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Anonymus St. Gallensis (C24) on *Categories* 7

An Edition

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This is another instalment in a series of editions of philosophical texts dealing with Aristotle's category of relation.¹ The text edited is a short excerpt from an anonymous twelfth-century commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* found in a manuscript held in St Gall (ms Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 833).

1. The Commentary (C24)

The small manuscript contains a collection of six commentaries on Porphyry, Aristotle and Boethius. The collection has been described by Grabmann.² The contents are the following:³

^{*}I would like to thank Sten Ebbesen for his comments.

¹For an introduction to medieval thinking about relations (and the issues discussed below), see Heine Hansen, 'Relations,' in *The Routledge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, ed. R. Cross and JT Paasch (New York, 2021), 96–106.

²Martin Grabmann, 'Bearbeitungen und Auslegungen der aristotelischen Logik aus der Zeit von Peter Abaelard bis Petrus Hispanus: Mitteilungen aus Handschriften deutscher Bibliotheken' (Berlin, 1937), 46–47. Repr. in Martin Grabmann, *Gesammelte Akademieabhandlungen* (Paderborn, 1979), 1361–1417.

³For the commentaries on Porphyry and Aristotle, I use the alpha-numeric labels of John Marenbon's working catalogue of early medieval commentaries to these texts ('Medieval Latin Commentaries and Glosses on Aristotelian Logical Texts, Before c. 1150 A.D.,' in *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts*, ed. C. Burnett (London, 1993), 77–127. Repr. with addenda in John Marenbon, *Aristotelian Logic, Platonism and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West* (Aldershot, 2000). Updated version of the catalogue of commentaries on the *Categories* in 'The Tradition of Studying the *Categories* in the early Middle Ages (until 1200): A revised working catalogue of glosses, commentaries and treatises,' in *Aristotle's Categories in the Byzantine, Arabic and Latin Traditions*, ed. S. Ebbesen, J. Marenbon and P. Thom (Copenhagen, 2013), 139–73.) For the commentaries on Boethius, I

- (1) Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* [P28], pp. 4–7
- (2) Commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* [C24], pp. 7–17¹
- (3) Commentary on Aristotle's *Perihermeneias* [H23], pp. 17–19
- (4) Commentary on Boethius' *De divisione* [D9], pp. 19–20
- (5) Commentary on Boethius' *De syllogismis categoricis* [SC5], pp. 21–26
- (6) Commentary on Boethius' *De syllogismis hypotheticis* [SH7], pp. 26–30

A common, and noteworthy, feature of the commentaries in the collection is their form: they consist solely in the discussion of a series of questions/objections to the authoritative texts. Another common feature is that they are quite short, as is made explicit in the titles of several of them: *Incipiunt de Categoriis pauca* (p. 7), *Pauca de Perierminiis* (p. 17), *De libro Divisionum parum* (p. 19). The second feature to some extent falls out of the first: by not bothering with any form of introduction to or literal exposition/paraphrase/glossing of the authoritative text, much ink and parchment is saved compared to a typical twelfth-century commentary. Furthermore, there are several avowals that no attempt is made at being comprehensive with regard to the selection of questions discussed. For example, in the commentary on Porphyry, the commentator explicitly says: *quaestiones quas Boethius in commento et movet et solvit apponere non curavi* (p. 4), and in the commentary on the *Categories*, we are told that: *multa propter fastidium lectorum praetereo, verum mihi benivoli debent esse* (p. 14). It is possible, perhaps, that these are not commentaries so much as excerpts of commentaries. Either way, of those in the collection, the one on the *Categories* is the most substantial.

use the labels employed by Yukio Iwakuma in his still unpublished lists of twelfth-century commentaries on these works. Note that the two small logical treatises which Grabmann ('Bearbeitungen', 47) identifies on p. 15 and p. 17 are in fact the comments on the final chapters of Aristotle's *Categories*. The error is tacitly corrected in Marenbon's catalogue.

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2. The Comments on *Categories* 7

It is, as it turns out, in the comments on chapter 7 that the author claims to skip much for the benefit of the reader, and the discussion of this particular category is indeed very short. Five questions/problems in total are briefly discussed:

- (Q1) Are this father and this son relatives?
- (Q2) What kind of highest genus or category is *toward something*?
- (Q3) What are the species of this highest genus?
- (Q4) How can Aristotle claim that the object of knowledge (*scibile*) is prior to knowledge on the grounds that knowledge does not carry the object of knowledge to destruction (7b22–31)?
- (Q5) Aristotle's claim that 'in few or no cases will one find that knowledge is produced at the same time as the object of knowledge' (7b25–27) appears to be false.


Of these questions, (Q2) receives the most sustained treatment, and it is, along with the related (Q3), also the most interesting part of the discussion of this category.

The issue that (Q2) concerns was also the central issue in the previous instalment in this series (a mid-thirteenth-century commentary on the *Categories*): what exactly is the category that Aristotle treats in chapter 7?¹ Or to put it in other words: how exactly are we to understand the prepositional phrase *toward something* (Gr. *πρός τι*, Lat. *ad aliquid*) that Aristotle uses to designate this category. C24 canvasses three positions:

- (P1) Ad aliquid = Relatio
- (P2) Ad aliquid = Relativum
- (P3) Ad aliquid = Relativa


Each of these positions involves a certain conception of the generic structure of the category. They may be illustrated as follows. First, (P1):

¹Heine Hansen, 'Anonymus Domus Petri 205 on *Categories* 7. An Edition,' *CIMAGL* 87 (2018), 267–300, at 270–271




Here the highest genus is *relation* and its species are items such as *paternity* and *filiation*. C24 rejects this position by an argument *ex auctoritate*.

(P2), in contrast, replaces the abstract *relation* with the concrete *relative* as the highest genus. This view may be construed, the author says, in two ways. The first, (P2a), like this (where the correlatives *superior* and *inferior* constitute two separate species):




This view is rejected on the basis that correlatives are mutually dependent on each other for their existence. They do not, as the commentator puts it, subsist *per se* and so cannot constitute two separate species. This leaves the second construal, (P2b), (where the correlatives constitute a single species):¹



¹Note that this construal is closer to the passage in Priscian (*Institutiones grammaticae* XVIII, 25) from which, despite the difference in terminology, the debate here seems to derive. Priscian is there relating a Greek distinction between relatives which are *aequiparantia* (Gr. ἰσοπαλῆ) and relatives which are *subiecta vel superposita* (Gr. ἐπαναβεβηκότα). The terminology (*praelatum, subditum*) that C24 uses with respect to this latter type of relatives — which are, in effect, those that are relative in virtue of asymmetrical relations — is found also in the note in ms Paris BnF, lat. 13368 edited in Appendix A. The marginalia in the Sankt Gallen manuscript edited in Appendix B use a derived combination (*praelatio, subiectio*).

C24 rejects this construal by arguing briefly that you cannot here predicate the genus of its species (the predication 'praelatum et subditum est relativum' is, he claims, false) nor can you predicate the species of its categorial inferiors (the predication 'dominus et servus est praelatus et subditus' is also, he claims, false). Instead, he opts for (P3), where the plural *relatives* replaces the singular *relative* as the highest genus:



He supports this view by a tacit quotation from Boethius' commentary on the *Categories* (217a) to the effect that in contrast to items belonging to other categories, items belonging to the category of *toward something* cannot be comprehended singularly but only in pairs, which is why Aristotle uses a verb in the plural (*dicuntur*) in his descriptions of these items.¹ The view, it is worth noting, involves the claim that the individuals in this category are correlative pairs (father and son is the example given).

¹Boethius, in turn, is drawing on a tradition among the Greek commentators that goes back, according to Simplicius (*in Cat.* 159.23–160.10), to followers of Achaicus and Sotion, a pair of Peripatetics who were active, it seems, in the first or second century AD (see Paul Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1984), 211–13).


3. A Note in ms Paris BnF, lat. 13368

The same three overall positions are found in the same order in a note written on a small slip inserted in ms Paris BnF, lat. 13368 (previously Saint-Germain-des-Prés 1310, *olim* 635), a composite manuscript containing in one of its several parts (ff. 128–231) a number of logical texts and notes from the twelfth century.¹ In this note, which is edited below in Appendix A, all three positions are ascribed to *quidam*. The first two positions are also rejected there, although with somewhat different counter-arguments. The third position is merely presented without counter-arguments, and indeed reads like a short summary of the position embraced by C24 (with some minor additions with regard to the species contained in the category). There is presumably some less than incidental connection between the two discussions, but it is not entirely clear what it is. Certainly, the way the third position is presented in the Parisian note suggests that the author is adapting some source, but the differences in the counter-arguments to the first two positions suggest that this source is not C24—at least not as found in the St Gall manuscript. They are, perhaps, rather drawing on a common source at one or several removes. The Parisian note is dated, on palaeographical grounds, to ca. 1150 by Iwakuma.² Given their connection, a roughly similar date seems likely for the St Gall material.

One interesting difference between this note and C24 is that the note gives two construals, not of (P2), but of (P1). In addition to (P1) as it was illustrated above, the note thus offers (P1b):

¹For the most recent description of the relevant part of this manuscript with references to previous discussions, see Yukio Iwakuma, 'Pseudo-Rabanus super Porphyrium (P3),' *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 75 (2008), 43–196, at 45–47. The present note is listed as item (13) in Iwakuma's table of contents (note that an error seems to have crept in with regard to the folio number: instead of 'f. 185v' read 'f. 184v' on the first line of page 47).

²Iwakuma, 'Pseudo-Rabanus', 46 (see also *ibid.*, 45n10).



Where on (P1) a given pair of converses were seen as two separate species of *relatio*, (P1b) posits only one species in each such case, something akin, seemingly, to what we nowadays, following Kit Fine, call a neutral relation, an adirectional relational link (*habitudō*) between (*inter*) the relata.¹ Such a view is surprising and rare in a medieval context, and the note duly dismisses it (interestingly enough, it does so by means of an infinite regress argument relying on Aristotle's revised definition of *toward something* in *Categories* 7.8a31–32).²

Another interesting difference between the note and C24 is that in the note (P1) and (P2a) are both rejected on the basis of a passage in Boethius' *De divisione* 884b, which is taken to state that items in this category lack substantial differentiae. Thus, *paternity* and *filiation* cannot constitute two separate species, since they do not have a substantial differentia by which they differ. The invocation of this passage is noteworthy in so far as in the early thirteenth century Nicholas of Paris explicitly refers to it precisely in his argument for a position resembling (P1b).³ There seems to be here, in

¹Kit Fine, 'Neutral Relations,' *The Philosophical Review* 109 (2000): 1–33.

²For a thirteenth-century example of a view akin to (P1b), see Heine Hansen, 'Strange Finds, or Nicholas of Paris on Relations', in *Logic and Language in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. L. Fink, H. Hansen and A. M. Mora-Márquez (Leiden, 2013), 139–54. DOI: 10.1163/9789004242135_010. See also Heine Hansen, 'On the Road from Athens to Thebes Again: Some Thirteenth-Century Thinkers on Converse Relations,' *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 24 (2016): 468–89. DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2015.1055230.

³Nicholas of Paris, *Rationes super Praedicamenta* (ms Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek 14460, f. 52va): 'quando Boethius dicit quod nulla substantiali differentia differunt relativa, intelligit de extremis eiusdem speciei relationis, ut dominus et servus sunt unius relationis, sicut pater et filius, cum paternitas et filiatio sit una species relationis, sed sortitur diversa nomina secundum comparationes extremitatum diversas, ut hic dicatur filius hic pater (et illae diversae comparationes sunt superpositio et suppositio); per comparationem enim patris ad filium dicitur paternitas, per comparationem filii ad patrem dicitur filiatio. Unde dico quod pater et filius nulla substantiali differentia differunt. Paternitas et filiatio,

other words, a clear indication of continuity between twelfth- and early thirteenth-century discussions of the category of relation.

4. Some Marginalia to C24

Apart from the five questions on chapter 7 addressed in the commentary, the Sankt Gallen manuscript contains in the margins brief and dense discussions, edited in Appendix B, of two claims relevant to the category of *toward something*:


(S1) Equal is not a relative

(S2) Some relatives are not relative


Both statements are, it is argued, false.¹ (S1) concerns what is now called symmetric relations (the example given being *equality*) and shows a medieval attempt at giving a uniform account of symmetrical and asymmetrical relations. The author assumes something like the following picture for asymmetrical relations:

dominium et servitus, quae sunt diversae species, differunt substantiali differentia.’

¹The style of argumentation is dense. First, an argument in favour of the relevant claim is given (in each case taking the form of a string of conditionals, where the consequent of each subsequent conditional is the antecedent of the previous one) and then a solution is worked out. For example, in the case of (S1), we get (382.1–7): ‘Equal is not a relative. Is this the case? If it is not referred [sc. to something else], then it is the case. But this [sc. that it is not referred] is the case: If it is not referred to equal (since it is not referred to anything else), then it is the case [sc. that it is not referred]. But this [sc. that it is not referred to equal] is the case: If it is not opposite to it, then it is not referred to it. But this [sc. that it is not opposite to it] is the case: If nothing is opposite to itself, then it [sc. that it is not opposite to it] is the case. But this [sc. that nothing is opposite to itself] is the case. [Solution:] This last consequence [sc. ‘if nothing is opposite to itself, then it [sc. equal] is not opposite to it [sc. equal]] doesn’t follow even though it looks like it does. For in fact there are two equalities which are distinct and opposite species of relation.’ (Note, by the way, that in the above argument ‘foundation’ refers to substances rather than their properties.)



Here we have (at least) two subaltern species under *relation*: *superiority* and *inferiority*. These two species are relational opposites (what we would call converses) and under them fall further species; *dominion*, for example, is a species under *superiority* while its relational opposite, *serfdom*, is a species under *inferiority*. To counter (S1) the author advances the somewhat surprising claim that symmetrical relations conform to this same pattern. *Equality*, in other words, has a distinct converse. This converse is also called *equality*, but equivocally so.¹ Let's call them *equality*^R and *equality*^A. These are, it is claimed, two distinct species under two distinct higher species which are themselves converses. Let's call them *species*^R and *species*^A. The author thus envisages the following picture:



On this view, we would say, even symmetric relations have direc-

¹The author (382.8–11) asks us to envision a scenario where the word 'son' is no longer in use. The word 'father' will now, he claims, pick out both father and son (*et filium significabit*). And, in this scenario, relative conversion will still hold for 'father': a father will be father of a father (just as an equal is now equal to an equal).

tion. Given the standard medieval view of relations, this would seem to imply that two substances, Socrates and Plato, say, may be equal in two different ways: the relation *equality*^R may inhere in Plato while *equality*^A inheres in Socrates, or vice versa. The author, unfortunately, does not address the issue.

(S2) concerns relations of temporal priority and posteriority.¹ As the note spells out, such relations were somewhat problematic in the medieval context, because, as the medievals read him, Aristotle claims at *Categories* 7.7b15ff. that true relatives are simultaneous by nature. On the standard view, this meant that for two substances to be related there has to be a time *t* at which they both exist. The author of the note tries to sidestep the problem by claiming that relatives such as *prior* and *posterior* are simultaneous in a more subtle sense (*subtilius*), namely in the way we conceive of them (that A *is* prior to some B, rather than that A *is or was or will be* prior with respect to posterior B). This idea of cashing out simultaneity in terms of how things are understood or conceived is also, it may be noted, one that we find in some early thirteenth-century discussions of relatives.²

That these marginalia do not belong to C24 and were not composed

¹The argument for (S2) takes a form like the one described for (S1) p. 370n1 above (382.21–383.3): ‘Some relatives are not relatives. Is this the case? If they are not temporally simultaneous, then it is the case (If he denies this, let him find the flaw). But this [sc. that they are not temporally simultaneous] is the case: If they do not exist at the same time, then it is the case [sc. that they are not temporally simultaneous]. But this [sc. that they do not exist at the same time] is the case: If their foundations do not exist at the same time, then it [sc. that they do not exist at the same time] is the case. But this [sc. that their foundations do not exist at the same time] is the case: For I may [sc. truly] say “Socrates, who is now dead, was prior to Plato.” [Solution:] And so one must reject the consequence “If their foundations do not exist at the same time, then some relatives do not exist at the same time.” For the antecedent is true and the consequent false, since all relatives exist at the same time.’ The author then explains how to deal with relatives like *prior* and *posterior*.

²See, e.g., Heine Hansen, ‘Anonymus Domus Petri 206’s Commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*,’ *CIMAGL* 78 (2008): 111–203, at 167: ‘Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod relativa sunt simul natura; ad illud quod obicitur, quod ibi non accipitur natura proprie sed pro naturali intelligentia, unde sensus est: relativa sunt simul natura, id est relativa sunt simul naturali intelligentia.’

by its author seems clear from the construal of the category of *toward something* that is presented in response to (S1): it is a variant of (P1), which, as we saw above, C24 explicitly rejects.

*

The texts edited here are short, but, as should be clear from the above sketch, also rich in their suggestiveness. Logicians around the middle of the twelfth century were, it appears, quite busy exploring the conceptual ramifications and possibilities of Aristotle's foundational discussion in *Categories 7*, and in the process a number of novel and non-standard views were seemingly entertained. It is to be hoped that with further exploration of the commentary tradition on this text, our understanding of these views and discussions will deepen.

5. *Ratio edendi*

I have imposed a standardised and classicising orthography on the texts as well as my own punctuation and paragraphing. At a few places, I have introduced numbering in <pointed brackets> to make clear the structure of the text. Below the text one will find first, where relevant, an apparatus containing references to authoritative texts, and secondly an apparatus recording manuscript readings where these deviate from the printed text.

ANONYMUS ST. GALLENIS (C24)
DE AD ALIQUID

< 1 >

Solet quaeri de hoc patre et hoc filio si sint relativa.

Negatur, quia scilicet non referuntur. Nullus enim dicit: hic pater <huius> filii hic pater est.

Quod si quis dicat ista referri, probabimus a simili: quia neque haec manus dicitur alicuius haec manus neque quoddam caput alicuius quoddam caput; et hoc ait Aristoteles. 5

Quod si quis obiciat Aristotelem non remove relationem ab huiusmodi quia individua sed quia substantiae, hoc modo contraibimus dicentes quod quia substantiae sunt ab eis relatio non aufertur, cum [esset] eorum universalia referantur, ut manus et caput. 10

Cum ergo referri non possint hic pater et hic filius et similia, non relativorum modo tenentur, nisi forte dicamus et ista esse relativa per eorum universalia, quae sunt pater et filius, quemadmodum dicit Boethius Socratem esse ad aliquid in eo quod est pater et filius, vel non per se sed per aliud. 15

< 2 >

Dubitatur quoque cuiusmodi praedicamentum vel generalissimum sit ad aliquid.

Quidam namque dicunt ad aliquid nihil aliud esse quam relationem, et huius relationis aiunt esse species paternitatem, filiationem et similia,

6 Arist. *Cat.* 7.8a18–21 (trans. Boethii; ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 22): ‘quaedam enim manus non dicitur alicuius quaedam manus, sed alicuius manus, et quoddam caput non dicitur alicuius quoddam caput, sed alicuius caput.’ 13–14 Boeth. *in Cat.* (ed. Migne, col. 220d): ‘Socrates namque in eo quod est Socrates substantia est, in eo quod pater vel filius ad aliquid’.

9 quod quia] *inv. G* 10 ut] et *G* 16 vel generalissimum] *in marg. G* 19 aiunt] aint *ut v. G*

addentes quod haec quoque vera relativa sint, et pater et filius sint relativa per ista.

Quod absurdum videtur cum relationem patris et filii ex auctoritatibus multis habemus, paternitatis autem et filiationis relationem nunquam inveniamus. 5

Item, dicunt alii ad aliquid nihil <aliud> esse quam relativum, et eius species dicunt esse et praelatum et subditum et cetera relativa.

Sed praelatum et subditum et similia species relativa esse non possunt, quia neque una species praelatum et subditum neque duae. 10

Quod duae non sint, erit manifestum sic: quia nihil horum per se subsistit, sed praelatum a subdito esse habet et e converso; quod autem per se non subsistat species esse non potest; non igitur praelatum et subditum duae species esse possunt. Sic et de aliis. 10

Rursus, una species non erit. Si enim essent una relationis species, relativum de eis praedicaretur, itaque de eis diceremus 'praelatum et subditum est relativum', quod falsum est; non enim haec sunt relativum sed relativa — nisi figuratim hoc intelligamus, ut scilicet sic exponamus: 'praelatum et subditum sunt relativum', id est uniuntur in relativo, sicut solemus dicere 'omnes homines sunt unus homo', id est uniuntur in hoc quod homine participant. 20

Rursus, una species esse non possunt praelatum et subditum. Si enim essent una species, aut specialissima aut subalterna esset. Si esset subalterna, haberet individua sub se et species. Sed neque species neque individua sub se habent. Si enim haberent species, vel dominum vel servum vel aliquid tale. Haec autem species eius esse non possunt. Non enim praelatus et subditus praedicantur de istis; nam si dicamus 'dominus et servus est praelatus et subditus', omnino falsum est; nam neque insimul neque singillatim possunt haec subici praelato et subdito. Propter eandem causam possumus dicere haec eadem praelati et subditi individua non esse, neque 25

18–19 cf. Porph. *Isag.* 6.21 (trans. Boethii; ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 12): 'participatione enim speciei plures homines unus'.

4 filiationis] relationis *a.c.* G 13 duae] *s.l.* G esse] non *add. a.c.* G aliis] alii G 15 diceremus] dicemus G 16 relativum] relativa *a.c.* G 18 uniuntur] inveniuntur G 19 uniuntur] inveniuntur G

hic pater neque hic filius eius individua esse possunt, et quia de eis non praedicatur praelatus et subditus, et quia etiam haec relativa non sunt, ut supradictum est. Cum praelatus igitur et subditus neque species neque individua sub se contineant, species esse omnino negantur. Cum igitur haec et his similia neque secundum se species esse relativi possunt neque insimul una species, nullo modo species relativi erunt. Quare non potest hoc — relativum — generalissimum esse.

Item, si [relativum volunt, alii volunt relationem generalissimum excipere esse] vellet Aristoteles in loco alicuius istorum ad aliquid posuisse, non dixisset 'ad aliquid dicuntur'. Nam sicut incongruum esset dicere 'relativum dicuntur' vel 'relatio dicuntur', sic incompetens esset dicere 'ad aliquid dicuntur' si pro aliquo istorum poneretur.

[14] Videamus ergo quid in hoc praedicamento recte generalissimum et quae eius species esse possint. | Dicamus itaque primum hoc praedicamentum ab aliis esse diversum, quia sicut substantia, quantitas etc. singulariter intelliguntur, ita ad aliquid singulariter et per se non potest intelligi, ut dicamus 'ad aliquid' singulare; quicquid enim in relationis natura cognoscitur cum alio considerari necesse est; cum enim dico 'dominus' sive aliquod relativum per se ipsum, nihil est si defuerit aliud relativum. Unde et Aristoteles non dixit 'ad aliquid dicitur' sed 'dicuntur' pluraliter, demonstrare volens relativorum naturam non in simplicitate sed pluralitate semper consistere. Unde nobis videtur opportunum neque relativum neque relationem generalissimum esse, sed ad aliquid sive

10 Arist. *Cat.* 7.6a36–37 (trans. Boethii; ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 18): 'Ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur quaecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud'. 14–20 Cf. Boeth. *in Cat.* (ed. Migne, col. 217a): 'Quod autem ait *ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur* hoc monstrat quod non sicut quantitas per se et singulariter intelligi potest, eodem quoque modo substantia et qualitas et unumquodque aliorum praedicamentorum sicut per se constat ita etiam per se et singulariter intelligitur, sic ad aliquid per se et singulariter capi intellectu non potest, ut dicamus esse ad aliquid singulariter. Quicquid enim in natura relationis agnoscitur, id cum alio necesse est consideretur; cum enim dico "dominus", per se ipsum nihil est si servus desit.' 20–22 Cf. Boeth. *in Cat.* (ed. Migne, col. 217b): 'atque ideo non dixit Aristoteles "ad aliquid vero tale dicitur", sed plurali numero "talia dicuntur" inquit, demonstrans relativorum intelligentiam non in simplicitate sed in pluralitate consistere.'

2 et] tunc *G ut v.* etiam] aetiam *vel sim. ut v. G* 8–9 excipere] *lectio incertissima, in marg. G* 10 dicuntur] dicitur *G* 18 considerari] *ex considerare corr. G ut v.*

relativa pluraliter; idem enim est ad aliquid et relativa, unde tantumdem valuit dicere 'ad aliquid dicuntur' quantum si diceret 'relativa dicuntur'.

< 3 >

Quod si quis huius generalissimi species quaesierit, quia earum nomina non habemus, per orationes eas designabimus. Dicemus unam speciem relativorum esse relativa quae referuntur per casum et etiam aliam relativa quae referuntur sine casu. Et eorum relativorum quae referuntur per casum rursus dicamus species esse relativa quae referuntur per genitivum et quae per dativum et quae per ablativum. Rursus eorum quae per genitivum referuntur dicemus species esse specialissimas quae convertuntur eodem casu et diverso. Huius autem specialissimae speciei, quae <est> relativa quae convertuntur eodem casu, sunt individua haec: pater filius dominus servus et similia quae iisdem casibus referuntur. In ceteris quoque licet individua eodem modo prospicere.

Quod si quis dicat 'pater et filius non est individuum, quia utrumque de pluribus praedicatur,' dicemus nos non dicere patrem per se et filium per se individua relativorum, sed duo insimul de nullis aliis relativis praedicantur; nullus enim dicit 'pater et filius praedicantur de domino et servo', et de quibuslibet aliis relativis. Neque est verum quod nullum individuum praedicatur de pluribus; cum enim animal sit generis individuum, de pluribus tamen animalibus praedicatur. Eodem modo in multis aliis. Multa propter fastidium lectorum praetereo, verum mihi benivoli debent esse.

2 valuit] valet *a.c. ut v. G* 3 species] speciem *a.c. G* 5 aliam] alia *G* 10 quae] *lectio incerta* 15 dicere] ducere *G* 21 esse] de qualitate *add. sed canc. G ut v.*

< 4 >

Dignum est inquisitu quomodo dicat Aristoteles scibile prius esse scientia, quoniam scientia scibile non destruat.

Hoc enim falsum videtur si 'scibile' accipiatur 'quod potest sciri'. Nam si scientia non est, nihil est quod sciri possit. Hoc sic probatur: vere si scientia non est, scibile non est, quia si scibile est, scientia est. Quod sic probatur: si scibile est, tunc potest sciri aliquid <quod> est, et si hoc est, tunc ab animali scitur, quia quicquid sciri potest ab animali sciri potest et econverso; et si hoc est, aliquid est quod animal potest scire (a relativis), et si hoc est, tunc animal habet sciendi potentiam aliquid quod est; si hoc est, tunc aliquid quod est animal est, tunc scientia est (a pari comitanti). Quare si scibile est, scientia est. Quare si scientia non est, scibile non est. Quare scientia scibile videtur destruere, quod est contra Aristotelem.

Sed ita solvi potest. Vel ut 'scibile' accipiamus non '<quod> potest sciri' sed 'quod habile est ad sciendum', quemadmodum rationale dicimus non quod potest loqui sed quod aptum natum est ad loquendum. Vel — ut quidam volunt — dicamus Aristotelem non dixisse quod scientia scibile non destrueret secundum se, sed secundum eos qui in animalibus tantum scientias accipiebant quae scire conferunt, scientiam autem quae sciri facit omnino praetermittebant, quae in lapidibus et ceteris inanimatis consideratur. Debilis esset ratio, si lapides et similia diceremus scibilia, si lapides et similia naturaliter in se scientias non haberent per quas sciri possunt ea.

< 5 >

Praeterea, falsum videtur quod ait Aristoteles 'in paucis vel nullis hoc quis-

1-2 Arist. *Cat.* 7.7b22-31 (ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 61): 'Scibile enim scientia prius esse videtur; namque in pluribus subsistentibus rebus scientias accipimus; in paucis enim vel nullis hoc quis reperiet simul cum scibili scientiam factam. Amplius scibile sublatum simul aufert scientiam, scientia vero non aufert scibile; nam si scibile non sit, non est scientia, scientia vero si non sit, nihil prohibet esse scibile.' 378.22-379.1 Arist. *Cat.* 7.7b25-27 (ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 61): 'in paucis enim vel nullis hoc quis reperiet simul cum scibili scientiam factam.'

1 est] *s.l.* G inquisitu] inquisitum G 2 quoniam] quomodo G 3 quod] *s.l.* G 7-8 et econverso] *s.l.* G 9 si¹] sci G 20 esset] esse G et] *iter. a.c.* G 22 quod] *iter.* G

que reperiet simul cum scibili scientiam factam', cum <in> multis ita sit quod antequam sint, eorum scientiam habeamus, ut de puero futuro antequam sit, de eo scientiam habemus quod erit corpus, quod erit coloratus; multas de eo alias scientias habemus vel habebimus.

Sed ad hoc responderi potest quod non agit Aristoteles nisi de plenaria 5 scientia quam de nullo habere poterimus nisi prius fuerit unde habeatur.

2 futuro] s.l. G

APPENDIX A
(ms Paris BnF, lat 13368, f. 184v)

Quaeritur si ad aliquid est generalissimum. Quod concedendum est.

Et cum sit generalissimum, quaerendum est quas species habet.

Sed videamus quod vocatur generalissimum, quia <quidam> dicunt esse generalissimum relationem, quidam relativum, quidam relativa.

Illi vero qui dicunt relationem esse generalissimum accipiunt ad aliquid et relationem pro uno et dicunt habere species paternitatem et filiationem, individua patrem et filium, vel etiam habitudinem quandam quae notatur inter patrem et filium dicunt esse speciem.

Sed hoc non potest esse, quod illa habitudo sit species, quia si esset species, praedicaretur de <ea> definitio[ne] sui generis, ista scilicet: ad aliquid sunt quibus hoc ipsum est esse ad aliud quodam modo se habere, et ita haberet se ad aliud, et ita iterum habitudo quae notaretur inter illa esset species, et ita usque ad infinitum.

Iterum, paternitas et filiatio non sunt species, quia si essent species, substantiali differentia differrent. Si aliquis dicit referri ad filiationem differentiam esse et referri ad paternitatem, male dicit quia hoc denegat Boethius in *Libro divisionum* quod relativa non habent substantiales differentias, et ideo removet illa a divisione generis in species. Sed si aliquis dicat: relativa alia vocabula, alia ipsae res et a rebus auctor removet tantum differentias, iterum male dicit, quia quando tractat de vocibus, gratia rerum tractat de illis, et quicquid attribuit illis, gratia rerum attribuit illis, quare

10–11 Arist. *Cat.* 7.8a28–33 (ed. composita, ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 62): ‘Si igitur sufficienter eorum quae sunt ad aliquid definitio assignata est, aut nimis difficile aut impossibile est solvere quoniam nulla substantia eorum quae sunt ad aliquid dicitur; si autem non sufficienter, sed sunt ad aliquid quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodam modo se habere, fortasse aliquid contra ista dicitur.’ 16–18 Boeth. *Div.* 884a–b (ed. Magee, p. 28): ‘Quartam vero oppositionem diximus quae est secundum ad aliquid, ut pater filius, dominus servus, duplex medium, sensibile sensus. Haec igitur nullum habent substantialem differentiam qua a se discrepent, immo potius habent huiusmodi cognationem qua ad se invicem referantur ac sine se esse non possint. Non est ergo generis in relativas partes facienda divisio, sed tota huiusmodi sectio a genere separanda est, neque enim hominis species est servus aut dominus nec numeri medium aut duplum.’

15–16 differentiam esse] d(ifferentiam) esse *s.l.* P 17 substantiales] sustantiales P
19 auctor] a P

cum res non habeant differentias, falsum est vocabula habere illas.

Iterum, illi qui dicunt relativum esse generalissimum accipiunt relativum et ad aliquid pro uno, et dicunt habere species praelatum et subditum. Sed priori ratione monstrantur non esse, quia non differunt aliqua substantiali differentia quemadmodum homo et asinus in rationalitate. 5

Iterum, illi qui dicunt relativa esse generalissimum accipiunt ad aliquid et relativa pro uno, et dicunt quod diversae naturae est ab aliis generalissimis quia cum alia semper maneant in singularitate, istud manet in pluralitate, et per orationes possumus infigurare nobis species quia caremus nominibus specierum, scilicet per istas orationes: relativa alia cum casu, alia sine casu. 10
Iterum relativa cum casu alia quae referuntur per genitivum, alia per dativum, alia per ablativum; sine casu alia per multitudinem, alia per magnitudinem, alia in magnitudine, alia in multitudine.

5 quemadmodum] quem admoveat P 11 referuntur] refertur P 12 per] ex
secundum corr. P ut v. 13 per] ex secundum corr. P ut v.

APPENDIX B

(ms Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 833, p. 12–13, in marg.)

Aequale non est relativum. Utrum? Si non refertur, tunc illud est. Sed hoc est: Si non refertur ad aequale, cum ad aliud non referatur, tunc illud est. Sed hoc est: Si non est ei oppositum, tunc non refertur ad illud. Sed hoc est: Si nihil est sibi oppositum, tunc illud est. Sed hoc est. Ista ultima consequentia non sequitur, licet bene videatur sequi; et verum est antecedens et falsum consequens. Quippe duae sunt aequalitates diversae et oppositae species relationis, licet aequivoce habeant istud vocabulum quod est 'aequalitas', sicut si amissum esset hoc vocabulum quod est 'filius', et istud quod est 'pater' nobis figuret. Et illud quomodo significet? et filium significabit. Cum ipsa in natura referantur, quomodo dicentur referri? Sic: pater patris pater. Et sciendum est quod illae duae aequalitates sunt species diversorum generum subalternorum, quia si unius essent subalterni, nunquam ad se referre<ntur>, ut magistratus et fundamentum et dominium sunt sub praelatione et referuntur ad disciplinatum et ad accidentale et servitium, quae sunt sub subiectione. Et iterum, si concedentur esse sub eodem subalterno, illud subalternum: aequalitas, sed de illo quaeritur ad quid referatur, ideo necesse oportet et dicere prorsus esse aliam rem. Si vero quis respondeat illud subalternum tantum referri suis speciebus, nihil est, quia quicquid est sub generalissimo refertur per se.

- [13] | Quaedam relativa non sunt relativa. Utrum? Si non sunt simul tempore, tunc illud est (si hoc renuat, inveniatur ubi fallat). Sed hoc est: Si non sunt in eodem tempore, tunc illud est. Sed hoc est: Si fundamenta eorum non sunt in eodem tempore, tunc illud est. Sed hoc est: Si fundamenta prioritatis et posteritatis non sunt in eodem tempore, tunc illud est. Sed hoc est, quia dicam 'Socrates qui iam mortuus est fuit prius quam Plato'. Et ideo deneganda est consequens: Si fundamenta eorum non sunt in eodem tem-

8 esset] *in marg.* G 10 filium significabit] filius significabat G ipsa] ipse G
ut v. 14 fundamentum] fundamentum G dominium] dominum G 15
servitium] dominium G 16 subalternum] subalternu G 17 quid] prae G 18
subalternum] *ill add. sed canc.* G 21 relativa] relata *bis* G 27 consequens] et se
G

pore, tunc quaedam relativa non sunt in eodem tempore. Verum est enim antecedens et falsum consequens, quia omnia relativa sunt in eodem tempore. Si quaeratur de priore et posteriore, dicatur quod hoc modo sunt in eodem tempore quod nos intelligimus aliquem esse priorem alicuius nec oportet nos intelligere illum esse priorem vel fuisse vel futurum esse respectu illius posterioris, et sic ista relativa subtilius sunt in eodem tempore quam omnia alia, quia ista circa intellectum, alia vero actualiter simul sunt suum esse dando sibi ad invicem (quod debet subintelligi cum dicatur relativa simul esse, quia nisi istud intelligatur, coaequis speciebus cuiuslibet generis conveniet simul esse natura).

5

10

8–10 Cf. Arist. *Cat.* 13.14b27–15a11

4 nos] non G priorem] peiorem(?) G 7 simul] similis G 10 simul] similis G