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Hytpibbius: Radulphus Brito's Emulator on the *Ars Vetus*
I
The *Questions on Porphyry*

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Introduction

During the 1970s, Heinrich Roos began the study of Brito's *Questions on the Ars Vetus* publishing some questions from the two extant redactions of the work: q. 13 of the A-version of the *Questions on Porphyry* (Roos 1974), and qq. 25 and 44 of the B-version of the same work (Roos 1978). After a few years, Jan Pinborg (1980a) published qq. 5-8 from both redactions of this work, allowing scholars to easily compare the two versions and evaluate their differences. Finally, in a 1981-82 article, Jan Pinborg and Sten Ebbesen published the critical edition of the Prologue to Brito's *Questions on the Ars vetus*, based on a complete collation of all the witnesses, and tried to give a first tentative picture of the relations between them. About the same time, the edition of q. 8 (A-version) on the *Categories* appeared (McMahon 1981), but with no mention of the problem of the two redactions. As Heinrich Roos pointed out, editing Brito's *Questions on the Ars Vetus* is a complicated task because one of the redactions (the B-version, in Roos' and Pinborg's labelling, transmitted only by ms N = Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. V.21, ff. 58ra-77rb; and 79va-124ra)¹ indicates two authors of a very large set of questions: Radulphus Brito and a mysterious Hytpibbius. The colophon of these *Questions on the Ars Vetus* says:

¹ According to its description (D'Alverny 1968, 338; Neske 1997) N is a XIV century parchment ms, mm. 295x215, written in two columns, composed of two codices, written by two different northern — maybe German — scribes. Cf. also Pinborg 1980b, 20-21. In what follows, my transcriptions from various manuscripts will keep their orthography, without normalizing it. In *App. B*, on the contrary, the orthography of N is (slightly) normalized. I owe my deepest thanks to Charles Girard and Julie Brumberg-Chaumont, who read a first draft of this paper and gave me very important suggestions, so that I could avoid mistakes and improve the final draft.

Expliciunt questiones super quatuor libros ueteris artis Britonis et Hytpibbii simul collecte pertinentes conscripte et finite anno domini M.^o CCC.^o XVII in die sancti Egidi Abbatis [= Sept. 1st, 1317] pro quo sit Christo laus \et gloria/, qui uiuit et regnat deus per omnia secula seculorum. Amen (N 124ra)

The *Ars Vetus* here includes four books, i.e. Porphyry's *Introduction (Isagoge)*, Aristotle's *Categories*, his *De interpretatione* and the anonymous *Liber sex principiorum* (usually attributed to Gilbert of Poitiers). One might wonder who collected these texts and for what purpose. I would like to try to give an answer to these questions, picking up again the problem of the two versions, hoping to shed some light on the mysterious Hytpibbius and his contribution to this set of questions (excluding those on the *Liber sex principiorum*).² However, in the present article I will limit my research to the questions on the *Isagoge*.

1. The state of the art

The first issues I would like to address are: 1) How many questions are there in each redaction of Brito's *Questions on Porphyry*? 2) Which of them can be ascribed to Brito, and which ones to Hytpibbius?

Starting from a complete transcription of both redactions I can easily answer the first question and only partially the second. In *Appendix A* one can see a table with the complete lists of questions offered by N (B-version) and by the A-version, ascribed with no doubt to Brito. Let's summarize what is known so far.

As Pinborg (1980a; 1981) and Roos (1978) pointed out, all mss but one offer the A-version (the earlier and shorter one, according to Pinborg and Roos).³ Only one ms (N) gives the complete B-version, but also contains some questions by the above-mentioned Hytpibbius, about whom we know nothing except for his name (or nickname). As said above, the Prologue to the whole set of questions on the *Ars Vetus*, together with some other questions have been edited:

² This article is a first step of the ambitious project of preparing a critical edition of Brito's *Questions on the Ars Vetus*, i.e. Porphyry, *Categories* and *De interpretatione*. Charles Girard, at the University of Geneva, is working on Brito's *Questiones super librum sex principiorum*.

³ The A-version is witnessed by 10 (*De int.*) or 11 (*Porph.* and *Cat.*) manuscripts, and an incunable edition, dated 1499 (cf. Pinborg 1975a, 79, n. 122; Pinborg 1980b, 15-16).

Prologue: see Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981-82, 293-313 (based on all the witnesses);

10 questions on *Porphyry*

q. 1, A-version: see Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981, xii-xv (based on four mss.);
 q. 3, A-version: see Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981, xv-xvi (excerpts);
 qq. 5-8, A-version and B-version: see Pinborg 1980a, 56-142 (the first based on 2 mss and the second based on 4 mss);
 q. 13, A-version: see Roos 1974, 329-34 (based on 4 mss and the 1499 edition);
 q. 33, A-version: see Ebbesen 1986, 85-87 (partial ed. based on 2 mss);
 qq. 25 and 44, B-version: see Roos 1978, 5-61 and 61-64 (based on N; these qq. correspond to qq. 15 and 32, according to my numbering that excludes the questions explicitly ascribed to Hytpibbius).

A quick comparison between the lists of questions of the two redactions (see *Appendix A*) shows that the *Quaestiones sup. Porph.* in the A-version contains 33 qq., while in the B-version (N) has 45 qq. (54 qq. including Hytpibbius’).

As for the authorship, all questions in N that have a corresponding item in the A-version, can be safely attributed to Brito. Even in these questions, however, it is not possible to completely exclude interpolations by Hytpibbius. On the other hand, following some marginal annotations in N, it is possible to attribute to Hytpibbius nine complete questions on Porphyry and some interventions in another question on the same work. In the upper margins of the first 22 questions on Porphyry the copyist transcribed the titles of each question in red ink, and marked Hytpibbius’ with an *H*,⁴ while leaving those ascribable to Brito without any identification (as a sort of default value). In one case, however (q. 12, corresponding to q. 9 of the A-version and to Hytpibbius’ q. 4), the upper margin annotation attributes a question to both authors:

Vtrum vniuersalia sint separata a singularibus uel sint coniuncta eis. Et
 B<ritonis> et H<ytpibbii> (N 63rb)

⁴ See, for instance, N 59rb: “Vtrum logica sit scientia practica uel speculatiua. H<ytpibpii>”.

The question to be answered here, about this text and the whole commentary on the *Ars Vetus*, is the following: Who merged the texts by Brito and Hytpibbius in the final redaction (the archetype of **N**)? Who is responsible for the whole text we now read in **N**? There are two possible explanations:

- 1) an editor, different from both Brito (B) and Hytpibbius (H),⁵ decided to merge B's and H's sets of questions on the *AV*, producing the archetype of **N**;
- 2) Hytpibbius himself did it, using a longer version of Brito's questions on the *Ars Vetus*, integrating it, wherever he thought it was expedient, adding some questions or just some further arguments (*rationes*), and the corresponding replies (*ad rationes*), or new portions of text, as one can see in q. 4 H (*Appendix B*).

The first hypothesis seems unlikely to me, because such a complex task as merging two texts the way it was done in q. 4 H requires too clever an editor. As one can see in the working edition of Hytpibbius' questions on Porphyry (*App. B*), the editor had to make many difficult choices in order to provide such a text, leaving aside (smaller or larger) portions of B's text and substituting them with H's, or vice versa: he shows a logical and philosophical competence that is far beyond the average competence of a professional scribe. Furthermore, this hypothesis requires the appeal to a third (unknown) man in order to explain the result of the work of B and of (the still unknown) H. The second hypothesis is more economic and explains the same result while assuming fewer actors. H, therefore, is likely to have been the man who manipulated B's text⁶ in order to produce the (direct or indirect) ancestor of **N**. In what follows, I'll use the expression 'the author of **N**' when I'm not sure the actual author of a question is either B or H.

Here, then, is what we know and what remains uncertain:

- 1) *Quest. sup. Porph.*: of the 54 qq. of **N**
 - 1) 33 qq. correspond to those in the A-version;
 - 2) 9 qq. are ascribed to H;

⁵ From now on, I will refer to Hytpibbius' (H's) questions as q. x H; and to Brito's (B's) questions as q. x Br (corresponding to the A-version preserved in ms Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royal "Albert I^{er}" 2910 (3540-47), which contains a collection of all of B's questions on logic, and from which I have transcribed his questions on Porph).

⁶ Whether the text he used was earlier or later than the standard redaction (the so-called A-version) is another question that I will try to address in a future paper.

- 3) 1 q. is ascribed to both (and therefore is also included in the first group);
- 4) 12 qq. remain doubtful.

There may, however, be other criteria than explicit attribution that we can use to reduce the uncertainty of attribution.

Here are some criteria I propose in order to try to dissolve our doubts:

1. *Stylistic considerations*: differences between B's style of argumentation and that of H might help to tell what is B's and what is H's.
2. *Intrinsic features*: a comparison between H's questions and the 13th-century tradition of question commentaries on Porph. might highlight intrinsic characteristics of H's approach to Porphyry's *Isagoge*.
3. *Extrinsic features*: a quantitative comparison between the authentic questions of both B and H reveals that not only is the average size of B's questions bigger than H's, but in particular there are significant differences in the average size of their solutions and of the replies to arguments (*ad rationes*). This might give us some further clues about their attribution.⁷
4. *Internal references*: in various questions on Porphyry, the author of N makes reference to previous or subsequent questions: examining each case might lead to cautious attributions of some questions to B or to H.
5. *External references*: there might be references to some of the non-ascribed questions from other authentic works by B: if so, the attribution to B can be taken as certain.
6. *Recurrence of topics*: Brito often discusses the same question in different works, sometimes with meaningful variations that might be taken as evidence of an evolution of his thought; the literal match between one or more questions discussed here and in other works by Brito might be interpreted as a clue to authorship attribution;
7. *Self-quotations*: portions of text (such as arguments or replies to them) might have been 'recycled' in different questions by H, together with references to favourite sources different from B's.

⁷ Mathematical approaches to authorship attribution exist (see, for instance, Basile et al 2008 or Benedetto et al. 2013), but I have not yet been able to avail myself of the collaboration of my colleagues in the Department of Mathematics for this project.

8. *Disagreement with B's positions*: there might be explicit or implicit disagreement between what is asserted in an unattributed question and what B maintains in both the A- and the B-version; in this case, one should try to understand whether the divergence is the result of a change of mind by B or of an actual disagreement between H and B.

Let us now try to apply these criteria to the *Questions on Porphyry*.

2. Stylistic considerations

As some scholars have recently argued, Radulphus' philosophical style is quite peculiar. The structure of his questions is quite regular and highly predictable:

- 1) Normally the title of each question is introduced by the formulas: *Consequenter queritur... Queratur/queritur consequenter* (as in many other collections of questions).
- 2) After the arguments for (*videtur/arguitur quod sic*) and against (*quod non*) the proposition offered for consideration, the solution follows, but this often contains an introductory discussion of other opinions, which are normally rejected as faulty; also, sometimes, before proposing his own solution, B makes explicit certain presuppositions necessary to understand it (*Ad cuius evidentiam suppono prius quod...*).
- 3) Each argument (usually introduced by *Item*, after the first one) is normally developed through a syllogism, whose major and minor premises are corroborated ("proved"), either by means of a new syllogism or by reference to an authority; in the first case, the premises of the new syllogism may in turn be proved (the process usually goes no further).
- 4) The minor premise is often introduced by *modo*, and less often by *sed*;⁸
- 5) Other points of doctrine may be introduced by *Intelligendum, Notandum, Advertendum quod...* after the solution.
- 6) The replies to the arguments are introduced by a formula: *Tunc/Per hoc ad rationes (in oppositum/contrarium)*, and can be quite long, in order to clarify where (in the major/minor premise or in the appeal to

⁸ Costa (2007, I, 121) underlines the peculiarity of this adverb, which is not common to other authors of the same period.

an authority) the criticized argument fails. In some questions the discussion of other opinions takes place exactly at this point.

- 7) It is in this context that another characteristic feature of B's style emerges: he appears to be fond of the following format for his answers to the principal arguments: "Cum dicitur "p", verum est — q", where p is a quotation of the argument he wants to refute, and q is usually a nominative absolute or an adverbial phrase that functions as a restrictive clause, stating that certain conditions are to be met for p to be true.⁹

If we look at the questions ascribed to Hytippibius (see *App. B*, for a working edition), however, we find that they meet almost all the requirements of the typical Britonian question (with the remarkable exception of q. 4 H). Let's take some samples from q. 9 H:

- 1) "Queratur consequenter utrum universalia sint corporea vel incorporea";
- 2) "1. Et videtur quod corporea... 2.1 In oppositum arguitur... 3. Ad istam questionem dicendum est quod...".
- 3) "1.1 Quia principia corporum sunt corporea; sed universalia sunt principia corporum; ergo etc. **Maior** patet: principium enim et principiatum sunt eiusdem generis, ut dicitur primo *Posteriorum*. **Minor** manifesta est: genera enim et differentie sunt principia corporum, dicitur enim 'homo est animal rationale'; ergo etc. 1.2 Preterea...".¹⁰
- 4) "1.2 Preterea, quod est idem corpus est corporeum; **sed** universale est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia que sunt eadem eandem rationem participant. Minor apparet: homo enim est corpus et animal est corpus".
- 5) (since in q. 9 H there is nothing similar, I take an example from q. 5 H) "3.1 Unde **notandum** quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit actu universale requiruntur quinque...".
- 6) "Ad 1. Per hoc ad rationes in contrarium." (see 7).
- 7) "Ad 1.1 Ad primam. Quando dicitur "principia corporis sunt corpora", verum est — **in quantum corporum principia**. In minori dicitis "universalia sunt principia corporum", dico quod verum est: universalia

⁹ See Ebbesen 2016, 12, who considers this feature Brito's typical *modus operandi*.

¹⁰ As one can see from other questions, H also makes use of *Item*, so that the use of *Preterea* cannot be taken as an indication of his authorship.

pro re sunt principia corporum, non tamen pro intentione. Ad probationem “genus et differentia sunt principia speciei que est corpus”, verum est — **ista sumpta pro re**, non pro intentione.”

As one can see, Hytþibbius is an imitator (maybe an admirer) of Brito’s philosophical style. Especially on the last point he is quite impressive: he often makes use of the nominative absolute to express the restriction on the truth of the quoted text. On three features, however, Hytþibbius doesn’t seem to match his model:

- 1) he never makes use of *modo* to introduce the minor premise of an argument: I would not, however, base the attribution of a question to him on this feature alone;
- 2) he is very quick and superficial in giving the justification for the premises of his arguments (he is often satisfied with “Maior/minor patet” or “Maior/minor patet de se” and *similia*);
- 3) finally, his replies to the arguments rarely give articulate support to his positions, and never engage in further discussions of other opinions (as Brito often does).

The last two features explain why H’s questions are usually shorter than B’s, in particular in his solutions and in his *ad rationes* sections. This is the reason why I am also going to try to use quantitative considerations, cross-checking this criterion with the three features just mentioned.

3. Intrinsic features: H’s questions and the 13th-century tradition of question commentaries on Porphyry

An analysis of the relationship between H’s questions and the question commentaries of the second half of 13th century may reveal influence from other authors on H and thus help us decide what is whose in N.

Starting with q. 1 H (*u. logica sit scientia practica uel speculatiua, App. B*), all we can say is that this question occurs in commentaries by authors of the generation before Brito, such as Simon of Faversham¹¹ and

¹¹ Simon of Faversham, *Questiones super libro Porphyrii*, q. 1, ed. P. Mazzarella, Padova: CEDAM, 1957, 16-18.

Durandus of Auvergne,¹² they both discuss it, but there is no match between their arguments and H's. B discusses a similar question in his *Questions on Aristotle's Topics*, but with different arguments and, as opposed to H, provides a solution.¹³ By treating the question while commenting on Porphyry, H inscribes himself into an existing tradition that was also to continue after him with representatives such as Gentilis of Cingoli¹⁴ and John Buridan.¹⁵ In contrast to what he does in the other questions, H does not here give his solution but, after listing the arguments supporting the idea that logic is a speculative science, goes on to reject the argument in favour of the opposite position.

In q. 2 H (*u. logica precedat alias scientias*) H makes use of modest terminology and theoretical tools: he invokes in particular a distinction between three types of grammar which is quite close to what B proposes in his questions on *Prisc. min.* (see *App. B*, apparatus, n. 11), where he talks about a speculative type of grammar. An analogous distinction (but with *regularis* instead of *speculativa*) can be read in Simon's commentary on Martin of Dacia's *Modi significandi* (see *ibid.*).

Question 3 H (*u. de uniuersali possit esse scientia*) is discussed by various authors before B, such as Peter of Auvergne,¹⁶ Simon of Faversham,¹⁷ Durandus of Auvergne,¹⁸ and some anonymous authors I am going to present. This question is actually the longest ascribable to H (about 1580 words); the length of the solution, however, is due to the discussion of a list of six requirements that any object of consideration must meet in order to be the subject-matter of a science. As far as I know, Brito nowhere

¹² Durandus of Auvergne, *Questiones Porfirii*, q. 2, ms **Pa** = Palermo, Biblioteca Comunale, 2 Qq D 142, 3vb-4ra. For a thorough description of the ms, see Tabarroni 1994, 343-45. The author probably is not the Durandus whose questions on the *Ars vetus* are found in ms **M** = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm. 18917, pp. 1a-50b: their sets of questions are very different. Durandus of Auvergne's text is much closer to Simon of Faversham's.

¹³ Cf. *Questiones super Topica Aristotilis*, I.4 (*u. dyaletica sit practica uel speculatiua*), **Br** 199vb-200ra.

¹⁴ Cf. Gentilis of Cingoli, *Questiones super Porphyrium*, **Pa** 74rb-va.

¹⁵ See John Buridan, *Quaestiones in Porphyrii Isagogen*, qq. 2, ed. Tatarzynski 1986, 129-33 (cf. Klima 2009, 13-4); Albert of Saxony, *Quaestiones circa logicam*, q. 1, ed. M.J. Fitzgerald, Leiden: Brill, 2002, 57-74.

¹⁶ Cf. Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Porphyrium*, q. 7, ed. Tiné 1997, 284-5.

¹⁷ Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 2, 18-20.

¹⁸ Durandus of Auvergne, *Quest. Porf.*, q. 1, **Pa**, 3va-b.

presents anything like that, but similar lists appear in some earlier or contemporary anonymous questions on Porphyry: one occurs in a Munich ms in a set of questions on the *Ars Vetus* ascribed to a certain Durandus, who is not Durandus of Auvergne),¹⁹ another in a Basel ms²⁰ (anonymous, probably contemporary with the previous one and somehow linked to it). As one can see from the following table, H's text is closest to the Basel text (even though the order of the requirements is slightly different):

Durandus, <i>Quest. Porf.</i> , q. 2, M p. 2a	q. 3 H, N 60va	Anon. Basileensis, <i>Quest. Porph.</i> , q. 3, Ba 126ra
... ad hoc quod de aliquo sit scientia omnia ista requiruntur:	Unde notandum quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum in aliqua scientia requiruntur sex conditiones:	Sed debemus primo scire quod VI sunt conditiones que requiruntur ad hoc quod de aliquo possit esse scientia:
primo quod sit ens, quia de non ente non est scientia, ut dicitur primo <i>Posteriorum</i> ;	prima est quod sit ens, quia de non ente non est scientia, ut dicitur primo <i>Posteriorum</i> ;	quarum prima est quod oportet quod sit ens, quoniam de non ente non potest esse scientia;
	secunda quod ei correspondeat aliquid a parte rei, quia de tragelapho non contingit scire quid est;	tertia conditio est quod sibi respondeat aliquid ex parte rei, quia de figmentis non est scientia, quoniam de tragelafo non contingit scire quid est, ut <dicit> Philosophus in libro <i>Posteriorum</i> ;
tertio quod sit intelligibile, quia scientia est habitus intellectus, ideo [[e]] omne illud de quo est scientia est intelligibile;	tertia quod sit intelligibile, quia scientia est habitus intellectus;	secunda est: <quia scientia est> habitus intellectualis et ideo requiritur quod suum subiectum sit intellectuale;

¹⁹ See above, footnote 12.

²⁰ **Ba** = Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.III.20, 125ra-134vb. This ms offers only a fragment of a probably larger set of questions on the *Ars Vetus*: only a complete set of 30 questions on Porphyry and 18 questions on the *Categories*, ending with a question on substance (*u. intellectus possit intelligere substantias separatas per suam essentiam*, **Ba** 144va-145ra), remain. An edition of q. 3-4 on the *Categories* is found in Ebbesen 1998, 113-121, where the name "Anonymus Basileensis" was introduced.

Durandus, <i>Quest. Porf.</i>, q. 2, M p. 2a	q. 3 H, N 60va	Anon. Basileensis, <i>Quest. Porph.</i>, q. 3, Ba 126ra
secundo quod sit separatum a singularibus siue a particularibus secundum [[enim]] rationem, quia de particulari ut sic non est scientia;	quarta quod sit perpetuum, unde dicitur primo <i>Posteriorum</i> scientia est eternorum;	quarta conditio est quod oportet quod sit incorruptibile, quoniam de corruptibili non est scientia, ut patet per Aristotilem;
item (scil. quinto) oportet quod habeat principia et causas, saltem secundum cognitionem, quia per talia probatur passio de subiecto +de isto ...iu(?)+ insunt hec omnia potest esse scientia; sed omnia hec insunt vniuersali; quare etc.	quinta quod primo occurrat intellectui pre aliis omnibus, unde primo <i>Posteriorum</i> de subiecto oportet precognoscere quid est et quia est;	VI ^o requiritur quod ipsum primo occurrat intellectui, quia secundum quod vult Auicenna subiectum in scientia est res que concipitur(?) esse, ad quam cetera que ibi determinantur habent attributionem.
4 ^o quod habeat passiones et proprietates que scientia dicitur de conclusione demonstratio; sed in conclusione predicatur passio de subiecto; et ideo etc.;	sexta est quod habeat proprietates et passiones, unde secundo <i>Posteriorum</i> dicitur: scire potissimum est demonstrare proprietates et passiones per causam immediatam. Hec omnia possunt reperiri in vniuersali, ut patet; ergo de eo potest esse scientia.	quinta conditio est quod oportet quod sit tale quod partes eius et passiones determinentur in scientia, quod patet per Aristotilem in libro <i>Posteriorum</i> , ubi dicit quod scientia est vnius subiecti partes et passiones considerans;

The similarities between q. 3 H and q. 3 of the Anonymus Basileensis on Porphyry are not limited to this list. As one can see from the apparatus of the working edition (*App. B*), H's discussion is indebted to some text that was close to that of the Anonymus. By contrast, the only affinity with Durandus' discussion lies in the list quoted in the table.

As said above, q. 4 H (*u. uniuersalia sint separata a singularibus, secundum quod ponit Plato, uel sint coniuncta eis*, N 63rb-vb) is the only one explicitly ascribed to both B and H. A comparison between mss N and S (see apparatus, *App. B*) may reveal the method followed by H in reworking this, and maybe other of B's questions: H probably added some

arguments (for instance *1.2* and the corresponding reply *Ad 1.2*) and some discussions, such as *3.1-3.2* and *3.3.2-3.3.3*. In particular, the former (*3.1-3.2*) articulate Plato's doctrine in four points, that are then rejected: both in its structure and content it recalls comparable discussions by Simon of Faversham and Durandus of Auvergne in their questions on Porphyry.

According to Plato — on their accounts —

- 1) universals are beings really existent outside the mind, really separated from their individuals;
- 2) they constitute the whole substance of their individuals;
- 3) they are specifically identical to them (*esse eiusdem speciei cum particularibus* or, as H puts it, *esse idem specie cum particularibus*);
- 4) they are the cause of the individuals and of their knowledge.²¹

H's account agrees on the first three points, and disagrees on the last one, saying that universals are the causes of science in general (see *App. B*), thus implying that if they are not separated there can be no science. The replies to the first three arguments appear to follow Durandus', who points out that

- 1) the separation of universals from individuals is not compatible with their being the whole substance of the individuals: if universals are separated, then they are singular, because everything existing outside the mind is individual;
- 2) this happens because the substance of each individual is identical with it, and thus not separated from it; so saying that universals are the whole substance of their individuals is incompatible with their separateness;
- 3) universals and their particulars cannot be of the same species, since the first ones are incorruptible and the second ones are corruptible.²²

²¹ Durandus of Auvergne, *Quest. Porf.*, q. 5, Pa 4va: "Item, opinio Platonis fuit quod uniuersalia essent quedam [[nunc?]] nature per se subsistentes, separata ab ipsis particularibus secundum esse et totam essentiam particularium et principium essendi et cognoscendi eorum. Vnde ponebat Plato hominem separatum secundum esse ab omnibus hominibus particularibus, puta Sorte, Platone etc., quem quidem hominem separatum declarauit(?) esse totam essentiam [[hominum]] hominum particularium et substantiam. Voluit etiam Plato quod homo uniuersalis separatus esset eiusdem speciei cum particularibus. Et etiam posuit hominem separatum <esse> principium essendi et cognoscendi omnes particulares homines." Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 5, 26-7.

²² Durandus of Auvergne, *Quest. Porf.*, q. 5, Pa 4va: "Sed hec opinio deficit in multis, quibus determinatis patebit solutio huius questionis. 1) Primo deficit ista(?) opinio predicta in hoc quod ponit ipsum universale per se existens separatum a singularibus siue

H's elaboration is much shorter than Simon's (or Durandus of Auvergne's), but it is easy to recognize in both the same line of argumentation.²³

In q. 5 H (*u. quiditas rei possit esse actu universalis circumscripta omni operatione intellectus*, N 63vb) again we find a match with some of the arguments used by the Anonymus Basileensis in his q. 7 on Porphyry (*u. aliquod vniuersale possit esse preter operationem intellectus*, Ba 127ra) and their sources (see apparatus, *App. B*). The solution however is very different, probably because the formulation of the question is not exactly the same.²⁴

The formulation of q. 6 H (*u. quiditas rei sensibilis possit esse actu universalis per primum conceptum vel per secundum rei attributum*, N 63vb-64ra) corresponds to that of q. 8 by the Anonymus Basileensis (*u. quidquid est <in> rei natura sit actu vniuersale (-is, ms) per primum conceptum eius aut per intentionem sibi attributa ab intellectu concipiente*, Ba 127va-b). Here, however, we find the opposite of the relationship between q. 5 H and q. 7 Ba: while only one argument by the Anonymus Basileensis matches an argument by H (but referred to Boethius rather than to Aristotle), the solutions are basically the same, being based on a distinction between logical and metaphysical universals. The former depends on the second act of the intellect (a second intention); the latter depends on the first act or concept of the intellect which gives universality to the *na-*

[[per?]] particularibus et tamen esse totam substantiam particularium, quoniam substantia uniuscuiusque est in unoquoque, et non est separatam secundum esse ab ipso cuius est substantia; 2) nunc autem universale sunt tota substantia particularium secundum esse, quod concedit opinio; non ergo sunt uniuersalia separata a particularibus secundum esse, sicut posuit Plato... 3) Secundo deficit in hoc quod dicit istud uniuersale separatam esse eiusdem speciei cum ipsis particularibus, quoniam hoc non potest esse uerum(?): corporale (*pro*: corruptibile) et incorruptibile/incorporale non possunt esse eiusdem speciei (lac. 15 litteris); quia(?) non secundum genus, <nec> secundum speciem(?); nunc autem, secundum Platonem, homo [[est]] uniuersalis est incorruptibilis, quia est separatus ab omnibus hominibus particularibus; homines autem particulares sunt corruptibiles; ergo homo separatus uniuersalis non potest esse eiusdem speciei cum particularibus, secundum quod Plato dicit." Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 5, 26-7.

²³ The whole question is also clearly linked to Durandus' q. 10 (M 4b-5a) and the Anonymus Basileensis' q. 4 (Ba 126rb-va) on Porphyry.

²⁴ The solution by the Anonymus rather corresponds to Brito's solution in the A-version of q. 6 on Porphyry. (see Pinborg 1980a, 86-88).

tura communis, indifferent in itself to its being individualized or universalized. In q. 6 H there are two passages worth noticing, where H echoes B's discussion. In the first one, he quotes one of the favourite sources of B's theory of universals, i.e. Themistius' definition of genus (as universal) as "a concept without foundation²⁵ gathered from the faint similitude that holds between individuals". The only differences are that H uses the participle *aggregatus* instead of *collectus*, and doesn't give any explanation of the Greek term *hypostasis*. The second passage refers to Aquinas' explanation of how we can know the individuals by reflecting on our own universal concepts,²⁶ but makes use of B's metaphorical rephrasing: "intellectus intelligit singulare linea reflexa".²⁷ This small detail might indicate H's acquaintance with B's questions on the third book of Aristotle's *De anima*.

The last four questions (qq. 7-10 H) have almost no match with earlier questions on Porphyry, except for the titles. Thus, Durandus has a question similar to q. 7 H (*u. vniuersale sit in intellectu solo*, N 64ra),²⁸ but none of the earlier authors talks about the 'naked' or pure intellect, i.e. the divine intellect, as the place where universals exist, as H does in q. 8 H (*u. vniuersale sit in intellectu nudo uel puro*, N 64 rb). Finally, while q. 9 H (*u. vniuersalia sint corporea uel incorporea*, N 64rb-va) has predecessors in Albert the Great's commentary, Martin of Dacia's q. 10 and Durandus q. 8 on Porphyry,²⁹ discussions similar to q. 10 H (*u. diffinitio detur*

²⁵ This is the way B understands the expression *sine hypostasi*, used by Themistius (*De an.*, Pro. CAG V.3, 3,32-33), cf. Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Top. Arist.*, IV.2, **Br** 255rb: "hoc apparet auctoritate Themistii supra prohemium De anima: dicit enim ibi quod genus est conceptus sine ypostasi, id est sine fundamento, sumptus ex tenui similitudine singularium, id est ex modo essendi singularium qui est debilis similitudo; ideo ex eius intentione patet quod genus non sit vnum in re." Cf. IV.4, **Br** 257rb; *Quest. sup. Porph.* q. 13 B, N 66rb; q. 15, N 67ra (= ed. Roos 1978, 57).

²⁶ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *STh* I.86, a. 1 ("quasi per quandam reflexionem"); *De veritate* 10.5, 309 (cf. Putallaz 1991, 120-1, n. 15).

²⁷ Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. in III De anima*, q. 9, ed. Fauser 1974, 185.

²⁸ Cf. Durandus, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 7, **M** 3b-4a (*u. uniuersalia sint in re uel solo intellectu*). Anon. Basil., *Quest. Porph.*, q. 6, **Ba** 126rb-vb, has a different formulation of the opposition (*in re* vs. *in anima*).

²⁹ Cf. Albert the Great, *Super Porphyrium de quinque universalibus*, II.4, ed. M. Santos Noya, Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff, 2004, pp.26b-29b; Martin of Dacia, *Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii*, q. 10, ed. H. Roos, Hauniae: G.E.C. Gad, 1961, 136-7 (*u. universale sit corporale*), where he distinguishes between what is *corporale*

de rebus in anima uel de rebus extra animam existentibus, N 65va-b) can be found only in questions on Aristotle's *Topics*.³⁰

These greater and smaller agreements or convergences between H's questions and the 13th-century tradition of question commentaries on Porphyry do not point in any definite direction or to a specific author, but do suggest that H had some other models at his elbows besides Brito's commentary on Porphyry: his questions are well entrenched in this tradition and followed it more or less freely in order to fill the gaps in B's treatment. A feature that might be important is that even when H follows the lead of this or that master of arts, he does not embark on a discussion of their or other thinkers' positions: at least in the 10 qq. here examined, H makes no reference to *aliqui*, whereas such references are frequent in B's questions. It is difficult to guess whether this feature is a peculiarity of H's approach to Porphyry only, or whether it is pervasive in his questions on the *Ars Vetus*. What is noticeable, however, is the conciseness of H's questions, as compared to B's, who often discusses at length other scholars' opinions and uses the replies to the arguments to refine his own positions.

4. Extrinsic features: average size of questions, solutions and *ad rationes* sections

As just noted, Brito's questions are generally longer and more articulated than Hyppibius'. On a quick estimate, B's questions, their solutions, and *ad rationes* sections in N and in Br contain on average the number of words indicated in Tab. 4.1-4.6 (where Q = question; S = solution; A = *ad rationes* section; min./max. = size of the shortest/longest question). For H's questions we can count only on those explicitly ascribed to him in the set on Porphyry; in order to make comparisons easier I write the results of my estimate on H's questions immediately below those of B's questions on Porphyry:

and what is *corporeum*; Durandus, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 8, M 4a-b (*u. uniuersalia sint corporea uel incorporea*).

³⁰ Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Top. Ar.*, I.22, Br 216ra-b.

	Q	S	A
B's <i>Quest. on Porph. N</i>	1828 (min. 484)	586 (min. 95)	768 (min. 79)
B's <i>Quest. on Porph. Br</i>	1224 (min. 378)	467 (min. 107)	458 (min. 37)
H's <i>Quest. on Porph. N</i>	783 (min./max. 391/1579)	245 (min./max. 41/1158)	236 (min./max. 135/438)

Table 4.1

As one can see, B's questions on Porphyry are generally much longer than H's, especially in their solutions, even when we consider their respective shortest questions; in particular, while the solution to the longest question by H is longer than the solution of B's shortest, it is still much below the average length of B's solutions. I will therefore take the length of the solutions as a clue for this inquiry, considering among the non-ascribed questions those that present

- (i) a value for Q >1000, and
- (ii) S as >200 (as close as possible to 586),³¹

as reasonable candidates for B's authorship. All the other non-ascribed questions should be attributed to H by default.

4.1 Questions selected by the quantitative criterion

Sifting the unattributed questions on Porphyry according to the above criteria yields five that (approximately) fulfil them:

³¹ The lower limit of the values here indicated can somehow be justified: 1000 as a plausible value for Q is motivated by the fact that H's questions on Porph. do not exceed 1015 words (and this is only 1 q. over 9, so that we can consider it an exception); 200 as lower limit for S is justified by the fact that S 95 in B's questions is an exception and that only 4 among B's questions on Porph. present S as <200. The same holds for the other sets of B's questions on the *Ars Vetus*: among B's questions on *Cat.* those with S <200 are only 3, and among B's questions on *De int.* they are only 2.

<i>Questions on Porphyry</i>	Q	S	A
q. 15: <i>u. genus significet aliquid unum</i>	2122	954	681
q. 17: <i>u. ista sit per se uera 'Sortes est homo'</i>	1027	313	312
q. 31: <i>u. sit dare gradus in formis</i>	2643	0	1880
q. 32: <i>u. ex uno apparenti in re intellectus possit con-surgere in intellectum es-sentialem generis</i>	857	331	173
q. 33: <i>u. species de se re-quirat multitudinem in-diuiduorum</i>	1171	500	387

Table 4.2

As one can see, in Tab. 4.2, all questions match the requirements, except two: q. 31 actually has $S = 0$, and q. 32 has $Q < 1000$. The first question deserves a closer analysis (§ 4.2). The four other questions will be examined in what follows (§§ 5, 6 and 7.2), the upshot being that this criterion can only work as a first superficial tool for selecting questions that *could possibly* be by B.

4.2 A question on the existence of gradus in formis

Question 31 on Porph.: *u. sit dare gradus in formis* (N 73ra-va) is anomalous not only because it has no solution, but also because it duplicates the replies to the arguments *quod sic* and *quod non*. After seven arguments *quod sic*, the author of N lists four arguments *quod non*, then without giving any solution he replies to the arguments *quod sic*. After this set of

replies, the same (or maybe another) author introduces a new series of arguments *quod non* with these words:

Ad positionem alterius partis, scilicet quod sint gradus in formis, primo quod non sint gradus in formis potest probari rationibus prius ad illam partem adductis.³²

Then he reproduces, almost *verbatim*, the original four arguments *quod non* (though in a different order) adding new ones (up to nine). Finally he alludes to the first series of arguments *quod sic*,³³ and replies to nine arguments *quod non*.³⁴ It is quite a weird question that proceeds in an unusual way. The second part might have been added either by H, as a kind of complement to what B had already written, or by Brito himself in a later period, not having yet made up his mind; the whole question, finally, might be H's product. The first hypothesis seems to me the more likely: H probably added new arguments (or repeated old arguments) to the uncertain position worked out by B.

That Brito had no clear ideas about the solution to the problem of the unity of substantial forms also emerges, later on, in his questions on Boethius' *De divisione*. In q. 5 of the Brussels redaction (*u. genus significet plures naturas vel unam*, **Br** 464va), after having proposed a first two-fold solution (a genus signifies a multiplicity of essences, but under one and the same concept), he adds other solutions, and one of them is compatible with the existence of *gradus in formis*:

3.3.1 Si tamen vellemus credere Platoni, diceremus quod genus significat unam naturam, quia cum Plato poneret universalialia separata in esse a singularibus, ponit genera esse separata a speciebus, et ita ponit quod genus significat aliquid quod separatum existit ab ipsis speciebus; id autem quod separatum existit ab aliis est una natura et ita genus secundum Platonem significat unam naturam separatam in esse ab ipsis speciebus.

3.3.2 Similiter, si vellemus credere ponentibus gradus in formis et plures formas substantiales in eodem composito, diceremus similiter quod genus significat unam naturam communem omnibus speciebus non separatam ab eis secundum esse, sed existentem in speciebus, diversam tamen a naturis et formis completivis specierum.

³² *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 31, **N** 73rb.

³³ *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 31, **N** 73va: "In oppositum sunt rationes <ad>ducte contra primam positionem, scilicet ille: "generatio est ad formam, ut dicitur V^o Phisicorum", etc."

³⁴ *Ibid.*: "Ad rationes igitur istas respondendum est per ordinem."

3.4 Sed quia tutius est ponere quod genus significet unam naturam communem speciebus et non esse separatam ab eis, sicut Plato voluit (quia illud est manifeste /465va/ contra Philosophum, septimo Metaphysicae), <sed> [vel] coniunctam speciebus, et ponere plures formas substantiales in eodem composito, sicut faciunt ponentes gradus in formis (quia hoc ponentes videntur ponere quod unum et ens sint multa entia, cum forma substantialis det esse simpliciter); ideo melius est etc.³⁵

Even in what seems to be a later text, B appears to accept as reasonable the plurality of forms or at least to waver between opposite options. This uncertainty might explain the absence of a solution in q. 31, so that I am inclined to ascribe to B at least the first part of this question (*rationes quod sic, quod non* and *ad rationes*), leaving to H any further addition (maybe for the sake of training himself in finding new arguments and counterarguments): as well as q. 9 N (or q. 4 H, see *App. B*), q. 31 on Porphyry may have been marked on the upper margin as “et B<ritonis> et H<ytpibii>”.

5. Internal references

The fourth criterion I will use to try to attribute some N questions to B or H is the variety of internal references to previous or subsequent questions clearly attributed to B. The network of internal references is not enormous and certainly not conclusive, but is interesting anyhow, as I shall show.³⁶

i-ii) In *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 13, N 65vb-66ra (// q. 13, A-version, Br 48v-50v) we find two references forward to q. 15, N 66vb-67rb (= q. 25, ed.

³⁵ *Quaest. sup. Boethii De div.*, q. 5, Br 464vb-465ra.

³⁶ I will not consider here the many internal references to and from B's authentic questions.

Roos 1978);³⁷ and one from q. 15 N to q. 13 N:³⁸ these cross-references suggest that question 15 N may be authentically B's.

iii) In *Quest. sup. Porph.* q. 17, N 67vb-68ra (*u. ista sit per se uera 'Sortes est homo'*) there is a reference to q. 24, N 70rb-71rb (*quid sit illud quod indiuiduum addit supra speciem; //q. 21, A-version, Br 57r-59v: quid sit principium indiuiduationis*),³⁹ and implicitly to q. 25, N 71rb (*u. indiuiduum in suo significato includat illud accidens per quod indiuiduum est indiuiduum; // q. 20, A-version, Br 56r-57r*):⁴⁰ in this case nothing allows us to decide whether the reference is to B's or to H's questions.⁴¹

iv) *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 26, N 71rb-va (*u. duo indiuidua eiusdem speciei*

³⁷ *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 13 (*u. genus possit saluari in unica specie*), N 66ra: "Hec tria declarantur per ordinem: primo primum, scilicet quod genus quantum ad rationem potest saluari in unica specie, quia supposito quod genus <non> significet suas species, sed significet aliquid quod est principium rationis a quo sumitur intellectus et ratio generis, et de hoc magis *uidebitur quando queretur de hoc*."; N 66rb: "Quid ergo nomine generis inportatur? Dico quod illud quod genus significat est aliquid aggregatum, ut ex ipso procedit aliqua operatio communis a qua sumitur ratio generis, ut animal significat aliquid aggregatum quod est principium motus et sensus, sed de isto postea plus apparebit, quia *de hoc mouebitur specialis questio*." In q. 13, A-version, Br 49r-v, of course, none of these references occurs.

³⁸ *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 13, N 66vb: "<Q>uia *superius*, dum quereretur utrum genus possit saluari in unica sui specie, mentio facta fuit de significato generis, ideo nunc queratur utrum genus significet aliquid unum, id est aliquam unam speciem uel multas suas species."

³⁹ *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 17, N 67vb: "De ista questione est diuersa opinio secundum quod diuersimode opinatur de principiis indiuiduationis, quia quidam dicunt principium indiuiduationis esse formam, quidam uero materiam, quidam quantitatem indiuisam. Quid autem de hoc sit sentiendum apparebit *in alia questione*."

⁴⁰ *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 17, N 67vb: "Alii dicunt: quidquid sit principium indiuiduationis, ista semper erit per se uera 'Sor est homo'. Et soluuntur rationes aliorum ex auctoritate <Philosophi>, primo Posteriorum, "terminus illud predicat" etc.; dicunt quod iste terminus 'homo' tantum inportat unum quantum ad significatum, scilicet naturam humanam; *accidentia autem uel quantitatem inportat non quantum ad significatum, sed quantum ad esse*. Et ista uia uidetur esse melior; ideo ista per se est uera 'Sor est homo'."

⁴¹ *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 17 might be compared to the *Sophisma* "*Sor dicit uerum si solus Plato loquatur*" (mss BAV, Vat. lat. 2173, 216vb-219ra; and BAV, Vat. lat. 3061, 43ra-45ra, where Brito discusses the question *u. Sorte non existente ista sit uera 'Sortes est homo' siue 'Sortes est Sortes'*. As far as I could see, however, there is no connection between the sophisma and q. 17 N.

differant secundum substantiam uel solo accidente) refers to q. 24 N (// q. 21, A-version, **Br** 57r-59v):⁴² there is no reason to ascribe q. 26 N to B or to H. A detail however deserves mention: this question is deleted by *vacat*; its author apparently wanted to exclude it from his work, but it is difficult to say whether B or H took that decision; certainly, its author correctly reports the two likely positions he admitted as plausible in q. 24 N;⁴³ this would incline me to ascribe this question to B, but the argument is not compelling; besides, the length of the question is below the average length of B's questions (Q 3897; S 987; A 146). I shall return to this question in § 9.

v) In *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 32, N 73va-vb (= q. 44, ed. Roos 1978: *u. ex uno apparenti in re intellectus possit consurgere in intellectum essentialem generis*) there is a reference to q. 31, N 73ra-va (*u. sit dare gradus in formis*):⁴⁴ neither question corresponds to any question in the A-version, so the reference seems to be of no help; accordingly, Heinrich Roos (1978), when he published q. 32, could not make up his mind about its

⁴² *Quest. sup. Porph.* q. 26, N 71rb: "Item, per illud per quod aliqua sunt indiuisa in se et a quocumque alio diuisa per illud differunt; hoc est per quantitas et quantitas est accidens; ergo etc. Maior patet de se. Minor declaratur per Philosophum, 2^o Phisicorum, vbi dicit quod diuisio et indiuisio quantitati congruunt; et etiam patet *ex prius habitis*."

⁴³ *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 26, N 71rb: "Tenendo quod quantitas indiuisa sit principium indiuiduationis dicunt quidam quod duo indiuidua eiusdem speciei differunt primo accidente: illud enim est principium diuersitatis quod est principium indiuiduationis. Sed tenendo aliam uiam potest aliter dici quod duo indiuidua eiusdem speciei primo et per se differunt per formam; sed per quantitatem differunt per accidens. Ratio primi est ista: per quod aliqua sunt indiuisa in se et diuisa a quocumque alio per illud differunt; hoc est per formam; ergo etc. Maior (Minor, ms) patet de se. Minor apparet per Philosophum, 7^o Methafisice, vbi dicit "forma separat et distinguit et dat esse distinctum". The last reference to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* corresponds exactly to the last position discussed in q. 24, N 71ra.

⁴⁴ *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 32, N 73va: "<Q>uia *in precedenti questione* [q. 31] in solutione 4^e rationis contra primam positionem dictum fuit quod genus accipitur ab apparenti magis communi, differentia ab apparenti minus communi, gratia huius queratur utrum ex uno apparenti in re intellectus possit consurgere in intellectum essentialem generis." Cf. q. 31, N 73rb: "Ad 4^{am}. Cum dicitur "sicut se habet genus ad differentiam" etc., conceditur. In minori dicitur "genus se habet ad differentiam ut materia ad formam", dico quod genus non sumitur simpliciter a materia et differentia a forma, sed ab apparenti magis communi et minus communi; et genus se habet ut contractum et differentia ut contrahens; et quia sic non oportet quod sensituum et intellectuum sint diuerse forme, sed unum est potentia alterius."

authenticity. As I will show below (§ 6), an external reference will dissolve our doubts, and also confirm that at least the first part of q. 31 is actually B's (as suggested in § 4.2, above).

vi) We find the last reference in q. 33, N 73vb-74ra (*u. species de se requirat multitudinem indiuiduorum*): the text here refers twice to q. 14, N 66va-vb (// q. 14, A-version, Br 50v-51r: *u. species possit saluari in unico indiuiduo*) which is certainly B's;⁴⁵ the two passages referred to, however, appear in portions of text missing from the A-version of q. 14,⁴⁶ so they just could be H's additions; in conclusion, at this stage it is impossible to decide who is the author of this text (and of the additions to q. 14 N).

6. External references

In B's other works there are several references to his questions on Porphyry, but it is often impossible to tell which redaction they refer to. For instance, in his questions on Boethius' *De divisione*, he says

Consequenter quaeritur, quia dictum est modo quod genus uno modo est totum ad species, alio modo pars, ideo quaeratur modo, licet etiam fuerit

⁴⁵ *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 33, N 73vb: "Item, quod uere et per se predicatur de uno indiuiduo tantum requirit unum indiuiduum; species est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia nisi species posset saluari in unico indiuiduo, non posset predicari de ipso. Minor apparuit *prius*. (...) Item, saluata diffinitione saluatur diffinitum; sed diffinitio saluatur in unico indiuiduo; ergo et species. Maior patet, quia diffinitio conuertitur cum diffinito. Minor patet, quia saluato Sorte saluatur diffinitio hominis. Et de isto *prius* satis uisum est."

⁴⁶ *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, N 66va: "2.3 Item, quod uere et per se predicatur de uno solo indiuiduo potest saluari in eo; species est huiusmodi (homo, *cod.*); ergo etc. Maior patet, quia quod uere predicatur de alio aliquo modo est in ipso. Minor apparet, quia uerum est dicere Sortes est homo. (...) 3.2.3 Item, saluata diffinitione saluatur diffinitum; sed diffinitio speciei saluatur in unico indiuiduo; ergo et species. Maior patet, quia diffinitio conuertitur cum diffinito. Minor etiam patet, quia saluato Sorte saluatur animal rationale mortale, quod est diffinitio hominis." Cf. *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, A-version, Br 50v.

*visum in Porphyrio*⁴⁷ quomodo genus de specie praedicetur, utrum genus possit de specie praedicari.⁴⁸

Both redactions of the *Questions on Porphyry* contain the question about the genus and its species, and so one cannot tell which redaction he had in mind when he wrote his commentary on *De divisione*. The same holds for the reference in the beginning of q. 11 on *De divisione*:

Postea esset quaerendum utrum genus sit principium suarum specierum et utrum genus sit totum ad species et utrum genus possit salvari in unica specie, sed ista *visa sunt supra Porphyrium* et ibi quaerantur.⁴⁹

In Brito's questions on Aristotle's *De anima*, besides other references to his logical works,⁵⁰ there is at least one to a question that is only found in N. Discussing whether and how accidents can lead to the cognition of substances, he reviews various solutions, including one that he says he has

⁴⁷ Cf. *Quest. sup. Porph.*, qq. 11-13, N 64vb-66va: *u. genus sit principium suarum specierum; u. ista diffinitio* [sc. "genus est quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid?"] *sit data de genere quod est res subiecta intentioni generis uel de genere quod est intentio secunda; u. genus possit saluari in unica specie*; qq. 11-13, A-version, **Br** 46v-50v: *u. diffiniatur intentio generis uel res subiecta intentioni; u. genus sit principium suarum specierum; u. genus possit saluari in unica specie* (q. 13, ed. Roos 1974, 335-42).

⁴⁸ *Quest. sup. De Div.*, q. 4, **Br** 462va.

⁴⁹ *Quest. sup. De Div.*, q. 11, **Br** 469rb. Cf. *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 11, N 64vb-65rb: *u. genus sit principium suarum specierum* (// q. 12, A-version, **Br** 48r-v); q. 13, N 65vb-66va: *u. genus possit saluari in unica specie* (// q. 13, A-version, **Br** 48v-50v; ed. Roos 1974, 335-42). One of the questions mentioned does not, in fact, occur in the *Questions on Porphyry*, but in a (probably) earlier set of questions on Boethius' *De divisione*: cf. *Quest. De Div.*, q. 7, **S** 56ra-b.

⁵⁰ Cf. *Quaestiones super libros De anima*, I.6, ed. De Boer 2012, 286 (probably refers to a similar question discussed in both redactions of the *Questions on Porphyry*, see qq. 6-7, ed. Pinborg 1980a, 84-110 (A-version), 85-111 (B-version); cf. also *Sophisma* "Aliquis homo est species", ed. Pinborg 1975b, IV.49-55, 141-6. Further, *Quaest. sup. De an.*, I.7, ed. De Boer 2012, 295 and 296, which contains references to Brito's discussions about the principle of individuation (*Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 24, N 70rb-71rb; // q. 21, A-version, **Br** 57r-59v).

once championed in another context (*alias*).⁵¹ He probably has q. 32 on Porphyry in mind, N 73va (ed. Roos 1978, 62-63), where he considers the problem of the *apparens* corresponding to the concept of genus (*u. ex uno apparenti in re intellectus possit consurgere in intellectum essentialem generis*), which has no match in the A-version. This reference would confirm the attribution to Brito suggested above (§ 5, i-ii). I am not, however, aware of any other reference to the B-version than this one.

7. Recurrent topics

As I noticed above, B tends to repeat the discussion of certain ‘hot’ topics in different works, sometimes without introducing any changes, at other times taking up a question once more because he has changed his mind. Let us first look at (1) a topic on which he has not changed his mind as far as the main issue is concerned (but only as regards a secondary one), and then (2) a topic where he takes two (slightly) different positions.

7.1 Analogy and analogous terms

This example does not help us ascertain the authorship of any of the questions in N, but it illustrates how Brito avails himself of discussions already composed in order to reaffirm his position on crucial points of doctrine or to change it. Brito discusses whether *ens* has a common *ratio* with respect to substance and accidents in the following texts:⁵²

1. *Quest. on Porph.* q. 22, A-version, Br 59v: *u. ens sit unius rationis ad substantiam et accidens*;
2. *Quest. on Porph.* q. 27, B-version, N 71va: *u. ens sit commune uniuocum ad substantiam et accidens siue ens sit unius rationis in substantia et accidente*;
3. *Quest. sup. Metaph.* IV.1, F = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr., E.1.252, 275ra-va:⁵³ *u. ens dicatur per unam rationem de omnibus entibus* (in Ebbesen 2001, 473-5);

⁵¹ *Quaest. sup. De an.*, I.8, ed. De Boer 2012, 303: “Aliter dicitur a quibusdam, et istam viam *alias tenui*, supponendo primo quod, quando virtutes aliquae sunt connexae et ordinate ad invicem, una illarum, scilicet inferiori, existente in sua operatione, ex hoc statim superior virtus potest cognoscere aliquid quod non est cognitum a virtute inferiori.”

⁵² The order of presentation is not meant to suggest any chronological priority between them.

⁵³ For a description of the ms, see *Catalogo di manoscritti filosofici nelle biblioteche italiane*, vol. 3, Firenze: Olschki, 1982, 49-51.

4. *Quest. sup. Phys.* I.14, **F** 6rb-7ra: *u. ens sit vnus rationis ad substantiam et accidens* (extensive quotations in Donati 2013);
5. *Quest. sup. Top. Arist.* IV.6, **Br** 258v: *u. ens sit vnus rationis ad substantiam et accidens*;
6. *Quest. sup. Soph. El.* I.18, **Br** 497ra-vb: *u. terminus analogus secundum se sumptus stet de virtute sermonis pro primario eius significato* (in Ebbesen 1998, 215-22).

While Brito clearly changed his mind on the existence of analogous terms (*termini analogi*),⁵⁴ on one point he did not: throughout his long career as a master of arts he always acknowledged analogy as a kind of unequal participation of a property by several beings (in this case the property is being itself, *ens* or *esse*). Only in his questions on *Metaph.* does he deny that *ens* has one and the same *ratio* in substances and accidents (ascribing that view to Avicenna), and this would suggest an early datation for this work (see Ebbesen 2001). Finally in *Quest. sup. Soph. El.*, while admitting real analogy, Brito rules out the existence of special terms (*termini analogi*) that would function in a peculiar way, when they occur in specific contexts.

7.2 Genus and its meaning

In q. 15 N we find a discussion of genus and its meaning, namely whether a genus signifies only one or many things (i.e. its species). In his edition of this question, Roos (1978) implicitly suggested that it is authentically B's. I agree with that opinion, even if — among the parallel questions listed below — only the ones on Aristotle's *Topics* show comparable developments of the discussion.⁵⁵

1. *Quest. sup. Porph.* q. 15, **N** 66vb-67rb (= q. 25, ed. Roos 1978, 5-61): *u. genus significet aliquid unum, id est aliquam unam speciem uel multas suas species*;
2. *Quaest. sup. Metaph.* VII.25, **F** = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr., E.1.252, 299ra-va (ed. Ebbesen 2001, 488-490):

⁵⁴ See Ebbesen 1979, 49-50; Marmo 1994, 325-8; 1995, 170-1. This evolution deserves a closer analysis, maybe in a future paper.

⁵⁵ Actually, the questions on the *Metaphysics* and on the *De divisione* appear to be closer to each other, in both their solutions and some of their arguments. It is interesting to notice that the solution proposed there is criticized by Brito in his questions IV.4 on Aristotle's *Topics* (see text in Tab. 7.1).

- u. genus significet plures naturas;*
3. *Quaest. sup. De Div. q. 5, Br 464va-466rb: u. genus significet plures naturas vel unam;*
 4. *Quest. sup. Top. Arist. IV.2-4, Br 254va-257va: u. genus sit aliquid <unum> in re; u. genus sit aliquid unum secundum rationem; u. genus significet unum secundum rationem uel significet multas species.*
 5. *Quaest. sup. Porph. q. 13, Br 49v-50v: u. genus possit in vnica saluari specie (where he discusses the question of the meaning of genus) (ed. Roos 1974);*

There is an agreement between items 1. and 4., that can be visualized (together with some passages of item 5.) in the following table:

<i>Quest. sup. Porph., q. 13, Br 48v-50v (ed. Roos 1974, 339)</i>	<i>Quest. sup. Porph., q. 15, N 66vb-67rb</i>	<i>Quest. sup. Top. Arist., IV.2-4, Br 254vb-257va</i>
	1.1 Quia quod predicatur de pluribus per se non unum significat, sed multa; sed genus (species, <i>cod.</i>) predicatur de pluribus speciebus per se; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia id terminus significat quod subicit et predicat, ut dicitur primo Posteriorum. Minor patet ex diffinitione generis.	q. 4, 1.1 Quia illud quod predicatur de omnibus speciebus significat (-et, <i>cod.</i>) eas; genus [significat eas] est huiusmodi; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia illud quod predicatur significatur; modo genus predicatur de multis speciebus, ut patet; ideo significat eas. (256vb)

	<p>1.3 Item, si genus significaret aliquid unum, tunc illud unum uel esset una species uel una natura communis ad omnia species uel unum accidens commune repertum in omnibus speciebus. Non unam speciem tantum, quia tunc non esset uere predicabile siue non posse<t> uere predicari de omnibus suis speciebus nisi falsa esset predicatio dicendo ‘homo est animal’ aut ‘asinus est animal’, quia species contente sub aliquo genere essentialiter distincte sunt et separate et talium unum uere de altero non predicatur. Item, non significat unam naturam communem ad omnes suas species, quia diuerse nature diuersarum specierum nullam naturam communem possunt habere. Item, non significat unum accidens commune, quia tunc quelibet predicatio generis de speciebus esset per accidens, quod nullus diceret. Ergo, per locum a sufficienti diuisione, genus significat multas species.</p>	<p>q. 4, 1.3 Item, aut genus significat omnes suas species aut aliquid commune eis secundum rem aut aliquam rationem eis communem; non videtur posse aliquid significare aliud; si significet omnes species, habeo propositum; si dicas “aliquid commune reale”, non potest esse, quia genus in re non est aliquid vnum, ut visum est [q. IV.2]; nec significat aliquam rationem communem speciebus, quia tunc genus nunquam predicaretur per se de speciebus, quia talis ratio intelligendi non predicatur per se de specie, cum sit accidentalis, nec etiam accidens ex quo sumitur ista ratio intelligendi. (256vb)</p>
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<p>Plus etiam: Si genus significaret omnes suas species, tunc omnis propositio aliqua, in qua predicaretur genus de specie, esset falsa, quia in propositione affirmatiua quidquid significatur nomine praedicati, attribuitur subiecto, ut dicendo: Homo currit. Hic denoto ego, quod illud, quod significat 'currit' attribuitur subiecto. Eodem modo dicendo: Homo est animal denoto, quod quidquid nomine animalis significatur, attribuitur ipsi homini. Modo, per te animal significat multas species et quiditates specierum. Ergo dicendo: Homo est animal denoto multas quiditates inesse uni quiditati. Modo omnis propositio in qua denotatur, quod non est, esse, est falsa sicut patet <i>I Perihermeneias</i> per commentatores et expositores.</p>	<p>2.1 Si genus significaret plures species, tunc quelibet predicatio generis de specie esset falsa. Consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis apparet, primo Posteriorum, quia omnis propositio per se est vera, sed dicendo 'homo est animal', ista est per se in primo modo, ut patet ibidem; ergo etc. Consequentia etiam apparet, quia multa et diuersa essentialiter sub quacumque ratione accepta numquam uerificantur de uno; unde in predicatione vera oportet quod quidquid nomine praedicati inportatur <in> nomine subiecti includatur et uerificetur de eo; si ergo genus nomine suo plures species sub quacumque ratione accidentali acceptas inportaret oporteret quod omnes ille species de una specie uerificarentur; si genus de specie debet predicari, sed hoc est falsum; ergo etc.</p>	<p>q. 4, 2.1 Oppositum arguitur, quia si genus significaret multas species, tunc de qualibet specie predicaret illas species omnes quas significat, quia illud quod terminus significat subicit et predicat; sed talis predicatio esset falsa in qua multe species predicarentur de vna specie; ergo ista predicatio in qua genus predicaretur esset falsa.</p>
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	<p>3.1.1 Primo (suppono) quod genus realiter non est aliquid unum, immo multa, secundum Philosophum, VI<I> Phisicorum, capitulo de permixtione motuum, ubi dicit quod iuxta genera latent multa, et intelligit de genere realiter sumpto.</p> <p>3.1.2 Idem vult Themistius in prohemio De anima, ubi dicit quod genus est quidam conceptus sine ypostasi ex tenui similitudine singularium collectus: sine ypostasi, id est sine natura una, immo realiter est plures nature.</p>	<p>q. 2, 3.1 Et hoc apparet primo auctoritate Philosophi, 7^o Phisicorum: ibi enim dicit quod iuxta genera latent multa; ideo secundum <genera> ut dicit non fiunt comparationes; vult ergo quod genus non significet vnum in re.</p> <p>3.2 Item, hoc apparet auctoritate Themistii supra prohemium De anima: dicit enim ibi quod genus est conceptus sine ypostasi, id est sine fundamento, sumptus ex tenui similitudine singularium, id est ex modo essendi singularium qui est debilis similitudo; ideo ex eius intentione patet quod genus non sit vnum in re. (255rb)</p>
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	<p>3.2 Secundo suppono quod genus, quantum ad rationem suam, est aliquid unum, quia in pluribus speciebus reperitur aliquis unus modus essendi communis ex quo potest sumi una ratio siue unus modus intelligendi generis communis omnibus speciebus illius generis, sicut in homine et asino et aliis speciebus animalis reperitur unus modus essendi communis sicut sentire et moueri ex quo sumitur ratio siue modus intelligendi animalis communis omnibus speciebus animalis.</p>	<p>q. 3, 3. Ad hoc dicendum quod genus est aliquid vnum secundum rationem, quia quecumque habent vnum apparens commune possunt esse vnum secundum rationem; modo ens, species siue illud quod importatur per genus habent vnum apparens commune in eis repertum; ergo istud potest esse aliquid vnum secundum rationem. Maior patet quia vnitatis rationis intelligendi sumitur ab vnitatis modi essendi, sicut videmus quod eadem res secundum diuersos modos essendi potest habere diuersas rationes intelligendi; ideo quantumcumque aliqua sunt diuersa, si habeant vnum modum essendi communem habebunt vnam rationem communem. Minor patet de se.</p>
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<p>Quid est ergo illud, quod genus significat? Dico, quod significat aliquid secundum quod habet in se principium apparentis, ex quo sumitur ratio sui generis, sicut verbi gratia animal, et sic intelligatur de aliis generibus. Non significat equum et asinum et sic de aliis speciebus animalis, sed significat aggregatum ex materia et forma sub ratione, qua (quae, ed.) est sentiens et movens. Modo, totum istud ut sic significatur et salvatur in qualibet specie animalis. Ergo genus quantum ad illud, quod nomine generis importatur, salvatur in unica specie.</p>	<p>3.3 Tunc ex istis suppositis dico duo ad questionem: primo quod genus significat aliquid unum secundum rationem et intellectum et non multa que sunt in re; secundo dico quod sunt multa realiter que substant isti rationi intelligendi generis, quia realiter sunt multe species.</p>	<p>q. 4, 3.2 Breuiter ego (ergo, cod.) dico <primo> quod illud quod nomine generis significatur est aliquid <unum> secundum quod habet esse principium apparentis ex quo sumitur ratio generis, ut 'animal' significat aggregatum ex materia et forma ut sentiens et mouens. 2° dico quod illud realiter non est unum sed multa. 3° dico quod genus tamen non significat illa multa.</p>
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Table 7.1

As one can see, while there is not literal agreement between the two sets of questions, they agree in their structure. The positions developed in **N** are the same as those in **B**'s questions on Aristotle's *Topics* (and in the A-version of his questions on Porphyry) the main difference being that in the latter what is just presupposed (i.e. a genus is one not in reality but rather according to reason — *secundum rationem*) is much more developed. This kind of agreement between the two series of texts might be explained by considering item 4. as a later development of Brito's doctrine, where he probably decided to expand the two presuppositions of q. 15 **N** into two separate questions (*Top.* IV.2 and 3). This match, however, seems sufficient to corroborate the attribution of item 1. to **B**, that was suggested above (§ 5, i-ii) on the sole ground of the internal references to and from q. 13 **N** (which, being parallel to q. 13 of the A-version, is basically **B**'s).

8. Self-quotations

If **N**'s q. 15 and q. 32 can be ascribed to Brito (at least in their core), and

q. 31 can be attributed to both B and H, what about the two other questions whose external parameters fit the average sizes of Q, S and A (see Tab. 4.2), i.e. q. 33 and q. 17? And what about q. 26 which refers to Brito's q. 24 N (see above § 5, iv)?

Question 33 N on Porphyry deals with problems usually prompted by the *Isagoge's* sections on genus and species. In the question commentary tradition we find the question whether a genus (or a species) can be 'saved' even in one species (or individual), i.e. whether an existing genus (or a species) keeps on existing even if only one of its species (or individuals) exists or, according to a different formulation, whether a genus (or a species) requires more than one species (or individual) to exist.⁵⁶ Sometimes the two types of question are merged. Since Brito discusses the problem in its first formulation (*u. species possit salvari in unico indiuiduo*) in both versions of his questions on Porphyry, we can compare on one side q. 14 in the two versions, and on the other side both of them with q. 33 N (*u. species de se requirat multitudinem indiuiduorum*).

If we first compare q. 14 A and q. 14 N, we can see that they share the same structure in the solution: a twofold justification for the positive answer, and a further clarification. A species, we are told, can exist even when only a single individual exists because what is essential to it (i.e. its matter and form, e.g. body and soul in human beings) keeps on existing even in a solitary individual. In both versions this argument is confirmed by reference to Themistius' definition of a genus (cf. above, §§ 3. and 7.2).⁵⁷ The second justification takes into account what is usually called in

⁵⁶ Cf. Martin of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. Porph.*, q. 18, ed. Roos, 143-4 (*u. genus requirit plures species actu*); Peter of Auvergne, *Quaest. sup. Porph.*, q. 12, ed. Tinè, 294-6 (*u. genus possit salvari in unica specie*); Anonymus Basileensis, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 12, **Ba** 128vb (*u. genus possit saluari in unica sui specie*), q. 14, **Ba** 129rb (*u. species possit saluari in unico indiuiduo*); Simon of Faversham, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 20, ed. Mazzarella, 38-40 (*u. genus contineat multipliciter specierum que sunt sub eo*); q. 26, 46-8 (*u. ad rationem speciei requiratur multitudo suppositorum*); Durandus of Auvergne, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 9, **Pa** 5rb-vb (*u. genus contineat multitudinem specierum*); q. 13, **Pa** 6vb-7ra; Durandus, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 13, **M** 6a-b (*u. genus possit saluari in unica suarum specierum uel exigit plures species in actu*).

⁵⁷ Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, N 66va: "Ad istam questionem dicendum quod species potest saluari in unico solo indiuiduo. Et probatur, quia in illo potest saluari species in quo potest saluari materia et forma pertinens ad illam speciem; sed in unico indiuiduo saluatur materia et forma pertinens ad speciem; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia cum ex materia et forma saluetur essentia alicuius rei in quo illa saluatur et ipsa res. Minor declaratur, quia, dato quod non esset aliquod aliud indiuiduum sub homine

modistic terminology the *apparentia* or *modi essendi*, tightly linked to the essence of a species, from which the concept of the species is drawn,⁵⁸ i.e. having sensations (*sentire*) and the ability to reason (*ratiocinari*). The confirmation of the last argument is derived from Avicenna, and leads to the conclusion that a species (or a universal, in general) does not require the actual existence of its individuals (or its subordinate items), but just the possibility of having them.⁵⁹ Question 14 N adds to q. 14 A two *rationes quod non*, two alternative formulations of the second justification,⁶⁰ and a

nisi Sortes, in eo saluaretur materia \et forma/ pertinens ad hominem qui est species, quia Sortes habet carnes et ossa que sunt materia hominis et animam humanam que est forma eius. Et confirmatur ratio, quia, secundum quod dicit Themistius in prohemio De anima, “genus est conceptus sine ypostasi ex tenui similitudine singularium collectus”; sed species vult esse quedam natura una; modo, illud unum in quolibet indiuiduo saluatur in Sorte uel in Platone et sic de aliis, quia quidquid continet species continet eius indiuiduum et adhuc plus, quia cum hoc continet principia indiuiduantia; ergo etc.” Cf.

Quest. sup. Porph., q. 14, **Br** 50v.

⁵⁸ On *apparentia* or *modi essendi*, see Donati 2013.

⁵⁹ Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, N 66va: “Item, idem arguitur alia ratione sic, et est sumpta ex predictis quasi quantum ad unum eius membrorum, quia illud cuius tota essentia et intellectus potest saluari in aliquo, illud potest saluari in eodem; sed tota essentia et intellectus speciei potest saluari in aliquo uno indiuiduo, sicut hominis in Sorte, quia essentia ex qua sumitur intellectus hominis, sicut sentire et ratiocinari, saluatur in Sorte: Sortes enim sentit et ratiocinatur, ut de se patet; sed ex illo sumitur ratio et intellectus hominis; ideo etc. Et confirmatur. Ad cuius euidenciam est sciendum quod Auicenna, in Logica sua, capitulo de vniuersali, dicit quod ad hoc quod sit vniuersale non oportet quod sit in pluribus actu, sed sufficit quod sibi non repugnet; et determinat hic de domo triangula, quia dato quod domus triangularis non sit in rerum natura, quia tamen sibi non repugnat esse in pluribus, ideo est vniuersale; et ideo quamuis species non sit nisi in uno solo supposito, quia tamen quantum est de materia et ex parte sue forme non repugnat sibi esse in multis, immo habet aptitudinem ad hoc quod sit in multis potest esse vniuersale.” Cf. *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, **Br** 50v.

⁶⁰ Radulphus Brito/Hyppibbius, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, N 66va: “1) Et potest sic formari ratio: illud saluatur in unico indiuiduo cuius intellectus saluatur in unico indiuiduo; sed species est huiusmodi, quia sumitur a sentire et ratiocinari, quia cum intellectus speciei sit compositus ex intellectu generis et differentie, et intellectus generis sumitur a sentire et differentie a ratiocinari, tunc intellectus speciei illa duo includit. 2) Vel formatur sic ratio: illud quod potest saluari in uno non requirit multa propter eius salutem; species est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet de se. Minor etiam patet ex dictis, quia saluato apparenti a quo accipitur ratio speciei saluatur species; sed tale apparens saluatur in unico indiuiduo; ergo etc. Maior huius patet, quia posita causa ponitur effectus. Minor etiam patet, quia saluato Sorte in eo saluatur sentire et ratiocinari a quo sumitur ratio speciei; ergo etc.”

third argument in support of the position expressed beforehand.⁶¹ These additions may probably be ascribed to H. The final clarification (before the replies to the *rationes quod non*), which is quite far from its corresponding A-version, may on the contrary be by B, probably reflecting a different stage of elaboration of the question.⁶²

If we examine q. 33 N, we find that some of the arguments used here are very close to those in q. 14, and that one of those ascribable to H is repeated here almost *verbatim*:

Item, saluata diffinitione saluatur diffinitum; sed diffinitio saluatur in unico indiuiduo; ergo et species. Maior patet, quia diffinitio conuertitur cum diffinito. Minor patet, quia saluato Sorte saluatur diffinitio hominis. Et de isto prius satis uisum est.⁶³

Actually, the whole question diverges considerably from what Brito held when answering q. 14 about a species and its only existing individual. The author, whom I suppose to be H, follows a tradition of distinguishing the case of inferior (or sublunar) species from that of superior ones, such as separate substances and celestial bodies. We find similar distinctions in

⁶¹ Radulphus Brito/Hytpibbius, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, N 66va: “(3) Item, saluata diffinitione saluatur diffinitum; sed diffinitio speciei saluatur in unico indiuiduo; ergo et species. Maior patet, quia diffinitio conuertitur cum diffinito. Minor etiam patet, quia saluato Sorte saluatur animal rationale mortale, quod est diffinitio hominis.”

⁶² Radulphus Brito (?), *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, N 66va-b: “Et notandum quod species potest considera//ri uel quoad rationem speciei, uel quantum ad id quod nomine speciei significatur, et sic species saluatur in unico indiuiduo; alio modo consideratur quantum ad omnia illa in quibus apta nata est species reperiri, sic species non potest saluari in unico indiuiduo.” Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, Br 50v-51r: “Sed propter solutionem rationum, intelligendum quod multiplicitas indiuiduorum sub aliqua // specie est propter hoc, sicut p<ropt>er causam finalem, quia indiuidua talis speciei sunt corporalia, nec possunt eadem numero permanere, ideo per continuam generationem possunt perpetuari in esse, ideo sunt multa supposita sub vna <specie>, vt Philosophus vult 2^o De anima. Huius est alia causa, quia non constat ex materia sua tota et ista est causa materialis, et habetur a Philosopho, primo Celi et mundi, quod autem non possibile plures esse mundos. Cum autem non est nisi vnicum indiuiduum sub se, tota materia occupata est forma. Ex hoc sequitur, quod ad hoc quod aliquid <sit> species sufficit quod ex parte sue forme sit aptum natum esse in pluribus.” As I said above, the chronological relationship between the two versions requires a deeper scrutiny.

⁶³ Radulphus Brito / Hytpibbius, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 33, N 74rb; see text in footnote 61.

Simon of Faversham or Durandus of Auvergne,⁶⁴ but not in Brito's questions concerning the relationship between species and individuals⁶⁵ or that between corporeal and incorporeal or separate substances.⁶⁶ The basic argument for denying superior species the necessity of having a plurality of individuals is actually the same that Brito gives in answering a *dubitatio* in q. 14, i.e. the fact that in superior beings the whole matter is occupied by the form,⁶⁷ but the author of q. 33 N adds a justification of this fact:

Et tu quereris quare in supercelestibus siue corporibus superioribus tota materia sit indissolubiliter coniuncta toti forme. Dicendum quod ratio huius est: quia magis approximantur primo et quanto aliquid magis primo approximatur tanto est perfectius; vnde in toto vniuerso non inueniuntur due species eiusdem perfectionis, ut innuit Philosophus, XII^o Methafisice, quod species entis se habent ad primum ut species numeri ad unitatem: non sunt autem duo numeri qui eque distent ab unitate, sic nec due species eque distant a primo; etc. Et ideo semper est in eis ordo secundum magis perfectum et minus perfectum; vnde dicit Philosophus, V^o Methafisice, est quoddam perfectum *quod non habet yperbolem*, id est excessum, ad cuius accessum et recessum omnia dicuntur perfecta et imperfecta.⁶⁸

As far as I have been able to ascertain, while Brito sometimes makes appeal to the authority of *Metaph.* VIII.3 (1043b34-1044a2, where Aristotle

⁶⁴ Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 26, ed. Mazzarella, 47-8; Durandus of Auvergne, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 13, Pa 6vb-7ra.

⁶⁵ Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, Br 50v-51r; N 66va-b.

⁶⁶ Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Pred.*, q. 11, A-version, Br 77r-78r; N 82vb-83rb.

⁶⁷ Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, N 66va-b: "(...) Et ideo ex hoc sciet intellectus et iudicabit quod soli et lune quantum est ex parte sue forme non repugnat esse in pluribus, immo habebunt aptitudinem essendi in pluribus. Ideo nec oportet quod aptitudo illa reducat ad actum, cum sit a parte forme, ut dictum est. Quantum tamen est ex parte sue materie sibi repugnat esse in pluribus, quia tota sua materia occupata est una forma indissolubiliter. Unde secundum quod dicitur 4^o Celi et mundi, quia tota materia mundi est occupata una forma indissolubiliter, ideo non sunt plures mundi (quod determinat ibi), quia si omnes carnes et ossa omnia requisita ad formam nasi essent sub una forma nasi indissolubiliter non esset nisi unus nasus; ideo etc." Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, Br 51r.

⁶⁸ Hytppibbius(?), *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, N 66vb. For analogous considerations (with no reference to *auctoritates*, though), see Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam. Reportation de Munich*, Comm. ad III.3 999a6, ed. W. Dunphy, Louvain-la-Neuve: Ed. de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1981, 125.

develops a parallel between numbers and essences) to support the idea that substantial forms are indivisible and therefore cannot increase or decrease (receive *magis* and *minus*), he never refers to the passages here mentioned, that are supposedly taken from *Metaph.* XII (possibly a wrong reference to *Metaph.* VIII.3) and *Metaph.* V (16 1021b32-33), not even in his questions on those books.⁶⁹ On the contrary, we find the last reference in a question on the *Categories* that occurs in N but not in the A-version. The question is devoted to a related topic, i.e. whether two species under the genus of substance can be equally perfect:

Item, magis perfectum est causa minus perfecti; sed si una species esset magis perfecta quam alia, tunc sequeretur quod esset causa illius speciei imperfecte, quod est inconueniens; ergo erunt eque perfecte. Maior patet, per auctorem libri *De causis*, in quadam propositione, et per Philosophum, 5^o *Methafisice*, vbi dicit quoddam est perfectum *quod non habet yperbolem* ad cuius accessum et recessum omnia alia dicuntur magis perfecta et minus perfecta. Minor apparet de se: vna enim species non est causa alterius speciei; ergo erunt eque perfecte.⁷⁰

In the reply to the arguments *quod non*, the author of N rejects this argument, since the principle of causality invoked in the major premise (*magis perfectum est causa minus perfecti*) only holds for beings that are essentially ordered, but does not hold for beings, such as the species of human beings and donkeys, that are only accidentally ordered.⁷¹ Since q. 33 N on Porphyry i) adopts a different solution than q. 14 (in both versions), ii) quotes an argument added to q. 14 N, and iii) makes reference to authorities that are not in Brito's standard repertory, I conclude that q. 33 N can be attributed to H. In corroboration I may add that in this question the adverb *modo* (with the adversative meaning of *sed*) is never used (see above, § 2).

⁶⁹ Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Metaph.*, V.28-29, Fi 288rb-vb; XII.2, Fi 309vb-310ra. A list of questions is published in Ebbesen 2001, 467-70.

⁷⁰ Hytppibbius(?), *Quest. sup. Pred.*, q. 14, N 83rb. Also the references to the *Liber de causis* in N, which are completely absent from the A-version of Brito's question on the *Ars vetus*, may be considered clues to H's authorship of the questions (or arguments) where they occur. I intend to return to this question in a future paper about Brito's/Hytppibbius' commentary on the *Categories*.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*: "Ad aliam. Cum dicitur "magis perfectum est causa minus perfecti", dico quod verum est in essentialiter ordinatis, ut inter causam et effectum; sed in accidentaliter ordinatis non oportet, qualia sunt due species, ut homo et asinus; ergo etc."

9. Disagreement between H and B: two questions about individuals

Question 17 (*u. ista sit per se uera 'Sortes est homo'*, N 67vb-68ra) deals with the truth conditions for singular propositions in which a species is predicated of its individuals, and question 26 (*u. duo indiuidua eiusdem speciei differant secundum substantiam uel solo accidente*) with the difference between individuals belonging to the same species. Both questions fit well in the question commentary tradition, where we find analogous problems discussed by Martin of Dacia, Durandus and the Anonymus Basileensis in their questions on Porphyry,⁷² even though the author of qq. 17 and 26 does not appear to rely on their arguments and/or discussions. As a matter of fact, both questions — as seen above (§ 5 iii and iv) — in their solutions refer to a long discussion about the principle of individuation found elsewhere in the same manuscript (q. 24, N 70rb-71rb).

In q. 17 N, the author says that the solution differs according to one's view concerning the principle of individuation, which he is going to discuss in another question.⁷³ Some philosophers — he goes on — think that this principle is form, others that it is matter, and yet others that it is undivided quantity.⁷⁴ He then proceeds to a quick examination of each option. The first two positions (i.e. form and matter) agree on the *per se* truth of such singular propositions as 'Socrates is a man', because a singular term and its corresponding common term signify the same matter and form (i.e. their essential components), albeit in different ways: the former in a determinate way (he suggests implicitly that it does not matter whether this

⁷² Cf. Martin of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. Porph.*, q. 11 (*u. universale predicatur de particulari*), ed. Roos, 137-8; Durandus, *Quest. Porph.*, q. 16, M 7a-b ("circa speciem, et primo queritur circa diffinitionem quam ponit Porfirius dicens quod species <est> quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus numero. Et dicitur quod species de indiuiduo non possit predicari.", M 7a); Anon. Basil. *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 16 (*u. species possit vere predicari de indiuiduo*, e.g. 'Sortes est homo'), Ba 130ra-b (this question and the previous one are very close to each other); q. 21 (*u. duo indiuidua substantie differant substantialiter uel accidentaliter*), Ba 131rb-vb. What is peculiar of q. 17 N is that it discusses not only about the truth of the singular proposition, but also about its being *per se* true.

⁷³ The link between this type of question and the question of individuation is present in Martin of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. Porph.*, q. 11, ed. Roos, 138.

⁷⁴ Hytppibbius(?), *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 17, N 67vb: "De ista questione est diuersa opinio secundum quod diuersimode opinatur de principiis indiuiduationis, quia quidam dicunt principium indiuiduationis esse formam, quidam uero materiam, quidam quantitatem indiuisam. Quid autem de hoc sit sentiendum apparebit in alia questione."

determination is caused by matter or by form), the latter in a common (or indeterminate) way.⁷⁵ Some of those who maintain that the principle of individuation is undivided quantity, think that the proposition is partially *per se* and partially *per accidens*, since the term *homo* signifies partially its essential components, and partially its principle of individuation.⁷⁶ Others say that whichever position we take, the singular proposition is always *per se* true, and reject all the arguments against it, holding that as far as their meaning is concerned such terms as *Socrates* only imply a common nature (*natura humana*), but as far as their being is concerned they imply their accidents (and among them quantity). The author ends his discussion by saying that this solution appears to be the best.⁷⁷ Even if we interpret these words as the indication of a theoretical choice limited to the issue at hand, and not as a solution to the question of individuation, it is difficult to reconcile them with B's position on this topic as expressed in q. 24 N (on the principle of individuation).

In q. 26 N, the author first marshals four arguments that the difference between two individuals (of the same species) is just accidental, and one argument for the opposite position. He then proceeds to the solution,

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*: “Sed qui dicunt formam esse principium et qui dicunt materiam esse principium, illi dicunt quod ista propositio sit per se vera ‘Sor est homo’. Huius ratio est: quia Sor e[s]t homo dicunt eandem formam et materiam, licet diuersimode, scilicet ‘homo’ communiter, ‘Sortes’ determinate, ut prius visum est.”

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*: “Sed qui dicunt quantitatem indiuisam esse principium indiuiduationis, de hiis quidam dicunt quod ista partim sit per se, partim per accidens [cum?] in quantum iste terminus ‘Sortes’ [homo] partim significat formam et materiam et partim quantitatem, secundum hoc etc., quod probatur primo Posteriorum, quia terminus illud predicat quod significat.”

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*: “Alii dicunt: quidquid sit principium indiuiduationis, ista semper erit per se vera ‘Sor est homo’. Et soluuntur rationes aliorum ex auctoritate <Philosophi>, primo Posteriorum, “terminus illud predicat” etc.; dicunt quod iste terminus ‘Sortes’ (homo, cod.) tantum inportat unum quantum ad significatum, scilicet naturam humanam; accidentia autem uel quantitatem inportat non quantum ad significatum, sed quantum ad esse. Et ista uia videtur esse melior; ideo ista per se est uera ‘Sor est homo’.” The text should be emended (if we want it to have any sense and be coherent with the replies to the arguments *quod non* that follow. See for instance the following: “Ad 3um. Cum dicitur “illa non est per se” etc., concedatur, si includit illa de significato suo. In minori dicis quod Sortes includit principia indiuiduantia que accidunt Sorti, dico quod non includit illa de significato suo, sed tantum quantum ad esse. Ad 4um... Et tu dicis quod Sortes includit principia indiuiduantia etc., dico ut prius quod non includit illa quantum ad significatum, sed quantum ad esse.”

first describing the position of those who hold that the principle of individuation is undivided quantity (individuals therefore differ by accident),⁷⁸ and then the position of those who think that form is the relevant principle (individuals therefore differ first and foremost substantially, and only secondarily by their accidents).⁷⁹ After giving voice to this position the author presents two arguments supporting it,⁸⁰ implicitly indicating that this is his final choice. Since this is not Brito's position, who on the contrary rejects it in both versions of his discussion on the principle of individuation, I think that H's authorship of q. 26 N is highly probable. The open disagreement with B's position may also be the reason why he decided to delete the question by *va—cat*. The attribution to H of q. 26 N together with q. 17 may also explain why in the latter the author adopts a solution which is not in line with B: in fact, he dismisses B's position on individuation (and its consequences for q. 17 N), opting for a solution that brackets the opposing views about individuation.

9. First conclusions: what do we know now about Hytppibbius?

The result of this study can be read in the last column of *App. A*, where I indicate the probable author of each question on Porphyry, taking into account all the criteria applied above. In summary, my conclusion is that besides the qq. that correspond to the A-version, we can ascribe qq. 15, 31 (partially) and 32 on Porphyry to Brito, whereas we can attribute to Hytppibbius 18 qq. on the same text. Further research may of course modify these figures, and improve our knowledge of the relationship between H and the question commentary tradition, but for the time being I consider

⁷⁸ Hytppibbius(?), *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 26, N 71rb: “Tenendo quod quantitas indiuisa sit principium indiuiduationis dicunt quidam quod duo indiuidua eiusdem speciei differunt primo accidente: illud enim est principium diuersitatis quod est principium indiuiduationis.”

⁷⁹ Hytppibbius(?), *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 26, N 71rb: “Sed tenendo aliam uiam potest aliter dici quod duo indiuidua eiusdem speciei primo et per se differunt per formam; sed per quantitatem differunt per accidens.”

⁸⁰ Hytppibbius(?), *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 26, N 71rb: “Ratio primi est ista: per quod aliqua sunt indiuisa in se et diuisa a quocumque alio per illud differunt; hoc est per formam; ergo etc. Maior (Minor, cod.) patet de se. Minor apparet per Philosophum, 7^o Methafisice, vbi dicit “forma separat et distinguit et dat esse distinctum”. Ratio secundi est ista: <ad> diuersas formas sequitur diuersa quantitas; sed duo indiuidua primo et per se differunt per diuersitatem specierum; ergo per quantitatem per accidens. Maior patet: determinata forma in materia requirit determinatam quantitatem. Minor apparet: forma enim dat esse unum substantie et quantitati.”

them as the best we can achieve.

This provides a basis for saying something more about Hytppibius and his attitude towards Brito and the texts they commented on. H touches upon various topics in his questions: sometimes they overlap with B's questions (thus the ones about the existence of universals at the beginning of H's questions on Porphyry, see *App. B*, q. 5 H); more often they differ and refer to portions of the texts B did not comment on. H's intention appears to be to supplement B's questions so as to provide a better coverage of the texts commented on. For instance, at the beginning of his questions on Porphyry H introduces a general question about the nature of logic, whether it is a practical or speculative science. As we have seen, H by so doing inscribes his work into a tradition for what a commentary on Porphyry ought to deal with. The same may be said about other questions edited in *App. B*: H seems to be well aware of the problems discussed in connection with Porphyry's *Isagoge* at the Parisian Faculty of Arts in the last decades of the 13th century, and intends to give his own contribution. Yet, his set of questions cannot stand alone, without B's, so his enterprise is limited to complementing B's wherever he thinks this is necessary.

From various passages it is clear that H knows modistic grammar and logic. We can consider him as a modistic logician, maybe one of B's pupils, who, wanting to compose a set of questions on Porphyry (and the *Ars vetus* in general) and, having at hand a redaction of B's questions, decided to build his own set on that, incorporating and integrating B's questions into his own, making them editorially homogeneous: he generally quotes the sources more carefully than B (at least as B appears in his *A*-version); he repeats in a regular way the transition formulas from one section of a question to another, like *Tunc ad rationes in oppositum/contrarium* introducing the last section. On the other hand, as we saw above (§ 2) some stylistic features typical of B can also be found in H's. In conclusion, H seems to be a classic epigone, and quite a mediocre one: he reports generally agreed-upon theories without questioning them; he often discusses his questions in a quick and simplified way, quoting canonical *auctoritates* (often B's favourite ones, but as we saw he also seems to have his own). The distance between H and B is that between an expert and sharpminded master of arts and a (young) pupil, who, perhaps, after having attended one or two years of courses is given a lecturing assignment by the master himself.⁸¹

⁸¹ Cf. Maierù 1994, chap. 4.

The qualitative difference between the two authors is quite impressive: H seldom engages in discussions with contemporary authors, while B is always ready to aim his arrows at them; H often restricts himself to the obligatory arguments *pro & contra*, a brief solution (often making reference to distinctions previously proposed by B), and cursory replies to the arguments that conflict with his solution. When H disagrees with B, he either conceals it, as in q. 17, or prefers to delete what he has written. What is not clear is whether H's contribution is limited to the addition of new questions and the addition of new arguments for or against certain theses in questions that globally speaking can be ascribed to B; it may also consist in rephrasing B's arguments or solutions, but this is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to demonstrate.

Hyppibius after all is an epigone, but he appears at least to be a fair man. He seems to be conscious of his lesser ability as a philosopher, and wants his reader to be aware of the authorship of each question. Maybe motivated by modesty, H has left pointers to identify his contribution. The marginal annotations in the first 22 questions on Porphyry must be his work: they evince a rare sense of authorship and a modesty even more uncommon at the Faculty of Arts of Paris. Probably, in H's own manuscript, the archetype of N, these annotations marked every question, and only the sloppiness, lack of time or laziness of the copyist can be held responsible for their almost complete omission, forcing the interpreter to perform hermeneutical somersaults in his attempts to figure out whose each of those questions is.

Abbreviations and sigla

AHDLMA = *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge*
CIMAGL = *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-âge grec et latin*

- Ba** = Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.III.20
Br = Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royal "Albert I^{er}" 2910 (3540-47)
F = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr., E.1.252
M = München, Staatsbibliothek, Clm. 18917
N = Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. V.21
Pa = Palermo, Biblioteca Comunale, 2 Qq D 142

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Appendix A

List of questions in the A-version and the B-version

Questiones super librum Porphyrii

A- vers.	B- vers.	Question titles in N	N fol.	Prob. auth.
Pro.	Pro.	Prohemium questionum Britonis super veterem artem (ed. Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981-82)	58rb	B
q. 1	q. 1	u. logica sit scientia	58vb	B
	[q. 1 H]	u. logica sit scientia practica uel speculatiua (App. B)	59rb	H
q. 2	q. 2	u. logica sit scientia rationalis	59va	B
	[q. 2 H]	u. logica precedat alias scientias (App. B)	59vb	H
q. 3	q. 3	u. sillogismus sit subiectum in tota logica	60ra	B
	[q. 3 H]	u. de uniuersali possit esse scientia (App. B)	60rb	H
q. 4	q. 4	u. uniuersale sit subiectum in libro Porphyrii	60vb	B
q. 5	q. 5	u. uniuersale in communi... sit genus ad v vniuersalia (ed. Pinborg 1980)	61rb	B
q. 6	q. 6	u. uniuersale habeat esse preter operationem intellectus (ed. Pinborg 1980)	62ra	B
q. 7	q. 7	u. ad uniuersale... sufficiat operatio intellectus agentis (ed. Pinborg 1980)	62va	B
q. 8	q. 8	u. uniuersale... habeat esse in intellectu sicut in subiecto uel in re (ed. Pinborg 1980)	63ra	B
q. 9	q. 9 [= q. 4 H]	u. vniuersalia sint separata a singularibus... uel sint coniuncta eis (App. B)	63rb	BH

A-vers.	B-vers.	Question titles in N	N fol.	Prob. auth.
	[q. 5 H]	u. quidditas rei possit esse actu vniuersalis circumscrip̄ta om̄ni operatione intellectus (App. B)	63vb	H
	[q. 6 H]	u. quidditas rei sensibilis possit esse actu vniuersalis per primum conceptum uel per secundum rei attributum (App. B)	63vb	H
	[q. 7 H]	u. vniuersale sit in intellectu solo (App. B)	64ra	H
	[q. 8 H]	u. vniuersale sit in intellectu nudo uel puro (App. B)	64rb	H
	[q. 9 H]	u. vniuersalia sint corporea uel incorporea (App. B)	64rb	H
q. 10	q. 10	de sufficientia v predicabilium siue vniuersalium, u. sint tantum, uel plura pauciora	64va	B
q. 11	q.12	u. ista diffinitio sit data de genere quod est res subiecta intentioni generis uel de genere quod est intentio secunda	65rb	B
q. 12	q. 11	u. genus sit principium suarum specierum	64vb	B
	[q. 10 H]	u. diffinitio (generis) detur de rebus in anima uel de rebus extra animam existentibus (App. B)	65va	H
q. 13	q. 13	u. genus possit saluari in unica specie	65vb	B
q. 14	q. 14	u. species possit saluari in unico indiuiduo	66va	B
	q. 15	u. genus significet aliquid unum, id est aliquam unam speciem uel multas suas species (ed. Roos 1978 as q. 25)	66vb	B
q. 15	q. 16	u. species secundum ueritatem possit predicari de indiuiduo	67rb	B
	q. 17	u. ista sit per se uera 'Sortes est homo'	67vb	H

A-vers.	B-vers.	Question titles in N	N fol.	Prob. auth.
q. 16	q. 18	u. indiuiduum predicetur de uno solo uel de pluribus	68ra	B
	q. 19	u. ista diffinitio speciei sit bona quando dicit Porphirius “species est quod dicitur sub assignato genere”	68ra	H
	q. 20	u. una res possit habere plures diffinitiones	68rb	H
q. 17	q. 21	u. species de aliqua re sicut de homine possit uere predicari, uel si ista sit uera ‘homo est species’	68va	B
q. 18	q. 22	u. hec sit uera ‘aliquis homo est species’	69ra	B
q. 19	q. 23	u. indiuiduum addat aliquid reale supra speciem	69va	B
q. 20	q. 25	u. indiuiduum in suo significato includat illud accidens per quod indiuiduum est indiuiduum	71rb	B
	q. 26	u. duo indiuidua eiusdem speciei differant secundum substantiam uel solo accidente (deleted by va—cat)	71rb	H
q. 21	q. 24	quid sit illud quod indiuiduum addit supra supra speciem	70rb	B
q. 22	q. 27	u. ens sit commune uniuocum ad substantiam et accidens siue ens sit unius rationis in substantia et accidente	71va	B
	q. 28	u. in quolibet genere sit una species specialissima	72rb	H
q. 23	q. 29	u. hec sit uera ‘Sortes et Plato sint unus homo’	72va	B
	q. 30	u. minus commune possit predicari de magis communi	72vb	H
	q. 31	u. sit dare gradus in formis	73ra	BH
	q. 32	u. ex uno apparenti in re intellectus possit consurgere in intellectum essentialem generis (ed. Roos 1978 as q. 44)	73va	B

A-vers.	B-vers.	Question titles in N	N fol.	Prob. auth.
	q. 33	u. species de se requirat multitudinem indiuiduorum	73vb	H
	q. 34	u. differentia sit substantia uel accidens	74rb	H
q. 24	q. 35	u. differentia predicetur in quale, secundum quod dicit Porphyrius	74rb	B
q. 25	q. 36	u. ista diffinitio sit bona quando dicit Porphyrius "differentia est quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie"	74ra	B
	q. 37	u. species ex parte differentie aliquid reale addat supra genus	74rb	H
q. 26	q. 38	u. mortale sit differentia	74va	B
q. 27	q. 39	u. proprium sit predicabile	74vb	B
q. 28	q. 40	u. proprium sit distinctum predicabile ab accidente	75ra	B
q. 29	q. 41	u. destructo proprio destruaturspecies cuius est proprium	75rb	B
q. 30	q. 42	u. proprium causetur ex propriis principiis speciei cuius est proprium	75va	B
q. 31	q. 43	u. accidens sit predicabile siue uniuersale	76ra	B
q. 32	q. 44	u. hec diffinitio accidentis sit bona seu bene data	76ra	B
q. 33	q. 45	u. inherencia sit de essentia cuiuslibet accidentis	76va	B

Appendix B

A working edition of 10 questions by Hytppibius on Porphyry

N = Nürnberg, SB Cent. V.21, ff. 59rb-65vb: saec. XIV, membran., mm. 295x215, two columns; northern European—maybe German—hands (cf. D'Alverny 1968, 338).

All numbers are spelled out and the choice between *c* and *t*, *u* and *v* has been normalized.

List of questions

- q. 1: Utrum logica sit scientia practica vel speculativa
- q. 2: Utrum logica precedat alias scientias
- q. 3: Utrum de universali possit esse scientia
- q. 4: Utrum universalia sint separata a singularibus, secundum quod ponit Plato, vel sint coniuncta eis
- q. 5: Utrum quiditas rei possit esse actu universalis circumscripta omni operatione intellectus
- q. 6: Utrum quiditas rei sensibilis possit esse actu universalis per primum conceptum vel per secundum rei attributum
- q. 7: Utrum universale sit in intellectu solo
- q. 8: Utrum universale sit in intellectu nudo vel puro
- q. 9: Utrum universalia sint corporea vel incorporea
- q. 10: Utrum diffinitio detur de rebus in anima vel de rebus extra animam existentibus

Abbreviations

AA = Jacqueline Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique*, Louvain—Paris: Publications Universitaires—Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974.

Hyppibius, *Questiones super librum Porphyrii*

***Questio 1* (59rb-va)**

Consequenter queritur utrum logica sit scientia practica vel speculativa.¹

1. Et arguitur quod practica.

1.1 Illa scientia que queritur propter alterum est practica; logica est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet. Minor etiam manifesta est: logica enim queritur propter alias scientias; ergo etc.

1.2 Preterea, scientia cuius finis est opus, ipsa est practica; sed finis logice est opus; ergo etc. Maior patet. Minor declaratur, quia logica docet diffinire, dividere et huiusmodi; ergo etc.

1.3 Preterea, illa scientia que docet modum operandi est practica; logica est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior est manifesta. Minor etiam apparet, ut in precedenti ratione.

1.4 Preterea, illa scientia que est de actibus humanis est practica; logica est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior declaratur per Eustachium in libro *Ethicorum*,² qui dicit quod operationis humane finis est opus. Minor apparet, quia homo diffinit, dividit etc.; ergo videtur quod logica sit scientia practica.

2. Oppositum potest probari ratione sic:

2.1 Illa scientia que queritur propter se est speculativa; logica est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior apparet per Philosophum, septimo *Metaphisice*:³ “finis theorice est scire vel veritas; practice vero opus”; et Commentator tertio *Ethicorum*⁴ dicit “bonum et malum sunt in rebus, verum et fal-

¹ Utrum logica sit scientia practica vel speculativa. H<ytippii> (*add. in mg. sup.*) N

² Eustratius, *Enarratio*, ed. Mercken, 15, 68-69: “Haec [scil. opera] autem proposuit dicere, quia hominis naturae operatio finis, ut ipse dicit procedens” (CAG 20, 9, 6-7).

³ Arist., *Metaph.* II.1 993b20-21 (AA 1.39, 118).

⁴ *Locum non inveni.* Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* VI.4 1027b25-29.

sum in anima: in rebus respectu agibilium, in anima respectu intelligibilium”. Minor apparet: logica enim est propter se, quia propter scire; ergo etc.

2.2 Hoc confirmatur alia ratione sic: illa scientia cuius finis est speculatio, ipsa erit speculativa; logica est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet ex dictis. Minor etiam manifesta est, quia finis logice est speculatio <vel> ipsius scire.

Ad 1. Tunc ad rationes in oppositum.

Ad 1.1 Ad primam. Cum dicitur “scientia que est propter alterum” dico quod duplex est finis, propinquus et remotus. Maior conceditur de fine propinquo et non remoto. Ad minorem, quando dicis “logica est /N 59va/ huiusmodi”, dico quod non est verum de fine remoto \et non propinquo/, quia ille (scil. finis) est scire ipsius logice vel speculatiue; ergo non concludit.

Ad 1.2 Ad secundum. Cum dicitur “cuius finis est opus” etc., verum est de fine propinquo et non remoto [et proprio].

Ad 1.3 Et similiter ad tertium. Cum dicitur “scientia que docet modum operandi” etc. dicendum ut prius.

Ad 1.4 Ad quartam. <Cum dicitur> “illa scientia que est de actibus humanis” etc., verum est, si est de actibus humanis operatiuis; si autem de speculatiuis non oportet. Ad minorem eodem modo; et ita ratio non concludit.

Questio 2 (59vb-60ra)

Consequenter queritur utrum logica precedat alias scientias.⁵

1. Et videtur quod non.

⁵ Utrum logica precedat alias scientias. H<ytpibii> (*add. in mg. sup.*) N

1.1 Quia illa scientia sine qua est impossibile habere logicam et alias scientias est prior; sed gramatica est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet. Minor declaratur per Philosophum in *De sensu et sensatu*,⁶ ubi dicit “sermo bene audibilis est proprium instrumentum doctrine”; et sic, merito gramatica erit prior, cum sit de sermone congruo et perfecto.

1.2 Preterea, illa scientia qua primo instruimur est prior; gramatica est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia in disciplinis est ordo. Minor etiam patet: gramatica enim docet litteras et sillabas, significata dictionum que primo addiscuntur; ergo etc.

1.3 Preterea, sicut habet se verum ad congruum, sic logica se habet ad gramaticam; sed verum presupponit congruum, ergo logica gramaticam. Maior patet, quia sicut se habet passio sive proprietas ad proprietatem ita habitus ad habitum. Minor apparet per Philosophum, secundo *Peryerme-nias*,⁷ ubi dicit “oratio non existens congrua, neque vera est neque falsa”; si sic, ergo gramatica precedit logicam.

2.1 Oppositum videtur velle Philosophus [2^o] secundo *Metaphisice*,⁸ ubi dicit quod inconueniens est simul querere modum sciendi et scientiam et neutrum facile; sed oportet primo querere modum sciendi et per ‘modum sciendi’ intelligit logicam, ut dicit ibidem Commentator.⁹

2.2 Item, dicit in *Topicis*¹⁰ quod dyalectica est viam habens ad omnium principia methodorum, id est scientiarum specialium; sed via prior termino ad quem est; ergo etc.

3.1 Ad istam questionem posset dici quod simpliciter gramatica precedit logicam, tamen ordine doctrine logica precedit gramaticam, quia tradit instrumenta docendi sive sciendi.

3.2 Vel dicendum aliter quod triplex est gramatica, scilicet positiva, usualis et speculativa. Gramatica positiva docet significata vocabulorum et quia

⁶ Arist., *De sensu* 1 3437a12-15 (AA 7.5, 196).

⁷ Cf. Arist., *De int.* 2 16b4-5 (AA 32.3, 305).

⁸ Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* II.3 995a13-14 (AA 1.60, 119).

⁹ Averroes, *In Metaph.*, II, com. 15, ed. Iuntina VIII, f. 35 F (AA 1.68, 120).

¹⁰ Arist., *Top.* I.2 101b3-4 (AA 36.3, 322).

voces significative instrumentum sunt scientie et doctrine et sine illis non contingat ad aliquam scientiam procedere, patet quod ipsa precedit non solum logicam, sed et alias scientias. Usualis est qua utuntur communiter loquentes, et ista indifferenter potest precedere vel sequi logicam; et neutra istarum procedit per principia et causas. Speculativa sive regularis est que procedit /N 60ra/ per principia et causas ostendendo passiones constructibilium et constructionis, et assignando principia constructionis, congruitatis et perfectionis, et alia huiusmodi; et istam precedit logica.¹¹

3.2.1 Cuius ratio est: illa scientia qua utuntur omnes alie scientie in docendo est prior; sed logica est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia instrumentum precedit operationem. Minor manifesta est, quia gramatica speculativa et omnes scientie sillogizant, diffiniunt et dividunt, que omnia docet logica; ergo etc.

3.2.2 Preterea, illa scientia est prior ordine doctrine qua procedunt alie scientie in docendo; logica est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet: artifex enim presupponit instrumentum. Minor apparet, ut prius, quia omnes scientie procedunt sillogistice; ergo etc.

3.3 Tunc quo ad priorem solutionem probatur quod gramatica simpliciter precedat: illa scientia qua habita non habentur alie, sed aliis habitis necesse est ipsa habere, precedit alias scientias; gramatica est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia prius est a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia, ut dicit Philosophus in *Postpredicamentis*.¹² Minor de se manifesta est,

¹¹ Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Prisc. min.*, I.14, ed. Pinborg 1980, 136-7: “Ad solutionem istius quaestionis est distinguendum de triplici grammatica, scilicet positiva, usualis et regularis. Positiva est quae est de impositione vocum ad significata specialia et docet quid nominis [sive] vocabulorum. Usualis est qua utuntur communiter loquentes... Alia est grammatica regularis sive speculativa quae procedit per causas et principia”. Cf. Simon de Faverisham, *Expositio Tractatum Petri Hispani*, I, in de Rijk 1968, 83; and Master Simon’s commentary on Martin of Dacia’s *Modi significandi*, ms. Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek 535, 64vb: “Sed ad maiorem euidentiam debe[n]t tria secundum ordinem uideri (-ere, cod.), scilicet primo de ordine grammaticae ad alias scientias et specialiter ad logicam, quia de ordine istarum magnum est dubium; secundum oportet videre qualiter distinguatur logica a grammatica, et tertio quid sit modus significandi. Circa primum notatur quod triplex est grammatica, scilicet positiua, in qua quidquid est nominis docetur (tacetur, cod.) uel uocabulorum significata, et proprie est scientia de lingua; alia est usualis, et illa est que est de effectibus grammaticae, quia tantum dicit propter quid cum causas non inquirat, et talis est grammatica Prisciani; alia est regularis siue inquisitiua et hec naturas effectuum grammaticalium per causas et eius principia inuestigat.” Cf. Pinborg 1967, 58 (who reads *rationalis* instead of *regularis* from ms. Leibzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1356, 29rb).

¹² Arist., *Cat.* 12 14a26-35 (AL I 1-5, 37).

quia gramatica potest haberi aliis scientiis non habitis, saltem positiva vel usualis; sed hec non convertitur; ergo etc.

Ad 1. Ad rationes in oppositum.

Ad 1.1 Ad primam. Cum dicitur “illa scientia sine qua est impossibile habere logicam” etc., verum est — sine gramatica simpliciter vel positiva, sed ordine doctrine logica est prior.

Ad 1.2 Ad aliud. Cum dicitur “scientia qua primo instruimur” etc., verum est simpliciter. Sed dicis in minori “gramatica primo instruimur”, concedatur; tunc vis concludere “ergo gramatica precedit logicam”, dico quod verum est simpliciter, non tamen ordine doctrine; et sic ratio non concludit.

Vel dicendum quod minor vera est de gramatica positiva, et quod illa precedat logicam est concessum.

Ad 1.3 Ad tertium. Cum dicitur “sicut se habet verum ad congruum” etc., conceditur. Sed dicis in minori “verum presupponit congruum”, et hoc probas secundo *Peryermenias* “oratio non existens congrua” etc., verum est simpliciter, non tamen ordine doctrine. Et sic ad illud.

Questio 3 (60rb-vb)

Queratur consequenter utrum de universali possit esse scientia.¹³

1. Et arguitur quod non.

1.1 Illud quod est commune omnibus scientiis, nulli est proprium; universale est huiusmodi; ergo de eo non potest esse scientia specialis. Maior

¹³ Utrum de universali possit esse scientia. H<ytpibii> (*add. in mg. sup.*) N; cf. Anonymus Basileensis, *Questiones super librum Porphyrii*, q. 3, ms. **Ba** = Basel, UB F.III.20, 125vb: utrum universale possit esse subiectum in ista scientia; and Durandus (de Alvernia?), *Questiones super librum Porfirii*, q. 2, **M** = München, Staatsbibliothek, clm 18917, pp. 1b-2a.

patet. Minor est evidens et ex primo *Posteriorum*¹⁴ et septimo *Methaphisice*,¹⁵ ubi dicitur quod quelibet scientia est universalium; ergo etc.¹⁶

1.2 Preterea, <illud> de quo debet esse scientia debet esse ens; sed universale non est ens; ergo etc. Maior patet primo *Posteriorum*,¹⁷ quia de non ente non est scientia, ut de tragelapho non contingit scire quid est. Minor declaratur per Boetium in *De unitate et uno*:¹⁸ “omne quod est, ideo est, quia unum numero est”; sed universale non est unum numero, sed multa; ideo universale non est ens, et per consequens de eo non potest esse scientia.¹⁹

1.3 Preterea, quod solum est in anima, de illo non est scientia; universale est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet: tale enim non est ens reale. Minor declaratur, quia universale non est in rerum natura; ideo etc.²⁰ /N 60va/

1.4 Preterea, omne de quo est scientia debet esse cognitum ab intellectu; sed universale non est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior est per se manifesta.

¹⁴ Cf. Arist., *An. Post.* I.4, 73b32-33 (AL IV.1-4, 14.10-11; 290.19-20).

¹⁵ Cf. Arist., *De an.* II5 417b22-23 (AA 6.59, 179).

¹⁶ Cf. Durandus, *Quest. sup. Porf.*, q. 6, **M** 3b: “Primo quia quod subponitur in omni scientia hoc non debet esse subiectum; sed uniuersale in omni scientia subponitur; quare etc. Maior patet, quia quod subponitur in omni scientia non debet alicui <ap>propriari. Minor patet per Philosophum, primo *Posteriorum*, qui vult quod omnis scientia est de uniuersalibus et ex vniuersalibus; sed principia in omni scientia supponuntur, quare et uniuersale cum scientia procedat ex vniuersalibus.”

¹⁷ Arist., *An. Post.* I.2, 71b25-26 (AA 35.13, 312).

¹⁸ Cf. Dominicus Gundisalvi, *De unitate*, ed. P. Correns, Münster: Aschendorff, 1891, 3.8-9.

¹⁹ Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 3, **Ba** 125vb: “Ad idem: quod de vniuersali non possit esse scientia, quia de illo quod non est non potest esse scientia; sed vniuersale non est; ergo de ipso non est scientia. Maior est vera, quia de non ente non <est> scientia. Minor probatur per Boetium qui <dicit> quod omne quod est ideo est, quia vnum numero est; cum ergo vniuersale non sit vnum numero, nec per consequens erit; quare etc. Maior est vera.” Cf. Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Porphyrium*, q. 7, ed. Tiné 1997, 284; Simon of Faversham, *Questiones super libro Porphyrii*, q. 2, ed. P. Mazzarella, Padova: CEDAM, 1957, 18.

²⁰ Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 3, **Ba** 125vb: “Ad idem: omne quod scitur aut est in anima aut extra; sed vniuersale nullo istorum modorum est; ergo non poterit sciri. Maior est vera, quia omnis scientia est de ente. Minor probatur: quia non est ens extra, quia dicit actor *De causis* quod omne illud quod recipitur recipitur per modum recipientis et non per modum rei recepte; sed intellectus est singularis; ergo quicquid recipietur in ipso erit singulare; quare etc.”

Minor declaratur ex primo et secundo *Posteriorum*,²¹ quia nichil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu; sed universale non sentitur; ergo etc.²²

2. In oppositum est Porphyrius qui tradit scientiam de universalibus.

3.1 Unde notandum quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum in aliqua scientia requiruntur sex conditiones: prima est quod sit ens, quia de non ente non est scientia, ut dicitur primo *Posteriorum*;²³ secunda quod ei correspondeat aliquid a parte rei, quia de tragelapho non contingit scire quid est; tertia quod sit intelligibile, quia scientia est habitus intellectus; quarta quod sit perpetuum, unde dicitur primo *Posteriorum*²⁴ scientia est eternorum; quinta quod primo occurrat intellectui pre aliis omnibus, unde primo *Posteriorum*²⁵ de subiecto oportet precognoscere quid est et quia est; sexta est quod habeat proprietates et passiones, unde secundo *Posteriorum* dicitur: scire potissimum est demonstrare proprietates et passiones per causam immediatam. Hec omnia possunt reperiri in universali, ut patet; ergo de eo potest esse scientia.²⁶

²¹ Arist., *De sensu* 6 445b16-17 (AA 197; 7.24). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 2 a. 3 arg. 19.

²² Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 3, **Ba** 125vb: “Ad idem: quod non est intelligibile non <est> subiectum <in aliqua scientia>; sed vniuersale non est intelligibile; ergo vniuersale non est subiectum in aliqua scientia. Maior est vera, quia omnis scientia est intellectualis res, et ideo requirit subiectum intelligibile. <Minor probatur, quia nichil est in intellectu> quin prius fuerit in sensu; vniuersale autem non potest esse in sensu.”; Durandus, *Quest. sup. Porf.*, q. 6, **M** 3b: “Item, subiectum <in> scientia debet esse intelligibile; sed uniuersale non est intelligibile; quare etc. Maior patet ex precedentibus, quia scientia est habitus intellectus. Minor probatur, quia nichil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu; ideo deficiente sensu de aliquo deficit scientia de illo, ut dicitur primo *Posteriorum*; sed uniuersale non cadit sub sensu; quare nec est in intellectu; ideo etc.”

²³ Arist., *An. Post.* I.2, 71b25-26 (AA 35.13, 312).

²⁴ Arist., *An. Post.* I.24 85b15-18 (AA 35.84, 318).

²⁵ Arist., *An. Post.* I.1 71a11-12 (AA 35.4, 311).

²⁶ Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 3, **Ba** 126ra: “Sed debemus primo scire quod VI sunt conditiones que requiruntur ad hoc quod de aliquo possit esse scientia, quarum prima est quod oportet quod sit ens, quoniam de non ente non potest esse scientia; secunda est habitus intellectualis et ideo requiritur quod suum subiectum sit intellectuale; tertia conditio est quod sibi respondeat aliquid ex parte rei, quia de figmentis non est scientia, quoniam de tragelapho non contingit scire quid est, ut <dicit> Philosophus in libro *Posteriorum*; quarta conditio est quod oportet quod sit incorruptibile, quoniam de corruptibili non est scientia, ut patet per Aristotilem; quinta conditio est quod oportet quod sit tale quod partes eius et passiones determinentur in scientia, quod patet per Aristotilem in libro *Posteriorum*, ubi dicit quod scientia est vnius subiecti partes et passiones considerans; VI^o requiritur quod ipsum primo occurrat intellectui, quia secundum quod vult Auicenna subiectum in scientia est res que concipitur(?) esse ad quam cetera que ibi determinantur habent

3.2 Hoc potest argui ratione: de eo quod est ens potest esse scientia; sed universale est ens; ergo etc. Maior patet primo *Posteriorum*.²⁷ Minor declaratur: universale enim est ens in anima cui correspondet aliquid in re extra.

3.3 Contra istas sex conditiones potest argui.

3.3.1 Primo, quod universale non sit ens, quia omne quod est ens est substantia vel accidens, ut patet septimo *Methafisice*;²⁸ sed universale nullum istorum est; ergo etc. Maior patet. Minor declaratur, primo quod non sit substantia: quia omnis predicatio substantie aut erit impossibilis aut necessaria; sed predicatio universalis de inferioribus non est impossibilis, immo possibilis, ut dicendo ‘homo est animal’, ‘Sortes est animal’; nec est etiam necessaria, ut patet in *Predicamentis*²⁹ “quando alterum de altero predicatur quidquid dicitur de predicato dicitur de subiecto”; sed hic non est sic:³⁰ non enim potest dici ‘Sortes est genus’, ‘homo est genus’; ergo etc. Non est etiam accidens, quia accidens non est principium substantie; universalis autem sunt principia substantie, sicut genus et differentia hominis; ergo etc.

3.3.2 Secundo, ostenditur quod universali nichil correspondeat a parte rei: quod preter intellectum non habet unitatem, preter intellectum non habet

attributionem.” Cf. Durandus, *Quest. sup. Porf.*, q. 2, **M** 2a: “Secunda ratio est: quia ad hoc quod de aliquo sit scientia omnia ista requiruntur: primo quod sit ens, quia de non ente non est scientia, ut dicitur primo *Posteriorum*; secundo quod sit separatum a singularibus siue a particularibus secundum enim rationem, quia de particulari ut sic non est scientia; tertio quod sit intelligibile, quia scientia est habitus intellectus, ideo [[e]] omne illud de quo est scientia est intelligibile; 4^o quod habeat passiones et proprietates que scientia dicitur de <con>clusionem demonstratio; sed in conclusione predicatur passio de subiecto; et ideo etc.; item oportet quod habeat principia et causas, saltem secundum cognitionem, quia per talia probatur passio de subiecto de isto ...iu(?) insunt hec omnia potest esse scientia; sed omnia hec insunt vniuersali; quare etc. Maior patet.”

²⁷ Cf. Arist., *An. Post.* I.2, 71b25-26 (AA 35.13, 312).

²⁸ Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* VII.1 1028a10-20 (AL XXV.2, 123.3-12).

²⁹ Arist., *Cat.* 3 1b10-12 (AA 31.8, 302).

³⁰ sic] hoc N

entitatem; universale est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet. Minor declaratur per Boetium in *De unitate et uno*:³¹ “omne est quod est”, etc.; sed universale non est unum numero: sunt enim quinque; ergo etc.

3.3.3 Tertio arguitur quod non sit intelligibile, quia quidquid est intelligibile recipitur in intellectu; sed universale non recipitur in intellectu; ergo etc. Maior patet tertio *De anima*, quia proprium obiectum intellectus est intelligibile. Minor declaratur per auctorem *Libri De causis*:³² “quidquid recipitur in alio recipitur in eo per modum rei recipientis et non rei recepte”; si ergo universale reciperetur in intellectu, reciperetur in eo per modum particularis, quia intellectus particularis est, cum sit in materia particulari, scilicet homine; et sic starent contradictoria simul, quod est impossibile; ergo etc.

3.3.4 Quarto arguitur quod non sit perpetuum, quia quod dependet a corruptibili non est incorruptibile; universale est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior est manifesta, secundo *Posteriorum*,³³ ubi dicitur “scientia est eternorum”. Minor patet, quia universalis sunt a particularibus que sunt corruptibilia; ergo etc.

3.3.5 Quinto arguitur quod universale non occurrat intellectui, quia hoc universale aut esset commune istis aut unum eorum aut nullum: non potest esse nullum, quia ens et nichil sunt opposita; non unum, quia qua ratione esset unum istorum, ea ratione esset alterum; nec est commune omnibus; verumtamen(?) oportet quod sit unum istorum, et sic erunt sex; vel erit genus eorum et predicetur de eis uniuoce, quod est impossibile.

3.3.6 Sexto arguitur quod universale non habeat proprietates et passiones, quia accidens non est subiectum accidentis; sed universale est accidens et proprietates et passiones etiam sunt accidentia; ergo etc.

Ad 3.3.1 Ad primum dicendum quod universale dupliciter consideratur: aut pro re subiecta intentioni aut pro ipsa intentione; si primo modo, sic est substantia; si secundo modo, aut in concreto aut in abstracto; si in concreto, sic est substantia et accidens: quantum enim ad rem a qua accipitur est

³¹ Cf. Dominicus Gundisalvi, *De unitate*, ed. Correns, 3.8-9.

³² *Lib. De causis*, IX.99, 46-49 (AA 11.12, 232).

³³ Cfr. Arist., *An. Post.* I.8 75b24-25 (AA 35.54, 315); I.24 85b15-18 (AA 35.84, 318).

substantia, sed quantum ad intentionem que supra(?) hanc fundatur est accidens; si autem pro intentione in abstracto, sic est accidens.

Tunc ad formam argumenti. Maior conceditur. Ad minorem, quod universale neque sit substantia, neque accidens, per interemptionem: ad minorem, quando dicitur “omnis predicatio” etc., dico quod predicatio universalis est necessaria. Tu probas quod non: non enim potest dici ‘Sortes est genus’; dico quod ibi est fallacia accidentis, quia ibi intentio tantum predicatur que est accidens; sed argumentum intelligendum est de re subiecta intentioni, ut dicendo ‘Sortes est animal’, et illa est predicatio substantialis.

Ad 3.3.2 Ad secundum. Quando dicitur quod preter intellectum etc., dico quod verum est quod nullam habet unitatem; quando tunc dicitur in minori “universalia nullam habent unitatem”, dico quod duplex est unitas, scilicet actualis et potentialis; et unitas actualis est in omnibus universalibus respectu intellectus; et unitas potentialis est in universalibus respectu rerum particularium, quia est communis natura reperta in omnibus particularibus.

Tunc ad formam dico: licet universale non habeat unitatem actualem et per consequens entitatem preter intellectum, tamen potest habere unitatem potentialem respectu particularium.

Ad 3.3.3 Ad tertium. <Cum dicitur> “quidquid est intelligibile” etc., conceditur. Ad minorem, quando dicitur “universale non est intelligibile”, dico per interemptionem. Ad probationem *Libri De causis*, <cum dicitur> “quidquid recipitur in alio recipitur” etc., conceditur; quando ulterius dicitur quod intellectus sit particularis, quia est in materia particulari, ut homine, ergo universale erit particulare, <distinguendum est> si recipitur in intellectu vel non recipitur in eo, quia contraria non possunt simul stare, dicendum quod intellectus consideratur dupliciter: vel pro forma sive prout est altera pars compositi, et sic intellectus est particularis; vel consideratur pro quadam potentia anime, et hoc est dupliciter: vel in comparatione ad animam, sic est particularis, vel comparatur ad organum cui intellectus non est immersus, et sic est universalis, quia est abstractus ab omni organo particulari; et sic recipit universale.

Ad 3.3.4 Ad quartum. Quando dicitur quod dependet a corruptibili etc., dico: verum est quod semper dependet a corruptibilibus. Ad minorem, cum

dicitur “universale dependet a particularibus que sunt corruptibilia”, dicendum: licet particularia secundum se sint corruptibilia, quia tamen generatio est eterna, ideo manet species et per consequens universale.

Ad 3.3.5 Ad quintum. Quando dicitur “si universale primo occurreret intellectui aut esset commune istis aut commune” etc., conceditur; sed cum dicitur in minori quod non sit commune istis, per interemptionem. Quando tunc probas “si esset commune, esset unum”, dico quod non oportet; vel dicis “esset genus univocum”, dico quod non oportet: licet non sit genus univocum, tamen quodam modo est genus, scilicet analogum. Non oportet etiam quod sit unum universale per se /N 60vb/ et sic sint sex, quia nichil correspondet ei a parte rei extra; sed secunde intentiones supponuntur ei tamquam res; si respicit intentionem concretam dicitur ‘universale’, si abstractam dicitur ‘universalitas’.

Ad 3.3.6 Ad sextum. Quando dicitur “accidens non potest esse subiectum accidentis”, dico quod verum est: non potest esse subiectum sufficiens. Ad minorem, quando dicitur “proprietates et passiones sunt accidentia et universale est accidens”, dico quod verum est; sed quando vis concludere “ergo universale non potest esse subiectum proprietatum”, verum est — sufficiens; tamen inherit ei mediante substantia, sicut albedo inest superfici ei et superficies est eius sustentamentum seu subiectum mediante substantia. Sic est hic, ergo ratio non concludit.

Ad 1. Tunc ad rationes principales.

Ad 1.1 Ad primam. Quando dicitur “quod est commune omnibus, nulli est proprium”, verum est — proprie proprium, ut risibile homini; vel concedatur maior. Ad minorem, quando dicitur “universale est commune omnibus scientiis”, verum est: pro re subicitur cuilibet scientie, sed pro intentione non; ergo ratio non concludit.

Ad 1.2 Ad aliam. Quando dicitur “de quo debet esse scientia, debet esse ens”, concedatur. Ad minorem, <quando dicitur> “universale non est ens”, dico per interemptionem. Ad probationem Boetii “omne quod est” etc,

dico quod verum est de rebus extra animam, tamen etiam de rebus in anima verum est suo modo.³⁴

Ad 1.3 Ad tertiam. <Quando dicitur> “de eo quod solum est in anima” etc., conceditur. Ad minorem, per interemptionem dico: licet actu sit in anima, tamen potentia est extra animam, ut in rebus particularibus.

Ad 1.4 Ad quartam. Quando dicitur “<omne> de quo debet esse scientia, debet esse cognitum ab intellectu”, conceditur. Ad minorem, per interemptionem. Ad probationem, <quando dicitur> “nichil est in intellectu” etc., verum est per se vel per alterum; modo, licet universale per se non sit in sensu, tamen per particulare et fantasma. Et sic ad illud.³⁵

Questio 4 (63rb-vb)³⁶

Consequenter queritur utrum universalia sint separata a singularibus, secundum quod ponit Plato, vel sint coniuncta³⁷ eis.³⁸

I. Et arguitur quod sint separata,

³⁴ Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 3, **Ba** 126ra: “Ad 1.2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Boetius intelligit de illis rebus que sunt existentes extra, quando dicit quod omne quod est ideo est quod vnum numero est.” Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 2, ed. Mazzarella, 19-20.

³⁵ Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 3, **Ba** 126ra: “Ad 1.3 Ad tertium respondeo concedendo maiorem, interimendo minorem; et quando probatur, quia nichil est in [[sensu]] intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu potest <dici quod> tamen aliquid esse in sensu <accipitur> multipliciter, quia potest ibi esse in se uel in suo apparenti, siue per se uel per accidens; modo dico quod quamuis per se non sit in sensu, tamen est in suo apparenti seu est in sensu per accidens; quare non valet.”; Durandus, *Quest. sup. Porf.*, q. 6, **M** 3b: “Ad aliud. Cum dicitur “subiectum scientie debet esse intelligibile”, concedo; et cum dicitur “uniuersale non est intelligibile”, dico per interemptionem; et ad probationem, cum dicitur “nichil est in intellectu quin prius cadat sub sensu”, dico quod verum est uel per se uel per accidens; modo dico quod, quamuis uniuersale non cadat sub sensu per se, cadit tamen per accidens, quia per ipsum particulare in quo includitur; quare etc.”

³⁶ Collated with **S** = Salamanca, Biblioteca de la Universidad 2350, 7rb-va. Cf. *Questio 9* of the Standard or A-version (e.g. ms. **Br** 45v-46r).

³⁷ coniuncta] cum *add.* S

³⁸ Utrum universalia sint separata a singularibus vel sint coniuncta eis. Et B<ritonis> et H<ytpib-bii> (*add. in mg. sup.*)

1.1 per rationem Platonis, quia omne quod est tale per participationem habet reduci³⁹ ad aliquod tale per essentiam; sed res /N 63va/ singulares sunt tales participatione specierum;⁴⁰ ergo habent reduci⁴¹ ad tale per essentiam existens tale;⁴² sed non est aliquid aliud ad quod vere possint⁴³ reduci nisi ad genus et speciem, et talia sunt ydee separate; ideo etc. Maior patet per Platonem⁴⁴ et potest haberi ex secundo *Methafisice*.⁴⁵ [Item, prius est aliquid in se quam in alio, et si non reduceretur aliquid ad primum, esset processus in infinitum, quod est impossibile.] Minor apparet per Porphyrium⁴⁶ dicentem “participatione speciei particulares homines sunt unus homo”.⁴⁷

1.2 Preterea, eadem est dispositio rei in entitate et veritate; sed universale secundum veritatem est separatum; ergo et secundum entitatem. Maior patet, secundo *Methafisice*,⁴⁸ ubi ponitur eadem propositio. Minor apparet primo *Posteriorum*, quia universalia sunt separata secundum intellectum a particularibus.⁴⁹

1.3 Preterea,⁵⁰ nullum ens⁵¹ generans et generatum est causa sufficiens generationis; sed /S 7va/ oportet ut reducatur ad causam sufficientem et per se; sed particularia sunt generantia et generata ut⁵² quilibet homo particularis⁵³ est generans et generatum; ergo nullus homo singularis sufficit ad generationem; ergo oportet quod sit homo in communi separatus ab istis

³⁹ habet reduci] reducitur S

⁴⁰ res... specierum] singularia sunt entia per participationem S

⁴¹ habent reduci] reducitur S

⁴² existens tale] *om.* S

⁴³ possint] posset S

⁴⁴ Platonem] Philosophum N

⁴⁵ Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* I.9 990b29-31 (AL XXV.2, 30.3-5).

⁴⁶ Porph., *Isag.*, 6.21...

⁴⁷ [Item, prius... impossibile.] Minor apparet... unus homo] *om.* S

⁴⁸ Arist., *Metaph.* II.1 993b30-31 (AA 118 1.42).

⁴⁹ Preterea... particularibus] *om.* S

⁵⁰ Preterea] Item S

⁵¹ ens] enim S

⁵² oportet... ut] *om.* S

⁵³ particularis] *om.* S

inferioribus hominibus singularibus qui⁵⁴ sit causa sufficiens⁵⁵ generationis hominis; et ideo est intelligendum in aliis speciebus et generibus. Maior patet secundo⁵⁶ *De generatione* et primo *Phisicorum*.⁵⁷ Minor apparet secundo *Phisicorum*,⁵⁸ ubi dicitur “homo generat hominem et sol”; ergo oportet esse causam sufficientem, aut ergo hoc erit corpus celeste aut species; non potest esse corpus celeste, quia generans et generatum debent esse eiusdem speciei, secundum quod innuitur secundo *Phisicorum*;⁵⁹ ergo oportet quod sit species et ita ipsa erit essentia per se.⁶⁰

1.4 Preterea, scientia est de incorruptibilibus et est universalium; sed si universale non esset separatum a singularibus esset corruptibile; ergo oportet esse separatum ab eis. Maior patet primo *Posteriorum*.⁶¹ Minor <apparet>, quia omnia que sunt preter ...lari(?) sunt corruptibilia, cuiusmodi sunt particularia; et si in hiis essent universalia eodem modo essent corruptibilia, quod est impossibile, quia sunt perpetua ; ergo etc.⁶²

2. In oppositum est Philosophus, tertio et quarto *Methafisice*, et in multis aliis locis, Commentator, Albertus et alii expositores.⁶³

3.1 Ad istam questionem dicebant platonici quatuor: primo quod universalialia essent separata a particularibus secundum esse et rationem (particularia enim sunt corruptibilia et universalialia incorruptibilia); secundo quod essent quiditates et essentie inferiorum, quia darent eis esse; tertio quod

⁵⁴ istis inferioribus hominibus singularibus qui] omnibus istis inferioribus et singularibus cum S

⁵⁵ sufficiens] efficiens S

⁵⁶ secundo] quinto S

⁵⁷ primo Phisicorum] *om.* S

⁵⁸ Arist., *Phys.* B.2 194b13 (AA 145 2.65).

⁵⁹ *Loc. cit.*

⁶⁰ apparet... per se] est evidens S

⁶¹ Cf. Arist., *An. Post.* I.24 85b15-18; AA 35.84, 318.

⁶² Preterea... ergo etc.] *om.* S

⁶³ tertio et quarto ... expositores] septimo *Methafisice*, etc. et etiam in multis aliis locis, et Albertus hic S; cf. Albert the Great, *Super Porphyrium de 5 universalibus*, II.3, ed. M. Santos Noya, *Monasterii Westfalarum*: Aschendorff, 2004, 24-25.

essent idem specie cum particularibus, quia essent eorum ydee; quarto quod essent causa scientie.⁶⁴

3.2 Sed istud non ualuit, ut patet per Philosophum in multis locis.

3.2.1 Et potest argui contra primum dictum Platonis: omne quod est extra intellectum est singulare, ut dicitur secundo *Methafisice* et quinto, et si universale est separatum ab intellectu erit singulare, quod est impossibile; ergo etc.

3.2.2 Contra secundum: essentia uniuscuiusque est indivisa ab eo cuius est essentia; ergo si universale separatum esset essentia particularium starent ista contradictoria simul, scilicet coniunctum et separatum, quod est impossibile; ergo etc.

3.2.3 Contra tertium: corruptibile et incorruptibile plus differunt quam genere secundum Philosophum octavo *Methafisice*,⁶⁵ sed universale est incorruptibile et particulare corruptibile; ergo differunt plus quam genere, et si sic non sunt idem specie; et quod corruptibile et incorruptibile differant genere apparet, quia dicit ibidem⁶⁶ Philosophus “que sunt eiusdem generis eorum est eadem materia”; sed corruptibile et incorruptibile non potest esse eadem materia; ergo non possunt esse eiusdem generis.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Cf. Durandus of Auvergne, *Quest. Porf.*, q. 5, Pa 4va: “Item, opinio Platonis fuit quod uniuersalia essent quedam [[nunc?]] nature per se subsistentes, separata ab ipsis particularibus secundum esse et totam essentiam particularium et principium essendi et cognoscendi eorum. Vnde ponebat Plato hominem separatum secundum esse ab omnibus hominibus particularibus, puta Sorte, Platone etc., quem quidem hominem separatum de... (?) esse totam essentiam [[hominum]] hominum particularium et substantiam. Voluit etiam Plato quod homo uniuersalis separatus esset eiusdem speciei cum particularibus. Et etiam posuit hominem separatum <esse> principium essendi et cognoscendi omnes particulares homines.” Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 5, ed. Mazzarella, 25-6.

⁶⁵ Arist., *Metaph.* X.10 1059a2-3 (AA 136 1.252).

⁶⁶ *Locum non inueni.*

⁶⁷ Cf. Durandus of Auvergne, *Quest. Porf.*, q. 5, Pa 4va: “Sed hec opinio defficit in multis, quibus determinatis patebit solutio huius questionis. 1) Primo deficit ista(?) opinio predicta in hoc quod ponit ipsum universale per se existens separatum a singularibus siue [[per?]] particularibus et tamen esse totam substantiam particularium, quoniam substantia uniuscuiusque est in unoquoque, et non est separatum secundum esse ab ipso cuius est substantia; 2) nunc autem uniuersale sunt tota substantia particularium secundum esse, quod concedit opinio; non ergo sunt uniuersalia separata a particularibus secundum esse, sicut posuit Plato... 3) Secundo deficit in hoc quod dicit istud uniuers-

3.2.4 Contra quartum: generatio est perpetua, et licet particularia corrumpantur, tamen secundum successionem manent et per generationem, et ita saluantur in eis universalia et per consequens scientia universalium.⁶⁸

3.3.1 Sed aliter dicendum est ad questionem, scilicet⁶⁹ quod universalia ut genus et species et alia coniuncta sint⁷⁰ secundum esse⁷¹ singularibus, sed secundum rationem sint separata ab eis,⁷² quia corruptibile et incorruptibile⁷³ non sunt unius generis predicamenti,⁷⁴ ut dicitur octavo⁷⁵ *Metaphisice*⁷⁶ et pluribus locis; sed si \essent/⁷⁷ animal separatum et homo separatus a singularibus secundum esse sicut ponit⁷⁸ Plato, ista essent incorporalia⁷⁹ et ingenerabilia, et⁸⁰ singularia sunt corruptibilia, ut manifestum est; ergo genus et species non essent eiusdem generis cum suis singularibus, quod est impossibile.

sale separatum esse eiusdem speciei cum ipsis particularibus, quoniam hoc non potest esse uerum(?): corporale (*pro*: corruptibile) et incorruptibile/incorporale non possunt esse eiusdem speciei (lac. 15 litteris); quia(?) non secundum genus, <nec> secundum speciem(?); nunc autem, secundum Platonem, homo [[est]] uniuersalis est incorruptibilis, quia est separatus ab omnibus hominibus particularibus; homines autem particulares sunt corruptibiles; ergo homo separatus uniuersalis non potest esse eiusdem speciei cum particularibus, secundum quod Plato dicit.” Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 5, ed. Mazzarella, 26-7.

⁶⁸ Ad istam questionem... scientia universalium] *om.* S

⁶⁹ Sed aliter... scilicet] Ad istam questionem dicendum est S

⁷⁰ coniuncta sint] sunt coniuncta S

⁷¹ esse] ipsis *add.* S

⁷² sed... ab eis] qui sunt esse sensibilia S

⁷³ corruptibile et incorruptibile] corporale et incorporale S

⁷⁴ predicamenti] proximi S

⁷⁵ octavo] decimo S

⁷⁶ Arist., *Metaph.* X.10 1059a2-3 (AA 136 1.252).

⁷⁷ essent] esse *add. s.l.* N (*transp.* S)

⁷⁸ sicut ponit] ut posuit S

⁷⁹ incorporalia] incorruptibilia S (*transpositum*)

⁸⁰ et] sua *add.* S

3.3.2 Preterea,⁸¹ illud quod dicit essentiam alicuius non est separatum ab eo; sed genus⁸² et species dicunt essentiam suorum⁸³ inferiorum et sunt de eorum essentia;⁸⁴ ergo non possunt separari ab eis.⁸⁵ Maior patet octavo *Methafisice*: essentia enim indivisa est ab eo cuius est essentia.⁸⁶ Minor patet per Boetium qui dicit quod species dicit totum esse suorum individuorum.

3.3.3 Preterea, omne quod per se existit in rerum natura est particulare; ergo si universale per se existeret, esset particulare, quod est impossibile; ergo etc. Maior patet secundo et octavo *Methafisice*. Minor manifesta est, quia universale et particulare ex opposito distinguuntur.

3.3.4 Preterea, quod est unum in multis et unum de multis non existit per se; universale est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet: accidens enim non potest esse sine eo cuius est accidens. Unde Philosophus in *Predicamentis*⁸⁷ “destructis primis impossibile est aliquid aliorum remanere”. Minor habetur primo *Posteriorum*; ergo etc.⁸⁸

Ad 1. Tunc ad rationes in oppositum.⁸⁹

Ad 1.1 Ad primam. Cum dicitur “omne tale per participationem reducitur ad⁹⁰ tale per essentiam”, conceditur; et cum dicitur quod particulares sunt huiusmodi per participationem, ergo habent reduci ad aliquod tale etc., concedatur; et cum dicitur “sed non est aliud ad quod reducitur nisi homo

⁸¹ Preterea] Hoc idem arguitur secundo sic S

⁸² genus] genera

⁸³ suorum] individuorum vel *add.* S

⁸⁴ et sunt de eorum essentia] *om.* S

⁸⁵ ab eis] secundum esse *va*-[Maior patet quia essentia non potest separari ab eo cuius est essentia ipso mediante; sed genera et species dicunt essentiam suorum individuorum vel suorum inferiorum ergo non possunt separari ab eis secundum esse]-*cat add.* S

⁸⁶ Maior... essentia] Maior patet quia essentia non potest separari ab eo cuius est essentia ipso mediante; sed genera et species dicunt essentiam suorum individuorum vel suorum inferiorum et sunt de sua essentia, ergo non possunt separari ab eis *add.* S

⁸⁷ Arist., *Cat.* 5 2b5-6 (AA 31.12, 302).

⁸⁸ Preterea, omne quod per se existit... Preterea, quod est unum... ergo etc.] *om.* S

⁸⁹ in oppositum] *om.* S

⁹⁰ ad] aliquid *add.* S

separatus vel ydea hominis separata”, dico quod falsum est, immo est causa prima ad quam reducuntur omnia alia entia.⁹¹

Vel aliter⁹² dicendum: concedo maiorem sicut prius, et ad minorem, cum dicitur “particulares homines \tales/ sunt per participationem specierum”,⁹³ dico quod falsum est, immo habent esse tale⁹⁴ per se et per suam essentiam, sicut Sortes est homo per se et ens;⁹⁵ ideo minor est falsa. Et tu probas auctoritate Porphyrii: “omnes homines participatione” etc., dico quod ‘participare’ consideratur dupliciter: vno modo ‘participare’ idem est quod recipere predicationem alterius, et sic auctoritas Porphyrii est vera; alio modo idem est quod recipere essentiam alterius, et sic non est vera; et isto modo procedit ratio, ergo non concludit.⁹⁶

Ad 1.2 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur “eadem est dispositio rei in entitate et veritate”, dico quod duplex est veritas: vno modo idem est quod vera rei entitas, et isto modo est eadem rei veritas et eius entitas, secundum quod dicit Commentator 4° *Methafisice*; alio modo veritas idem est quod vera rei intellectio, et isto modo non est eadem cum re.

Vel posset aliter dici et melius quod veritas secundum quod est secunda operatio intellectus, scilicet componentis et dividensis, sic propositio est vera; sed pro prima operatione intellectus que est apprehensio simplicium, sic non est vera; et ab isto intellectu comprehenditur universale, circa quod neque /N 63vb/ est veritas, neque falsitas, ut dicitur primo *Peryermenias*; et ideo ratio non concludit.⁹⁷

Ad 1.3 Ad tertiam. Cum dicitur “nullum generans” etc., conceditur; totus processus usque dum infertur quod oportet quod homo in communi separatus ab istis singularibus hominibus sit causa sufficiens generationis, dico quod falsum est. Et ad confirmationem, cum dicitur “cum oporteat esse

⁹¹ entia] que per participationem sunt entia *add.* S

⁹² aliter] *om.* S

⁹³ specierum] vel habent esse S

⁹⁴ habent esse tale] *om.* S

⁹⁵ ens] per se, ens per se est homo per se *add.* S

⁹⁶ Et tu probas... ergo non concludit] *om.* S

⁹⁷ Ad aliam... concludit] *om.* S

causam sufficientem, et illa vel erit corpus celeste vel species”, volo; et tu dicis quod non possit esse corpus celeste, dico per interemptionem; et tu probas “generans et generatum debent esse eiusdem speciei”, verum est de generante proximo, non tamen oportet de generante remoto, quale est corpus celeste, quod sit idem specie cum re generata; et sic ad illud.⁹⁸

Ad 1.4 Ad quartam. Cum dicitur “scientia est de incorruptibilibus et est universalium”, conceditur; in minori, cum dicis “si universale non esset separatum a singularibus, esset corruptibile”, dico per interemptionem: licet enim particularia secundum se sint corruptibilia, quia tamen generatio eorum per successionem est perpetua, isto modo saluantur in eis universalia.⁹⁹

Questio 5 (63vb)

Queratur consequenter utrum quiditas rei possit esse actu universalis circumscripta omni operatione intellectus.¹⁰⁰

I. Et videtur quod sic.

I.1 Quia cuicumque conuenit diffinitio et diffinitum; sed quiditati rei conuenit diffinitio universalis; ergo etc. Maior patet quarto *Topicorum* et est quedam maxima in logica. Minor apparet primo *Peryermenias*¹⁰¹ “universale est aptum natum in pluribus”; ergo etc.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Ad tertiam... sic ad illud] Ad aliam, cum dicitur “nullum generans” etc., concedatur; et cum dicitur “quilibet particularis homo” etc., concedatur; et confirmatur “ergo nullus particularis homo est causa sufficiens generationis”, concedatur; et cum dicitur ulterius “non est aliud quod sit causa sufficiens istius generationis, nisi (non, S) homo separatus”, dicendum quod falsum est, ideo corpus celeste sicut sol, quia sicut dicitur in secundo *Phisicorum* homo et sol generant hominem; ideo ratio non concludit S (cf. A-version)

⁹⁹ Ad quartam... universalia] *om.* S

¹⁰⁰ Utrum quiditas rei possit esse actu universalis circumscripto intellectu. H<ytpibii> (*add. in mg. sup.*) N

¹⁰¹ Arist., *De int.* 7 17a39-40 (AA 32.10, 305).

¹⁰² Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 7, **Ba** 127ra: “Quia cuicumque conuenit diffinitio, eidem conuenit diffinitum; sed diffinitio vniuersalis conuenit rei preter operationem intellectus; ergo vniuersale erit preter operationem intellectus. Maior est vera, quia dicit Aristoteles, VI^o *Topicorum*,

1.2 Preterea, obiectum virtutis passive oportet precedere potentiam, sed quidditas rei est obiectum intellectus qui est virtus passiva; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia actus precedit potentiam, ut dicitur tertio *De anima*, et octavo et nono *Metaphysice*.¹⁰³ Minor patet tertio *De anima*,¹⁰⁴ ubi dicitur quod quidditas rei est obiectum intellectus; ergo etc.¹⁰⁵

1.3 Preterea, talis est res per suam essentiam qualis intelligitur; sed res intelligitur universalis; ergo per suam essentiam est universalis. Maior patet, quia intelligere sequitur esse. Minor est manifesta, tertio *De anima*, <ubi dicitur> quod quidditas rei intelligitur per modum universalis; ergo etc.

1.4 Preterea, cuilibet modo intelligendi debet correspondere modus essendi in re; sed res intelligitur per modum universalis; ergo sibi correspondet modus essendi universalis; et si sic, res secundum se erit universalis actu.¹⁰⁶

2. In oppositum est Commentator, prohemio *De anima*,¹⁰⁷ ubi dicit quod intellectus agens causat universalitatem in rebus; et si sic, res secundum se sine operatione intellectus agentis non potest esse universalis.¹⁰⁸

quod diffinitio et diffinitum se communicant. Minor probatur, quia Aristoteles diffiniendo vniuersale, <in> libro Periarmenias, dicit quod vniuersale est <quod> aptum natum est predicari de pluribus; sed ista diffinitio conuenit rei preter operationem intellectus, sicut animal; ergo etc.”

¹⁰³ Cf. Arist., *De an.* III.7 431a2-3; *Metaph.* IX.8 1049b5, 18-23 (AA 6.156, 187).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Thomas Aquinas., *In De an.* III.8, n. 706 (AA 6.144, 186).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 7, **Ba** 127ra: “Ad idem. Obiectum virtutis passivae precedit ipsam virtutem, et etiam eius operationem, quia virtus passiva de se non vadit ad actum nisi ab aliquo extrinseco moueatur; sed intellectus noster virtus passiva est, ut scribitur libro *De anima*; ergo suum obiectum precedit (-et, cod.) suam operationem et suum obiectum est vniuersale; ergo vniuersale erit preter operationem intellectus.” Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Questiones super librum Porphyrii*, q. 6A, ed. Pinborg 1980a, 84, 12-16; q. 6B, ed. Pinborg 1980a, 85, 10-15.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 7, **Ba** 127ra: “Ad idem. Cuilibet modo intelligendi respondet suus modus essendi; ergo modo intelligendi vniuersalis respondet modus essendi vniuersalis; sed modus essendi potest esse [[esse]] preter operationem intellectus; ergo etc. Maior est vera, quia aliter esset fictus. Minor etiam satis apparet de se.”

¹⁰⁷ Averroes, *In De an.* I, com. 8, ed. Iuntina VIII, 12 (AA 6.27, 176).

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 7, **Ba** 127ra: “Oppositum arguitur. Quia dicit Commentator quod intellectus facit vniuersalitatem in rebus.” Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Questiones super librum Porphyrii*, q. 6A, ed. Pinborg 1980a, 84, 17-23; q. 6B, ed. Pinborg 1980a, 85, 16-17.

3.1 Unde notandum quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit actu universale requiruntur quinque: primo quod sit res actu; secundo ut sit in eo plurificatio suppositorum, et hoc vel secundum actum vel potentiam vel saltem quod sibi non repugnet talis multiplicatio; tertio ut sit unum secundum rationem, unde primo *De anima*¹⁰⁹ dicit Philosophus quod universale aut nichil est aut posterius; quarto ut sit predicabile de pluribus,¹¹⁰ ut patet in quolibet universali;¹¹¹ quinto ut sit commune extra animam. Prime due conditiones sunt in universali a parte rei; alie due a parte intellectus; quinta est consequens ultimas duas.

3.2 Tunc arguitur: cui non possunt competere omnes proprietates et conditiones requisite ad hoc quod aliquid sit actu universale, illud nullo modo potest esse actu universale; sed res secundum se est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior manifesta est. Minor etiam patet, quia rei tantum competunt due prime proprietates, et alie tres nullo modo possunt sibi competere; sed tamen omnes iste quinque requiruntur; ergo etc.

Ad 1. Per hoc ad rationes in oppositum.

Ad 1.1 Ad primam. Quando dicitur “cuicumque competit diffinitio et diffinitum”, dico quod verum est, si sufficiens diffinitio competit sibi; si tamen insufficiens et incompleta, non oportet. Et dicis in minori quod rei competit diffinitio universalis, [et dicis in minori “rei competit diffinitio universalis”], et probas primo *Peryermenias* “universale est quod aptum natum est esse in pluribus”, dico quod ista diffinitio est insufficiens, quia tantum materialis et non convertitur cum re: non enim verum est “quod aptum natum est esse in pluribus est actu universale”; sed diffinitio sufficiens et diffinitum convertuntur; ergo etc.

Ad 1.2 Ad aliam. Quando dicitur “obiectum virtutis passivae” etc., concedatur. Ad minorem, quando dicitur “quiditas rei est obiectum intellectus”,

¹⁰⁹ Arist., *De an.* I.1 402b7-8 (AA 6.6, 174).

¹¹⁰ de pluribus] *add. a.m. s.l.* N

¹¹¹ Cf. Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Questiones super librum Porphyrii*, q. 6B, ed. Pinborg 1980a, 87, 34-42: “...ad hoc quod aliquid sit universale istis duobus modis (scil. pro re vel pro intentione concreta) tria requiruntur: Primo quod naturae suae non repugnat esse in pluribus... Secundo requiritur quod illud quod significat sit aliquid unum in multis... Tertio requiritur quod praedicetur de illis pluribus, in quibus est”

concedatur; ergo vis concludere “ideo precedit intellectum”, dico quod precedit intellectum possibilem, non tamen precedit intellectum agentem, sed ipse precedit obiectum.

Ad 1.3 Ad tertiam. Quando dicitur “talis est res per suam essentiam” etc., dico¹¹² quod quidam est intellectus rei essentialis, puta diffinitio, et si sic intelligitur, res est talis per suam essentiam; alius est intellectus rei accidentalialis, et si sic intelligitur, non oportet quod sit talis per essentiam suam; et huiusmodi est intellectus universalis, quia universale accidit rei; ergo ratio non concludit.

Ad 1.4 Ad quartam. Cum dicitur “cuilibet modo intelligendi” etc., conceditur. Et quando dicitur in minori quod res intelligitur per modum universalis, dico quod verum est. Et tu vis concludere “ergo modus essendi rei est universalis”, dico quod hoc non est actu, sed aptitudine; sed si debet esse actu universalis, hoc oportet fieri per intellectum agentem; et ita ratio non concludit.

Questio 6 (63vb-64ra)

Consequenter queritur utrum quiditas rei sensibilis possit esse actu universalis per primum conceptum vel per secundum rei attributum.¹¹³

1. Et arguitur quod per primum possit esse actu universalis.

1.1 Et hoc probatur per Themistium, prohemio *De anima*,¹¹⁴ ubi dicit “universale est conceptus sine ypostasi ex tenui similitudine singularium aggregatus”; sed talis conceptus est primus; ergo per primum conceptum quiditas rei potest esse actu universalis. Maior patet auctoritate. Minor etiam apparet: possum enim intelligere naturam humanam sine suppositis.

¹¹² dico] diffinitio N

¹¹³ Utrum quiditas rei sensibilis possit esse actu universalis per primum conceptum vel secundum rei attributum. H<ytpibii> (*add. in mg. sup.*) N. Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 8, **Ba** 127va: “utrum quidquid est <in> rei natura sit actu vniuersalis per primum conceptum eius aut per intentionem sibi attributa ab intellectu concipiente”.

¹¹⁴ Themist., *De an.*, Pro. CAG V.3, 3,32-33 (Brito usually has *collectus*, instead of *aggregatus*; cf. AA 6.34, 177).

1.2 Preterea, per Philosophum primo *Posteriorum*,¹¹⁵ <ubi dicitur>: “universale est dum intelligitur, particulare dum sentitur”; sed per primum conceptum aliquid intelligitur; ergo per primum conceptum aliquid potest esse actu universale. Maior patet. Minor est manifesta, quia primo et secundum se et absolute aliquid potest intelligi.¹¹⁶

1.3 Preterea, per Boetium in fine *De consolatione*,¹¹⁷ ubi dicit “est quoddam quod si ad subiectum referas est particulare et ad intellectum est universale”; sed per primum conceptum potest referri ad intellectum; ergo per primum conceptum potest esse actu universalis. Maior patet auctoritate: quod enim potest referri ad animam est universale. Minor patet de se.

1.4 Preterea, sicut se habet quod quid est ad principia individuantia ita suo modo se habet ad esse abstractum; sed ad principia individuantia se ita habet quod si sibi adveniat, erit actu particulare; ergo si conceptus primus sibi advenerit sive intellexerit,¹¹⁸ erit actu universale; ergo etc. Maior est manifesta: quiditas enim indifferenter se habet ad esse particulare et ad esse universale. Minor patet, quia intellectus illam quiditatem facit /N 64ra/ actu universalem.

1.5 Preterea, si universale non esset actu universale per primum conceptum, sequeretur quod intellectus possibilis esset actus; consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis apparet per Philosophum, tertio *De anima*,¹¹⁹ ubi dicit quod intellectus possibilis est quoddam pati. Antecedens patet, quia ex duobus entibus in actu non fit tertium, sed oportet quod unum sit in actu, aliud in potentia; et intellectus possibilis non potest esse in actu qui recipit universale; ergo oportet quod est in actu universale.

¹¹⁵ Arist., *An. Post.* I.24 86a29-30; II.19 100a17 (AA 35.87, 318; 35.122, 321).

¹¹⁶ Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 8, **Ba** 127va: “Quoniam dicit Boetius quod singulare est dum sentitur, vniuersale dum intelligitur, per hoc innuens quod primus conceptus sufficit ad hoc quod sit vniuersale.”

¹¹⁷ Boethius, *De cons. phil.* V P6, 36 (AA 25.89, 294: “Omne quod sensibus patet, si ad rationem referas, universale est, si ad sensum, particulare est”.

¹¹⁸ intellexerit] intellectus N

¹¹⁹ Cf. Arist., *De an.* III.4 429a 13-14 (AA 6.136, 185).

2.1 In oppositum arguitur auctoritate Avicenne in *Logica* sua,¹²⁰ qui dicit quod universale est de secundis intentionibus, et secunde intentiones sunt universales; ergo per primum conceptum non potest esse aliquid actu universale logice, sed per secundum. Maior patet per Avicennam. Minor apparet: nichil enim actu predicatur de pluribus per primum conceptum, sed per secundum tantum.

2.2 Preterea, si per primum conceptum posset aliquid esse actu universale, sequeretur quod intentio particularis sive individualis esset actu universalis; sed consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis est manifesta: individuum enim non est universale. Antecedens patet: possum enim per primum conceptum intelligere quiditatem rei et per lineam reflexam intelligere esse particulare: ut Sortem secundum se et absolute possum intelligere secundum quod homo est et per lineam reflexam quod sit homo particularis, ut apparet tertio *De anima*.¹²¹

3.1 Ad istam questionem est dicendum quod duplex est universale: quoddam est universale metaphisicum et quoddam logicum; metaphisicum, ut cum intelligo naturam humanam secundum se et absolute; sed universale logicum addit rationem predicandi de pluribus: causatur enim a modo intelligendi rem ut apta nata est esse in pluribus.¹²²

3.2 Tunc dico quod universale logicum non potest esse actu universale per primum conceptum, sed oportet quod fiat hoc per secundum conceptum;

¹²⁰ Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I.2, ed. van Riet, 10.

¹²¹ Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. in III De anima*, q. 9, ed. Fauser, 1974, 185: “primo et per se (intellectus) cognoscit ipsum universale. Modo ipsum universale est conveniens cum singulari et differens ab ipso; conveniens, ut includit naturam universalis, et differens per rationem propriam superadditam rationi universalis. Ergo intellectus intelligit singulare linea reflexa illo modo, scilicet et est differens ab ipso universali vel conveniens cum ipso. Et non intelligit singulare per propriam rationem eius.” Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *STh* I.86, a. 1 (“quasi per quandam reflexionem”); *De veritate* 10.5, 309 (F.-X. Putallaz, *Le sens de la réflexion chez Thomas d’Aquin*, Paris: Vrin, 1991, 120-1, n. 15).

¹²² Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 8, **Ba** 127va: “Ad istam questionem est intelligendum quod duplex est vniuersale, scilicet logicum et metaphisicum. Vniuersale metaphisicum est vniuersale per potentiam in actu conceptione eius concipientem, et vniuersale logicum est [est] vniuersale per intentionem sibi attributam ab intellectu concipiente ita quod modus intelligendi rem per modum entis absoluti et abstracti preter omnem habitudinem ad sua supposita facit vniuersale metaphisicum, sed modus intelligendi rem per modum dicibilis de pluribus facit vniuersale logicum. Et hoc dicit Albertus in commento suo.”

universale autem methafisicum potest esse actu universale per primum conceptum. Et huius ratio est: cuius esse et ratio consistit in primo conceptu intellectus, hoc per primum conceptum potest esse actu universale; sed esse et ratio universalis methafisici consistit in primo conceptu¹²³ intellectus; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia cuius esse dependet ab aliquo per ipsum est actu tale. Minor manifesta est, quia per primum conceptum est aliquid actu universale simpliciter et absolute.

3.3 Aliud etiam probatur: cuius esse et ratio consistit ab alio non potest esse sine eo; sed esse et ratio universalis logici consistit a conceptu secundo; ergo sine conceptu secundo esse non potest. Maior patet de se. Minor etiam apparet, quia universale logicum predicatur de pluribus; tamen et predicari de pluribus est per secundum conceptum; ergo ipsum est actu universale per secundum conceptum.

Ad 1. Per hoc ad rationes in contrarium.¹²⁴

Ad 1.1 Ad primam. Cum dicitur “Themistius dicit, prohemio *De anima*, quod universale est conceptus” etc., conceditur. Ad minorem, quando dicitur “talis conceptus est primus”, dico quod duplex est conceptus rei: absolutus et secundum se, et talis conceptus est universale methafisicum et de illo procedit ratio; alius est conceptus rei respectivus et prout predicatur de pluribus, et ille est conceptus secundus, scilicet universale logicum, et isto modo non concludit ratio.

Ad 1.2 Ad aliam. Quando dicitur “per Philosophum, primo *Posteriorum*, universale est dum intelligitur” etc., conceditur. Sed dicis in minori “per primum conceptum quiditas rei intelligitur”, dico quod intelligi est duobus modis: vel secundum se et absolute, et sic verum est; vel prout predicatur de pluribus, et sic non est verum.

Ad 1.3 Ad auctoritatem Boetii. Quando dicitur “est quoddam” etc., conceditur. Ad minorem, quando dicitur “per primum conceptum potest aliquid

¹²³ in primo conceptu] per primum conceptum N

¹²⁴ Cf. Anon. Basil., *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 8, **Ba** 127vb: “Rationes procedunt viis suis. Bene probant rationes prime de vniuersali methaphesico, quod est vniuersale per ipsam conceptionem sub modo abstracti, et hoc modo concessum est.”

referri ad intellectum”, dico quod verum est de universali methafísico, non autem logico.

Ad 1.4 Ad quartam. <Quando dicitur> “sicut se habet quiditas rei” etc., conceditur. Ad minorem dicendum quod verum est de universali methafísico et non logico, ut prius.

Ad 1.5 Ad quintam. Quando dicitur “si universale non esset actu universale per primum conceptum, sequeretur quod intellectus possibilis esset actus”, dico quod intellectus possibilis dupliciter consideratur: uno modo in quantum est in pura potentia ad formas intelligibiles; alio modo secundum quod formas intelligibiles habet actu et eis vestitus est. Primo modo procedit ratio; secundo modo non habet veritatem, quia ut sic intellectus possibilis potest esse actus et intelligere quando vult.

Ad 2. Si quis vellet tenere primam viam, solveret argumenta in oppositum.

Ad 2.1 Primo auctoritate. Cum dicit “logica est de secundis intentionibus”, conceditur. Et cum dicis in minori “secunda intentio est secundus conceptus de quo est universale et per quod est actu universale”, dico quod verum est de universali logico, non tamen methafísico.

Ad 2.2 Ad aliud. Cum dicitur “si quiditas rei per primum conceptum esset actu universalis, sequeretur quod intentio individualis esset universalis”, conceditur; sed dicis “consequens est falsum”, dico quod est ita de genere logico, non autem methafísico.

Questio 7 (64ra-b)

Queratur consequenter utrum universale sit in intellectu solo.¹²⁵

1. Et arguitur primo quod sic.

¹²⁵ Utrum universale sit in intellectu solo. H<ytpibii> (*add. in mg. sup.*) N

1.1 Quia quod est in intellectu et non in alio est in eo solo; universale est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet. Minor etiam est manifesta, quia universale est proprium obiectum intellectus et non res: nulla enim res extra est universalis.

1.2 Preterea, universale vel est in re sola vel in aggregato ex re et intellectu, vel in intellectu solo; non in re quia nulla res extra est universalis; non in aggregato, quia nichil est compositum ex re et universali; ergo erit solum in intellectu. Maior patet per locum a sufficienti divisione: in pluribus enim esse non potest. Minor apparet, ut declaratum est.

1.3 Preterea, illud est in intellectu solo cui nichil correspondet a parte rei; sed universale est huiusmodi, ergo etc. Maior est manifesta de se, quia hoc dicimus intellectum solum. Minor apparet, quia si sibi aliquid corresponderet a parte rei sequeretur quod universale esset aliquid extra animam quod est impossibile; ergo etc.

2.1 In oppositum arguitur: si universale esset tantum in intellectu sequeretur quod esset figmentum; consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis apparet, quia intellectus nichil habet nisi sit ortum a sensibus, ut dicitur primo *Posteriorum*.¹²⁶ Consequentia patet per idem.

2.2 Preterea, intellectus solus est cui nichil correspondet a parte rei; sed universali aliquid correspondet in re extra; ergo non est in intellectu solo; ista patet ex dictis.

3. Ad istam questionem dicendum quod ‘intellectus solus’ potest nominare duo: vel enim dicit tantum intellectum et non aliud, [uel] cui nichil correspondet a parte rei; <vel dicit intellectum cui correspondet aliquid a parte rei>; primo modo universale est solum in intellectu et non in alio: intellectus enim est proprium subiectum universalis; secundo modo dico quod non est in intellectu.

Ad 1. Per hoc ad rationes.

Ad 1.1 Ad primam. Quando dicitur “quod est in intellectu et non in alio, est in eo solo”, conceditur. Ad minorem, quando dicitur “universale est

¹²⁶ Cf. Arist., *De sensu* 6 445b16-17 (AA 7.24, 197)

huiusmodi”, dico quod verum est primo modo et non secundo, ut dictum est in positione.

Ad 1.2 Ad secundam. <Quando dicitur> “universale vel est in re vel in aggregato” etc., /N 64rb/ potest concedi. Sed dicis “non in re, nec in aggregato, ergo in intellectu”, dico quod verum est primo modo et non secundo; vel possum dicere quod ista divisio est insufficiens, sed quartum membrum adhuc debet addi, scilicet vel in intellectu cui correspondet aliquid a parte rei; et isto modo verum est quod universale est in intellectu.

Ad 1.3 Ad tertiam. Cum dicitur “illud est in¹²⁷ intellectu solo” etc., conceditur. Sed dicitur in minori, quod universali nichil correspondeat a parte rei, dico per interemptionem; et tu probas “quia si sibi aliquid corresponderet a parte rei, oporteret quod tunc universale esset aliquid extra animam”, dico quod non oportet, sed sufficit quod sibi correspondeat similitudo rei, et non res. Et sic ad illud.

Questio 8 (64rb)

Consequenter queritur utrum universale sit in intellectu nudo vel puro.¹²⁸

1.1 Et arguitur primo quod sit in intellectu nudo.

1.1.1 Quia Philosophus dicit, secundo *De anima*,¹²⁹ “intus inexistens prohibet extraneum”; sed si aliqua species intelligibilis esset in intellectu, ille intellectus tunc non esset nudus, et etiam universale non posset¹³⁰ intelligi ab ipso intellectu; sed universale ab intellectu intelligitur; ergo oportet quod intelligatur ab intellectu nudo. Maior patet per Philosophum. Minor apparet, quia intellectus plura actu intelligere non potest, ut dicitur tertio *De anima*,¹³¹ quia est uirtus simplex; ergo etc.

¹²⁷ in] est N

¹²⁸ Utrum universale sit in intellectu nudo vel puro. H<ytpibii> (*add. in mg. sup.*) N

¹²⁹ Arist., *De an.* III.4 429a20-21: “intus apparens enim prohibebit extraneum” (*Nova translatio*).

¹³⁰ posset] pusset(?) N

¹³¹ Cf. Arist., *De an.* III.4 429b22-25 (AA 6.145, 186): “Intellectus est simplex...”.

1.1.2 Preterea, secundum Philosophum primo *Topicorum*,¹³² duo individua eidem non possunt actu inesse; sed si intellectus intelligeret universale, aliqua specie alia existente in intellectu intelligeret simul duo actu, quod est impossibile, ut ostensum est iam; ergo oportet quod universale intelligatur ab intellectu nudo in quo nulla sit alia species intelligibilis. Maior patet per auctoritatem Philosophi. Minor apparet de se.

1.1.2.1 Contra illud potest argui ratione sophistica sic: universale non est in intellectu, ergo non est in intellectu nudo, per locum a toto in modo ad suam partem. Maior est manifesta, quia universale est res: videmus enim quod lapis est quoddam universale quod est res; sed Philosophus dicit, tertio *De anima*,¹³³ quod lapis non est in anima; et si lapis est universale, universale non erit in anima; et per consequens non erit in intellectu nudo.

1.2 Deinde probatur quod universale sit in intellectu puro, et hoc sic: universale aut est in intellectu humano aut divino, per locum a sufficienti divisione: non potest esse in intellectu humano, quia Philosophus dicit, primo *Posteriorum*,¹³⁴ quod nichil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu; sed universale nunquam est in sensu; ergo non est in intellectu; relinquatur ergo quod universale sit in intellectu puro sive divino.

2. In oppositum potest argui.

2.1 Primo quod non sit in intellectu nudo, quia si universale esset in intellectu nudo starent contradictoria simul, scilicet quod intellectus esset nudus et non nudus; sed stare contradictoria simul¹³⁵ est impossibile; ergo etc. Ista patet de se; ergo universale non potest esse in intellectu nudo.

2.2 Deinde arguitur quod non sit in intellectu puro tantum, quia si esset in intellectu puro tantum, sequeretur quod nos non haberemus scientiam. Consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis est manifesta: habemus enim scientiam de universalibus; ergo universale non tantum est in intellectu puro, sed etiam nostro. Consequentia patet.

¹³² *Locum non inveni.*

¹³³ Arist., *De an.* III.8 431b29-432a1 (AA 6.163, 188).

¹³⁴ Arist., *De sensu* 6 445b16-17 (AA 7.24, 197)

¹³⁵ simul] *corr.* ex stailis(?) N

3. Ad istam questionem dicendum quod universale non est in intellectu nudo, nec tantum in intellectu humano, nec tantum in intellectu divino; sed in utrisque. Preterea, notandum quod aliquid esse in intellectu potest esse dupliciter: vno modo habitu; alio modo actu.

Ad 1.1 Per hoc ad rationes in oppositum.

Ad 1.1.1 Primo ad auctoritatem Philosophi. Quando dicitur “intus inexistens prohibet extraneum”, dico quod verum est: si illud primum inexistit actu, prohibet aliquid inexistere actu; si tamen primum inest habitu, nichil prohibet aliquid inexistere actu. Et sic etiam ad minorem; ergo ratio non concludit.

Ad 1.1.2 Ad secundum. Quando dicitur auctoritate Philosophi, primo *Topicorum*, “duo individua actu eidem inesse non possunt”, dico quod verum est actu; tamen unum potest inesse habitu, aliud actu. Et ita est de intellectu: et postquam habet aliquod intelligibile aut habitu aut actu non dicitur intellectus nudus; ergo etc.

Ad 1.1.2.1 Ad rationem sophisticam que probabat propositum potest responderi: quando dicitur quod non est in intellectu etc., conceditur. Ad minorem per interemptionem; et tu probas “lapis non est in anima” etc., dico quod verum est: non est in anima in quantum res extra, sed in quantum similitudo rei. Et ita non concludit ratio quin universale possit esse in intellectu.

Ad 1.2 Ad aliam que probavit quod universale tantum esset in intellectu puro. Quando dicitur “vel est in intellectu humano vel divino”, conceditur. Ad minorem, quando dicitur “universale non est in intellectu humano”, dico per interemptionem. Et tu probas, primo *Posteriorum*, “quidquid est in intellectu prefuit in sensu”, dico quod verum est per se vel per accidens; et dicis ulterius “universale numquam fuit in sensu”, dico quod verum est per se; tamen per accidens est in particularibus, quia sumptum est a quiditate particularium. Et sic ad illud.

Questio 9 (64rb-va)

Queratur consequenter utrum universalialia sint corporea vel incorporea.¹³⁶

1. Et videtur quod corporea.

1.1 Quia principia corporum sunt corporea; sed universalialia sunt principia corporum; ergo etc. Maior patet: principium enim et principiatum sunt eiusdem generis, ut dicitur primo *Posteriorum*.¹³⁷ Minor manifesta est: genera enim et differentie sunt principia corporum, dicitur enim ‘homo est animal rationale’; ergo etc.¹³⁸

1.2 Preterea, quod est idem corpus est corporeum; sed universale est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia que sunt eadem eandem rationem participant. Minor apparet: homo enim est corpus et animal est corpus.

1.3 Preterea, quod est in corpore est corporeum; sed universalialia sunt in corpore; ergo etc. Maior est manifesta, quia quod est in corpore extenditur extensione corporis, ut albedo Sortis. Minor patet, quia Sortes est albus et Plato est albus; sed nichil predicatur de <aliquo> nisi quod est in, et Sortes est corpus; ergo etc.¹³⁹

2.1 In oppositum arguitur per auctoritatem *Libri De causis*,¹⁴⁰ ubi dicitur in quadam propositione “quidquid recipitur in alio recipitur per modum rei recipientis et non rei recepte”; sed universale recipitur in intellectu qui est

¹³⁶ Utrum universalialia sint corporea vel incorporea. H<ytpibii> (*add. in mg. sup.*) N

¹³⁷ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In Post. An.* I.32, n. 270 (AA 35.75, 317).

¹³⁸ Cf. Durandus, *Quest. sup. Porf.*, q. 8, M 4a: “Item, quod est principium corporum est corporeum; uniuersale est principium corporum; quare etc. Maior patet, quia principium et principiatum sunt unius generis, ut dicitur primo *Posteriorum*. Minor manifesta est per Philosophum, 6^o(?) *Metaphisice*; ergo etc.”

¹³⁹ Cf. Durandus, *Quest. sup. Porf.*, q. 8, M 4a: “Quia omne quod est in corpore recipit dimensiones corporis; quod autem habet dimensiones est corporeum; et ideo [[est]] omne quod est corporeum est in corpore. <Maior patet, ...> Minor etiam manifesta, quia uniuersalia sunt in corporibus; ideo etc.”

¹⁴⁰ *Lib. De causis*, IX.99, 46-49 (AA 11.12, 232).

incorporeus; ergo universale est incorporeum. Maior patet auctoritate pre-allegata. Minor apparet: corpus enim non est in intellectu, cum intellectus sit immaterialis, simplex et indivisibilis.

2.2 Preterea, corpus non potest agere in non corpus; sed intellectus est non corpus; ergo universale quod agit in ipsum non potest esse corpus. Maior patet, quia activum et passivum communicant in materia. Minor est manifesta, quia universale ducit /N 64va/ intellectum de potentia ad actum.

2.3 Preterea, universalia sunt essentie rerum et essentie rerum sunt indivisibiles, et quod est indivisibile est incorporeum; ergo universale est incorporeum. Maior patet, quia superiora sunt essentie inferiorum. Minor apparet per Philosophum, septimo *Metaphisice*,¹⁴¹ quod essentia uniuscuiusque indivisibilis est; ergo etc.

3. Ad istam questionem dicendum est quod universale potest considerari dupliciter: pro re vel pro intentione; si pro re, sic est corporeum; si pro intentione, sic non est corporeum.¹⁴²

3.1 Probatio primi: de quo verificatur corpus per se, illud est corpus; sed de universali pro re verificatur corpus per se in primo modo perseitatis; ergo erit corpus. Maior patet, primo *Posteriorum*:¹⁴³ nichil verificatur de aliquo per se primo modo nisi diffinitio vel pars diffinitionis vel aliquid quod habet reduci ad unum istorum. Minor apparet, quia animal est universale et potest dici quod animal per se est corpus in primo modo perseitatis; ergo etc.

3.2 Secundum probatur, quia universale pro intentione sunt dispositiones intellectus, et dispositiones sunt in prima specie qualitatis, et qualitas non est corpus; ergo universale pro intentione non est corpus. Maior patet, quia rei intellectio est dispositio intellectus. Minor apparet, quia corpus vel est de genere substantie vel quantitatis; et non qualitatis, ergo etc.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* V.6 1116a32-34.

¹⁴² Cf. Durandus, *Quest. sup. Porf.*, q. 8, M 4a-b: Ad hoc dicendum quod <si> accipiatur uniuersale per intentiones uniuersalitatatis, dico quod non est corporeum. hoc patet ex duobus... Secundo dico quod si uniuersale accipiatur pro re // subiecta uniuersalitati, quandoque est corporea...”

¹⁴³ Cf. Arist., *An. Post.* I.4 73a34-37 (AA 35.38, 314).

Ad 1. Per hoc ad rationes in contrarium.

Ad 1.1 Ad primam. Quando dicitur “principia corporis sunt corpora”, verum est in quantum corporum principia. In minori dicis “universalia sunt principia corporum”, dico quod verum est: universalia pro re sunt principia corporum, non tamen pro intentione. Ad probationem “genus et differentia sunt principia speciei que est corpus”, verum est — ista sumpta pro re, non pro intentione.

Ad 1.2 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur “quod est idem corpus est corporeum”, dicendum ut prius.

Ad 1.3 Ad tertium. <Quando dicitur> “quod est¹⁴⁴ in corpore est corporeum”, dicendum quod aliquid esse in corpore est duobus modis: uno modo aliquid est in corpore quod non extenditur extensione corporis, ut intellectus possibilis est in corpore, tamen non extenditur extensione corporis, quia non est immersus organo corporeo; alio modo est aliquid in corpore, quod <extenditur> extensione corporis, ut album in Sorte. Et isto modo habet veritatem; primo modo non.

Ad 2. Qui vellet tenere aliam partem, posset solvere argumenta in oppositum.

Ad 2.1 Primo ad auctoritatem *Libri De causis*. <Cum dicitur> “quidquid est in alio” etc., conceditur. Ad minorem, quando dicitur “intellectus est incorporeus in quo recipitur universale”, ergo vis concludere “universale est incorporeum”, dico quod verum est pro intentione, non tamen pro re. Et sic ad illud.

Ad 2.2 Ad aliud. Quando dicis “corpus non potest agere in non corpus”, dico quod duplex est actio: quedam est que fit cum abiectioe contrarii in passo, et tali actione corpus non potest agere in non corpus; alia est actio que magis est salus et perfectio, ut dicitur tertio *De anima*,¹⁴⁵ et tali actione corpus potest agere in non corpus. In minori, quando dicis “intellectus est incorporeus”, conceditur; “ergo non potest recipere corporeum obiectum”,

¹⁴⁴ est] etiam N

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Arist., *De anima* I.1 402a25-26.

dico quod verum est primo modo, non tamen secundo. Et tu probas “activum et passivum communicant in materia”, dico quod verum est primo modo actionis, non tamen secundo.

Ad 2.3 Ad tertium. Quando dicitur “universalialia sunt essentiae rerum”, conceditur; et ulterius quando dicitur “essentia rei est indivisibilis”, dico quod verum est pro intentione, non tamen pro re.

Et tu diceres: genus est¹⁴⁶ essentia specierum et genus dividitur in species, ergo essentia est divisibilis. Dicendum quod Philosophus dicit, quinto *Metaphisice*,¹⁴⁷ quod uni esse et indivisibile esse sibi ipsi, et ita licet genus dividatur quantum ad species, tamen in se est indivisibile; etc.

Uterius, quando dicitur “quod est indivisibile est incorporeum”, dico quod duplex est corpus: uno modo corpus nominat michi quantitatem, alio modo substantiam; licet tunc universale non sit corporeum secundum quantitatem, scilicet quod habeat trinam dimensionem, tamen potest esse corporeum, in quantum corpus nominat michi substantiam, scilicet materiam et formam. Et sic ad illud.

Questio 10 (65va-b)

Queratur consequenter utrum diffinitio detur de rebus in anima vel de rebus extra animam existentibus.¹⁴⁸

I. Et videtur primo quod de rebus extra animam.

I.1 Quia illud diffinitur quod de suis inferioribus predicatur; sed res extra animam predicatur de inferioribus; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia omne diffinitum habet inferiora quibus convenit diffinitio. Minor patet: illud enim

¹⁴⁶ est] et N

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* V.6 1116a32-34 (?).

¹⁴⁸ Utrum diffinitio detur de rebus in anima vel de rebus extra animam. H<ytpibii> (*add. in mg. sup.*) N

quod predicatur de pluribus oportet quod sit in eis; sed res secundum intellectum non potest¹⁴⁹ /N 65vb/ esse in alio; ergo oportet quod sit in re extra.

1.2 Preterea, quodcumque aliqua realiter sunt idem unum non potest separari ab altero; sed quod diffinitur et res extra animam sunt huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet de se. Minor apparet, quia quod diffinitur et sua inferiora sunt idem realiter; sed talia inferiora sunt res extra animam; ergo res extra animam diffinitur.

1.3 Preterea, dicit Commentator, prohemio *De anima*,¹⁵⁰ “diffinitio datur de rebus extra animam existentibus”; et si sic, ergo etc.

2. In oppositum arguitur.

2.1 Diffinitio est universalium et universalia sunt [sunt] in anima; ergo diffinitio datur de rebus in anima. Maior patet, primo *Posteriorum*.¹⁵¹ Minor apparet de se.

2.2 Preterea, illud solum est diffinibile quod solum per se ab intellectu est intelligibile; et hoc est res in anima; ergo etc. Maior est manifesta: diffinitio enim est quidam modus sciendi. Minor patet: res extra animam¹⁵² enim non sunt per se intelligibilia, sed solum sensibilia, ut dicit Philosophus secundo *De anima*;¹⁵³ ergo etc.

2.3 Preterea, diffinitio est entis, vel ergo est entis particularis vel universalis, per locum a sufficienti divisione; non particularis, ergo universalis. Maior patet primo *Posteriorum*,¹⁵⁴ quia omne quod diffinitur oportet quod sit ens: non entis enim non est genus, neque differentia. Minor apparet septimo *Metaphisice*,¹⁵⁵ ubi dicitur quod diffinitio non est particularium; ergo etc.

¹⁴⁹ potest] *corr. ex* possunt N

¹⁵⁰ *Locum non inveni.*

¹⁵¹ Cf. Arist., *An. Post.* II.3 90b3-4.

¹⁵² extra animam] sensibilia N

¹⁵³ Arist., *De an.* II.5 417b27-28 (AA 6.60, 179).

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Arist., *An. Post.* II.3 90b3-4.

¹⁵⁵ Arist., *Metaph.* VI.10 1036a2ss; VI.11 1036a28-29.

3. Ad istam questionem dicendum quod diffinitio datur de rebus in anima; tamen potest esse quod habeant esse extra animam.

3.1 Primum potest probari sic.

3.1.1 Illorum solum est diffinitio quorum est scientia; sed rerum in anima solum est scientia; ergo etc. Maior apparet, quia diffinitio est quedam modum sciendi. Minor patet primo *Posteriorum*,¹⁵⁶ quia scientia solum est universalium, que solummodo sunt apud intellectum; ergo etc.

3.1.2 Preterea, omne diffinitum est unum predicabile de suis inferioribus, et tale non est nisi ens in anima; ergo etc. Maior patet per Philosophum, sexto *Topicorum*,¹⁵⁷ ubi dicitur quod sola species diffinitur et etiam est quid unum. Minor apparet: illam enim unitatem habet ab anima.

3.2 Secundum probatur sic: si diffinitio daretur solum de rebus apud animam existentibus et non de rebus vel pro rebus extra, cum diffinitum verificetur de omnibus inferioribus, sequeretur quod non possit verificari de particularibus; sed consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Consequentia apparet; falsitas consequentis est manifesta, quia si sic, Sortes esset homo quantum ad suum esse intellectum, quod est inconveniens; ergo etc.

Ad 1. Per hoc ad rationes in oppositum.

Ad 1.1 Ad primam. Quando dicitur “illud diffinitur quod de suis” etc., concedo. Ad minorem, quando dicitur “res extra predicatur de suis inferioribus”, dico per interemptionem; et tu probas “illud quod predicatur de inferioribus oportet quod sit in eis; sed res intellecta realiter non potest esse <in> alio”, dico quod res intellecta dupliciter consideratur: vel secundum esse intellectum vel secundum esse reale; diffinitio enim non verificatur de re primo modo; sed secundo modo, scilicet pro esse reali.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Arist., *Eth.* VI.7 1141a16.

¹⁵⁷ per Philosophum sexto *Topicorum*] sexto *Topicorum* per Philosophum N — Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* VII.4 1030a6-7.

Ad 1.2 Ad secundam. Quando dicitur “quandocumque aliqua sunt idem realiter” etc., dico quod verum est quantum ad esse reale, non quantum ad esse intellectum.

Ad 1.3 Ad auctoritatem Commentatoris, cum dicit quod diffinitio datur de rebus extra animam existentibus, dico quod Commentator non intelligit quantum ad esse extra animam, sed pro esse quod habent extra animam. Et sic ad illud.

Ad 2. Tunc ad rationes alterius positionis.

Ad 2.1 Ad primam. Quando dicitur “diffinitio est universalium” etc., dico quod verum est sub esse universali, non tamen pro esse quod habent in suppositis. Et sic ad illud.

Ad 2.2 Ad aliud. Quando dicitur “illud solum est diffinibile quod solum ab intellectu est intelligibile”, concedatur. Ad minorem, cum dicitur “sed res in anima est solum intelligibile, non autem \res/ extra animam”, verum est per se: solummodo res in anima est intelligibile; ex consequenti autem res extra animam et per quandam <lineam> reflexam, ut dicitur tertio *De anima*.¹⁵⁸

Ad 2.3 Ad tertiam. Quando dicitur “diffinitio est entis vel ergo est entis particularis” etc., dico quod est entis universalis sub esse universali; sed particularis pro esse particulari quod habet in re extra. Et ita ratio concludit uno¹⁵⁹ modo; alio modo non.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. in III De anima*, q. 9, ed. Fauser, 185 (cf. supra).

¹⁵⁹ uno] suo N