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79

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The ‘Anonymus Aurelianensis III’
and the reception of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics in the Latin West

Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist

Aristotle’s syllogistic theory, as put forth in the Prior Analytics, held an important position in the ancient Aristotelian tradition and has exerted an immense influence on the development of Western thought. The Prior Analytics, however, made its way into Western Europe of the Middle Ages with some difficulty. I shall here concentrate on the medieval reception of the Prior Analytics in the Latin West and, in particular, on a work which deserves careful attention for its relevance in this context: a large anonymous fragment of a commentary on the Prior Analytics covering Anal. pr. 24a10–46a34. The work has been given the title ‘Anonymus Aurelianensis III’ by Sten Ebbesen, who discovered it in the manuscript Orléans, Bibliothèque municipale, 283 (second half of the 12th c.)¹ and will be referred to under this preliminary title here also.

The background is as follows. Whereas the ancient Greek commentary tradition on the Prior Analytics was continued in the works of the Byzantine commentators,² we had until recently no indication that the Prior Analytics was read in the Latin West between the time of Boethius in the early 6th century and Abelard in the 12th. The medieval interest in Aristotelian syllogistic theory was awoken before the time of Abelard, but for the early textbooks on logic (such as Alcuin’s Dialectica, Abbo of Fleury’s Sylogismorum categoriorum et hypotheticorum enodatio, and Garlandus Compotista’s Dialectica), Latin compendia such as Boethius’ De syllogismo categorico, which circulated as a part of the Logica vetus, and Apuleius’ Peri hermeneias acted as intermediary sources. When Aristotle’s text eventually did come into use, it seems to have spread rather slowly at first. Abelard’s Dialectica (dating between 1116 and 1120) shows some acquaintance with Aristotle’s text, but the main source for Aristotelian logic in the Dialectica is

² For an overview of lost and extant works on the Prior Analytics in the ancient Greek and Byzantine tradition, see Ebbesen (1981, pp. 1f.).
still the *Logica vetus*.\(^3\) John of Salisbury’s *Metalogicon* (1159) is the earliest medieval Latin work to use the entire *Logica nova*.

The fact that the *Prior Analytics* gradually replaced the *De syllogismo categorico* as the main source for Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism from the late 12th century onwards is well known. Boethius’ *De syllogismo categorico* stands firmly in the tradition of the Greek commentators and a detailed analysis of its sources shows that the medieval reader of Boethius’ *De syllogismo categorico* encountered Aristotle’s theory of the categorical syllogism not only via Boethius but also – and significantly so – via the ancient commentators.\(^4\) Boethius’ use of the ancient Greek tradition in the monographs on the categorical syllogism, and in particular in *De syllogismo categorico*, is so vigorous that describing it as a strong influence would be too weak and labeling it as a paraphrase, though not entirely justified, would be closer to the truth. In other words: The influence of the ancient Greek exegesis was present in the medieval tradition of the *Prior Analytics* from the very beginning, but the question remains of how the medieval commentators in the Latin West approached the *Prior Analytics* when they were confronted with it. An attempt at a reply must start with the subsequent question: What else besides Boethius’ Latin translation was at the Western scholastics’ disposal to aid the interpretation of Aristotle’s *Analytica priora*?\(^5\)

Lorenzo Minio-Paluello’s discovery of a series of scholia accompanying the recensio Florentina of Boethius’ translation of the *Prior Analytics* in the MS Florence, Bibl. Naz., Centr. Conv. Soppr. J.VI.34 dated to the second half of the 12th c. provided new evidence on the matter. Whereas Minio-Paluello’s attribution of the scholia to Boethius, however probable, must remain a conjecture,\(^5\) there is no uncertainty about Minio-Paluello’s

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\(^3\) See De Rijk (1970, pp. xivf). Boethius’ *Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos* is listed by De Rijk among ‘direct sources’, but note that there is in fact no clear indication that the *Introductio* was used by Abelard, whereas it is obvious that *De syllogismo categorico* is Abelard’s main source for Aristotle’s theory of the categorical syllogism; see Thomsen Thörnqvist (2008a, p. xlix n.). Also, see Martin (2010, pp. 161ff) on Abelard’s knowledge of the *Prior Analytics* and Ebbesen (2010).

\(^4\) There are systematic analyses of the use of the ancient sources in my critical editions of *De syllogismo categorico* and *Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos* (Thomsen Thörnqvist 2008a; 2008b).

\(^5\) The question of whether Boethius’ ever wrote a commentary on the *Analytica priora* had been discussed for several decades before Minio-Paluello’s discovery. Two references in the *De syllogismo categorico* to ‘our Analytics’ triggered the issue:

(a) *De syll. cat.* II, 71.13f.: *Est etiam alia expositio, sed in Analyticis nostris iam dicta est.*
conclusion that the scholia are heavily dependent upon the Greek exegesis and, in particular, very close to Philoponus’ commentary on Analytica priora I.\(^6\)

In 1981, Sten Ebbesen’s discovery of a large fragment of an anonymous commentary on the Prior Analytics in the manuscript Orléans, Bibl. mun. 283 (second half of the 12th c.) further advanced our knowledge of the Latin reception. The contents of the manuscript are as follows.\(^7\)

1. Anon., De medicina, pp. 1–109
2. Anon., Comm. in Ar. Soph. el., pp. 110–139
3. Anon., De paralogismis, pp. 140–149
5. Anon., De parte et toto, pp. 151B–154C
6. Anon., Comm. in Boethii De diff. top., pp. 156–170
7. Anon., Comm. in Boethii De div., pp. 171–177
9. Augustine, De fide et operibus (fragm.), pp. 204–211

Ebbesen’s observations and conclusions regarding the ‘Anonymus Aurelianensis III’ – henceforth abbreviated ‘AA III’ – rest on an analysis of some sample passages of the text and may be summarized as follows: Some passages in AA III are very close to the scholia identified by Minio-Paluello in the Florence manuscript, but AA III also contains passages which are dependent on the Greek tradition, but not present in the scholia. Doctrinal parallels between the exposition of Aristotle’s definition of the syllogism in AA III and the corresponding passages in three other works, all dated by Ebbesen to the second half of the 12th c., viz. the anonymous commentary on the Sophistici elenchi found in the Orléans manuscript and the De paralogismis (ibid.), by Ebbesen named ‘Anonymus Aurelianensis I’ and ‘II’ respectively,\(^8\) and Anonymus Cantabrigensis, an anonymous commentary on the Sophistici Elenchi in ms Cambridge, St. John’s D.12, indicate that the

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\(^7\) For a codicological description of the manuscript, see Cuissard (1889, pp. 138f.) corrected by Ebbesen (1976, pp. 1f. and 1981, p. 4).

\(^8\) See Ebbesen’s edition of the former in CIMAGL 34 (1979) and of the latter in CIMAGL 16 (1976).
Scholia and AA III are dependent on a common source, a Latin translation of the whole or parts of a Greek commentary on the Prior Analytics, ‘Commentum Graecum’ in Ebbesen’s analysis.

Ebbesen notes that the similarities between AA I and AA III are particularly striking and concludes that the author of AA I and the author of AA III may well be one and the same, proposing the date 1160–1180 and the origin Northern France for both works.⁹

The connection between the Florentine scholia and AA III and the similarities between the three Aurelianenses in addition to the dependence of AA I and AA II on James of Venice’s (Jacobus Veneticus) translations of commentaries on the Sophistici elenchi and the Analytica posteriora suggest, Ebbesen argues, that the ‘Commentum Graecum’ was either a Greek commentary on the Prior Analytics by a contemporary of Philoponus in the 6th c. or a Byzantine compilation of material dating from the same period, perhaps translated into Latin by James of Venice.¹⁰

Having compared the whole text of the ‘Anonymus Aurelianensis III’ with the commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius (which is only partly extant), Philoponus, and the monographs on the categorical syllogism by Boethius, I am able to supplement Ebbesen’s conclusions regarding AA III on some points.

An analysis of the exposition of Anal. pr. 24a10–b12, i.e. the introductory passages of the Prior Analytics, which treats the scope of the work and the definition of a premiss, leads Ebbesen to conclude that the commentary quotes Aristotle from the recensio Florentina, since the passage contains only insignificant deviations from the Florentine recension, whereas it deviates significantly from the recensio Carnutensis on several points. Ebbesen also notes that the author of AA III knows one reading from the Carnutensis, that is the rendering of τίνος in 24a10 by ‘cuius’ instead of ‘de quo’, which is the translation found in the recensio Florentina. AA III here states that alia translatio has ‘gratia cuius’,¹¹ which, as pointed out by Ebbesen, is found in the Florentine scholion on 24a10:

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¹⁰ See Ebbesen (1981, pp. 8f).
Ait ergo circa quid est intentio, id est circa demonstrationem, et cuius gratia, id est demonstrativae disciplinae. (Ps-Philop. et al. 295.4–6)

While this conclusion holds in the case of AA III’s exposition of 24a10–b12, an analysis of the whole work regarding the commentator’s use of the Latin translation of the Prior Analytics reveals the fact that AA III in other passages uses the recensio Carnutensis so frequently that the commentator must be assumed to have had access to a conflated version of Boethius’ translation or to both recensions in separate sources. The latter scenario is by no means impossible, but it seems less probable that the commentator would constantly shift between two sources, when, as is the case, there is no obvious reason for him to exchange one translation for the other at such short intervals – and that without at any point mentioning the superiority of one recension over the other.

Note the following lemmata, which are only a few of numerous examples of the commentator following the recensio Carnutensis against the Florentina.

(1) Ar. 25b19f.: νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν ἔστω πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους δήλων ὅτι τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενὶ ἢ τινὶ μη ὑπάρξῃν

AA III: nunc autem: Posset uideri alicui, quod, ubi de negatuis praedicamus hos modos, iuxta iudicium simplicium debeant et modales negatuae uocari. Quod hic remouet dicens nunc autem insta dicta, id est praeter ea, quae iam dicta sunt de elementis sequentis doctrinae, sit manifestum nobis hoc aliud, quioniam quod contingit nulli inesse, id est modalis, qua de uniuersali negatiae praedicamus contingens, aut alicui non inesse

Flor. 8.25–7: nunc autem tantum nobis sit cum bis quae dicta sunt manifestum, quioniam contingere nulli aut alicui non inesse

Carn. 145.29: nunc autem tantum nobis sit insta dicta, manifestum quioniam quod contingit nulli aut alicui non inesse

demonstrationem spectat tota nostra intentio et non propter cauendum, sed propter docendum’. Note that Alexander In Anal. pr. 9.5–20 rejects this interpretation and claims that Aristotle in 24a10f. is stating the the Prior Analytics is a work about demonstration and of – not about – demonstrative science (περὶ ἀπόδειξιν καὶ ἑπιστήμης ἀποδεικτικῆς).
(2) Ar. 25b35: (καλὸ δὲ μέσον μὲν ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ) ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τούτῳ
ΑΑ III: et quid ‘medium’ uocet uel ‘extrema’, subiungit: In alio, id est subicitur maiori extremitati, et alius in ipso, id est minor extremitas supponitur ei
Flor. 9.16f.: in alio et alius in ipso
Carn. 146.12f.: in alio et alius in ipso

(3) Ar. 26a11: οὐδ’ οὕτως ἔσται συλλογισμός
ΑΑ III: Similiter nec syllogismus erit, ubi duae uniuersales negatiuae ponuntur et eadem causa est, quare nulla conclusion ibi inferatur, quod ostenditur in terminis
Flor. 10.3: nec sic erit syllogismus.
Carn. 146.23: similiter nec tunc erit syllogismus

(4) Ar. 26a27: όρισται
ΑΑ III: manifestum est, quid sit dici de nullo
Flor. 10.19 : determinatum est
Carn. 147.4: manifestum est

(5) Ar. 26b30: πάντες γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦνται διὰ τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ληφθέντον
ΑΑ III: perficiuntur, id est manifestam ueritatem complexionis habent per propositiones sumptas ab initio, id est per propositiones, quae in syllogismo praecedunt, quae ad hoc sufficient, sine aliqua ipsarum conversione
Flor. 12.8 : (omnes enim) perficiuntur quae ex principio sumuntur
Carn. 148.13f.: (omnes enim) perficiuntur per ab initio summptas

(6) Ar. 33b12: (ὁ μὲν γὰρ) καταφατικὸς ἀναφείται τῷ στερητικῷ
ΑΑ III: et hoc <est>, quod ait affirmatius, id est quod extrema quandoque contingit omnino sibi inesse, perimit privatium, id est auferit, ne priuatiua colligi possit, similiter et e contra
Flor. 30.9f.: (nam affirmatius) interimitur privativo
Carn. 163.15: (nam affirmatius) perimit privatium

Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin, No. 79 2010
As to AA III’s use of both recensions, it should here be noted that there are numerous examples of the translation quoted by the commentator providing readings from both recensions in the rendering of a single Greek sentence.

Ar. 34a26: ψεύδους ὑποτεθέντος τὸ συμβαίνον διὰ τὴν ύπόθεσιν
AA III: et hoc est, quod ait: Falso posito Praeter concessum adversarii hoc, inquam, posito, quod accidit per hypothesim, id est quod sequetur per positionem
Flor. 32.5f.: falsa posito et non impossibili, et quod accidit propter positionem
Carn. 165.1f.: falsa concessio et non impossibili, et quod accidit per hypothesim

Moreover, in some passages there seems to be reason to suspect that AA III had access to readings which are not found in either the recensio Florentina or the recensio Carnutensis. This is a difficult – not to say impossible – matter to settle definitely, since the possibility that the deviations from both recensions are due to scribal errors or to the commentator paraphrasing and not quoting Aristotle cannot be excluded. In my opinion, however, at least the instances listed below deserve some attention.

Consider the following lemma, which is the commentator’s definition of proof by exposition. AA III renders Aristotle’s τὸ ἐξήγησθαι (28a23) by per ostensionem:

AA III: Per ostensionem: Demonstratio per ostensionem dicitur, cum ad probandum, quod dixeras, inducis singularem suppositionem rei, quam primo per uniuersale supposueras.

Both the Florentine recension (15.29) and the recensio Carnutensis (151.16), however, render τὸ ἐξήγησθαι by expositione:

est autem et per impossibile et expositione facere demonstrationem

Note the Florentine scholion on Ar. 28a23 (297.23–6):

expositionem autem dicit positionem termini qui pars sit communis termini; per ipsum enim ostensio quaedam fit quoniam inest extremitas extremitati
In chapter 14 of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle treats first figure syllogisms in which both premisses are contingent. The third mode is *imperfectus* since it needs a conversion of the minor premiss in order to be reduced to the first mode of the first figure with contingent premisses. Thus, the third mode is a valid syllogism, but it is not *perfectus* since it does not hold, Aristotle claims, ‘in virtue of the premisses assumed.’ Note the commentator’s use of *positas* in the exposition of 33a6f.

*Ar. 33a6f.*: διὰ μὲν τῶν εἰλημμένων προτάσεων (οὖδεις γίνεται συλλογισμός)

*AA III:* *nullus syllogismus:* ‘perfectus’ subintellige. *Fit enim syllogismus,* sed non *propter* in ipso *positas* *propositiones*

*Flor. 28.26f.*: *per sumptas quidem propositiones* (*nullus fit syllogismus*)

*Carn. 162.6f.*: *propter assumptas quidem propositiones* (*nullus fit syllogismus*)

In 42a14f., Aristotle discusses the number of terms and propositions of the valid syllogism – the main subject of chapter 25 of *Analytica priora I*. It is tempting here to assume that the commentator’s translation had *solis* for Boethius’ *tantum.*

*Ar. 42a14f.:* καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ Ε, ἐκ τῶν Α Β μόνον ἔν εἰ ὁ συλλογισμός

*AA III:* *et si E quidem est conclusio,* cum sequatur ex A et B, *pater,* quod *ex AB solis erit syllogismus*

*Flor. 55.8f.* & *Carn.:* *ex AB tantum erit syllogismus*

The following lemma is also an extract from chapter 25 and from a passage in which Aristotle discusses the interrelation between the number of terms and the number of conclusions in a valid syllogism. In 42b5–26, Aristotle treats chains of syllogisms and states that the interrelation between the number of conclusions and the number of terms and premisses is not the same as it is between the premisses and the terms: If the number of premisses is increased by one, the number of terms also increases by one; if, however, (in a chain of Barbara syllogisms) one term is added, the number of conclusions will increase by two. Note the commentator’s use of *semper.*

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12 Note that two important manuscripts of the Prior Analytics (Urbinas 35 and Coisilianus 330; see David Ross’ edition) read the genitive μόνον.
In chapter 28, Aristotle treats the method of selecting the middle term. The variation between Boethius’ *collectiones* and the commentator’s *electiones* in the exposition below may be due to scribal error, but it should be noted that the commentator’s rendering is actually closer to Aristotle’s *ékloγάς* than is Boethius’ translation.

Also, note the following instances where the translation used by AA III contains readings which deviate significantly from the text of the principal manuscripts of the two recensions, but are preserved in other manuscripts in the textual traditions.

The recc. Florentina and Carnutensis both have *simul* for *similiter*, but AA III’s reading is found in MS Glasgow, Bibl. univ. U.6.10

Both recensions of Boethius’ translation render Aristotle’s *έπι τῶν πολλῶν* by *in pluribus*, but again the reading of AA III is paralleled in the Glasgow manuscript.
As mentioned above, Ebbesen concludes that there is a connection between the scholia in the Florence manuscript and AA III. There is evidence which may be added to that adduced by Ebbesen – I provide here only a few examples, but there are several more.

The following passage is AA III’s exposition of Aristotle’s account of the order of the terms in the third figure, i.e. *Anal. pr.* 28a10–5; the major extreme is first, since it is predicated twice, whereas the minor is the second, because it is predicated once, and the middle term the last in order, because it is the subject twice, that is of both the premisses. Both the commentary and the scholia give this explanation, which rests on the ancient notion that the predicate is by its nature prior to the subject.

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\text{AA III: Postremum est medium. Cum enim praedicatum semper primo sumatur, ut praedicetur de medio uel de alterutro extremo, quod supponitur ei, sumitur posterius eo. Quare, cum in hac figura posterior sit minor extremitas quam prima, medium, quod etiam posteriori illi supponitur, iure postremum dicitur.}
\]

\[
\text{Ps.-Philop. schol. 297.17f. on 28a13: et hic longius natura est intelligendum. Nam qui semel subicitur propinquior est medio eo qui semper praedicatur.}
\]

In *Anal. pr.* 28a16, Aristotle states that the third figure syllogism is not perfect, but δινάτιστος. AA III and the scholia both give the explanation that syllogisms in the third figure are imperfect *actu*, but potentially perfect, since they may be reduced to the perfect modes in the first figure.

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\text{AA III: Possibilis: Cum enim perfectionem non habeat actu, tamen potestatem habet perficiendi per alium, per quem probatur.}
\]

\[
\text{Ps.-Philop. schol. 297.19–21: Prima figura actu habet necessarium; secunda vero et tertia potestate. Haec potestas assumit actum, cum vel ostensive vel per impossibile transferuntur in primam.}
\]

The following passage of AA III is an excerpt from the exposition of chapter 29 of the *Analytica priora*, where Aristotle treats the discovery of arguments in syllogisms which are reduced to the impossible, and by *ad quem est syllogismus mendacii* the commentator specifies that Aristotle by (ἀντιστραφέσης) ταύτης τῆς προτάσεως (45b6f.) is referring to the conclusion of a false syllogism; as demonstrated below, this explanation is paralleled in the Florentine scholia.

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\text{Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin, No. 79 2010}
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AA III: *Conversa*, id est mutata, *ea propositione*, in qua praedicatur uel remouetur terminus, ad quem est syllogismus mendacii

*Ps.-Philop. schol.* 319.21: id est ad quam est syllogismus mendacii

As noted by Minio-Paluello, the Florentine scholia on the first book of the *Prior Analytics* are very close to Philoponus’ commentary and in several cases the similarity is paralleled in AA III. The following passage in AA III is an exposition of a passage in chapter 28 (44b25–37) in which Aristotle discusses the selection of the middle term. In this passage, various combinations which do not render a valid syllogism are accounted for. The explanations given by AA III here are closely paralleled in the Florentine scholia and the scholion is in this case a translation of Philoponus’ exposition. Compare the following lemmata.

AA III: *Manifestum*. Hic de reliquis duabus adiungit repetens tamen praemissam, ut addat: *Aliae duae, quae sunt secundum electiones mediorum, inutiles sunt et cetera*. Et repetit praemissam dicens: *Ut, id est ueluti*, *si sequentia utrumque, id est si praedicata utriusque extremi sint eadem, aut quae sequitur A, id est subiecta praedicati, et quae non contingit E*, id est extranea subiecti, *aut quae non possibile, id est extranea utriusque*.


There are, however, also several indications of AA III being dependent on other ancient Greek sources. The following passage in AA III is paralleled not only in the Florentine scholia but also in Alexander, whereas Philoponus provides a different explanation on this point. The passage in question is the beginning of the exposition of the fourth chapter of the *Prior Analytics*, which is the account of the categorical syllogisms in the first
figure. Aristotle here states that he will demonstrate ‘by what means, when, and how (διὰ τῶν καὶ πότε καὶ πάντως) syllogisms are produced’ (25b26ff.).

Λ Α III, the Florentine scholia, and Alexander all interpret ‘πότε’ as referring to the three figures of the syllogism. Philoponus, however, takes the following ‘πάντως’ to refer to the figures.

Λ Α III: _Per quae_, cum scilicet dicet, quod per tres terminos. _Et quando_, cum scilicet sic disponuntur, ut terminus subiectus in prima praedicetur in secunda uel idem praedicetur in utraque uel idem subiciatur. _Et quomodo_, scilicet propositionibus sub aliquo modorum dispositis.

_Ps.-Philop. schol._ 296.18–22: “_Per quae_”, id est per tres terminos; “_quando_” id est cum maior extremitati subiact medium et de minori praedicatur, vel cum de utraque praedicatur, vel cum utrique subiact; “_quomodo_”, id est vel universaliter vel particulariter vel affirmative vel negative.

_Alex. In Anal. pr._ 42.1–3: ἐστι δὲ τὸ διὰ τῶν οἱ συλλογισμοὶ γίνονται, ὁτι διὰ προτάσεων. ἐπεὶ δὲ διὰ ποῖας προτάσεως συνθέσεως οἱ συλλογισμοὶ γίνονται, διὰ τούτο προσέθηκε τὸ διὰ τῶν τὸ πότε καὶ πάντως, σημαντικὰ ὅντα τὸ μὲν πότε τῶν τε συχνών καὶ τῶν σχιμάτων, ὅτι κατὰ ὅρους ταύτα δὲ έκοινων τὰς προτάσεις, ἐν αἷς σχίμασι καὶ ἐν αἷς συχνίας οἱ συλλογισμοὶ, καὶ ἐτί τῆς τῶν προτάσεως ποιότητος.

_Philop. In Anal. pr._ 71.18–24: διὰ μὲν τοῦ εἰπεῖν διὰ τῶν ἔστημαι ὅτι τούλαχιστον ἐκ δύο προτάσεων εἰσὶν οἱ συλλογισμοὶ, καθὼς καὶ πρότερον εἰρηται. διὰ δὲ τοῦ εἰπεῖν καὶ πότε ἐδήλωσεν ὅτι οὐκ ὡς ἐπεκεῖν οὐδὲ πάσαι αἱ προτάσεις συμπληκτέομεν ποιοῦσι συλλογισμοῖς. διὰ δὲ τοῦ εἰπεῖν πῶς ἔστημαι ὅτι τοῦ μέσου ὅρου ποτὲ μὲν ἕνι τῶν ἕκρου ὑποκειμένου τοῦ δὲ ἐπέρων κατηγορουμένου, ποτὲ δὲ ἁμφότερος κατηγορουμένου, ποτὲ δὲ ἁμφότερος ὑποκειμένου.

But there are also a number of passages which are not paralleled in the scholia but still clearly dependent on the ancient Greek tradition. Ebbesen mentions the commentator’s use of ‘secundum materiem’ (vs. ‘secundum usum’) in the commentary’s exposition of Ar. 24a22, which agrees with Ammonius and Alexander (τὴν ὑλή) against Philoponus (ἐκ τῆς φύσεως).13 Among others, the following passages should be noted in addition to

Ebbesen’s observations. The first passage is quoted from the exposition of Aristotle’s account of the different quantities of the proposition. AA III here comments on Aristotle’s omission of the singular proposition and claims the reason to be that singular propositions are irrelevant for demonstration, which is what the doctrine of the Prior Analytics is meant to serve. Philoponus gives the same explanation.

AA III: et singularem a divisione excludit … eo, quoniam tota haec doctrina praeципue spectat ad demonstrationes, ad quas non pertinent singulares propositiones, sed generales tantum, ut sunt maximae propositiones et similes.


Also, note the following passage which is one out of several parallels between Alexander and AA III. AA III is here expounding the definition of the syllogism and, more specifically, Aristotle’s use of συμβαίνει in 24a19: ‘A syllogism is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.’ The anonymous commentator claims that ‘accidit’ is used in order to stress the fact that not only the conclusion in syllogisms with categorical or necessary premisses follows by necessity but also the conclusion of syllogisms with contingent premisses.

AA III: Unde etiam adiungit acedit per hoc innuens necessitatem hanc posse esse etiam in terminis sibi contingenter inhaerentibus.

The same explanation is given by Alexander in In Anal. pr. 21.1–3:

καὶ γὰρ ἄν ἐνδεχόμενον ἢ τὸ συμβάσας, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γε καὶ σύμτο ἑπεται ταῖς προτάσεσιν ἐν ταῖς συλλογιστικαῖς συζύγιαις

As to the Latin sources, Ebbesen concludes that Boethius’ De syllogismo categorico has been used, but that there is no evidence of AA III being dependent on Apuleius Peri hermeneias. Both these observations hold good for the text in its entirety; there is, as far as I can see, no trace of influence from Apuleius’ treatise. As to the influence from Boethius’ De syllogismo categorico, Ebbesen’s conclusion rests on the commentator’s use of
‘perridiculi syllogismi’ in the exposition of ἐπεργοῦ in the definition of the syllogism (24a19).\textsuperscript{14} In addition to Ebbesen’s reference, there is also a clear indication of a dependence on Boethius in two separate passages which both treat the additional five modes in the first figure, not explicitly recognized by Aristotle but traditionally ascribed to Theophrastus and Eudemus:

(1) AA III: Et nota, quod hos quattuor modos, quos posuit Aristoteles, adiungit quinque in prima figura, quos adiunctos dicit a Theophrasto et Eudemo Aristotele dante principium.

(2) AA III: Supra posuit tantum quattuor modos in prima figura, quibus quinque superadditos esse dicit Boethius a Theophrasto et Eudemo Aristotele dante principium, quod hic habetur.

Note the striking similarity to Boethius’ De syllogismo categorico 52.10-4:

Habet enim prima figura sub se Aristotele auctore modos quattuor, sed Theophrastus uel Eudemus super hos quattuor quinque alios modos addunt Aristotele dante principium secundo Priorum Analyticorum uolumine.

Also, note AA III’s exposition of Aristotle’s definition of the term (24b16-8):

AA III: Eadem enim dicuntur et elementa propositionum et termini, sed elementa dicuntur, quoniam ab eis constitutio propositionum incipit, et termini, quia resoluto propositionum in ipsis terminatur, quoniam non est logicorum resoluere terminos in syllabas et litteras.

Cf. Boethius’ definition of ὁρὸς in the monographs on the categorical syllogism:


Boeth. Introd. 19.19f.: At si minutatim tota orationis membra carpamus, usque in nomina ac uerba postrema fiet resolutio.

\textsuperscript{14} Ebbesen (1981, p. 5).
Also, see Philoponus’ account in *In Anal. pr. 25.8–12:*

> δόρος δὲ καλεῖται διὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ περιορίζεσθαι τὴν τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἀνάλυσιν’ ἄχρι γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐλθὼν ὁ ἀναλύων πέπαυται. ὡς πρὸς φιλοσόφους δὲ λέγω ἄλλ’ σὺν ὡς πρὸς γραμματικοὺς, οἴτινες περί μόνον τῶν ἰνδικτικῶν φωνῶν ποιοῦνται τὴν σκέψιν, σὺνὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀσῆμων πολλῷ γε μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ συλλαβῶν.

Since it seems certain that AA III contains material of Greek origin, it may be pertinent to ask whether the text contains any indication that the author himself knew Greek. There seems to be only three relevant passages, and none of them displays an advanced knowledge of Greek; in fact, their elementary character suggests that they may have been stock explanations in the Latin tradition. Note the following lemma in the exposition of the introduction to the *Prior Analytics*, where Aristotle treats the scope of the work and states that he will define a premiss, a term and a syllogism. The remark ‘cum definitio sit terminus’ seems to refer to the etymological connection between ὅρος and διορίζεσθαι:

> Propter quod, cum definitio sit terminus, bene ait determinare, id est definire.

In the exposition of the geometrical proof used in 41a26, that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with the side, the explanation provided by AA III reveals some knowledge of Greek, though not very advanced:

> ‘Metris enim est mensura, ‘syn-’, id est ‘con-’; unde ‘simmetrum’, id est commensurabile, et ita ‘asimmetrum’, id est sine commensuratione.

Also, note the commentator’s explanation of *methodus* in the exposition of 46a2 (ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν):

> Methodus, id est inspectio siue via syllogizandi, de omnibus propositionibus eadem est et circa philosophiam.  

Far more interesting are the passages which reveal that the commentator on some points had access to alternate explanations. The following passage should here be noted, since it provides clear evidence of the commentator having (direct or indirect) access to more than one reading. AA III is here
expounding on Aristotle’s proof in 26b1–10 that there will be no syllogism in the first figure if the major premiss is universal and the minor premiss is particular and negative. AA III follows the Florentine recension when rendering Ar. 26b7f.: εἴτα καὶ ὄν μὴ κατηγορεῖται λεικόν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἰλήθω κύκνος καὶ χίὼν = deinde et de quibus non prae dicatur albis ’homo’ sumantur ’cygnus’ et ’nīx’ (Flor. 11.12f.) and states:


In addition to a critical edition of the whole work, further research is needed in order to determine the origin of AA III. Also, to determine the influence of AA III on the later medieval tradition, the commentary will have to be carefully compared to later works on Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism, such as, for instance, Robert Kilwardby’s commentary (c. 1240), which until the discovery of AA III was thought to be the earliest surviving Latin commentary on the Prior Analytics. So far, however, in response to Ebbesen’s remark that ‘more research is needed to get a clearer picture of the size of the debt Anonymus Aurelianensis III owes to the Greek commentator’ (1981, p. 7), I think we may safely conclude that it is considerable.
Bibliography


