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## Alberic of Paris on Aristotle's *Categories*: Some Fragmentary Evidence

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This paper contains editions of three incompletely transmitted twelfth-century commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*. The commentaries, all of them anonymous, are the following:<sup>1</sup>

- C21** Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal 910, fols 143rb–144ra
- C25** Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2237, fols 27r–28v
- C29** Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2486, fol. 4ra

In their current state, they are all rather short, but as noted by John Marenbon, there is for all three commentaries a more or less explicit connection to the philosopher Alberic of Paris, who, according to the testimony of John of Salisbury, was the most eminent logician besides Abelard in Paris in the later 1130s and a fierce critic of the nominalists.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The alpha-numerical labels here and in what follows refer to John Marenbon's catalogue of early medieval Latin commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*. The first version of this catalogue appeared in Marenbon 1993. It was reprinted with a supplement in Marenbon 2000. The latest version is found in Marenbon 2013. Unless special reasons call for it, I refer only to the latest version in what follows.

<sup>2</sup> For the three commentaries here concerned, see Marenbon 2013, pp. 163–66; pp. 148–49. For Alberic, see John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* 2.10: “Cum primum adulescens

As far as known, none of Alberic's works survive. If he wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, it too appears to be lost. That he did write such a commentary seems likely, given the many references to his interpretation of the text found in other commentaries from the period, but it is perhaps possible that some of these references derive from oral teaching.

The fragments are short, but they nonetheless supply important evidence both for Alberic's interpretation of Aristotle's text and for his influence on other commentators. They also contain useful information for establishing Alberic's logical and metaphysical views more generally, though here I confine myself mainly to laying the philological basis.

The presentation of the material is structured as follows. The texts follow in the order that they occur in Marenbon's catalogue, which means that the order of presentation is not necessarily chronological. The edition of each text is prefaced by a short introduction and followed by a brief series of notes.

The editions are based on transcriptions made from high-resolution digital images of the respective manuscripts (for C21 in combination with a digital scan of the old microfilm). In cases of doubt, the manuscripts were inspected *in situ*. I have imposed a classicising orthography on the texts, as well as my own punctuation and paragraphing. I have put all lemmata in SMALL CAPITALS and supplied them with references to the Bekker edition of Aristotle. I use < > for conjectural additions, { } for conjectural deletions, and [ ] for supplements in cases where physical damage or wear has made the text illegible. In the critical notes underneath the text, I signal

admodum studiorum causa migrassem in Gallias, anno altero postquam illustris rex Anglorum Henricus leo iustitiae rebus excessit humanis, contuli me ad Peripateticum Palatinum, qui tunc in monte sanctae Genovefae clarus doctor, et admirabilis omnibus praesidebat. Ibi ad pedes eius prima artis huius rudimenta accepi, et pro modulo ingenioli mei quicquid excidebat ab ore eius tota mentis aviditate excipiebam. Deinde post discessum eius qui mihi praeproperus visus est, adhaesi magistro Alberico qui inter ceteros opinatissimus dialecticus enitebat, et erat revera nominalis sectae acerrimus impugnator. Sic ferme toto biennio conversatus in monte, artis huius praeceptoribus usus sum Alberico et magistro Roberte Meludensi, ut cognomine designetur quod meruit in scolarum regimine, natione siquidem Angligena est."

where my text differs from the reading of the manuscript (except for orthographical differences, which are signalled only in a few ambiguous cases). Provisional transcriptions of the material have also been made (and generously made available to other scholars) by Yukio Iwakuma and in cases where my edition contains an emendation that has already been proposed by Iwakuma in his transcription, I signal this in the apparatus (except in completely obvious cases where the scribe has either mistakenly repeated a word or corrected himself *in scribendo* without properly deleting the mistake he made). Because of the provisional nature of Iwakuma's material, I do not, however, signal where we differ in our reading of the manuscripts or in our constitution of the texts.

The main purpose of the notes that follow the edition is to provide parallels to other twelfth-century logical texts. They are not, it must be stressed, meant to be exhaustive, but merely to highlight some important contextual features of the material and bring out some of the unacknowledged debts to Alberic.

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### **C21: Introduction, Edition, Notes**

This fragment comprises c. 2000 words and consists in the very beginning of a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. The fragment is contained in the composite manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal 910, fols 143rb–144ra and was identified, although rather inaccurately, in the nineteenth-century catalogue by Martin.<sup>1</sup> The importance of the manuscript, which once belonged to the Abbey of St. Victor, was first brought to the attention of scholars of medieval logic by L. M. De Rijk, who in the inaugural volume of his *Logica Modernorum* supplied a more complete and precise list of the manuscript's contents.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Martin 1886, p. 164 gives the correct incipit, but states that it's found on fol. 144. He fails to note the explicit and to correctly identify where the text ends.

<sup>2</sup> De Rijk 1962–67, vol. 1, pp. 116–20.

The connection to Alberic was first stressed by John Marenbon, who in his paper in the 1992 special issue of *Vivarium* dedicated to twelfth-century nominalism says the following:<sup>1</sup>

In Paris Arsenal 910 (**Ar**), an important logical collection, there is a fragment of a commentary on the *Categories* (**C21**: ff. 143r–144r) which includes only the introduction and the very first glosses. By its polished style and its lack of references to a master or masters, it appears to be a particular master's own exposition of his views. Since a number of the comments it contains correspond exactly to what in **C15** and **C17** are recounted as Alberic's views, there is a strong probability that this fragment comes from a commentary by Alberic himself, or is very closely related to such a work.

Marenbon has subsequently had second thoughts about the tentative ascription to Alberic he here proposes. Whereas the first version of his catalogue listed the author of the fragment as "quite probably Alberic," the most recent version no longer includes this ascription.<sup>2</sup> As Marenbon says in a footnote:<sup>3</sup>

In 'Vocalism, Nominalism', 55, I suggested that C21, the fragmentary beginning of a commentary, was Alberic's, because views attributed elsewhere to Alberic are put forward here by the writer himself. But there is not an exact correspondence, and this method of attribution is unreliable in an area where ideas were routinely taken and repeated.

Exact correspondence is certainly not always a feature of how medieval authors refer to one another's writings. Still, there may well be good reasons to have doubts about the ascription to Alberic. For while it is correct that other sources ascribe to Alberic several of the views explicitly endorsed by C21, there are also other ideas ascribed to him which are not found in C21.<sup>4</sup> Of course, Alberic most probably lectured more than once

<sup>1</sup> Marenbon 1992, p. 55.

<sup>2</sup> See Marenbon 1993, p. 115; Marenbon 2013, pp. 163–64.

<sup>3</sup> Marenbon 2013, p. 148 n. 20.

<sup>4</sup> For examples, see the notes to the text below.

on the *Categories* and his views may well have developed, but the most likely scenario is probably, as Marenbon points to, that the commentary is not by Alberic, but by someone who hews very closely, albeit selectively, to his views.

Apart from references to Aristotle’s *Categories*, the fragment contains references to the following authoritative texts:

Author	Text	References
Aristotle	<i>On interpretation</i>	1
Boethius	<i>in Cat.</i>	3
—	<i>in Isag.</i> <sup>2</sup>	1
—	<i>in Top. Cic.</i>	1
Porphyry	<i>Isagoge</i>	2

Table 1. References to authoritative texts in C21

There are no named references to contemporary philosophers, not even Alberic, many of whose views the author adopts, but there is one reference to “some people” (*quidam*).

Marenbon gives the date for this commentary as “probably 1130s–1150s.”<sup>1</sup> This is hardly wide of the mark and appears to tally well with the date of the extant copy.<sup>2</sup>

### ⟨Anonymi Commenti in *Categories* Aristotelis Fragmentum (C21)⟩

#### ⟨PROOEMIUM⟩

5 ⟨I⟩NCIPIUNT *CATEGORIAE* ARISTOTELIS. Quod hoc nomen “praedicamenta” sonat apud Latinos, hoc idem sonat “categoriae” apud Graecos. Unde hic

<sup>1</sup> Marenbon 2013, p. 163.

<sup>2</sup> According to the “cautious proposal” of Dr Sofia Orsino, who has studied the matter and kindly shared her findings with me in private correspondence, the script indicates that the copy dates to the mid to third quarter of the twelfth century.

est habendus titulus huius operis {titulus} ita: Incipit liber *Praedicamentorum* Aristotelis. Cum inveniuntur plures huius nominis “praedicamentum” acceptiones, videndum est quot<sup>1</sup> sint. Dicitur praedicamentum praedicatum; unde habemus in libro *Peri hermenias*<sup>2</sup> “in quantiscumque praedicamentis nulla erit oppositio in adiecto etc.,” hoc est in quibuscumque praedicatis. Dicitur et aliud praedicamentum, genus videlicet generalissimum, et per excellentiam vocatur praedicamentum; est enim dignius praedicatum inter alia praedicata eo<sup>3</sup> quod continet plura. In alia etiam ab his duabus significatione reperitur hoc nomen “praedicamentum.” Dicitur  
 10 enim praedicamentum collectio generalissimi et subalternorum et aliorum usque ad specialissima (non enim sunt assignanda in praedicamentis esse individua; terminat etiam Porphyrius<sup>4</sup> praedicamenta dicens: “extrema unam habent habitudinem<sup>5</sup> etc.”).<sup>6</sup> Dicimus igitur collectionem huius generalissimi *substantia* et secundarum substantiarum usque ad specialissima et eorum quae in secundis substantiis intelliguntur, videlicet substantialium differentiarum, primum esse praedicamentum, quod substantiae praedicamentum appellatur. Collectionem vero huius generalissimi *quantitas* et universalium quantitatum et eorum<sup>7</sup> quae secundum quantitates dicuntur quantitatis praedicamentum appellamus. Et sic de aliis praedicamentis dicimus. In his tribus etiam significationibus et non in pluribus nomen hoc “praedicamentum” reperimus. Et quod talis collectio praedicamentum appelletur habemus Porphyrium<sup>8</sup> sequacem, qui ait: “In unoquoque praedicamento sunt generalissima et specialissima et<sup>9</sup> media, ad aliud quidem et ad aliud sumpta.”<sup>10</sup> In praedicta etiam significatione accipitur

<sup>1</sup> quot] quod *ms*

<sup>2</sup> Arist. *Int.* 11.21a29 Bekker

<sup>3</sup> eo] *coni. Ebbesen* : et *ms*

<sup>4</sup> porphyrius] *coni. Iwakuma* : -lius *ms*

<sup>5</sup> unam ... habitudinem] *scripsi cum fonte* : duas ... habitudines *ms*

<sup>6</sup> Porph. *Isag.* 5.6–16 Busse

<sup>7</sup> et eorum] eorum etiam *ms*

<sup>8</sup> porphyrium] *coni. Iwakuma* : -lium *ms*

<sup>9</sup> specialissima et] mali *ms*

<sup>10</sup> Porph. *Isag.* 4.15–20 Busse



cum dicitur: Incipit liber *Praedicamentorum* Aristotelis. Quod etiam praedicamentum pro genere generalissimo accipiatur, Boethium ubique<sup>1</sup> auctorem in commentis habemus.

Visa huius operis inscriptione, videnda est auctoris intentio. Quam  
5 Boethius assignat in commento supra *Praedicamenta* verbis his: “Intentio est Aristotelis in hoc opere de primis vocibus decem prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant disputare.”<sup>2</sup>

Cum dictum sit “de primis vocibus,” quaeritur quare primas eas vocet. Dici potest eas idcirco appellari primas quia designant rerum genera quae  
10 sunt prima et principia omnium aliarum rerum, et non idcirco quod aliqua prioritas sit in eis existendi, scilicet quod prius habuissent esse quam aliqua aliarum vocum, sed propter hoc quod dictum est. Potest et alia assignari causa quare primae sint appellatae. Voces enim hae<sup>3</sup> sunt nomina primae impositionis, id est primo loco imposita ad significandum, et has idcirco  
15 primas appellavit. Nominum quidem haec habetur divisio: Nominum alia sunt primae impositionis, alia sunt secundae impositionis. Primae vero impositionis nomina sunt quae conveniunt<sup>4</sup> rebus, sicut hoc nomen “homo,” “lapis,” “bos,” “asinus,” et alia huiusmodi. Secundae vero impositionis sunt nomina vocum quibus voces subiectae sunt secundum diversas proprietates quas habent. Quaedam enim voces appellatae sunt nomina secundum hoc quod sine tempore significant et quod nullam partem extra habent significativam, aliae vero verba sunt appellatae ex eo quod significabant cum tempore, aliae coniunctiones, aliae praepositiones. Dictum est: “secundum diversas proprietates sunt quaedam nomina quae conveniunt vo-  
20 cibus”; sunt enim quaedam nomina quae vocibus conveniunt<sup>5</sup> sed non secundum proprietates quas habeant ex impositione, sicut hoc nomen “vox,” hoc nomen “sonus.” “Vox” enim nomen rei est, et “sonus.”

<sup>1</sup> ubique] verbiq[ue] ut v. ms

<sup>2</sup> Boeth. in *Cat.* 159c Migne (cf. 160a, 160b, 161a)

<sup>3</sup> hae] s.l. ms

<sup>4</sup> conveniunt] u add. ms

<sup>5</sup> sunt enim...conveniunt] in marg. ms

Sic igitur dicendum est Aristotelem disputare de primis vocibus (dicunt quidam<sup>1</sup> “de decem primis vocibus,” sed nusquam reperitur hoc<sup>2</sup> in commento) decem prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res habent | 143va | significare. Illa Boethius genera in assignatione intentionis<sup>3</sup> Aristotelis appellat prima idcirco quia sunt ab Aristotele constituta quasi<sup>4</sup> omnium rerum principia et ad ea<sup>5</sup> reducuntur omnia. Dictum est de vocibus his Aristotelem agere in eo quod res significant. Non enim de eis agitur ut quomodo significant ostendatur vel quas habeant motuum variationes secundum casuum inflectiones vel temporum consignificationes vel ut ostendatur quod habeant se aliter, sed ut demonstretur quod habeant significare res.

In his quae praediximus verbis assignata est Aristotelis quam habuit in hoc opere intentio. Sed sic non videtur sufficienter esse assignata, ut ipse Boethius docet, paulo post in eodem commento dicens: “Tria sunt in mente quorum unum est quid velit *Praedicamentorum* intentio” (alia vero duo tacet).<sup>6</sup> Unde manifestum est: Si sufficienter superius assignasset intentionem, hoc postea apponere superfluum esset. Si enim sufficienter {Aristoteles} assignasset de quo Aristoteles intenderet, pro nihilo hoc idem assignare repetisset.

Ut igitur sufficiens fiat assignatio, videndum est quid *Praedicamentorum* velit intentio. Quod ipse Boethius ad plenum ostendit in secundo commento Porphyrii dicens: “Ad hoc in libro *Praedicamentorum* tendebat Aristoteles et haec ipsius intentio est ut quod propter infinitas rerum diversitates minime sub scientia<sup>7</sup> cadere posset generum paucitate comprehenderet et quod per incomprehensibilem rerum multitudinem sub notitia venire

<sup>1</sup> Cf., e.g., Guillelmus Campellensis(?), C8, fol. 41ra MS Vatican, Reg. lat. 230; Anonymus D’Orvillensis, C26, 251–52 Ebbesen.

<sup>2</sup> hoc] *s.l. ms*

<sup>3</sup> intentionis] diffinitionis *a.c. ms* : diffi intentionis *p.c. ms*

<sup>4</sup> quasi] *coni. Iwakuma* : quiasi *ms*

<sup>5</sup> ea] *s.l. ms*

<sup>6</sup> Boeth. *in Cat.* 160a Migne

<sup>7</sup> scientia] *i add. (sed fortasse exp.) ms*

non posset, ut dictum est, per paucitatem generum animo disciplinaeque fieret subiectum.”<sup>1</sup> Non enim sub notitia venire potest de quot hoc generalissimum *substantia* praedicetur et de quot hoc generalissimum *quantitas*, et sic de singulis. Omnium igitur<sup>2</sup> rerum genera propter eorum paucitatem  
 5 collegit, de quibus disputare intendit, sic ostendens quae praedicata de quibus habeant praedicari et quae a quibus abnegari; hoc quidem per rerum omnium genera facit. Et sic sufficienter assignata est intentio Aristotelis.

Ab his quaeritur quare Boethius eorum quae erant in mente duo dicere praetermisit cum tertium dixerit, et quae sint illa quae ipse tacuit. Dicen-  
 10 dum est quod ea idcirco tacuit quia in secundo<sup>3</sup> *Praedicamentorum* commento quod se facturum proposuerat ea dicturus erat. Fuit enim consuetudo Boethii quod<sup>4</sup> quaecumque commentabat supra ea duo commenta faciebat, primum quorum introductoriiis scribebat et provectoris secundum. Hanc et ipse habuit consuetudinem in *Praedicamentis* commentandis; fecit  
 15 enim duo commenta, unum introductoriiis, alterum provectoris. In eo vero<sup>5</sup> quod introductoriiis fecit a gravioribus se abstinuit et ea in secundo dicere reservavit. Haec itaque quae in primo tacuit et in mente se habere dixit in secundo *Praedicamentorum* commento manifeste declaravit. Cum igitur secundo careamus commento, ignoramus ea quae Boethius tacuit in primo.

20 Opinamur tamen quaedam, existimantes eum velle dicere utrum illa genera quae appellavit prima {quod ipsa simul}<sup>6</sup> sic sint prima quod ipsa simul nullum supra se habeant genus quod eorum {sint}<sup>7</sup> principium sit, vel sic sint prima quod nullum eorum habeat superadveniens genus. Unde nos dicimus nullum eis simul superadvenire genus, aliquod tamen eorum  
 25 est quod habet supra se principium et omnia novem *accidens* habent super-

<sup>1</sup> Boeth. *in Isag.*<sup>2</sup> 143.14–20 Brandt

<sup>2</sup> igitur] *s.l. ms*

<sup>3</sup> secundo] *com add. ms*

<sup>4</sup> quod] *s.l. ms*

<sup>5</sup> vero] *s.l. ms*

<sup>6</sup> quod ipsa simul] *secl. Iwakuma*

<sup>7</sup> sint] *secl. Iwakuma*

adveniens genus, nullum tamen genus est quod non sit aliquod horum decem aut permixtum his.

Opinamur etiam Boethium tacuisse in illo primo<sup>1</sup> opere hoc: utrum illa divisio quam proponit Aristoteles dicens: “Singulum incomplexorum  
5 etc.”<sup>2</sup> sit sufficiens quantum ad terminos et ad res. Hoc est si nulla res sit quae non sit aut substantia aut quantitas aut aliquod aliorum, et si nulla vox sit incomplexa quae non significet aliquod praedictorum. Ad hoc vero respondemus sufficientem eam esse quantum ad utrumque spectat. Nulla enim talis vox est quae non significet aut hoc aut hoc; nulla etiam res est  
10 quae non sit aliquod istorum. Per opposita vero non est facta quantum ad terminos; quidam enim terminus quantitatem significat et substantiam. Non etiam debet dici divisio, sed quaedam enumeratio.

Visa auctoris intentione, | 143vb | videnda est eius materia. Quae in his verbis est assignanda: Aristotelis in opere *Praedicamentorum* est materia voces incomplexae et res a vocibus incomplexis significatae.  
15

Post haec videndum est qua causa scribat et ad quem finem tendat. Ab intentione vero finis attenditur. Ad hunc igitur finem tendit ut quod propter incomprehensibilem rerum multitudinem sub scientia cadere non poterat per generum paucitatem animo disciplinaeque subiectum fiat.

Utilitas vero haec est ut sciamus cognoscere quarum rerum multitudo  
20 sub quo genere comprehendatur. Et non haec solum<sup>3</sup> utilitas ad dialecticam spectat facultatem, sed ad<sup>4</sup> quamlibet aliam; physicis<sup>5</sup> etiam utile est noscere<sup>6</sup> quae res cui conveniat in genere et quae in generibus habeant differre.

His omnibus ad memoriam redactis, sciendum est cui parti logices supponatur. Non magis enim pertinet ad scientiam inveniendi quam ad scientiam iudicandi. Utrumque enim docet liber iste, et invenire et de

<sup>1</sup> primo] prino primo *ms*

<sup>2</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 4.1a25–27 Bekker

<sup>3</sup> solum] l *add. ms*

<sup>4</sup> ad] *s.l. ms*

<sup>5</sup> physicis] *iter. ms*

<sup>6</sup> noscere] nosti noscere *ms*

inventis iudicare. Ex hoc enim quod scimus quae multitudo quarum rerum sub quo genere contineatur et quae sub quo non, scimus argumenta invenire et de ipsis iudicare. Potest igitur dici quod utrique supponitur scientiae: inveniendi et iudicandi.

5 Vel aliter solvitur<sup>1</sup>, ut melius dicatur. Dividit enim Boethius logicam et per scientiam dividendi et per scientiam definiendi et colligendi, quas partes logices dicit.<sup>2</sup> Quae sunt aliae partes quam scientia inveniendi et quam scientia iudicandi, hae tamen sunt permixtae illis. Simili modo dici potest quod scientia praedicamentorum est una pars logices; est enim de  
10 logica sicut et scientia colligendi et definiendi. Supponitur igitur liber iste logicae<sup>3</sup> per praedicamentorum scientiam, et sic<sup>4</sup> per logicam philosophiae attingit<sup>5</sup>.

Hoc etiam in notitia debet haberi: Librum *Praedicamentorum* spectare ad demonstrativam disciplinam et dialecticam. Demonstrativa vero disci-  
15 plina est illa quae necessariis<sup>6</sup> utitur argumentis, et per excellentiam vocatur disciplina. Dialectica vero est illa quae probabilibus intendit uti. Quarum utrique supponitur liber *Praedicamentorum*. Docet enim de his ex quibus probabilia et necessaria consistunt argumenta, de specie videlicet et de genere et differentiis.

20 His omnibus sufficienter pertractatis, videndus est modus et ordo, quo modo scilicet et quo ordine utatur in his. In modi vero assignatione propter breviterem comprehenditur assignatio ordinis. Hoc ergo<sup>7</sup> modo et hoc<sup>8</sup> ordine assignandum est Aristotelem uti quod prius agit de aequivocis quam sigillatim de praedicamentis, definiendo aequivoca et postea subdendo  
25 exempla, postea de univocis, definiens ea et apponens exempla, et simili

<sup>1</sup> solvitur] *s.l. ms*

<sup>2</sup> Boeth. in *Top. Cic.* 1045b Migne

<sup>3</sup> logicae] logices *ms*

<sup>4</sup> sic] *s.l. ms*

<sup>5</sup> attingit] *atti attingit ut v. ms*

<sup>6</sup> necessariis] *necessa necessariis ms*

<sup>7</sup> ergo] *s.l. ms*

<sup>8</sup> hoc] *s.l. ms*

modo de denominativis. Post quasdam divisiones facit eorum quae dicuntur et eorum quae sunt. Deinde quasdam regulas ponit quae ad notitiam praedicamentorum sunt necessariae. His diligenter pertractatis, primo ingreditur praedicamentum substantiae, definiens primam et secundam substantiam ac si talem substantiae fecisset divisionem: Substantiarum aliae sunt primae, aliae sunt secundae. Post ostendit quae sint primae et secundae. Deinde dicit quae sit magis substantia et minus substantia. Assignat etiam proprietates quae conveniunt substantiis. Ad ultimum proprie proprium<sup>1</sup> substantiae dicere non praetermittit. Pertractato diligenter substantiae praedicamento, continue de quantitate incipit, statim dividens compositam quantitatem, quae est species quantitatis. Postea alias divisiones facit, dicens quod quantatum quaedam constant ex partibus habentibus positionem, quaedam ex partibus non habentibus positionem. Deinde plures ostendit convenire quantitibus proprietates. Ad ultimum<sup>2</sup> innuit quid sit proprie proprium quantitatis. Statim post praedicamentum quantitatis ingreditur ad aliquid, ostendens Platoniam definitionem relativorum esse culpabilem, postea callide introducit suam, deinde proprietates multas relativorum ostendens, in fine proprie eorum | 144ra | proprium<sup>3</sup> assignans. His tribus pertractatis praedicamentis, de qualitate agere intendit, cuius definitionem ponit. Deinde ipsam per quattuor species dividit. Postea proprietates ostendit quae qualitibus conveniunt, et in fine praedicamenti assignat qualitatis proprie proprium. Haec itaque quattuor praedicamenta diligentissime et immoranter pertractat; erant enim minus nota et minus in usu habita. Alia vero sex praedicamenta breviter transcurrit nec in his diu detinetur faciendo ibi<sup>4</sup> moras breviterque proponit de actione et passione, de situ et ubi et quando et habere. Horum autem decem praedicamentorum executis tractatibus, quattuor, sicut praedictum est, diligentissime, alia vero sex brevi transcurso, sicut quaedam antepaedicamenta posuit quae ad praedicamentorum notitiam valde erant necessaria, sic illis pertractatis

<sup>1</sup> proprium] prium *ms*

<sup>2</sup> ultimum] o *add. ms*

<sup>3</sup> proprium] proprie prium *ms*

<sup>4</sup> ibi] *s.l. ms*

statim supponit alia quae valent ad praedicamenta melius intelligenda. Agit enim de oppositis, ostendens quattuor genera esse oppositorum, deinde de priori demonstrans quot modis alterum dicatur prius esse altero<sup>1</sup>, postea de simul similiter declarans quot modis res dicantur simul esse. Ab his transit  
5 ad motum, dicens: “Species sunt sex: generatio, corruptio, etc.”<sup>2</sup> In fine sui operis repetit de habere. Hoc modo et hoc ordine agitur in tractatu *Praedicamentorum* ab Aristotele.

(CAPITULUM 1)

10 AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR etc. (1.1a1) Quaedam praemittit priusquam agat de singulis praedicamentis, quae praemittere fuit necessarium ad habendam praedicamentorum notitiam, incipiens ab aequivocis. Agit itaque de aequivocis et univocis priusquam sigillatim de praedicamentis<sup>3</sup>.

Et est causa exigensque ratio quare prius agat de univocis. In praedi-  
15 camento enim substantiae erat facturus mentionem<sup>4</sup> de eis, velut ubi<sup>5</sup> ostendit quaedam praedicari univoce et ubi<sup>6</sup> univocorum definitionem repetit, quare nisi prius ostendisset quae univoce praedicantur et quid sit univoce praedicari, capitulum illud nequaquam posset intelligi nec etiam scirent lectores quid esset univoce praedicari.

20 Tractatum vero aequivocorum praemittit univocorum tractatui. Hoc etiam facit ratione exigenti. Est enim consuetudo recte scribentium ut suas purgent doctrinas ab his per quae<sup>7</sup> possunt impedire ( \* \* \* )

<sup>1</sup> altero] q *add. ms*

<sup>2</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 14.15a13–14 Bekker

<sup>3</sup> praedicamentis] praedicatis *a.c. ms*

<sup>4</sup> mentionem] *coni. Iwakuma* : mensionem *ms*

<sup>5</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 5.3a33–34 Bekker

<sup>6</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 5.3b7–8 Bekker

<sup>7</sup> quae] qua *ms*

**272.3 <PROOEMIUM>** The fragment comprises a prologue and some incomplete preliminary remarks on chapter 1 of Aristotle's text. The commentator discusses the following seven features of Aristotle's text in his proem:

1. Its title (*titulus*), incl. the various senses of the word "category" (*praedicamentum*)
2. Its author's intention (*intentio*)
3. Its subject matter (*materia*)
4. Its goal (*finis*)
5. Its utility (*utilitas*)
6. To which part of logic it belongs (*cui parti logices supponatur*)
7. Its mode and order of presentation (*modus et ordo*)

It was customary for commentators to discuss such proemial issues.<sup>1</sup> As noticed by Grabmann, a commentary on Aristotle's *On interpretation* found in ms Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz, lat. fol. 624, fols 87vb–96vb, at fol. 87vb seems to attribute to Alberic the view that six topics ought to be discussed: “{C}um plura et vario ordine tam librorum quam artium principiis ad maiorem consequentium evidentiam magistri praemittere consueverunt, his impraesentiarum relictis quae circa principia cuiuslibet artis versantur, consideranda ea sola inspiciamus quae circa cuiuslibet philosophici operis principia sunt praemittenda. Ea autem sunt numero sex, scilicet intentio, materia, modus tractandi, cui parti philosophiae supponatur, causa operis, et quis libri titulus. Quidam tamen plura dicunt debere praemitti, scilicet nomen auctoris, vitam, et cuius fuerit conditionis. Magister Albericus ut puerilia et quasi supervacanea huiusmodi putans nulla ratione in principio philosophici operis dicit

<sup>1</sup> There has been some interest in these twelfth-century discussions in recent scholarship: Iwakuma 2018; Podolak 2024. Unfortunately, the former study remains unpublished and the latter appeared too late to be taken into consideration here.



*esse conspicienda. Sola enim sex sufficiunt ad consequentium evidentiam.*”<sup>1</sup> According to this view, then, the six topics to be discussed are:

1. *Intentio*
2. *Materia*
3. *Modus tractandi*
4. *Suppositio (i.e. cui parti philosophiae supponatur)*
5. *Causa operis (= Utilitas)*<sup>2</sup>
6. *Libri titulus*

A commentary on the *Categories* (C17), which is found in the same Berlin manuscript and which also cites Alberic frequently, discusses precisely these six issues in this order in its proem.<sup>3</sup> All other commentaries on the *Categories* associated with Alberic, however, do like C21 and distinguish between utility (*utilitas*) on the one hand and end (*finis*) or final cause (*finalis causa*) on the other; thus, they end up with seven topics.<sup>4</sup> Whether this is a development that can be traced back Alberic is unclear.

**272.4–273.2 *INCIPIUNT ... Aristotelis.*** According to H17, fol. 87va commentators disagreed about the order in which the proemial topics were to be discussed:<sup>5</sup> “*Item, de ordine istorum diversa habetur sententia. Quidam enim dicunt intentionem debere praemitti, quidam materiam, quidam etiam et causam. Illi autem qui dicunt materiam esse praeponendam hac*

<sup>1</sup> See Grabmann 1939, p. 24. See also Grabmann 1938. An improved transcription, which I am quoting from here, was given by De Rijk 1966, p. 39. The commentary is known as H17, see Marenbon 1993, pp. 120–21; Marenbon 2000, p. 137.

<sup>2</sup> See fol. 88va: “*Utilitas huius operis est scientia habita ex hoc opere.*”

<sup>3</sup> For this commentary, which is known as C17, see Marenbon 2013, pp. 162–63. I am currently preparing an edition of this commentary.

<sup>4</sup> Apart from C17, C21, and C25, the commentaries are C15 and C20. For these two commentaries (of which I am also preparing editions), see Marenbon 2013, pp. 161–62; 163.

<sup>5</sup> Again, I quote the text from De Rijk 1966, p. 40. I have noted, however, places in which De Rijk tacitly corrects the manuscript.

*ratione utuntur: Prius enim quis habet materiam, qua habita aliquod opus de ipsa constituere intendit. Verbi gratia, habendo quis lapides de ipsis postmodum domum vel aliquid construere<sup>1</sup> tale cogitat. Magister vero Albericus, subtiliori acumine mentis<sup>2</sup> intuens, intentionem asserit praemittendam; haec enim naturaliter praecedit, etsi materia in quibusdam actu antecedit<sup>3</sup>. Illi qui dicunt vero causam antecedere ac sunt muniti ratione; aiunt enim esse aliquam causam propter quam quis habet intentionem et materiam. Sed haec ratio non omni(no) videtur spernenda. Sed quia ista sex convenientior sic ordinantur, ideo intentio omnibus praemitti potest.”* H17 seemingly takes Alberic’s point to be about the overall ordering of the proemial topics rather than just the relative ordering of *intentio* and *materia*. If this is correct, then, by beginning with a discussion of the title, C21 is here diverging from the order of discussion Alberic prescribed.

**273.2–21 Cum inveniantur ... reperimus.** It was customary among twelfth-century commentators to discuss the various meanings of the word “category” (*praedicamentum*) in connection with the title of Aristotle’s work. C21 claims that it has three meanings: (1) predicate, (2) most general genus, and (3) collection of a most general genus and all the subalternate and most special species falling under it (plus some other items, such as substantial differentiae, but excluding individuals). It is in this latter meaning that the word is to be taken in the work’s title. The claim made at the end that there are no other meanings of the word is worth noting, for C25 lists one more: (4) mode of predication (*modus praedicandi*). Given that this meaning seemingly derives from Aristotle’s *Topics*, it may suggest that the author of C21 (or his source) was less familiar with this text. For more on this, see the note on C25 on pp. 315–16 below.

<sup>1</sup> aliquid construere *De Rijk* : aliquod construeret *ms*

<sup>2</sup> mentis *De Rijk* : montis *ms*

<sup>3</sup> antecedit *De Rijk* : antecedeat *vel* antecederat *ms*

**274.4–7 Visa ... disputare.** It was common at the time for discussions of the *intentio* of Aristotle’s work to take the form of a commentary on Boethius’ influential formulation of it in his commentary on the *Categories*: “*Ut igitur concludenda sit intentio, dicendum est in hoc libro de primis vocibus prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod significantes sunt dispositum esse tractatum.*”<sup>1</sup> Many commentators, however, adjusted the Boethian formulation slightly and, most importantly for present purposes, added two instances of the numeral *decem*. Thus, for example, the commentary known as C8 and attributed to William of Champeaux by Yukio Iwakuma opens as follows: “*(I)ntentio Aristotelis est in hoc opere de decem primis vocibus decem prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant disputare.*”<sup>2</sup> The *Anonymus D’Orvillensis* (C26), a nominalist commentator writing towards the end of the twelfth century, does the same; purporting to quote Boethius, he says (251): “*intendit enim de decem primis vocibus decem prima rerum genera significantibus prout res significant.*” The habit continued well after the twelfth-century; see, for example, the references to commentators from the first half of the thirteenth century collected in Hansen 2012 (65\* n. 28). The author of C21 omits the first of these two *decem*, and, as it turns out, this omission is intentional.

**275.1–4 Sic igitur ... significare.** The objection to the qualification *decem* of *primis vocibus* is attributed to Alberic in C25: “*Magister noster Albericus dicit quod primum ‘decem’ non sit ponendum cum dicitur: ‘Intendit Aristoteles de primis decem etc.,’ quia si poneretur ibi, sequeretur hoc: Ergo intendit de aliquibus primis vocibus decem genera rerum etc., ergo de aliquibus (decem) Latinis vel de aliquibus decem Gallicis vel de aliquibus decem Graecis vel Anglicis vel aliis. Sed nec de aliquibus Latinis vel Graecis vel Gallicis, sed intendit de primis vocibus decem genera rerum etc. Unde dicit praedictus doctor quod si inveniatur in aliquo*

<sup>1</sup> Here and below, I quote the proem from the edition in Asztalos 1993.

<sup>2</sup> I cite the text from Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. lat. 230, fol. 41ra. For more on this commentary, see Iwakuma 1999; Iwakuma 2003; Marenbon 2013, pp. 159–60. For methodological reflections concerning the attribution, see Jacobi 2011.

*commento, absolvendum sit.*" For more on this, see the note on C25 on pp. 308–9 below.

**275.12–19 In his ... repetisset.** The claim that Boethius' oft-repeated formulation of the *intentio* of the *Categories* was inadequate is explicitly attributed to Alberic in a commentary (C15) in ms Padua, Biblioteca Universitaria 2087, fol. 1ra. Alberic clearly knew his Boethius very well and was well-aware that in the middle of his discussion of the *intentio* Boethius announces his plan to write a second commentary on the *Categories* intended for more advanced students: "*Haec quidem est tempori introductionis et simplicis expositionis apta sententia, quam nos Porphyrium nunc sequentes, quod videbatur expeditior esse planiorque, digessimus. Est vero in mente de tribus olim quaestionibus disputare, quarum una est quid Praedicamentorum velit intentio. Ibiq[ue], numeratis diversorum sententiis, docebimus cui nostrum quoque accedat arbitrium; quod nemo huic impraesentiarum sententiae pugnare miretur cum videat quanto illa sit altior, cuius non nimium ingredientium mentes capaces esse potuissent, ad quos mediocriter imbuendos ista conscripsimus.*"<sup>1</sup> According to C15 (fol. 1ra), Alberic then had two arguments for his claim that Boethius' initial formulation of the *intentio* is inadequate: "*Nunc Albericus assignat illam insufficientem esse tum ex verbis Boethii tum ex titulo huius libri. Ex verbis Boethii dicentis: 'Olim in mente auctoris venit de tribus quaestionibus disputare, quarum una haec est: quid velit Praedicamentorum intentio.' His verbis dicit Albericus quod Boethius demonstrat quod illa sit insufficientis; si enim esset sufficiens, non diceret: 'quid velit Praedicamentorum intentio.' Ex titulo demonstrat quod non intendit de vocibus tantum, qui talis est: Incipit liber Praedicamentorum, id est de praedicatis, quia hoc nomen "praedicamentum" tantum valet quantum "praedicatum ex pluribus confectum," quod habemus ab Aristotele dicente: "Quare in quantiscumque*

<sup>1</sup> I quote from Asztalos 1993, p. 379 (=160a Migne). Note that Asztalos's edition differs from Migne's on a crucial point here in that Migne's text includes what is clearly a gloss. See Asztalos 1993, p. 381 n. 47 for the details.

*praedicamentis,*” *id est in quantiscumque praedicatis ex pluribus con-*  
*fectis, etc.; sed omne praedicatum est res, et ipse intendit de praedicatis;*  
*ergo de rebus; ergo non de vocibus tantum. Et sic non est sufficiens...*” As  
is clear, C21 here reproduces the first of Alberic’s two arguments, but not  
the second.

**275.20–276.4 Ut igitur ... singulis.** If the *intentio* given by Boethius in  
his first commentary on the *Categories* is inadequate and his second com-  
mentary (if ever written) is lost, what then is the *intentio* according to Boe-  
thius? The answer in C21 begins with a reference to Boethius’ second com-  
mentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* 1.4: “*Aristoteles enim librum qui De de-*  
*cem praedicamentis inscribitur hac intentione composuit ut infinitas rerum*  
*diversitates quae sub scientiam cadere non possent paucitate generum*  
*comprehenderet, atque ita quod per incomprehensibilem multitudinem sub*  
*disciplinam venire non poterat per generum, ut dictum est, paucitatem ani-*  
*mo fieret scientiaeque subiectum.*” C17 also explicitly invokes this passage  
in this context, so the reference perhaps goes back to Alberic, although the  
passage is indeed called to mind by what Boethius himself says at *in Cat.*  
160b–161a, esp. 161a: “*Rerum ergo diversarum indeterminatam infini-*  
*tamque multitudinem decem praedicamentorum paucissima numerositate*  
*conclisit ut ea quae infinita sub scientiam cadere non poterant decem pro-*  
*priis generibus definita scientiae comprehensione claudantur.*”

**276.4–7 Omnium ... Aristotelis.** The core point in Alberic’s formulation  
of Boethius’ full view of the *intentio* is that the *Categories* is about predi-  
cation (*quae praedicata de quibus habeant praedicari et quae a quibus*  
*abnegari*). Here is how the text from C15 (fol. 1ra) quoted above contin-  
ues: “*Et sic non est sufficiens, sed ad hoc ut sit sufficiens sic debet as-*  
*signari: Intentio Praedicamentorum est tractare de primis vocibus decem*  
*rerum genera significantibus prima in eo quod significant et de praedicatis*  
*assignando quae de quibus habeant praedicari et qualiter, quia maiora de*  
*minoribus et de paribus paria univoce, et quae de quibus non habeant*  
*praedicari nec tamen removeri, ut minora de maioribus, vel quae a quibus*

*habeant removeri, ut oppositum ab opposito.*" A number of other commentaries associated with Alberic follow C21 in putting the point slightly more succinctly. Thus, C25 (pp. 295.28–296.2 below): "*Intentio Praedicatorum est docere quae praedicata de quibus praedicatis habeant praedicari et quae praedicata a quibus praedicatis habeant removeri.*" C20 (Paris, Bibliothèque de l' Arsenal 910, fols 147rb–162vb), fol. 147va: "*Illam autem intentionem non habemus, sed suspicamur talem quia Aristoteles intendit docere in hoc libro de praedicamentis, ostendendo scilicet de praedicatione rerum quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quae de quibus non praedicantur, id est per praedicationem ab aliis separentur.*" C16, pp. 606.28–607.2 (in Hansen 2023): "*Quoniam in duobus tota Praedicatorum versatur doctrina, id est ut sciamus quae de quibus praedicari habeant et quae non, ostendo quod secundae praedicantur de primis et quomodo, ostendit quae de quibus praedicari non possint, scilicet ea quae in eis sunt de eis praedicari non possunt.*" A commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* (P20) in Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2486, fols 45ra–60vb, also associated with Alberic, makes the same point (fol. 45va): "*Quemadmodum enim Aristoteles in Praedicamentis docet quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quomodo et quae non, per quod scimus et invenire et iudicare, sic Porphyrius quae de quibus praedicantur et quomodo et quae non instruit.*" It should be noted that, as the text from C20 makes explicit, predication here means thing-predication (*predicatio rerum*). It is, in other words, an *ontological* relation, and it is, as Donato (forthcoming) shows, the foundation on which Alberic's realist logic is built.

**276.20–277.10 Opinamur tamen ... istorum.** Boethius said he intended to discuss three issues in his second commentary on the *Categories*, the first of which was the *intentio*. What were the two others? C17, fol. 81ra deals with the question by telling us what Alberic thought: "*Dicit magister Albericus quod alia duo quae Boethius habebat in mente sunt ista: utrum illa denaria divisio sit sufficiens in terminis et in rebus, et utrum aliquid generalissimum possit esse supra illa decem.*" The author of C21 does not refer to Alberic, but this is also basically what he thinks, although he

reverses the order. The latter issue, moreover, he takes to include both the question whether there might be a genus that subsumes all ten categories at once (being (*ens*), for example) and the question whether there might be a genus that subsumes some but not all of them (accident (*accidens*), for example).

**277.13–15 Visa ... significatae.** Cf. C17, fol. 81ra: “*Materia Aristotelis est duplex: Voces incomplexae et res significatae a vocibus incomplexis.*”

**277.25–278.4 His omnibus ... iudicandi.** For the division of logic into invention (*inventio*) and judgement (*iudicium*), see Cicero, *Topica* 6 and Boethius, *De topicis differentiis* 1.1.1 (=1173b Migne). The view that the *Categories* falls under both perhaps goes back to Alberic (see the note on C25 on pp. 314–15 below for more on this).

**278.5–12 Vel aliter ... attingit.** For the alternative division of logic into division (*scientia dividendi*), definition (*scientia definiendi*) and deduction (*scientia colligendi*), see Boethius’ commentary on Cicero’s *Topica* 1045b Migne.

**278.20–22 His omnibus ... ordinis.** The author of C21 distinguishes between the mode and order of presentation, but treats them under one “for the sake of brevity” (*propter brevitatem*). In so doing, he is following Alberic. See H17, fol. 87vb: “*Sunt autem quidam qui faciunt distinctionem inter modum et ordinem, dicentes modum consistere secundum qualitatem operis, ordinem vero in dispositione ipsius ordinis, videlicet quid primo, quid secundo, quid alio loco dicatur. Magister vero Albericus hanc distinctionem esse commendabilem confitetur, sed ut brevius et commodius dicatur, modum et ordinem sub eodem ponit.*”

**280.9 <CAPITULUM 1>** The commentator now turns to discuss some preliminary points regarding chapter 1 of Aristotle’s text:

1. Why Aristotle had to discuss univocals from the outset
2. Why he nonetheless discusses equivocals before univocals

The commentary breaks off in the discussion of the second point.

**280.20–22 Tractatum ... ( \* \* \* )** Why does Aristotle discuss equivocals before univocals? The question was raised by Boethius, in *Cat.* 166c Migne: “*Cur autem prius de aequivocis, post de univocis tractat?*” The answer proposed here in C21 appears to be roughly the view that C25 ascribes to “some people” (*quidam*): “*Quidam enim dicunt: Ideo praemittit de aequivocis quia prius extirpanda sunt vitia, deinde sunt inserendae (virtutes). Univoca autem praedicatio quasi virtus est, aequivoca vero quasi vitium collaterale illi virtuti. Ideo ne vitium possit obesse virtuti, prius tractavit de aequivocis quam de univocis, ut cognita aequivoca praedicatione sciremus quae essent univoca, quae non.*” C25 in fact gives several solutions and ends up endorsing Alberic’s view (see comments on C25 on pp. 317–18 below). Given that C21 breaks off before the discussion seems to have been brought to a close, it cannot be determined whether it too contained more than one answer to this question.

\* \* \* \* \*

### **C25: Introduction, Edition, Notes**

This fragment comprises c. 3800 words and, like C21, consists in the very beginning of a commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*. The fragment is contained in the composite manuscript Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2237, fols 27r–28v and was identified, although rather inaccurately, in the library’s nineteenth-century catalogue.<sup>1</sup> The importance of

<sup>1</sup> *Tabulae codicum manu scriptorum praeter Graecos et orientales in Bibliotheca Palatina Vindobonensi asservatorum* 1868, pp. 40–41. According to this catalogue, the commentary runs until fol. 34v. As Iwakuma 2013, p. 46 correctly indicates, the commentary fragment in fact ends on fol. 28v, the rest being other short notes on logic and a list of Alberic’s main theses.



the manuscript was first brought to the attention of scholars of medieval logic by Yukio Iwakuma, who in his pioneering article “Alberic of Paris on Mont Ste Geneviève against Peter Abelard” from 2013 edited the *De sententia magistri nostri Alberici*, a list of Alberic’s main logical theses, contained on fol. 31r.<sup>1</sup>

The commentary’s connection to Alberic was noted by Marenbon in the addition to his initial catalogue, where, citing Iwakuma as his source, he notes that the commentator at one point explicitly refers to “our teacher Alberic” (*magister noster Albericus*), although at several other points the commentator also refers to “our teachers” (*magistri nostri*) in the plural.<sup>2</sup> The reference to Alberic, it should be noted, need not imply that the commentator had actually heard Alberic lecture or been taught by him personally, it may mean simply that he identified as one of the *Albricani*, that is to say, as a member of the school of thought (*secta*) that Alberic founded. The *magistri nostri* would then most likely be other *Albricani*, i.e. some of the philosophers who in later decades taught logic in accordance with Alberic’s views.<sup>3</sup> That something like this is most likely the case is suggested by the fact that in several instances the commentator does not actually embrace the view that other sources cite as Alberic’s, but a view that is best described as a development of it (see the notes for these cases). Marenbon’s suggested dating (see below) tallies well with such a scenario.

<sup>1</sup> For this important edition, see Iwakuma 2013, pp. 30–31.

<sup>2</sup> Marenbon 2000, p. 135. For the updated version, see Marenbon 2013, pp. 164–65.

<sup>3</sup> We know of one of them, Richard the Albrican, from Gerald of Wales, *Gemma Ecclesiastica* 1.9: “Vidimus in urbe Parisiensi virum de Anglia oriundum liberalibus artibus affatim eruditum, qui magister Richardus Albericanus nuncupative dicebatur, de sententia enim illa multos habens auditores principaliter in urbe legebatur.” Gerald studied in Paris for several periods in the 1160s and 1170s. To my knowledge, nothing is known about this Richard apart from the anecdote Gerald proceeds to tell about his religiousness. See Lesne 1940, pp. 232–33.

Apart from references to Aristotle's *Categories*, the fragment contains references to the following authoritative texts:

Author	Text	References
Aristotle	<i>On interpretation</i>	1
Boethius	<i>Consolatio Philosophiae</i>	1
—	<i>in Cat.</i>	7
—	<i>in Isag.</i> <sup>1</sup> (?)	1
—	<i>in Top. Cic.</i>	1
Priscian	<i>Institutiones Grammaticae</i>	1

Table 2. References to authoritative texts in C25

In addition there are general mentions of Aristotle's *On interpretation*, *Topics* and *Prior analytics*. There are also several references to contemporary philosophers in the text:

Author	References
Alberic, our teacher	1
Our teacher	1
Our teachers	5
Nominales	1
Quidam	2

Table 3. References to contemporaneous authors in C25

For more on these references to contemporaries, see the notes.

Marenbon proposes a date for this commentary around the mid to later twelfth century. This too is hardly wide of the mark and also seems to tally reasonably well with the date of the extant manuscript copy.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Again, according to the “cautious proposal” of Sofia Orsino, who has studied the matter and kindly shared her findings with me in private correspondence, the script indicates that the copy dates to the late twelfth or early thirteenth century.

**⟨Anonymi Commenti in *Categorias* Aristotelis Fragmentum (C25)⟩**

Commentum super *Praedicamenta*

⟨PROOEMIUM⟩

5 | 27r | Summus et dux omnium Peripateticorum Aristoteles perfectam et absolutam compositionem huius artis in connexione syllogismorum instituit. Ex duobus sicut cuiuslibet<sup>1</sup> rei capit initium, ex materia scilicet et forma. Quaedam autem operum suorum instituit Aristoteles ad eruditionem materiae, quaedam ad eruditionem formae. De quibus, scilicet quae  
10 instituit ad eruditionem formae, alibi dicendum est. Quae vero instituit<sup>2</sup> ad eruditionem materiae praesentis est speculationis.

Materia itaque categoricorum syllogismorum duplex est. Est enim alia prima, alia secunda. Aristoteles ergo *Categorias* suas, id est *Praedicamenta*, instituit ad docendam primam materiam categoricorum syllogismorum, librum vero *Peri hermenias* instituit ad docendam secundam materiam categoricorum syllogismorum. In hoc enim opere docetur quid sint  
15 simplices sermones et eorum significata, in *Peri hermenias* vero docetur quid sint compositi sermones et eorum significata. Simples autem sermones sunt prima materia categoricorum syllogismorum, compositi vero  
20 sermones sunt secunda materia categoricorum syllogismorum.

Ad cuius rei evidentiam videndum est quoniam voces aliae sunt primae impositionis, aliae secundae. Voces primae impositionis sunt nomina rerum, ut hoc nomen “Socrates,” “Plato,” et hoc nomen “homo,” hoc nomen “albedo,” hoc nomen “animal.” Voces secundae impositionis sunt nomina  
25 vocum, ut [hoc] nomen “nomen,” hoc nomen “participium,” hoc nomen “verbum,” hoc nomen “oratio,” hoc nomen “syllogismus,” hoc nomen

<sup>1</sup> cuiuslibet] exlibet *a.c. ms* : clibet *p.c. ms*

<sup>2</sup> instituit] instuit *ms*

“enthymema” et huiusmodi. Ideo autem dicuntur nomina primae impositionis quia primo rebus imposita sunt nomina, quare dicuntur etiam illa primae impositionis. Dicuntur autem ideo secundae impositionis quoniam animus imponentis postea reversus est ad vocabula, et illa quae poterant  
 5 inflecti per casus vocavit nomina, illa vero quae poterant inflecti per tempora vocavit verba.

Cum ergo Aristoteles in hoc opere intendat tractare de primis vocibus, non tamen de quibuslibet primis vocibus, quoniam non intendit de his quae appellant et significant individua, ut hoc nomen “Socrates” et hoc nomen  
 10 “Plato” et huiusmodi, sed intendit de his quae appellant individua et significant universalia. Sed quoniam illorum alia significant species specialissimas et appellant individua, alia significant genera et appellant individua, non de his quae significant species et appellant individua intendit<sup>1</sup>, sed de significantibus genera et appellantibus individua; sed non de omnibus ta-  
 15 libus intendit, sed tantum de his quae significant decem rerum genera et appellant individua. Unde competenter Boethius in commento super hunc librum assignat intentionem Aristotelis dicens “de decem primis vocibus decem prima genera rerum significantibus in eo quod significantes sunt disputare.”<sup>2</sup>

20 Magister noster Albericus dicit quod primum “decem” non sit ponendum cum dicitur: “Intendit Aristoteles de primis decem etc.,” quia si poneretur ibi, sequeretur hoc: Ergo intendit de aliquibus primis vocibus decem genera<sup>3</sup> rerum etc., ergo de aliquibus<sup>4</sup> (decem)<sup>5</sup> Latinis vel de aliquibus decem Gallicis vel de aliquibus decem Graecis vel Anglicis vel aliis.  
 25 Sed nec de aliquibus Latinis vel Graecis vel Gallicis, sed intendit de primis vocibus decem genera rerum etc. Unde dicit praedictus doctor quod si inveniatur in aliquo commento, absolvendum sit.

<sup>1</sup> intendit] indtendit *a.c. ms*

<sup>2</sup> Boeth. *in Cat.* 159c Migne (*cf.* 160a, 160b, 161a)

<sup>3</sup> genera] *s.l. ms*

<sup>4</sup> aliquibus] alibus *a.c. ms*

<sup>5</sup> decem] *suppl. Iwakuma*

Ad hoc dicimus quod ponendum sit “decem” et hoc modo intelligen-  
 dum: Intentio Aristotelis est de decem primis vocibus, id est<sup>1</sup> de decem  
 modis significandi, quem modum significandi habent decem voces prima  
 decem rerum genera significantes, quia sunt quaedam voces quae habent  
 5 significare decem genera rerum in quolibet genere linguae — in Latino et  
 in Graeco et in quolibet. Sed quia sunt voces secundae impositionis, ad  
 exclusionem illarum dicit “primis.” Sed quia sunt voces primae impositio-  
 nis, ut hoc nomen “Socrates” et huiusmodi, de quibus non intendit, ad ex-  
 clusionem illarum dicit “genera”<sup>2</sup>. Sed quia sunt voces primae impositionis  
 10 quae significant genera ut<sup>3</sup> hoc genus *animal* et<sup>4</sup> genera subalterna, de qui-  
 bus non intendit, ideo dicit “decem prima genera rerum significantibus.”

Quaerit in hoc loco Boethius quare ponat “in eo quod significantes  
 sunt disputare,” et ibi dissolvit dicens quod et grammatici et dialectici trac-  
 tant<sup>5</sup> de vocibus, sed grammatici de vocibus agunt secundum quod inflec-  
 15 tuntur per casus, dialectici vero tractant<sup>6</sup> de vocibus non sic sed secundum  
 significata vocum. Ut ergo excluderet intentionem grammaticorum quam  
 habent de vocibus, dixit “in eo quod significantes sunt disputare.”<sup>7</sup> Vel et  
 aliter solvitur quod ideo posuit “in eo quod significantes sunt disputare”  
 ad exclusionem intentionis quam habet Aristoteles in *Peri hermenias*. In  
 20 *Peri hermenias* enim tractavit de prima significatione vocis secundum  
 quod intellectus [est] in anima, in *Praedicamentis* vero intendit de vocibus,  
 id est de secundaria significatione vocis secundum quod intellectus de re-  
 bus habetur. Ad exclusionem ergo praemissae intentionis dixit “in eo quod  
 significantes sunt,” id est quod habent significare rem. Ex hac intentione  
 25 Aristotelis manifestum est esse decem genera generalissima.

<sup>1</sup> id est] *coni. Iwakuma* : et *ms*

<sup>2</sup> genera] *genere ms*

<sup>3</sup> ut] et *a.c. ms*

<sup>4</sup> et] et *a.c. ms* : ut *p.c. ms*

<sup>5</sup> tractant] *tractent ms*

<sup>6</sup> tractant] *tractans ms*

<sup>7</sup> *Revera haec solutio apud Boeth. non invenitur; cf. autem in Cat. 162d–163b Migne*

Etiam dicit Aristoteles alibi tantum esse duo prima {rerum} genera rerum, quae sunt substantia et accidens.<sup>1</sup> Et ita sibi videtur esse contrarius. Ad quod dicimus quod illa contrarietas est in solis verbis. Nam multis modis dicuntur genera generalissima. Dicuntur enim genera generalissima super quae nulla alia sunt genera supervenientia, et secundum hanc acceptio-

5 nem tantum sunt duo genera generalissima, scilicet substantia et accidens. Dicuntur etiam prima rerum genera quae per proprium modum praedicandi distincta sunt a se invicem et secundum ordinem rerum praedicament-

10 lium, et secundum hoc sunt decem genera generalissima: substantia, quantitas, qualitas etc. Alio etiam modo dicuntur genera generalissima, scilicet quae per propria principia et per continentiam specierum et individuorum distincta sunt ab aliis praedicamentis, et secundum hoc sunt quindecim genera generalissima: *Substantia*, *quantitas* et reliqua quae ponit Aristotelis in *Praedicamentis*, et unum quod continet illa novem, scilicet *accidens*;

15 praeterea hoc universale *singulare*, hoc universale *universale*, hoc universale *bonum*, hoc universale *malum*. Et haec sunt quindecim<sup>2</sup>, quoniam unumquodque istorum distinctum est per propria principia et per continentiam specierum et individuorum.<sup>3</sup> Unde dicit Boethius in commento super hunc librum: “Singularium bonorum et singularium malorum genus est

20 hoc universale *bonum*, hoc universale *malum*.”<sup>4</sup>

Post assignatam intentionem Aristotelis subiungit Boethius in primo commento *Praedicamentorum*: | 27v | “Tria sunt quae olim in mente habui. Unum illorum est quid sibi velit *Praedicamentorum* intentio.”<sup>5</sup> Reliqua vero duo reticet. Ex his verbis coniciunt magistri nostri Boethium in primo

25 commento non plenarie assignasse intentionem Aristotelis, sed ex his verbis innuit se plenius assignare intentionem Aristotelis in secundo commento, quod non habemus. Sed magistri nostri coniciunt sic illic assignasse quid *Praedicamentorum* intentio sibi velit: Intentio

<sup>1</sup> *Hoc nusquam dicit Arist., cf. autem Cat. 2.1a20–b9 Bekker*

<sup>2</sup> quindecim] x s.l. ms

<sup>3</sup> distincta ... individuorum] iter. ms

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Boeth. in *Cat.* 283c Migne

<sup>5</sup> Boeth. in *Cat.* 160a Migne

*Praedicamentorum* est docere quae praedicata de quibus praedicatis habeant praedicari et quae praedicata a<sup>1</sup> quibus praedicatis habeant removeri. Et hanc intentionem probant esse Aristotelis per duas regulas quas ponit Aristoteles in *Antepraedicamentis*. Quarum prima haec est: Si aliquid  
 5 praedicatur de altero, quicquid praedicatur de praedicato, et de subiecto.<sup>2</sup> Haec enim regula utilis est ad cognoscendum quae praedicata de quibus praedicatis<sup>3</sup> habeant<sup>4</sup> praedicari. Item subiungit aliam regulam, quae utilis (est) ad cognoscendum quae praedicata a<sup>5</sup> quibus praedicatis habeant removeri, talem: Diversorum generum et non subalternatim<sup>6</sup> positorum di-  
 10 versae sunt differentiae secundum species.<sup>7</sup>

Secundum olim habitum in mente Boethii arbitrantur magistri nostr[i] esse hanc quaestionem: Quare Aristoteles cum principaliter intenderet de vocibus, totam doctrinam refundat in earum<sup>8</sup> significata, id est in ipsas res. Et huius ipsius rei subiungit talem solutionem, dicens: Ideo Aristoteles doctrinam vocum refundit in res, (quia)<sup>9</sup> et res eadem sunt apud  
 15 omnes, voces vero permutabiles sunt et non sunt eadem apud omnes (nam aliis vocibus utuntur Graeci, aliis Latini, aliis aliae gentes), et etiam voces nunc sunt in usu nunc non sunt in usu, res vero eadem manent apud omnes et earum<sup>10</sup> doctrina rata est et firma. Sed quoniam novit haec Aristoteles,  
 20 ideo volens facere firmum et impermutabile opus, fere omnem doctrinam vocum refundit<sup>11</sup> in res (“fere” autem ideo dico quia nusquam facit mentionem de vocibus nisi in quodam capitulo substantiae<sup>12</sup>, dicens: “Omnis

<sup>1</sup> a] *coni. Iwakuma* : de *ms*

<sup>2</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 3.1b10–15 Bekker

<sup>3</sup> praedicatis] *in marg. ms*

<sup>4</sup> habeant] *coni. Iwakuma* : habent *ms*

<sup>5</sup> a] *coni. Iwakuma* : de *ms*

<sup>6</sup> subalternatim] subalternorum *a.c. ms*

<sup>7</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 3.1b16–24 Bekker

<sup>8</sup> earum] *coni. Iwakuma* : eorum *ms*

<sup>9</sup> quia] *suppl. Iwakuma*

<sup>10</sup> earum] eorum *ms*

<sup>11</sup> refundit] refundens *ms*

<sup>12</sup> substantiae] *in marg. ms*

substantia videtur hoc aliquid significare, et in primis quidem indubitabile et verum est, in secundis vero sub appellationis figura.”<sup>1</sup> Quod autem Aristoteles principaliter intendat de vocibus et secundario de rebus, ex hoc coniciunt magistri nostri quod Aristoteles in *Antepaedicamentis* (praepo-  
5 nit) divisionem eorum quae dicuntur divisioni eorum quae sunt.<sup>2</sup>

Tertium habitum olim in mente Boethii magistri nostri esse coniciunt si denaria divisio quam facit Aristoteles in *Antepaedicamentis* omnia comprehendat an aliquid<sup>3</sup> sit quod possit subterfugere illam. Solutionem huius quaestionis transferamus usque ad locum istum ubi dicit Aristoteles:  
10 “Singulum incomplexorum significat substantiam, quantitatem etc.”<sup>4</sup> Quidam alii dicunt quod tertium habitum olim in mente Boethii sit an aliqua divisio per pauciora membra facta quam per decem possit omnia comprehendere. Ad quod dicimus quod bimembris divisio potest omnia comprehendere, ut ista: esse in subiecto, non esse in subiecto.

15 Post assignationem intentionis Aristotelis restat assignare materiam auctoris, sed alia est auctoris, alia libri. Materia auctoris est id circa quod versatur eius intentio. Voces igitur et res circa quae versatur eius intentio sunt materia auctoris quantum attinet ad disquisitionem veritatis et falsitatis. Libri sententiae sunt quae subiectae<sup>5</sup> suscipiunt formam per aptam ordinationem et per congruam verborum elocutionem. Et quod haec sint materia libri probatur auctoritate Boethii in primo libro *Consolationum* dicen-  
20 tis: “Vestes philosophiae textae erant tenuissimis filis subtili artificio et indissolubili materia.”<sup>6</sup> Vestes philosophiae quadam similitudine vocat libros; sicut enim in vestibus latet<sup>7</sup> res dum ad usum hominum extrahitur,

<sup>1</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 5.3b10–16 Bekker

<sup>2</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 2.1a16–1b9 Bekker

<sup>3</sup> aliquid] aliquod *ms*

<sup>4</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 4.1b25–27 Bekker

<sup>5</sup> subiectae] substantiae *ms*, *sed cf.* P20 (Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2486, fols 45ra–60vb), fol. 45va: “magis proprie materia libri possunt dici sententiae illae et rationes ... quae subiectae compositionem suscipientes hunc tractatum constituunt.”

<sup>6</sup> Boeth. *Cons.* 1.1.3.

<sup>7</sup> latet] latent *ms*



sic philosophica sententia latet in libris donec per fidelem expositionem alicuius magistri detegatur<sup>1</sup>. Tenuissima fila vocat subtiles sententias quadam similitudine; sicut enim de rudi lana fila eliciuntur, sic de rudi ingenio eliciuntur tenuissimae sententiae. Subtile artificium vocat sollertem iuncturam sententiarum, id est ut una sententia coniungitur alteri competenter. Indissolubilem materiam vocat necessitatem sententiarum.

Vidimus intentionem et materiam Aristotelis et libri. Restat videre per quam partem logicae<sup>2</sup> supponatur. Duae sunt itaque partes logices<sup>3</sup> secundum unam divisionem: inventio et iudicium, tres vero secundum aliam divisionem, scilicet scientia dividendi, colligendi, definiendi. Hanc autem divisionem ponit Boethius in commento super *Topica* Marci Tullii, et de scientia colligendi addit quod scientia colligendi adiuncta sibi probabilitate fit dialectica, adiuncta necessitate fit demonstrativa, adiuncta apparentia<sup>4</sup> fit sophistica.<sup>5</sup> Cum igitur duae sunt partes logices secundum unam divisionem, et tres secundum aliam, videndum est per quam partem supponatur liber iste logicae<sup>6</sup>.

Sed primo videndum est quid sit aliquem librum supponi logicae per aliquam eius partem. Librum ergo aliquem<sup>7</sup> supponi logicae<sup>8</sup> per aliquam eius partem nihil aliud est quam partem illam vel aliquid {ad}<sup>9</sup> cooperativum<sup>10</sup> ad illam partem sibi comparari per librum illum, sicut liber *Divisio-*  
*num* supponitur logicae per scientiam dividendi quia illa scientia vel

<sup>1</sup> detegatur] detegantur *p.c. ms* : retegantur *a.c. ms*

<sup>2</sup> logicae] logicen *ms*

<sup>3</sup> logices] logicen *ms*

<sup>4</sup> apparentia] *coni. Ebbesen* : apparenti *ms*

<sup>5</sup> Boeth. *in Top. Cic.* 1045b–c Migne

<sup>6</sup> logicae] logices *ms*

<sup>7</sup> aliquem] *in marg. ms*

<sup>8</sup> logicae] logicen *ms*

<sup>9</sup> ad] *del. Iwakuma*

<sup>10</sup> cooperativum] *coni. Iwakuma* : comparativum *ms*

aliquid cooperativum<sup>1</sup> ad illam scientiam comparatur<sup>2</sup> per<sup>3</sup> illum librum; et sic de ceteris.

Liber itaque *Praedicamentorum*, ut placet Nominalibus, supponitur logicae per scientiam iudicandi. Et hoc dicunt hac consideratione, quia liber iste introductorius<sup>4</sup> est ad librum *Peri hermenias*, librum vero *Peri hermenias* introductorius<sup>5</sup> est ad librum *Topicorum*<sup>6</sup> Aristotelis, qui omnino<sup>7</sup> supponitur logicae per scientiam iudicandi; et ideo a primo ⟨ad⟩ ultimum liber iste supponitur logicae per scientiam iudicandi.

Sed magister noster dicit quod aeque convenienter liber *Praedicamentorum* supponitur logicae per scientiam inveniendi et per scientiam iudicandi, quia iste liber omni<sup>8</sup> modo cooperatur ad scientiam<sup>9</sup> cognoscendi quae praedicata de quibus<sup>10</sup> praedicatis habeant praedicari, quae praedicata a quibus praedicatis habeant removeri. Ubi enim dicit: “Quando alterum de ⟨altero praedicatur⟩<sup>11</sup>, quicquid<sup>12</sup> de praedicato et de subiecto”<sup>13</sup> cognoscitur per hoc praeceptum quae praedicata de quibus praedicatis praedicentur. Sed hoc aeque valet ad inventionem argumentorum ut valet ad iudicandum de illis. Subiungit etiam aliam regulam ibidem, per quam scitur quae praedicata a<sup>14</sup> quibus praedicatis removeantur, scilicet: “Diversorum

<sup>1</sup> cooperativum] *coni. Iwakuma* : comparativum *ms*

<sup>2</sup> comparatur] *coo- add. s.l. ms*

<sup>3</sup> per] *coni. Iwakuma* : ad *ms*

<sup>4</sup> introductorius] *introctorius a.c. ms*

<sup>5</sup> introductorius] *introductorius a.c. ms*

<sup>6</sup> topicorum] *sic ms* : analyticorum *malim, cf. C20* (Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal 910, fols 147rb–162vb), fol. 147va: “Dicunt quidam, ut Roscelinus, quod liber iste iudicandi scientiae supponitur, quia liber iste tendit ad *Peri hermenias*, et *Peri hermenias* tendit ad *Analytica*, qui liber est resolutorius.”

<sup>7</sup> omnino] *coni. Iwakuma* : omino *ms*

<sup>8</sup> omni] *omnino ms*

<sup>9</sup> ad scientiam] *coni. Iwakuma* : a scientia *ms*

<sup>10</sup> de quibus] *iter: a.c. ms*

<sup>11</sup> altero praedicatur] *suppl. Iwakuma ex fonte*

<sup>12</sup> quicquid] *quic ms*

<sup>13</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 3.1b10–12 Bekker

<sup>14</sup> a] *coni. Iwakuma* : de *ms*

et non subalternatim<sup>1</sup> positorum etc.,”<sup>2</sup> et aequae valet ad inveniendum quantum ad iudicandum. Et ideo liber iste per utramque partem supponitur logicae.

Vel possumus dicere quod supponitur per facultatem<sup>3</sup> quae comparatur per librum istum. Quaeritur per quam facultatem supponatur. Videndum est ergo quid sit facultas et quid sit supponi aliquem librum logicae per aliquam | 28r | eius facultatem. Facultas igitur sic definitur: Facultas est facilitas facile quid faciendi ex arte profecta<sup>4</sup>. Quattuor autem sunt facultates: dialectica, demonstrativa, rhetorica, sophistica. Dialectica facultas est facilitas colligendi ex probabilibus et facilitas sustinendi probabilem positionem ita ut nihil dicat sibi repugnans neque probabilitati. Nota quod temptativa continetur sub dialectica facultate, quod innuit Aristoteles in *Topicis* suis, deserviens aequae dialectico et temptatori. Demonstrativa facultas est facilitas colligendi ex necessariis, id est secundum praecepta quae dantur<sup>5</sup> ab Aristotele in *Prioribus analyticis*, et facilitas iudicandi de necessariis. Sophistica facultas est facilitas sophisticandi aliquem et facilitas sustinendi positionem ut nihil contra eum agatur sophisticae. Rhetorica facultas est facilitas persuadendi et dissuadendi. Librum aliquem supponi logicae per aliquam eius facultatem nihil aliud est quam illam facultatem comparari<sup>6</sup> sibi per illum librum vel aliquid cooperativum ad illam facultatem. Supponitur itaque liber iste principaliter dialecticae et demonstrativae facultati, quia utraque comparatur per<sup>7</sup> librum istum, sed secundario supponitur rhetoricae et sophisticae facultati.

Sequitur de fine. Finis libri huius est, sicut uniuscuiusque, scientia habitata per librum.

<sup>1</sup> subalternatim] subalternorum *a.c. ms*

<sup>2</sup> Arist. *Cat.* 3.1b16–17 Bekker

<sup>3</sup> facultatem] *coni. Iwakuma* : scientiam *ms*

<sup>4</sup> profecta] *coni. Ebbesen* : profecta *ms*

<sup>5</sup> praecepta quae dantur] *coni. Ebbesen* : quae dantur praecepta *ms*

<sup>6</sup> comparari] comparare *ms*

<sup>7</sup> per] ad *ms*

Utilitas eius est qualitas innata per istum librum. Quae ampla est, nam per hunc librum nobis spondetur omnimoda praedicatio terminorum et omnimoda remotio termini a termino.

Restat inscriptio tituli. Inscriptionem tituli diversi diversis modis assignant. Quidam enim sic assignant: Incipit tractatus Aristotelis de vocibus. Alii sic: Incipit tractatus de generibus rerum. Quos omnes, ut dicit Boethius<sup>1</sup>, idem et similis error confundit, cum Aristoteles non minus intendat tractare de vocibus quam de rebus. Immo, ut dictum est, principalius intendit de vocibus quam de rebus, quamvis totam doctrinam refundat<sup>2</sup> in res et nullam vel<sup>3</sup> parvam doctrinam faciat de vocibus (et superius dictum est quando hoc faciat). Est itaque inscriptio tituli talis: Incipiunt *Categoriae* Aristotelis. *Categoriae* dicuntur a Graeco verbo “categorō, categoras,” quod est “praedico, praedicas.” Inde dicitur categorica propositio, id est praedicativa propositio. Unde dicuntur *Categoriae* Aristotelis, id est *Praedicamenta* Aristotelis. Etiam “categorō, -as” in alia significatione (invenitur)<sup>4</sup> pro “significo, -cas.” Unde dicit Priscianus<sup>5</sup> quod adverbia et praepositiones et coniunctiones sunt syncategoremata<sup>6</sup>, id est consignantia<sup>7</sup>.

Item, notandum est quod praedicamenta multis modis dicuntur. Dicitur praedicamentum supremum genus. Unde dicit Boethius: “Quid enim est praedicamentum quam genus primum?”<sup>8</sup> Rursus dicitur praedicamentum compositum praedicatum, ut homo albus. Unde dicit Aristoteles in *Peri hermenias*: “Quare in quantiscumque praedicamentis in quibus nullum contrariorum nec aliquid oppositorum ad quae sequatur contradictio inest, non verum sed falsum est.”<sup>9</sup> Dicitur etiam praedicamentum collectio

<sup>1</sup> Boeth. *in Cat.* 162a–b Migne

<sup>2</sup> refundat] refundit *ms*

<sup>3</sup> vel] ve *ms*

<sup>4</sup> invenitur] *suppl. Ebbesen*

<sup>5</sup> Prisc. *Inst. gramm.* 2.4.15

<sup>6</sup> sunt syncategoremata] sint categoremata *ms*

<sup>7</sup> consignantia] *scripsi cum fonte* : consignantia *ms*

<sup>8</sup> *locum non inveni, sed cf.* Boeth. *in Isag.*<sup>1</sup> 1.22

<sup>9</sup> *Cf.* Arist. *Int.* 11.21a18–33 Bekker

praedicabilium quae (est) a generalissimo usque ad specialissimum. Secundum<sup>1</sup> hoc dicitur genus *substantia* unum praedicamentum, scilicet<sup>2</sup> collectio praedicabilium quae est<sup>3</sup> a generalissimo ex utraque parte usque ad species specialissimas contentas sub eodem praedicamento dicitur  
 5 unum praedicamentum. Idem dicendum est de hoc genere *quantitas* et singulis aliis. Et secundum hanc acceptionem hic accipitur praedicamentum. Dicitur etiam praedicamentum modus praedicandi in quid vel quomodo se habet.

Modus agendi talis est: Antequam Aristoteles incipiat tractare de praedicamentis, praemittit quendam qui dicitur *Antepraedicamenta* tractatum<sup>4</sup>,  
 10 in quo tractat de aequivocis, de univocis, de denominativis; postea subiungit divisionem eorum quae dicuntur et divisionem eorum quae sunt; ad ultimum illius tractatus facit divisionem incomplexorum in decem membra: “Singulum incomplexorum aut (substantiam)<sup>5</sup> significat (aut)<sup>6</sup> quantitatem aut qualitatem aut ad aliquid<sup>7</sup> etc.” Postea incipit tractare de praedicamentis, primo de hoc praedicamento *substantia*. Qualiter autem tractet de illo suo loco determinabimus.

### (CAPITULUM 1)

20 AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR (1.1a1) Postquam<sup>8</sup> ea diximus quae extra litteram dicenda erant, restat litterae expositio. Sed sciendum est quod antequam Aristoteles agat de praedicamentis tractat de univocis, quia descensus et ascensus praedicamentorum consistit in univoca praedicatione. Genus enim generalissimum univoce praedicatur de suis speciebus et species

<sup>1</sup> secundum] *coni. Iwakuma* : sed *ms*

<sup>2</sup> scilicet] *coni. Iwakuma* : sed *ms*

<sup>3</sup> praedicabilium quae est] quae est praedicabilium *ms*

<sup>4</sup> tractatum] tractatus *ms*

<sup>5</sup> substantiam] *suppl. Iwakuma ex fonte*

<sup>6</sup> aut] *suppl. Iwakuma ex fonte*

<sup>7</sup> ad aliquid] *coni. Iwakuma ex fonte* : aliquid aliud aliorum *ms*

<sup>8</sup> postquam] posquam *ms*

praedicantur de suis differentiis divisivis et constitutivae differentiae praedicantur de suis speciebus univoce; similiter species praedicatur de suo proprio univoce et econverso; et sic praedicatio praedicamentorum consistit in univoca praedicatione. Ideo Aristoteles ad maiorem evidentiam  
 5 praedicamentorum, antequam agat de praedicamentis, agit de univocis. Causa autem univocorum agit de aequivocis; nam univoca praedicatio quasi virtus est, aequivoca vero praedicatio quasi vitium est. Omnis enim virtus habet collaterale vitium.

Sed potest quaeri, cum Aristoteles causa univocorum intendat de aequivocis, quare tractatum aequivocorum praemittat tractatui univocorum.  
 10 Ad hanc quaestionem sunt diversae solutiones. Quidam<sup>1</sup> enim dicunt: Ideo praemittit de aequivocis quia prius extirpanda sunt vitia, deinde sunt inserendae (virtutes)<sup>2</sup>. Univoca autem praedicatio quasi virtus est, aequivoca vero quasi vitium collaterale illi virtuti. Ideo ne vitium possit obesse virtuti, prius tractavit de aequivocis quam de univocis, ut cognita aequivoca  
 15 praedicatione sciremus quae essent univoca, quae non. Vel ideo ante tractatum univocorum tractavit de<sup>3</sup> aequivocis, quia hoc nomen “praedicamentum” habet aequivoce convenire omnibus praedicamentis. Dicitur enim hoc genus *substantia* praedicamentum, hoc genus *quantitas*, *qualitas*, et  
 20 sic de ceteris. Vel ideo quia nomina omnia continentia sunt aequivoca, ut hoc nomen “ens,” “aliquid,” “res.” Vel aliter solvitur, quae melior est omnibus: Ideo praemisit de aequivocis quia aequivoca praedicatio simplicior est quam univoca, et omnia simpliciora natura sunt priora. Quod autem<sup>4</sup>  
 25 quia (non)<sup>5</sup> nisi unum exigitur ad hoc ut fiat aequivoca praedicatio: termini communitas; plura vero exiguntur ad hoc ut fiat univoca praedicatio, scilicet ut {si} aliqua uniantur in aliquo verbo et ratio data {est} secundum

<sup>1</sup> Cf. C21, p. 280.20–23 *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> virtutes] *supplevi cum Iwakuma et fonte* (Isid. *Sent.* 2.36.6)

<sup>3</sup> de] univocis *add. sed canc. ms*

<sup>4</sup> autem] ui *add. sed canc. ms*

<sup>5</sup> non] *suppl. Iwakuma*

verbum<sup>1</sup> praedicetur de illis, sicut in hoc nomine “animal” potestis videre; ad hoc enim ut praedicetur de homine et de asino univoce, oportet et homo et asinus uniantur in hoc termino “animal” et aliqua ratio sit secundum illud nomen quae conveniat eis et utrique illorum.

5 Hic notandum est quod omnis coniunctio terminorum aut est naturalis aut rationalis. Naturalis coniunctio est quando aliquid naturaliter pluribus convenit, ut hoc nomen “homo,” hoc nomen “animal,” hoc nomen “asinus”; quae omnia naturaliter pluribus conveniunt. Rationalis coniunctio | 28v | termini est quae fit aliqua deliberatione praecedente. Item, rationalis  
10 coniunctio aut fit casu aut consilio. Fit casu ut in hoc nomine “Pyrrhus,” quod impositum est regi Epirotarum; item casu contigit quod idem nomen impositum est filio Achillis. Consilio fit quattuor modis. Aut enim fit similitudine aut proportione aut fit ab uno aut fit ad unum. Similitudine fit coniunctio vocabuli, ut in hoc nomine “homo,” quod dicitur de vero homine  
15 et de picto homine propter similitudinem quam habet pictus homo cum vero homine. Proportione fit ut in hoc nomine “principium,” quod cum primo dicitur de unitate, postea translatum est ad punctum ut etiam punctum diceretur principium, et hoc ideo quia unitas et punctum proportionally habent se; sicut enim unitas est principium numeri, sic punctum est  
20 principium lineae. Alia tamen significatione dicitur unitas principium, alia punctum. Fit ab uno ut in hoc nomine “Tullius,” quod dicitur de libro Tullii<sup>2</sup> et de statua Tullii. Dicitur enim liber Tullii Tullius et statua eius dicitur Tullius, et hoc ab uno, id est a Tullio, tamen in diversis significationibus. Fit ad unum ut quando aliqua duo tendunt ad unum et eundem exitum et  
25 nomen aliquod distortum ab effectu utriusque utrique attribuitur, ut in hoc nomine “salutare,” quod dicitur de esca et de vectatione corporis<sup>3</sup>; dicitur enim esca salutaris et vectatio salutaris<sup>4</sup> et ideo quia intendunt ad unum exitum, id est ad salutem. Sed alio modo dicitur esca salutaris, alio modo

<sup>1</sup> verbum] *coni. Iwakuma* : verum *ms*

<sup>2</sup> tullii] tulliu *a.c. ms*

<sup>3</sup> corporis] cor *ms*

<sup>4</sup> salutaris] salutare *a.c. ms*

vectatio; dicitur enim esca salutaris quod conferat salutem, vectatio salutaris ideo quod parit salutem.

Item, quinto modo dicitur fieri aequivocatio; fit enim translatione. Sed notandum est quod translatio alia ex necessitate, alia causa solius ornatus. 5 Sed aequivocatio quae est causa ornatus nullius momenti est, ut dicit Boethius, quoniam non facit terminum aequivocum.<sup>1</sup> Quamvis enim dicamus “pes montis,” “pes navis,” tamen hoc vocabulum “pes” non est aequivocum. Similiter, quamvis dicam: “Iste est meus Ulixes,”<sup>2</sup> id est meus placitator, tamen hoc nomen “Ulixes” non est aequivocum, id est diversarum 10 significationum. Translatio quae fit causa necessitatis facit terminum aequivocum, ut patet in hoc nomine “genus,” quod cum primo impositum sit ad significandam Romanorum collectionem habentium se ad unum supremum principium, id est ad Romulum—illa inquam congregatio dicta est genus, deinde postquam philosophi invenerunt unum philosophicum<sup>3</sup> 15 praedicabile<sup>4</sup> (quod sic describitur: Praedicabile de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid est), non habuerunt aliud nomen quod imponerent suo praedicabili et ita quadam necessitate vocaverunt illud genus;<sup>5</sup> et hoc factum est quadam translatione, et ista translatio fit causa necessitatis.

Notandum est quod “aequivocans” et “aequivocatio” sunt nomina vo- 20 cum. Dicimus enim: “Hoc nomen est aequivocans sub se istas res.” Quod autem “aequivocatio” sit nomen vocis habemus a Boethio, qui dicit quod aequivocatio dividi dicitur in sex species.<sup>6</sup> “Aequivocum” vero et “aequivocatum” sunt nomina<sup>7</sup> rei, quamvis<sup>8</sup> “aequivocum” sit aliquando nomen vocis.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Boeth. *in Cat.* 166d–167a Migne

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Plaut. *Men.* 902

<sup>3</sup> philosophicum] *coni. Iwakuma* : physicum *ut v. ms*

<sup>4</sup> praedicabile] principium *a.c. ms*

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Porph. *Isag.* 1.17–2.17 Busse

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Boeth. *in Cat.* 166b–167a Migne

<sup>7</sup> sunt nomina] *iter. ms*

<sup>8</sup> quamvis] *coni. Iwakuma* : qua *ms*



Postquam diximus ea quae dicenda erant de aequivocis, restat exponere definitionem aequivocorum. Ait ergo definiendo aequivoca: AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR (1.1a1). Nota quod magis dixit in plurali AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR quam “aequivocum dicitur,” ideo quia hoc nomen “aequivocum” nomen ad aliquid, sicut hoc nomen “simile”; sed nomina ad aliquid in singulari non possunt venire in constructionem sine respectu obliqui. Sicut non dicimus: “Istud est simile” sed dicimus: “Istud est simile isti,” sic<sup>1</sup> etiam non dicimus: “Istud est aequivocum” sed: “est aequivocum illi.” In plurali autem numero nomina ad aliquid veniunt in constructionem sine respectu obliqui, ut “Ista sunt similia,” “Ista sunt aequivoca.” Maluit autem Aristoteles ponere dictionem quam plures dictiones, quia in omnibus fuit brevilocus, et ideo magis dixit AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR quam “Aequivocum illi dicitur.”

Item, quaeritur quare Aristoteles dixisset DICUNTUR et non dixisset “sunt.” Ad hoc dicimus quia “aequivocans” et “aequivocatio” sunt nomina vocis, “aequivocum” et “aequivocatum” nomina rei, sed res ex eo quod sunt non habent esse aequivocae vel aequivocatae, sed ex eo quod dicuntur et nominibus significantur habent esse aequivocae<sup>2</sup>, et ideo magis dicit DICUNTUR quam “sunt.”

AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR, id est res aequivocae<sup>3</sup> dicuntur.

QUORUM NOMEN etc. Hic incipit definitio aequivocorum. Nam hoc nomen AEQUIVOCA est subiectum, hoc verbum DICUNTUR est copula, sicut potestis videre: “Homo (est)<sup>4</sup> animal rationale mortale.” Hoc nomen “homo” est subiectum, hoc verbum “est” copula, “animal rationale mortale” est loco praedicati. Sic et hic.

Res aequivocae dicuntur QUORUM NOMEN COMMUNE EST. Sed quia hoc convenit univocis, ideo ad exclusionem univocorum addit SOLUM, excludendo per SOLUM rationem substantiae, id est substantialem definitionem. Sed quia aliquis posset putare quod aliud vellet excludere per SOLUM

<sup>1</sup> sic] sicut *ms*

<sup>2</sup> aequivocae] vel aequivocatae *add. sed exp. ms*

<sup>3</sup> aequivocae] aequivocatae *ms*

<sup>4</sup> est] *suppl. Iwakuma*

quam substantialem definitionem, ideo subdit quid velit excludere per SOLUM: AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR QUORUM (NOMEN) COMMUNE SOLUM EST, VERO, pro sed, sed ita dico SOLUM NOMEN COMMUNE quod, pro ut, RATIO SUBSTANTIAE sit DIVERSA, id est substantialis definitio. Sed pro ratione  
 5 substantiae comprehenditur substantialis definitio, quae inchoans a genere completur specificis differentiis, et descriptio (quae)<sup>1</sup> data est secundum sententiam termini. Descriptio vero quae non est data secundum sententiam termini est ut “crispus albus musicus Sophronisci filius”; talis non comprehenditur sub ratione substantiae.

10 Nota quod hoc vocabulum DIVERSA (a) diversis diverso modo exponitur. Dicunt enim quidam<sup>2,3</sup> RATIO SUBSTANTIAE DIVERSA, id est opposita, ut ratio latrabilis est diversa, id est opposita, rationi celestis canis. Sed hoc falsum est, quia saepe contingit totum et partem aequivocari sub aliquo nomine, ut hoc nomen “sensibile” est aequivocum et ad totum et ad partem,  
 15 et idcirco definitiones sunt oppositae, scilicet istae “potens sentire” et “potens sentiri”; si enim est potens sentire est potens sentiri, sed non e converso. Ideo dicimus quod DIVERSA ponitur pro “non eadem,” scilicet nec in voce nec in sententia; sunt enim aliquae definitiones non eadem<sup>4</sup> voce quae sunt eadem<sup>5</sup> sententia, velut<sup>6</sup> “animal rationale (mortale)” et “animal gressibile bipes.”  
 20

Sed quia omnia quae praemissa sunt possunt convenire univocis, quia possunt solum nomen habere commune et rationem substantiae diversam, ut homo et equus hoc nomen “animal” habent commune, rationem vero substantiae diversam, ideo addit SECUNDUM NOMEN, id est<sup>7</sup> ut data secundum illud nomen sub quo aequivocantur sit<sup>8</sup> diversa.  
 25

<sup>1</sup> quae] *suppl. Iwakuma*

<sup>2</sup> quidam] o *add. sed exp. ms*

<sup>3</sup> locum non *inveni*

<sup>4</sup> eadem] *eadem ms*

<sup>5</sup> eadem] *eadem ms*

<sup>6</sup> velut] *vel ms*

<sup>7</sup> id est] *coni. Iwakuma : .u. vel .ii. ms*

<sup>8</sup> aequivocantur sit] *aequivocatur sunt ms*

Est itaque plena definitio aequivocorum: AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR QUORUM NOMEN COMMUNE EST SOLUM, RATIO VERO SUBSTANTIAE DIVERSA SECUNDUM NOMEN { \* \* \* }

**292.4 {PROOEMIUM}** The fragment comprises a prologue, preliminary remarks on chapter 1 of Aristotle’s text and an in-depth literal exposition of the definition of equivocals that take up its first one and a half lines. The prologue discusses the following features of Aristotle’s work:

1. Its author’s intention (*intentio*)
2. Its subject matter (*materia*)
3. To which part of logic it belongs (*cui parti logices supponatur*)
4. Its goal (*finis*)
5. Its utility (*utilitas*)
6. Its title (*titulus*), and, in this connection, the various senses of the word “category” (*praedicamentum*)
7. Its mode and order of presentation (*modus agendi*)

This is the same set of traditional issues that C21 discusses, although the order in which they are discussed is different. *Intentio* is thus discussed first, as according to H17, Alberic thought it should be. See the note on C21 on pp. 282–83 above.

**293.20–27. Magister ... absolvendum sit.** As noted above (pp. 284–85), the view here ascribed to Alberic is endorsed by C21. C15 and C17 do not mention the issue explicitly, but both omit the contested “*decem*” as Alberic says one should. C15, fol. 1ra: “*Et sic habemus talem intentionem: Intentio huius operis est tractare de primis vocibus decem prima rerum genera significantibus (in) eo quod res significant.*” C17, fol. 81ra: “*(D)icit Boethius in commento Praedicamentorum: Intentio Aristotelis est tractare de primis vocibus decem prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant.* C20, fol. 147rb follows suit and seemingly refers

to Alberic: “*Ut ait Boethius in commento, intentio Aristotelis in hoc opere de decem primis vocibus decem rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant disputare, id est earum significationem et rerum naturam subiectarum aperire. In quibusdam commentis habetur ‘decem vocibus,’ in quibusdam non; sed melius est, ut dicitur magistro, quod ibi non habeatur ‘decem’ ut sit doctrina generalior.*” As mentioned above, Boethius’ actual formulation (in both Migne’s and Asztalos’s edition) does not include numerals at all, neither the first nor the second *decem*. Abelard, *LI Cat.* 111.18–21 is thus more precise: “*teste Boethio in hoc opere intentio est de primis vocibus prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant disputare.*” However, Abelard (112.5–6) goes on, on the basis of Boethius *in Cat.* 160b–161a, to say that: “*Haec autem decem nomina Boethius intentionem huius libri aperiens primas appellat voces prima rerum genera significantes.*” The deeper point of Alberic’s remark is perhaps, as Marenbon 1992, pp. 57–58 suggests, to stress that the categorial distinctions are fundamentally ontological in nature and not dependent on some specific linguistic context.

**294.1–6 Ad hoc ... quolibet.** That the commentator disagrees with Alberic, whom he has just called “our teacher,” is worth noting, but it should also be noted, as done by Iwakuma 2013, 29–30, that disagreement on this or that point of doctrine was not uncommon within the twelfth-century schools, both in the form of disagreement between followers of the same master and in the form of disagreement with something or other the master has said. The disagreement here seems rather innocuous.

**295.24–27 Ex his ... habemus.** As discussed above (pp. 285–86) in connection with C21, the view here ascribed to *magistri nostri* is Alberic’s. Besides C21 and C15 mentioned above, the view is also endorsed in C17 and C20. See C17, fol. 81ra: “*Et quod praedicta intentio sit insufficiens demonstrat Boethius cum dicit: ‘Tria sunt quae mihi restant in mente, unum quid velit Praedicamentorum intentio.’ Si sufficienter esset assignata praedicta intentio, non sic dixisset Boethius.*” And C20, fol. 147va: “*Haec*

*est intentio quam Boethius assignat in primo commento, dicens his verbis 'sitque in praesens quae data est intentio.' Deinde subiungit: 'Tres,' inquit, 'quaestiones habeo dudum in mente, quorum unum est quid sibi velit Praedicamentorum intentio.' Reliqua duo tacet. Ex his perpendimus nos nec inmerito intentionem huius libri non esse sufficienter assignatam, quia cum intendat et doceat magnopere de rerum praedicatione, tamen dicit eum agere de vocibus."*

**295.27–296.2 Sed ... removeri.** As shown in the discussion of C21 on pp. 286–87 above, the view that the *Categories* is centrally about predication, and specifically about which predicates are predicated of which and which are removed from which, can be traced back to Alberic.

**296.3–10 Et hanc ... species.** I have not found texts that explicitly give such a “proof,” but the claim that the two rules given in chapter 3 of the *Categories* line up with the *intentio* in such a way that the first rule (3.1b10–15) stipulates which predicates are predicated of which and the second rule (3.1b16–24) which predicates are removed from which is found in all three commentaries associated with Alberic that comment on this part of Aristotle’s text: C15, C17 and C20. The point is most succinctly put by C20, fol. 149rb: “*QUANDO ALTERUM etc. (3.1b10) ... quia de praedicatis doctrina facere intendit, id est ostendere quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quae a quibus habeant removeri, quandam praemittit regulam qua ostendit quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quandam aliam subiungit qua docet quae a quibus removeantur.*” But see also C15, 10ra: “*Praemissa regula quae demonstravit quae de quibus habeant praedicari et qualiter, praemittit Aristoteles regulam quae demonstrat quae a quibus habeant removeri. Quae talis est: DIVERSORUM GENERUM etc. (3.1b16).*” That the view was most likely Alberic’s is also strongly suggested by C25 below (at pp. 299.9–300.3).

**296.11–21 Secundum ... in res.** Boethius said he intended to discuss three topics in his second commentary on the *Categories*, the first of which

was 1) *intentio*. What were the two others? As shown in the comments on C21 on pp. 287–88 above, Alberic took the two remaining topics to be: 2) Whether the list of categories is exhaustive (with regard to both terms and things), and 3) Whether there can be a genus subsuming all of the ten categories. C21 basically followed suit. C25, however, ascribes to his masters (*magistri nostri*) a somewhat different view. According to this view, the first remaining topic is: 2\*) Why, when Aristotle is primarily concerned with words, he bases almost (*fere*) his whole doctrine on things (*refundit in res*). The *magistri nostri* here thus seemingly do not include Alberic. A version of the view is, however, found in C20, fol. 147va, who first gives Alberic's view and then an alternative proposal: “*Reliqua duo confingere possumus. Forsan enim quaerebat apud se utrum illa divisio quae in decem fit ab Aristotele sufficiens sit, et an aliquid excogitari valeat quod illa decem quasi superius continere queat. Sed si quis eundem Boethium inspiciat, ipse solvit primum cum dicit ‘quia maior hac divisione inveniri non potest.’ Secundum solvit in commento super Porphyrium, quod res et ens non sunt superiora ad illa decem. Possumus etiam alia duo confingere, quia quaerit Boethius: cum Aristoteles de vocibus intenderet, totam doctrinam fere ad res transtulit, et quare etiam pauca de vocibus, plura de rebus. Quod ideo fecit quia firma et stabilis doctrina non potest esse in voce propter diversitatem linguarum et nationum. Non enim sunt apud omnes eadem voces. Et si diceret: ‘haec vox “animal” de hac voce “homo” praedicatur,’ ista doctrina non esset omnibus communis, et cetera huiusmodi. Doctrina autem rerum immobilis est, quia sunt eadem apud omnes.*” According to C20's alternative proposal the two remaining topics were thus: 2\*\*) Why almost (*fere*) all of the theory concerns things, and 3\*\*) Why little is said about words and much about things. The distinction between 2\*\*) and 3\*\*) seems rather academic, and C20 gives just the one answer. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to see only one issue here, as C25 does.

**296.21–297.2 “fere” ... figura.** Both C20 and C25 have the qualification “almost” (*fere*) here, but only C25 gives an explanation of it.

**297.2–5 Quod autem ... sunt.** Cf. C20, 148vb: “*EORUM QUAE DICUNTUR (2.1a16) Quia Aristoteles tam de vocibus quam de rebus intendit, tam rerum quam vocum inducit divisionem, sed quia vocum doctrina praecedit in logica per quas de rebus loquimur et doctrinam facimus, ideo vocum ad placitum significatarum praemittit divisionem hanc, scilicet: EORUM QUAE DICUNTUR ALIA DICUNTUR SECUNDUM COMPLEXIONEM, ALIA SINE COMPLEXIONE.*” The view that logic is about both words and things (in that order) was fundamental to the *Albricani*. See, for example, the opening lines of the anonymous logical textbook based on Alberic’s views known as the *Introductiones Montanae Minores* (De Rijk 1967, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 11.2–3): “*De duobus in logica agitur, scilicet de vocibus et rebus. Sed quia doctrina vocum prior est doctrina rerum, ideo primum de voce agamus.*”

**297.6–14 Tertium ... subiecto.** According to the view C25 ascribes to his masters (*magistri nostri*), the third topic Boethius intended to discuss was 3<sup>\*A</sup>) Whether the list of categories is exhaustive. This corresponds precisely to Alberic’s 2). C25 also gives another variant, ascribed to “some other people” (*quidam alii*), according to which the last issue was rather: 3<sup>\*B</sup>) Whether a division with less members than the tenfold one can be given. This, by contrast, seems to trace back to Alberic’s 3), if one takes into account its development in C21. What C25 is proposing, in sum, may be best described as two different amalgams of the view we find in C20 and Alberic’s view.

**297.15–16 Post ... libri.** For the distinction being invoked here, see H17, fol. 88ra: “*Auctoris vero materia alia est de qua, alia ex qua. Materia de qua est id de quo auctor tractat, ut genus et species sunt materia Porphyrii. Materia autem ex qua est id ex quo opus constat, ut sententia generis et speciei sunt materia Porphyrii — sed haec materia convenientius potest dici libri quam auctoris.*”

**297.16–19 Materia auctoris ... falsitatis.** See the note to C21 on p. 288 above.

**297.19–20 Libri ... elocutionem.** Cf. C20, fol. 147va: “*Materia huius libri secundum quosdam sunt voces incomplexae et res vocibus significatae de quibus tractat. Nos autem dicimus quod materia huius libri sunt sententiae et rationes quae tractatum istum componunt.*” Cf. also P20, fol. 45va: “*magis proprie materia libri possunt dici sententiae illae et rationes ... quae subiectae compositionem suscipientes hunc tractatum constituunt.*”

**297.20–298.6 Et quod ... sententiarum.** The invocation of Boethius’ *Consolatio Philosophiae* 1.1.3 to justify the idea that the *sententiae* (or *sententiae et rationes*) of a book constitute its matter is common in texts associated with Alberic. See, e.g., H17, fol. 88ra: “*Quod autem materia sit sententia probatur auctoritate Boethii in libro Consolationis. Ait enim: ‘Vestes Philosophiae erant textae tenuissimis filis et indissolubili materia.’ Quod ab omnibus magistris hoc modo glossatur: id est indissolubili sententia. Hic ergo habetur quod sententia materia dicatur.*” See also Anon., *Glossae “Doctrinae sermonum”* (H15) Pr.6.78–87 King: “*Dicimus enim uniuscuiusque materiam esse rationes et sententias quae in libro docentur, quarum contextu totus liber efficitur. ... Idemque in aliis libris dicimus, quod quidem Boethius in libro De consolatione plane insinuat ubi vestes Philosophiae inscribit. Vocat enim materiam indissolubilem rationes et sententias quae indissolubiler coniunctae philosophicos componunt tractatus, quae proprie materia dicuntur quia omnis materia debet esse in compositione sui materiati.*”

**299.3–8 Liber ... iudicandi.** Cf. C20, fol. 147va: “*Dicunt quidam, ut Roscelinus, quod liber iste iudicandi scientiae supponitur, quia liber iste tendit ad Peri hermenias, et Peri hermenias tendit ad Analytica, qui liber est resolutorius. Magister Petrus dicit quia supponitur scientiae inveniendi.*” The latter is, indeed, Abelard’s view in *LI Cat.* 114.16–19 Geyer: “*At vero cum haec scientia de logica esse concedatur, restat quaestio utrum scientiae inveniendi an iudicandi sit supponenda. Sed ad inventionem recte refertur, quia hic praecipue instruimur ad invenienda argumenta...*” C15, fol. 2ra appears to have gotten his nominalists confused and



mistakenly attributes Roscelin's view to Abelard: "*Tamen probat magister Petrus quod hic liber supponitur scientiae iudicandi hoc modo: Aristoteles composuit librum Analyticorum, in quo tractatur de iudicio, et gratia illius fecit librum Peri hermenias, et causa illius composuit librum Praedicatorum; ergo iste liber supponitur scientiae iudicandi illis mediantibus.*" Later nominalists followed Abelard in placing Aristotle's book under invention, but they made a small disclaimer which may well have been prompted by the *Albricani*. Thus, Anonymus D'Orvillensis (C26), 254 Ebbesen: "*Supponitur autem hoc opus illi parti logices quae dicitur scientia inveniendi ... Plurimum tamen iuvat hoc opus artem iudicandi.*" C27, fol 1va: "*Iste liber scientiae inveniendi supponitur, quamvis agat de illis quae pertinent ad iudicium, eo scilicet quod in hoc opere inventio traditur.*"

**299.9–300.3 Sed ... logicae.** The *magister noster* is most probably Alberic. The view that Aristotle's *Categories* falls under both invention and judgement is also endorsed and grounded in the view that it centrally concerns predication by both C15 and C20. C15, fol. 2ra: "*Qua ratione supponitur scientiae iudicandi, eadem ratione supponitur et scientiae inveniendi, quia sicut in hoc libro tractatur vel demonstratur quae de quibus habeant praedicari, ut maiora de minoribus, et quae a quibus habeant removeri, ut genera et species unius praedicamenti a generibus et speciebus alterius praedicamenti, et quae de quibus non habeant praedicari nec tamen removeri, ut minora de maioribus, quod pertinet ad iudicium, eodem modo in hoc libro tractatur de locis illis ex quibus eliciuntur argumenta, quod attinet ad inventionem; et sic iste liber supponitur scientiae inveniendi.*" C20, fol. 147va: "*Sed nos dicimus quod neutri istarum magis quam utrique supponitur sed aequae utrique. Scire enim quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quae a quibus removeri valet ad inventionem argumentorum et iudicium.*" See also P20, fol. 45va: "*Dicimus tamen quod utrique, mediante scientia praedicatorum ad quae introducit, supponitur: Quemadmodum enim Aristoteles in Praedicatorum docet quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quo modo et quae non, per quod scimus*

*et invenire et iudicare, sic Porphyrius quae de quibus praedicantur et quo modo et quae non instruit, et ideo librum eius scientiae inveniendi et iudicandi supponi testatur.*" C17, fol. 81ra also places Aristotle's book under both invention and judgement, but gives no reasons for this: "*Supponitur logicae. Ad logicam reducitur per dialecticam. Per scientiam inveniendi et iudicandi reducitur ad dialecticam.*" For C21, see the note on p. 288 above.

**300.8–9 Quattuor ... sophistica.** Cf. Boethius, *De topicis differentiis* 1.7.17 Nikitas (=1181c Migne): "*Quattuor igitur facultatibus earumque velut opificibus disserendi omnis ratio subiecta est, id est dialectico, oratori, philosopho, sophistico.*" A few lines later, at 1.7.19 (=1181d), Boethius identifies the *philosophus* with the *demonstrator*: "*Philosophus vero ac demonstrator de sola tantum veritate pertractat...*"

**300.11–13 Nota ... temptatori.** This nota bene might have been occasioned by the similar but different division that we find in another text associated with Alberic, Anon. *Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum* (SE6), 282.10–12 De Rijk: "*Potest etiam facultas vel scientia disserendi praedicto modo dividi. Facultatium enim alia demonstrativa, alia dialectica, alia temptativa, alia sophistica.*"<sup>1</sup>

**301.18–302.8 Item ... se habet.** As noted above (p. 283) in the comments on C21, it was customary among twelfth-century commentators to discuss the various meanings of the word "category" (*praedicamentum*) in connection with the title of Aristotle's work. C25 first lists three meanings: (1) most general genus, (2) complex predicate, and (3) collection of a most general genus and all the items falling under it down to the most special species. These three meanings roughly correspond to those given by C21, and the two commentators agree that it is in the third meaning that the word is to be taken in the work's title. But whereas C21 claimed that there were

<sup>1</sup> This text was edited by De Rijk 1962–67, vol. 1, pp. 257–458.

no more meanings of the word, C25 lists a fourth: (4) mode of predication. As a parallel passage in Anonymus D’Orvillensis (C26), 254 Ebbesen shows, twelfth-century commentators found this meaning in chapter 9 of the first book of Aristotle’s *Topics*: “*Dicitur etiam praedicamentum modus praedicandi in quid vel in quale vel in quomodo se habet, secundum quod dicitur in primo Topicorum: ‘Omnia genera et omnes species continentur in primo praedicamento,’ id est omnia genera et omnes species praedicantur in quid.*” In fact, one of the rival twelfth-century logical schools, the *Meludinenses*, built its theory of categories on this fourth meaning. Thus, number (35) and (36) in the list of the school’s theses found in the text known as *Secta Meludina* (see De Rijk 1967, vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 282–86) are: “(35) *Omnia genera et omnes species sunt in primo praedicamento.* (36) *Praedicamentum est modus praedicandi, et primum praedicamentum est primus modus praedicandi.*” See also Hansen 2023, pp. 578–79.

**302.9–17 Modus ... determinabimus.** Like C21 (see note on p. 288 above), C25 does not give separate proemial discussions of mode and order of presentation. This is in line with Alberic’s practice. What C25 calls *modus agendi* here is really the order of presentation. The promise to discuss how (*qualiter*) Aristotle proceeds, i.e. the mode of presentation, in connection with the category of substance (and presumably also the other categories) shows that the author did not plan for his commentary to end where it breaks off in the Vienna manuscript.

**302.19 <CAPITULUM 1>** The preliminary remarks on chapter 1 discuss:

1. Why Aristotle discusses univocals from the outset
2. Why he nonetheless discusses equivocals and why he does so before discussing univocals
3. The various kinds of equivocals
4. The expressions “equivocating” (*aequivocans*), “equivocation” (*aequivocatio*), “equivocated” (*aequivocatum*) and “equivocal” (*aequivocum*).

The commentary then gives an in-depth literal exposition of Aristotle's definition of equivocals after which it breaks off with the end of fol. 28v. The first two points, it will be seen, are basically the first two points also discussed in C21 (see note on pp. 288–89 above).

**303.9–16 Sed ... non.** Why does Aristotle discuss equivocals before univocals? For the question and this first solution ascribed to “some people,” see the note on C21 on p. 289 above. Cf. also C20, fol. 147vb: “*De aequivocis autem ante univoca praemittit ... quia prius docet quid sit vitandum, deinde quid sit tenendum; aequivoca enim praedicatio secludenda est ab illis de quibus intendit in Praedicamentis.*” Note that C25 has actually paved the way for this solution just above (at p. 303.6–8).

**303.16–20 Vel ideo ... ceteris.** This is the solution Boethius proposes (*in Cat.* 166c Migne): “*Idcirco quod ipsa decem praedicamenta cum definitionibus diversa sint, uno praedicationis vocabulo nuncupantur; cuncta enim praedicamenta dicimus.*”

**303.20–21 Vel ideo ... “res.”** Cf. C15, fol. 2va (which has *res*, *ens*, *unum*, and *aliquid*): “*Item, prius tractat de aequivoco quam de univoco, quia inter aequivocos comprehenduntur termini digniores aliis sicut ‘res’ et ‘ens,’ ‘unum’ et ‘aliquid,’ de quibus dicit Aristoteles quod aequaliter de omnibus rebus praedicantur; et ex hac dignitate prius tractat de aequivocis quam de univocis.*” Cf. also C20, fol. 147vb (which has *res* and *ens*): “*De aequivocis autem ante univoca praemittit, quia inter aequivoca quaedam enumerantur quae omnia continent, ut res et ens.*” C17, fol. 81rb (which has only *ens*) mistakenly ascribes this solution to Boethius: “*Item, quaeritur quare prius de aequivocis quam de univocis. Ideo, ut dicit Boethius, quia omnia sunt aequivoca sub ente.*”

**303.21–304.4 Vel aliter ... illorum.** This last, best of all solutions, is explicitly ascribed to Alberic in C17, fol. 81rb: “*Dicit magister Albericus quod ideo prius de aequivocis quia sunt simpliciora. Ad hoc ut aliqua sint*

*aequivoca oportet quod nomen sit commune solum, sed ut aliqua sint univoca oportet quod nomen et definitio sit communis.*”

**304.5–305.18 Hic ... necessitatis.** This passage is an elaboration on Boethius, *in Cat.* 166b–c Migne in so far as the subdivision of what is here called *rationalis coniunctio terminorum* corresponds to the division of equivocals Boethius gives there. Boethius does not, however, use the phrase *coniunctio terminorum* there, and it is somewhat odd in this context. I have so far failed to find any parallels, but it seems that by *coniunctio* something like *communitas* or *communio* is meant (note that the text has *termini communitas* a few lines above). I have refrained from emending it, however, as the manuscript is very clear in all occurrences.

**304.21–23 Fit ab uno ... significationibus.** Whereas the commentator has taken over Boethius’ examples for the other types of equivocation, he here introduces a completely different one. A statue of Tully and a book by Tully are both called Tully, but they are so called from the man himself: Tully. This example, as it turns out, is taken rather from chapter 10 of Augustine’s *De Dialectica* (for some other traces of *De Dialectica* in the twelfth-century, see p. 6 in Jackson’s introduction to the text). What might have made the commentator introduce it here? Well, it appears to have been relevant to a piece of school doctrine. In the list of theses ascribed to Alberic (*De sententia magistri nostri Alberici*) on fol. 31r of this same Vienna manuscript we read (Iwakuma 2013, 31): “*Quinta est quod convenienter et vere dicitur: ‘Marcus et Tullius sunt,’ Marco existente; sed Marco non existente, incongrue dicitur.*” The thesis is among those of which Iwakuma (2013, 35) says: “I have failed so far to discover more detailed discussions and do not know what exactly they mean.” The passage here suggests that the deliberately strange-sounding and attention-grabbing tenet trades on the point regarding the ambiguity of “Tully.” Whereas “Marcus” refers to the human being Marcus Tullius Cicero, “Tully” can also, albeit in a different meaning, refer to a book he’s written. So after Marcus has written his book but before he gets his head chopped

off, there is a distinct, existing referent for both terms and one can correctly say in the plural that both Marcus and Tully exist.

\* \* \* \* \*

### **C29: Introduction, Edition, Notes**

This fragment comprises c. 500 words and is actually a series of brief notes on select issues relevant to the beginning of Aristotle's *Categories* (from the second half of chapter 2 to the very beginning of chapter 5). The notes may (but need perhaps not) be excerpts from a larger commentary. They are contained in ms Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2486, fol. 4r, where they occupy the blank space after a short treatise on universals which ends a little before the middle of the page.<sup>1</sup> Their existence was noted, albeit imprecisely by both Grabmann and De Rijk, but they were not properly identified until Iwakuma listed them in his 2013 paper on Alberic of Paris, and they then entered Marenbon's revised catalogue from the same year.<sup>2</sup> The importance of the manuscript was first brought to the attention of scholars of medieval logic by Martin Grabmann, who edited the short tract on universals mentioned above, and its relevance was further stressed by De Rijk, who edited an introduction to logic based on Alberic's views also contained in the manuscript, the *Introductiones Montanae Minores*.<sup>3</sup>

That items in the manuscript display a connection to Alberic was noticed already by Grabmann and was further brought out by De Rijk.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> De Rijk 1962–67, vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 89–91 gives a description of the manuscript and its contents. I have found nothing that supports (at least with regard to these notes on the *Categories*) De Rijk's claim (at p. 89) that the notes in this part of the manuscript "were apparently taken, for the main part, from the greater logical works found in the manuscript."

<sup>2</sup> Grabmann 1947, p. 60; De Rijk 1962–67, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 89; Iwakuma 2013, p. 46; Marenbon 2013, p. 166.

<sup>3</sup> Grabmann 1947; De Rijk 1962–67, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 90; vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 7–71.

<sup>4</sup> Grabmann 1947, p. 63; De Rijk 1966, pp. 1–9.

Iwakuma ascribes C29 to a “follower of master Alberic,” whereas Marenbon remarks that “[t]he master from whose teaching the notes derive refers to one of Alberic’s ideas, but rejects it.”<sup>1</sup>

The issues discussed in these notes are the following:

1. The notion of being said of a subject (*dici de subiecto*), introduced at *Cat.* 2.1a20.
2. The rule of predicational transitivity, introduced at *Cat.* 3.1b10–12.
3. Some purported counterexamples to the enumeration of the ten categories given at *Cat.* 4.1b25–27.
4. The division of substance into primary and secondary substance underlying Aristotle’s opening remarks at *Cat.* 5.2a11–19, and the further subdivision of the category.

The notes are all rather short, the longest being the one concerned with the transitivity rule in *Categories* 3. It is in this note, which makes up more than half of the edition below, that Alberic is mentioned. This note also contains a reference to “some people” (*quidam*).

Marenbon proposes a date around the middle of the twelfth century for these notes.<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to say, but perhaps a date like the one proposed for C25 (around the mid to later twelfth century) would be a safer bet.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Iwakuma 2013, p. 46 (this is what the notation “#” means, see *ibid.*, p. 44); Marenbon 2013, p. 166.

<sup>2</sup> Marenbon 2013, p. 166.

<sup>3</sup> According to the “cautious proposal” of Sofia Orsino, the script indicates that the copy dates to the late twelfth or early thirteenth century, as was also the case with the copy of C25 (see note 1 on page 291 above).

**⟨Anonymi Notulae in *Categorias* Aristotelis (C29)⟩**

Dici de subiecto tribus modis dicitur: Dici de subiecto est esse universale, dici de subiecto est praedicari de contento, dici de subiecto est fundari in subiecto, ut albedo (quod dicit Aristoteles: “Qualitates<sup>1</sup> quae in subiecto  
5 sunt de subiecto dicuntur”<sup>2</sup> de universalibus intelligendum est, non de singularibus); vel “praedicatur de subiecto,” id est per nomen denominative sumptum ostenditur esse in subiecto.

QUANDO ALTERUM DE ALTERO PRAEDICATUR UT DE SUBIECTO etc.<sup>3</sup>  
(3.1b10) Quidam ita exponunt: Praedicari in substantiam, id est praedicari  
10 ut materiale esse vel formale substantiale vel totum esse rei.<sup>4</sup> Secundum istos iste syllogismus non esset syllogismus, scilicet: “Omnis homo est animal; sed omne animal est coloratum; igitur omnis homo est coloratus,” quia nulla regula formari potest.

Nos autem dicimus praedicari ut de subiecto non praedicari in sub-  
15 stantiam, sed praedicari ad similitudinem eorum quae in substantiam praedicantur, id est quae de omni eo de quo praedicantur prorsus praedicantur et de sibi opposito, ut coloratum de homine et asino.

Si autem aliquis secundum praedictam regulam, scilicet: “Quando alterum de altero etc.,” probare voluerit Socratem esse speciem (vel genus)  
20 dicens: “Homo est species (vel animal est genus); sed Socrates est homo (vel animal); igitur Socrates est species (vel genus),” dicimus non valere nec sequi posse. In prima enim propositione secundum magistrum

<sup>1</sup> qualitates] *in marg. ms*

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Arist. *Cat.* 2.1a29–1b3

<sup>3</sup> etc.] *post praedicatur ms*

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Anonymus, C27, fol. 2rb MS Milan, Archivio Capitolare della Basilica di Sant’Ambrogio M 2: “Et attende quod dici (dicit *ms*) de subiecto idem est quod in substantia praedicari. In substantia vero praedicari est praedicari tanquam genus vel tanquam species vel tanquam differentiam.”



Albericum<sup>1</sup> individuum subicitur nec de universali<sup>2</sup> aliquid praedicatur, immo de individuo; in assumptione autem universale praedicatur, videlicet species; ideo non sequitur. Sed quia huiusmodi individua nobis videntur ficticia, idcirco universale (vel universalia)<sup>3</sup> dicimus ibi subici et de ipso  
 5 speciem praedicari<sup>4</sup> secundum accidens, id est secundum naturam universalis<sup>5</sup> et non secundum naturam individuorum. In ista tamen<sup>6</sup> propositione: “Animal est genus” et in similibus individuum quidem subicitur, vel potius ipsum universale, sed non ut universale, id est non universaliter subicitur, ac de ipso agitur, id est locutio de ipso habetur. Cum autem dicitur: “Nul-  
 10 lum animal est genus,” hic genus a specie non removetur, sed a rebus quae sunt animalia; universale quidem subicitur, sed de ipso locutio non habetur, immo de rebus ipsius.

Duobus modis secundum accidens praedicari dicitur, vel quando aliquid praedicatur non in substantiam, ut coloratum de homine, vel quando  
 15 aliquid assignatur de aliquo, ut species de hoc universali *homo* assignatur; cum dico: “Quid est universale *homo?*,” respondetur: “Species.” Non autem universaliter praedicatur de ipso; non enim possum dicere: “Omnis homo est species.”

SINGULUM INCOMPLEXORUM etc. (4.1b25) Obicitur de hoc nomine  
 20 “Adam,” “Caesar,” “chimera,” et de similibus, quid haec<sup>7</sup> significant. Ad quod dicimus quod de rebus existentibus facta est haec divisio. Vel dicimus quod significant ut substantiam, quia si res subiectae existerent, significare possent.

Substantia alia prima, alia secunda. Primarum aliae sunt unae numero,  
 25 aliae non unae numero. Non unae sunt illae quarum coniunctione cum aliis

<sup>1</sup> magistrum albericum] ma. a. *ms*

<sup>2</sup> universali] universale *ms*

<sup>3</sup> vel universalia] *in marg. ms*

<sup>4</sup> et ... praedicari] *in marg. ms*

<sup>5</sup> universalis] vel universalium *ms (lectio incerta)*

<sup>6</sup> tamen] *lectio incerta*

<sup>7</sup> haec] *lectio incerta*

non potest fieri<sup>1</sup> progressio ad aliquid numerale nomen. Hae sunt individua quae subiciuntur cum de universalibus agitur. Secundarum alia est generalis praedicata de generibus et speciebus, ut: “Omne subalternum genus secunda substantia est,” alia specialis praedicata de individuis tantum, ut  
 5 cum dicitur: “Hoc universale *animal* est secunda substantia,” “Hoc universale *homo* est secunda substantia.”<sup>2</sup>

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**321.9–10 Quidam ... rei.** I have found no exact correspondences to the exposition here ascribed to some people (*quidam*), but compare C15, fol. 9ra: “*Boethius sic exponit illam: QUANDO ALTERUM DE ALTERO in quid vel in substantia, quicquid de praedicato in quid vel in substantia, illud idem et de subiecto in quid vel in substantia.*” In glossing the passage in question, Abelard (*LI Cat.* 133.6–7 Geyer) says: “*Est autem praedicari de subiecto teste Boethio praedicari in substantia, quod nos diligenter supra exposuimus.*” This is, indeed, more or less what Boethius claims: “*De subiecto vero praedicare est quotiens altera res de altera in ipsa substantia praedicatur.*” This implies a restriction of the rule to certain types of predicate, as Boethius explicitly says a few lines later: “*quare illa sola de subiecto dicuntur quaecumque in cuiuslibet rei substantia et in definitione ponuntur.*” Abelard (*LI Cat.* 127.11–13 Geyer) follows suit: “*Dici itaque de subiecto convenit omnibus tam generibus quam speciebus, cuiuscumque sint praedicamenti, respectu suorum inferiorum et insuper differentiis respectu specierum vel individuorum earum.*” An anonymous nominalist commentator (C27, fol. 2rb) puts the view succinctly as follows: “*Et attende quod dici de subiecto idem est quod in substantia praedicari. In substantia vero praedicari est praedicari tanquam genus vel tanquam species vel tanquam differentiam.*” Boethius and the nominalists thus seem to

<sup>1</sup> fieri] *lectio incerta*

<sup>2</sup> non est inconueniens si aliquod universale dividitur per genus et speciem] *in marg. inf. ms*

agree in restricting the rule to the predication of genera, species and differentia. Of course, for the nominalists predication is a linguistic relation, and it is only Boethius who speaks of predicating one thing (*res*) of another. He does not, however, speak of material or formal being, as C29 does in reporting the view. Alberic, by contrast, seems to have used this sort of language, at least on occasion, as emerges from an anonymous twelfth-century commentary on Priscian known as *Tractatus Glosarum Prisciani*, which reports his exposition of Priscian's definition of the noun at *Inst.* 2.4.18 (*Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare*): “*Dicit enim magister Albricus: ‘Substantiam vocat materiale esse, qualitatem formale, quae nomen habet significare. Ac patet in hoc nomine ‘homo’: significat substantiam, id est materiale, ut animal, et qualitatem, id est formale, ut rationale et mortale.’*” In other words, what we find here in C29 is possibly an Albrician report of the Boethian view, such that “*materiale esse*” corresponds to the genus, “*formale substantiale (sc. esse)*” corresponds to the differentia(e), and “*totum esse rei*” to the species.

**321.10–13 Secundum ... potest.** Cf. C15, fol. 9ra: “*Sed secundum hoc iste syllogismus non potest confirmari illa regula, scilicet: Omnis cygnus est albus; sed omne album est corpus; ergo omne cygnus est corpus, et quamplures alii.*” That syllogisms of the first mood of the first figure conform to the rule in *Cat.* 3.1b10–12 is explicitly stated in both C15 and C17. See C15, fol. 9va: “*Regula illa quae assignatur hic ab Aristotele convenit omni syllogismo primae figurae et modi primi.*” C17, fol. 82ra: “*Et secundum hanc regulam fit primi modi et primae figurae syllogismus.*” If the rule is restricted to the predication of genera, species and differentiae, syllogisms of the first mood of the first figure involving other predicate types will not conform to the rule.

**321.14–17 Nos ... asino.** Regarding the notion of being predicated wholly (*prorsus*), see C15, fol. 9ra: “*Unde sic magister Petrus et Albericus exponunt, et in hoc concordant: QUANDO ALTERUM DE ALTERO PRAEDICATUR prorsus, quicquid de praedicato prorsus, illud idem et de subiecto*

*prorsus.*” C15 immediately explains the notion as follows: “*Ideoque videndum est quid sit prorsus praedicari. Prorsus praedicari est ita praedicari quod ad quicquid perveniat praedicatio subiecti, et praedicatio praedicati; verbi gratia sicut album praedicatur de cygno prorsus, quia ad quicquid pervenit praedicatio cygni, pervenit et praedicatio albi.*” The attribution of this exposition to Abelard is surprising, because, as noted above, in *LI Cat.* he interprets the rule quite differently; nor have I found anything in later nominalist commentaries such as C26 and C27 to suggest that the Peripatetic of Le Pallet changed his mind. That Alberic expounded the rule in this sort of way is, however, most likely correct. At least, C17, 82ra also invokes the notion of being predicated wholly (*prorsus*) when glossing the rule: “*QUANDO ALTERUM PRAEDICATUR DE ALTERO UT DE SUBIECTO, id est prorsus singulariter vel universaliter, QUAECUMQUE DICUNTUR DE EO QUOD PRAEDICATUR, ut de subiecto, OMNIA ETIAM DICUNTUR DE SUBIECTO.*”

**321.18–22 Si autem ... posse.** Cf. Boethius in *Cat.* 176d: “*Sed fortasse quisquam dicat minime verum esse quod dictum est. Nam cum homo de Socrate praedicetur (Socrates enim homo est), de homine vero species (homo enim species est), Socrates species esse non dicitur. Et rursus cum animal de homine praedicetur, de animali vero genus (animal enim genus est), homo generis vocabulo caret (non enim dicitur homo esse genus; homo enim genus non est, sed tantum species).*” This sophism was a staple of the Greek commentary tradition and occurs already in Porphyry’s commentary on the *Categories* (80.32–81.2 Busse; see also Ebbesen 1981, vol. 1, pp. 224–33).

**321.22–322.3 In prima ... sequitur.** Cf. C15, fol. 8va: “*Item: ‘Omnis homo est animal; sed animal est genus; ergo omnis homo est genus.’ Non sequitur, quia illud quod praedicatur in prima non subicitur in secunda, quia in prima praedicatur hoc genus animal, in secunda vero subicitur quoddam individuum, et est singularis illa propositio, quia quotiens fit sermo de aliquo universali vel singulari determinate, illa propositio est*

*singularis.*” As noted by Iwakuma 2013, p. 38, the idea that the subject term in sentences such as “Man is a species” stands for an individual is ubiquitous in texts by followers of Alberic. Moreover, that Alberic took the sophism in question to trade on an ambiguity in the middle term and thus to commit a fallacy of equivocation is also confirmed by SE6, pp. 357–58: “*Magister Albericus vero dicit quod non secundum accidens, sed secundum aequivocationem in his paralogismis fit sophisma ... Similiter dicit de alio paralogismo, scilicet ‘Socrates est homo, sed homo est species, ergo Socrates est species,’ quod est ibi sophisma secundum aequivocationem, quia in prima propositione ‘homo’ appellat homines, sed in secundo appellat illam speciem; ergo cum in utraque propositione diversa appellat, secundum aequivocationem est ibi sophisma, et non secundum accidens.*” As will be noted, however, the solution ascribed to Alberic in SE6 is slightly different in that no appeal to some subject individual is made with regard to the premise “Man is a species.” Did Alberic change his mind?

**322.3–6 Sed quia ... individuorum.** There are three things to note here. First, Iwakuma (2013, p. 38) suggests that Alberic’s claim that the subject term in sentences such as “Man is a species” stands for an individual “has little ontological implication.” This, as the remarks here in C29 suggest, is somewhat questionable. Second, a version of the view that the sophism in question commits the fallacy of accident because “species” is predicated accidentally (*secundum accidens*) in the second premise is attributed to James of Venice in SE6, p. 357.<sup>1</sup> Third, despite C29’s rejection here of Alberic’s “fictitious” individuals, they seem to reoccur below in his division of substance.

**322.24 Substantia ... secunda.** As noted by Iwakuma (2013, p. 37), the *Albricani* took this to be a division of a genus into its proximate species. As C15, fol. 13va explains, “primary” here means singular, “secondary” universal: “*Dicimus quod hoc nomen ‘primum’ et hoc nomen ‘secundum’*”

<sup>1</sup> For more on this dispute between Alberic and James, see Ebbesen, forthcoming.

*non retinentur in propria significatione, immo aequipollent istis vocabulis 'universale' et 'singulare,' quae significant differentias."*

**322.24–25 Primarum ... numero.** Cf. the strikingly similar division of the category of quantity in C17, fol. 84ra: "*Quantitas alia singularis, alia universalis; singularis alia una numero, alia non; una numero alia simplex, alia composita. Simplex ut unitas, punctum, elementum, instans et simplex locus. Composita ut linea, superficies, corpus, tempus, locus, numerus et oratio.*"

**322.25–323.2 Non unae ... agitur.** Although such individuals were dismissed above as fictitious, they are seemingly endorsed here. For the claim that these individuals are not numerically one or discrete, compare C15, fol.14rb: "*Item: Illud individuum est prima substantia; ergo est res discreta numero; sicut si dicerem: 'Socrates est prima substantia; ergo est res discreta numero.' Non est simile, quia aliud est de individuis quae subiacent tantum intellectui quam de eis quae subiacent visui.*" These curious "intelligible individuals" are a remarkable feature of the Albrican interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories*, and their appearance here in C29 is strong evidence that the notes, although critical of Alberic, have their background in this environment.

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