

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE'S TOPICS IN THE 13TH CENTURY.

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The origin of this little preliminary study lies in my participation in editing the commentary on Aristotle's Topics written by Boethius de Dacia. Boethius' work gives a lucid treatment of many points in Mediaeval logic, but it seems on the reader's side to presuppose some knowledge of Aristotle's text and of some terms commonly used in the Mediaeval interpretation of it. Accordingly it was necessary to study some other commentaries in order to achieve a better understanding of Boethius' text. It has seemed fit to publish some of the results in the hope that it might prove helpful to the readers of the forthcoming edition (*Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi* vol. VI).

I. Commentaries used and their form. ¹⁾

1) Albertus Magnus

Edition: Alberti Magni Opera omnia I, ed. P. Iammy, Lyon 1651, pp. 658a-839b.

This might best be characterized as a paraphrase of Aristotle's text, but it is an uneven paraphrase. Some passages are very elaborately explained, others are only given a few words. Whenever something has interested Albertus he has added a discussion which often loses connexion with the text. Each book is divided into tractates, and each tractate into chapters. At the beginning of the work Albertus has added a prooemium of his own.

As far as I know no exact date can be given, but it is often assumed

1) Only the manuscripts actually used for this study are listed. For further information about the MSS. see Grabmann, *Ungedruckte lateinische Kommentare zur Aristotelischen Topik aus dem 13. Jahrhundert. Mittelalterliches Geistesleben III*, 142-157. München 1956. P. Glorieux, *La faculté des arts et ses maîtres au XIII^e siècle*. J. Vrin Paris 1971. C.H. Lohr, *Medieval latin Aristotle Commentaries*, *Traditio* 23 (1967), 24 (1968), 26 (1970), 27 (1971), 28 (1972).

that Albertus' Aristotle-paraphrases have been written between 1256 and 1270. ²⁾ I would prefer the earlier part of this period, but I have no arguments of any weight.

2) Robert Kilwardby, Scriptum super libro Topicorum.

MS.: Oxford, Bodleian Library Cod. Canon. misc. 4o3 ff. 182ra-221ra.

In this commentary the whole text is divided into 'lectiones' consisting of: 1) a short survey of the contents and a division into parts 2) an explanation of the text 3) arguments for the position of the 'lectio' in relation to the preceding ones and the following 4) some 'dubia' or questions. This procedure is not always strictly followed, and is often repeated more than once in the same lectio.

Again it is not possible to state an exact date, but it would not seem improbable to place it round the middle of the 13th century. ³⁾

3) Adenulph of Anagni, notulae Topicorum.

MS.: Perugia, Biblioteca Comunale MS 1o77, ff. 1-119v.

The form of this commentary is almost the same as that found in Kilwardby, but the scheme is more strictly followed. It has been shown by Ludwig Ott ⁴⁾ that the commentary is found in two versions.

No exact date can be given. Adenulph is called 'magister' in 1250, and he dies in 1290. ⁵⁾ I would reckon that the last 20 years of his life cannot come into consideration, with regard to the date of the composition.

4) Boethius de Dacia, Quaestiones super librum Topicorum.

Edition: Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi VI (forthcoming).

The greater part of this commentary is in the form of questions; some are taken from Aristotle's text, some treat related subjects that are not directly found in the text. Paraphrases are given of parts of the text,

2) Ueberweg/Geyer, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie II, 4o8. Basel 1951. F. van Steenberghen, La Philosophie au XIIIe siècle. Louvain-Paris 1966, p. 273.

3) Cf. D.A. Callus, The "Tabulae super Originalia Patrum" of Robert Kilwardby O.P. *Studia Mediaevalia in honorem R.J. Martin*, Brugge 1948, pp. 243-270.

4) L. Ott, Die Wissenschaftslehre des Adenulph von Anagni. *Melanges offerts à E. Gilson*, Toronto-Paris 1959, pp. 465-490.

5) Grabmann, Adenulph von Anagni, Propst von Saint-Omer († 1290) *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben III*, 306-322. München 1956.

but not systematically. A more detailed description can be found in the introduction to the edition.

Date: 1269-74.

5) Elias, Sententia libri Topicorum.

MS.: Vaticanus lat. 4883 ff. 56r-88r.

An exposition of the text with notanda, dubia etc. very much like the form used by Thomas Aquinas. Short and without details.

The author is unknown, and it will not be easy to date the commentary. It is probably later than the work by Boethius, but it is difficult to say how much.

The text in the Vatican-MS. is rather corrupt. I have not had the opportunity to consult the other MS. (Assisi Bibl. comunale 322).

6) Simon of Faversham, Sententia libri Topicorum Aristotelis.

MS.: Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek cod. lat. 1359 ff. 24r-44ra.

In the same form as the commentary by Elias, but more detailed. F. 39vb ends abruptly with the treatment of IV c.5, 127a 19, and f. 40ra starts abruptly with VII c.3, 153a 10, so that about one half of the work has been lost. As far as I know, no other other manuscript containing the commentary has been found.

No exact date can be given. De Rijk ^{5a)} has dated Simon's commentary on Peter of Spain about 1275-80. This would also seem a probable date for the commentary on the Topics.

7) Henricus de Bruxella.

MS.: Wien, Dominikanerkonvent cod. 192/158 ff. 61r-109v.

The form is not the same throughout the whole work. The greater part is an exposition (like Thomas) or even a paraphrase (like Albertus), but now and then some 'lectiones' (like Kilwardby or Adenulph) are found.

The commentary is probably from the end of the 13th century.

8) Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones supra Topica Aristotelis.

MS.: Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 11132 ff. 12ra-52ra.

This commentary consists of questions throughout. Most of them are directly connected with the text, but in the beginning of book II some questions on 'signum universale' are found (as in the commentary by Boe-

5a) L.M. de Rijk, On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's Summulae logicales. II. Vivarium VI (1968) 74-76.

thius de Dacia).

A manuscript in Erfurt (Ampl. Q 276) containing this commentary is dated 1295 which gives a terminus ante quem.

9) Angelo of Camerino, Sententia libri Topicorum.

MS.: Vaticanus Pal. lat. 1057 ff. 1-198v.

An exposition of the text like that by Elias, but with many notanda and dubia, and very detailed.

In 1296 Angelo became bishop of Cagli, so the commentary is probably before that time.

All these commentaries have used the translation by Boethius. Adenulph has known the translation called Translatio anonyma in the edition by Minio-Paluello (Aristoteles Latinus V,3), since he says of VI c.11, 148b 30: "...in alia translatione habetur: cuius medium decurrit ad fines" (f. 91vb). He goes on to say that in this particular place he prefers that translation. Elias also talks of an 'alia translatio', he says (f. 80ra):

"Et dicendum quod alia translatio non habet aliquid loco huius secundae rationis, est enim ab alio loco Nam si definitio (VII c.3, 153a 15) usque ad hunc locum Quoniam ergo contingit ex definitione (153a 23) talis: definitio est indicans quid est esse rei, quae autem dicunt quiditatem rei sunt tantum genus et differentia essentialis, quare oratio composita erit (s.l.) et definitio ex talibus."

From the text which precedes the passage just quoted it can be seen that the 'secunda ratio' said to be missing in alia translatio is the sentence 'non enim contingit (153a 20) -praedicatur' (153a 22). But this sentence is found in both translations. The words Elias quotes from alia translatio are from neither translation. Perhaps the words are not a quotation but a paraphrase, but still it cannot be decided from which translation. So the possibility remains that Elias speaks of another manuscript containing Boethius' translation but without this sentence.

In the other commentaries I have found no remarks about other translations.

The commentary by Albertus seems to have had some influence since it is quoted or referred to by name in Henricus on almost every page, Simon (often, and especially in the first part), Radulphus (occasionally), and An-

gelo (a few times). But it is difficult to say how deep this influence goes. Henricus evidently owes a lot to Albertus, even though he has something of his own. With regard to the others it would be beyond the scope of the present study to try to ascertain whether they are more than superficially dependent upon Albertus.

Adenulph has probably known the commentary by Kilwardby. After having discussed scientiae and artes in his introduction, Adenulph opens his treatment of Aristotle's text with the words: "Cum tota logica est de sermone...", which comes very close to the incipit of Kilwardby's commentary (Totum negotium logicum est de sermone). There are also many verbal agreements in the rest of this passage and in many other passages in the two commentaries. Compare what Ludwig Ott has shown about Adenulph's introduction to his work, that it is to a great extent taken from Nicolaus of Paris.⁶⁾ If it is true that Adenulph has taken something from Kilwardby, it will not make his commentary worthless, as it contains much besides which is either Adenulph's own or taken from other sources.

II. Aristotle's Topica and Boethius' De differentiis topicis.

In the Middle Ages both Aristotle's Topics and Boethius' De differentiis topicis were read and used in teaching. Naturally the question of the difference between the two works was raised. In four of the commentaries used by me this question is discussed, most elaborately by Kilwardby (see text 3).

They all⁷⁾ give the same answer: A locus can be considered in two ways: 1) according to its constitutio (or substantia, generatio) which is what Boethius does. 2) according to its usus (or applicatio, operatio) which is done by Aristotle.

Radulphus in his commentary on De differentiis topicis says exactly the same thing.⁸⁾

In his commentary on De diff. top. Martinus Dacus⁹⁾ says that Boethius

6) Cf. note 4.

7) Besides Kilwardby see Adenulph on loca 25, f. 4va; Simon proemium f. 24rb; Angelo end of I, f. 36ra.

8) Radulphus Brito, Super libro Topicorum Boethii I qu. 1; Bruxelles Bibl. Royale cod. 3540-47 f. 164ra.

9) Martinus de Dacia, Quaestiones super librum Topicorum Boethii, qu. 1, I ad rationes. Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Meddi Aevi II, 321.

considers argumentatio dialectica (or in the arguments syllogismus dialecticus) according to its 'substantia', Aristotle according to 'constitutio praedicatorum et ipsorum usus'. Iohannes Dacus in his Divisio scientiae¹⁰⁾ says that Boethius considers syllogismus dialecticus according to its constitutio and Aristotle according to its usus. Their formulations seem to contradict Kilwardby's statement that Aristotle treats of syll. dial. both according to its substantia and to its usus, a view which is shared by the other commentators. But in my opinion one should not lay too much emphasis on that. Since Martinus talks of constitutio praedicatorum his words are not absolutely incompatible with Kilwardby's. Moreover Martinus ends his remarks by saying that this is 'commune verbum' i.e. the common saying which might imply that as far as he knows, no disagreement exists on this point. Could a possible explanation of Iohannes' formulation be that, as he has made his whole division of the sciences by their various syllogisms, he so to speak automatically uses the syllogism to distinguish between the two "topics" ?

In connection with this explanation of the difference between the two works, it is often¹¹⁾ said that this difference is the reason why Aristotle calls that consideratio which Boethius calls locus. In other words: a locus considered according to its use is called a consideratio. The only probable source of this use of consideratio as a technical term is found in the way in which Aristotle usually sets forth the loci. As any reader of his text knows, he says: "See (latin: considera (ndum)) if the other part says..., then do..., because..." The word consideratio itself is not found in Aristotle's text in this technical sense.

A good example of this use of consideratio is found in the commentary by Boethius Dacus. In the fourth book after qu. 14 he gives a paraphrase of the text c.1, 12ob 21-121b 8 which consists of seven loci. Boethius presents them as secunda consideratio, tertia consideratio etc. Adenulph goes so far that when Aristotle in the beginning of book II uses the phrase iste locus, he explains this by: "id est ista consideratio".¹²⁾

The passage in Aristotle's text to each locus beginning with "because"

10) Iohannes Dacus, Divisio scientiae. Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi I, 40.

11) Kilwardby in text 3. Adenulph, Radulphus and Angelo as in note 7-8.

12) Adenulph on 109a 34sq., f. 28va.

is called ratio considerationis, being or containing a maxima (propositio) or more precisely "maxima supra quam fundatur consideratio".¹³⁾

Kilwardby concludes that since there is this difference between the two works, Aristotle's is 'naturaliter posterior' to Boethius', (text 3). I have not found this expressly stated by any of the other commentators, but there can be no doubt that they would agree.

As a consequence of this view of the difference between the two works we should expect that doctrines which are not Aristotelian are taken from the *De differentiis topicis* and used in the interpretation of Aristotle's work.

This can be illustrated by a point which is discussed in the openings of most of the commentaries on Aristotle's text. Boethius begins *De diff. top.* by dividing *logica* in *pars inveniendi* and in *pars iudicandi*; the latter consists of the two *Analytica*, the former of the *Topics*. Following this distinction the commentators on Aristotle discuss whether *ars topica* (or *dialectica*) is *inventiva* or *iuducativa* (*resolutoria*). The answers, however, are influenced by Aristotle.

Albertus, Kilwardby, Adenulph, Henricus, and Angelo¹⁴⁾ give the same answer. They say that '*ars topica procedit per signa et probabilia*' and in that way only inventio is possible, not *resolutio* or *iudicium*. *Ars demonstrativa* on the other hand '*procedit per causas et principia*', and this is how iudicium and resolutio take place, not *inventio*. The question raised cannot be taken from Aristotle - even though the commentators naturally refer to the "*invenire*" in the first line of his text - it must come from Boethius. On the other hand, nothing can be found in Boethius' text from which the answer can be taken, and if we read the *Glossae super Topica* (Boethii) by Abelard¹⁵⁾ nothing similar to the explanation just cited is found. The same is the case with the explanation of the difference between *inventio* and *iudicium* found in a little anonymous commentary

13) E.g. Adenulph on 121a 5sq, f. 50rb; 121b 4, f. 50rb; 121 b 12, f. 50rb.

14) Albertus I Proemium 1, 659a; Adenulph on 100a 19sq, f. 4ra-b; Henricus on 100a 19sq, f. 61ra; Angelo on 100a 19sq, f. 9ra; Kilwardby text 2.

15) Pietro Abelardo, *Scritti di logica* ed. M. dal Pra, La Nuova Italia Firenze 1969, pp. 210-213.

to Porphyry (12 th cen.). ¹⁶⁾ But if we go on to Aristotle's text we find that in his opening lines (and often later on) he says that this method is "ex probabilibus". As any reader of Aristotle's text knows, Aristotle regards this as the distinguishing characteristic of dialectic. So it would seem that it has been tried to combine the distinction made by Boethius between The Analytics and the Topics with the distinction made by Aristotle between the same works. A consequence of the Medieval explanation is that the Topics often seems to be opposed especially to the Posterior Analytics.

The answer found in Simon ¹⁷⁾ is a little different. He says that *dialectica utens* ¹⁸⁾ is *inventiva*, because it teaches "invenire media probabilia per signa", *dialectica docens* is *iudicativa*, because it teaches "resolvere syllogismum in suas partes"; also the two Analytics are *iudicativae* because they proceed from 'necessaria'. Here, too, the question is from Boethius, the answer is from Aristotle.

Radulphus Brito ¹⁹⁾ must have known some commentary which gives the same answer as Simon since he begins by stating that so is the opinion of some 'antiqui et moderni'. But "omissa ista distinctione" he goes on to state his own view which is that a *scientia* is *resolutoria* 1) "resolvendo aliquid in suas causas et principia" - in that way every *scientia* is *resolutoria*. 2) Because it teaches "modum resolvendi in..." - in that way the Analytics are *resolutoria*. A *scientia* is *inventiva* 1) because it "docet invenire media ad problemata terminanda" - no *scientia* is mentioned. 2) Because it teaches "modum inveniendi..." - in that way the Topics is *inventiva*. He proceeds by saying that it teaches this "respiciendo habitudinem localem et signa". The point of view has changed a good deal since the weight here is put on the teaching of *modus*. Radulphus' view may not be absolutely compatible with Kilwardby's, but still *resolutio* is combined with *causae*, and *inventio* with *signa*.

Elias ²⁰⁾ says that the distinction between *inventiva* and *iudicativa* is applied to logic rather than to other *scientiae*, because only logic

16) Oxford Bodl. Laud. Lat. 67 ff. 6r-7v. Partly edited in L.M. de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* II,I, 165. Van Gorcum Assen 1968.

17) Simon, prooemium f. 24rb.

18) On this distinction, see chapter IV,2.

19) Radulphus text 2.

20) Elias on *looa* 19, f. 56ra.

teaches 'modus inveniendi et iudicandi'. He says no more about it, but from this it would look as if his opinion is similar to Radulphus'.²¹⁾

III. Praedicata and praedicabilia.

Today it is the usual practice to speak of the four predicables in Aristotle's Topics.²²⁾ But in the Middle Ages the term praedicabile was not used in connexion with the Topics, but only about the *quinque voces* in Porphyry's Isagoge. In the Topics only the term praedicatum was used. In some of the commentaries a discussion is found about the difference between praedicabilia and praedicata. Robert Kilwardby²³⁾ explains that praedicatio can be considered in two ways: 1) as found in propositione sive conclusionē which is what Aristotle does, 2) as found in linea praedicamentali which is what Porphyry does. As these two ways of considering praedicatio are not parallel, the number of praedicata is not the same as the number of praedicabilia. It is probably the same thing Radulphus Brito means when he says²⁴⁾ that the praedicabilia are distinguished by the various ways they "praedicantur de inferioribus", while the praedicata are distinguished "penes ... modum inhaerendi subiecto de quo possunt terminari per considerationes...". Adenulph²⁵⁾ offers the same explanation, and besides he calls praedicatum an actus and praedicabile an aptitudo. This last is found in Simon²⁶⁾ who distinguishes between the two by saying that "praedicabile dicitur ab aptitudine praedicandi", and the praedicabilia are different in accordance with their different modi praedicandi. Praedicatum "dicitur ab actu praedicandi de subiecto" and they are different as they "determinantur...per diversas considerationes logicas". As far as I can see Angelo²⁷⁾ says the same as Simon.

This explanation of the difference (aptitudo vs. actus) cannot be used here according to Radulphus Brito (text 3). So it might seem that we are

21) Cf. Lambertus, *Summa I* (De propositionibus); ed. F. Alessio La Nuova Italia Firenze 1971 p.5.

22) See e.g. W.A. de Pater, *Les Topiques d'Aristotle et la dialectique platonicienne*, Thomistische Studien 10, Paulusverlag Fribourg 1965.

23) Kilwardby on 101b 12sq., f. 185vb.

24) Radulphus Brito text 3.

25) Adenulph on 101b 37sq., f. 11ra.

26) Simon text 1.

27) Angelo on 101b 17sq., f. 8rb.

here confronted by two explanations. But in my view the discrepancy cannot be great. All commentators would probably agree that the list of predicables is something like a catalogue of the ways in which something is predicated of something. The four predicates on the other hand are the predications possible in sentences used as premisses or conclusions (in an *ars* where species must be the subject of the sentence). Moreover, we find the two explanations combined, as said before, in Adenulph.

One of the reasons for this discussion to arise is of course that species and differentia belong to the predicables but not to the predicates, while definitio is one of the predicates but not one of the predicables. This had to be explained.

About species Albertus²⁸⁾ explains that it cannot be a praedicatum in the Topics, because individua would then be subject, and 'individuum non est subiectum artis'. This explanation is also given by Kilwardby, Adenulph, Simon, Radulphus and partly by Angelo²⁹⁾. Some of these explain further that there can be no *ars* or *scientia* about individua, because they belong to the infinita, about which there can be no *scientia*, according to Porphyry, Isagoge 6,15 Busse. Accordingly there can be no 'considerationes' about species as praedicatum. But, they say, species is the subject in all topical propositions. Boethius Dacus says something different, namely that "species...realiter enim idem est cum definitione, licet differant in modo. Idem enim significant species et definitio, et ideo sunt unum praedicatum realiter". And: "ponendo (Porphyrius) speciem praedicabile ponit definitionem." (VII qu. 2 ad 2.).

About definitio Kilwardby and Adenulph³⁰⁾ state that it is no predicabile, because it is a complexum and as such it cannot 'ordinari in linea praedicamentali'; only its parts (i.e. genus et differentia) can. Radulphus says³¹⁾ that definitio has the same 'modus praedicandi de inferioribus' as species, and therefore it is no predicable in its own right, but it has another 'modus inhaerendi subiecto' than the other predicates. This should be compared to Boethius' words about species as a predicate. An-

28) Albertus I Prooemium 2, 661b.

29) Kilwardby on 101b 12sq., f. 185vb; Adenulph on 101b 37sq., f. 11ra-b; Simon text 1; Radulphus I qu. 20 ad 9. f. 19rb; Angelo on 101b 17sq., f. 8rb.

30) As note 29.

31) Radulphus I qu. 20 ad 2., f. 19ra.

gelo's ³²⁾ explanation seems to be like Kilwardby's.

About differentia it is often explained that it is not a predicate in its own right, because it 'reducitur ad genus', i.e. it is determined by the same considerations as genus. I shall come back to this problem in the discussion of annexa.

IV. Some remarkable points in the discussion of the text.

BOOK I

1. Praedicata and annexa - 1,5-7.

When a topical debate is opened the subject of the debate is presented in the form of a problema, i.e. an alternative question, e.g. (the example given by Aristotle, I,4, 101b 33) "utrum animal gressibile bipes definitio est hominis vel non?". The respondens in the discussion has to choose one of the two sides. The problema is then discussed through propositiones, i.e. simple questions which the opponens asks the respondens to deny or affirm. E.g. "putasne animal genus est hominis?". Such problems and propositions when considered with regard to the relation between their subject and predicate are classified as belonging to one of the four types of predicates. But as Aristotle says (I,6,103a 1sq.) some problems are left which cannot, strictly speaking, be said to belong to one or other of the predicates; of those problems, however, each one is adiungendum to the predicate to which it is 'conueniens'.

These hints given by Aristotle have been further developed in the Middle Ages to a theory of the praedicata principalia and their annexa. A predicate has as its annexum the 'problemata ad eandem methodum reducibilia' or 'per easdem considerationes determinata'³³⁾. The word methodus has to be explained. The best explanation is found in Boethius Dacus I qu. 26, where it is said that the method of each predicate "...est collectio considerationum et rationum, per quas concludi potest...". As shown before consideratio is another word for locus, so methodus here is identical with

32) Angelo on 101b 17sq., f. 8rb.

33) See e.g. Albertus I,II, 2-5, 671b-675a; Kilwardby text 4; Adenulph text 1-4; Boethius Dacus I qu. 25 ad 1.; Simon text 2; Angelo on 102b 28sq., f. 13ra.

the loci which can be used for a predicate. Annexum to a predicate, then, are those problems which do not, strictly speaking, belong to the predicate, but can still be determined by (part of) the same loci as the principal predicate.

Up to this point all commentators would, as far as I can see, agree, but differences of opinion arise when we come to the question of which annexum each predicate has.

About annexum definitioni(s) there is not much disagreement. All commentators follow Aristotle's hints in I,5, 102a 6sq. They say that annexum definitioni are problems about idem et diversum definitione, and most of them repeat the example which Aristotle gives of such problems: 'utrum bonum sit honestum'.³⁴⁾ The loci which can be used to determine such problems are found in VII, 1-2, 151b 28-153a 1.

Genus has, as the only of the predicates, two annexa.

1) differentia. This idea is taken from Aristotle (I,4, 101b 18), who says that differentia is 'cum genere ordinanda', and it is repeated and explained without alterations by Kilwardby, Adenulph, Boethius Dacus, Elias, and Angelo³⁵⁾. The others make a distinction. In Simon's formulation it is said that when differentia is 'constitutiva speciei subalternae' it is generalis and annexum generi, when it is 'constitutiva speciei specialissimae' it is 'collocanda cum definitione'³⁶⁾. Albertus, and with him Henricus, makes the distinction for virtually the same reason, but explains that 'ultima differentia.... convertibilis.... ideo cum specie locatur ad subiectum'; this differentia he calls divisiva³⁷⁾. Radulphus Brito says that differentia generalis is annexum generi; he gives 'sensibilis' as an example. Differentia specifica however '...quae convertitur cum specie, dicendum quod reducitur ad definitionem'³⁸⁾. This division of differentia would most probably be taken from the distinction made by Boethius, De differentiis topicis I 1173 B between differentia constitutiva and divisiva.

34) E.g. Albertus I,II,2,671b; Kilwardby text 4; Adenulph text 1; Boethius Dacus VII qu. 2-3; Radulphus VII qu. 2.

35) Kilwardby on 101b 11sq., f. 185ra; cf. text 4; Adenulph on 101b 12sq., f. 9vb-lora; cf. text 3; Boethius Dacus I qu. 25 ad 1.; Elias on 101b 11sq., f. 57vb; Angelo on 101b 11sq., f. 8ra-b.

36) Simon on 101b 11sq., f. 26ra; cf. the quotation in the preceding chapter from Boethius Dacus VII qu. 2 on species/definitio.

37) Albertus I,II,1,669b; Henricus on 101b 11sq., f. 63vb.

38) Radulphus I qu. 31, f. 22va; cf. text 3 ad 8.; cf. again Boethius Dacus VII qu.2.

2) idem genere. All commentators agree that this is annexum generi. It consists of problems such as: 'utrum in eodem genere vel diverso' (Aristotle I,5, 102a 37).³⁹⁾

The loci treating of the two annexa generi are found in book IV, among the loci treating of genus.

According to almost all commentators annexum accidentis are problems in form of comparationes secundum magis vel minus vel aequae,⁴⁰⁾ as stated by Aristotle in I,5, 102b 15sq. The loci treating of such problems are found in III, 1-5. Boethius Dacus, however, in III qu. 8 ad 1. denies this; annexum accidentis is not 'magis et minus...Accidentis autem annexum est idem vel diversum secundum accidens'. A text by Adenulph explicitly denies that idem accidente is annexum accidentis (see text 3). We have not got much basis for a discussion, since Boethius neither gives an example of a problem nor says where the loci for annexum accidentis in his opinion are to be found.

In the section of chapter 5 where Aristotle discusses proprium he does not "annex" any problems to it, as he does to the three other predicates. Accordingly most of the commentators do not say anything about annexum proprii. Kilwardby, Adenulph, and Radulphus Brito deny that there can be an annexum proprii (see texts Kilwardby 4; Adenulph 2-3; Radulphus Brito 4). Boethius Dacus (III qu. 7 ad 1) says: "Tamen non dico, quod proprium non habeat annexum, quamquam aliqui hoc dixerunt." He says no more about this.

Aristotle's discussion of the four predicates is followed in chapter 7 by a discussion of idem. All commentators agree, and rightly I think, that this is an annexum. Adenulph calls it annexum definitionis⁴¹⁾, perhaps influenced by the fact that the loci in book VII are often said to be about idem et diversum, without the qualification 'definitione'. But in most of the other literal commentaries the chapter is said to be about annexum omnibus (or communibus) praedicatis. By Angelo it is opposed to the annexa specialia mentioned under each predicate.⁴²⁾ Kilwardby only says that it

39) E.g. Albertus I,II,4,673b; Kilwardby text 4; Adenulph text 3; Simon on 102a 36sq., f. 26vb-27ra.

40) E.g. Albertus I,II,5,674b; Kilwardby on 101b 11sq., f. 186rb; Adenulph on 102b 15sq., f. 13rb; Simon on 102b 15sq., f.27ra; Radulphus I qu. 31, f. 23va-b.

41) Adenulph on 103a 6sq., f. 14rb.

42) Albertus I,II,7,676a; Elias on 103a 6sq., f. 57vb; Henricus on 103a 6sq., f. 65rb; Angelo on 103a 6sq., f. 13va.

is annexum; this might of course be interpreted to mean 'for all predicates', but on the other hand it is in this section he denies that idem proprii is annexum proprii (text 4), which seems to contradict Aristotle's text (103a 27). Simon calls idem 'annexum essentiae praedicatorum' or 'ann. praedicato'.⁴³⁾ Probably he means that it is "annexed" to all predicates. Boethius' view of the existence of an annexum proprii could possibly be explained from this doctrine of idem as "annexed" to all predicates, since his words in III qu. 8 (especially ad. 1.) might perhaps be taken to mean that the only annexum he accepts - besides differentia - is idem. Moreover all the arguments we know against an annexum proprii are against idem proprio being annexum proprii. (Cf. Albertus I,II,7,676a).

It should be mentioned that Albertus does not say annexum, but adiunctum.

2. Dialectica docens - utens.

The last part of book I was not in the Middle Ages the subject of interesting considerations from a general point of view. The instrumenta were simply said to be 'instrumenta habundandi in syllogismis dialecticis';⁴⁴⁾ then followed the exposition of the text. On the function of the instruments I have found nothing.

But in the Middle Ages a distinction was made between what was called dialectica docens and dialectica utens, and by this distinction the difference in contents between book I and II-VIII was explained.

To start with Kilwardby. In one of the questions in his prooemium⁴⁵⁾ he says that dialectica docens has one subject, namely the dialectical syllogism, and so it is 'una scientia'. Dialectica utens however is 'circa omnia', and so it is not 'una scientia, sed una ars'. Virtually the same explanation of the difference between docens and utens is given by Albertus, Adenulph, and Angelo.⁴⁶⁾ Simon says that 'multi' have not understood the distinction correctly.⁴⁷⁾ Dialectic is a 'habitus animae existens in

43) Simon on 103a 6sq., f. 27rb.

44) E.g. Albertus I,IV,I,685asq.; Kilwardby on 105a 10sq., f. 188va; Boethius Dacus I qu. 34.

45) Text 1.

46) Albertus I prooem. 1, 660a; I,I,5,668a; Adenulph on 100a 19sq., f. 4ra; Angelo on 100a 19sq., f. 3ra.

47) Simon prooem. f. 24ra.

intellectu speculativo sicut in subiecto'. It can be compared either with 'causas et principia per quae...aggeneratur', and so it is docens; or with 'scibilia aliarum scientiarum, quibus per sui usum applicatur', and so it is utens. The distinction can only be made in 'scientiae, quae disputant ad alias scientias', i.e. grammatica, logica, rhetorica. Radulphus' explanation (text 1) has some similarity with Simon's, but he emphasizes the point that docens is a scientia and connected with demonstratio, while utens is connected with opinio. This last point was also stressed by Boethius Dacus in I qu. 1 ad 1. and I qu. 13. Simon does not make it clear what is wrong about the views he criticizes, but I do not see that his and Radulphus' view would be incompatible with a view like Kilwardby's.

It must be admitted that as far as I have found none of the commentators says expressly that book I is docens while II-VIII are utens. But if we read Kilwardby's beginning of book II ⁴⁸⁾ we find him saying that in book I dialectic has been determined 'ut est scientia', and there the dialectical syllogism is subject. The following books are about 'usum dialectici syllogismi... ut est ars...et instrumentum applicatum ad opus'. Even if we do not find the words docens/utens used here it is, I think, sufficiently clear that the distinction he makes between I and II-VIII is the same as that between docens-utens. Nor does any of the other commentators explicitly say that I is docens while II-VIII are utens, but Adenulph, Boethius, Henricus, Simon, and Angelo ⁴⁹⁾ state that book I has the dial. syll. as subject and that it treats of its principia or constitutio, while the remaining books are about the 'usus' of dial. syll. or its 'applicatio ad problemata'.

Abelard in his Super Topica (Boethii) glossae ⁵⁰⁾ explains the same distinction, only he does not say docens, but tractans.

BOOK II-III

These two books are connected. Both of them have problemata de accidentibus as subject. According to the commentators the contents of the two books

48) Kilwardby text 5; cf. the beginning of VIII, f. 211va.

49) Adenulph begin. II, f. 27ra; Boethius Dacus concluding remarks in I; Henricus begin. VIII, f. 103rb; Simon begin. II, f. 30va; Angelo begin. II, f. 36rb.

50) To Diff. top. I 1181C; ed. M. dal Pra, Pietro Abelardo, Scritti di logica, La Nuova Italia Firenze 1969, p. 315.

can be divided in the following way:

- 1) Accidens universale (to III c.6, 119a 32)
 - a) accidens ut accidens (to II c.2, 109b 12)
 - b) accidens de simplici inhaerentia (to end of II)
 - c) accidens comparatum et contractum (ad materiam moralem) (to III c.3, 118b 38) ^{x)}
 - d) accidens contractum et non comparatum (to III c.4, 119a 107) ^{x)}
 - e) accidens comparatum et non contractum (to III c.6, 119a 32) ^{x)}
- 2) Accidens particulare (to end of III)

^{x)} c-d-e are together called annexum accidentis.

This division can be found in all literal commentaries.⁵¹⁾ All of them make further divisions, but there is no agreement as to how this is done. The distinction made between the first locus in II and the rest of the book is nowhere clearly explained. It is only said that the first locus is about problems of accidens according to the notion of accidens, while the remaining ones treat of problems on 'simpliciter inesse vel non', and such problems are most suitingly said to belong to accidens.⁵²⁾

3. Loci intrinseci - extrinseci.

One point in the division however is of interest, the division into loci intrinseci and extrinseci. This has come from the De differentiis topicis. There the loci maximae are categorized according to the loci differentiae maximae. The latter are divided (following Themistius, Cicero's division was hardly used in the Middle Ages) into loci intrinseci, extrinseci, and medii.⁵³⁾ This distinction is used by the commentators on Aristotle when they describe how each book is composed by Aristotle. In the following tables (see p. 17-20) I have given the information I have found about sections containing loci intrinseci, extrinseci, and (medii) in book II, IV, V, VI. Since the division is made in all the books II-VII, tables could also be given for books III and VII, but the information there is so scarce that I do not find it worth while. Information about the composition and division is not always given systematically, and this has the con-

51) See e.g. Kilwardby begin. II, f. 192ra; Simon begin. II, f. 30vb-31ra.

52) See e.g. Adenulph on 109a 34sq., f. 28rb; Angelo on 108b 37 sq., f. 38ra; Boethius Dacus III qu. 1; and the texts in note 51.

53) De diff. top. II. PL 64, 1186D.

Book II

	Intrinseci	Extrinseci	(Medii)
Albertus (II, I, 2; II, II, 1)	begin. - 112b 1	112b 1 -	114a 25 ^a) - end
Kilwardby (f. 192ra-b)	begin. - 112b 1	112b 1 - end	
Adenulph (f. 33vb)	begin. - 112b 1	112b 1 - end	
Elias (f. 61ra; 62rb)	begin. - 112b 1	112b 1 -	114a 25 ^b) - end
Simon (f. 30vb-31ra)	begin. - 112b 1	112b 1 - 114a 25	114a 25 ^c) - end
Henricus (f. 72ra; 72va)	begin. - 112b 1	112b 1 - 114a 25	114a 25 ^d) - end
Angelo (f. 50rb; 56va)	begin. - 112b 1	112b 1 -	114a 25 ^e) - end

a) called: extrinseci tamen convenientes.

b) called: extrinsecum quod est convenientes et simile.

c) called: partim intrinseci partim extrinseci.

d) called: partim intrinseci partim extrinseci.

e) called: extrinseci convenientes.

Book IV

	Intrinseci	Extrinseci	(Medii)
Albertus (IV, II, 1)	begin. - 123b 1	123b 1 -	124a 1o ^a -
Kilwardby (f. 2oora; 2o5va)	{begin. - 123b 1 127a 2o- 127b 6}	123b 1 - (127a 19) 127b 7 - 128a 13	
Adenulph (f. 55ra; 62ra)	{begin. - 123b 1 - 127b 18}	123b 1 - 127b 19- 128a 13	
Elias (f. 66ra)	begin. - 123b 1	123b 1 - 125b 14	
Simon (f. 37rb)	begin. - 123b 1	123b 1 -	124a 1o ^b - 125b 14
Henricus (f. 86va)	begin. - 123b 1	123b 1 -	
Angelo (f. 78rb-va)	begin. - 123b 1	123b 1 -	

a) called: loci extrinseci cognationem habentes cum propositio (IV, II, 2).

b) On f. 38vb, to 124a 1o (Rursum in casibus) it is said: "Philosophus hic accipit locum extrinsecum pro loco quocumque, <sive sit> intrinsecus, sive sit medius sive extrinsecus..."

Book V

	Intrinsecus	Extrinsecus	(Medius)
Albertus (V, III, 2)	132a 21 - 135b 7	135b 7 -	136b 15 ^a) - (138b 27)
Kilwardby (f. 203rb)	132a 21 - 135b 7	135b 7 - 138b 27	
Adenulph (f. 73ra)	132a 21 - 135b 7	135b 7 - 138b 27	
Elias (f. 7ova)	132a 21 - 135b 7	135b 7 -	136b 15 ^b) - 138b 27
Simon	lost	lost	
Henricus (f. 92vb)	132a 21 - 135b 7	135b 7 - 136b 15	136b 15 ^c) - 138b 27
Angelo (f. 112ra)	132a 21 - 135b 7	135b 7 - 136b 15	136b 15 ^d) - (138b 27)

a) called: locus extrinsecus ex convenientibus; opposed to "opposita, quae maxime extrinseca sunt."

b) called: extrinsecum simile et conveniens.

c) On f. 94ra to 135b 7 it is said: "... adiungit quosdam locos"; no further explanation is given.

d) called: non omnino extrinseci, sed medio modo se habentes. Cf. VII c.3, where 153a 26-153b 24

is called 'omnino extrinseci' (opposita), 153b 25sq. 'non Omnino extrinseca a terminis in quae-
stione positis' (casus et coni., magis et minus, proportionaliter se habentia); f-164vb; 165va-b.

Book VI

	Intrinseci	Extrinseci	(Medii)
Albertus (VI, IV, 1)	141a 23 - 147a 22	147a 23 - (148a 22)	
Kilwardby (f. 209ra)	141a 23 - 147a 22	147a 23 - (148a 22)	
Adenulph (f. 87ra)	141a 23 - 145b 35	145b 35 - (148a 22)	
Elias (f. 75vb; 76ra)	141a 23 - 145b 35	145b 35 -	
Simon	lost	lost	
Henricus (f. 99va; loova)		- 148a 9	148a 10 ^a) - (148a 22)
Angelo	nothing found	stated	

a) called: medii.

sequence that we are not always told where a section containing e.g. loci extrinseci begins or ends. This is why many places in the tables are left empty. The numbers which are probable, but not quite certain are in parentheses. The references are to Bekker-pages. Only the literal-commentaries give such information of course.

If the reader consults Aristotle's text, he will see that the loci called extrinseci (and medii) are loci ex oppositis, a magis et minus, a proportionaliter se habentibus, a casibus et coniugatis and a generatione et corruptione (the latter only treated of in II and IV). The loci intrinseci on the other hand are - if I may use that expression - loci of many kinds. The few divergences found (especially in VI) result from a disagreement as to which loci Aristotle's text shows us, not from a disagreement about which loci are intrinseci, respectively extrinseci.

The greater part of this is not surprising. It corresponds with the division found in the De differentiis topicis and the tractates following it.⁵⁴⁾ But there are some surprises. The loci a generatione et corruptione are intrinseci in De differentiis topicis and the tractates. As far as I have found no explanation of this divergence is given. The examples given in Aristotle and Boethius are the same.

Another remarkable thing is that the term locus medius is so rarely used. As shown in the tables I have only found it once: book VI, note a; cf. book V, note d. Kilwardby and Adenulph never use it, nor do they make any other distinction where the treatment of loci a casibus et coniugatis begins. (These are the only loci in Aristotle's text that should be medii according to the Diff. top.). The other commentators sometimes but not regularly make a distinction when the treatment of these loci begins (normally coming just after loci ex oppositis). In the notes to the tables I have given the central words from the distinction. It will be seen that in most cases the extrinseci are said to continue, but the following ones are in some way different from the preceding ones. A comparison with the definitions given of intrinsecus - medius - extrinsecus in the Diff. top. and the tractates⁵⁵⁾ will, I think, show that the words

54) Diff.top.III, PL 64, 1201-2; and e.g. Petrus Hispanus, Summulae 5.08sq.

55) Diff.top.II, PL 64, 1186D; L.M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum II,II, Assen 1968, p. 365, 401, 406, 438, 529; Lambertus, Logica, ed. (cf. note 21) p. 122-23; Petrus Hispanus, Summulae 5.08.

used to make the distinction between loci ex oppositis and the rest of the (extrinseci) - i.e. conveniens, simile, partim-partim - may well be derived from the definitions of medii. But it is strange that in this way loci a magis et minus and a similibus etc. (normally following loci a cas. et coni. in the text) are grouped together with loci a casibus et coniugatis and opposed to loci ex oppositis. Just as if the extrinseci were subdivided into two groups, one consisting of the loci ex oppositis, being primarily or strictly speaking extrinseci, and another consisting of the loci a magis et minus, a casibus et coniugatis etc., being extrinseci, but with some qualification. We have no statement anywhere that the commentators consider this to be the case, even if the quotations from Angelo in table V note d come close to it. The few definitions of intrinsecus etc. which I have found ⁵⁶⁾ are the same as those found in the tradition derived from Boethius.

One thing however should be noticed in connection with this division into intrinseci vs. extrinseci. The loci called extrinseci are exactly the same as those de Pater calls 'les lieux les plus utiles' ⁵⁷⁾ i.e. the loci which can be used for all the four predicates and which accordingly are found in each of the books II-VI, some of them with modifications for each predicate. This has been remarked upon by one of the commentators, namely Albertus. When commenting upon I c.6, 102b 35, where Aristotle says that you cannot find one method for all problems, Albertus explains that such one method had to be 'per locos extrinsecos', but could not be 'intrinsecus'; this is the reason why such a method would be 'incerta'; he gives an example with a locus ex oppositis. ⁵⁸⁾ The meaning of method in this connection has been explained before (ch. IV, 1). Again commenting upon VII c.4, 154a 14sq. (Aristotle here talks of 'utilissimi loci'; de Pater has derived the term from this phrase) Albertus says: '... utilissimi ad plura problemata ... habere illos locos, qui maxime sunt communes ... sicut maxime sunt loci extrinseci'. ⁵⁹⁾ The whole of Aristotle's

56) E.g. Adenulph on 110b 16sq., f. 31vb; on 119b 35sq., f. 48vb; Boethius Dacus I q. 7 ad 2.; Angelo to 135b 8sq., f. 118vb.

57) de Pater op. cit. (cf. note 22) 170sq., 229. The name is derived from Aristotle VII c.4, 154a 14-15.

58) Albertus I,II,6, 675b-676a.

59) Albertus VII,II,2, 815b.

text here is about loci called extrinseci by Mediaeval commentators. This is all Albertus says, and he makes no more of it. Henricus quotes Albertus for the former of these two remarks, ⁶⁰⁾ but does not add anything of his own. In the other commentators I have found no remarks on this point.

In a few of the commentaries we sometimes find proprius combined with intrinsecus and communis with extrinsecus. It is said e.g. that until now Aristotle has been treating of loci 'proprii et intrinseci' from now on he will treat of 'extrinseci et communes'. This combination is found in Albertus, Elias, and Simon. ⁶¹⁾ This sounds very strange. The distinction made by Aristotle in the Rhetorics is that loci communes are logical laws, while loci proprii are laws belonging to some special science. ⁶²⁾ This distinction is repeated by Aegidius Romanus in his commentary on the Rhetorics. ⁶³⁾ It is evident that this distinction cannot be combined with the distinction between extrinseci and intrinseci. But perhaps the commentators on Aristotle's Topics who use the name proprius/communis mean something else. We have some hints of that. Stating the division of the section of IV beginning c.5, 125b 15, which is about 'genus contractum ad materiam naturalem et moralem', Elias ⁶⁴⁾ says that this is first treated of 'divisim et per considerationes utrique materiae proprias' and then 'coniunctim et per considerationes communes ad terminationem utriusque simul'. Here the division is quite another than that made in the Rhetorics. In Angelo we also find proprius/communis used, but never expressly combined with intrinsecus/extrinsecus, and we find communis opposed to specialis. A few of the most interesting examples: at the division made at IV c.5, 125b 15 he says ⁶⁵⁾ that till now we have had 'considerationes non ad materiam specialem contractas, immo ex quibusdam communibus proprietatibus generi et speciei convenientibus' from now on we shall have 'considerationes ad specialem materiam contractas sumptas ex

60) Henricus f. 65rb, on 1o2b 35.

61) Albertus VII,I,1, 811a; VII,II,1, 814a; cf. note 59; Elias begin. IV, f. 66va; on 145a 18sq., f. 75vb & 76ra; Simon on 123b 1sq., f. 38va.

62) Aristotles Rhetorica I c. 2, 1358a 25-35. Cf. de Pater, op. cit. (note 22) p. 117sq.

63) Ed. Venezia 1515; reprint Minerva Frankfurt 1968, f. 11va-12ra.

64) f. 68ra; cf. on 127a 19, f. 69ra.

65) f. 94vb.

natura generis et speciei et eorum quibusdam proprietatibus specialibus,' There seems to be a double division here, both from materia specialis and from natura generis, so I would be cautious to draw a too hasty conclusion. But it should be noticed in table IV that some commentators end the section of extrinseci here. Commenting upon VII c.4, 15a 14sq., ⁶⁶⁾ he says that these loci communes (the word is in Aristotle's text) which he opposes to speciales, are utilissimi, because they can not only be used about definitio, 'sed etiam ad problemata de aliis praedicatis, et eis usus est in arte, quam tradidit de singulis praedicatis'. Again at IV c.3, 123b 1 ⁶⁷⁾ he says that until now Aristotle has presented loci 'ex his quae sunt propria generi', he gives no name to the following loci; but he says that the same distinction can be expressed in other words: until now loci magis ex convenientibus, from now on loci magis ex oppositis. And when at the beginning of IV he divides the whole book ⁶⁸⁾, he puts the division between intrinseci and extrinseci here.

As far as I can see the only interpretation that would make these statements compatible would be to take communis/proprius not as technical terms, but simply as meaning 'common to different kinds of...' and 'special to one kind of...', leaving 'kinds of...' indefinite. That would of course mean that we have to take 'proprius' and 'specialis' as equivalents, which is uncertain. Having this meaning 'communis' might very well be combined with 'extrinsecus' meaning (as normally) 'argument not taken especially from the terms used' or even meaning 'used for all four predicates'. But the last would, I think, be going too far, even if some of the texts quoted from Angelo might support this interpretation. In the same way 'proprius' and 'intrinsecus' could also be combined. ⁶⁹⁾

But I do not think that these questions can be answered now. We need more material, material consisting not of a line or two, but a treatment of the whole subject. And such material still remains to be found.

66) f. 166ra.

67) f. 87rb.

68) f. 78rb-va.

69) Should we suppose some influence from e.g. Cicero, De inventione II, 48: "haec ergo argumenta, quae transferri in multas causas possunt, locos communes nominamus." The division of rhetorical loci in proprii/communes is a different one; see Lausberg, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik; Hueber, München 1960, § 373 and 407.

4. Idoneitas.

It seems that the commentators on the Topics - or most of them at least - have used the word idoneitas as if it was some kind of technical term. When going through the text they say e.g. "ponit (Philosophus) aliam considerationem..., consequenter ponit aliam considerationem..." (see e.g. Boethius Dacus, book IV the paraphrases after qu. 14). In the same way we sometimes find them saying: "consequenter ponit idoneitatem". In the following list examples are given of sections of the text called idoneitas by some commentators.

- 1) II c.2, 110a 10-13: Albertus (II,I,4,700a), Kilwardby (f. 191rb), Adenulph (f. 29rb), Elias (f. 61rb), Simon (f. 31va); documentum: Henricus (f. 73rb).
- 2) II c.2, 110a 14-21: Albertus (II,I,4,700a), Adenulph (f. 29va), Elias (f. 61rb), Simon (f. 31va); documentum: Henricus (f. 73rb).
- 3) II c.4, 111a 8-13: Albertus (II,I,5,703a), Kilwardby (f. 193ra), Adenulph (f. 31rb), Simon (f. 32ra).
- 4) VI c.10, 148a 37-148b 22: Adenulph (f. 91va-b), Elias (f. 77rb-va), Henricus (f. 100vb); cautelae: Albertus (VI,V,1,803a), Kilwardby (f. 209rb).
- 5) VI c.14, 151b 4-151b 23: Adenulph (f. 95rb-vb), Elias (f. 79ra), Henricus (f. 102rb); documenta: Albertus (VI,VII,3,810a-b).

It is nowhere explained what idoneitas means in this connection. But if we look at Aristotle's text, we shall see that the passages listed are not real loci, i.e. we cannot find a maxima propositio in Aristotle's text or construe one for any of these passages. If we consult de Pater's book on Aristotle's Topics we shall see that he is of the same opinion concerning examples 1,3,4, and 5.⁷⁰⁾ He calls them "règles" and says that such would normally be found in book VIII. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that some of the same passages are called documenta (meaning: teaching, instruction) or cautelae (meaning: precautions (to be taken)). Even more clearly pointing in the same direction is that Adenulph in ex. 4 (f. 92rb) discusses a question on why such 'cautelae et idoneitates (quae) sunt principia materialia in obviativa disputatione' are stated at this place in the text. The answer given is of no interest, but

70) de Pater, op. cit. (note 22) p. 142-43 note 340 (ex. 1,3), p. 226-27 (ex. 4,5).

'obviativa' - as will be explained later - is the name given to the first half of book VIII, so it would seem that Adenulph holds the same opinion of these passages as de Pater. I have nowhere in VIII found passages called idoneitates; but that book is said to consist of 'documenta'. That Aristotle in some of the passages discussed says locus (e.g. 1,3), does not disturb me any more than de Pater. It is a question for the historians on Aristotle.

How this use of Idoneitas has come up I do not know. But I would like to point out that in II c.4, 111b 12-16 (called idoneitas be Kilwardby f. 193rb and Simon f. 32va) the word idoneus occurs.

BOOKS IV-VII

With regard to books IV-VII I shall only give a survey of the main divisions. Few things in these are surprising, so there is not much need for a discussion. Nor have we much basis for a discussion since the division is rarely explained, normally only stated. For the points mentioned in the list, the reader should consult e.g. the beginning of each of the books; Kilwardby f. 198va; 201ra; 206ra; 210ra. Adenulph f. 49ra; 64ra; 77rb; 96va. Elias f. 66va; 70va; 72vb; 79rb. Angelo f. 78rb; 106va; 112rb; 126ra; 161ra.

IV

- 1) loci destructivi (principaliter); to c.6, 128a 12^a)
- 2) loci constructivi; to end of IV

V

- 1) bonitas proprii; to c.3, 132a 21
- 2) entitas proprii
 - a) simpliciter; to c.8, 138b 26
 - b) cum dependentia (potentia); to end of V

VI-VII

- 1) destruere definitionem; to end of VI
- 2) terminare idem et diversum (annexum definitioni); to VII c.3, 153a 7
- 3) construere definitionem; to c.3, 154a 11
- 4) comparare locos ad locos et problemata ad problemata; to end of VII

a) Albertus (IV,IV,1,755a) and with him Henricus (f. 83va) make this division at c.5,127b 37.

Further divisions are of course made by all commentators, but as they disagree on most points it would take us into long discussions to follow them.

BOOK VIII

In book I chapter 2 Aristotle states that dialectic has three utilitates. It can be used 1) ad secundum philosophiam disciplinas 2) ad obviaciones 3) ad exercitationem. The Medieval commentators took up this idea and gave three names to dialectic according to its use. 1) was called dialectica inquisitiva 2) dialectica obviativa 3) dialectica exercitativa.⁷¹⁾ Furthermore, this was used in the discussion of Aristotle's composition of his work. Dialectica inquisitiva is treated of in books II-VII according to Albertus, Kilwardby and Adenulph.⁷²⁾ According to Elias, Simon, Henricus, and Angelo⁷³⁾ in books I c.4-VII. This would mean that dialectica inquisitiva is the doctrine about loci and their application to the discussion of problems. Dialectica obviativa is treated of in VIII c.1-13.⁷⁴⁾ This means that dialectica obviativa is the doctrine about the duties of each of the two parts in a discussion. Accordingly the treatment is divided in two parts 1) on opponens (c.1-3) 2) on respondens (c.4-13). Dialectica exercitativa is treated of in the rest of book VIII, i.e. c.14.⁷⁵⁾ So it is the doctrine about the training to become a good dialectician.

As said before book VIII consists of a series of documenta about the various subjects treated of.⁷⁶⁾ I do not think that documentum is a special technical term; it simply has a normal meaning, like: teaching, instruction, example.

71) See e.g. Albertus I,I,5,666bsq.; Kilwardby text 5.

72) Albertus VIII,I,1,818a; Kilwardby text 5; Adenulph begin. II,f. 27ra; begin. VIII, f. 101ra.

73) Elias on I c.4, 101b 12, f. 57ra; Simon f. 26ra; Henricus f. 63rb; Angelo f. 7va.

74) Cf. texts in notes 72-73.

75) Cf. texts in notes 72-73.

76) See e.g. Adenulph on 155b 2, f. 102vb; Henricus on 155b 2, f. 104ra; Angelo on 157a 6sq., f. 175rb.

NOTE

A Commentator on the Topics?

In Adenulph's commentary I have 14 times found a commentator quoted. The greater part of these quotations is found in the part of the lectio which is a detailed exposition of the text, and the quotations are explanations of words or phrases in Aristotle's text. 8 times Adenulph gives quotations of the same kind from a glossator. Whether he means that glossator is the same person as commentator or only means 'some glossator' I cannot decide. But who is the commentator? Averroes is out of question since his commentary on the Topics was not known to the Middle Ages. But in this connection I shall point to Radulphus Brito text 2 ad oppositum where Radulphus refers to 'Boethius in commento supra librum istum'. If the Middle Ages knew a commentum on the Topics attributed to Boethius he would be a favourite candidate to the title 'commentator'. It is known that Boethius wrote a commentary on the Topics ⁷⁷⁾, probably glosses taken from Greek sources, like the glosses on Priora Anal. edited by Minio-Paluello in Aristoteles Latinus III,4. Below I give a list of the quotations found in Adenulph; (g) after the number means glossator, otherwise it is attributed to commentator:

loo a 19; looa 25sq.; loob 22sq.; lola 18; lo5a 1o; lo8b 12-14; 113b 36; 122b 1sq.; 124a 1osq.(g); 126b 7sq.(g); 137b 4sq.(g); 138a 3osq.; 139a 5sq.(g); 139b 2osq.; 14oa 2osq.; 146a 22 sq.(g); 147a 6sq.; 148b 34sq.; 148b 3osq.(g); 149b 26; 152a 18 (g); 153 a 3o (g).

77) See L.M. de Rijk, On the Chronology of Boethius' works on Logic II, Vivarium II (1964) p. 156-7.

V. Texts.

The following should not be considered as an edition, but only as a transcription where such changes have been made as seemed necessary and probable; the orthography has been normalized.

ROBERT KILWARDBY

1.

f. 182va (from the prooemium)

Circa secundum (utrum sit una scientia vel non) sic: Ut habetur in Posterioribus, una est scientia, quae est unius generis partes et passiones considerans. Igitur cum dialectica sit de omnibus et non unius generis determinati, ut habetur in Posterioribus et in Elenchis, ipsa non erit scientia una. Et non potest responderi sicut de metaphysica - quod quamvis sit de toto ente, quia tamen est de his in quantum ad unum ens reducuntur, scilicet ad primam causam, quae est causa non causata, ideo est una scientia - quia aequaliter est logici de accidentibus et de substantiis. Et ideo dicendum quod duplex est logica: utens, et hoc est circa omnia, et sic logica non est una scientia, sed una ars ab unitate finis, quia ars dicitur una ab unitate finis et non subiecti. Vel secundum quod est docens, et sic est una ab unitate subiecti, quia sic est de dialectico syllogismo.

2.

f. 182va (from the prooemium)

Circa tertium (quare <haec> dicitur inventiva, demonstrativa resolutoria) sic:

1. Sicut dialecticus invenit medium contingens, ita demonstrator medium necessarium. Ergo qua ratione haec est inventiva, et illa.

2. Item, si aliquis quaerit et inveniat, et non iudicat se invenisse, non pausat inquirendo. Ergo cum dialecticus quaerat et inveniat et pausat inquirendo, iudicat se invenisse, et ita dialectica erit iudicativa.

3. Item, sicut demonstrativus syllogismus potest resolvi in suas propositiones et propositiones in terminos, ita dialecticus in suas propositiones contingentes. Ergo sicut illa dicitur resolutoria, ita et ista.

4. Item, cum sit resolutoria prior et posterior, deberet esse inventiva prior et posterior.

5. Item, cum sit scientia Posteriorum continua cum scientia Priorum, eadem ratione scientia Topicorum deberet esse continua cum scientia Priorum.

6. Item, quaeritur quare scientia Topicorum non dicitur posterior [um] respectu Priorum, sicut demonstratio dicitur posterior syllogismo respectu Priorum.

1. Ad primum dicendum quod haec dicitur inventiva, quia procedit per talia, per quae res solum potest inveniri et non iudicari; procedit enim per signa et per locos. Sed res potest inveniri per signa, ut aurum quia rubeum, et per locum. Dicitur vero demonstrativa iudicativa, quia procedit per talia, per quae contingit iudicare rem; procedit enim per causas ex quibus est res. Sed ex talibus ex quibus est res potest iudicari, et ideo dicitur iudicativa.

Ad obiectum ergo dicendum, quod non dicitur inventiva ab inventione cuiuscumque medii, sed medii quod est signum.

2. Ad aliud dicendum quod haec est interimenda 'si aliquis quaerat me (f. 182vb)dium et invenit et non iudicat se invenisse, non pausat inquirendo'; quod patet si aliquis quaerat denarium perditum et opinatur se invenisse, licet <non> invenerit, pausat inquirendo.

3. Ad aliud dicendum quod non dicitur resolutoria, quia de resolubili syllogismo - quia omnis syllogismus resolubilis in sua principia - sed quia procedit per talia, in quae res habet resolvi. Resolvitur enim unumquodque in ea ex quibus componitur . Igitur cum componatur ex causis et non ex signis, resolvitur in causas et non in signa. Et ideo demonstrativa quae procedit per causas dicitur resolutoria, topica quae procedit per signa non dicitur resolutoria, sed inventiva.

4. Ad aliud dicendum quod quia una resolutoria apponit supra alteram et non deponit - quia una procedit per causam consequendi, alia per causam consequendi et essendi - ideo cum una se habeat per additionem respectu alterius, una dicitur prior alia posterior, cum illud quod se habet per additionem posterius est [cum] illo. Sed una inventiva non apponit supra alteram, immo potius deponit, et ideo non dicitur una prior altera posterior; signum enim phantasticum non apponit supra signum probabile, sed potius deponit.

5. Ad aliud dicendum quia utrumque procedit per causam, cum causa et causatum fuit eiusdem continuationis et ordinis.

Item, quia non apponit demonstrator ^{a)} supra prioristam nisi materiam et non formam.

Item, quia principia utriusque ab eadem virtute cognoscuntur, scilicet ab intellectu, ideo sunt scientiae continuae Posteriorum et Priorum.

Sed quia scientia Priorum procedit per causam, haec autem per signum, cum causa et signum non sunt eiusdem continuationis.

Item, cum haec addit formam supra illam et non materiam solum.

Item, cum principia istius apprehendantur a ratione, principia illius ab intellectu, ideo haec non est eiusdem continuationis nec scientia continua illi, sicut est scientia Priorum.

6. Item dicendum est ad aliud quod quia demonstrativus syllogismus aliquid apponit quod est eiusdem ordinis cum eo ex quibus est syllogismus Priorum, ideo dicitur posterior et ille prior. Sed quia dialecticus non apponit materiam, sed signum, quod quidem non est eiusdem continuationis et ordinis, ideo non dicitur posterior respectu illius.

a) demonstrator] demonstrativa ms.

2.

f. 182vb (from the prooemium)

Circa quintum (de differentia topicorum Boethii ad ista et ordine) sic:

1. Cum Aristoteles sufficienter determinavit de locis, videtur quod illud quod determinatur a Boethio superfluat.

2. Item, cum Boethius determinavit de locis tam de dialecticis quam rhetoricis, videtur quod iste similiter tam ^{a)} de his quam de illis deberet determinare.

3. Item, cum ille appellat locum iste considerationem, quaeritur unde hoc.

4. Item quaeritur utrum ista Topica sint priora illis vel e converso.

1. Ad primum dicendum quod alterius artificis est facere gnomonem et uti gnomone, et alterius est facere gladium et uti gladio, quia militis est uti gladio, fabri est componere gladium. Similiter alterius est constituere locum et uti loco. Et ideo dicendum quod Boethius determinat constitutionem loci et determinat de loco quantum ad substantiam, iste vero quantum ad eius usum. Tamen hic determinatur quantum ad eius substantiam de dialectico syllogismo et eius usum, quia non est idem consti-

tuere dialecticum syllogismum et constituere locum. Et si quaeratur quare non determinavit de loco quantum ad substantiam, quoniam in hoc videtur esse diminutus, dicendum quod cum locus nihil aliud sit quam habitudo generalis rei ad rem, eius cuius est considerare communes differentias entis, eius est considerare constitutionem, et ideo est metaphysici et non logici. Dicendum ergo quod logicus ab ipso ^{b)} supponit constitutionem loci et eius usum determinat. Boethius tamen cum serviat explanationi potest determinare quaedam faciliter, quae non ita de facili possent cognosci ^{c)} ex metaphysica, et ideo constitutionem loci potest determinare. Per hoc patet quod iste liber naturaliter est posterior, licet est tempore prior, cum scientia rei naturaliter praecedat ^{d)} usum eius.

2. Ad aliud dicendum quod loci dialectici et rhetorici idem sunt in substantia, quia rhetor utitur loco a simili et ita de aliis sicut dialecticus. Ideo cum Boethius determinat de locis secundum substantiam, determinat de locis tam dialecticis quam rhetoricis. Sed quia differt usus locorum dialecticorum et rhetoricorum - quia usus dialecticorum est circa totum ens et ad inducendum oppositum, usus vero rhetoricorum est circa substantiam rationalem et eius attributa et ad persuadendum - ideo dialecticus solum, cum determinat de locis secundum usum, de dialecticis determinat et non de rhetoricis.

3. (f. 183ra) Ad aliud dicendum quod locus dicitur in quantum capit argumentum, consideratio in quantum comparatur ad considerantem. Et ideo ille appellat locum, iste considerationem, cum consideratio dicat comparisonem ad considerantem sive ad utentem.

a) tam] quam ms. b) ipso] ipsa ms. c) cognosci] cognoscere ms. d) praecedat] procedit ms.

4.

f. 186vb (on I c. 7, 103a 6sq.)

Item, cum idem definitione sit annexum definitioni et idem genere generi, videtur quod idem proprio proprio debeat esse annexum.

Item, cum habeamus duplex annexum generi, scilicet genere et differentia, quaeritur quare non habeamus duplex annexum aliorum.

Item, quaeritur quare cuiusdam ^{a)} annexi, ut differentiae, est omnino eadem methodus cum suo principali, cuiusdam scilicet comparationi ^{s)} om-

nino alia, cuiusdam scilicet nomine vel definitione quodammodo eadem quodammodo diversa.

.....

Ad aliud dicendum quod sermo supponit <falsum> ; non enim idem definitione est annexum definitioni, quia non potest quaeri nisi duobus modis, utrum sint aliqua eadem definitione, ita quod definitio sit unum obiectum et definitum alterum, et tunc idem quaerere est ac si hoc sit definitio eius; sed tale non est annexum, sed principale praedicatum. Aut ita quod utrum de duobus sit: suntne ista eadem in definitione, et hoc est quaerere, utrum sit definitio non-definitio, eo quod definitio <uni> soli convenit. Sed tamen hoc totum idem nomine vel definitione est praedicatum annexum definitioni et in plus, quia bonum et honestum sunt idem nomine, non tamen unum definitio alterius.

Similiter dicendum est de proprio, quod quaerere utrum sint eadem proprio, hoc est dupliciter, quia aut quaeretur, utrum hoc sit proprium huius, et hoc est principale praedicatum et non annexum; aut quaeretur, utrum illa sint eadem in proprio, ita quod hoc proprium sit istorum, et hoc est interimere proprium et quaerere utrum proprium sit non-proprium, eo quod proprium uni soli convenit ut definitio; et ideo idem proprio ^{b)} non potuit esse annexum proprio. Sed si idem nomine eidem adderetur ut definitioni, tunc idem proprio vel nomine esset annexum proprio, sicut idem nomine vel definitione annexum definitioni.

Sed tunc quaeritur quare idem nomine appositum definitioni facit annexum definitioni, non autem appositum proprio facit annexum proprio.

Ad quod dicendum quod idem nomine explanat idem nomen et nihil apponit, quod patet; si dicatur: 'Marcus est Tullius', Tullius explanavit Marcum et nihil apponit. Similiter definitio explanavit definitum et nihil apponit quod non sit in definito. Item et idem ex definitione et idem nomine sit unum annexum, non autem idem nomine appositum idem proprio facit annexum proprio, eo quod proprium apponit aliquid diversae naturae supra subiectum et non solum explanavit.

Ad aliud dicendum quod genus unum habet annexum a parte rei, scilicet differentiam, alterum a parte modi, scilicet idem genere. ^{c)} Sed ita non est de allis, quia idem definitione non potuit esse annexum definitionis a parte modi, ut visum est nec idem proprio proprio.

Ad aliud dicendum quod in II. libro determinatur de accidente habenti

simplicem inhaerentiam. Cum igitur ei comparatio non sit annexa - quod (f. 187ra) sic esset annexa omnibus aliis, cum tale materiale sit respectu omnium aliorum accidenti~~um~~, quod habet accidentis essentiam et intenditur et remittitur - ideo necesse fuit in alia methodo determinari de annexo tali et de essentia accidentis. Et ideo fuit diversa methodus omnino tertius liber, qui est de accidente comparato, a secundo, qui est de simplici inhaerentia. Sed differentia, quia per omnia eadem media habet terminari mutato modo, per quae genus, ideo habet omnino eandem methodum cum genere. Sed idem quantum ad eius destructionem destruit definitionem, quantum vero ad eius constructionem nec destruit nec construit, quia non sequitur: 'est idem ergo est definitio' vel 'ergo non est definitio'. Ideo partim est eadem methodus partim diversa. Unde dicendum quod in septimo libro quattuor facit: destruit idem, et in hoc destruitur definitio, et hoc innuit in illa parte dicens quod his locis temptandum est destruere definitionem; construit idem et construit definitionem, et comparat problemata ad invicem et locos. Unde quantum ad destructionem est eadem methodus, quantum vero ad constructionem eiusdem non est eadem constructio eiusdem, nec construat nec destruat definitionem. Quod vero ad constructionem definitionis est eadem methodus. Et per hoc patet quod septimus liber non est omnino diversus a sexto, eo quod eiusdem methodi simpliciter est construere et destruere; unde cum in sexto omnes considerationes fuerint destructivae definitionis, in septimo ponantur constructivae, eadem erit methodus sexti et septimi simpliciter, quodammodo diversi.

- a) quare cuiusdam] quid eiusdem ms. b) proprio] proprium ms. c) genere] genus ms.

5.

f. 192ra (On the beginning of II)

Sunt autem problematum etc. Superius auctor docuit constitutionem syllogismi dialectici quantum ad eius principia materialia. Unde in primo libro determinatur dialectica, ut est scientia, et sic dialecticus syllogismus est subiectum. In hac parte determinat usum dialectici syllogismi, unde determinatur dialectica ut est ars, et sic dialecticus syllogismus constituitur, ut est instrumentum applicatum ad opus. Unde in primo libro constituitur dialecticus syllogismus prout communiter valet ad inquisitionem, ad obviationem, ad exercitationem. In libris sequentibus de-

terminatur dialecticus syllogismus ut distincte valet ad inquisitionem, ad obviationem, ad exercitationem. Sed quia contingit uti syllogismo dialectico tripliciter, aut ipsum inquirentem aut ipsum obviantem aut ipsum exercitantem sive multiplicantem, ideo haec pars dividitur in tres in quarum prima determinat usum secundum quod ipso utitur inquirens, secundo obvians, tertio exercens. Unde in sex libris intermediis dialectica est inquisitiva, et ordinatur ad secundum philosophiam disciplinas, in octavo vero est obviativa et exercitativa. Sed quia dialectica est inquisitiva circa problemata, dividitur haec pars secundum divisionem problematum, ita quod primo docet terminare problema de accidente, secundo de genere, tertio de proprio, quarto de definitione.

ADENULPH OF ANAGNI

(The Perugia-ms. (P) has been controlled with Brugge Stadtbibliothek 493 (=B)).

1.

On I c.5, 101b 37sq. f. 11rb (B f. 129ra)

Circa quartum et ultimum sic quaeritur: 1. Auctor dicit quod idem et diversum sunt annexa definitioni, quia destructo eodem et diverso destruitur definitio. Contra: interempto genere interimitur definitio, et interempto accidente, cum accidens dicat inesse simpliciter, et interempto proprio, cum praedicatur conversim. Ergo ista sunt annexa (f. 11va) definitioni. Sed hoc est falsum. Ergo primum.

.....

Solutio: Ad primum dicendum quod sine dubio interempto genere interimitur definitio, et sic de aliis praedicatis, sed non reducuntur supra definitionem. Et haec est causa, quia illa tria se habent ad definitionem tamquam causa ad causatum; sed prius non potest reduci ad posterius; ideo illa tria non reducuntur ad definitionem. Sed idem et diversum se habent ad definitionem tamquam posterius; sed posterius bene potest reduci ad prius; ideo bene possunt reduci ad definitionem.

2.

On I c.5, 102a 18sq. f. 12ra (B f. 129va)

Item, sicut est idem genere et idem definitione, ita est idem proprio. Quaeritur, cum idem genere sit annexum generi et idem definitione sit annexum definitioni, quare idem proprio ^{a)} non est annexum proprio. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ea quae sunt eadem proprio, unum est proprium

alterius; sed idem non reducitur ad se ipsum; ideo annexum ^{b)} proprio non dicitur idem proprio. Sed ista quae sunt eadem genere, unum non est genus alterius; ideo annexum ^{c)} genere dicitur idem genere.

a) proprio] om. P. b) annexum] de add.P. ^{c)} annexum] de add. P.

3.

On I c.5, 1o2b 15sq. f. 13vb (B f. 13ovb-13lra)

Item, annexum definitioni dicitur definitivum, annexum autem generi ^{a)} generale; quaeritur quare annexum accidenti non dicitur accidentale.

Item, cum idem definitione reducitur ad definitionem et idem genere ad genus, quaeritur quare idem accidente non reducitur ad accidens.

Ad septimum dicendum quod annexum definitioni non est definitio, ideo dicitur definitivum. Similiter annexum generi non est ^{b)} genus, ideo dicitur generale. Sed annexum accidenti est simpliciter accidens (f. 14ra), sed addit solum modum sive ^{c)} quandam comparisonem supra accidens, et ideo annexum accidentis non dicitur accidentale.

Ad octavum dicendum quod idem accidente est accidens simpliciter; sed idem non reducitur ad se ipsum; ideo idem accidente non reducitur ad accidens.

a) generi] om. P. b) est] dicitur P. c) sive] supra P.

4.

On I c.7, 1o3a 6sq. f. 14vb (B f. 13lva)

Circa secundum sic proceditur: 1. Cum genus et definitio habeant annexa, quare proprium non habet annexum. Et videtur quod deberet habere, quia sicut idem genere est annexum generi et idem definitione definitioni, videtur quod idem proprio sit annexum proprio.

2. Item, cum genus habeat duo annexa, scilicet idem genere et differentiam, quare definitio et accidens unumquodque non habet nisi unum solum annexum.

3. Item, videtur quod differentia sit annexum definitioni; differentia, cum sit completiva et essentialis pars definitionis, essentialior est definitioni quam generi; sed est annexum generi; ergo multo fortius definitioni.

Solutio: 1. Ad primum dicendum quod proprium non potuit habere annexum nisi idem proprio; sed idem proprio ^{a)} non potest esse annexum, quia quaestio de eodem proprio non potest esse nisi dupliciter: comparando u-

num ad alterum, ut utrum homo et risibile sint eadem proprio; sed istud quaerere nihil aliud est quam quaerere, utrum risibile est proprium hominis, et ista quaestio est principalis, ergo non annexa. Aut comparando duo ad tertium, ut utrum homo et equus sint eadem proprio; sed ista quaestio non est artis, quia hoc nihil aliud est quaerere nisi utrum proprium conveniat soli, et hoc est quaerere, utrum proprium non sit proprium. Et ideo proprium non potuit habere annexum.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod genus habet duo annexa, unum tamquam praedicatum fluens et descendens a principiis generis, scilicet in materia. Et habet aliud per modum comparationis ad praedicatum, ut si quaeratur utrum horum sit idem genus. Et definitio et accidens non habent nisi unum, quod est per modum comparationis ad praedicatum, quia non habent aliud tamquam praedicatum fluens et descendens a principiis generis. Ideo definitio et accidens non potuerunt habere nisi unum annexum.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod differentia est actu in definitione, cum sit pars essentialis et completiva; sed nullum essenziale in quantum tale est annexum; ideo differentia non potuit esse annexum definitioni, quod nullum essenziale annexum sit in quantum tale. Patet, quia omne annexum adiunctum; sed nullum essenziale est adiunctum; ergo non est annexum. Sed differentia est potentia solum in genere, ideo non est essentialis generi, et ideo bene potuit esse annexum.

a) proprio] proprium P.

SIMON OF FAVERSHAM

1.

f. 26rb (on I c.4, lolb 19sq.)

Sed ad evidentiam huius nota quod praedicamentum et praedicatum et praedicabile differunt; et ex isto apparebit quare quaedam istorum ponit praedicata et non praedicabile. Differunt autem sic, quia praedicamentum nihil aliud est quam coordinatio praedicabilium secundum sub et supra, directe et indirecte et collateraliter. Sed praedicabile dicitur ab aptitudine praedicandi in quid et quale. Ideo quaecumque diversum modum praedicandi habent, sunt diversa praedicabilia. Ipsum autem praedicatum ^{a)}, prout sumitur hic, dicitur ab actu praedicandi de suo subiecto, sed secundum quod habet determinari per diversas considerationes logicas sunt diversa praedicata. Sic igitur differunt, quod illud quod est formale in

praedicabili est materiale in praedicato, quia modus praedicandi est formale praedicabili, sed iste est in praedicato materialis.

Secundo nota quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit praedicatum duo requiruntur. Primo requiritur quod praedicatum de suo subiecto terminetur per diversas considerationes logicas sive dialecticas, et ideo quia habent diversum modum praedicandi de suo subiecto per diversas considerationes logicas, sunt diversa praedicata. ^{b)} Secundo requiritur quod habeat tale subiectum, quod sub arte cadet. Ex istis potest solvi omne quod potest argui, ut videlicet quare species non possit esse praedicatum. Ratio est quia eius subiectum non cadit sub arte, quod requirit secunda condicio, quia eius subiectum sunt individua, quae non cadunt sub arte, quia ut inquit Plato sive Porphyrius auctoritate Platonis, infinita relinquenda sunt sub arte. Definitio autem potest esse praedicatum, quia habet istas duas condiciones, sed [differentia] ^{c)} non est praedicabile, quia non habet modum praedicandi diversum ^{d)} a genere, et quia etiam non ponitur in genere.†

a) praedicatum] praedicamentum ms. b) praedicata] sic igitur....praedicato materialis (ut in praecedenti) add. et cancell. ms. ^{c)} differentia] i.mg.ms. ^{d)} a genere] i.mg.ms.; specie scribendum? (Pinborg).

2.

f. 27ra (on I c.6, 1o2b 28sq.)

Advertendum tamen est, ad hoc quod aliquid proprie sit praedicatum vel ^{a)} annexum tria requiruntur. Primo quod ille modus praedicandi competat praedicato per se et annexo competat per accidens et ex consequenti. Secundo requiritur quod praedicatum per se habeat considerationes dialecticas, quibus possit construi et destrui, sed annexa per accidens. Tertio quod <praedicatum> per se habeat habitudines locales, annexum vero per accidens.

a) vel] haud legibile ms.

RADULPHUS BRITO

1.

I qu. 1 f. 12ra-b

Consequenter quaeritur utrum dialectica sit scientia.

Et arguitur quod non:

1. Quia dialecticus non est sciens, ergo dialectica non est scientia.

Consequentia patet per locum a coniugatis. Antecedens patet quia dialecticus syllogizat ex probabilibus, et talis non est sciens.

2. Item, omnis scientia est ex necessariis; dialectica non est ex necessariis; ergo et cetera. Maior patet ex I. Priorum, minor patet in libro isto.

3. Item, omnis scientia est ex propriis; dialectica non est ex propriis; ergo et cetera. Maior patet ex primo Posteriorum, minor patet <quia est> ex quibusdam communibus ad omnem materiam applicabilibus.

In oppositum:

1. Est Philosophus.

2. Et arguitur ratione, quia ut nunc logica est scientia; dialectica est pars logicae; ideo et cetera.

Dicendum est quod dialectica potest dupliciter accipi: Uno modo pro dialectica docente. Et est dialectica docens habitus aggeneratus in intellectu de syllogismo dialectico per eius causas et principia. Alio modo accipitur dialectica pro dialectica utente, quod nihil aliud est nisi habitus generatus de aliqua conclusione probabili per syllogismum dialecticum. Modo dialectica primo modo dicta est scientia, secundo modo dicta non est scientia. Primum patet, quia omnis habitus firmus per demonstrationem acquisitus est scientia; sed dialectica primo modo dicta est habitus; ideo et cetera. Maior patet ex I. Posteriorum, quia demonstratio facit scire, ergo habitus per demonstrationem acquisitus est scientia. Minor patet, quia dialectica docens est habitus acquisitus de syllogismo dialectico per causas eius et principia, et talis habitus est firmus per demonstrationem acquisitus. Secundum declaratur, quia dialectica utens est habitus aggeneratus de aliquo per syllogismum dialecticum ex probabilibus, quae possunt aliter se habere; et talis habitus non est scientia sed opinio.

Ad rationes:

1. Ad primam, cum dicitur "dialecticus etc.", dicendum quod dialecticus est duplex, scilicet utens et docens. Modo utens non est sciens ut sic, nec etiam dialectica utens, ut visum est, est scientia. Sed dialecticus docens, qui habet habitum firmum de syllogismo dialectico per suas causas et principia, est sciens, et dialectica docens ut sic est scientia.

2. Ad aliam, cum dicitur "omnis scientia est ex necessariis", conceditur, et cum dicitur quod dialectica non est huiusmodi, quia procedit ex probabilibus, quae possunt aliter se habere, dicendum quod licet causae

syllogismi dialectici sint possibiles aliter se habere, tamen respectu syllogismi sunt necessariae et impossibiles aliter se habere. Unde haec est per se et necessaria: 'syllogismus dialecticus est ex probabilibus.'

3. Ad aliam cum dicitur "omnis scientia est ex propriis", verum est, et cum dicitur "dialectica non est ex propriis", dicendum est quod verum est loquendo de utente, sed loquendo de docente illa ex quibus ista procedit sunt propria syllogismo dialectico.

2.

I qu. 7 f. 13rb-vb

Consequenter quaeritur, utrum ista scientia quae dicitur dialectica sit inventiva vel resolutoria.

Arguitur primo quod resolutoria:

1. Quia ista scientia quae procedit demonstrative est iudicativa sive resolutoria; ista scientia est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia demonstrative procedens docet resolvere principiatum in sua principia et causatum in suas causas. Minor est manifesta, quia ista scientia docet constitutionem syllogismi dialectici ex suis principiis demonstrando proprias passiones de proprio subiecto et de eius partibus.

2. Item, quod per se inest superiori inest cuilibet inferiori; sed syllogismo ^{a)} simpliciter, qui est subiectum in libro Priorum, per se inest, quod sit resolutorius; ergo competit omni syllogismo; quare competit syllogismo dialectico; et sic per consequens ista scientia erit resolutoria, cum scientia sortitur nominationem a subiecto. Maior patet: quod per se inest, omni inest, ut dicitur I. Posteriorum. Minor etiam patet, quia liber Priorum et Posteriorum dicuntur resolutorii vel iudicativi.

3. Item, aliqua scientia non est inventiva, nisi quia docet invenire plura media ad terminandum problema dialecticum. Sed scientia libri Priorum et scientia libri Posteriorum docent invenire media. Ergo et cetera.

Oppositum:

1. dicit Boethius ^{b)} in Topicis suis, qui dividit logicam in inventivam et iudicaticam seu resolutoriam, et vocat istam scientiam inventivam, sed scientiam libri Priorum et Posteriorum vocat (f. 13va) iudicativam seu resolutoriam. Hoc etiam dicit idem Boethius in commento supra librum istum.

Aliqui distinguunt de dialectica, sicut prius dictum est, quia quaedam est dialectica docens et alia est dialectica utens. Modo dicunt quod dialectica utens est inventiva, quia docet invenire plura media per signa

communia et probabilia ad terminandum problemata in scientiis specialibus, dialectica autem docens est resolutoria, quia procedit ex propriis principiis syllogismi dialectici, et docet resolvere syllogismum dialecticum in suas causas et principia.

Omissa tamen ista dictinctione, licet antiqui et moderni istam teneant, dicendum est ad praesens quod scientiam esse resolutoriam vel esse inventivam, hoc est dupliciter: Uno modo scientia dicitur resolutoria, quia procedit resolutorie resolvendo aliquid in suas causas et principia; et sic omnis scientia posset dici resolutoria, cum omnis scientia procedit resolutorie resolvendo aliquid in suas causas et principia aliquo modo. Alio modo scientia dicitur resolutoria, quae docet modum resolvendi et iudicandi, secundum quem aliquis scit resolvere aliquid in suas causas et principia; et isto modo proprie liber Priorum et Posteriorum dicuntur resolutorii vel iudicativi. Similiter scientia dicitur inventiva dupliciter, vel quia docet invenire media ad terminandum problemata, vel quia docet modum inveniendi media; et isto ultimo modo ista scientia dicitur inventiva.

Utrumque istorum declaratur, primo quod liber Priorum et Posteriorum sint resolutorii. Patet quia in libro Priorum docetur resolutio syllogismi in tribus terminis et duabus propositionibus in virtute dici de omni vel dici de nullo. In libro autem Posteriorum docetur modus resolvendi demonstrationem in primas propositiones veras et immediatas et notiores in per se causas et principia et in per se passionnes; et sic de aliis. Liber autem Topicorum non ~~est~~ iudicativus illo modo, quia non docetur ibi modus resolvendi aliquam conclusionem in sua principia, sed magis docet invenire plura media ad terminandum conclusionem unam respiciendo aliquam habitudinem localem et ad signa, et ideo dicitur inventivus et non resolutorius.

Tunc ad rationes.

1. Ad primum: cum dicitur "ista scientia quae procedit resolutorie est resolutoria", immo ista quae docet modum resolvendi. Modo licet dialectica procedat resolutorie, quia demonstrative, tamen non docet modum resolvendi, ideo non dicitur resolutoria.

2. Ad aliam rationem, cum arguitur "quod inest per se superiori inest cuilibet inferiori", conceditur, et cum dicitur quod syllogismus est resolutorius, dico quod non, immo resolubilis, sed scientia de ipso est resolutoria, quia ibi docetur resolutio syllogismi simpliciter in tribus ter-

minis, in duabus propositionibus et in dici de omni et de nullo. Item peccabat ratio in alio, quia licet syllogismus simpliciter sit superius ad dialecticum, tamen scientia, quae de ipso considerat, sicut scientia libri Priorum non est superior ad istam scientiam.

3. Ad aliam, quando arguitur quod in scientia libri Priorum et Posteriorum docetur invenire media, dico quod falsum est, immo docetur invenire medium unum ad investigandum quod quid est, quod est medium in demonstratione. Similiter in scientia libri Priorum docetur invenire unum medium recte dispositum duabus propositionibus et tribus terminis ad quamlibet conclusionem inferendam. Sed in ista scientia docetur invenire media ad unam conclusionem dialecticam. Vel potest dici aliter quod aliquid docere invenire medium, hoc est dupliciter: vel propter inventionem principaliter et fit ibi status, et sic ista scientia dicitur inventiva, quia est principaliter propter (f. 13vb) inventionem medii. Alio modo aliquid potest invenire non principaliter, sed ut illo medio invento possit resolvere illud medium inventum in suas causas et principia, et sic ista scientia, quae isto modo docet invenire media, non est inventiva, sed magis resolutoria. Scientia autem libri Priorum et scientia libri Posteriorum isto modo docet invenire medium.

a) syllogismo] syllogismus ms. b) Boethius] Philosophus ms.
3.

I qu. 2o f. 18vb-19va

Consequenter quaeritur, quia Philosophus dicit quod sunt quattuor praedicata, ideo quaeritur, utrum hoc sit verum.

Arguitur primo quod non:

1. Sed quod sunt plura quam quattuor, quia praedicatum et praedicabile sunt idem nec differunt nisi penes aptitudinem <et actum> ; sed praedicabilia sunt quinque, ut patet in libro Porphyrii. Ergo quinque erunt praedicata.

2. Item probatur quod non sint tot, quia definitio non est praedicabile, ergo nec erit praedicatum.

.....

8. Item, 'homo est rationalis', hic non praedicatur aliquod istorum; quare et cetera.

9. Item nec in illa 'Socrates est homo' praedicatur aliquod istorum.

.....

Dicendum est quod tantum sunt quattuor praedicata et non plura nec pauciora (f. 19ra). Sed intelligendum quod praedicatum et praedicabile sunt distinctae intentiones attributae obiecto secundum diversos modos essendi repertos in illo obiecto, quia praedicabile attribuitur alicui obiecto secundum modum praedicandi de suis inferioribus, et ideo sunt tot praedicabilia quot modis potest aliquid de inferiori praedicari. Modo hoc est solum quinque modis, quia omne illud quod praedicatur de inferiori vel praedicatur in quid vel in quale. Si habet modum praedicandi in quid, vel hoc est de pluribus differentibus specie, et sic est genus, vel de pluribus differentibus numero, et sic est species. Si habet modum praedicandi in quale, hoc est vel essenziale vel accidentale. Si essenziale, sic est differentia. Si accidentale, hoc est dupliciter, vel quia praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero, et sic est proprium, vel de pluribus differentibus specie, et sic est accidens. Vel sic: si praedicetur in quale accidentale, vel causatur ex propriis speciei, et sic est proprium, vel non, et sic est accidens. Unde intelligendum est quod proprium respectu speciei non est praedicabile, sed magis respectu eius debet dici proprium; sed est praedicabile respectu individuorum speciei.

Praedicata autem distinguuntur penes modos uniendi ipsa cum subiecto et modum inhaerendi subiecto, de quo possunt terminari per considerationes constructivas et destructivas. Et ideo cum solum quattuor modis contingat praedicatum uniri cum subiecto sive sibi inhaerere, solum debent esse quattuor praedicata. Maior patet ex sufficientia, quam dat Philosophus (Top. 1,8). Minor etiam patet, quia omne praedicatum aut inhaeret, de quo terminatur per considerationes immediate sequentes ^{a)}, <***> aut convertitur vel non convertitur. Si convertatur, aut indicat essentiam sui subiecti aut non. Si indicet essentiam sui subiecti, sic est definitio; si non, sic est proprium. Si inhaereat non convertibiliter, aut ponitur in definitione aut non; si ponitur in definitione, sic est genus, si non, sic est accidens.

Sed notanda sunt duo, primo quod genus respectu speciei est praedicabile et praedicatum; differenter tamen, quia est praedicabile penes modum praedicandi in quid de suo inferiori, sed praedicatum est penes modum inhaerendi, quem habet cum subiecto, secundum quod ad illam inhaerentiam terminandam possunt ordinari considerationes constructivae et destructivae. Secundo est notandum quod respectu omnium praedicatorum unum est

principale subiectum, scilicet species, quia de ipsa omnia praedicata construuntur et destruuntur.

Et si dicas: non habemus nisi unum subiectum, ergo non debemus habere nisi unum praedicatum, quia praedicatum et subiectum correlative dicuntur. Dicendum est quod praedicatum et subiectum quantum ad intentiones subiecti et praedicati dicuntur correlative, tamen id quod est subiectum et id quod est praedicatum non dicuntur correlative, ideo non oportet quod quot sint praedicata tot sint subiecta et e converso.

Ex his ad rationes:

1. Ad primum, cum dicitur "praedicatum et praedicabile sunt idem", dicendum quod praedicatum secundum quod hic sumitur, praedicatum et praedicabile non sunt idem, immo differunt ut visum est; tamen si sumas praedicatum eo quod actualiter praedicatur, ut sic praedicatum et praedicabile non differunt nisi secundum actum et aptitudinem; sed sic non sumitur praedicatum hic, ut visum est.

2. Ad aliam, 'definitio non est praedicabile, ergo nec praedicatum' non sequitur, quia definitio non dicitur praedicabile pro tanto, quia non habet alium modum praedicandi de inferioribus a specie. Tamen habet alium modum inhaerendi subiecto a modo inhaerendi aliorum praedicatorum, et ideo est praedicatum.

.....

8. (f. 19rb) Ad aliam, cum dicitur 'homo est rationalis', dicendum quod duplex est differentia, scilicet generalis et specialis sive convertibilis cum specie. Generalis reducitur ad genus, quia eundem modum inhaerendi habet cum genere, quia utrumque essentialiter et non convertibiliter <inhaeret>. Sed differentia specialis reducitur ad definitionem, quia inhaeret convertibiliter et essentialiter sicut definitio.

9. Ad aliam, 'Socrates est homo' etc. Dicendum sicut Albertus dicit quod hic proprie non est praedicatum, quia in tali propositione non est subiectum quod possit cadere sub arte, quia est corruptibile, et ad terminandum aliquod praedicatum de tali subiecto non possunt ordinari considerationes. Modo quia essent transmutabiles~~***~~. Vel potest dici, quod reducitur ad genus quia species habet eundem modum inhaerendi individuui, sicut genus speciei.

.....

a) immediate sequentes] sup. lin. ms.

4.

I qu. 25 f. 20vb-21ra

Consequenter quaeritur, utrum proprium habeat annexum.

Arguitur quod sic:

1. Quia sicut idem definitione se habet ad definitionem, ita idem proprio ad proprium; sed idem definitione est annexum definitionis; ideo et cetera. Maior patet per simile, minor etiam in VII. huius, ubi determinatur de eodem et diverso, quod est annexum definitionis. Hoc etiam apparet in I. huius.

2. Item quod habet denominationem proprii et non est proprium, videtur esse annexum proprii, quia annexum est partim idem et partim diversum, cum eo cuius est. Sed proprium quando et proprium ubi et proprium ad aliquid habent denominationem proprii et non sunt proprium. Ideo et cetera.

Oppositum dicit Albertus et etiam Philosophus, qui non posuit annexum proprio.

Ad istam quaestionem aliqui dicunt quod proprium habet annexum, et sunt moti propter rationem primo adductam, tamen breviter dico sicut dicit Albertus quod proprium non habet annexum. Cuius ratio est, quia annexum ^{a)} debet partim convenire cum illo cuius est annexum in modo inhaerendi, et partim differre ab eo, sicut differentia generalis, quae est annexum generi, partim differt ab eo et partim convenit cum eo in modo inhaerendi. Et cum hoc requiritur quod non conterminatur formaliter sub aliquo praedicato.

Tunc arguitur: si aliquid esset annexum proprio oporteret illud vel simpliciter non differre a proprio vel esse formaliter sub aliquo praedicato; sed tale non debet esse annexum, ut iam visum est. Ideo et cetera. Probatio maioris, quia modus inhaerendi proprii est convertibiliter inesse et non indicat essentiam. Tunc ergo illud quod esset annexum proprii (f. 21ra) vel conveniret cum proprio quantum ad conversim praedicari et differret in hoc quod est indicare essentiam, et tunc esset definitio, quod non potest esse annexum eius, cum sit formaliter aliquod praedicatum. Si autem conveniret in hoc quod est non indicare essentiam et differret in hoc quod est conversim praedicari, sic esset accidens commune. Si autem omnino differat, ita quod non conveniat nec in uno nec in alio, sic est genus. Et si in utroque conveniat, sic est formaliter ipsum proprium. Ergo nullum annexum debet habere.

Et si dicas quod proprium quando et proprium ubi sunt sibi annexum, hoc non potest esse, quia annexum non potest esse sub aliquo praedicato formaliter; modo proprium quando et proprium ubi sunt formaliter sub praedicato accidentis. Ideo et cetera.

Sed intelligendum est propter solutionem primae rationis, quod idem et diversum, quod est annexum alicui praedicato, debet causari ex identitate vel diversitate eius, cuius est annexum, quia terminatur per easdem considerationes cum illo, sicut identitas in definitione terminatur eo quod definitio aliquorum sit eadem utrobique. Modo [ex] hoc quod aliqua habent idem proprium vel non, non causatur ex proprio, sed magis ex parte formae specificae, quam consequitur proprium.

1. Tunc ad solutionem primi, cum dicitur: "sicut idem in definitione et cetera," dicendum quod non est simile, quia idem definitione causatur ex parte definitionis, sed idem proprio causatur ex parte formae specificae, in qua aliqua conveniunt, ad quam sequitur ea proprietas, quae est proprium.

2. Ad aliam: "Quod habet denominationem" et cetera, verum est nisi contineatur sub aliquo praedicato, et cum dicitur "quando" et cetera, dicendum quod ista duo formaliter continentur sub accidente, ideo non possunt esse annexum alicuius praedicati.

a) annexum] proprium ms.