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THE COMMENTARY OF THIERRY OF CHARTRES ON CICERO'S DE INVENTIONE.

Karin Margareta Fredborg

The commentary of Cicero's De Inventione by Thierry of Chartres 1) has in the last few years engaged renewed interest. It has been the object of a comparison with Dominicus Gundissalinus' section on rhetoric in the De Divisione Philosophiae, carried out by N.M. Haring 2) and it has been studied in combination with other rhetorical treatises from the Eleventh and Twelfth centuries by M. Dickey 3). While Thierry's commentary appears to be a careful, scholarly work compared with the contemporary rhetorical treatises, 4) these very qualities have been subjected to doubt as seen in the study of N.M. Haring. 5) It is therefore an interesting task to look into these incompatible views and try, again, to give an estimate of the work, by bringing forth some significant points of rhetorical theory and outline the main scope of Thierry's commentary. But before this, it will be convenient to attempt a dating of the work and consider Gundissalinus' and Thierry's claims to originality once again.

1) The commentary, of which I am preparing an edition, is found in:
(A) Brit.Mus.Arumd.348 fol.102r-179v, s.XII.
(B) Bruxelles, Bibl.Roy.10057-62, fol.1-31v, s.XIII.
(Ph) Berlin lat.oct.161, (Phillips 9672), fol.1v-36v, s.XII.
   Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, Berlin.
(H) Heidelberg, U.L.Salem VII,103,fol.142r-173v, s.XII.
(L) Leyden, U.L.,B.P.L.189 fol.42r-47r, s.XIII.
(M) München, lat.3565 fol.174-219, s.XV.
(h) Brit.Mus.Harley,5060, s.XV.

The only extant edition is from the fragmentary Leyden MS, by W.H.D. Suringar, in Historia Critica Scholiastorum Latinorum, Leyden 1834, p.213-253.

I wish to thank Prof. N.M. Haring for the kindness of lending me the microfilms of the MSS Ph., H.an d L, and J.O. Ward for directing my attention to the Brit.Mus.Harley 5060.


4) M. Dickey, o.c. in note 3,p.23,30-32.

5) o.c. note 2,p.278.
The dating.

While some of Thierry of Chartres' theological treatises, the commentaries on Boethius' De Trinitate, have been dated on doctrinal grounds, no such attempts have been made on the commentary on the De Inventione, no doubt due to our still very slender knowledge of Twelfth century rhetoric. The commentary itself does, however, offer some suggestions in the more personal sections, the prologues to the two parts of the commentary. Especially the second prologue is helpful. It is formed as a fictitious dialogue between "Fama" and "Invidia, falso vultu Dialectice", where Invidia or Dialectica complains of Thierry, because her school was suffering a decline, when Thierry got too great a share of Fame. Then the two ladies take action:

Talibus Invidie verbis Fama permota alas concutit, sonos multiplicat, urbes et nationes, duce Invidia, peragrat, rumoribus implet. Theodoricum ubique accusat, ignominios nominibus appellat. Cum vero rudibus et indiscretis loquitur Boetum crasso tunc vocat in aere natum, quando vero religiosius tunc necromanticum vel hereticum vocat. At inter consocios veritatis.

6) Only Anselm of Besate's Rhetorimachia has been edited by K. Magnüss, M.G. Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte der Mittelalters II, 2, 1958. A few excerpts of mediaeval, rhetorical doctrine can be found in the article of M. Dickey, o.c. in note 3, and more in M. Wisén, De scholiis Rhetorices Ad Herennium codice Holmiensi traditis, Uppsala 1905. Adelard of Bath has a chapter on rhetoric in De Eodem et Diverso, ed. H. Willner, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters IV,1, p.19, Münster 1903. The contributions of J.O. Ward on the commentaries on the De Inventione, to appear in a forthcoming volume of O. Kristeller, Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum, will be welcomed as a very substantial help for future research.

7) The prologues have been edited by P. Thomas in Un commentaire du Moyen-Âge sur la Rhétorique de Cicéron, Mélanges Graux, Thorin 1884, pp.41-45. His text is founded on MS B only, my excerpts on MSS A B H M. Only the more important variants are indicated in the notes.


9) loquor M.


11) consocios consicios B.M.
tacet et si 12) de eo mentio fiat 13) aliam historiam inceptat. In scolis vero et scolarium conventibus merces 14) commutat ut ignominiam 15) eius lucetur. Platonem ei concessit ut rhetoricam auferat. Rhetoricam vero vel grammaticam quasi per hypothesim donat ut dialecticam surripiat. Quidlibet 16) vero potius quam dialecticum....

Ad ultimum cum cetera deficiunt obicit eum legere provectis, ut novos detinat vel potius corrumpat, ut ulterior non possint apud eum proficere. Hactenus Invidie respondi.

We know too little about Thierry's life 17) to be able to conjecture the precise nature and date of this acid criticism, but the mention of his logical teaching provides a clue. For his logical teaching is mentioned again in another work of his, the Lectiones on Boethius' De Trinitate; there Thierry when dealing with some sophisms refers to his Logica: 18)

More docentis loquitur quod verbis aliis utitur in doctrinis, aliis in disputationibus. Et est haec locutio talis qualis et haec "Homo est animal quod est genus, Socrates est homo qui est species". Et relativum valet "et" ut: "Mulier quae salvavit damnavit", i.e. mulier salvavit et damnavit. Et in praedictis locutionibus eodem modo, "Socrates est homo qui est species". Socrates est homo et est species. "qui" pro "et". Et sunt concedendae omnes istae locutiones: "Socrates est homo et eadem res est species, homo est animal et eadem res est genus". Sed non est concedendum "Socrates est haec res homo quae est species; homo est haec res animal quod est genus". Sed in Logica de hoc satis diximus.

12) et si] quia per M.
13) fiat] non fiat H. fuit M.
14) merces] mentes B., Haring, o.c.in note 2, p.278.
15) ignominiam] ignorantiam B.
16) quidlibet] quibuslibet A. quibuslibet B.
He also quotes the De Inventione commentary and the logical treatise: 19)

QUIDAM FINIS inquit (Boethius). Finis cuiuslibet artis, sicut alibi dicitur est id ad quod tendit artifex per officium. Sicut finis rhetoricae est persuadere dictione sicut in Rhetorica dicitur. Finis Logicae est veri et falsi discretio. Et eodem modo unaqueaque ars proprium finem habet.

Thus the De Inventione commentary must, because of the quotation: "Finis rhetoricae", be earlier than the Lectiones, the date of which, sometime around 1148 because of its doctrine, 20) then is the Terminus Ante Quem for the De Inventione commentary.

A convenient Terminus Post Quem would be the logical treatise. This is mentioned as an object of vehement opposition in the De Inventione commentary and, if it is the same work, appears to be a treatise dealing with sophisms and maybe with a formal Accessus, as the "Finis logicae est..." does suggest in the Lectiones.

This Logica or Dialectica, however, has not been found and thus provides a very shadowy Terminus Post Quem. I have tried in the appendix to collect the few identification marks, we have, to Thierry's logical teaching in order to suggest some useful approaches for the search of it, but until it has been found or we know more about Thierry's life and logical teaching, we have very little of a Terminus Post Quem for the De Inventione commentary. For, what is left, are the references, found in the dialogue between Fama and Invidia, to Thierry's platonic, rhetorical and grammatical teaching which cannot be dated. The platonic teaching might refer

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19) ibidem p.130 cf. the De Inv. Commentary, ed. Suringar, p.221: Finis igitur artis rhetoricae est id, ad quod tendit orator secundum suum officium. Id autem est persuadere dictione.


There is no longer a need to suppose that Thierry not openly criticized Gilbert of Poitiers in the Lectiones (o.c. in note 18), p.137: "Trinitas est unitas et unitas est trinitas. Nec est credendum ei (i.e. Gilbert) qui hoc denegat, quia temerarius et imperitus huius rei est". For Thierry was among the very persons who met in St. Bernards house in 1148 in order to form the four sentences which Gilbert had to swear at the council at Reims, cf.N.M. Haring The writings against Gilbert of Poitiers by Geoffrey of Auxerre, Analecta Cistercienstia XXII,1,p.35, Rome 1966.
to the M. Cappella Gloses, 21) but only single pieces of these are preserved in later treatises.

Various suggestions have been offered by other scholars to the date of the De Inventione commentary. N.M. Haring 22) held that it was a very late work, later than the commentaries on the De Trinitate. This, as I have shown, cannot be right as the De Inventione commentary is quoted in the Lectiones and must be earlier than this. On the other hand R.W. Hunt 23) dates it very early, "in all probability his earliest work". This might be true but it is not necessary, as the Dialogue between Fama and Invidia pictures Thierry as a renowned master in several disciplines and a very controversial one in logic, under threats of closing of his school. This might refer to his leaving Paris for Chartres in the late 1130es when he taught John of Salisbury rhetoric. 24) Or it could be a hidden reference to Thierry's dispute with Gilbert of Poitiers, around 1148, which might have covered more than the theological dissents which are voiced in the Lectiones 25). I shall therefore only stress that the De Inventione commentary is earlier than the Lectiones and maybe the other commentary on the De Trinitate, Aggregditur propositum, 26) and I should with much caution ascribe it to the late 1130es or the 1140es.

21) Traces of these glosses have been found by E. Jeaneau, cf. o.c. in note 17, p. 830-833 and 834-837.
22) o.c. in note 2, p. 275, 277-278. The dating of N.M. Haring has been suggested to him by the rather unpleasant picture Thierry lets Invidia draw of him.
26) cf. o.c. in note 20, p. 74-75.
Thierry of Chartres and Dom. Gundissalinus.

The question of originality of the Accessus to Thierry's commentary on De Invenzione was raised in 1942 by R. McKeon, who noted that the whole section on rhetoric in Gundissalinus' De Divisione Philosophiae is more or less identical with Thierry's Accessus. He preferred, however, not to make any decisions on the priority as he only had Suringar's edition of Thierry's commentary (printed from the somewhat fragmentary Leyden manuscript), not the rest of the manuscripts. Then R.W. Hunt dealt with the matter in his important study of the Accessus to the Artes and concluded that Thierry's Accessus was the original from which Gundissalinus copied his section. Lately N.M. Haring after a careful examination has come to the opposite conclusion.

The similarity between the two is so close - as can be seen in the article by N.M. Haring, who prints, in full, the corresponding paragraphs - that the decision of priority can only be reached by studying the differences. While the Accessus by Thierry has this scheme: Gundissalinus follows this:

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(Circa liberum:)

(Circa divisionem philosophiae:)

Intentio auctoris
Utilitas libri

Quo ordine legenda sit

27) cf. Speculum 17,1942,p.17,n.2. W.H.D. Suringar's edition, in Historia Critica Scholiastorum Latinorum, Leyden 1834,p.213-253, covers only the first prologue, the Accessus and the commentary to De Inv.1,1,1.-1,5,7. Unfortunately the Leyden MS has many lacunas, so the text of the Accessus should be read from N.M. Haring's edition thereof in M.S.26,p.281-86.


30) o.c. in note 2,p.281-86.
The section Ars intrinsecus/extrinsecus is in De Divisione Philosophiae to be found in the section of grammar, not in that of rhetoric. 31)

The differences of minor importance, such as the heads Circa librum, which are only found in Thierry's Accessus, and Gundissalinus' "Quo ordine legenda sit" are easily explained by the different aims of the two works. Thierry is writing a commentary, Gundissalinus goes systematically through all the sciences, exposing the order in which they should be taught. 32)

Other differences are more important. In the section on Materiar artis 33) Gundissalinus writes: "Set quid sit circumstantia in Tullio melius dicetur", where Thierry has: "Sed quid sit circumstantia in sequentibus melius dicetur". This passage R. McKeon 34) took as an indication pointing to Thierry as the original source, while N.M. Haring 35) did not think this section alone could decide the question of priority. I believe that R. McKeon was right. The future "dicetur"makes nonsense in Gundissalinus' treatise as he is not going to teach on Cicero, and what is far more important, it is not Cicero, but Thierry of Chartres who develops the theory of Circumstantiae. The term "Circumstantia" is not found in the De Inventione and Cicero's division of topics does not easily conform with the (Hermagorean 36) scheme of Circumstantiae, as was already felt by Boethius in the Fourth book of De Differentiis Topicis. 37) But a great part of Thierry's treatise is absorbed with the teaching of Circumstantiae. Therefore Gundissalinus' "in Tullio dicetur" appears rather to be an incautious slip, when he copied Thierry's passage.

32) P. Helias, however, treats of "ordo legendi", cf. MS München CLM 3515, fol. 1v.
34) o.c. in note 27.
35) o.c. in note 2, p. 279.
Another important objection has been raised\(^{38}\) to the different order of *Quid sit ipsa ars* and *Genus artis*. Here Thierry is guilty of a logical error, putting *Genus* first, before defining the *Ars*. Here it must be born in mind that Thierry very openly transferred his commenting on *Genus*, *officium*, *finis* etc. (De Inv.I,V,7) from the forthrunning commentary into the Accessus:

"Forsitan dicet aliquis quod hic potius ea duci debuisserint, que ante proemium dicta sunt. Sed iccirco nos premimus quia eorum cognitio ad proemium valde est necessaria".\(^{39}\)

When transforming the commentary on *Genus* etc. into a mediaeval Accessus Thierry starts, as his sources, Cicero and Boethius\(^{40}\), with genus and, illogically, then has Quid. This is only understandable and excusable if Thierry is the source of Gundissalinus, while it would be strange if he committed the error, copying the whole thing from the (more original and logical) Gundissalinus.\(^{41}\)

It should also be noted that Thierry in his commentary on the Ad Herennium, which follows the De Inventione commentary in the Berlin manuscript, starts his Accessus in this way:\(^{42}\)

\begin{quote}
Circa artem rethoricam hic sunt inquirenda, quid ipsa rethorica sit;\(^{43}\) que eius materia, quod genus, quod officium;\(^{44}\) quis finis, que partes, que species, quod instrumentum, quis artifex quare etiam rethorica vocetur; circa librum duo, que auctoris intentio, que libri utilitas. In superiori commentario que super Primam Rethoricae conscripsimus;\(^{45}\) quid sit ipsa rethorica, que
\end{quote}

\(^{38}\) by N.M. Haring o.c. in note 2, p.275.


\(^{40}\) P.L.64,1207,A.B.

\(^{41}\) cf.N.M. Haring o.c. in note 2, p.279.

\(^{42}\) fol.36vb. The commentary, which has not previously been identified, covers the rest of the Berlin MS, fol.36vb-75vb. The very end, i.e. the commentary to the epilogue is missing. The explicit (ad Her.IV,55,68) is:"Defringit signum dando scilicet so- cict. Deos incipit precari more sermocinatorem qui sic incipi- unt predicacionem suam: <Gratia> sancti spiritus adsit nobisque". The incipit of the commentary proper starts thus: "ETSI IN NEGOTIIS. Ingressum facit ad artem in quo captat Gaii Herennii beni- volentiam". I propose to edit this commentary with the De Inventione commentary.

\(^{43}\) Rethorica sit rethorica MS.

\(^{44}\) officium MS.

\(^{45}\) conscripsimus MS.
eius materia, que etiam cetera que inquirenda prediximus etsi non sufficienter, pro viribus tamen diligenter expedivimus, semel autem dicta repetere non est consilium, namque dicta semel fortassis non placuerunt, repetita non laudem scriptori sed potius odium ac vituperationem ab auditore merentur. De intentione tamen auctorisi et de libri utilitate, que diverse ab intentione auctoris in primo libro et a primi libri utilitate (sunt), pro capacitati ingenii et facundie facultate dicemus. Est igitur in hoc libro auctoris intentio plenarie de tota rethorica disputare... etc.

Here the logical Quid is before Genus - maybe because he no longer was pressed by his sources, Cicero and Boethius, to start with Genus. The Accessus then in the two commentaries show that the careful division into the heads Circa artem and Circa librum, which is one of the major merits of this new Accessus scheme, was planned because Thierry wanted to write a corpus of rhetorical commentaries, not only on the De Inventione. That this idea of an Accessus was his own is made clear by the "Que inquirenda prediximus, etsi non sufficienter..." and by the fact that he in the first commentary kept the order of Genus, then Quid, because his sources started with Genus.

Two more questions raised against Thierry's priority should be dealt with before the problem of originality is definitely settled. The rearrangement of the Ars intrinsecus and extrinsecus, with the other more general headings, i.e. officium cuiuslibet artis, finis cuiuslibet artis etc., which in De Divisione Philosophiae are to be found, not in the rhetoric section but under grammar, and the question of the ultimate sources of the Accessus.

The section on Ars intrinsecus and extrinsecus in De Divisione Philosophiae ought, if Gundissalinus had been faithful while copying out Thierry's commentary on De Inventione, to have been put under rhetoric, or, if he had thought it through carefully, to be un-

46) sufficienter MS.
47) For further corroboration of Thierry's authorship compare M. Wissen, o.c. in note 6, p.56: (Ad Her.IV,22,30,Quid veniam...)"Magister Theodorus dicit quod color est in hoc quod verba sunt subiuncti va. Magister Petr.Hel.dicit esse in hoc quod eadem littera repetitur, sc.q." with this commentary fol.7ora, ad loc.: huiusmodi sc. per eundem verbi modum diversa verba proferuntur hoc modo: Quid veniam etc. Potest etiam hic quedam diccionum similitudo notari qua convenientior ab uno ad alium sit verborum transitio, ut quis, quid, quare... (Petr. Hel. had studied under Thierry).
48) cf. N.M. Haring o.c. in note 2, p.279 f.
der the first science which he deals with, as it has a very broad application. This distinction, which goes back to Victorinus,\(^{49}\) is however only found under grammar as are the other analogous general headings, maybe because he did not want to repeat himself or thought it unimportant. These general headings are also found in Summa super Priscianum by P. Helias, who was a pupil of Thierry's\(^{50}\) but the Summa\(^{51}\) does not deal with extrinsecus and intrinsecus Ars. The headings, "Finis cuiuslibet artis etc.", except the distinction "Ars extrinsecus" and "intrinsecus", could have come to Gundissalinus from P. Helias; still it could come from Thierry too, for, as it has been shown, Thierry does not confine himself to speak of these matters in the rhetorical commentaries only. Also the Lectiones deal with "Finis cuiuslibet artis". I should therefore suggest that the identical general headings in the Accessus found in P. Helias and Gundissalinus goes back to Thierry's teaching generally, not to the rhetorical commentaries alone. It could thus be lecture notes from Thierry's lectures on grammar which are the ultimate sources of Gundissalinus' transplacement of the general headings to the section of grammar. This accounts for including the Ars intrinsecus section by Thierry into the grammatical context, which otherwise leans strongly on P. Helias.

If this is the reason for the transplacement, it also accounts for the universal use of Thierry's Accessus scheme for all the sciences in the De Divisione Philosophiae.\(^{52}\) No doubt the Accessus scheme was first used in the rhetorical commentaries\(^{53}\) by Thierry of Chartres, but we have seen that Thierry soon applied it elsewhere, and, what is relevant, his pupil P. Helias used it elsewhere, in grammar. Gundissalinus might well have been a pupil of Thierry's,

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52) which was used as the strongest objection from R. McKeon to the originality of Thierry's Accessus, loc.c. in note 27.
53) because the Accessus scheme goes back to rhetorical treatises, Boethius De Diff.Top.IV P.L.64,p.1207 A-B, and Victorinus' Commentary on De Inventione I,V,7,ed.Halm p.170 ff. An interesting echo of this is found in Summa Sophist.Elench. ed.R. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum I,p.265, 1962 which states the rhetoricians as the inventors of this Accessus scheme.
he was much younger and appears elsewhere too to have been in contact with the schools of Northern France.  

The last objection I would have to Thierry copying his whole Accessus out of the Grammar and rhetoric sections in De Divisione Philosophiae, is that the sources for The Accessus, Cicero, Victorinus and Boethius, are the very books which have been at the elbow of Thierry when writing the rest of the commentary.  

This does not apply to Gundissalinus. Why should Thierry go the crooked way of stealing from Gundissalinus, what was on his desk already? And how and why make the transitions and references between the Accessus and the commentary so carefully and lie so blatantly about his theft from the much younger Gundissalinus, when he had the sources to the Accessus in front of him?  

For these reasons it is very unlikely that Gundissalinus is the source of the famous Accessus to Thierry of Chartres' commentary to De Inventione and Ad Herennium, he was rather his pupil.

The disposition of the commentary on the De Inventione.

In his disposition of the commentary Thierry breaks the plan of Cicero's treatise. He takes out the preliminary discussion of Rhetoric as an Ars and works it out as an Accessus. Then he divides his commentary into two parts, not following Cicero's division into two books, but letting the first part of the commentary deal with De Inventione I, I, 1 - I, 14, 19, the second part deal with all the rest of the De Inventione.

In doing so Thierry does away with the rather repetitious structure of the second book of De Inventione and he gets the advantage of dealing with the theoretical foundation for rhetoric, before teaching rhetoric proper. His reason for lifting out the material

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54) cf. N. M. Haring o. c. in note 2, p. 279-80.  
55) Boethius as source for most of the Accessus, cf. P. L. 64, 1207 A-B, 1208 A, 1208 D, 1210-1211 D. For intentio et utilitas, p. 161 B.  
56) In MS Brit. Mus. Arund. 348: 1. prologue fol. 102r, Accessus fol. 102r-104r, 1. part of the commentary fol. 104r-128r. 2. prologue (dialogue between Fama and Invidia) fol. 128r-129r. 2. part of the commentary: fol. 129r-179v, (the very end is missing). This MS and MS Bruxelles Bibl. Roy. 10057-62 form the basis of my following excerpts (A= Arundel, B= Bruxelles).
for the Accessus and putting it in the beginning, before Cicero's proemium, is printed above,57) and his reason for the rest of the redispersion is found to be very much in line with the Accessus:

In superiori commentario dicta sunt ea que ad prohemium libri et genus artis et officium et finem et materiam pertinebant. Nunc autem de his dicemus que ad instrumentum artis rethorice pertinent, i.e. de partibus orationis, quorum prima est exordium a quo sumatur tractandi exordium.58) The lemma Thierry usually treats in two parts, first giving the main definitions of terms and his own discussion of theory, then dealing in greater detail with Cicero's text. The first part of the treatment he calls "sensus",59) to which he sometimes adds a point of controversy in the end, "sed queritur...". The second part he calls "littera". This kind of commentary is what Guillaume of Conches60) called "glossae", distinguishing it from the "commentum" which only deals with "sententia". In Guillaume's definition of "glossae" he established three parts, "sententia", "sensus" and "littera", but the distinction between "sensus" and "sententia" is not to be found in Thierry's commentary.

The first part of the treatment of the lemma, "sensus", is of the greatest concern to Thierry. Here he discusses the varying doctrines of the ancient rhetors on controversial points, defines his terms, often in rather complex and closely knit structures, and here he links together the different parts of doctrine. The second part, "littera", deals with Cicero's structure of thought, i.e. the proper "sensus" in Guillaume of Conches' terminology, and with interpretation of single words. In this he shows himself rather dependent of Victorinus and Grillius, copying out definitions of words with similar meanings, like "principium" and "initium",61) using their

57) page 8, cf. note 39.
58) A fol.129r, B fol.10 rb, ad De Inv.I,15,2o.
quotations from classical literature, 62) and following their indication of Cicero's way of argumentation. 63) The greater importance assigned to the "sensus" shows a development of the commentary away from the old Carolingian kind, dealing mostly with "littera", and approaching the "summa" dealing only with "sententia".

This development as well as the very full Accessus is not only an interesting formal development, but, as it can be seen in the Accessus of Thierry's commentary on the De Inventione, it had clear consequences on the shaping of doctrine, forming an inventory of necessary questions to ask of any Ars and determining the scope of treatment of the textbooks, here the De Inventione and the Ad Herennium.

The doctrine of argumentation.

A good deal of Thierry of Chartres' theory of argumentation is developed around the differences between logic and rhetoric. In his discussion of "genus artis rethorice" he points out that rhetoric is a part of civil science, not of logic: 64)

Maio vero pars civilis scientie dicitur rethorica quoniam magis operatur in civilibus causis quam sapientia, etsi sine sapientia eloquencia nihil prodsit. .... Non est autem dicendum rethoricam aut logicam esse aut eius partem idcirco quod logica circa thesim solam, i.e. circa generaliter proposita tantummodo versatur. Rethorica vero circa ypothesim solam, i.e. circa particuliter proposita tantummodo versatur.

This objection to Isidorus' division of logica (Nunc partes logices exsequamur. Constat autem ex dialectica et rhetorica 66) is founded on the theories of Boethius, who in the De differentiis Topicis IV takes pains to distinguish rhetoric from logic. Thierry leans

65) quod A B.
66) De diff.rer.P.L.83,94 C.
heavily on Boethius for his doctrine on "materia artis" and his discussions of "hypothesis" and the topics are very full of quotations from Boethius, even if Thierry sometimes rejects parts of his doctrine.

Hypothesis.

Cicero's definition of "causa" as "res quae habet in se controversiam in dicendo positam cum personarum certarum interpositione" becomes more complicated in Thierry's commentary:

"Causa igitur, ut supra diximus, est res quae habet in se controversiam in dicendo positam de certo dicto vel facto alicuius certe persone... Ipsam vero controversiam appello litem eorum ex intentione et depulsione constantem cum rationibus et confirmationibus utriusque partis. Quo lis in iudicialibus placitum dicitur, in deliberativis vero consultatio, in demonstrativis vero contio vocatur. Hec igitur triplex controversia materia est artis rethoricis sive oratoris quoniam orator secundum artem rethoricam tractat ipsam controversiam. Tractare vero controversiam est rationabiliter intendere sive depellere".

The complexity of this definition springs from a concern to gather all the important elements of a "causa". It has to be one of the three "genera", deliberative, demonstrative or judicial and it should have a certain status (ex intentione et depulsione) as a controversy without either an accusation or a defense, lacks status and is a Thema asystatton. The interrelationship of these elements in a speech Thierry finds in Cicero's definition:

67) alicius A.
68) cointanatem A.
69) qualis A.
70) conscio B.
71) ad De Inv. I, 8, 10, Omnis res..., A fol. 115r, B fol. 6ra.
72) cf. A fol. 164v and B fol. 24rb: "Nam quedam themata assistata sunt, i.e. sine statu et sine constitutione quando altera pars deficit sive intendentis sive depellentis".
73) A fol. 117r, B fol. 6vb.
"Uno autem compendio et causam et genera causarum et constitutas in hac littera distinxit; dicendo autem QUE HABET IN SE CONTROVERSIAM removit causas assistatas".

Likewise the defense and accusation must be proved or rejected on the ground of the orators' "rationes et confirmationes". For if not, there can be no "iudicatio", no decision from the audience as to the probability of the defense and accusation. 74) Thierry agrees with Cicero 75) that the status conecturalis lacks iudicatio, but all the other status must give scope for the iudicatio. Thus controversia, status and iudicatio are closely knit together. 76)

Iudicatio vero est auditis et ratione et rationis informatione de eisdem iudicum inquisitio. 77)

It springs from the status, set forth in the 5th and 6th parts of speech:

Tamen ex intentione et depulsione est constitutio quoniam res inde aliqua est dubia quod unus intendit et alius depellit. Ex constitutione vero est auditorum dubitatio 78) .... Ad hanc vero dubitationem ab oratoribus et rationes et rationum informatione adducuntur, ex quibus nascitur iudicatio ad quam adducuntur confirmatio et reprehensio post quas nichil restat nisi peroratio ...

Prohemium vero et narratio ac partitio eandem precedent quoniam sunt quaedam preparatio ad constituendam causam. 79)

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74) cf. the discussion of thema asistatton: A fol.115v: "Dicimus quod non est causa in qua et ratio rationisque infirmatio aliquid probabilis non habent. Immo vero illud dicitur causa asistatton, i.e. sine statu".

75) De Inv.I,13,19.

76) Iudicatio should be carefully distinguished from Judicium which by Cicero in Top.2,6 is set forth as the counterpart to Inven- tio, cf. Thierry ad De Inv.I,7,9. A fol.114v, B fol.6ra: Cum autem quinque predicta (that is inventio, dispositio etc.) partes sint artis rethorice, de iudicio queritur utrum extra artem (om.B.) rethoricam sit an in aliqua parte rethorice continetur, quod verius est. Nam in inventione principaliter continetur etsi in aliis partibus opus sit iudicio.

77) ad De Inv.,1,8,10, Omnis res etc. A fol.115v. B fol.6rb.

78) ad De Inv.,1,8,10, Omnis res etc. A fol.116v. B fol.6va.

79) ad De Inv.,1,8,10, Omnis res etc. A fol.117r. B fol.6va.
So the definition of "causa" incorporates the discussions of "genera", of the relationship between "iudicatio" and "status" and of "partes" ("confirmatio" and "reprehensio"). It also gives a glimpse of the theory of argumentation (rationabiliter intendere et repellerere), and of "Materia artis rithorice, Hypothesis". For rhetoric must deal with "particulariter proposita", i.e. not with "causa sine certa persona". This has always been a point of controversy in rhetorical doctrine and Thierry discusses it carefully.\(^8\)

Sed diligenter querendum est utrum causa esse possit sine ea circumstantia que dicitur persona. Et Boetius\(^81\) quidem in quarto Topicorum dicit: "Causarum esse alias\(^82\) speciales, alias individuas" et hanc divisionem in omnibus generibus causarum ponit. Grillius\(^83\) vero in Commentario super Rethoricam affirmat demonstrativam causam esse non possit sine certa persona. Si vero certa persone non insit non demonstrativum vocat, sed appellativum quod ipse communem locum esse dicit. Quintilianus quoque in Tertio Institutionum Oratoriarum\(^85\) dicit non sibi videri vocari proprie causam que a propria persona remota sit.

Hoc ergo dicendum est quod Boetius improprie causas appellavit illa specialia. Alii vero auctores proprie vocabulo usi sunt et extra certam personam causas esse negaverunt.

Thierry's criticism of Boethius here is directed against his use of a division into individual and special in all genera, while Thierry only allows this division for the genus demonstrativum, i.e. to be without "certa persona" when he first discusses this "genus".\(^86\)

Only in the above printed passage, when he approaches the problem principally, he demands a "certa persona". In the discussions of Grillius and Quintilian he seems a bit at loss. For Grillius'
solution of defining this special genus as a "locus communis", a
handy way, but not strictly acceptable, only saves the general defi-
nition of "causa cum certa persona" but no more. A locus communis
can hardly develop into a "genus causae" and anyhow Thierry himself
does not allow a "locus communis" such a scope as he only defines it
as an "argumentum commune". 87) The quotation from Quintilian is mang-
led and too short, for, after the passage quoted, Quintilian goes on
to modify his statement, saying that he would not like to decide on
the matter, as Cicero himself in the rhetorical treatises later than
the De Inventione allows a rhetorical "causa" to be without certa
persona. 88) It seems reasonable here to suppose that Thierry did
not know more from Quintilian than what he quoted here and thus on-
ly had an abridged edition of Quintilian or knew him from a flor-
ilegium.

Circumstantiae.

Thierry demands that a rhetorical Causa, Hypothesis, must be con-
ected with the circumstances of the case, the seven Circumstanti-
ae, which are those from which all argumentation departs. This
theory, which goes back to Hermagoras, if Augustinus is right,
became through Cicero's elaboration 90) the topical canon for the
following centuries for most rhetoricians. However, Cicero left
this system in his later rhetorical works and shows in the Par-
titiones Oratoriae a topical system, 91) which he says goes back to
the 2. Academy, 92) and in the De Oratore 93) and Topica 94) he puts

87) A fol.164r and B fol.24ra, ad De Inv.II,16,51: Dicit omnes com-

munes locos sumi vel ex attributis negotio vel ex attributis

personae et ideae, etsi dicatur communes loci non tamen per se
dicuntur loci. Nam communis locus nihil est aliud quam argu-
mentum commune. (Commune argumentum B) cf. Thierry's commentary
on the ad Her.II,19,29,Ph. (Berlin) fol.49ra: Nota communes
locos apellamur sententias generales que non ad unum tantum
sed aut ad omnes aut ad plures pertinent.

89) Augustinus, De Rhetorica 7, ed.Halm,p.141,12 = Hermagoras,
Fragment 7, ed.D. Matthes.
90) De Inv.I,24,34 - I,28,43.
91) Part.Or.2,5-7.
92) ibidem 40,139.
93) De Orat.II,39,162-41,176.
94) Top.2,8-4,25;5,26-13,55.
forth a new list of topics, which he claims to have taken from Aristotle; but the question of sources is far from decided yet. 95)

Later, as Cicero became an authority on Topics, his ambivalent position left its marks on both rhetoric and logic. The dialecticians (Boethius) 96) used the system from Topica, while the rhetoricians either gave the system from both Topica and the Hermagorean doctrine embedded in De Inventione in an elaborate structure (Quintilian) 97) or only the one from Topica (Martianus Cappella) 98) or parts of the system in De Inventione (Fortunatus). 99) Finally Victorinus 100) and Boethius 101) took over the whole system from the De Inventione, when dealing with rhetoric.

Boethius' division into a rhetorical Topica (from the De Inventione) and a dialectical Topica (from Cicero's Topica) decided the matter for the next centuries and the problems which Boethius encountered are the very problems which raise difficulties for Thierry.

The topical system in the De Inventione is according to Boethius and Victorinus embedded in the seven Circumstantiae, (Who, What, When, Where etc.). But Cicero himself does not mention "Circumstantiae" but deals with them rather loosely in two groups, so that Who covers all the topics from Persona, while the rest, What, When, Where etc., must be found in the topics from Negatio: 102)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E persona:</th>
<th>E. negotio:</th>
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<tr>
<td>nomen</td>
<td>consilia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natura</td>
<td>facta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victus</td>
<td>casus</td>
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<tr>
<td>fortuna</td>
<td>orationes</td>
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<td>affectio</td>
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<td>studium</td>
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100) ed. Halm, p. 206, 39 ff and 213, 17 ff. 101) P. L. 64, 1212 A - 1215 A.
102) De Inv. I, 24, 34 - I, 28, 43. This interpretation is given by Boethius, P. L. 64, 1212 C and Victorinus, ed. Halm, p. 220 ff.
It will be clear from this table, 1° that the seven Circumstan-
tiae are not found in the same, simple way in all groups, 2° that
group III and IV under the topics from negotium are very different
from the rest and 3° that this same group III has a clear affinity
to the topical system in Cicero's Topica. 103)

These three sets of difficulties were only halfway solved by Bo-
thius and Thierry takes pains to deal with them, partly with the
help from Victorinus, partly by widening the definition of a locus,
when he deals with group III among the topics of Negotium.

In the general definitions of rhetorical topics Thierry sets out
to distinguish the rhetorical and logical topics: 104)

Dicendum est quid argumentum sit, quid argumentatio, quid locus
argumenti deinde ad id quod volumus ostendere descendemus. Argumentum igitur est ratio rei dubie faciens fi-
dem 105) i.e. rei dubie probatio. Argumentatio vero explicatio
argumenti per orationem, 106) i.e. oratio 107) per quam ordine
competenti fit argumentum. Unde Tullius expolitionem argumenti
eam vocat.

Locus vero argumenti est sedes ipsius argumenti, 108) i.e. res
continens in se argumentum ex 109) qua nascitur et eliciendum
est. Nam sicut non in omni loco pisces nascuntur vel aves, 110)
sed unus locus naturalis sedes est piscibus, alius autem avibus,
alis vero ceteris animalibus et horum locorum periti cito et
facile inveniunt quod querunt; sicut, inquam, hoc est, ita in
ratione disserendi et in rethorica sunt quedam res ex quibus
sunt origines probationum, quasi sedes naturalis argumento-
rum 111) et istarum rerum periti cito et facile probationem 112>
rei propositae inveniunt. Sunt autem in ratione disserendi loci
argumentorum maxime propositione aut earum differentie. 112)
Nam maxime propositiones prima sunt probationum principia, differentias vero maximarum dico esse quod una earum est a definitione alia vero a genere et ita de aliis, que differentie idcirco loci argumentorum dicuntur, quoniam ipsos locos argumentorum continent. Nam plures maxime sunt quarum unaqueque a definitione est et ita de aliis. Hi quidem loci qui generalis sunt, ad questionem generalem, i.e. ad thesin pertinent.

In rethorica vero quoniam hypothesis i.e. particularis questio que est de certa persona tractatur, iccirco particulares loci, i.e. circumstantie septem reputantur sedes esse argumentorum.

Circumstantie vero sunt quedam particularia que personis aut negotiis insunt ex quibus argumenta fiunt in causa ut aliquod genus vel aliqua species vel aliqua diffinitio vel aliqua causa et consimilia quibus aliquid ostenditur aut de persona aut de negotio.

In ratione igitur disserendi sedes argumentorum sunt hec maxima propositio unde abest diffinitio et quod diffinitur et hec alia cui adest species et genus et consimiles quorum una ad omnem diffinitionem pertinent, alia vero ad omnem speciem et sic alie generaliter ad multa pertinent.

In rethorica vero sedes argumenti est vel hoc genus vel hec species vel hec diffinitio et consimilia que particularia esse quantum ad predictas maximas patet culibet. Nunc de circumstantiis. Sunt igitur duo de quibus in rethorica questione agitur, persona scilicet atque negotium. Personae est ille vel illa, qui vel que ducitur in causam, negotium vero est

113) cf. Boethius, P.L.64,1186 A,B.
114) Hi quod A. Hic quidem B.
115) generalis B. cf. Boethius, P.L.64,1205 C,D.
116) particulares A.
117) cf. Boethius, P.L.64,1205 C,D.
118) = Boethius, P.L.64,1216 B.
119) = Boethius, P.L.64,1212 A.
dictum vel factum persone propter quod ipsa devocatur in causam. 120) Circumstantiae vero sunt res que insunt ipsi persone aut negotio, quae iiccirco dicitur circumstantiae quoniam circum-

stant personam 121) aut negotium, i.e. circa illa sunt de quibus questio est; nec sine Ipsis rethorica questio staret, 122) nisi enim hec circumstans null cubitatio audienses remoratur. Ista etiam personam atque negotium determinat, unde 124) civilis questio dicitur esse implicata circumstantiis, qua si 125) per hec restricta circa certam personam atque negotium. Nam si hec per-

sone atque negotio detrahantur fit ipsa dubitatio thesis. Si vero rei de qua generaliter cubitatur hec adiungantur, fit ipsa cubitatio hypothesis.... Unde circumstans dicuntur efficere civilis questionis substantiam. 126)

Sed 127) quiritur, cum iste circumstans sint loci argumentorum quomodo circumstantiis implicata sit civilis questio vel quomodo substantiam eius 128) ipse 129) effician. Non enim in questione loci argumentorum esse debent.

Ad quod dicimus quod ideo circumstans dicuntur implicate causam vel eius substantiam efficere, non quod de ipsis in questi-

one queratur, sed ideo quod persona et negotium in causam venire non possunt, nisi ex eorum aliquibus circumstantiis.

Thierry's distinction between the logical and the rhetorical topics is more or less what Boethius says himself in De Differentiis To-

pics, and so is the theory of Circumstansiae of the rhetorical to-

pics. Yet by confining the rhetorical topics to such narrow limits Thierry encounters a difficulty in the end (Sed quiritur...). 130)

Here the seven circumstansiae are so closely connected with the

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120) devocatur in causam detinetur in causa B. cf. Boethius, P.L. 64,1212 A.
121) Ipsam personam B.
123) circumstans circumstans A.
124) unde etiam B.
125) quare A.
126) = Boethius, P.L. 64,1212 C.
127) si A.
128) vel quomodo substantiam eius vel eius substantiam B.
129) ipse om. B.
130) Boethius deals with the same question, P.L. 64,1212 B: Persona igitur et negotium suggerere argumenta non possunt, de ipsis enim quaestio est.
persona and negotium which are "in questione", that it is objected that the loci themselves are "in questione", i.e. the "sedes certi argumenti", the locus itself is doubtful. Thierry does not understand this as a question of the validity of the locus; thus his answer, that the Circumstantiae are the connecting link between persona and negotium on one side and argumenta on the other, is only partly satisfying.

For he only takes into account the place from which arguments are drawn, not the topic's special ability to provide good, valid arguments, i.e. such which are not tinged of any doubt. This ability in a topic is only hinted at, by Boethius, by the dialectical topics, 131) and first defined by Abailard, who defines (the dialectical) locus as "vis inferentie". 132)

Later, however, when Thierry treats the topics "ex adiunctis negotio", Cicero's III group, he uses the very word "vis" to prove that these are proper topics, and he maintains that they still are circumstantiae, i.e. circumstantiae from another lawsuit, adduced to prove the present one by comparison or relation (genus, pars, minus, maius, par etc.).

They are Circumstantiae133)

Non autem omnia attributa negotio sunt circumstantia ipsius negotii, i.e. non insunt ipsi negotio presenti134) de quo agitur sed per quandam relationem ei negotio, 135) de quo agitur, sunt adiuncta et extrinsecus collocata.

Quedam alia vero cum sint similiter extrinsecas nec ad negotium aliquam relationem habentia tamen quoniam sunt quedam auctoritates, quibus probatur negotium, non inconvenienter illa dicuntur esse attributa negotio.

Quamvis autem negotio adiuncta sint extrinsecas, tamen secundum circumstantias presentis negotii adducuntur ita ut causa cause aut summa negotii presentis. Et sic alie circumstantiae per quandam relationem conferuntur circumstantiarum alterius negotii ex qua collatione nascentur loci illi qui dicuntur adiuncta negotio, ut maius, minus, simile et consimilia.

131) P.L.64,1185 D.
133) ad De Inv.I,24,34, A fol.139v B fol.14ra.
134) presenti om.B.
135) ei negotio...relationem om.A.
Similiter consequentia negotium, etsi extrinseca sint, tamen quoniam aliquid vim auctoritatis habent ad probandum negotium ideo loci argumentorum dicuntur quamvis neque a persona neque a negotio ducantur, i.e. neque his inhereant neque ad ea aliquid relationem habeant, sed ad aliquid testimonium pertineant.

And they have a vis:

GENUS EST etc. Cum adiuncta negotio sint extrinseca, genus autem insit naturaliter partibus suis queritur quomodo ergo genus et pars sint de adiunctis negotio. Dicimus igitur quod esse genus, i.e. continens, et esse partem, i.e. conceptum, relata sunt et quando ab uno eorum ad probandum aliud sumitur argumentum ex vi continentie vel ex eo quod continetur, tunc est argumentum ab adiunctis negotio. Quando autem genus de parte predicatur et non ex vi continentie vel continenti aliquid de toto predicatur vel de parte, tunc potest fieri argumentum a natura, (one of the topics from Cicero’s IV group and negotio).

The transition from "ex Adiunctis negotio" to "consequentia negotium", as shown in the end of the above text, is important for Thierry, mainly because the two sets of topics have a different value:

Differt etiam hic eventus qui consequitur negotium ab eo qui est in adiunctis negotio, quoniam hic consideratur exitus sive necessarius sive non, ut idem sit testimonium rei precedentis. In adiunctis vero negotio tantummodo necessarius exitus consideratur... Nam, ut sepe dixi, non solum res que in argumentum dicitur attendenda est sed etiam secundum quam vim adducatur dilin
duo.

136) idem A.

137) this group of topics is called, with Victorinus (ed. Halm 207, 9) "opinio" or the B. "circumstantia"; ad De Inv.I,28,43, Quarta autem etc. A fol.147v and B fol.17rb: De septem circumstantiis satis dictum est. Nunc ergo de octavo quod dicitur consequens (presens A) negotium....

138) ad De Inv.I,28,42. A fol.147r and B fol.17rb.

139) autem an B.

140) et esse...conceptum om. B.

141) relativa B.

142) toto predicatur vel de parte toto vel de parte probatur A.

143) ad De Inv.I,28,43: Deinde natura etc., A fol.148r and B fol. 17vb.

144) in adiunctis adiunctus B.
Thus the topics from "adiunctis negotio" give necessary arguments, those from "consequentia negotium" not. This point and the fact that the topics from "adiuncta negotio" are so very like the dialectical topics allows Thierry an opportunity to discuss them more penetratingly, and he shows, in fact, that there can be raised doubt as to that they maybe should be treated like dialectical topics, i.e. that an argument "e contrario" might not be, as he first defined, "e hoc contrario" but "e contrarietate".

Quamvis autem attributa extrinsecse persone vel negotio sint adiuncta presenti negotio, non tamen illa attributa dicuntur esse attributa presenti negotio...

Nam illa extrinsecse non sunt ex se attributa presenti negotio, sed ex relatione quam habent ad id; ablata igitur relatione veritas enuntiationis constare non potest. Nam id quod forsitan posset dici quod ipse scilicet relationes extrinsecorum, non ipsa relata, sint adiuncta negotio, hoc, inquam, videtur esse Boetio contrarium, qui in Quarto Topicorum ita dicit: Sumuntur vero argumenta non ex contrarietate, sed ex contrario etc., deinde subiungit: ut appareat non ex relatione sumi argumenta ab adiunctis negotio. Sed in eodem libro videtur velle Boetius quod septem circumstantie presentis negotii, si per se considerentur, sunt aut attributa persone aut continentia cum negotio aut in gestione negotii; si autem ille eadem ad aliquam extrinsecum referantur in hoc dicuntur esse adiuncta negotio. Ac sic questio predicta cessatur. Sed Tullius videtur esse huic sententiae contrarium, qui dicit adiunctum negotio esse id quod maius est vel minus vel simile ei negotio de quo agitur. Unde adiuncta negotio videntur esse extrinsecum sed ad negotium

145) aliquo B.  
146) see page 2o.  
147) ad De Inv. I, 28, 41. Maius, minus etc. A fol. 148r and B fol. 148v.  
148) negotio om. B.  
149) scilicet ipse A.  
150) dicit esse A.  
151) quid B.  
152) quod maius est quod in maius A.  
153) esse om. A.
relata. Adiuncta igitur negotio sunt ea que superius diximus et ad hanc sententiam verba Boetii applicanda sunt. 154)

Thierry here falls back to his first definition of adiuncta negotio as "relata", not "relationes", but he shows that he knew that Boethius was not very clear about Circumstantiae, allowing them a difficult, double position (si per se considerentur...si autem ille eodem ad aliqua extrinsecam referantur...). While Thierry here shows himself rather dependant of Boethius, he still marks a new step forward in the topical discussions, by pointing out the topical difficulties in Boethius' system of Rhetorical Topics and by at times, using the word "vis", maybe not in its completely technical sense, as did Abailard for the dialectical loci, but still in order to show both where and by what force or ability a necessary argument should be produced. One must, however, keep in mind that to renew the topical system was much easier in the field of dialectic, than in rhetoric where it would at this time be a break with all existing authorities.

Argumentum necessarium vel probabile.

When dealing with Cicero's theory of probable arguments Thierry spends some time on the three different divisions, which are to be found in De Inventione. The last one he links with his discussion of topics, first giving the distribution which Victorinus 155) has, then his own: (vel potius etc.) 156)

Tertia divisio probabilis est que sit in quattuor que in tribus superioribus continentur. 157) Nam credibile attributa persone continet que per excellensiam credibili dicuntur, signum vero continentia cum negotio et in gestione negotii et hec omnia, scilicet signa et credibilias, 158) sub eo quod fere solet fieri continentur. 159) Comparabile 160) vero sub adiunctis negotio continetur et ad similitudinem refertur. Judicatum autem consequen-

154) sint B.
155) Victorinus, ed. Halm p. 239, 39.
156) ad De Inv. I, 30, 47: Probabile etc. A fol. 149v and B fol. 18rb.
157) continetur A.
158) incredibilias A.
159) refertur A.
160) Comprobabile A.
tia negotium et sub opinione continetur; vel potius credibile ad id quod fere solet fieri refertur, signum vero tum ad id sicut continentia cum negotio et in gestione negotii, tum ad consequentia negotium que sunt in testimonio persone refertur.

When dealing with "argumentum necessarium" Thierry encounters great difficulties, because the three types of arguments mentioned by Cicero, "complexio", "enumeratio" and "conclusio simplex", are not derived from the normal Boethian tradition known to Thierry, but should be sought in a partly stoic, partly rhetorical tradition current in the time of Cicero - when the Aristotelian categorical syllogism was rarely in use. By the time of Quintilian Cicero's term "argumentatio" was interpreted as "syllogismus" in a wider concept than the Aristotelian. Victorinus used it so and it appears that Boethius was the first to narrow down the meaning of "syllogismus" to either the Aristotelian categorical one or the Theophrastean hypothetical one.

Thierry did not know the system of logic of the Stoics and his interpretation of Cicero's three forms of "argumentum necessarium" starts off from the Boethian tradition, discussing various other interpretations of the lemma and using an unusual terminology:

Necessarium argumentum diuidit per modos quibus maxime tractari solet scilicet per complexionem, enumerationem, simplicem conclusionem.

Modi vero isti, ut quibusdam videtur, genera sunt sillogismorum, quibus necessarium argumentum tractatur; et complexio quidem

161) continentur A.
164) a strange account of categorical and hypothetical argumentation, slightly confounded with stoic remains is found in Grillius, cf. ed. Martin, o. c. in note 62, p. 58, 25-62, 3.
165) even if the elements thereof ought to be known to him from Apuleius and M. Cappella; the Peri Hermeneias of Apuleius is to be found in Thierry's Heptateuchon. MS Chartres 498, fol. 33vb-37rb.
166) ad De Inv. I, 29, 44 ff. Hoc genus etc. A fol. 148v and B fol. 17vb.
167) necessaria argumenta tractantur B.
secundum eos est sillogismus qui a rethoribus cornutus sillogismus dicitur propter duplicem conclusionem, a dialectis vero ratiocinatio indirecta, quia ducit ad inveniens. Sed mihi quidem videtur quod complexio species est divisionis, scilicet disiunctio cuius utraque pars reprehenditur. Nam complexio nichil est aliud quam disiunctio qua undique quicquid ex duobus aut pluribus adversarius conesserit, cogitur ad id quod non vult; velut si quis aliquem accusare et simul societatem eius habere vellet, cogatur ad id quod non vult hoc modo: Nam si conesserit esse probum cogetur ad hoc ut non accuset; si vero improbum cogetur ad hoc ut non habeat societatem eius.

Et hoc est quod ait Tullius: COMPLEXIO EST IN QUA etc., id est quidcumque conesseris fit reprehensio, i.e. negatio eius quod adversarius vult. Nam reprehenditur hic inpersonaliter.

ENUMERATIO etc. Enumeratio quoque secundum quosdam sillogismus est qui fit per enumerationem partium, sed ego dico quod enumeratio est species divisionis facta per enumerationem partium ex quarum partium quibusdam negatis reliquum confirmatur ut subsequenti exemplo Tullius demonstrat enumerans partes causa suscipienti maleficii.

SIMPLEX AUTEM etc. Secundum alios simplex conclusio est hypotheticus sillogismus sine complexione et enumeratione. Ego vero dico simplicem conclusionem esse quasi coactionem simplicem, i.e. consequentiam necessariam sine complexione et enumeratione.

We do not know the people against whom Thierry is arguing here, except for the interpretation of complex. For Abailard calls

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168) sit A.
169) deiunctio A.
170) deiunctio A.
171) velut om. B.
172) proprium A.
173) improprium A.
174) societatem eius eius societatem A.
175) EST IN QUA A om. B.
176) Nam....inpersonaliter. ENUMERATIO etc. om. A.
177) sed ego....enumerationem partium om. A.
178) in quibusdam A.
179) sequenti A.
an inference like complexio for "indirecta ratiocinatio" and might
thus be one of the dialecticians hinted at (a dialecticis). The
rhetorical interpretation is not wellknown either, as the term
"cornutus syllogismus" usually is reserved for one of the stoic pa-
radoxes (is it possible to loose what one does not have?); 181) this
termology could, however, spring from a passage in Hieronymus, 182)
who in a letter uses the term "cornutus syllogismus" about an infe-
rence of the kind mentioned in De Inventione as a "complexio".

Also Thierry's own terminology is rather difficult. His "speci-
es divisionis" used for "complexio" and "enumeratio" is puzzling,
and ought rather to be sought in dialectical discussions than in
rhetoric. For "divisio" is in rhetoric used ad a fixed term for
the third part of speech, (exordium, narratio, partitio etc.) where
"divisio" is a subdivision of "partitio". 183) Or it is used in the
theory of status, where it means a distribution of arguments to the
different "status" in a fixed order. 184)

The dialecticians used "divisio" in dealing with logic of terms,
very often when treating of "Fallaciae" 185) and they used it too in
a kind of logic of propositions, i.e. in topical discussions. 186)
The kinds of "species divisionis" mentioned by Thierry I have not
found elsewhere, 187) but Abailard uses inferences like Cicero's
"complexio" when he writes on "indirecta ratiocinatio" and "locus
a divisione". 188)

"In hac autem argumentatione duo principales loci a divisione es-
se a Boetio conceduntur cum videlicet vel impossibile concludi-

181) Gellius, 16, 2, 10. Seneca, Epist. 45, 8 and 49, 8. M. Cappella, De
Nuptiis... IV, 327.
1 ff. However cf. Quint. V, 10, 64–70.
185) cf. Fallacie Parvipontane, lib. II, ed. De Rijk, Logica Moderno-
187) However in Thierry's edition of Boethius, De Diff. Top., in the
Heptateuchon, the enumeration of Themistius' topics subdivides
"locus a divisione" in "per negationem" and "per comparationem".
This is not to be found in P. L. 64 (i.e. 1201–1202) cf. also Bo-
ethius (P. L. 64, 1203 A); (Cicero's) locus a partium numeratione
in Themistii divisione inter medios "a divisione" nominatum est.
tur ex concessione, vel ex falsificata parte altera vera esse ostenditur, quae opposite invicem sunt tamquam affirmatio et negatio."

Abailard does not speak of "species divisionis" as does Thierry but it seems reasonable to suppose that what Thierry was after in his discussion of Cicero's "necessarii argumenti modi" was to prove that none of the arguments proposed under "complexio", "enumeratio" and "conclusio simplex" are syllogisms proper, but topical arguments.

Thus the unusual terminology used by Thierry for "argumentum necessarium" maybe should be sought in (unedited) topical treatises or be seen as a part of his own teaching of topics. That the terminology is rare and maybe later abandoned, might only be an indication of the rise of new problems with the introduction of the rest of the Organon in the middle of the Twelfth century. Undoubtedly many new terms were coined in this period, which later went out of use, when the topical teaching had settled and got accustomed to the new material.

Argumentatio: Ratiocinatio et Inductio.

In dealing with Cicero's "ratiocinatio" and "inductio" Thierry takes pains to distinguish the dialectical and rhetorical ways of arguing: 189)

Due species sunt expolitionis, i.e. argumentationis: Inductio, sub qua intelligitur 190) exemplum, et ratiocinatio, i.e. syllogismus sub quo intelligitur 191) entimema; sed secundum Tullium etsi 192) ista, i.e. exemplum et entimema argumentationes sint non tamen videntur esse expolitiones. Nam expolitio secundum Tullium est 193) integra argumenti tractatio. 194) Quod autem dixit omnem argumentationem ita tractandam (esse) non ita dixit quin aliquando vellet fieri et exemplum et entimema, sed ideo

189) ad De Inv. I, 31, 51. Omnis igitur etc. A fol. 150 v and B fol. 18vb.
190) intelligi A.
191) intelligi A.
192) etsi om. A.
193) est om. A.
194) argumenti tractatio} argumentatio B.
quia sic
debet fieri nisi causa brevitatise cogat aut exemplum aut entimemate uti. Sunt igitur tantummodo due species ex-
poitationis, inductio et ratiocinatio.

INDUCTIO EST etc. Inductionem describit dicens illam esse ora-
tionem in qua ex rebus certis quorum assensio
cessio ab adversario captatur, i.e. elicitur, ex his, inquam, rebus probatur aliquod dubium. Sed hoc totum habet sillogismus
ideo additum est
PER SIMILITUDINEM etc.
Nam in inductione sive a particularibus ad universale
fiat progressio sive a particularibus ad aliud particulare
semper vis similitudinis sic probat: sicut in his est ita in om-
nibus vel sicut in his est ita in illo. Sillogismo vero non
ita sicut postea ostendetur. Notandum vero est quod hoc descriptio
ductionem factum est secundum usum philosophorum qui inter-
rogando inducunt; usum vero oratorum docebit exemplo de Epami-
nunda
allato.

The difference between the rhetorical induction and the dialecti-
cal or philosophical is not found in the process of the argument
but in the different aims:

Nam is modus inducendi ex his tribus constat, scilicet ex eo
quod primo inducit et ex eo quod circa causam inducit
et ex conclusione, que et celanda est et hoc modo quo predixi-
mus facienda est.

SED QUA etc. Quomodo philosophi induc-
tione utantur et diffinitione et exemplo docuit. Nunc vero solo
exemplo docet quomodo oratores utantur \textsuperscript{210} eadem quoniam in pre-
cepto formandi inductionem non est differentia sed quoniam phi-
losophus interrogando, orator vero non.

The distinction between the rhetorical and philosophical induction
Thierry owes to Victorinus, \textsuperscript{211} who also used it when interpreting the examples of Cicero, but it is Thierry who brings in the
distinction between the different aims, (philos. = interrogando
rhet. = persuadendo).

The "ratiocinatio" in De Inventione Thierry takes to be a syllo-
gism and he compares it with the inductio: \textsuperscript{212}

Ratiocinatio igitur, inquit, est oratio ELICIENS, i.e. explicans
argumentum probabile EX IPSA RE, i.e. ex vero concesso QUOD ar-
gumentum EXPOSITUM, \textsuperscript{213} i.e. explicatum \textsuperscript{214} ET PER SE COGNI-
TUM, \textsuperscript{215} i.e. non ex aliqua similitudine factum sicut argumen-
tum inductionis CONFIRMAT SE SUA VI etc. \textsuperscript{216} i.e. habet in se
necessitatem rationalem, \textsuperscript{217} i.e. evidentem. Ubi dixit \textsuperscript{218} ex-
positum \textsuperscript{219} removit exemplum et entimem quo non exonunt, i.e.
integre ostendunt \textsuperscript{220} argumentum. Ubi vero dixit per se cogni-
tum et cetera sequentia removit inductionem.

In the following passage Thierry goes on to interpret the number of
parts in the syllogism, showing the various reasons for assigning
to it 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 part. When dealing with Cicero's own opin-
ion on this matter Thierry strongly denies that one could hold
such a position. The rather strong terms in which Thierry deals
with Cicero here are due to some misunderstanding, partly by Thierry.
For while rightly rejecting the idea that Aristotle and Theophrastus

\textsuperscript{210} a diffinitione.....utantur om. A.
\textsuperscript{211} Victorinus, ed.Halm p.240,13 ff.
\textsuperscript{212} ad De Inv.I,34,57. Ratiocinatio etc, A fol.151v and B fol.19rb.
\textsuperscript{213} exponitur A.
\textsuperscript{214} explicat A.
\textsuperscript{215} agnitum A.
\textsuperscript{216} etc. om. A.
\textsuperscript{217} rationabilem A.
\textsuperscript{218} dicit A.
\textsuperscript{219} exponitur A.
\textsuperscript{220} ostendere A.
should have sponsored the five part syllogism, of which Cicero is champion, he fails to notice how accepted the five part syllogism was by the rhetors in the first century b.c. and the next centuries. The author Ad Herennium treats of this kind of argumentation too and Quintilian when dealing with Epicheirema gives some useful hints for interpretation of this very passage in De Inventione. Thus Thierry did not see that Cicero was confounding Aristotle with normal, rhetorical theory of his time:

Quod est dicere? cum illi et isti in agendo causas facerent eodem modo syllogismum, hoc est cum utrique propositionem et eius probationem et assumptionem e eius probationem et conclusionem facerent; et tamen quidam eorum probationes dicebant esse alias partes syllogismi a propositione et assumptione. Et isti constituebant esse quinquepertitos, quadripertitos, tripertitos syllogismos. Alii vero dicebant non esse partem syllogismi et propositionem esse partem eiusdem syllogismi eandem, que est sua probatio, nec ullo modo esse propositionem syllogismi, nisi probationem habeant. Idem de assumptione et eius probatione dicendum est. Iste igitur tantum tripertitos syllogismos esse dicebant. Ac sic cum eodem modo syllogismum facerent, tamen in docendo numerum partium eius dissererunt....

NOBIS AUTEM etc. Priori parti consentit Tullius, inducens

221) Ad Heren. II, 18, 28.
223) ad De Inv. I, 34, 57. Hoc de genere etc. A fol. 151v and B fol. 19rb.
224) isti et illi B.
225) eadem B.
226) et om. A.
227) vero om. B.
228) non om. A.
229) probationis A.
230) et A.
231) probationem A.
232) cum om. B.
233) edem A.
testes et argumenta. QUARE AUTEM etc. Post testes ponit argu-
menta, non que suam sententiam probent sed que sententiam
aliorum falsificent, quasi Tullio constaret quod illa falsifi-
cata staret illa cui fauebat. Michi autem uidetur quod utra-
que sententia falsa sit: nam neque probatio pars est sillogismi
nec semper proppositio sillogismi probatione indiget.
SI QUADAM etc. Falsificat Tullius sententiam eorum qui dicebant
enuntiationem semper exigere probationem, ut sit proppositio sil-
logismi nec posse probabilitym ab ea separari. Et primo uti-
tur quinquepertito sillogismo, deinde quadrupertito, ad ultimum
tripertito. QUOD SI ITA EST etc. Putabat Tullius quod apud om-
nes constaret probationem partem esse sillogismi, quod si
posset probare eam non posse contineri in propositione uel as-
sumptione, putabat quod inde staret sua sententia.

The commentary by Thierry of Chartres on the De Inventione owes much
to its principal sources, Boethius and Victorinus, while other im-
portant sources, Grillius and M. Cappella play a lesser role. The
importance of the Ad Herennium is certainly discernible, especially
in the discussion of Status. Still Boethius and Victorinus, with
their interest for dialectic, determine in many ways the scope of
the treatise, giving much impulse for the discussions of the dif-
ference between logic and rhetoric, which take up a good part of
the treatise and often show Thierry at his best. It is also worth
noting that Thierry tries hard to prove that Rhetoric is an autono-
mous art, not a part of logic. He does not admit that they at times
have a common Materia, i.e. thesis, nor does he, like Abailard
did, allow the difficult rhetorical topics "ex adiunctis negotio" to
be, plainly, dialectical topics, however difficult it is to pro-

235) nec A.
236) illa om. B.
237) sillogismi nec semper propositio] sillogismi cum propositio
sillogismi sit ne posse propositionem sillogismi ab ea separari.
Et primo utitur quinquepertito sillogismo, deinde quadrupertito,
ad ultimum tripertito neque posse semper A.
238) nec posse.... tripertito om. A.
239) partem esse] esse partem A.
240) Logica Ingredientibus, Super Topica Glossae, ed.M. Dal Pra,
Firenze 1969, p.262,22.
ve their place among the circumstantiae. In these efforts to make
rhetoric distinct from the other Arts he mostly succeeded and to
what degree he went to make his commentaries on the De Inventione
and the Ad Herennium into a Handbook on rhetoric can be read out
of the Accessus alone, building up a framework of ten set require-
ments to the understanding of an art. In such formal and doctri-
nal innovations, where he was followed by Guillaume of Conches,
dealing with grammar, he was to get an important position in the
renaissance of the Twelfth century.
Appendix.

The logica of Thierry of Chartres.

I have found it useful to collect what is known of Thierry of Chartres' logical teaching in order to provide a handy list of sources for scholars with a greater knowledge of Twelfth century Logic, than I possess. Two important points should be made:

We have no absolutely sure indications that Thierry's Logica or Dialectica is a single work.

We do not know if what is to be sought for, exists as a textbook or maybe only is preserved as lecture notes.

A great part of the interest around Thierry's Logica stems from the Heptateuchon, a collection of (mainly classical) textbooks for the 7 Artes, which holds the earliest manuscripts we have to the new, full Organon. The text has been studied by L. Minio-Paluello in Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 46, 1954, p.211-226, and the manuscripts, MS Chartres 497-498, are used in the editions of Aristotle Latinus, Union Académique internationale, 1939 - .

There are reasons to believe that Thierry wrote on Sophisms:


"In geometria dicuntur lunule quaedam portiuncule circuli, et in hac significacione utitur Aristotiles vocabulo in libro Elenchorum, ubi de quadratura circuli loquitur (Soph. Elench. 171 B 15, 172 A 3) ubi Terricus deceptus legit "plunulas" antequam iste venisset in manus Magistri Ade Parve Pontis".

This reference is not to the Heptateuchon, which (MS Chartres 498, fol. 5va and fol. 5vb) has the correct reading "per lunulas" (cf. P.L. 64, 1020).

II. The revised edition of Adam Parvipontanus' Ars Disserendi, has in the margin (ed.L. Minio-Paluello, Twelfth century Logic I, p. 36,16 (36,12) and 104,6) the sigla T (Theodoricus) for some passages disclosing other views on the subject than Adam's, cf. Introduction, p. XIX, XXIII.
III. Thierry's Lectures on Boethius' De Trinitate, ed. N.M. Haring, A.H.D.L.M.A. 25, 1958, p.198, have a reference to a Logica, dealing with some sophisms:

"More docentis loquitur quod verbis aliis utitur in doctrinis, aliis in disputationibus. Et est haec locutio talis qualis et haec: "Homo est animal quod est genus, Socrates est homo qui est species". Et relativum valet "et" ut: "mulier quae salvavit damnavit" i.e. mulier salvavit et damnavit. Et in praedictis locutionibus eodem modo. "Socrates est homo qui est species" Socrates est homo et est species: "qui" pro "et". Et sunt concedendae omnes istae locutiones: "Socrates est homo et eadem res est species, homo est animal et eadem res est genus". Sed non est concedendum: "Socrates est haec res homo quae est species; Homo est haec res animal quod est genus". Sed in Logica de hoc satis diximus".


"Dissolvens Logice nodos penetravit ad illa
Que non adigerant tempora nostra prius:
Primus Analeticos, primusque resolvit Helencos,
E Gallis grecas accumulavit opes".

Other references to a logical work of less definite nature are in:
V. Commentarius in Rhetoricam Ciceronis, 2. prologue, the dialogue between Fama and Invidia, ed. P. Thomas, Mélanges Graux, Thorin 1884, cf. my excerpt, printed above, page 2-3.

A logical work with a formal Accessus?
VI. The Lectures on Boethius' De Trinitate, ed. N.M. Haring, p.130:

"Finis logicae est veri et falsi discretionio".

For a logical work with an Accessus of Thierry's type, see above p. 10, note 53. This work, however, is not by Thierry, not showing such a "Finis", nor having the sophisms printed above.

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