value:¹⁴³⁾

Differt etiam hic eventus qui consequitur negotium ab eo qui est in adiunctis¹⁴⁴⁾ negotio, quoniam hic consideratur exitus sive necessarius sive non, ut idem sit testimonium rei precedentis.

In adiunctis vero negotio tantummodo necessarius exitus consideratur... Nam, ut sepe dixi, non solum res que in argumentum ducitur attendenda est sed etiam secundum quam vim adducatur dili-

136) idem A.

137) this group of topics is called, with Victorinus (ed. Halm 207, 9) "opinio" or the 8. "circumstantia"; ad De Inv. I, 28, 43, Quarta autem etc. A fol. 147v and B fol. 17rb: De septem circumstantiis satis dictum est. Nunc ergo de octavo quod dicitur consequens (presens A) negotium....

138) ad De Inv. I, 28, 42. A fol. 147r and B fol. 17rb.

139) autem] autem an B.

140) et esse...conceptum om. B.

141) relativa B.

142) toto predicatur vel de parte] toto vel de parte probatur A.

143) ad De Inv. I, 28, 43: Deinde natura etc., A fol. 148r and B fol. 17vb.

144) in adiunctis] adiunctus B.

genter videndum est, ut ex quo¹⁴⁵⁾ attributo sit argumentum perpendi possit.

Thus the topics from "adiunctis negotio" give necessary arguments, those from "consequentia negotium" not. This point and the fact that the topics from "adiuncta negotio" are so very like the dialectical topics allows Thierry an opportunity to discuss them more penetratingly, and he shows, in fact, that there can be raised doubt as to that they maybe should be treated like dialectical topics, i.e. that an argument "e contrario" might not be, as he first defined,¹⁴⁶⁾ "e hoc contrario" but "e contrarietate":¹⁴⁷⁾

Quamvis autem attributa extrinsece persone vel negotio sint adiuncta presenti negotio,¹⁴⁸⁾ non tamen illa attributa dicuntur esse attributa presenti negotio...

Nam illa extrinseca non sunt ex se attributa presenti negotio, sed ex relatione quam habent ad id; ablata igitur relatione veritas enuntiationis constare non potest. Nam id quod forsitan posset dici quod ipse scilicet¹⁴⁹⁾ relationes extrinsecorum, non ipsa relata, sint adiuncta negotio, hoc, inquam, videtur esse Boetio contrarium, qui in Quarto Topicorum ita dicit: Sumuntur vero argumenta non ex contrarietate, sed ex contrario etc., deinde subiungit: ut appareat non ex relatione sumi argumenta ab adiunctis negotio. Sed in eodem libro videtur velle Boetius quod septem circumstantie presentis negotii, si per se considerentur, sunt aut attributa persone aut continentia cum negotio aut in gestione negotii; si autem ille eedem ad aliqua extrinseca referantur in hoc dicuntur esse adiuncta negotio. Ac sic questio predicta cessatur. Sed Tullius videtur esse huic sententie contrarius, qui dicit¹⁵⁰⁾ adiunctum negotio esse id quod¹⁵¹⁾ maius est¹⁵²⁾ vel minus vel simile ei negotio de quo agitur. Unde adiuncta negotio videntur esse¹⁵³⁾ extrinseca sed ad negotium

145) aliquo B.

146) see page 20.

147) ad De Inv. I, 28, 41. Maius, minus etc. A fol. 146r and B fol. 16vb.

148) negotio om. B.

149) scilicet ipse A.

150) dicit esse A.

151) quid B.

152) quod maius est] quod in maius A.

153) esse om. A.

relata. Adiuncta igitur negotio sunt ea que superius diximus et ad hanc sententiam verba Boetii applicanda sunt.¹⁵⁴⁾

Thierry here falls back to his first definition of adiuncta negotio as "relata", not "relationes", but he shows that he knew that Boethius was not very clear about Circumstantiae, allowing them a difficult, double position (si per se considerentur...si autem ille eedem ad aliqua extrinseca referantur...). While Thierry here shows himself rather dependant of Boethius, he still marks a new step forward in the topical discussions, by pointing out the topical difficulties in Boethius' system of Rhetorical Topics and by at times, using the word "vis", maybe not in its completely technical sense, as did Abailard for the dialectical loci, but still in order to show both where and by what force or ability a necessary argument should be produced. One must, however, keep in mind that to renew the topical system was much easier in the field of dialectic, than in rhetoric where it would at this time be a break with all existing authorities.

Argumentum necessarium vel probabile.

When dealing with Cicero's theory of probable arguments Thierry spends some time on the three different divisions, which are to be found in De Inventione. The last one he links with his discussion of topics, first giving the distribution which Victorinus¹⁵⁵⁾ has, then his own: (vel potius etc.)¹⁵⁶⁾

Tertia divisio probabilis est que fit in quattuor que in tribus superioribus continentur.¹⁵⁷⁾ Nam credibile attributa persone continet que per excellentiam credibilia dicuntur, signum vero continentia cum negotio et in gestione negotii et hec omnia, scilicet signa et credibilia,¹⁵⁸⁾ sub eo quod fere solet fieri continentur.¹⁵⁹⁾ Comparabile¹⁶⁰⁾ vero sub adiunctis negotio continetur et ad similitudinem refertur. Iudicatum autem consequen-

154) sint B.

155) Victorinus, ed.Halm p.239,39.

156) ad De Inv.I,30,47: Probabile etc.A fol.149v and B fol.18rb.

157) continetur A.

158) incredibilia A.

159) refertur A.

160) Comprobabile A.

tia negotium et sub opinione continetur;¹⁶¹⁾ vel potius credibile ad id quod fere solet fieri refertur, signum vero tum ad id sicut continentia cum negotio et in gestione negotii, tum ad consequentia negotium que sunt in testimonio persone refertur.

When dealing with "argumentum necessarium" Thierry encounters great difficulties, because the three types of arguments mentioned by Cicero, "complexio", "enumeratio" and "conclusio simplex", are not derived from the normal Boethian tradition known to Thierry, but should be sought in a partly stoic, partly rhetorical tradition current in the time of Cicero - when the Aristotelian categorical syllogism was rarely in use. By the time of Quintilian¹⁶²⁾ Cicero's term "argumentatio" was interpreted as "syllogismus" in a wider concept than the Aristotelian. Victorinus used it so¹⁶³⁾ and it appears that Boethius was the first to narrow down the meaning of "syllogismus" to either the Aristotelian categorical one or the Theophrastean hypothetical one.¹⁶⁴⁾

Thierry did not know the system¹⁶⁵⁾ of logic of the Stoics and his interpretation of Cicero's three forms of "argumentum necessarium" starts off from the Boethian tradition, discussing various other interpretations of the lemma and using an unusual terminology:¹⁶⁶⁾

Necessarium argumentum diuidit per modos quibus maxime tractari solet scilicet per complexionem, enumerationem, simplicem conclusionem.

Modi vero isti, ut quibusdam videtur, genera sunt syllogismorum, quibus necessarium argumentum tractatur;¹⁶⁷⁾ et complexio quidem

161) continentur A.

162) Inst.Orat.V,14,14 and V,14,24.

163) Victorinus takes Syllogismus in a looser sense, cf.ed.Halm 187,42;189,12;243,19.

164) a strange account of categorical and hypothetical argumentation, slightly confounded with stoic remains is found in Grilius, cf.ed.Martin, o.c. in note 62, p.58,25-62,3.

165) even if the elements thereof ought to be known to him from Apuleius and M. Cappella; the Peri Hermeneias of Apuleius is to be found in Thierry's Heptateuchon, MS Chartres 498, fol. 33vb-37rb.

166) ad De Inv.I,29,44 ff. Hoc genus etc. A fol.148v and B fol.17vb.

167) necessaria argumenta tractantur B.

secundum eos est sillogismus qui a rethoribus cornutus sillogismus dicitur propter duplicem conclusionem, a dialecticis vero ratiocinatio indirecta, quia ducit ad inconueniens. Sed mihi quidem videtur quod complexio species est¹⁶⁸⁾ divisionis, scilicet disiunctio¹⁶⁹⁾ cuius utraque pars reprehenditur. Nam complexio nichil est aliud quam disiunctio¹⁷⁰⁾ qua undique quicquid ex duobus aut pluribus adversarius concesserit, cogitur ad id quod non vult; velut¹⁷¹⁾ si quis aliquem accusare et simul societatem eius habere vellet, cogatur ad id quod non vult hoc modo: Nam si concesserit esse probum¹⁷²⁾ cogetur ad hoc ut non accuset; si vero improbum,¹⁷³⁾ cogetur ad hoc ut non habeat societatem eius.¹⁷⁴⁾ Et hoc est quod ait Tullius: COMPLEXIO EST IN QUA¹⁷⁵⁾ etc., id est quidcumque concesseris fit reprehensio, i.e. negatio eius quod adversarius vult. Nam reprehenditur hic impersonaliter.¹⁷⁶⁾ ENUMERATIO etc. Enumeratio quoque secundum quosdam sillogismus est qui fit per enumerationem partium, sed ego dico quod enumeratio est species divisionis facta per enumerationem partium¹⁷⁷⁾ ex quarum partium quibusdam¹⁷⁸⁾ negatis reliquum confirmatur ut subsequenti¹⁷⁹⁾ exemplo Tullius demonstrat enumerans partes cause suscipiendi maleficii.

SIMPLEX AUTEM etc. Secundum alios simplex conclusio est hypotheticus sillogismus sine complexione et enumeratione. Ego vero dico simplicem conclusionem esse quasi coactionem simplicem, i.e. consequentiam necessariam sine complexione et enumeratione.

We do not know the people against whom Thierry is arguing here, except for the interpretation of complexio. For Abailard¹⁸⁰⁾ calls

168) sit A.

169) deiunctio A.

170) deiunctio A.

171) velut om. B.

172) proprium A.

173) improprium A.

174) societatem eius] eius societatem A.

175) EST IN QUA A om. B.

176) Nam.....impersonaliter. ENUMERATIO etc. om. A.

177) sed ego.....enumerationem partium om. A.

178) in quibusdam A.

179) sequenti A.

180) Dialectica, Tract. III, ed. De Rijk, p. 447, 9 ff. cf. Boethius, P.L. 64, 1193 A.

an inference like *complexio* for "*indirecta ratiocinatio*" and might thus be one of the dialecticians hinted at (a dialecticis). The rhetorical interpretation is not wellknown either, as the term "*cornutus syllogismus*" usually is reserved for one of the stoic paradoxes (is it possible to loose what one does not have?);¹⁸¹⁾ this terminology could, however, spring from a passage in Hieronymus,¹⁸²⁾ who in a letter uses the term "*cornutus syllogismus*" about an inference of the kind mentioned in *De Inventione* as a "*complexio*".

Also Thierry's own terminology is rather difficult. His "*species divisionis*" used for "*complexio*" and "*enumeratio*" is puzzling, and ought rather to be sought in dialectical discussions than in rhetoric. For "*divisio*" is in rhetoric used as a fixed term for the third part of speech, (*exordium*, *narratio*, *partitio* etc.) where "*divisio*" is a subdivision of "*partitio*".¹⁸³⁾ Or it is used in the theory of status, where it means a distribution of arguments to the different "*status*" in a fixed order.¹⁸⁴⁾

The dialecticians used "*divisio*" in dealing with logic of terms, very often when treating of "*Fallaciae*".¹⁸⁵⁾ and they used it too in a kind of logic of propositions, i.e. in topical discussions.¹⁸⁶⁾ The kinds of "*species divisionis*" mentioned by Thierry I have not found elsewhere,¹⁸⁷⁾ but Abailard uses inferences like Cicero's "*complexio*" when he writes on "*indirecta ratiocinatio*" and "*locus a divisione*":¹⁸⁸⁾

"In hac autem argumentatione duo principales loci a divisione esse a Boetio conceduntur cum videlicet vel impossibile concludi-

181) Gellius, 16, 2, 10. Seneca, Epist. 45, 8 and 49, 8. M. Cappella, *De Nuptiis*..., IV, 327.

182) Hieronymus, Epist. 69, 2, ed. J. Labourt, Paris, tom. III, 1921.

183) Victorinus, ed. Halm, p. 208, 39.

184) C. Iul. Victor, ed. Halm, p. 385, 32. Fortunatianus, ed. Halm, p. 105, 1 ff. However cf. Quint. V, 10, 64-70.

185) cf. *Fallacie Parvipontane*, lib. II, ed. De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* I, 1, p. 151 and 609, Assen 1962.

186) cf. Boethius In Top. Cic. P. L. 64, 1061 ff and 1094 A ff.

187) However in Thierry's edition of Boethius, *De Diff. Top.* in the *Heptateuchon*, the enumeration of Themistius' topics subdivides "*locus a divisione*" in "*per negationem*" and "*per comparisonem*". This is not to be found in P. L. 64 (i.e. 1201-1202) cf. also Boethius (P. L. 64, 1203 A): (Cicero's) *locus a partium numeratione* in Themistii *divisione inter medios* "*a divisione*" nominatum est.

188) *Dialectica*, ed. De Rijk, p. 447, 27 ff.

tur ex concessione, vel ex falsificata parte altera vera esse ostenditur, que opposite invicem sunt tamquam affirmatio et negatio".

Abailard does not speak of "species divisionis" as does Thierry but it seems reasonable to suppose that what Thierry was after in his discussion of Cicero's "necessarii argumenti modi" was to prove that none of the arguments proposed under "complexio", "enumeratio" and "conclusio simplex" are syllogisms proper, but topical arguments.

Thus the unusual terminology used by Thierry for "argumentum necessarium" maybe should be sought in (unedited) topical treatises or be seen as a part of his own teaching of topics. That the terminology is rare and maybe later abandoned, might only be an indication of the rise of new problems with the introduction of the rest of the Organon in the middle of the Twelfth century. Undoubtedly many new terms were coined in this period, which later went out of use, when the topical teaching had settled and got accustomed to the new material.

Argumentatio: Ratiocinatio et Inductio.

In dealing with Cicero's "ratiocinatio" and "inductio" Thierry takes pains to distinguish the dialectical and rhetorical ways of arguing:¹⁸⁹⁾

Due species sunt expolitionis, i.e. argumentationis: Inductio, sub qua intelligitur¹⁹⁰⁾ exemplum, et ratiocinatio, i.e. syllogismus sub quo intelligitur¹⁹¹⁾ entimema; sed secundum Tullium etsi¹⁹²⁾ ista, i.e. exemplum et entimema argumentationes sint non tamen videntur esse expolitiones. Nam expolitio secundum Tullium est¹⁹³⁾ integra argumenti tractatio.¹⁹⁴⁾ Quod autem dixit omnem argumentationem ita tractandam <esse> non ita dixit quin aliquando vellet fieri et exemplum et entimema, sed ideo

189) ad De Inv. I, 31, 51. Omnis igitur etc. A fol. 150 v and B fol. 18vb.

190) intelligi A.

191) intelligi A.

192) etsi om. A.

193) est om. A.

194) argumenti tractatio] argumentatio B.

quia sic¹⁹⁵⁾ debet fieri nisi causa brevitatis cogat aut exemplo aut entimemate uti. Sunt igitur tantummodo due species ex-
positionis, inductio et ratiocinatio.

INDUCTIO EST etc. Inductionem describit dicens illam esse orationem in qua ex rebus certis quarum assensio¹⁹⁶⁾ i.e.¹⁹⁷⁾ concessio ab adversario captatur, i.e. elicitur, ex his, inquam, rebus probatur aliquod dubium. Sed hoc totum habet sillogismus ideo additum est¹⁹⁸⁾ PER¹⁹⁹⁾ SIMILITUDINEM etc.

Nam in inductione²⁰⁰⁾ sive a²⁰¹⁾ particularibus ad universale²⁰²⁾ fiat progressio sive a particularibus²⁰³⁾ ad aliud particulare semper vis similitudinis sic probat: sicut in his est ita in omnibus vel sicut in his est ita in illo. Sillogismo²⁰⁴⁾ vero non ita sicut postea ostendetur. Notandum vero est quod hec descriptio inductionis data est secundum usum philosophorum qui interrogando inducunt; usum vero oratorum docebit exemplo de Epaminunda²⁰⁵⁾ allato.²⁰⁶⁾

The difference between the rhetorical induction and the dialectical or philosophical is not found in the process of the argument but in the different aims:²⁰⁷⁾

Nam is modus inducendi ex his tribus constat, scilicet ex eo quod primo inducitur et ex eo quod circa causam inducitur²⁰⁸⁾ et ex conclusione, que et celanda est et hoc modo quo prediximus facienda est.²⁰⁹⁾ SED QUIA etc. Quomodo philosophi induc-

195) sicut A.

196) ascensio B.

197) i.e. om. A.

198) additum additum est B.

199) propter A.

200) in inductionem A, inductionem B, inductione, MS Heidelberg, Salem VII,103,fol.162ra.

201) a om. A.

202) universalis B.

203) a particulari B.

204) sillogismus A.

205) Epaminenda A.

206) allata A.

207) ad De Inv.I,32,54, Tertia ex conclusione etc. A fol.151r, B fol. 19ra.

208) et ex eo.....inducitur om. B.

209) est om. A.

tione utantur et diffinitione et exemplo docuit. Nunc vero solo exemplo docet quomodo oratores utantur²¹⁰⁾ eadem quoniam in precepto formandi inductionem non est differentia sed quoniam philosophus interrogando, orator vero non.

The distinction between the rhetorical and philosophical induction Thierry owes to Victorinus,²¹¹⁾ who also used it when interpreting the examples of Cicero, but it is Thierry who brings in the distinction between the different aims, (philos. = interrogando rhet. = persuadendo).

The "ratiocinatio" in De Inventione Thierry takes to be a syllogism and he compares it with the inductio:²¹²⁾

Ratiocinatio igitur, inquit, est oratio ELICIENS, i.e. explicans argumentum probabile EX IPSA RE, i.e. ex vero concessio QUOD argumentum EXPOSITUM,²¹³⁾ i.e. explicatum²¹⁴⁾ ET PER SE COGNITUM,²¹⁵⁾ i.e. non ex aliqua similitudine factum sicut argumentum inductionis CONFIRMAT SE SUA VI etc.²¹⁶⁾ i.e. habet in se necessitatem rationalem,²¹⁷⁾ i.e. evidentem. Ubi dixit²¹⁸⁾ expositum²¹⁹⁾ removit exemplum et entimema que non exponunt, i.e. integre ostendunt²²⁰⁾ argumentum. Ubi vero dixit per se cognitum et cetera sequentia removit inductionem.

In the following passage Thierry goes on to interpret the number of parts in the syllogism, showing the various reasons for assigning to it 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 part. When dealing with Cicero's own opinion on this matter Thierry strongly denies that one could hold such a position. The rather strong terms in which Thierry deals with Cicero here are due to some misunderstanding, partly by Thierry. For while rightly rejecting the idea that Aristotle and Theophrastus

210) a diffinitione.....utantur om. A.

211) Victorinus, ed.Halm p.240,13 ff.

212) ad De Inv.I,34,57. Ratiocinatio etc. A fol.151v and B fol.19rb.

213) exponitur A.

214) explicant A.

215) agnitum A.

216) etc. om. A.

217) rationabilem A.

218) dicit A.

219) exponitur A.

220) ostendere A.

should have sponsored the five part syllogism, of which Cicero is champion, he fails to notice how accepted the five part syllogism was by the rhetors in the first century b.c. and the next centuries. The auctor *Ad Herennium* treats of this kind of argumentation too²²¹⁾ and Quintilian when dealing with *Epicheirema* gives some useful hints for interpretation of this very passage in *De Inventione*.²²²⁾ Thus Thierry did not see that Cicero was confounding Aristotle with normal, rhetorical theory of his time:²²³⁾

Quod est dicere? cum illi et isti²²⁴⁾ in agendo causas facerent eodem²²⁵⁾ modo sillogismum, hoc est cum utrique propositionem et eius probationem et assumptionem et²²⁶⁾ eius probationem et conclusionem facerent; et tamen quidam eorum probationes dicebant esse alias partes sillogismi a propositione et assumptione. Et isti constituebant esse quinquepertitos, quadriperitos, triperitos sillogismos.

Alii uero²²⁷⁾ dicebant non²²⁸⁾ probationem propositionis²²⁹⁾ esse partem sillogismi et propositionem esse partem eiusdem sillogismi eandem, que est²³⁰⁾ sua probatio, nec ullo modo esse probationem²³¹⁾ sillogismi, nisi probationem habeant. Idem de assumptione et eius probatione dicendum est. Isti igitur tantum triperitos sillogismos esse dicebant. Ac sic cum²³²⁾ eodem²³³⁾ modo sillogismum facerent, tamen in docendo numerum partium eius dissenserunt....

NOBIS AUTEM etc.²³⁴⁾ Priori parti consentit Tullius, inducens

221) *Ad Heren.* II, 18, 28.

222) *Inst. Orat.* V, 10, 6.

223) *ad De Inv.* I, 34, 57. Hoc de genere etc. A fol. 151v and B fol. 19rb.

224) isti et illi B.

225) eodem B.

226) et om. A.

227) vero om. B.

228) non om. A.

229) probationis A.

230) et A.

231) probationem A.

232) cum om. B.

233) eodem A.

234) *ad De Inv.* I, 35, 61. A fol. 152r and B fol. 19rb.

testes et argumenta. QUARE AUTEM etc. Post testes ponit argumenta, non²³⁵⁾ que suam sententiam probent sed que sententiam aliorum falsificent, quasi Tullio constaret quod illa falsificata staret illa²³⁶⁾ cui fauebat. Michi autem uidetur quod utraque sententia falsa sit: nam neque probatio pars est sillogismi nec semper²³⁷⁾ propositio sillogismi probatione indiget.

SI QUADAM etc. Falsificat Tullius sententiam eorum qui dicebant enuntiationem semper exigere probationem, ut sit propositio sillogismi nec posse²³⁸⁾ probationem ab ea separari. Et primo utitur quinquepertito sillogismo, deinde quadripertito, ad ultimum tripertito. QUOD SI ITA EST etc. Putabat Tullius quod apud omnes constaret probationem partem esse²³⁹⁾ sillogismi, quod si posset probare eam non posse contineri in propositione uel assumptione, putabat quod inde staret sua sententia.

The commentary by Thierry of Chartres on the *De Inventione* owes much to its principal sources, Boethius and Victorinus, while other important sources, Grillius and M. Cappella play a lesser role. The importance of the *Ad Herennium* is certainly discernible, especially in the discussion of Status. Still Boethius and Victorinus, with their interest for dialectic, determine in many ways the scope of the treatise, giving much impulse for the discussions of the difference between logic and rhetoric, which take up a good part of the treatise and often show Thierry at his best. It is also worth noting that Thierry tries hard to prove that Rhetoric is an autonomous art, not a part of logic. He does not admit that they at times have a common Materia, i.e. thesis, nor does he, like Abailard did,²⁴⁰⁾ allow the difficult rhetorical topics "ex adiunctis negotio" to be, plainly, dialectical topics, however difficult it is to pro-

235) ne A.

236) illa om. B.

237) sillogismi nec semper propositio] sillogismi cum propositio sillogismi sit ne posse propositionem sillogismi ab ea separari. Et primo utitur quinquepertito sillogismo, deinde quadripertito, ad ultimum tripertito neque posse semper A.

238) nec posse.....tripertito om. A.

239) partem esse] esse partem A.

240) *Logica Ingredientibus*, Super Topica Glossae, ed.M. Dal Pra, Firenze 1969², p.262,22.

ve their place among the *circumstantiae*. In these efforts to make rhetoric distinct from the other Arts he mostly succeeded and to what degree he went to make his commentaries on the *De Inventione* and the *Ad Herennium* into a Handbook on rhetoric can be read out of the *Accessus* alone, building up a framework of ten set requirements to the understanding of an art. In such formal and doctrinal innovations, where he was followed by Guillaume of Conches, dealing with grammar, he was to get an important position in the renaissance of the Twelfth century.

Appendix.

The logica of Thierry of Chartres.

I have found it useful to collect what is known of Thierry of Chartres' logical teaching in order to provide a handy list of sources for scholars with a greater knowledge of Twelfth century Logic, than I possess. Two important points should be made:

We have no absolutely sure indications that Thierry's Logica or Dialectica is a single work.

We do not know if what is to be sought for, exists as a textbook or maybe only is preserved as lecture notes.

A great part of the interest around Thierry's Logica stems from the Heptateuchon, a collection of (mainly classical) textbooks for the 7 Artes, which holds the earliest manuscripts we have to the new, full Organon. The text has been studied by L. Minio-Paluello in Rivista di Filosofia Neoscholastica 46, 1954, p.211-226, and the manuscripts, MS Chartres 497-498, are used in the editions of Aristoteles Latinus, Union Académique internationale, 1939 - .

There are reasons to believe that Thierry wrote on Sophisms:

I. Alexander Nequam, Corrog. Prom. ed. Meyer, p.667; Notic. e extr. d. Manuscripts d. Bibl. Nat. XXXV,2, Paris 1897:

"In geometria dicuntur lunule quedam portiuncule circuli, et in hac significatione utitur Aristotiles vocabulo in libro Elenchorum, ubi de quadratura circuli loquitur (Soph. Elench. 171 B 15, 172 A 3) ubi Terrius deceptus legit "plunulas" antequam iste venisset in manus Magistri Ade Parve Pontis".

This reference is not to the Heptateuchon, which (MS Chartres 498, fol. 5va and fol. 5vb) has the correct reading "per lunulas" (cf. P.L. 64, 1020).

II. The revised edition of Adam Parvipontanus' Ars Disserendi, has in the margin (ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Twelfth century Logic I, p. 36, 16 (36, 12) and 104, 6) the sigla $\frac{I}{O}$ (Theodoricus) for some passages disclosing other views on the subject than Adam's, cf. Introduction, p. XIX, XXIII.

III. Thierry's Lectures on Boethius' De Trinitate, ed. N.M. Haring, A.H.D.L.M.A. 25, 1958, p.198, have a reference to a Logica, dealing with some sophisms:

"More docentis loquitur quod verbis aliis utitur in doctrinis, aliis in disputationibus. Et est haec locutio talis qualis et haec: "Homo est animal quod est genus, Socrates est homo qui est species". Et relativum valet "et" ut: "mulier quae salvavit damnavit" i.e. mulier salvavit et damnavit. Et in praedictis locutionibus eodem modo. "Socrates est homo qui est species" Socrates est homo et est species: "qui" pro "et". Et sunt concedendae omnes istae locutiones: "Socrates est homo et eadem res est species, homo est animal et eadem res est genus". Sed non est concedendum: "Socrates est haec res homo quae est species; Homo est haec res animal quod est genus". Sed in Logica de hoc satis diximus".

IV. Thierry's Epitaphium, ed. A. Vernet, Recueil offert au M. Cl. Brunel, II, p.660-670, Paris 1955, writes thus on his logic, v. 25-28:

"Dissolvens Logice nodos penetravit ad illa
Que non adtigerant tempora nostra prius:
Primus Analeticos, primusque resolvit Helencos,
E Gallis grecas accumulavit opes".

Other references to a logical work of less definite nature are in: V. Commentarius in Rhetoricam Ciceronis, 2. prologue, the dialogue between Fama and Invidia, ed. P. Thomas, Mélanges Graux, Thorin 1884, cf. my excerpt, printed above, page 2-3.

A logical work with a formal Accessus?

VI. The Lectures on Boethius' De Trinitate, ed. N.M. Haring, p.130: "Finis logicae est veri et falsi discretio".

For a logical work with an Accessus of Thierry's type, see above p. 10, note 53. This work, however, is not by Thierry, not showing such a "Finis", nor having the sophisms printed above.

VII. Thierry scorned the Topica of Drogo, cf. John of Salisbury, Metalogicon IV,24, ed. C.C.J. Webb, Oxford 1929, p.191,7.

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