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**Sankt Gallen ms. 134 and the Unpublished Additions  
to Pseudo-Rabanus super Porphyrium (P3):  
An Edition of the Text with a Study**

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## **1 Introduction**

Twelfth-century logical commentaries constitute a broad corpus of mainly unpublished texts. Their dissemination exhibits five important characteristics: 1. They tend to circulate in twelfth-century manuscripts only; 2. These manuscripts are often poor and not decorated; 3. The

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I would like to express my deep gratitude towards all those who made this research possible, first of all the principal investigator of the project, Caterina Tarlazzi, but also my colleagues within the project, Charles Girard, who proposed some very interesting corrections to the text of the manuscript, and Sofia Orsino, who in several cases improved my reading of the manuscript. I am also deeply indebted to Yukio Iwakuma for sharing his unpublished research and transcriptions with me. The present article is the product of true teamwork, or in other words, it is a polyphonic study from both philological and philosophical points of view of a twelfth-century commentary on the *Isagoge*.

This piece of research is complemented by the dataset: P. Podolak, “Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, MS 134, pp. 77-96a. Annotated Images for A Critical Edition of the Unpublished Sections of the Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* known as P3” (link: <https://datarepository.unive.it/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.71731/DATA/UW0ZYH>; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.71731/DATA/UW0ZYH>). The dataset contains open-access reproductions of all relevant pages in the manuscript, with annotations highlighting the sections peculiar to the Sankt Gallen manuscript, edited in this article.

manuscripts preserving the commentaries are few; 4. The texts are usually anonymous; 5. They are in most cases preserved in a single manuscript.<sup>1</sup>

Taking into consideration the conditions under which these texts were preserved, it is no wonder that the study of such works poses more difficulties than in the case of other medieval texts. The text we are currently focusing on, that is to say the *Isagoge* commentary conventionally named P3, is particularly challenging. It benefits, indeed, from a pioneering edition by Iwakuma.<sup>2</sup> The transcription and publication of this and other texts opened the way for further studies, such as, for instance, the articles by Brumberg-Chaumont focusing on some doctrinal aspects of the work,<sup>3</sup> and gave rise to different proposals concerning both chronology and attribution of the text. It is well known, for example, that Iwakuma first dated the text to the years 1060/1070.<sup>4</sup> Later, he dated the work to the late 1090s and attributed it to William of Champeaux.<sup>5</sup>

The study of twelfth-century logical commentaries is further complicated by the fact that, when preserved by more than one manuscript, these different versions are often significantly different.

Textual criticism of classical texts often speculates about author's variant readings, and faces several difficulties in identifying traces of later

<sup>1</sup> For these elements see Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> For this and other commentaries to Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's works we use the alphanumeric tags introduced by Marenbon 2000 and Marenbon 2018 (in the specific case of the *Isagoge*). For the edition of the text see Iwakuma 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Brumberg-Chaumont 2008 and 2011; for a complete bibliography updated to 2018 see Marenbon 2018, pp. 173–175.

<sup>4</sup> See Iwakuma 1992, p. 42, followed by Marenbon 1993, p. 102; Marenbon 1997a, p. 31. See also Marenbon 2004, p. 33: “this version of P3 [that is to say, the version of **O**] almost certainly predates William's encountering *in voce* exegesis, and therefore Abelard's arrival in Paris in 1100: the later version of P3 discusses *in voce* exegesis explicitly and raises objections to it, whereas there is no mention of it here”; Marenbon 1997b, p. 125: “dating perhaps from even before 1100”.

<sup>5</sup> See Iwakuma 2008, pp. 52–53; Marenbon 2018, p. 173 dates it to “probably before 1090”. For an intellectual profile of William and the complicated issues concerning the attribution of the texts and opinions see Tarlazzi 2018, pp. 291–325; the most important contribution on William of Champeaux has been published by Grondeux and Rosier-Catach (*Notae Dunelmenses* 2017).

changes to the texts by their authors. The case of medieval texts is quite different. Since the extant manuscripts are written a relatively short time after the original, we have ample information about the history of the text.

La proportion de manuscrits conservés augmentant, l'écart chronologique diminue entre la rédaction première des œuvres et les premiers témoins qui nous en sont parvenus, ce qui permet de poser dans de meilleures conditions la question des recensions multiples.<sup>1</sup>

Twelfth-century logical commentaries can be considered a clear example of texts with multiple drafts. As already highlighted by secondary literature, when preserved by more than one copy, “their text tend to vary greatly from one manuscript to the other”,<sup>2</sup> to such a large amount that we can speak about the *fluidity* of logical commentaries.<sup>3</sup> As Poirel writes: “La multiplicité des recensions est au fond la situation la plus normale au Moyen Âge.”<sup>4</sup>

Starting with classical ancient texts, textual critics often considered how to distinguish author's variants from readings that originated during the manuscript tradition. Summarising, we can say that we are facing author's variant readings when, during the collation of different manuscripts or printed editions, we can identify not only mechanical errors or copy mistakes, but also substantial differences that can only be explained as an intentional choice.<sup>5</sup>

The amount of intentional variants in the different manuscripts preserving the text makes the *Isagoge* commentary labelled as P3 a

<sup>1</sup> Poirel 2003, p. 507.

<sup>2</sup> Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, p. 221.

<sup>3</sup> Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, p. 222: “the fluidity of logical commentaries has been observed at different levels”; for interesting suggestions about how to treat texts in different versions see also Poirel 2003; Poirel 2011.

<sup>4</sup> Poirel 2011, p. 257.

<sup>5</sup> Poirel 2011, p. 258: “La question d'une multiplicité de recensions survient lorsqu'en collationnant divers témoins d'une même oeuvre, on remarque, outre les inévitables erreurs de copie, un nombre suffisant d'écarts substantiels qui ne peuvent s'expliquer que par un acte littéraire, conscient et délibéré.”

particular case for which “the very notion of the same text becomes problematic”, not to mention that more than one author/authorial voice may well be involved.<sup>1</sup> The pioneering edition prepared by Iwakuma offers an example of a complicated textual transmission of this logical commentary. The critical text is based on three manuscripts that contain the whole commentary:<sup>2</sup>

**A** = Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento, Fondo Antico Comunale 573, ff. 4r–15v.

**O** = Oxford, BL, Laud. Lat. 67, ff. 9v–14v.

**P** = Paris, BnF, Lat. 13368, ff. 215–223.

And a fourth one, whose text is composed completely of extracts from P3 and P16 (= München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14458):

**D** = Dublin, Trinity College, ms. 494.<sup>3</sup>

The printed layout of the critical edition gives an idea of the complicated manuscript tradition. Some parts of the text, printed in smaller typeface, are preserved by a single manuscript; in other parts, where two manuscripts agree against a third (in the most cases, **OA** against **P**), the text is split into two columns, so that the reader can quickly recognise the agreement and divergences of textual witnesses.

The different drafts of the text have been studied by Iwakuma, who summarised the “genetic” relationships of the three versions of the text in the following way:<sup>4</sup>

**O** substantially preserves the original version of P3.

**A** preserves a revised version of the original, augmented by additions.

<sup>1</sup> Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, pp. 222–223.

<sup>2</sup> For a description and bibliography of these manuscripts see Iwakuma 2008, pp. 44–48; Sofia Orsino is currently working on detailed codicological descriptions of all these manuscripts.

<sup>3</sup> See Iwakuma 2008, p. 48.

<sup>4</sup> Iwakuma 2008, pp. 48–49.

**P** preserves another version made independently from the **A** version, providing both additions to and revisions of the original version.

When Iwakuma's edition was already in press, however, a fifth manuscript emerged:<sup>1</sup> Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 134, ff. 77ra–96a (= **S** in the following pages). The present article, based on a complete collation of **S**, does not aim to propose new hypotheses concerning the chronology or attribution of the work, but **a.** to investigate the relationships between the different versions of the text preserved in the four main manuscripts, **O**, **A**, **P** and **S**, and **b.** to make accessible the first edition, with translation and commentary, of the unpublished sections preserved by **S**. By doing so, I hope to shed some new light on the genesis of an important witness of twelfth-century logical commentaries.

## 2 Manuscript S

Before taking into account the textual features of the manuscript tradition of P3, it can be worthwhile to provide an analytical description of the neglected manuscript **S**. Since complete and exhaustive descriptions of the manuscripts preserving logical commentaries from the twelfth century are being prepared by my colleague Sofia Orsino, in what follows I will limit myself to providing a brief description of manuscript Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 134 on the basis of the digital images available online.

The *codex* is made up of 135 *folia* of parchment, but they are numbered as 264 pages (because of a mistake, the page after 96 is not numbered, so I will indicate it as p. 96a; the numbers 200–204 are repeated after p. 204). It is a small-size (20,5 × 15 cm) composite manuscript; the units may have been bounded together in the fifteenth century; the binding

<sup>1</sup> At the end of the preface, Iwakuma pointed out: “I discovered a new manuscript while this article was already in press. I shall present and discuss this discovery in the next issue of the *Archives*” (Iwakuma 2008, p. 59), but, unfortunately, this supplement was never published. The exact shelf mark of this witness appears in secondary literature from 2018 onwards. The new witness is quoted with the exact shelf mark by secondary literature from 2018 onwards: See also Marenbon 2018, p. 174; Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, p. 223; Tarlazzi 2018, p. 295 n. 19.

is made up of wooden plates and a leather cover. The first and the third section could have been written in the abbey itself,<sup>1</sup> but in my opinion it seems unlikely that the second unit was written there.

The first codicological unit (pp. 1–76) dates back to the ninth or tenth century.<sup>2</sup> After two introductory texts to Prudentius (pp. 2–3, see Gennadius in PL 58, 1068 a–b) the unit contains Prudentius, *Cathemerinon*, hymns 1–10 (pp. 3–55) and *Peristephanon*, hymns 1, 5, and 2 (pp. 56–76; ed. M.P. Cunningham, *CC SL* 126). It contains a large amount of annotations in Latin and Old German.

The second codicological unit (pp. 77–147), dating back to the middle of the twelfth century,<sup>3</sup> contains logical texts, that is to say P3 (pp. 76a–96a), SH3 (pp. 96bis a–133b, the explicit is *mutilum*) and D1 (pp. 134a–147b, acephalous).

The third codicological unit (pp. 148–264), dating back to the tenth or eleventh century,<sup>4</sup> contains Boethius' *Opuscula sacra: De Trinitate* (pp. 148–175); *Utrum Pater et Filius* (pp. 175–180); *De hebdomadibus* (pp. 180–191); *De fide catholica* (without *inscriptio*, pp. 191–206); *Contra Nestorium et Eutychen* (pp. 206–264) [= pp. 165–241 Moreschini].

BIBLIOGRAPHY: G. Scherrer, *Verzeichniss der Handschriften der Stiftsbibliothek von St. Gallen*, Halle 1875, pp. 49–50; Aurelii Prudentii Clementis *Carmina*, ed. M.P. Cunningham, *CC SL* 126, Brepols, Turnhout 1966, p. XVIII; L. Smith (ed.), with the assistance of Th. Christchev – R. Gameson – A. Holdenried – F. Robb – T. Webber – J. Ziegler, *Codices Boethiani. A Conspectus of Manuscripts of the Works of Boethius*, vol. 2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, “Warburg Institute. Surveys and Texts 27”, Warburg Institute - N. Aragno, London-Torino 2001, p. 198 (with further bibliographical references); R. Bergmann – S. Stricker, unter Mitarbeit von Y. Goldammer – C. Wich-Reif, *Katalog der althochdeutschen und altsächsischen Glossenhandschriften*, W. de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2005, vol. 1, pp. 480–

<sup>1</sup> Smith et al. 2001, p. 198; Bergmann et al. 2005, p. 480.

<sup>2</sup> Bergmann et al. 2005, p. 480, but the tenth century according to Scherrer 1875, p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> Smith et al. 2001, p. 198.

<sup>4</sup> Bergmann et al. 2005, p. 480; it is dated to the eleventh century by Scherrer 1875, p. 49.





conveniently underlined by several contributions.<sup>1</sup> In this case, however, both the amount and quality of the errors we find in **O** can dissuade us from considering it as an original. Hence, in what follows we have to distinguish carefully the version of the commentary preserved by **O** (version **O**) and the text we read in **O**, which is affected by omissions and other copy mistakes.

To the current state of knowledge, the model from which **O** was copied can be considered lost. In what follows I will indicate this model, as usual for lost manuscripts, with a Greek letter,  $\alpha$ .


Moreover, in all the extant manuscripts a large amount of mechanical errors occurs. That seems to suggest that neither **A** nor **P** can be considered as an original, but are copies of an original. The lists of copy mistakes found in the manuscripts show that none of the preserved manuscripts is a copy of another existing witness, so we are not in the presence of *codices descripti*. See the following examples (in this case too, *sauts du même au même* are marked with an asterisk):

[2.] **Copying errors of A:** pp. 66, 33 – 67, 1 vocis esse – vero divisionem] *om.* A\* || p. 84, 3 quod ita – ipsum naturae] *om.* A\* || p. 86, 23–24 determinatae secundum – hoc est] *om.* A\* || pp. 87, 25 – 88, 2 item Hercules – est genus] *om.* A\* || p. 89, 2–3 sub una – et ideo] *om.* A || p. 91, 7–8 dictum ad – dicit fortasse] *om.* A\* || p. 96, 21–22 illa vel – quod definitio] *om.* A\* || p. 98, 24–25 ad interrogationem – genus respondetur] *om.* A\* || pp. 100, 24 – 101, 1 dicit enim – aliquo praedicari] *om.* A\* || p. 102, 24–25 ut si – specie differunt] *om.* A || p. 103, 24 numerando ita – differunt in] *om.* A\* || p. 104, 10–12 quod species – differentibus numero] *om.* A || p. 104, 29 de eis – et accidentia] *om.* A\* || p. 119, 22–23 illi vero – esse accidentia] *om.* A\* || p. 133, 9–11 dicitur enim – eorum individuus] *om.* A\* || p. 164, 6–7 quattuor modis – et cetera] *om.* A || p. 178, 27–30 cum genere – genus commune] *om.* A\* || pp. 189, 31 – 190, 1 sic quia – non praedicatur] *om.* A\*.

<sup>1</sup> See Reeve 2011, pp. 3–23, with an interesting list of examples of author's errors collected under different labels and further bibliography on this issue.

[3.] **Copying errors of P:** p. 77, 10–11 quandoquidem neque – possit inquiritur] *om.* P || p. 87, 19–20 hoc est – gemitus est] *om.* P\* || pp. 93, 17 – 94, 3 item dicendum – in quid] *om.* P || p. 102, 23–24 quaecumque igitur – esse specie] *om.* P || p. 108, 3–6 sicut autem – prolixitate confunderet] *om.* P || p. 109, 22–23 esse speciem – genere est] *om.* P\* || p. 111, 8–9 id est – de pluribus] *om.* P\* || p. 111, 15–17 substantialibus ut – specialissima species] *om.* P || p. 116, 18–24 dicetur ergo – rationalis dicatur] *om.* P || p. 125, 10–11 quod autem – omnibus convenit] *om.* P || p. 127, 13–19 vel aliter – et incorporeitate] *om.* P || p. 128, 6–14 vel per – descendentibus etc] *om.* P || p. 139, 26–27 differentia faciente – differentia id est] *om.* P\* || p. 145, 9–18 si realem – magis proprias] *om.* P\* || p. 153, 2–3 neque enim – genere potest] *om.* P\* || p. 176, 17–21 remaneat quidam – ipsum genus] *om.* P\* || p. 177, 1–2 cum eis – remanere potest] *om.* P\* || p. 188, 16 due igitur – a partibus] *om.* P.

The analysis we have done so far to a large extent confirms the results of previous literature. Indeed, on the basis of the material he had access to, Iwakuma gave the following stemma for the different versions:<sup>1</sup>



The reconstruction of the genealogical relationships between the four versions of the text, however, must be integrated with the information that can be obtained from the examination of **S**.

Keeping aside for a moment proper errors affecting the text of **S**, I will now analyse intentional variant readings of the version preserved in **S** and its relationships with other versions. The list of the variant readings shows that the manuscript often agrees with the versions preserved in **O** and **A**. As if there were some need, that confirms Iwakuma's thesis: the version preserved in **P** shows several innovations in relation to both the **O** and the **A** version.

<sup>1</sup> Iwakuma 2008, p. 49.

[4.] **Innovations of P:** pp. 65, 6 – 66, 34: S = OA; P has a much shorter text || pp. 70, 14 – 73, 32: S = OA; P has a much longer text || pp. 82, 26 – 83, 5: *om.* S = OA; P adds a section || pp. 85, 15 – 86, 8: S = OA; P has a much longer text || pp. 87, 21 – 88, 8: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 90, 10–13, 20–25: S = OA || pp. 91, 11–15: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 92, 1–2, 6–8: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 95, 13–19: *om.* S = OA; P adds a section || p. 101, 25–29: *om.* S = OA; P adds a section || p. 105, 1–10: S = OA; P has a longer text || pp. 112, 23 – 116, 12: S = OA; P has a different text || pp. 117, 13 – 120, 11: S = OA; P has a different text || p. 121, 12–16: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 122, 1–7: S = OA; P has a longer text || pp. 123, 22 – 124, 5: S = OA; P has a shorter text || pp. 128, 15 – 129, 11: S = OA; P has a shorter text || p. 129, 15–19: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 130, 12–23: S = OA; P has a different text || p. 131, 11–14: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 132, 20–25: S = OA; P has a longer text.

As seen before, however, **S** is not affected by the errors of **A** (see [2.]), so it cannot be considered a copy of **A**. The examination of the variants and errors of **S** lead us to postulate a lost common model, which originated from  $\alpha$ ; we will call this lost model  $\alpha'$ .

The information that can be obtained from **S** can also confirm some of Iwakuma's hypotheses concerning the relationships among the various versions. The section printed at p. 82, 5–10, omitted by **O** and **P**, is not preserved by **S**, so that we can be reasonably sure that this bit of text is an original addition of the version preserved by **A**.

Iwakuma correctly points out that “it never happens that the **O** version gives different texts where the **A** and **P** agree with each other, except in only one case where **O** gives an abbreviation of the **AP** version.”<sup>1</sup> This is that one case:

[5.] The one exception: 122, 19–26: **A** and **P** exhibit a longer version of the text.

In this passage, **S** agrees with the versions preserved in **A** and **P**. The explanation for this can be very simple if we keep in mind that **O** is not an

<sup>1</sup> Iwakuma 2008, p. 48.


original, but a copy of **α**: we just have to admit that the copyist of **O** abbreviated the text of his model, so he introduced one of the few innovations that characterise the very conservative text of this manuscript. Iwakuma's statement is true if we only consider intentional variants exhibited by **A**, **O** and **P**. If we take into account minor variants, like for instance one-word omissions, differences in word order, and other minor textual phenomena (in such cases it can be difficult to decide whether we are dealing with intentional variants or copy mistakes) we have to note that there are several cases where **A** and **P** (and **S**) agree against **O**:

[6.] **Agreement APS vs. O**: p. 60, 3 utilis est APS] valet O || p. 60, 7 agere dicitur APS] dicitur agere O || p. 61, 10 idem APS] *om.* O || p. 61, 13 tantum APS] *om.* O || p. 61, 15 species sunt APS] sunt species O || p. 61, 21–22 generis descriptionem APS] descriptionem generis O || p. 63, 2 quae de APS] quod O || p. 63, 14 etiam APS] enim O || p. 63, 19 impossibile APS] possibile O || p. 64, 1 iudicatur APS] iudicabitur O || p. 69, 5 scientiae iudicandi] iudicandi scientiae O || p. 69, 8 solvendas quaestiones APS] solvendam quaestionem O || p. 74, 10 subsistant APS] subsistunt O || p. 77, 1 eorum intellectus APS] intellectus eorum O || p. 79, 5 rationis meae APS] meae rationis O || p. 80, 21 earum APS] eorum O || p. 81, 5 singularis APS] singularum O || p. 83, 9 tibi monstrare APS] monstrare tibi O || p. 89, 15 iudicat APS] indicat O || p. 94, 19 alias praedicationes APS] aliam praedicationem O || p. 96, 2 illa definitio APS] definitio illa O || p. 98, 3 cui definitio illa dicitur APS] definitio cui dicitur illa O || p. 109, 1 supponuntur APS] supponitur O || p. 112, 3 solum est species APS] solum species est O || p. 122, 17–18 species inferiorum O] inferiorum species APS || p. 134, 1 talibus APS] duabus O || p. 134, 16 scilicet speciem APS] speciem scilicet O || p. 147, 17 distantiam differentiarum APS] differentiarum substantiam O || p. 150, 9 divisivae differentiae APS] differentiae divisivae O || p. 152, 23 non sunt differentiae APS] differentiae non sunt O || p. 160, 15 species eiusdem generis APS] eiusdem generis species O || p. 160, 15 differre faciunt APS] faciunt differre O || p. 161, 5 definitionem esse propositam APS] esse praepositam definitionem O || p. 161, 15 sunt sub eodem APS] sub eodem sunt O || p. 161, 23 exponitur littera APS] exponunt litteram O || p. 165, 10 homini et soli APS] et soli homini O || p. 165, 22 est homo APS] homo est O || p. 165, 22 de quodam inanimato praedicatur APS] praedicatur de quodam inanimato O || p. 169, 1 dividitur APS] dividunt O || p. 169, 7 actum APS] acceptum O || p. 178, 4 ideo determinatur APS]

determinant ideo O || p. 178, 7 differentias APS] species O || p. 181, 9 differentiam APS] distantiam O || p. 181, 11 erit APS] erant O || p. 187, 4 efficiunt APS] faciunt O || p. 187, 5 quattuor sunt APS] sunt quattuor O.

Although we are not dealing with proper errors but (often equivalent) variant readings, the amount of passages where **A**, **P** and **S** agree against **O** suggests that **APS** originated from their common model  $\alpha'$ . This way, cases where **APS** agree against **O** can be explained as innovations of either **O** or the common ancestor  $\alpha'$ .

We can therefore draw the following stemma integrating the position of **S**:



Such a genealogical model is not contradicted by the facts.

We have already taken into account the passages ([4.]) where **S** agrees with **OA**; such cases can be easily explained as innovations by **P**, which contains the most innovative version. We have also already examined ([5.]) a single passage where **S** agrees with **AP** (this case can be explained as an innovation by **O**).

Within the commentary there are also some (few) cases of agreement between **S** and **A**. See the following passages:

[7.] **Agreement AS**: p. 101, 6–18: **S** exhibits a long section of text which is preserved by **A** only || p. 112, 17–18 quidam vero – alterum vocale] **S** exhibits two lines of text that are preserved by **A** and **D** only || p. 138, 11–15: the version of **S** shows some differences, but it exhibits a very similar version to a bit of text preserved by **A** only.

These features shared by **A** and **S** admit a simple solution if we consider them as innovations by  $\alpha'$  that **P** (a very innovative version, as seen before) has elaborated upon. Two cases of agreement of **S** with **P**

could be *prima facie* more problematic, but they can also be clarified with the genealogic model we have proposed.

[8.] **Agreement PS vs. OA (?)**: The text of **S** shows two apparent similarities with the text of **P**.

[8.1.] pp. 74, 20 – 75, 2: the text of **S** seems to agree with **P**. This apparent similarity, however, stands in need of a more thorough investigation. (In what follows the text of different manuscripts is reproduced word for word, even with the most evident errors.)

**P**: Tres quippe incorporeorum formae sunt, ut alia praeter corpora esse possint et separata a corporibus in sua incorporalitate perdurent, ut Deus et angeli; alia in corporibus et etiam extra corpora, ut mens et anima; alia vero quae cum sint incorporea esse tamen non possunt praeter corpora.

**S**: Tres quippe incorporeorum formae sunt, ut alia praeter corpora esse possint et separata a corporibus in sua corporalitate perducet, ut Deus et angeli; alia in corporea quo cum corpore et extra corpora esse possunt, ut mens anima; animalia vero quae cum sint incorporea tamen in corporibus ita sita sunt quod ab illis divelli nequeunt.

The text of **O**, on the other hand, is quite different and deeply indebted to Boethius' second commentary to the *Isagoge*:

*In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 160, 23 – 161, 7: Duae quippe incorporeorum formae sunt: ut alia praeter corpora esse possint et separata a corporibus in sua incorporalitate perdurent (ut Deus, mens, anima); alia vero cum sint incorporea, tamen praeter corpora esse non possint (ut linea vel superficies vel numerus vel singulae qualitates), quas tametsi incorporeas esse pronuntiamus quod tribus spatiis minime distendantur, tamen ita in corporibus sunt ut ab his divelli nequeant aut separari aut si a corporibus separata sint, nullo modo permaneant.

**O**: Duae quippe incorporeorum formae sunt, ut alia praeter corporea esse possunt et separata a corporibus in sua incorporalitate perdurant, ut dicitur anima, alia vero quae, cum sint incorporea, esse tamen non possunt praeter corporea, ut linea superficies, quae cum sint incorporea tamen in corporibus ita sunt quod ab aliis (!) divelli nequeant.

Differences don't just concern the form of the text but they entail important divergences from the doctrinal point of view. Boethius and **O** offer a twofold division of incorporeal things: God, the human mind, and the soul, on the one side, can subsist in their incorporeal nature; the line and the surface, on the other side, cannot subsist without a body. The versions preserved in **P** and **S**, on the contrary, offer a threefold division: God and the angels can subsist in their incorporeal nature; the human mind and soul can subsist both within a body and without a body; the third category, which is left unspecified but accompanied by clear allusions to the line and surface, cannot subsist without a body. This version, preserved (as far as we have seen until this moment) by **P** and **S** with its threefold and more sophisticated division, should clearly be considered a later development away from the Boethian starting point. But what about the text of **A**? Iwakuma's edition seems to be affected by some oversights at this point.<sup>1</sup> In the following lines, I present a transcription of this section based on a new collation of the manuscript.

<sup>1</sup> As noticed in the last line of the apparatus to p. 74, **A** exhibits *angeli*; p. 75, first line in the apparatus, **A** exhibits *et alia in corporibus et extra corpora* (Iwakuma 2008).



A, f. 5ra-rb: *Duae*<sup>1</sup> etiam quippe incorporeorum sunt formae, alia praeter corpora esse possunt et separata a corporibus in sua incorporeitate perdurant, ut Deus et angeli, et alia in corporibus et extra corpora, <\*\*\*> ut linea et superficies; quae cum sint incorporea<sup>2</sup> tamen in corporibus ita sunt quod ab illis divelli nequeant et si ab illis separata sint nullo modo permanent.

Apart from the first word *duae*, **A** shows a threefold partition of the incorporeals: see, for instance, *Deus et angeli, in corporibus et extra corpora* and then *linea et superficies*. The main divergence we can observe in **A** is the omission of the words between p. 74, 24 *ut mens* and p. 75, 1 *praeter corpora* (this gap, originating from a *saut du même au même*, should be considered just a mechanical error). Last but not least, the word *duae*, in contrast to the content of the following lines where a threefold division is introduced, is written *in rasura* with a different ink and by the same later hand which adds a marginal annotation. To conclude, here we do not have an agreement of **OA** against **PS**, but simply a disagreement between **O** (the older and ‘more Boethian’ version) and **APS**.

[8.2.] pp. 75, 20 – 76, 3 item probat – substantiam valeat] this bit of text is placed in **P** after p. 76, 19 *inveniri potest*, but omitted by **S**. Moreover, **S** omits the lines (p. 76, 4–6) where we have a divergence between the versions preserved in **OA** on the one hand and **P** on the other. In this passage we do not have, properly speaking, an agreement between **S** and **P**, but different phenomena (replacement or omission of the same portion of text) affecting the same lines. Considering this, we could infer that this portion of text was originally not integrated into the main text, but it was written in the margins or in a *schedula* (a separate parchment sheet); that would explain why the scribe of **S** decided not to copy the text or why he did not find it in his model.

Finally, we have to consider just three examples of agreement between **S** and **O**.

[9.] Agreement **OS** (?): [9.1.] p. 99, 18–23 *sciendum est – de pluribus*] this section is omitted by **O** but placed by **S**, with several intentional modifications,

<sup>1</sup> *Duae* A<sup>p.c.</sup> *in rasura*

<sup>2</sup> *incorporea* A<sup>p.c.</sup>] *in corpora* A<sup>a.c.</sup>

after p. 101, 12 *animalis generalitas* (see the edition of the text). In this case, too, the same bit of text is affected by different phenomena (omission/misplacing) in the manuscripts, which can be explained by a portion of the commentary being preserved in the margins of the original or on a *schedula*. [9.2.] pp. 102, 1 – 103, 16 nunc videndum – sit praedicatur] this long section is omitted by both **O** and **S**. The text, however, is an unoriginal paraphrasis of Boethius' second commentary, which is copied *verbatim*. Here, too, we can imagine the section was added in the margins or on a *schedula* and omitted by the scribes of **O** and **S**. [9.3.] pp. 165, 25 – 166, 2 quia de – est risibile] this section is omitted by **O** and **S**. The section of text is necessary for the logical sequence of the reasoning. The portion of text, however, is short, and the omission can be explained as an interlinear addition in the original omitted by **OS**.

Since, as seen before, there are no cases of agreement of **PS** vs. **OA** [8.], nor of agreement of **OS** vs. **AP** [9.], nothing suggests that there was a lost common ancestor of two or more manuscripts between **α'** and the extant codices.

As already noted by Iwakuma,<sup>1</sup> an important witness for reconstructing the text of P3 is **D** (= Dublin, Trinity College Library 494, ff. 113r–118v). Properly speaking, **D** does not preserve P3 but another *Isagoge* commentary named P15.<sup>2</sup> P15 is a composite commentary, conflating excerpts from P3 and P16.<sup>3</sup> This is the reason why **D** has been collated and used by Iwakuma in the edition of P3. According to Iwakuma's reconstruction "the excerpts in **D** from P3 usually agree with the original version aside from minor variant readings, but there is one place where **D** contains an **A** addition. That is to say, the compiler of P15 used the revised version common to **A**."<sup>4</sup>

The comparison of P15 with the text of **S** can provide some additional important information.<sup>5</sup> As far as I can see, there are at least two cases

<sup>1</sup> Iwakuma 2008, p. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Marenbon 2018, p. 182.

<sup>3</sup> Iwakuma 2008, pp. 48–49; Marenbon 2018, p. 182.

<sup>4</sup> Iwakuma 2008, p. 49.

<sup>5</sup> For P15, here and in the following, I am using Iwakuma's transcription, occasionally

where the text of P15 seems to preserve some traces of the additions that are characteristic of **S**.

The first case is the annotation to p. 112, 13–21 (by the way, this is the only place where according Iwakuma **D** is following the version of **A**). The situation here is complicated by the fact that **S** both reworks the text of the previous versions, and adds some new lines. On the one hand, it is worthy of notice that lines 13–19 *id est in omnibus praedicamentis – unoquoque praedicamento* are omitted by **O**. So, it is not completely correct to say that **D** is following the addition of **A**, because **O** is lacking and **P** preserves an independent version. On the other hand, it is evident that, although they are just a few lines, the annotations preserved by **S** and P15 have some bits of text in common that cannot be found in other codices. In the following table the passages that are common only to P15 and the unpublished section preserved by **S** are underlined. (Major interventions are explained in the footnotes.)

checked against the reproduction of the manuscript. Minor elements in the punctuation have been changed.

p. 112, 13–21 non specialissima – accipiunt duo praedicamenta] | **S p. 84a ll. 36–45**] Vel altero modo dicitur: IN UNOQUOQUE PRAEDICAMENTO, omnibus praedicamentis tantum simul acceptis, quaedam SPECIALISSIMA sunt. Ideo sic exponimus litteram quia, si diceremus in unoquoque praedicamento esse generalissima, cum X sint praedicamenta, ad minus iam essent XX generalissima, quod quidem auctoritas contradicit. Quidam vero dicunt in unoquoque praedicamento II generalissima esse, unum vocale et alterum reale. Quod hic<sup>1</sup> dicatur in unoquoque praedicamento duo genera generalissima esse, unum vocale et aliud reale, non multum habet ponderis nisi<sup>2</sup> praedicamentum accipiatur collective, quia in unoquoque praedicamento non sunt duo generalissima: in re reali enim tantum est unum, in vocali unum. Vel sic potest iungi littera: PLANUM ERIT QUOD DICITUR HOC MODO. IN UNO<QUO>QUE PRAEDICAMENTO (9.10), vel plurale accipitur pro singulari.

P15 (= **D**, f. 116v): IN UNOQUOQUE PRAEDICAMENTO id est in omnibus praedicamentis insimul acceptis quaedam generalissima. Ideo sic exponimus litteram quia, si diceremus in unoquoque praedicamento generalissima, cum decem praedicamenta, iam essent viginti generalissima, quod auctoritas contradicit. Quidam vero dicunt: in unoquoque praedicamento sunt duo generalissima, scilicet unum vocale, aliud reale. Sed non multum habet ponderis, nisi praedicamenta accipiuntur collective<sup>3</sup>. Quidam vero sic exponunt: IN UNOQUOQUE PRAEDICAMENTO, id est in unaquaque praedicamentali collectione SUNT QUAEDAM GENERALISSIMA, et praedicamentalem collectionem ad minus accipiunt duo praedicamenta. Quidam vero sic dicunt quod alio modo facienda est distinctio litterae; hoc modo scilicet PLANUM autem ERIT QUOD DICITUR IN UNOQUOQUE PRAEDICAMENTO, postea vero dicit sunt quaedam generalissima per se; sic disponendo litteram, ut in unoquoque praedicamento sit ‘de’ praecedenti sententia, hic vero sit capitulum alterius sententiae sunt quaedam generalissima etc. Vel accipiatur plurale pro singulari, quod multotiens evenit.

<sup>1</sup>•hic] *correx*i, haec S, *ut videtur*

The second case is more clear, since it is an addition to the printed text and not a different version of it. The similarity of the two texts, as one can see, is exact, although the section shared by the two manuscripts is short:

<p>p. 131, 5 superior eo iudicetur]  S  <b>p. 86b ll. 46–49</b>] <i>add.</i> Nota illud idem  superius esse dictum in descriptione  generis quod DE SPECIE PRAEDICATUR  GENUS (13.1–4), hic vero ad aliud  inducitur<sup>•1</sup>, ut ostendatur modus  praedicationis. †quod†<sup>•2</sup> id est quae  res sit genus, id est quae sit illa res cui  conveniat generalitas, et quae res sit  species, id est cui conveniat  specialitas.</p>	<p>D f. 118r: Nota illud ideo superius  dictum esse in descriptione generis  quod DE SPECIE PRAEDICATUR GENUS,  hic autem aliud inducitur scilicet  ostendatur modus praedicationis.</p>
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A deep and complete study of the relationships between **D** and the different versions of the commentaries is not the aim of the present article, so I will limit myself to a provisional conclusion. **D** seems not to have excerpted the version preserved by **A**, but it presents some unpublished lines that are in **S** only: potentially, P15 could have extracted its text from a model which already contained some additions that are characteristic of **S**. This should not sound so strange if we consider that another addition peculiar to **S**, the addition to p. 118, 30, occurs almost identically in the margins of the manuscript preserving P14.<sup>3</sup>

#### 4 Textual features of S

In this section I will take into account some cases that could give us an idea about the model of **S** and some of its features. As emerged from the

<sup>2</sup>•nisi] *correx* ex P15, *probante Girard*, ubi S

<sup>3</sup>•collective] *correx*, collectionem D

<sup>1</sup>•inducitur] *correx* ex P15, indicitur S

<sup>2</sup>•quod] <in> quid *Girard*, *recte, ut videtur*

<sup>3</sup> See the commentary to the annotation to p. 118, 30.

collation of the manuscript, several cases can be found where, with no apparent reason, one or more words are omitted and a blank space is left in **S**. In what follows I quote just the most relevant examples (blank spaces between two words are marked with asterisks):

[10.] p. 63, 10 modis] *om.* S || p. 83, 8 subnixus] *om.* S || p. 93, 24 tres] *om.* S || p. 100, 9 individuorum] \*\*\* duorum S || p. 114, 14–16 homo aliud – Plato et ceteri] omne scilicet animal homo homo animal \*\*\* animal Plato etc. || p. 126, 13 quae res \*\*\* in tate] *add.* S || p. 132, 10 autem] *om.* S || p. 139, 20 ut nasi curvitas et cicatrix oculorum eo \*\*\* ex vulnere] *add.* S (see the Boethian translation of the *Isagoge* quoted in the commentary) || p. 148, 19 aquilum autem et simum] *om.* S || p. 158, 15 ex aere] *om.* S || p. 159, 16 proportionaliter] portio \*\*\* S || p. 161, 19–22 quod est esse rei id est pars [19.7–8] \*\*\* essentiae rei S (see text and commentary) || p. 161, 24 suum] *om.* S || p. 169, 12 nigrum] *om.* S || p. 176, 20 litteram] *om.* S || p. 180, 23 genera] *om.* S || p. 181, 28 supervadunt] superna \*\*\* S || p. 192, 27 curtatum] *om.* S || p. 194, 25 autem] *om.* S || p. 195, 1 species a proprio] species a proprio \*\*\* ostendit S.

As one can easily imagine, the scribe omitted these words, leaving blank spaces, because his model was difficult to read and decipher.<sup>1</sup> That is no wonder if we remember that manuscripts of twelfth-century logical commentaries are often poor and lower quality manuscripts, with a large amount of abbreviations and a minute text.<sup>2</sup> It is easy to imagine that the model of **S** was such a codex and that the scribe, facing the difficult handwriting of his model, from time to time could not decipher some words of the text he was copying.

Starting from some intentional additions preserved in **S** only, I would like to shed some new light on the fluid nature of twelfth-century commentaries. After the studies of Iwakuma, a complete collation of **S** will allow us to better recognise the innovative character of **P** as well as to identify some specific additions by **A**.<sup>3</sup> I will now inspect more carefully

<sup>1</sup> For a similar phenomenon see Grondeux and Rosier-Catach (*Notae Dunelmenses* 2017, vol. 1, pp. 20–21).

<sup>2</sup> See §1 and Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, p. 221.

<sup>3</sup> See above, [5.] and [6.].

how the master of **S** innovated with respect to the text of his model. There are some cases where portions of text added by **S** seem to be, so to say, a “foreign body” in the context of the former text. In the following examples additions by **S** are printed in brackets or, if too long, marked by three asterisks in brackets. (In what follows, the most important steps of the reasoning are underlined in order to help the reader to follow the logical sequence of the text and spot the added words.)

[11.] p. 61, 10–15: Licet enim idem sit genus et species, eadem vero res sit species et accidens, quando tamen agit de generibus, non agit secundum illam proprietatem quod species sunt, sed secundum illam tantum quod generalitatem suscipiunt [respectu inferiorum; tunc quando agit de speciebus, non agit secundum hoc quod genera esse possunt, sed secundum hoc quod specialitatem suscipiunt respectu superiorum]; rursus cum eadem res sit species et accidens, quando agit de accidentibus, non agit de eis secundum hoc quod species sunt, sed secundum hoc quod accidentia sunt; et eodem modo de ceteris. In this case, the standard text of P3 is marked by a perfect parallelism: *idem sit genus et species/ quando agit de generibus; eadem res sit species et accidens/ quando agit de accidentibus*. The bit of text preserved by **S**, starting with *quando agit de speciebus*, modifies this parallelism and seems to have been introduced just for analysing every detail in more depth. || p. 64, 25: Ad eam vero quae substantialis est cognitio generis et differentiae utilis est. [\*\*\*] Ipsa enim, ut dictum est, ex genere et huiusmodi differentiis constituitur. After having distinguished between different descriptions, the standard version of P3 says that for substantial description the knowledge of genus and differentia can be useful. *Ipsa enim* (that is to say, the *substantialis definitio*) is composed of genus and differences. Now, if we read the text after the long addition preserved by **S**, it is impossible to understand the link between *ipsa enim* and the *substantialis definitio*. || p. 101, 8–10 [the text is preserved by **A** and **S**]: Sed ita ei respondendum est quod haec generalitas quae est in animali nihil aliud est quam generalitas animalis, et generalitas animalis adiacet pluribus, quare non est individuum. [Omne enim individuum accidens uni soli rei adiacet; sed generalitas animalis adiacet pluribus; quare non est individuum.] The addition preserved by **S** is just a detailed explication of the same syllogism which can be found above. ||p. 124, 12–15: Littera sic continuatur et legitur. In ascensu conveniunt genera et familiae, sed in hoc differunt quod in familiis quidem plerumque omnes familiae reducuntur ad

unum principium hoc est ad unum supremum patrem [Nota per similitudinem esse dictum: non enim omnes familiae ad Iovem reducuntur, sed in veritate ad unum supremum patrem, ut Adam, vel Deucalionem fabulose], verbi gratia ut supradictae familiae reducuntur ad unum supremum patrem, scilicet ad Iovem. Here the addition preserved by **S** interrupts the logical concatenation of the standard version. In this case the name of Jupiter provided the opportunity to point out that all human families can be traced back not to Jupiter, but to Adam (according to the sacred history) or Deucalion (according to pagan mythology). || p. 119, 5–8: quidquid enim fundatur in prima substantia alicui secundae substantiae supposita, fundatur in illa secunda substantia [Item haec regula “quidquid fundatur in prima substantia, fundatur in secunda,” sic est intelligenda: quidquid fundatur in prima substantia alicuius secundae substantiae eo respectu et eo nomine quo designatur esse prima substantia illius secundae, fundatur in secunda]. As already seen before, in this case too the addition preserved by **S** is just an attempt to explain fully and in every detail a syllogism which was presented in a shorter form in the standard text.

In these examples we can notice quite clearly that the commentary P3 is a text *in fieri* in all the manuscripts. That means that the masters responsible for the different additions felt free to add sections of text to integrate or better explain the former version of the *Isagoge* commentary. Anyway, if we compare variants in **S** to the standard version, it emerges that the most common innovations of our manuscript are additions, omissions, and minor textual phenomena (one-word omissions; changes in the order of the words), whereas the tendency to rewrite or modify the text seems not so marked. The additions can easily be considered a “second layer text”,<sup>1</sup> as examples of steps within a constant re-elaboration of the logical tradition on the margins of *Isagoge* starting with Boethius.

Within the additions to the standard text preserved by **S**, there is one case which can be interesting for understanding how some annotations were added to the main text:

<sup>1</sup> For logical commentaries as “layered compositions” or texts with a “layered character” see Marenbon 2011, pp. 186, 197–198; *Notae Dunelmenses* 2017, p. 262: “les commentaires ... se présentaient tous comme des textes évolutifs et stratifiés”.



[12.] In the published text of the commentary (p. 131, 5), after an explanation of the lemma ‘*de specie praedicatur genus*’ (13.1–4), we find an asyntactical word (*quod*) and an explanatory sentence: *id est quae res sit genus, id est quae sit illa res cui conveniat generalitas, et quae res sit species, id est cui conveniat specialitas*. Some lines after that (p. 131, 8), after the lemma ‘*assignato genere et specie*’, *id est assignato ‘quid utrumque sit’*, the manuscript exhibits an almost identical annotation: *id est quae res sit genus, scilicet quae res sit illa cui conveniat generalitas et quid sit species, id est quae res sit cui conveniat specialitas*. It is quite evident that these two different annotations are a duplicate. Moreover, the words fit with the standard commentary of p. 131, 8: *quae res* and *quid sit genus* are to be considered as explanations of *utrumque*, whereas this bit of text is inserted with no evident reason into the commentary on p. 131, 5. Another element to be noted is that the lines are added to p. 131, 5 after a word (*quod*) which does not seem to make sense in this context; moreover, this word seems to be completely unnecessary, since it is followed by *id est*. We could explain this *quod* as the result of a misunderstanding of a cross-reference mark inserted for creating a link with an annotation added in the margin.<sup>1</sup> So, at least in the case of annotations of minor extension, we can imagine that some additions were born as marginal notes.<sup>2</sup>

This hypothesis, however, cannot be adopted for all the additions preserved by **S** and other manuscripts. For some portions of text preserved by **S** are too long to fit in the margins of a manuscript.<sup>3</sup> In a similar way, **P** preserves a number of additions that are too long for being considered a marginal note.<sup>4</sup> The same can be said about **A**; its additions, in at least two cases, are too long for the margins of a codex.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, these

<sup>1</sup> I owe this suggestion to Caterina Tarlazzi.

<sup>2</sup> Examples of marginal additions are attested in still extant manuscripts: see e.g. the case of P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 7v), preserving near the main text an addition from an S-version of P3 (see annotation to p. 118, 30 and commentary).

<sup>3</sup> See for example the additions of **S** at p. 112, 13; 133, 3; 116, 24; 126, 13; 135, 24; 138, 7; 164, 1.

<sup>4</sup> See for example the additions of **P** at pp. 61, 25 – 62, 23; p. 69, 18–33; p. 155, 6–28; p. 166, 6–19; pp. 167, 5 – 168, 4.

<sup>5</sup> See for example **A**, p. 101, 6–18; pp. 171, 1 – 172, 16.

additions are quite long and complex from the theoretical point of view, so it is unlikely that they are improvised integrations added to the base text. As material support for such additions, we could imagine, theoretically, wax tablets or other provisional supports during the different phases of elaboration preceding the final draft.<sup>1</sup> But it is difficult to imagine a dozen wooden tablets containing about fifty “additional notes” linked to the main text with cross-reference marks, since it would have been too difficult to find where to place the note again. The best way to imagine the material shape of the codex containing the original text once integrated with the different second- (or third-) layer additions is a manuscript containing some inserted parchment sheets.<sup>2</sup>

### 5 The text of S and the current edition of P3

The collation of a new manuscript is a laborious ordeal which can also have some welcome surprises. It is well known that **P** ends abruptly while commenting on the text of *Isag.* 28.14.<sup>3</sup> After this point, based on the manuscripts **O** and **A** only, Iwakuma was aware of the need to correct the text conjecturally. In several of these cases the reading of **S** confirmed the need for an intervention on the text of the manuscripts or validated Iwakuma’s conjectures. See the following cases:

<sup>1</sup> The use of wax tablets in antiquity is well known and studied, whereas there are much fewer modern studies concerning the use of wax tablets in the Middle Ages; see Lalou 1989; Lalou 1992; Brown 1994, p. 8. See in particular Lalou 1989, pp. 130–131 for the use of wax tablets in the schools and Lalou 1989, p. 133: “une grand partie de celles-ci étaient utilisées comme support de brouillons”. Here Lalou also quotes several examples of wax tablets as support for the first draft of a work to be copied on parchment once finished: “le diable en personne brisa les tablettes de saint Anselme de Cantorbéry parce qu’elles contenaient le brouillon d’un écrit qui lui était préjudiciable.” And on p. 134: “le parchemin était donc trop cher pour qu’on l’employât pour le brouillon”.

<sup>2</sup> For some *schedulae* at the origin of the *Notae Dunelmenses* see Grondeux and Rosier-Catach (*Notae Dunelmenses* 2017, pp. 21–22).

<sup>3</sup> See Iwakuma 2008, p. 192.

[13.] p. 194, 19 *perficiunt* <aliam rem individualem>] *suppl. Iwakuma, perficiunt alium individuum S* || p. 194, 30 <quod>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet S* || p. 195, 36 <de>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet S* || p. 196, 4 <et>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet S* || p. 196, 18 <in>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet S* || p. 196, 25 <proprium>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet S*.

## 6 Collation of S

As already said, this article aims to integrate the already existing edition of P3 with the information to be obtained from the collation of S. To identify the unpublished sections and evaluate which text is shared with other manuscripts, the codex of Sankt Gallen has been collated with the edition prepared by Iwakuma. This edition is the base text used for the collation of S. After the page and line number of Iwakuma's edition, I indicate the word or words affected by variants, and after a square bracket the words by S are printed.

To render all the information accessible to the reader, the collation is printed as an appendix at the end of the edition of the Latin text. Only the complicated transpositions of S (p. 92b) are also reported in the pages containing the edition. Minor textual variants are annotated in the collation only. Merely graphical variants are not registered. For the sake of clarity, the bits of text that are preserved by just one manuscript (A, O or P) and omitted by S are indicated with *om.* (= *omisit*). For the same reason, cases where S agrees with two other manuscripts against a third one are indicated (for instance, S = OA vs P), so that the reader can know which version of the text S is following. In the same way, when the square bracket is followed by *add. S* without any further indication, that means that this passage is affected by one of the additions published in the article.

## 7 Principles of the edition

Since this text is conceived as a supplement to the edition of P3 published by Iwakuma, the text formatting of the Latin annotations is very similar to the main edition of P3.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See also Iwakuma 2008, p. 58.

PASSAGES IN CAPITALS are quotations from Boethius' translation of the *Isagoge*, in lemmata as well as in paraphrastic sections. For the Boethian translation, I use the reference edition by L. Minio Paluello.<sup>1</sup> Other editions of Boethius or medieval texts are quoted in the bibliography.

*Passages in italics* are quotations from Boethius' second commentary of the *Isagoge*.

Before every annotation the exact passage of S (folio and line number) where the text is preserved is indicated.

If the annotation is simply added to the printed text, after the reference to the page and line number of Iwakuma's edition, the last two words of the standard text of P3 that precede the unpublished annotation are quoted, and the siglum "add." precedes the Latin. In other cases, the annotation in S substitutes the text of P3 as printed by Iwakuma; in such cases the first and the last words of the text affected by the variant are given without the siglum "add."

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<sup>1</sup> See the edition in the series *Aristoteles Latinus* I.6–7 (Porphyry 1966).

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## LATIN TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

S = Sankt Gallen 134, pp. 77a–96a.

p. 60, 4 praedicamentorum cognitionem] |S p. 77a ll. 3–8| *add.* Quidam dicunt Porphyrium tantum intendere de his vocibus quae sunt ‘genus’ ‘species’ et cetera, vel de vocibus significatis<sup>1</sup> ab his vocibus quae sunt ‘genus’ et cetera, et de hac voce quae est ‘animal’ et ‘lapis’, ducti hac occasione quod iste liber est introductorius ad *Praedicamenta*: ibi vero intendit Aristoteles de vocibus, ergo hic Porphyrius debet agere de vocibus. Sed non valet, quia per naturam rerum bene ostendit naturam vocum, et etiam praedicamentum aliud reale, aliud vocale; et etiam Aristoteles cum de vocibus intendat, transferendo se ad res, per naturam rerum ostendit naturam vocum.

TRANSL.: Porphyry – some people say – wishes to discuss only the words (*voces*) ‘genus’, ‘species’, and so on; or <he wishes to discuss> words signified by the words ‘genus’, ‘species’, and so on, and this <particular> word ‘animal’ and <this particular word> ‘stone’. They have been induced <to this claim> by the fact that this book is an introduction to the *Categories*; and in the *Categories*, Aristotle wishes to discuss words, so in this work Porphyry must speak of words. But that reasoning is not correct, for <Aristotle> correctly shows the nature of the words through the nature of the things. Also, among the categories, there is both a real one (*reale*), and a vocal one (*vocale*); also Aristotle, when he wishes to discuss words, moves to <discussing> things, and, through the nature of things, he shows the nature of words.

COMMENTARY: The prologue of P3 provides several preliminary remarks to the commentary. This preface discusses a set of particular questions, which are concerned with *intentio*, *materia*, *utilitas* and “to what part of

<sup>1</sup>•significatis] *correx*i, significans S

philosophy the treatise belongs” (*cui parti supponatur*). Iwakuma underlines a series of similarities with the prologues of C8 and H11 (Iwakuma 2008, p. 50). This prefatory schema, however, is not typical of medieval commentaries only, but can be traced back to Boethius. In his second commentary on the *Isagoge*, indeed, we find a discussion about the following points: **a.** to what part of philosophy the treatise belongs (*In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>; pp. 140, 13 – 143, 7); **b.** what the title of the work means (pp. 143, 8 – 146, 25); **c.** what the aim of the treatise is (*intentio*; pp. 146, 26 – 147, 4); **d.** the utility of the work (pp. 147, 17 – 149, 2). In doing so, Boethius is deeply indebted to the *schemata isagogica* of the Alexandrian tradition: πρόθεσις or σκοπός corresponds to the *intentio*; χρήσιμον to *utilitas*; αἴτιον τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς to *titulus*; and ὑπὸ ποῖον μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀνάγεται to *pars philosophiae* (see Mansfeld 1994, pp. 10–11). Medieval commentaries on the *Isagoge* seem to use Boethius as a basic model for the set of questions to be settled before commenting on the text: see for instance *Excerpta Isagogarum* (P2, p. 3, 5–9): *praedocent enim quae sit cuiuscumque operis intentio, quae utilitas, qui ordo, si eius proprius germanusque liber sit cuius dicitur esse, quae sit eius operis inscriptio et ad quam partem philosophiae cuiuscumque libri ducatur intentio*; *Excerpta Pommersfeldiana* (P4, Iwakuma 1992, pp. 103–104), with the set of headings *intentio*, *titulus*, and *cui parti supponatur*; *Editio super Porphyrium* (P5, pp. 3–4), where we find *intentio*, *titulus*, and *utilitas*; *Disputata Porphyrii* (Iwakuma 1992, p. 74): *intentio*, *materia*, *cui parti supponitur*, and *titulus*; Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus, Isag.* (P10, pp. 1–3): *cui parti supponitur*, *inscriptio*, *materia*, *intentio*, *modus tractandi*, and *utilitas*; *LNPS, Isag.* (P12, pp. 505–509): *intentio*, *materia*, *modus tractandi*, and *utilitas*.

Porphyry’s intention – say the *quidam* that are confuted here – is threefold: Porphyry is dealing **a.** with *voces*, that is to say, the words ‘genus’, ‘species’, and so on; **b.** with the *voces* that are signified by these *voces* (for instance, ‘animal’, ‘homo’, etc.); and **c.** with particular *voces* (*de hac voce*) that are proffered in a specific context or moment. Some similarities can be found in *Excerpta Pommersfeldiana* (P4 in Iwakuma 1992, pp. 103, 2–3): *intentio Porphyrii est tractare de vocibus quinque non*

*significatis sed significantibus alias voces.* In this case, as often in the following, the most similar parallel is to be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 1ra–rb): *volunt tamen quidem Porphyrium agere de his vocibus quae sunt genus et species et cetera, vel de vocibus significatis ab istis, i.e. de hac voce ‘animal’ hac ‘lapis’ et cetera, ponentes hanc causam quod liber iste est introductio ad Praedicamenta, in quibus agitur de vocibus. Sed non valet, quia tanta affinitas est inter res et voces quod voces contrahunt suas proprietates |1rb| ex rebus, et ideo per naturam rerum familiariter ostenditur natura vocum. Inde etiam Aristoteles, cum intendat de vocibus, transferendo se ad res per naturam rerum multotiens aperit proprietates vocum. Item cum praedicamentum aliud reale aliud vocale sit, recte per naturam unius declaratur proprietas alterius.* Concerning the expression *per naturam rerum bene ostendit naturam vocum*, see C14 (Assisi 573, f. 19ra): *per naturas rerum sicut supradictum est aperiat proprietates vocis*; in the same commentary we find the distinction between *praedicamentum reale* and *vocale*, see C14 (Assisi 573, f. 25ra): *vocali praedicamento*. For the distinction between something taken as *nomen rerum* and as *nomen vocum* in C8 see Rosier-Catach (2008, p. 128); a similar passage in S can be found in the annotation to p. 112, 22. The infinitive *intendere* indicates the *intentio* of the author as distinct from his subject matter; for *intendere* governing *tractare* see Abelard (*Dial.*, p. 111, 27): *vocum significatio ... de qua intendimus; ibid.* (p. 536, 9–10): *de his namque tantum ... Boethius intendit.*

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pp. 60, 14 – 61, 7 dicitur – ipsius rei] *om.* S

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p. 61, 13 quod generalitatem suscipiunt] |S p. 77a ll. 15–16| *add.* respectu inferiorum; tunc quando agit de speciebus, non agit secundum hoc quod genera esse possunt, sed secundum hoc quod specialitatem suscipiunt respectu superiorum.

TRANSL.: [when Porphyry is discussing the genera, he does not discuss them according to their capacity to be species, but only according to their capacity to admit the *generalitas*] with reference to inferior things; and when he is tackling the species, he does not discuss them according to their capacity to be genera, but according to their capacity to admit the *specialitas* with reference to superior things.

COMMENTARY: The section added to the prologue is a paraphrastic rewriting of the published text: the same element can be a genus as well as a species; depending on the context, it can be defined as genus or as a species. For a parallel to this see P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 1rb): *quando tractat de genere agit de eo secundum hoc quod habet habitudinem respectu speciei, quando de specie secundum quod habet habitudinem ad suum genus, quando de accidenti secundum hoc quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem, et sic de ceteris.*

p. 64, 25 differentiae utilis est] |S p. 77b ll. 17–27| *add.* Videndum quod <de><sup>1</sup> sua materia duobus modis agit, scilicet secundum relationem et secundum propriam essentiam. Et <in><sup>2</sup> definitionibus harum rerum agit secundum relationem, in communitatibus agit et secundum relationem et secundum propriam essentiam.

Quidam dicunt individuum esse de sua materia, sed sciendum quinque res tantum esse suam materiam, quia quando de individuo agit<sup>3</sup>, incidenter agit. Obiciunt praedicamenta igitur non constitui ex individuis, quia cum Porphyrius sit introductorius ad *Praedicamenta*, agendo de eis quae constituunt praedicamenta, et non agat de individuis, constans est secundum illos individua non constituere praedicamenta. Sed non procedit, quia licet non agat de omnibus quae<sup>4</sup> constituunt praedicamenta, tamen bene est introductorius ad *Praedicamenta*.

<sup>1</sup>•de] *supplevi*

<sup>2</sup>•in] *add. Iwakuma*

<sup>3</sup>•quando de individuo agit] *corr. Girard*, quodque individuum agit *S*

<sup>4</sup>•quae] *Iwakuma*, non *S*

Modus vero tractandi talis est quod primum de unaquaque re agit, postea vero de eis communiter agendo dat inter eas communitatem et differentiam.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: Porphyry tackles his subject matter in two ways, namely, according to relation and according to <each thing's> own essence. In the definitions of these things (= genus, species, difference, proprium, and accident), he discusses <the issue> according to the relation; in the <section on> common features, he discusses <it> both according to relation and according to <each thing's> own essence.

Some people say that the individual belongs to Porphyry's subject matter, but we must keep in mind that five things only (= genus, species, difference, proprium, and accident) are his subject matter: when Porphyry discusses individuals, he discusses them in an accidental way. But then they object that the categories are not constituted by individuals: because, given that Porphyry is introducing the *Categories*, speaking of the things that constitute categories, and does not discuss individuals, it is clear – they say – that individuals do not constitute the categories. However, such reasoning does not go through: although he does not speak of everything that constitutes the categories, he is still introducing the *Categories*.

<Porphyry's> way of treating the subject matter is the following: first, he speaks of each thing (= genus, species, difference, proprium, and accident); then, discussing them together, he explains the commonalities and differences among them.

COMMENTARY: Text. The knowledge of genus and difference – we read in the text of P3 (p. 64, 24–26) – is important for substantial definition: the latter, indeed (*ipsa enim*), is constituted by genus and differences. The addition is inserted here by S between the *substantialis definitio* and the following sentence, which starts with *ipsa*. This breaks the thread of the reasoning as presented by P3. Therefore, these lines can be considered a “second layer addition” originating from a line of reasoning that was added later.

Philosophical content. Porphyry's discussion is defined as twofold: in a first section (§§ 1–12) Porphyry tackles his subject matter *secundum relationem*; in the rest of the treatise he discusses it *secundum relationem* as well as *secundum essentiam*. The content of this note can be organised as follows: 1. The individual – some people say (*quidam dicunt*) – belongs to Porphyry's subject matter; 2. The *adnotator* replies (*sed sciendum*): the subject matter of the *Isagoge* is only the five predicables, and Porphyry discusses individuals *incidenter*; 3. Objection (*obiciunt*): if the subject matter of Porphyry's *Isagoge* is only the five predicables, and the point of Porphyry's *Isagoge* is to introduce the *Categories*, and therefore to discuss what constitutes a category, then individuals do not constitute a category; 4. Final reply (*sed non procedit*): Porphyry provides an introduction to the *Categories*, but he does not discuss everything that constitutes a category. For the same issue concerning the structure of the treatise, see the addition of **P** to P3 (p. 69, 10–12): *de individuo non tractet. Sed hoc ideo facit quia istis quinque vocibus cognitis individuorum facilis est notitia*; see also P3 (pp. 61, 25 – 62, 23; addition of **P**), with the discussion of the *quidam*.

As far it concerns the *materia* of the treatise, the *adnotator* shares a very similar position to P3 and identifies the five *voces* as Porphyry's subject matter (P3, p. 68, 12): *materia sunt genus species differentia proprium et accidens*. On this point the *adnotator* shares the position that identifies the five predicables with Porphyry's subject matter: see *Excerpta Pommersfeldiana* (P4, p. 103, 10): *de quinque significantibus tractare vocibus*; Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus, Isag.* (P10, p. 2, 23): *tractando de quinque quae sunt eius materia*; LNPS, *Isag.* (P12, p. 509, 22): *materia sunt illa quinque nomina in quae agit*. That means that individuals are excluded from the five predicables. However, in several sources individuals are considered as the sixth predicable tackled by Porphyry: P7 (Iwakuma 1992, p. 74, 19–20): *materia vero huius operis sunt illae sex voces, scilicet genus species differentia proprium accidens individuum*; P5 (p. 3, 20): *huius operis sunt materia istae sex voces et earum significata*.

p. 85, 14 multiplicem significationem] |S p. 80b ll. 29–30| *add.* Hic accipitur ‘genus’ materiale impositum vel secundum aliam sententiam nomen ipsarum rerum.

TRANSL.: Here ‘genus’ is understood as *materiale impositum* or, according to another opinion, as the name of the things.

COMMENTARY: Philosophical content. This annotation is added before the commentary on *Isag.* 6.2 (*videtur autem neque genus neque species simpliciter dici*). The genus here is to be taken as *materiale impositum*. As highlighted by Rosier-Catach (2003, pp. 21–55), the mention of *materiale impositum* often occurs in twelfth-century authors involved in the grammatical tradition: see Petrus Helias, *Summa super Priscianum* (vol. 1, p. 193, 78–83): *hic enim non de nomine loquimur, sed potius de hoc nomine ‘homo’. Et hoc appellabant antiqui ‘materiale impositum’ quod quid sit ut intelligas, materiale impositum est vox representans seipsam id est posita ad loquendum de se ipsa et dicitur materiale impositum quia nomen, si ita contingit, representat materiam suam, id est vocem quae quasi materia preiacet ut inde fiat nomen; ibid.* (vol. 2, p. 914, 17–20): *appellant autem antiqui materiale impositum quando nomen imponitur ad agendum de sua materia id est de ipsa voce, ut cum dico “homo est nomen”, ibi nomen ‘homo’ est materiale impositum qua imponitur ad agendum de sua materia, id est de ipsa voce, quia vox est materia nominis; see also Notae Dunelmenses VIII.38 (p. 43, 471–473): accipi potest ‘tempus’ in designatione temporis ut sit materiale impositum; ibid.* (p. 43, 490); II.22 (p. 108, 47–49): *“homo est species” et similiter de qualibet alia nominali voce, et est in praedicta propositione ‘homo’ materiale impositum.* This theory is based on the distinction between vocal matter (vox) and form, that is to say, signification.



p. 93, 16 in hac descriptione generis] |S p. 81b ll. 34–37| *add.* Et non agitur hic de<sup>1</sup> praedicationibus, ut fundamentum de suo accidente vel minus de maiori vel accidens de suo accidente dicitur ut cum dicimus<sup>2</sup> ‘quidam †abunduntur’ †<sup>3</sup>.

TRANSL.: He does not speak of predications here, such as <predicating> the foundation of its accident, or the less of the more, or the accident of its accident, like when we say †...†.

COMMENTARY: Parallels. P3’s text, commenting on *Isag.* 6.25 (cf. Boeth., *In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 183, 15 – 187, 21), distinguishes between predication *secundum accidens* and predication *secundum substantiam*; the latter, in turn, is divided into predication *in quid* and predication *in quale*. A similar distinction can be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 4ra–va). In this case, however, we have a different taxonomy: P14 divides predication *in quale* into *secundum substantiam* and *secundum accidens*.

The text added here by S shows several similarities with P14 (f. 4va): *de praedicatione autem, ubi minus de maiore, vel subiectum de accidenti vel de proprio vel de differentia, vel aequivocum de suis significatis vel e converso, vel coaccidens de suo coaccidenti, vel si qua est alia, hic non agit.*

Text. Concerning *de praedicationibus*, Tarlazzi suggests the integration <irregularibus>, quoting the parallel from P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 5ra): *nam individua videntur praedicari de pluribus, ut Socrates de hoc albedine et de hac crispitudine et de hac musica, quae insunt ei. Sed non est regularis praedicatio, quia subiectum de accidenti hic praedicatur; ibid. (f. 9ra): cum enim proprium de specie praedicatur, regularis est praedicatio; cum vero species de proprio, irregularis est praedicatio, quia sicut minus non praedicatur de maiori regulariter, ita illud quod subiacet alii ut proprio fundamentum si de eo praedicatur, irregularis est praedicatio.*

<sup>1</sup>de <irregularibus> *suppl.* Tarlazzi collato P14 f. 9ra

<sup>2</sup>cum dicimus] *difficile lectu*

<sup>3</sup>quidam abunduntur] S, ‘quoddam album <est> durum’ *corr.* Girard

In the last line of the text there is an evident copy mistake in the words *quidam abunduntur*, which is not Latin. From the parallel with P14 we can infer this passage is about predication *coaccidens de suo coaccidenti*. Subsequently, Girard's correction *quoddam album <est> durum* becomes probable; for the terms 'white' and 'hard' as examples of *coaccidentia* see Abelard (*Dial.* p. 578, 22–23): *haec autem illa est quae accidens in coaccidentia distribuit hoc modo: "album aliud durum, aliud molle."*

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p. 93, 17–21 item dicendum – species specialissimae] |S p. 81b ll. 38–40| Item dicendum quod illa quae praedicantur alia de uno solo, alia de pluribus. De uno solo, sicut individua. Illa quae praedicantur de pluribus, alia praedicantur de pluribus speciebus, alia vero minime, ut species specialissimae.

TRANSL.: We have to say that among things that are predicated some are predicated of one element only, some of many <elements>. Predicated of one only: for example individuals. Among things that are predicated of many elements, some are predicated of many species, some are not, like for instance the most specific species.

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p. 95, 3 sedens est Socrates] |S p. 82a ll. 15–18| *add.* Vel sic: 'Socrates est <hoc>•<sup>1</sup> album' et 'haec manus est hoc album', hoc•<sup>2</sup> est•<sup>3</sup>: 'albedo'•<sup>4</sup> praedicatur de pluribus, scilicet de manu et de Socrate, sed figurative•<sup>5</sup>; quia gratia manus praedicatur haec albedo de Socrate, et de figurativis•<sup>6</sup> praedicationibus hic non agitur. Vel sic: 'Socrates est hoc album' et 'haec albedo <est hoc album>•<sup>7</sup>', haec albedo praedicatur hic de Socrate et de

<sup>1</sup>•hoc] *suppl. Girard*

<sup>2</sup>•hoc] *haec aut <hic> haec Girard*

<sup>3</sup>•est] *an cum legendum?*

<sup>4</sup>•albedo] *an <haec> albedo supplendum?*

<sup>5</sup>•figurative] *an significative legendum?*

<sup>6</sup>•figurativis] *an significativis legendum?*

<sup>7</sup>•est hoc album] *suppl. Girard probante Tarlazzi*

hac albedine, sed non eodem modo praedicationis, quia de Socrate in adiacentia et de albedine in substantia.

TRANSL.: Or like this: “Socrates is this white thing” and “this hand is this white thing”; here this whiteness is predicated of different things, that is to say, of the hand and of Socrates; but <it is predicated> in a figurative way, because this whiteness is predicated of Socrates because of his hand; and, here, <Porphyry> is not dealing with figurative predications. Or like this: “Socrates is this white thing” and “this whiteness <is this white thing>”; here this whiteness is predicated of Socrates and of this <particular> whiteness; but <it is> not <predicated> using the same type of predication, because in the case of Socrates <it is predicated> *in adiacentia*, in the case of whiteness it is predicated *in substantia*.

COMMENTARY: This section is added by **S** to the commentary on *Isag.* 6.25–7.3 (concerning the threefold meaning of the term *genus*). P3 (p. 94, 24) discusses the case of individuals that are predicated of more general concepts, as for instance Socrates being predicated of whiteness and seating. In this case – in the version of the commentary edited by Iwakuma – Porphyry tackles the predication *ubi accidens praedicatur de suo fundamento* or *secundum substantiam*; the proposition *hic albus est Socrates* (p. 95, 1), however, is not related to them.

Text. The manuscript reads *figurative* and, some lines after, *de figurativis praedicationibus*; in such cases the palaeographical abbreviation can easily be misinterpreted as *significative*. This alternation *significative/figurative* often creates problems for editors, see Abelard, *Gloss. Cat.* (p. 175, 35–40); *Dialectica* (p. 69, 22): *sic autem, “chimaera est opinabilis” significative intellegitur, cum non forma aliqua chimaerae, quae non est, attribuitur (significative corr. De Rijk, figurative V)*; see also Abelard, *Glossae super Peri hermeneias* 100 (p. 124, 728–730): *sicut enim figurative (significansem A) dicimus “chimaera est opinabilis”, vel “chimaera excogitatur”, non videlicet aliquid attribuentes chimaerae sed magis intelligentes aliquem opinari eam, ita nihil impedit et non figurative (haec significansem A) ad aliquem sensum transferri*.

Parallels. Here we have some interesting similarities with the text of P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813 f. 5ra): *iterum potest obici individuum praedicari de pluribus, ut hic “Socrates est hoc album” et “haec albedo est hoc album.” Sed non valet, quia non est idem modus praedicandi, quia licet eadem res praedicatur, tamen diversus modus est: praedicatio in essentia et in adiacentia.*

For a distinction between predication *in adiacentia* and *in substantia* see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus, Perih.* (pp. 360, 33 – 361, 2): *in essentia vero non potest vere album Socrati copulari, ut scilicet dicatur “Socrates est albedo.” Unde ut et album copuletur in adiacentia et secundum substantivum ‘album’ coniunctio essentiae vere ponatur, adiectivum quod est album, coniungitur verbo quod et formam quam significat adiacenter praedicet et fundamentum quod nominat, essentialiter secundum albedinem tantum praedicet, quod in ea tantum vi, ut dictum est, poni intenditur.*

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p. 100, 10–18 alii vero dicunt – tamen notanda est] |S pp. 82b l. 46 – 83a l. 1| Vel potest dici quod ‘Socrates’ ibi significat socratitatem, quandam summam quae efficitur coniunctione speciei et accidentium. Illi vero qui dicunt omnia individua de aliquo praedicari, idem de se ipso praedicari concedunt. Faciunt enim huiusmodi praedicationem: ‘hic homo Socrates est’ ubi eadem res de <se><sup>1</sup> ipsa praedicatur; sed dicunt: licet diversitas <non><sup>2</sup> sit in re, in vocibus tamen notanda est.

TRANSL.: Alternatively, one can say: here ‘Socrates’ means Socrateity, that is to say, a sum originating from the combination of species and accidents. Those who say that all individuals are predicated of something admit that one and the same thing can be predicated of itself. They make a predication like this: “this man is Socrates”, where one and the same thing is predicated of itself; then they say: although there is no difference in the thing, still there is a difference to be noted in the *voces*.

<sup>1</sup>•<se> *supplevi*

<sup>2</sup>•<non> *suppl. Girard; an absit pro sit corrigendum?*

COMMENTARY: Commenting on *Isag.* 7.2, **S** preserves a section which differs from the printed text (p. 100, 10–18). Distancing itself from the *alii* of P3, this additional passage of **S** says that ‘Socrates’ signifies *socratitas*, that is to say, the individual form originating from the combination of species and accidents.

Parallels. The most interesting similarity can be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 5rb): *sed contra illi dicunt quod Socrates non est ibi appositum nisi exemplum individuorum, scilicet quod Socrates est individuum; vel potest dici quod Socrates sit ibi sumptum a Socracitate, i.e. individuali forma Socratis, quae efficitur ex coniunctione speciei et accidentium, et illa praedicatur de suo fundamento: “Socrates est Socrates.” Qui vero dicunt de omnibus [esse dictum], accipiunt large praedicari de uno solo, ita scilicet vel de uno fundamento vel de ipso. For socratitas as a collection of accidents see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus, Isag.* (pp. 64, 25 – 65, 11): *et hi quoque socratitatem totam accidentium collectionem vocant. Nec tunc socratitas una res est per naturam, sed compositum individuum. Hi vero qui socratitatem vocant proprietatem ex accidentibus, in natura eam individuum appellant humanae compositionis ex accidentibus innatae.**

p. 101, 10 non est individuum] |**S p. 83a ll. 12–13**| *add.* Omne enim individuum accidens uni soli rei adiacet; sed<sup>1</sup> generalitas animalis adiacet pluribus; quare non est individuum.

TRANSL.: Every individual accident inheres in one single thing; but the generality of animal (*animalis generalitas*) inheres in many things, so it cannot be an individual.

COMMENTARY: P3 starts with the text of *Cat.* 5, 3a 36–37: ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας οὐδεμία ἐστὶ κατηγορία (cf. P3 p. 101, 1–2: *a principali*

<sup>1</sup>•sed] *correx*i, scilicet *S*

*namque substantia nulla est praedicatio*); this sentence seems to be contradicted by *Isag.* 7.2–4: *eorum enim quae praedicantur alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo ... alia vero de pluribus*. P3’s published text explains the dissonance with reference to a different target: Aristotle tackles the predication *ut de inferiori*, whereas Porphyry deals with the predication *superius de inferiori* or with the predication *de se ipso*. **A** adds a section shared by **S** (P3 p. 101, 6–18). In this passage we find an objection (*opponitur*) according to which *generalitas animalis* can be predicated of many subjects; but *generalitas animalis adiacet pluribus* – replies the author of the annotation – so, it cannot be an individual. The unpublished annotation preserved by **S** just clarifies with a syllogism the same reasoning that is also found in **A**.

Parallels. See P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 5rb): *videndum vero est quod quidam dicunt omnia individua praedicari de uno solo, alii tantum de individuis accidentium [hoc dictum] putant quorum unumquodque de uno solo individuali fundamento tantum praedicatur*.

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p. 101, 12 sed tamen – sit universale] |**S p. 83a ll. 14–17**| *add.* Quare nec universale est nec singulare proprie, sed ‘quasi individuale’ dicitur. Sciendum est autem<sup>1</sup> quod ‘hic’ et alii articuli aliquando adduntur vocibus quae rem significant singularem, ut ‘hic homo’, aliquando adduntur vocibus quae significant rem universalem, ut ‘hoc genus’.

TRANSL.: Therefore, it is neither properly a universal nor a singular, but it is called ‘quasi-individual’. It should be known, moreover, that ‘this’ and other articles are sometimes added to words that signify a particular thing (such as, for instance, “this <particular> man”); sometimes they are added to words that signify a universal thing (such as, for instance, “this genus”).

COMMENTARY: This annotation shows several similarities with the printed text of P3 p. 99, 18–23 (a section that is omitted in **S**). Just for clarity, I

<sup>1</sup>•autem] *difficile lectu, an hoc?*

prefer to treat this bit of text as an independent annotation. The main interest of this section is that it contains a short reflection on the use of the ‘articles’ *hic*, *haec* and *hoc* for singular and universal nouns.

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p. 101, 15–16 non in quantum – fundamentum generalitatis] |S p. 83a ll. 19–20| non in quantum prima substantia, et cum dicitur ‘Socrates prima substantia est hoc genus’ tantum intelligitur quod sit Socrates actuale fundamentum generis.

TRANSL.: [The individual of the *generalitas* is founded in Socrates] but not in Socrates inasmuch as he is a first substance; when one says “the first substance Socrates is this genus” it is understood only that Socrates is the actual foundation of the genus.

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p. 105, 4–5 sic quia – in quale] |S p. 83a ll. 40–43| Quia aliquibus INTERROGANTIBUS ILLUD, id est ponentibus in interrogatione illam rem de qua [re]•<sup>1</sup> ista habent praedicari, NON IN EO QUOD QUID SIT – id est non si illa interrogatio <facta est>•<sup>2</sup> (*spatium vacuum 6 litterarum reliquit*) per quid•<sup>3</sup>, sed MAGIS IN EO QUOD QUALE (8.3) – id est ad interrogationem factam per quale. Et hic MAGIS accipitur elective.

TRANSL.: [Here, he proves <with an argument> from the effect that differences and accidents are predicated in answer to a which-question.] For, “to some people who ask that” (that is, who put into a question the thing of which these <words> (differences/common accidents) happen to be predicated) <we give these (= differences/common accidents) as a reply> “not in answer to a what-question” (that is, not if the question is made through <the term> “what?”), but “rather in answer to a which-

<sup>1</sup>•re] *seclusi*

<sup>2</sup>•facta est] *suppl. Tarlazzi*

<sup>3</sup>•an per quid <haec respondemus> *supplendum?*

question” (8.3) (that is, to a question made through <the term> “which?”). And here “rather” (*magis*) is taken in a superlative manner.

COMMENTARY: This annotation is added to the commentary on *Isag.* 7.35–81 (genera differ from differences and from common accidents: these last, indeed, are predicated of several subjects *non in quid sed in quale*). P3’s commentary (p. 105, 1–5) shows a twofold redaction here. The text of **O** and **A** (followed by **S**) is a literal analysis of Porphyry’s words as translated by Boethius.

Parallels. For the closest parallel see P14 (BnF. Lat. 17813, f. 5vb): *vere differentiae et accidentia praedicantur non in quid, sed in quale, quia nos dicimus ab auctoritate de quo i.e. est secundum quem modum. Magis dicit propter differentias quae videbantur quibusdam praedicari in quid, quia sunt substantiales; in veritate tantum non in quid sed in quale praedicantur.*

In the last line of the text we find that ‘especially’ (*magis*) in the *Isagoge* is to be interpreted as a superlative (*elective*); for other examples see P14 (BnF. Lat. 17813, f. 11vb): *maxime dicitur elective, non comparative*; Abelard, *Gloss. in Cat.* (p. 54, 35): *sed magis elective possumus dicere*; *Super Arist. De interpr.* (p. 137, 37): *magis dictum est elective.*

Text. The text preserved by **S** is probably incomplete, since we have an empty space of about six letters. Because of this gap, the translation is hypothetical.

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p. 108, 6 prolixitate confunderet] |**S p. 83b ll. 19–23**| *add.* Notandum est Porphyrium praetermittere quandam subtiliorem speciem quae<sup>1</sup> conficitur ex coniunctione materiae et substantialis formae. Cum enim consideramus animal purum et substantiales formas, scilicet rationale et mortale<sup>2</sup>, in compositione hominis speciei animalis<sup>3</sup> convenire, ex conventu illarum

<sup>1</sup>•quae] *correx*i probantibus Girard Tarlazzi, cum *S*

<sup>2</sup>•rationale et mortale] rationalem et mortalem *legeram*

<sup>3</sup>•speciei animalis] *corr.* Tarlazzi, specie alia *S*



trium illis<sup>1</sup> tribus alia species efficitur quae ‘humanitas’ vocatur, quae qualitati supponitur.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: Porphyry omits a certain subtler species that is made from the combination of matter and substantial form. So, when we consider that the pure animal and the substantial forms (that is to say, rational and mortal) come together in the composition of the human being, a species of animal, from the union of these three, thanks to them, another species originates which is called ‘humanity’, <and> which is placed under <the category of> quality.

COMMENTARY: Philosophical content. The *subtilior species* does not occur in Boethius’ commentaries on the *Isagoge*. Its far origin, however, is rooted in Boethius’ second commentary (*In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, p. 200, 7–8): *alia est enim substantialis formae species quae humanitas nuncupatur*. During the twelfth century, this concept undergoes important changes and becomes synonymous with humanity: see for instance *LNPS, Isag.* (p. 542, 4–8): *subtilem vero speciem vocat Boethius humanitatem. Ideo subtilem vocat quia cum aliae formae aliquantulum distinguantur per sensum ... sola humanitas non venit ad sensum sed sola ratione distinguitur*; John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* 3, 1 (p. 121, 11 = *CCCM* 98, p. 104, 28–36). Other parallels are to be found in Abelard and P17 (BnF, lat. 3237, f. 127ra [Lb]): *dicunt alii quod ipse homo sit subtilis species, et propter aliud appellatur species generi supposita, id est propter habitudinem relativam, et propter aliud subtilis species, id est propter constitutionem quam a genere suscipit, secundum quam const(ituti)onem non agitur hic de specie ut dicit Boethius, sed secundum relativam habitudinem*; P20 (Wien, ÖNB 2486, f. 49va–b): *has duas acceptiones ponit Porphyrius, Boethius vero tertiam adiungit in commento [In Isag.<sup>2</sup>, p. 200, 7 – 201, 3], dicens “est tertia species subtilis vel substantialis” (quia utrumque in diversis commentis legitur), quae est propria forma speciei, de qua intendit auctor, et appellatur humanitas. Subtilis dicitur ista species, quia sola ratione et*

<sup>1</sup>•illis] *correx*i, illas S

*intellectu* (post *intellectu*] *nec aliquam* add. ms.) *et non sensu corporeo* (*corporeo*] *incorporeo* ms.) *nec per se nec per individua potest percipi*. The best explanation of this concept has been provided by Geyer (Abelard 1933, pp. 598–599): the *species subtilis* originated from a false reading, or from an abbreviation in the manuscripts having been written out incorrectly.

The words *animal purum* refer to the terminology of purity: see for instance P3 (p. 79, 1): *res illa in puritate sua*; *ibid.* (p. 79, 18). This terminology may be connected to Boethius' translation of the *Isagoge* (*Isag.* 1.10 ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται; transl. Vict.: *an intellectu solo et mente teneantur*; Boeth.: *sive posita sint in solis purisque intellectibus*).

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p. 108, 15 uniuscuiusque individui] |S p. 83b ll. 29–30| *add.* id est species. Haec vox dicitur, id est enuntiatur, de compositione uniuscuiusque individui, ut significans de suo significato; et ibi 'species' est materiale impositum.

TRANSL.: ...that is to say, the species. This word is said, that is, it is uttered, about the composition of every individual, as the signifier <is uttered> about what it signifies; so here 'species' is *materiale impositum*.

COMMENTARY: The previous lines of the text provided a (traditional) definition of genus (as *principium/collectio/illud cui supponitur species*) and of species as form. This short annotation has important doctrinal implications due to the notion of *materiale impositum*: in the addition to p. 85, 14 it was said of the genus; here, however, it is said of the species.

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p. 112, 13–21 non specialissima – accipiunt duo praedicamenta] |S p. 84a ll. 36–45| HOC MODO IN UNO<QUO>QUE PRAEDICAMENTO (9.10–11), id est in unaquaque praedicamentali collectione, ad minus accipiuntur duo praedicamenta. Vel altero modo dicitur: IN UNOQUOQUE PRAEDICAMENTO,

omnibus<sup>1</sup> praedicamentis tantum simul<sup>2</sup> acceptis, quaedam GENERALISSIMA<sup>3</sup> sunt. Ideo sic exponimus litteram quia, si diceremus in unoquoque praedicamento esse generalissima, cum X sint praedicamenta, ad minus iam essent XX generalissima, quod quidem<sup>4</sup> auctoritas contradicit. Quidam vero dicunt in unoquoque praedicamento II generalissima esse, unum vocale et alterum reale. Quod hic<sup>5</sup> dicatur in unoquoque praedicamento duo genera generalissima esse, unum vocale et aliud reale, non multum habet ponderis nisi<sup>6</sup> praedicamentum accipiatur collective, quia in unoquoque praedicamento non sunt duo generalissima: in re reali enim tantum est unum, in vocali unum. Vel sic potest iungi littera: PLANUM ERIT QUOD DICITUR HOC MODO IN UNO<QUO>QUE PRAEDICAMENTO (9.10). Vel plurale accipitur pro singulari.

TRANSL.: [Porphyry’s passage can be explained] “In the following way in every category” (9.10–11), that is to say, in every categorial collection, at least two categories are admitted. <Alternatively, it can be explained> in a different way: “in every category”, if we just understand all the categories collectively, there are some *generalissima*. We explain the text in this way, because if we were to say that in every category there are some *generalissima*, then, since there are ten categories, we would have at least twenty *generalissima*, which is contradicted by authority. In every category – some people say – there are two *generalissima*: the one is vocal, the other is real. What is said here (that in every category there are two genera *generalissima*, one vocal, the other real) does not have much weight unless the category is understood collectively, since in every category there are not two *generalissima*: in the real domain there is just one, as well as in the vocal domain. Alternatively, we can construe the text as follows:

<sup>1</sup>•omnibus] *corr. Girard ex p. 112, 14, duobus S*

<sup>2</sup>•simul] *correxerit ex p. 112, 14, similiter vel similis P. An tantum similis in insimul corrigendum (Girard)?*

<sup>3</sup>•generalissima] *corr. Girard ex p. 112, 14, specialissima S*

<sup>4</sup>•quidem] *corr. Girard, quae S, an secludendum?*

<sup>5</sup>•hic] *correxerit, haec S, ut videtur*

<sup>6</sup>•correxerit ex P15, probante Girard, ubi S

“What is said will be clear, in this manner, in every category” (9.10). Again, alternatively, the plural form can be understood as singular.

COMMENTARY: Philosophical content. This annotation of **S** substitutes the text printed at p. 112, 13–21 (commentary on *Isag.* 9.10–11): *in unoquoque praedicamento sunt quaedam generalissima et rursus alia specialissima*. From this starting point the *adnotator* infers that there are two predications in each categorial collection, (for a parallel to *praedicamentalis collectio* see below, P5 [p. 14, 1–2]).

The second explanation has a parallel in P5 (p. 14, 1–6): *in unoquoque praedicamento, id est praedicamentis collectim acceptis, quaedam sunt nomina quae dicuntur generalissima, et quaedam alia quae dicuntur specialissima. Quippe si in singulis praedicamentis dicerentur esse generalissima, quod littera videtur velle, falsum esset. In praedicamento enim substantiae non est nisi unum nomen generalissimum*. At the end of the text we find the opinion of unspecified *quidam*: in each category there are two most generic genera, a real one and a vocal one. See on this P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 1ra): *item cum praedicamentum aliud reale aliud vocale sit...* (Iwakuma 1992, p. 45). However – the *adnotator* replies – this can be easily rejected: in the category of substance, indeed, there is a single most generic genus. For the same position see the addition by **A** (P3, p. 112, 17–18).

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p. 113, 3 sit superveniens genus] |**S pp. 84a l. 47 – 84b l. 6**| *add.* est. Per hoc quod dicit ‘non est ALIUD SUPERVENIENS GENUS’ (9.13–14) videtur invenire quod supra generalissimum sit aliquid quod non sit genus, quod non est verum. Sed ideo voluit his verbis uti quia, si aliquid esset supra generalissimum [sit]<sup>1</sup>, magis videretur genus quam species vel |**84 b**| individuum et, removendo illud quod magis videtur, ostendit nihil esse supra generalissimum. Dicunt<sup>2</sup> etiam quidam [quod]<sup>3</sup>, cum dialectici

<sup>1</sup>•sit] *seclusi*

<sup>2</sup>•dicunt] *correxī*, dictum *S*

<sup>3</sup>•quod] *seclusi*

tantummodo agant de rebus formatis, esse generalissimum esse rem formatam, dicentes substantiam<sup>1</sup> generalissimum formari susceptibilitate<sup>2</sup> contrariorum; sine qua forma si consideretur, ipsa substantia remanet pura substantia quae est supra generalissimum et non est genus; sic sine forma considerata est secundum illos quia<sup>3</sup>, sive sine forma sive cum forma consideretur, semper remanet generalissimum.

TRANSL.: [Above it there is no superior genus.] By saying “there is no ‘superior genus’ ” (9.13–14) he seems to think that above the most general genus there is something which is not a genus, but that is not true. He wanted to use these words for this reason: if there were something above the most general, it would seem more <likely> a genus than a species or an individual; by removing that which seems to be more <likely>, he shows that there is nothing above the most general. Some people also say that, since the dialecticians speak of formed things only, the most general being is a formed thing, affirming that substance, that is to say, the most general thing, is formed thanks to its susceptibility to opposites; were it considered without such form, the substance itself would remain a pure substance that is above the most general and is not a genus; and so, it is considered without any form, according to them: considered with or without a form, it always remains the most general.

COMMENTARY: Philosophical content. The commentary refers to *Isag.* 9.12–14: *est autem generalissimum quidem super quod nullum ultra aliud sit superveniens genus*. At the very beginning, the *adnotator* offers a peculiar interpretation (*videtur invenire quod supra generalissimum sit aliquid quod non sit genus*). This reading of the text, however, is rejected as absurd: if there were something more general than the most generic genus, the latter would no longer be a most generic genus. In this case, the line of reasoning follows the *locus ab eo quod magis* of Boethius (*De diff.*

<sup>1</sup>•substantiam] *correxi*, substantia *S*

<sup>2</sup>•susceptibilitate] *correxi*, susceptibilitat *S*

<sup>3</sup>•quia] *sed corr. Girard*

2, p. 38, 9–10): *si id quod magis videtur inesse non inest, nec id quod minus videbitur inesse inerit.*

With *dicunt quidam* starts a second, more difficult reasoning. I would summarise it as follows: 1. Dialecticians speak of formed things only; 2. Dialecticians speak of the most generic genus; 3. Therefore, the most generic genus is a formed thing; 4. Without this capacity substance is above the most generic genus but it is not a genus; 5. Substance, considered with or without form, is a most generic genus (this seems to be the position of the opponents). In this taxonomy the *pura substantia*, without the determination originating from opposites, cannot be explained as a genus; once it receives a form, however, it causes the *esse generalissimum*.

Parallels. In this case the most interesting similarities are to be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 6vb), which is very critical of this position: *notant quidam verba Porphyrii, quod non dicit “supra quod nihil est”, sed “supra quod non est aliud superius genus”; et volunt aliquid esse supra generalissimum, velut supra substantiam generalissimum, informatur susceptibilitate contrariorum, dicunt esse substantiam puram sine omni forma attentam.* However, the opposition between *pura substantia* and *esse generalissimum* seems to be similar to Porphyry’s opposition between εἶναι and τὸ ὄν. Some connection may be established with a well known Boethian passage in *De hebdomadibus* (nr. 2 p. 187, 26–28): *diversum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at vero quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit; ibid.* (nr. 6 p. 188, 37–40): *ac per hoc id quod est participat eo quod est esse ut sit; est vero, ut participet alio quolibet*). For this topic in Porphyry and Boethius and for its medieval reception see Hadot (1970).

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p. 116, 24–28 animae rationalis dicatur – ante individua] |S pp. 84b l. 47 – 85a l. 1| animae vel corporis rationalis dicatur. Sciendum tamen in rerum natura hunc hominem compositum non<sup>1</sup> esse unum individuum sed duo individua sunt coniuncta. ET OMNE QUOD EST PROXIMUM ANTE INDIVIDUA

<sup>1</sup>•non] corr. Girard, duo S

SOLUM SPECIES EST, NON GENUS (10.6–7). Probat a toto quod homo est solum species et non genus.

TRANSL.: [It cannot be called ‘rational’, because rationality does not inform this whole, that is to say, the corporeal and incorporeal nature, unless it is called ‘rational’ because of its parts, that is to say, because of] the soul or body. It has to be noted that in the nature of things the composite human being is not a single individual but consists of two united individuals. “Every thing which is immediately prior to individuals, is only species, not genus” (10.6–7). <Porphyry> here shows <with an argument> *a toto* that human being is only species, not genus.

COMMENTARY: This short annotation is related to the commentary on *Isag.* 10.6–7 (P3, p. 116, 25–28) and it simply paraphrases Porphyry. For the lines p. 116, 25–28 the published text of P3 is affected by a twofold redaction, where **O** and **A** agree against the innovative version of **P**. The present addition of **S** seems to have the remark concerning the *locus* (*probat a toto*), which cannot be found in **P**, in common with **OA**; on the other hand, the lemma of Boethius’ translation is different from the original version of the *Isagoge*, and it is shared also by **P** (in Minio Paluello’s apparatus there are no variant readings). For the man as *mixta substantia* see Iwakuma 2013, pp. 38–40.

p. 118, 30 secundae substantiae] |**S p. 85a ll. 15–20**| secundae, quod sic intelligendum: quidquid, id est quodcumque accidens singulariter acceptum, fundatur<sup>1</sup> in secunda substantia, fundatur<sup>2</sup> in prima. Non enim dictum est de duobus<sup>3</sup> accidentibus quae<sup>4</sup> fundantur<sup>5</sup> in secunda substantia, quod fundantur in aliqua prima: namque haec risibilitas et haec

<sup>1</sup>•fundatur] *correx*i, fundantur *S*

<sup>2</sup>•fundatur] *correx*i, fundantur *S*

<sup>3</sup>•duobus] omnibus *corr. Girard*

<sup>4</sup>•quae] *correx*i, quod *S*

<sup>5</sup>•fundantur] *Girard*, si sita *S* (*cf. commentarium*)

rudibilitas fundantur in animali, non tamen fundantur<sup>1</sup> in aliquo animali individuato. Et ideo notanda est illa argumentatio quam quidam<sup>2</sup> faciunt: si sunt<sup>3</sup> mors et vita in secunda substantia, fundantur in prima.

TRANSL.: [Everything grounded in a second substance is grounded in the first substance corresponding to this second.] This expression has to be understood as follows: everything (that is to say, every accident intended as singular) that is grounded in a second substance, is grounded in a first. It was not said: two accidents that are grounded in a second substance, are grounded in a first one: indeed, this ability to laugh and this ability to bray are grounded in animal, but they are not grounded in a certain individuated animal. We should also take into consideration the argument of some people: if death and life are in a second substance, they are grounded in a first.

COMMENTARY: This annotation is added to the commentary on *Isag.* 10.6 (P3, p. 118, 30, *prima ipsius secundae substantiae*). This section of P3 is occupied by the aporia which starts at p. 117: if each thing that is above an individual is a most specific species, the body must be a most specific species. Moreover, a long section of P3 (p. 116–122) is affected by a long twofold redaction where **O** and **A** agree against **P**. The text of **S**, together with **O** and **A**, solves the aporia by identifying both the animate and the inanimate body as most specific species. After this, another problem arises: if divisive differences, for instance rationality and irrationality, are founded in the animal, the animal would be the most specific species above the individuals. The annotation added by **S** explains that just the *accidens singulariter acceptum* can be extended to the first substance. For the general rule which governs the conclusion, see the commentary on the following annotation.

<sup>1</sup>•fundantur] *correxi*, fundatur *S*

<sup>2</sup>•quam quidam] *correxi*, quendam *S*

<sup>3</sup>•sunt] *correxi*, sum *S*



Parallels. The present annotation is almost identical to the text added in the margins of the main text of P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 7v): *quidquid fundatur in aliqua secunda substantia, fundetur in aliqua prima illius secundae. Quod sic intelligendum est. Quodcumque accidens singulariter acceptum fundatur in secunda substantia, fundetur in prima. Non enim dictum est de duobus accidentibus quod si in secunda substantia fundentur, fundentur etiam in prima. Nam risibilitas et rudibilitas fundantur in animali, non tamen in aliquo individuato animali. Et ideo illa argumentatio vitiosa videtur: si mors et vita fundantur in secunda substantia, et in aliqua prima substantia illius.*

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p. 119, 8 in illa secunda substantia] |S p. 85a ll. 24–26| *add.* Item haec regula ‘quidquid fundatur in prima substantia, fundatur in secunda’, sic est intelligenda: quidquid fundatur in prima substantia alicuius secundae substantiae eo respectu et eo nomine quo designatur esse prima substantia illius secundae, fundatur in secunda.

TRANSL.: The rule “everything that is grounded in a first substance is grounded in the second one” has to be understood as follows: everything that is grounded in the first substance of a second substance from the same aspect and with the same name according to which the first substance is said to be first in relation to the second one, is grounded in the second.

COMMENTARY: This addition by S does not have deep philosophical implications, but it discusses a different rule than the previous addition.

Parallels. The previous annotation quoted the rule “everything that is grounded in a second substance is grounded in the first one”; for a parallel in Abelard see *Logica Ingredientibus, Cat.* (p. 147, 12–15): *nota, quod ex hoc loco talis habetur regula, quod quicquid fundatur in secundis substantiis, fundatur in primis, id est quicquid fundatur in re secundae substantiae, fundatur in re alicuius primae substantiae illius.* The published text of P3, however, seems to use the logical procedure in a different way (p. 119, 5–8): *quidquid enim fundatur in prima substantia*

*alicui secundae substantiae supposita fundatur in illa secunda substantia; for further parallels see also P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813 f. 7va): quidquid enim fundatur in aliqua prima substantia, fundatur in qualibet secunda illius primae; P17 (BnF, Lat. 3237, f. 128ra): sed contra sic obicitur: quidquid fundatur in secunda substantia, fundatur in prima. Et ita, cum rationalitas fundetur in animali, fundatur in Socrate; et si fundatur in Socrate, et in homine; et ita posterior est homine in quo fundatur; et prior, cum eum substantialiter constituat, quod inconueniens esse dicunt.*

p. 122, 26 ad inferiora] |S p. 85b ll. 19–24| *add.* Ex hoc quod ipse vocat specialissimas species EXTREMA (10.18), concipiunt<sup>1</sup> quidam individua<sup>2</sup> non constituere praedicamenta quia, si essent in praedicamentis, species specialissimae non essent extremae. Sed hic non agit de extremitate nisi secundum relationem. Illud etiam considerandum est, quod in hac propositione ‘homo est SPECIES INDIVIDUORUM’ (11.4) non specialitas sed continentia praedicatur, in hac vero ‘homo est species animalis’ specialitas praedicatur.

TRANSL.: Because [Porphyry] himself calls the most specific species “extreme” (10.18), some people hold that the individuals do not constitute categories: if they were in the categories, the most specific species would not be the extreme. Here, however, he [Porphyry] speaks about extremity (*extremitas*) only regarding relation. We also have to keep in mind that in the sentence “the human being is a ‘species <made> of individuals’ (11.4)”, the object of predication is not the property of being-species (*specialitas*), but <the property of> having a certain content; however, in the sentence: “the human being is a species of animal”, the object of predication is the property of being-species (*specialitas*).

<sup>1</sup>•concipiunt] *correx*i, concipiunt concipiunt S

<sup>2</sup>•individua] *corr.* Girard, individuo S; *an* <ex> individuo *corrigendum?* (*cf.* S ad p. 64, 25)

COMMENTARY: Commenting on *Isag.* 10.19–20, **S** follows the same version of the text preserved by **A** and **P** (p. 122, 19–26). Just these lines are added. As already said before (p. 64, 25), the *quidam* deny that individuals cannot constitute a category; if that were the case, the most specific species could not be extreme.

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p. 124, 14 supremum patrem] |**S p. 86a ll. 1–3**| *add.* Nota per similitudinem esse dictum: non enim omnes familiae ad Iovem<sup>1</sup> reducuntur, sed in veritate ad unum supremum patrem, ut Adam, vel Deucalionem<sup>2</sup> fabulose.

TRANSL.: It has to be noted: [Porphyry] is using a simile in his words. Indeed, in reality, all families can be traced back not to Jupiter, but to a supreme father, like Adam or, according to the fables, Deucalion.

COMMENTARY: This short annotation just adds to the previous lines that the common ancestor of all human families is not Jupiter but Deucalion (see Ovid, *Met.* 1, 348ff.) or Adam, according to the Christian tradition. As an interesting feature, the annotation breaks the thread of the reasoning as presented by P3. This shows that these lines can be considered a “second layer addition” inserted by the master of **S**.

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p. 126, 13 quod est ens] |**S p. 86a ll. 27–41**| *add.* Probat a maiori quod genera et species non reducuntur ad unum supremum genus quia non reducuntur ad ens (de quo magis videretur), quia ens non EST COMMUNE GENUS OMNIUM (11.20–21). Videndum est quomodo in hac propositione ‘ens’ accipiatur: si enim ‘ens’<sup>3</sup> ut vox [aequivoca]<sup>4</sup> accipiatur in hac propositione, nullum pondus habet; nemo<sup>5</sup> enim istas tres litteras quae

<sup>1</sup>Iovem] *correx*i, Ionem *S*

<sup>2</sup>Deucalionem] *correx*i, Ducalionem *S*

<sup>3</sup>ens ] *correx*i, eis *S*

<sup>4</sup>aequivoca] *seclusi ex suggestu correctoris*

<sup>5</sup>nemo] *correx*i, ne me *S*

sunt in hac voce quae est ‘ens’ genus omnium esse existimat. Rursus si in hac propositione ‘ens’ accipiatur in significatione alicuius suae significationis vel substantiae vel qualitatis, non multum valet, ut si<sup>1</sup> diceretur: vere ens non est commune genus omnium, scilicet aliquod<sup>2</sup> significatum entis, quia neque substantia neque qualitas<sup>3</sup> etc. Nullus enim putat quod vel substantia vel qualitas<sup>4</sup> sint genus omnium praedicamentorum. Sed hoc modo dici potest: vere non est aliquod<sup>5</sup> commune genus omnium quia ens (id est aliqua universalis res significata ab hac voce quae est ‘ens’, quae sit dispersa per omnia genera et species et individua) de quo magis videretur, non est commune genus omnium. Quae res in veritate<sup>6</sup> nichil est, et tamen<sup>7</sup>, quantum ad illos qui putabant ens esse commune genus omnium, ens (scilicet res ab hac voce quae est ‘ens’ significata) aliquid est; de significato entis magis videretur quod esset genus omnium, quia ‘ens’ omnia habet significare.

TRANSL.: [Porphyry] is demonstrating with an *argumentum a maiori* that genera and species cannot be reduced to a single supreme genus because they cannot be reduced to the *ens* (of which it would seem most likely <that it is a common genus>) because *ens* “is not the common genus of everything” (11.20–21). We also have to inspect in what sense *ens* is understood in this proposition: if it is understood as an equivocal utterance (*vox aequivoca*), <the proposition> does not have any relevance; nobody, indeed, thinks that these three letters that compose the word ‘*ens*’ can be the genus of everything. Then again, if *ens* is understood here to signify one of its senses (either substance or quality <etc>) <the proposition> would not make much sense, as for instance if we say: for sure (*vere*), *ens* is not the common genus of everything, namely a certain meaning of *ens*,

<sup>1</sup>•si] *correx*i, sic *S*

<sup>2</sup>•aliquod] *an* aliquid *legendum*?

<sup>3</sup>•qualitas] *correxit* *Tarlazzi*, qualis *S*

<sup>4</sup>•qualitas] *correxit* *Tarlazzi*, qualis *S*

<sup>5</sup>•aliquod] *an* aliquid *legendum*?

<sup>6</sup>•in veritate] *correxit* *Tarlazzi*, in tate *spatio vacuo relicto* *S*

<sup>7</sup>•et tamen] *attamen dubitanter* *Tarlazzi*

since substance or quality is not the genus of all categories, and so on. No one, indeed, thinks that either substance or quality is the genus of all the categories. But it can be said in this manner: for sure (*vere*), there is no common genus to all, because *ens* (that is, a universal thing, signified by the word ‘*ens*’, which is dispersed through all genera and species and individuals) – of which it would seem most likely <that it is a common genus> – is not a common genus of everything. That <universal> thing, in reality (*in <ver>itate*), is nothing, and yet, according to those who think that *ens* is a common genus of everything, *ens* (that is, the thing signified by the word ‘*ens*’) is something. It seems most likely that the meaning of ‘*ens*’ is the genus of all, because ‘*ens*’ has the property of signifying everything.

COMMENTARY: This annotation is added to the commentary on *Isag.* 12.3 (cf. Boeth., *In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 222, 11 – 225, 9; see in particular p. 223, 24: *convincitur enim hac quoque ratione id quod dicimus ens praedicamentorum genus esse non posse*). Against the idea that being can be the common genus of all things see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus, Isag.* (p. 51, 18–22): *ne propter similitudinem ascensus datam inter praedicamenta et familias videantur diversa praedicamenta ad unum genus posse reduci, sicut diversae familiae ad unum patrem, ideo hoc removet per ens, id est de quo magis videretur, quod genus omnium esset, quia scilicet de omnibus praedicatur*; LNPS, *Isag.* (p. 514, 23–26): *et Porphyrius cum secundum Aristotelem ostendit ens non esse genus omnium eo quod de omnibus hoc nomen ‘ens’ aequivoce praedicari dicitur, invalidam afferret rationem de nomine ad rem*; P5 (p. 17, 37–39).

The author does not think that *ens* is the common genus of all, but he wants to grasp the definition of *ens* used by those who do share this idea. Therefore, we find in the annotation three hypotheses for defining *ens*: 1. *ens* as *vox* is intended as common genus of all (*si enim ens ut vox aequivoca accipiatur*); 2. one of the meanings of *ens* is a common genus (*rursus – substantiae vel qualitatis*); 3. *ens* means a *res universalis* dispersed in genera, species, and individuals (*sed hoc modo – species et individua*).

p. 131, 5 superior eo iudicetur] |S p. 86b ll. 46–49| *add.* Nota illud idem superius esse dictum in descriptione generis quod DE SPECIE PRAEDICATUR GENUS (13.1–4), hic vero ad aliud inducitur<sup>1</sup>, ut ostendatur modus praedicationis. †quod†<sup>2</sup> id est quae res sit genus, id est quae sit illa res cui conveniat generalitas, et quae res sit species, id est cui conveniat specialitas. TRANSL.: Note that the same thing has been said above, in the description of the genus, that “the genus is predicated of the species” (13.1–4); but this statement is introduced here with another purpose, that is, in order to show the manner of predication. †...† that is to say, <to show> which thing is a genus (namely, which is the thing to which *generalitas* applies) and which thing is a species (namely, <which is the thing> to which *specialitas* applies).

COMMENTARY: This annotation is added to the commentary on *Isag.* 12.22. At this point P3 (p. 130, 24 – 131, 5) contains a summary of the previous reasoning (that a genus can be predicated of a species, but a species cannot be predicated of a genus). The addition of S aims to underline the connection of the present section with the previous lines of the *Isagoge* (*idem superius esse dictum*). The sentence can be identified with a later section of Porphyry’s text (13, 14: *de specie praedicatur genus*). Other than that, we can recognise in the words *in descriptione generis* a reference to p. 7, 20–21: *genus autem non de una specie praedicatur sed de pluribus*. The first part of this annotation can be found also in P15, with several variant readings in regard to our text (P15 = Dublin, Trinity College 494, f. 118r, I quote the text according to Iwakuma’s transcription: *nota illud ideo superius dictum esse in descriptione generis quod de specie praedicatur genus, hic autem aliud inducitur scilicet ostendatur modus praedicationis*). The second part of the annotation, that is to say the words after *modus praedicationis*, can be found in an almost identical form just some lines later (see the commentary on the following note). That gives

<sup>1</sup>•inducitur] *correxi ex P15, indicitur S*

<sup>2</sup>•quod] <in> quid *corr. Girard*

the impression that these lines, which fit much better after p. 131, 8, were copied here because of a mistake of the scribe. That can be easily explained if we imagine that this note was in origin a marginal addition linked to the main text with a cross-reference mark. The word *quod*, which apparently makes no sense, could have originated from the misunderstanding by the scribe of this sign. On the basis of a comparison with P16, where the sentence ends after *praedicationis*, I believe the sentence ought to be interrupted with a full stop at the same point.

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p. 131, 8 *utrumque sit*] |S p. 87a ll. 1–3| *add.* Id est quae res sit genus, scilicet quae res sit illa cui conveniat generalitas et quid sit species, id est quae res sit cui conveniat specialitas.

TRANSL.: [after having shown what are both genus and species,] that is to say, which thing is a genus (namely, which is the thing to which *generalitas* applies) and which thing is a species (namely, <which is the thing> to which *specialitas* applies).

COMMENTARY: This short annotation is added just some lines after the former addition and it repeats almost exactly the same words, so that the former addition seems to have been repeated and misplaced because of a mistake of the scribe. The immediately preceding words (p. 131, 7–8: *assignato quid utrumque*) seem to suggest that this annotation was supposed to be placed here (see the twofold explanation *quae res sit genus/quid sit species*, which fits with the *utrumque* of the text edited by Iwakuma).

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p. 132, 25 *verum est Socratem etc.*] |S p. 87a ll. 17–23| *add.* Notandum est hanc conclusionem quam liber facit ubi dicit VERUM EST SOCRATEM esse ANIMAL ATQUE SUBSTANTIAM (13.11–13) non sequi secundum verba apposita sed secundum praedictum sensum. In omnibus enim

intelligendum est: si aliquid praedicatur de aliquo ut de contento<sup>1</sup>, de quo iterum aliud praedicetur ut de contento<sup>2</sup>, ultimum praedicatur de primo ut de contento<sup>3</sup>. Ideo quia<sup>4</sup> hic Porphyrius ostendit praedicationem individui, hac<sup>5</sup> occasione quidam<sup>6</sup> ducti volunt individuum esse de sua materia principaliter, sicut est genus et species et differentia; sed non est ita, quia quod hic dicitur de individuo non dicitur gratia individui sed gratia generis et speciei.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: the conclusion reached by the book, where it says “it is true that Socrates is an animal and a substance” (13.11–13), does not follow from the words we find <before>, but from the previously stated sense. In every case it must be understood as follows: if something is predicated of something as of its content, and something else is predicated of the same as of its content, the last <element> is predicated of the first as of its content. Because Porphyry shows the predication on individuals here, some people have been induced to think that the individual belongs to his principal subject matter, like genus, species, and difference; but it is not true: what is stated here about individual is said not because of the individual but because of the genus and the species.

COMMENTARY: Philosophical content. This annotation is commenting on *Isag.* 13.9–15: *de quibus autem species praedicatur, de his necessario et speciei genus praedicabitur et generis genus usque ad generalissimum*. In other words: if *a* is predicated of Socrates as of its content and *b* is predicated of *a* as of its content, the last (*b*) is predicated of Socrates as of its content. Up until this point the annotation is very similar to Boethius’ second commentary on the *Isagoge*. In the second part, however, the text

<sup>1</sup>•contento] *correxi*, contempto *S*

<sup>2</sup>•contento] *correxi*, contempto *S*

<sup>3</sup>•contento] *correxi*, contempto *S*

<sup>4</sup>•ideo quia] *legit Girard*, loquitur *legeram*

<sup>5</sup>•hac] *correxi*, ac *S*

<sup>6</sup>•quidam] *breuiatum ac difficile lectu, an quidem legendum?*



refutes an anonymous objection (*quidam*) according to which individuals are the subject matter (*materia*) of the *Isagoge*. That position is to be put in connection with the annotation to p. 64, 25: *quidam dicunt individuum esse de sua materia sed sciendum quinque res tantum esse suam materiam*. Quite the opposite – the *adnotator* says – everything that is predicated of individuals is predicated *gratia generis et speciei*. In this passage, the lower level is defined as *contentum*. For an Abelardian parallel to this terminology see Abelard, *Dial.* (p. 325, 7–10): *nam cum ex ‘continenti’ ad ‘contentum’ inferimus, videtur opponenda constantia quae hoc in illo comprehendi demonstrat. Veluti cum dicimus: “si omne animal, tunc homo”; ibid.* (p. 340, 8–9): *quidquid praedicatur de genere ut de contento, et de specie*.

p. 135, 24 magis propriam] |S p. 87b ll. 17–42| *add.* Videnda est aequivocatio huius vocis quae est ‘differentia’. Dictum est namque in exordio<sup>1</sup> tractatus generis quod ideo cum genere speciem posuit *ne solum genus multiplicis significationis esse putaretur*<sup>2</sup>; ideo etiam differentiam et proprium et accidens apponere recusavit ne multiplici loquacitate animum lectoris impediret. Ex quibus verbis colligimus et differentiam et reliqua duo aequivoce debere accipi, quae aequivocatio in differentia<sup>3</sup> hoc modo perpenditur. Ille qui prius<sup>4</sup> imposuit hoc vocabulum quod est ‘differentia’ imposuit illud primum substantialibus differentiis, ita scilicet quod per hoc nomen poneret in illis quod facerent differre substantialiter; postea vero consideratum est quod omne accidens aliquo modo facit differre et ideo haec vox, scilicet ‘differentia’, est imposita omnibus accidentibus tam separabilibus quam inseparabilibus praeter substantiales differentias, imponens illis hanc proprietatem, quod faciat solummodo alteratum. Et ita hoc nomen quod est ‘differentia’, cum <in> substantialibus<sup>5</sup> differentiis ponat quod substantialiter differre faciant, in

<sup>1</sup>•exordio] exordio recusavit S *ante corr.*

<sup>2</sup>•Cf. *Isag.* p. 6, 1–2; Boeth., *In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, p. 171, 18–22; P3, p. 84, 19–20.

<sup>3</sup>•differentia] *mauult corrector*, differentiam S

<sup>4</sup>•prius] *an primus legendum?*

<sup>5</sup>•<in> substantialibus] *corr. Tarlazzi*, universalibus S

accidentibus quod solum alteratum, iudicandum est ad ea aequivocum<sup>1</sup>. Secundum vero hanc sententiam ista divisio: differentia alia communis, alia propria, alia magis propria (cf. 14.15–16) est aequivocae vocis in significationes. Et est notandum quod illa duo membra, communis et propria, accipiuntur pro una significatione et ultimum membrum, scilicet magis propria, pro alia significatione, ut sic dicatur differentia alia communis, alia propria, alia magis propria. Et hic accipitur large differentia par ad accidens, et tantundem valet illa divisio quantum si diceretur: “accidens aliud purum, aliud substantiale; substantiale accidens idem est quod magis propria, purum idem quod communis et propria”. Potest etiam dici quod ‘differentia’ ponat eandem<sup>2</sup> rem in omnibus suis significatis, scilicet quod faciant differre. Quam sententiam videtur approbare Porphyrius ubi dicit quod OMNIS DIFFERENTIA FACIT ALTERATUM (15.3), et in hac proprietate differentia non erit aequivoca sed univoca, et tunc haec divisio ‘alia communis, alia propria, <alia><sup>3</sup> magis propria’ est superioris in inferiora. Vel potest dici quod sit vocis in modos, quae in hoc differt ad divisionem vocis in significationes quod vox aequivoca nihil universale ponit in suis significatis, in modos rem universalem ponit in omnibus suis significatis cum diversis <modis><sup>4</sup>.

TRANSL.: We have to note the equivocity of the word (*vocis*) ‘difference’. At the very beginning of the treatise on the genus it has been said that <Porphyry> placed the species together with the genus so that one would not think that only the genus has multiple meanings; but he did not also mention difference, proprium, and accident so that he would not confuse the mind of the reader with loquacity. As we can understand from the above words, the difference and the other two elements have to be understood in an equivocal way. In the case of difference, this equivocity can be considered as follows. The person who first imposed the name ‘difference’ imposed it at the very beginning on substantial differences, so that –

<sup>1</sup>•aequivocum] *correx*i, aequivoca *S*

<sup>2</sup>•eandem] eadem *S* (*difficile lectu*)

<sup>3</sup>•alia] *suppl. Girard*

<sup>4</sup>•modis] *suppl. Girard, collato p. 138, 2*

through this name – he determined that they make <something> differ substantially. Later, it was considered that every accident somehow produces a difference, so the word (*vox*) ‘difference’ was imposed on every accident, both separable and inseparable (in addition to substantial differences), attributing to them the property to produce alteration only. So, the name ‘difference’ (given that, in substantial differences, it determines that they make <something> differ substantially, but, in accidents, <it determines> that <they> only make something altered) should be judged as equivocal with respect to these. According to this position, the division according to which a difference is either common, proper, or most proper, is <the division> of an equivocal word into <its various> meanings. It should also be noted that these two members <of the division> (‘common’ and ‘proper’) are taken in one sense, while the last member (that is to say, ‘most proper’) <is taken> in another sense, so that one can say that a difference is either common, proper, or most proper. Here ‘difference’ is understood in a broad sense, on a par with ‘accident’, so that such division amounts to saying: “amongst accidents, some are pure, some are substantial; a substantial accident is the same as the most proper <difference>, a pure accident is the same as the common and proper <difference>.” Moreover, it can be said: difference determines one and the same thing in all the items it signifies, that is to say, that they make <something> differ. Porphyry seems to share this opinion when he says: “every difference makes <something> altered” (15.3); and in this property difference shall not be equivocal but univocal, and therefore the division “<a difference is either> common, proper, or most proper” is <the division> of a superior into its inferiors. Alternatively, one can say that it is <a division> of a word (*vox*) into <various> modes; this division is different from the division of a word into <various> meanings, since an equivocal word does not put anything universal in the items it signifies, whereas <the division> into modes puts a universal thing in all the items it signifies, in different ways.

COMMENTARY: This annotation is added to P3’s section *de specie* (p. 135, 24). At the very beginning of the *Isagoge* – the *adnotator* says – Porphyry

stated the equivocal nature of ‘genus’, just to avoid confusion in the reader. This equivocity is now discussed for difference and two other predicables, species and accident. Following Boethius (*In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 240, 14 – 241, 14), the *adnotator* distinguishes between substantial and accidental difference, that is to say, between a difference producing a different substance and a difference that only gives origin to a change in the same substance. In the second part of the annotation (*secundum hanc sententiam ... ista divisio*) the author collects the differences *communis* and *propria* on one side, and on the other side the difference *magis propria*. The text is, all in all, a paraphrase of Boethius (*In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 244, 12 – 245, 23): *communis* and *propria* are accidental differences, *magis propria* is a substantial one.

The same lines of Boethius’ commentary are also repeated in P3 (p. 140, 3–21), in a section that is preserved by S. That gives the impression that, while paraphrasing Boethius, the *adnotator* inserted a duplicate here.

At the end of the addition, the words *vocis in modos – cum diversis* are very similar to p. 137, 24 – 138, 2; this also renders the correction *cum diversis <modis>* proposed by Girard more probable. For a parallel to this sentence see also P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 10va): *hinc colligunt quidam supradictam divisionem melius esse vocum in modos quam in significationes, quia facere differre convenit omnibus, sed diverso modo, et hoc communiter attribuit eis Porphyrius*. The division *in modos/in significationes* is indebted to Boethius’ *De divisione* (p. 42, 1–9 = 888 d): *fit autem vocis diuisio tribus modis. Dividitur enim in significationes ut aequivoca vel ambigua ... alia autem modo secundum modum, haec enim non plura significant sed multis modis, ut cum dicimus “infinitum” unam rem quidem significat cuius terminus inveniri non possit, sed hoc dicimus aut secundum mensuram aut secundum multitudinem aut secundum speciem*.

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p. 138, 7–10 secundum autem – generis in species] |S pp. 87b l. 46 – 88a l. 12| Si vero sic accipiatur differentia, in hoc libro non habemus aequivocationem huius vocis, sed alibi est quaerenda; et sciendum quod,

cum de substantialibus tantum intendat, [qui]<sup>1</sup> de communibus et propriis agens incidenter<sup>2</sup>, interserit gratia<sup>3</sup> substantialium. Notandum est quod substantialis differentia facit differre substantialiter, id est facit aliud in essentia diversas |S p. 88 a| species inter se vel individua diversarum specierum, vel ipsam speciem a suo genere, id est ipsum genus substantialibus differentiis informatum a se ipso puro et informi considerato, quia rationalitas adveniens animali facit ipsum animal formatum aliud a se ipso informi considerato; quia si <non><sup>4</sup> faceret animal formatum aliud a se ipso puro, homo<sup>5</sup> non differret ab asino in substantiali esse quia si animal formatum rationalitate non est aliud a se ipso informi, tunc est idem, et ita illa res quae est homo est idem in suo substantiali esse quod animal suum genus. Item: <si><sup>6</sup> irrationale adveniens eidem animali non facit diversum a se ipso informi, id<sup>7</sup> tunc est idem substantiali esse et ita asinus non differt ab homine in substantiali esse quia asinus nihil est aliud quam animal informatum irrationalitate quod non differt a se ipso informi in substantia et item homo nihil est aliud quam animal informatum rationalitate, quod similiter non differt a se informi. Quare homo et asinus, si differre non faciunt animal [animal]<sup>8</sup> a se sine formis considerato, non differre videntur inter se in substantia.

TRANSL.: If difference is understood in this way, we do not find the equivocity of this word (*vox*) in this book, but it must be sought elsewhere. We have to keep in mind that because <Porphyry> intends to tackle just the substantial <differences>, discussing the common and proper ones incidentally, he inserts these because of substantial differences. The following has to be noted: substantial difference makes two things

<sup>1</sup>•qui] *seclusi*

<sup>2</sup>•incidenter] *correx*i, incidendum *S*

<sup>3</sup>•gratia] *corr. Girard*, genera *S*

<sup>4</sup>•non] *addidi*

<sup>5</sup>•homo] *correx*i, iam *S*

<sup>6</sup>•si] *suppl. Girard*

<sup>7</sup>•id] *correx*i, in *S*, in <substantia> *suppl. Girard*

<sup>8</sup>•animal] *secl. Girard*

different concerning the substance, that is to say, it makes different species or the individuals of different species different in their essence; or it makes the species different from its genus, that is, <it makes> the genus, once informed by substantial differences, <different> from the genus itself considered as pure and not shaped by forms. Rationality, for instance, attaching itself to the animal, makes the animal, once informed, different from itself considered without forms. If <difference> would not make the informed animal different from the <animal> itself in its purity, a human would not be different from a donkey in its substantial being: if an animal informed by rationality is not different from itself <when> not informed <by rationality>, it must be the same, and that thing which is a human would be identical in its substantial being to its genus, that is the animal <in its purity>. Again: if irrationality, attaching itself to the animal, does not make it different from itself <when> not informed, this <animal> is identical to <its> substantial being, so a donkey is not different from a human in its substantial being: a donkey, indeed, is nothing else than an animal informed by irrationality, which is no different in substance from itself <when> not informed <by irrationality>; and likewise, a human is nothing else than an animal informed by rationality, which, similarly, is no different from itself <when> not informed <by rationality>. Therefore, if ‘man’ and ‘donkey’ do not make the animal different from itself considered without forms, then they do not seem to differ from each other in substance.

COMMENTARY: Text. In the pages 87b–88a the text of **S** shows several differences, both in extension and sequence, from Iwakuma’s printed text. As in the printed edition, the section on difference starts with p. 87b, but after that Sankt Gallen’s text shows the following order:

<b>Sankt Gallen (S)</b>	<b>Iwakuma's edition (P3)</b>
p. 87b ll. 7–17	p. 135, 1–24
p. 87b ll. 17–42	unpublished
p. 87b ll. 43–46	p. 138, 2–7 unde ait – scilicet infinitatem
p. 87b l. 46 – 88a l. 12	p. 138, 7–10 secundum autem – generis in species, with substantial differences
p. 88a ll. 12–45	p. 136, 1 – 137, 20 tribus modis – propria differentia
<i>om. S</i>	p. 137, 20 – 138, 2 hic etiam dici – tamen diversis modis
p. 88a l. 45 – 88b l. 1	p. 138, 11–15, with variants
p. 88b ll. 1–2	unpublished

In short, instead of the text of P3 published by Iwakuma, we find that: 1. **S** has an unpublished section after 135, 24 (**S** p. 87b ll. 17–42); 2. The section p. 138, 2–15 from P3 is misplaced in **S** and, where it is present, contains several variants; 3. The section p. 137, 20 – 138, 2 from P3 is omitted in **S**; 4. **S** adds two unpublished lines (88b ll. 1–2) after p. 138, 15. From that point onwards, **S** again agrees with the printed text (p. 138, 16 and further).

Philosophical content. Following Boethius, the section of P3 on difference (p. 135–137) distinguishes between *differentia communis*, *propria*, and *magis propria*. The first one can be identified with the *accidens separabile*, the second one with the *accidens inseparabile*, and the third one with the difference that shows the substance of each species (*quae substantiam uniuscuiusque speciei monstrant*). As a result, *differentia* is not a *vox aequivoca* (P3, pp. 135, 1 – 137, 20, in particular p. 137, 22: *non tamen differentia est vox aequivoca*). The unpublished annotation starts from this distinction, although in **S** it is placed *before* it (once again, **S** has a tendency to misplace sections of the text against their logical order). The first part of the reasoning seems to add elements that are not found in the text of P3 published by Iwakuma: substantial difference, for instance, makes things differ *substantialiter*, that is to say, it makes individuals of the same species different from each other, or it

makes a species different from its genus, or an informed genus from a pure genus. As in the former addition to p. 108, 6, the concept of purity is used to indicate the unformed genus.

In the second part of the note (*item...*) we have perhaps to recognise a *modus tollens*: if difference did not make the *genus formatum* different from the *genus informe*, species would be identical with their substantial being; as species which are both under the genus animal, a man and a donkey would then be no different from each other. If a man and a donkey do not make the informed genus different from the pure genus, then a man and a donkey do not seem to be different from each other in substance.

Parallels. The first lines of the annotation are similar to P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 9va): *et cum hic agat de communibus et propriis et magis propriis differentiis, de magis propriis principaliter intendit ... et gratia substantialium de communibus et propriis incidenter interserit.*

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pp. 136, 1 – 137, 20 tribus modis – propria differentia] **S p. 88a ll. 12–45**

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p. 138, 11–15 hic etiam – differre facit] |**S pp. 88a l. 45 – 88b l. 2**| Et rursus propria plura quam magis propria; communis enim differentia diversas species et diversa individua eiusdem speciei et idem individuum a se ipso differre facit; propria vero diversas species et diversa individua eiusdem speciei, sed numquam idem individuum a se ipso differre facit. Magis propria vero nec idem individuum a se ipso nec individua eiusdem specialissimae speciei sed diversas species a se differre facit.

TRANSL.: Again: proper <difference makes different> more elements than the most proper; indeed common difference makes different species differ <from each other>, and different individuals belonging to the same species, and even an individual from itself; proper difference makes different species and different individuals of the same species differ, but never an individual from itself. The most proper difference does not make



an individual differ from itself nor the individuals of the most specific species, but it makes different species differ from each other.

COMMENTARY: These lines are very similar, but not identical, to p. 138, 11–15. For the sake of clarity, I prefer transcribing the text of the manuscript in full. The threefold distinction is based on Boethius (see the commentary on p. 138, 7–10). The focus here is on the number of entities affected by the three kinds of differences. The common difference makes species differ from each other, different individuals from each other, and the same individual from itself. The proper difference, *qua* inseparable accident, cannot make the individual differ from itself. The most proper difference, *qua* specific difference, can only make species differ from each other.

An interesting parallel to our text can be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 9vb): *Nota quod communis differentia et propria plura fac<it> differre quam magis propria. Communis enim differentia diversa genera et diversas species et individua eiusdem speciei et idem individuum a se ipso differre facit, ut sessio quae est in Socrates facit eum differre ab arbore et a ceteris et a se ipso stante; similiter et propria, ut cicatrix; magis propria vero nec idem individuum a se ipso nec individua eiusdem specialissimae speciei, sed diversas species a se differre facit.*

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p. 139, 21 ut nasi curvitas etc] |S p. 88b ll. 23–24| ut nasi curvitas et cicatrix oculorum eo (*spatium vacuum reliquit*) ex vulnere. Notandum quod cum deberet exemplificare de inseparabili accidenti...

TRANSL.. [Inseparable accident is] like a curved nose, a scar in the eyes ... resulting from a wound. It has to be noted that <at this point>, when he had to give an example of an inseparable accident...

COMMENTARY: This short annotation just adds some examples to the preceding reasoning. The scribe left a blank space after *oculorum eo*, since he probably used an unreadable model. The content of the lost words

should have been similar to the *Isagoge* and Boethius' commentary: see *Isag.* (transl. Boethii, 14.22–23): *ut nasi curvitas, caecitas oculorum, cicatrix, cum ex vulnere obcalluerit*; Boethius, *In Isag.*<sup>2</sup> (pp. 242, 22 – 243, 3).

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p. 141, 11 *substantiali esse*] |S p. 88b ll. 46–48| *add.* Videndum est quod OMNIS (15.3) hic apponitur contra usum quia non colligit individua, sed tantum universalia, scilicet communem et propriam et magis propriam differentiam, et ut colligat individua addit UNIVERSALITER.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: “every” (*omnis*, 15.3) is used here against the common usage: it does not bring together individuals, but only universals, that is to say, common, proper, and most proper difference; for bringing together individuals he adds “universally” (*universaliter*).

COMMENTARY: This short annotation just adds a lexical clarification concerning *omnis* and *universaliter* (*Isag.* 15.3; *In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 244, 1 – 245, 4).

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p. 148, 14–16 *ut materiale – suscipiens est*] |S p. 90a ll. 4–5| et quod sit idem in omnibus ut materiale esse vel speciale esse quantum ad individua neque intensionem neque remissionem suscipiens.

TRANSL.: [We find this here: <ifferences> complete the definition of each thing, but the <essence> of each is one and the same in every subject]; it is the same in each thing as material or special being as far it concerns the individuals, and admits neither intension nor remission.

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p. 149, 6 *non ab eis continentur*] |S p. 90a ll. 18–20| *add.* Potest etiam sic dici, ut fiat per apparentia membra: differentiae alicuius rei vel sunt divisivae eiusdem rei vel constitutivae, quia illae quae erunt constitutivae numquam erunt eiusdem divisivae.

TRANSL.: Alternatively, it can be said like this so that <the division> is made through apparent members: differences of a certain thing are either divisive or constitutive of it, since those that are constitutive will never be divisive of the same thing.

COMMENTARY: The starting point of this annotation is *Isag.* 16.21–17.3 (in particular 17.1–3: *hae quidem quae divisivae sunt differentiae generum completivae fiunt et constitutivae specierum*). This short addition specifies that the same differences cannot be constitutive and divisive in relation to the same thing.

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p. 156, 10 quod fieri non potest] |S p. 91a ll. 17–23| *add.* Vel aliter potest legi supradicta littera ista, scilicet NEQUE ENIM (17.19). Dictum est species habere differentias a generibus, sed tamen<sup>1</sup> genus non habet oppositas et hic accipimus ENIM pro ‘tamen’. Vel aliter: species habet differentias a generibus, sed tamen genera non habent eas in actu et vere genera non habent, quia non habent eas oppositas. Et hoc habes ibi, NEQUE ENIM OPPOSITAS HABET (17.19), quod probat a toto sic: si nulla habet opposita, tunc non habet oppositas differentias, et hoc extra<sup>2</sup>; quam consequentiam sic probat in littera a destructione consequentis, quia si haberet eas oppositas, haberet opposita; et hoc est ibi: NAM IN EODEM (17.19–20).

TRANSL.: The words above, that is to say “nor indeed” (17.19), can be explained in another way. It has been said that species have their differences from the genera; but the genus does not have opposite differences; in this case we read “indeed” as “nonetheless”. Alternatively, <we can explain these words like this>: species have differences from the genera; nonetheless, the genera do not have differences in act and genera do not truly have differences, because they do not have opposite differences. This is what you find here: “nor does it have the opposite

<sup>1</sup>•tamen] *an tantum legendum?*

<sup>2</sup>•Cf. P3 p. 154, 2–4: itaque genus consideratum extra omnia inferiora non habet differentias contrarias.

<differences>” (17.19), which <Porphyry> shows with an argument *a toto* in the following way: if <the genus> does not have any opposites, it does not have opposite differences <if considered> apart from other things. <Porphyry> proves this consequence in his writing with a *destructio consequentis*: if the genus had opposite differences, it would have opposites; this argument can be found in the words: “indeed in the same thing <they will have opposites at the same time>” (17.19–20).

COMMENTARY: The mention of the *littera* connects this annotation to the former lemma, p. 155, 29: *littera sic continuatur*. The lemma of the Latin translation is affected by a variant reading (neque autem *Kö Minio Paluello*] *om. Fl*, neque enim *cett*). That shows that the *adnotator* read a Boethian translation that was affected by the most common reading in medieval manuscripts. In the text of the preceding lines (which is identical to P3’s printed text) one reads that the *genus in sua puritate* does not have *in actu* opposite differences. The *adnotator* is aware of the impropriety of *neque enim* at the beginning of a sentence and proposes an explanation of these words as synonymous to *tamen*. A second explanation is introduced by *vel aliter*: a species derives its differences from genera; in genera, however, differences are not *in actu*. In this way, the presence of opposite differences in the genus is explained with the opposition *potestate/actu*.

Parallels. For a similar statement see P20 (Wien, ÖNB 2486, f. 55rb): *Neque enim* (17.19). *Vere genus non habet differentias quia non habet eas oppositas. A pari vel a toto. Vel aliter: Nam unde etc. Species abundat a genere differentiis, sed tamen habet eas a genere et vere habet eas a genere. Hoc extra. Nam unde habebunt eas differentias species nisi a genere, quod diceretur a nullo. Neque enim: dico quod species habeant differentias a genere, sed tamen genus non habet eas in sui constitutione. Hoc extra. Et vere non habet eas in sui constitutione, neque habet eas oppositas. A pari vel a toto.*

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p. 159, 9 vel rationalitatem] |S p. 91b ll. 14–17| *add.* enim proportio est proprie duarum habitudinum similitudo, ut cum duae habitudines inter se

sunt similes earum similitudo vocatur proportio. Inter aes enim et statuam consideratur quaedam habitudo, inter hominem et animal alia; quae duae inter se sunt similes, quare similitudo vocatur proportio.

TRANSL.: Proportion is properly a similarity of two relations (*habitudinum*): for example, when two ratios (*habitudines*) are similar to each other, their similarity is called ‘proportion’. Between bronze and a statue there is a certain ratio (*habitudo*), between human and animal there is another one; but these <ratios> are similar to each other, so their similarity is called a proportion.

COMMENTARY: The manuscripts of the Boethian translation (*Isag.* 18.9–15) juxtapose the terms *proportionem/similitudinem* and *proportionaliter/similiter*. This annotation is quite similar to a paraphrase of *In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 267, 3 – 269, 5 (P3, p. 158, 19–27); it aims to connect *similitudo* and *proportio*; for a parallel see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, *Isag.* (p. 79, 26): *est autem proportio similitudo habitudinum*.

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p. 161, 19–22 sciendum est – unam descriptionem] |S p. 92a ll. 2–6| Vel sic est PARS EIUS QUOD EST ESSE REI id est pars ([19.7–8] *spatium vacuum reliquit*) essentiae rei id est speciei; differentia enim speciei pars formalis est. Et faciunt duas descriptiones differentiae de hoc quod dicit Porphyrius: et quod CONDUKIT AD ESSE et de hoc QUOD EST EIUS QUOD EST ESSE REI PARS EST; secundum quam sententiam littera superius exposita est, quidam vero unam.

TRANSL.: [Some people give a single description <of difference>; the text is explained in the following way]: Alternatively, “<difference> is a part of what the thing is” (19.7–8), that is to say, it is a part of the essence of the thing, that is, of the species; difference, indeed, is the formal component of the species. On the basis of Porphyry’s words, they give two definitions of ‘difference’: it “is what leads to being” or “is a part of what

the thing is”. The text has been exposed before according to this interpretation; some people, nonetheless, give a single definition.

COMMENTARY: After the words *faciunt duas* the text of the annotation is almost identical to P3’s printed text. However, I prefer editing the addition in this form in order to better highlight how its reading differs from the printed text. After the quotation from *Isagoge*’s text a word is lacking; the model used by the scribe was perhaps unreadable at this point. Based on the parallel with P3 (p. 161, 8–9: *est etiam illa quae est ars eius quod est esse rei id est quae est pars definitionis*), we can imagine the scribe omitted *definitionis*.

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p. 162, 3 esse ipsius speciei] |S p. 92a ll. 10–12| *add.* Siquidem †insistit vim†<sup>1</sup> litterae sine determinatione verum est; differentia est QUOD CONDUKIT AD ESSE (19.7), non est enim natura generis quod conducat ad esse cum ipsum sit esse speciei, differentia vero ad esse conducit quia genus informando speciem<sup>2</sup> constituit.

TRANSL.: If we inspect the text without any determination, it is true: difference is “what leads to being” (19.7); the nature of the genus is not what leads to being: it is, in itself, the essence of the species; however, difference is what leads to being since, informing the genus, it constitutes the species.

COMMENTARY: Paraphrasing the *Isagoge* (p. 19, 7–8), P3’s printed text quotes two anonymous opinions about the definition of difference. According to the first one, difference can be defined as the thing which brings the species to its being (*conducit ... speciem ad suum esse*) and which is part of the thing (*est pars eius quod est esse rei*). The second definition seems to be attested in Porphyry’s text and just contains “the thing which brings the species to its being” (without mentioning being part

<sup>1</sup>•siquidem – vim] *an si quidam inspicit vim corrigendum?*

<sup>2</sup>•speciem] *correxi, specie S*

of the thing); to avoid any confusion with the genus, the *adnotator* adds: “which is part of the essence of a thing”. The nature of the genus – so specifies the addition of **S** – does not bring the species to being; but difference does: indeed, difference constitutes the species by giving a form to the genus.

Parallels. For other discussions on the concept of *differentia* see P5 (p. 33, 22–28): *sed illud dicunt esse differentiam quod conducit ad esse, id est quod cum alio ducit ad esse, id est constituit substantialem diffinitione*<*m*>; *et quia genus cum differentia ducit ad esse, determinat: et quod, scilicet differentia, est pars eius, id est generis, quod genus est esse rei, id est speciei, scilicet genus dat esse speciei, id est ipsum genus est materia speciei*; Abelard, *LNPS, Isag.* (p. 569, 24–28).

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p. 164, 1 in iuventute pubescere] |**S pp. 92a l. 37 – 92b l. 7**| *add.* Hic videndum quomodo †haec vox†, quae est ‘proprium’, aequivocum ille prius<sup>1</sup> imposuit. Hoc nomen quod est ‘proprium’<sup>2</sup> imposuit ille<sup>3</sup> risibilitati<sup>4</sup> et rudibilitati<sup>5</sup> et similibus secundum hanc proprietatem quod conveniunt alicui speciei omni et soli et semper, ponendo illud in illis, convenire alicui omni et soli et semper; et ita ‘proprium’ ad risibile et rudibile et similia univocum, quia idem ponit in omnibus, hoc scilicet quod omni speciei et soli et semper conveniunt. Postea vero ipse impositor consideravit medicinam et similia; secundum hanc proprietatem imposuit eis hoc nomen quod est ‘proprium’, quae diversa est a supradicta proprietate. Quare cum diversis rebus secundum diversas proprietates hoc nomen sit impositum, iure ad illa dicitur aequivocum; hoc idem in aliis notandum est.

<sup>1</sup>•prius] *an primus legendum?*

<sup>2</sup>•hic videndum – quod est proprium] Hic videndum quomodo haec vox quae est ‘proprium’ aequivoca <est>. Ille <qui> prius imposuit hoc nomen quod est ‘proprium’ *corr. Girard; an* Hic videndum quomodo hanc vocem, quae est ‘proprium’, aequivocam ille prius imposuit. Hoc nomen quod est ‘proprium’... *corrigenum?*

<sup>3</sup>•ille] *correxerit Girard, illud S*

<sup>4</sup>•risibilitati] *corr. Tarlazzi, ribibilitate S*

<sup>5</sup>•rudibilitati] *corr. Tarlazzi, rudibilitate S*

Hic quidam obiciunt<sup>1</sup> quod tertia significatio proprii nihil differt a prima; est enim prima quod convenit soli et non omni; tertia vero quae convenit omni et soli et aliquando; ex tertia vero significatione sic sequitur pri<ma><sup>2</sup>. Verbi gratia si canescere convenit omni homini in senectute |S p. 92b | tantum, tunc non omni homini convenit, quia si in senectute tantum convenit, non convenit in iuventute; si in iuventute non convenit, tunc iuvenis non canescit; si iuvenis non canescit, quidam homo non canescit; et si hoc est, tunc<sup>3</sup> canescere non convenit <omni><sup>4</sup> homini et sic, cum non conveniat omni et conveniat soli, convenit soli et non omni. Itaque non differre videtur tertia a prima, sed differt; illud enim quod ‘convenit soli et non omni’ sic debet intelligi quod nec semper nec aliquando omni conveniat, ut medicina conveniat soli et non omni, non semper nec aliquando omni convenit, canescere vero – quod continetur sub tertia – aliquando omni convenit.

TRANSL.: We must now take into account how he first imposed this word (*vox*) ‘*proprium*’ as equivocal. He imposed the name ‘*proprium*’ on the ability to laugh, the ability to bray and on similar things on the basis of the property that they <all> always happen to one whole species alone, determining this in them – namely, <the fact of> always happening to one whole <species> alone. Therefore, ‘*proprium*’, considered with respect to <what> is able to laugh, able to bray, and similar things, is a univocal term, because it determines one and the same <property> in all of them, namely, that they always happen to one whole species alone. Later, the name giver considered medicine and similar things; and he imposed the name ‘*proprium*’ on them according to this property, which is different from the former. Therefore, given that this name is imposed on different things on the basis of different properties, it is correctly described as equivocal with respect to them; and the same can be noted in other circumstances.

<sup>1</sup>•obiciunt] *correx*i, abiciunt *S*

<sup>2</sup>•prima] *supplevi*, pri *S*

<sup>3</sup>•tunc] *corr. Girard*, non *S*

<sup>4</sup>•omni] *suppl. Girard*



Here some people object that the third meaning of ‘*proprium*’ does not differ at all from the first one: the first one is <the fact of> happening to a certain <species> alone, thought not to the whole <species>; the third one is <the fact of> happening to a certain whole <species> only, and at a certain time: so, the first <meaning> follows from the third. For instance: if becoming grey-haired happens to every human but just in old age, then it does not happen to every human, because if it only happens in old age, it does not happen in youth and if it does not happen in youth, a young human does not become grey-haired; and if a young human does not become grey-haired, there is a human who does not become grey-haired; and if this is so, then becoming grey-haired does not happen to every human. And so, it does not happen to the whole <species> but it happens to the <species> only, so it happens <to the species> only but not the whole <species>. If it is like this, the third <meaning> does not seem to differ from the first. But it does differ! The sentence “it happens to the <species> only but not to the whole <species>” is to be understood in the sense that it does not happen always nor at a certain time (as for example medicine happens to the <human species> only, but not to the whole <human species> and it does not happen always nor at a certain time to the whole species); becoming grey-haired, however – which falls under the third meaning – happens at a certain time to the whole <human species>.

COMMENTARY: The text of *Isag.* 19.18–20.1 distinguishes between *propria* that happen: **a.** *solī etsi non omni*; **b.** *omni etsi non solī*; **c.** *solī et omni et aliquando*; **d.** *omni et solī et semper*. P3’s published text (pp. 163, 13 – 164, 2) is, all in all, a simple paraphrase of Boethius’ translation. The text of **S** has several differences from Iwakuma’s edition, for instance the present addition and the misplacing of the section between p. 164, 19 and 165, 13. Concerning this annotation, the anonymous *adnotator* stresses the equivocity of *proprium*: in Boethius’ commentary (pp. 275, 3 – 280, 12) the adjective *aequivocus* is not used for *proprium*. Quite the opposite, in the opinion of the *adnotator* ‘*proprium*’ is imposed *diversis rebus secundum diversas proprietates*.

The second part of the annotation addresses an objection by some anonymous *quidam*. The third meaning of *proprium* – they say – is not different from the first. Their reasoning for showing that is quite sophisticated: *canescere* happens just to old people; so, *canescere* happens just to a part of the human species. *Sed differt* – adds the *adnotator*. His argument is based on the fact that the first kind of *proprium* does not happen *semper nec aliquando*, that is to say, it is not connected with differences that happen at a certain time. The third kind, on the other hand, happens to the whole species but it admits differences that happen at a certain time.

Parallels. P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 13vb): *quod dicit accidit soli et non omni, intelligendum est soli et nunquam omni, quia nisi nunquam intelligatur ex tertia significatione sequitur prima, quia quidquid omni aliquando, non convenit omni. Verbi gratia si canescere convenit omni homini in senectute tantum, tunc non omni convenit, quia si <in> senectute tantum convenit, tunc non convenit in iuventute; si in iuventute non convenit, tunc iuvenis non canescit; si iuvenis non canescit, quidam homo non canescit; et si hoc est, canescere non convenit omni homini, sed non potest inferri nunquam ei convenire; for a similar reasoning, although concerning the fourth kind of *proprium*, see P3 (p. 166, 10–19, in particular ll. 11–12): *si convenit omni convenit semper quia si non convenit semper nec convenit omni*.*

Text. The Latin text seems to be corrupted at the beginning of the addition (see the critical notes); the meaning, however, is clear enough.

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p. 164, 19–21 hic obicitur – ad senectutem] |S p. 92b ll. 8–9| Hic obicitur: si convenit omni homini, tunc morienti puero in ventre matris accidit canescere in senectute, et si hoc est, tunc perdurabit usque in senectutem<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>•senectutem] *mauvlt corrector*, senectute S

TRANSL.: Here, some people object: if it happens to every human, becoming grey-haired in old age happens even to a baby who dies in the womb of its mother; if it is so, then the baby will last until old age.

COMMENTARY: This annotation is a rewriting of P3's text as printed by Iwakuma (p. 164, 19–21; at this point the manuscripts **O**, **A** and **P** all present the same version of the text), but, for the sake of clarity, I prefer to give a full transcription of the note.

Parallels. For similar examples concerning a dying baby, see also P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 13vb): *hic obicitur: si convenit omni homini ea in senectute, tunc puero morienti; et si hoc est, tunc perdurabit usque ad senectutem, quod falsum est*; P17 (BnF, Lat. 3237, f. 129vb): *sed falsum videtur quod canescere in senectute omni conveniat homini, cum ei qui puer moritur non conveniat*; P20 (f. 56vb–57ra): *ut homini in senectute canescere (19.22). Nota quod dicit hoc esse proprium quod convenit omni homini et soli et aliquando falsum videtur esse, quia hoc nunquam convenit omni homini, scil. canescere in senectute, quia nonnisi illis qui ad senectutem ve|57ra|niunt, et si nunquam convenit omni, nunquam convenit soli.*

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pp. 164, 21 – 165, 13 item falsum videtur – de una sola specie ut proprius] |S p. 92b 9–22|

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p. 164, 1–18 aliud quod convenit – canescere in senectute] |S p. 92b ll. 22–31|

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p. 165, 22 quia si] |S p. 92b ll. 37–38| de quocumque praedicatur de eo scilicet inanimato corpore<sup>1</sup> descriptio alicuius et describunt illius sed

<sup>1</sup>•de eo – corpore] *linea infrascripta del. S*

COMMENTARY: In the text of P3 printed by Iwakuma, the objection of the anonymous *quidam* (p. 165, 20) starts from the definition of a *proprium* as *potens est ridere*. If *potens est ridere* is the definition of *risibilis*, the inanimate body of the foetus (which *in potentia* can laugh) must be defined as a human being. After this, the printed version of P3 provides further determinations of the definition of *risibilis* (p. 166, 2–4).

The short annotation preserved by S does not seem to have a full meaning. The words *de eo scilicet inanimato corpore* have been written and then deleted with an underlining; the words *descriptio alicuius et describunt illius*, on the other hand, are asyntactical; all that gives the impression that these are incomplete fragments of text that have been written here in an uncontrolled way.

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p. 168, 18 subiectum non corrumpitur] |S p. 93a ll. 12–22| *add.* Vel possumus dicere, quod melius est, omne accidens tam purum quam substantiale<sup>1</sup> in hac accidentis descriptione describi. Omne enim accidens suum proprium fundamentum habet a quo sustentetur, cui et adesse et abesse potest absque eius corruptione, ut rationalitas proprium habet fundamentum animal, risibile hominem, quibus et adesse et abesse possunt absque eorum corruptione. Secundum quam sententiam quantitas et cetera<sup>2</sup> praedicamenta praeter substantiam hic describuntur in quantum sunt accidentia et, sicut in ceteris, sic hic huius vocis quae est ‘accidens’ notanda est aequivocatio. Et dicimus accidens aequivocum ad separabilia et ad <in>separabilia<sup>3</sup>, ponentes in separabilibus hanc proprietatem, quod separantur a subiectis, in inseparabilibus quod non separantur. Potest etiam dici quod ‘accidens’ significat substantias, secundum quod<sup>4</sup> homo dicitur accidens in tractatu aliquod, et tunc ponit<sup>5</sup> in illis extraneitatem. Rursus

<sup>1</sup>•substantiale] *correx*i, substantialem S

<sup>2</sup>•cetera] cetera cetera S

<sup>3</sup>•inseparabilia] *correx*i, separabilia S

<sup>4</sup>•quod] *correx*i ex suggestu Girard, pro S

<sup>5</sup>•ponit] *an ponenti legendum?*

ita accipitur quod ponit<sup>1</sup> in rebus accidentibus esse in subiecto, et ad istas significationes<sup>2</sup> iure dicitur aequivocum.

TRANSL.: Alternatively, we can more properly say: every accident, both pure and substantial, falls under this definition of accident. For every accident has its own proper fundament by which it is supported, and to which it can be present or absent without its corruption. Rationality, for instance, has animal as its proper fundament, the ability to laugh <has> human <as its proper fundament>, to which they can be present or absent without their destruction. According to this opinion, quantity and other categories, apart from substance, are described here as accidents; as in other cases, we have to note here the equivocal character of the word (*vox*) ‘accident’. We say that ‘accident’ can be equivocal in relation to separable and inseparable things: we put in the separables the property that they can be separated from substances, in the inseparable <accidents> the property that they cannot be separated. Alternatively, we can say that ‘accident’ means substances, and according to this human is called “a certain accident” in the treatise, and then Porphyry puts in them the property of being extraneous. Moreover, it is understood that he puts in the accidental things the property of being in a subject, and in relation to these meanings <accidents> are correctly called equivocal.

COMMENTARY: This is the first annotation to the section *de accidenti*. Porphyry – says the printed text of P3 – excludes the *substantialis differentia* and the *proprium* from the accidents; P3, on the other side, points out that Porphyry’s position is more restrictive than Aristotle’s (p. 168, 14–18). The addition of S at the very beginning is a simple paraphrase of *Isagoge*’s text. Quoting the example of rationality, the *adnotator* seems to be on a very different path than Boethius; according to the latter, rationality, for instance, is a substantial characteristic and it cannot be removed without destruction of the substrate (*In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, p. 282,

<sup>1</sup>•ponit] *an ponitur legendum?*

<sup>2</sup>•significationes] *correx*i, significationis S

1 – 283, 4): *ergo quod dictum est et adesse et abesse, non re sed animo intellegendum est. Alioquin et substantialia, quae omnino separari non possunt, si animo et cogitatione disiungimus, ut si ab homine rationabilitatem auferamus – quam licet actu separare non possumus, tamen animi imaginatione disiungimus – statim perit hominis species quod idem in accidentibus non fit: sublato enim accidenti cogitatione species manet.* This annotation is closer to P14’s commentary (BnF 17813, f. 14rb): *si enim respiciamus earum proprium subiectum, abesse possunt vel ratione ab eo, ut cum animal sit proprium rationalitatis subiectum, sicut secundum quosdam superius probatum est, ab animali rationalitas potest separari. Nec dico tantum posse separari ab animali in eius simplicitate, quia tunc nemo sanus dubitat ei non inesse; sed dico posse separari ab ea re quae est homo, non in quantum est homo, sed in quantum est animal.* For rationality as a substantial characteristic see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus, Isag.* (p. 42, 14–19).

In the last lines, the doctrine according to which ‘accident’ can be identified with the second substance and the short, cryptic allusion to the *extraneitas* of accidents are worthy of consideration. These statements can be explained with a (polemical) reference to Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus, Cat.* (p. 150, 1–4): *quare genera et species tantum, quae primas substantias continent, dicantur secundae substantiae et non etiam accidentalia vocabula, causam reddit, quia scilicet ista post primas substantias secundam significationem habent et dignius rem subiectam nominant quam accidentalia vocabula. Haec enim in essentia rem appellant et secundum naturam substantiae sunt imposita, accidentalia vero nomina extranea et adventitia proprietate conveniunt.*

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p. 172, 19 namque animal etc.] |S p. 93b ll. 7–9| *add.* Quod dicit animal praedicari DE EQUIS ET BOBUS (21.8): est notandum quod, cum debet exemplificare quod animal praedicatur de speciebus, exemplificat de individuis, scilicet ideo exemplificat de individuis ubi debet exemplificare

de speciebus quia species nihil aliud est quam substantialis similitudo collecta<sup>1</sup> ex omnibus individuis.

TRANSL.: <Porphyry> says that ‘animal’ can be predicated of “horses and oxen” (21.8); the following has to be noted: when he has to give an example <to show> that ‘animal’ is predicated of species, he gives an example concerning individuals, that is to say, he gives an example concerning individuals in a place where he should give an example concerning species: species, indeed, is nothing else than a substantial similarity <that has been> collected from all individuals.

COMMENTARY: The starting point of this addition is the text of *Isag.* 21.8–10: *namque animal de equis et bubus et canibus praedicatur quae sunt species et de hoc equo et de hoc bove quae sunt individua*. Actually, Porphyry’s text does not give examples of individuals *instead of* species, but gives examples of individuals *beyond* species. For a definition of species as *substantialis similitudo* see Boethius, *In Isag.*<sup>2</sup> (p. 166, 16–17): *nihilque aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex individuorum dissimilium numero substantiali similitudine, genus uero cogitatio collecta ex specierum similitudine; ibid.* (p. 229, 7–10): *in speciebus etiam idem considerari potest. Ut enim ipsae individua, quae sunt infinita, una similitudine substantiali colligunt, ita indiuidua speciem propria infinitate distribuunt.*

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p. 173, 18 quot suum genus] |S p. 93b ll. 19–20| add. RATIONALE ENIM (21.21–22.1). Hic ostendit in parte quod differentia continet species, licet non tot contineat quot suum genus.

TRANSL.: “Rationality indeed” (21.21–22.1). Here <Porphyry> shows in part that difference contains the species, although <difference> does not contain as many <species> as its genus.

<sup>1</sup>•collecta] *correxi*, *collecta S*; *verba cal-lecta* – individuis *in sequenti versu praebet S*

p. 174, 9–10 hanc vero – ut genera etc] |S p. 93b ll. 32–37| Notandum est hoc omne dictum, quod diversa differentia quae dicit RATIONE UTI (22.10) praedicari<sup>1</sup> de rationali ut differentia. Omne enim dividens praedicatur de suo diviso particulariter; si divisum sit universale, totum ad dividenda; et cum RATIONE UTI de rationali praedicetur particulariter ut differentia eius divisiva, praedicatur etiam ut existens differentia de inferioribus RATIONALIS. Hanc vero communitatem ostendit Porphyrius dicens: ET QUAECUMQUE PRAEDICANTUR DE GENERE UT GENERA (22.3–4) etc.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: “use of reason” (22.10) <is> a different difference which is predicated of a rational being as difference. Everything causing division is predicated of its divided things in a particular way; if the divided is universal, it is a whole with reference to its dividings. Since “use of reason” is predicated of the rational in a particular way, that is to say, as a difference causing division, “rational” is also predicated of inferior things as existing difference. Porphyry <shows> this commonality with the words: “Whatever things are also predicated of genus as genera”, (22.3–4) etc.

COMMENTARY: This annotation substitutes the printed text of P3, p. 174, 9–10 (*Isag.* 22.3-4: *et quaecumque praedicantur de genere ut genus et de his quae sub ipso sunt speciebus praedicantur*). P3, like Boethius (*In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, p. 293, 1 – 294, 1), argues that two lower differences can be predicated of *rationalis differentia*, that is to say, *habere rationem* and *ratione uti*. Therefore – says the *adnotator* – predication *ut genus* can be used for the genus as well as for lower species; this way, predication *ut differentia* can be used for difference and for lower species as well (for a parallel see P5, p. 37, 30–35). Compared to Boethius and to the text of P3, some important elements are added: 1. *omne dividens praedicatur de suo diviso particulariter*; this statement is also attested in *De divisionibus*, attributed to Abelard (p. 157, 11–15): *intentio vero omnis divisionis est ut*

<sup>1</sup>•praedicari] an praedicatur corrigendum?



*ipsa dividencia recipiant praedicationem sui divisi, aut singillatim tantum, aut collectim tantum, aut utroque modo et ut ipsum divisum recipiat praedicationem suorum dividantium particulariter; 2. si divisum sit universale, totum ad dividencia.*

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p. 175, 11 quam accidens praedicetur] |S pp. 93b l. 49 – 94a l. 4| *add.* QUADRUPES |94 a| VERO (22.20). Probat a parte differentiae, quod differentia praedicatur de paucioribus quam genus, quia quadrupes de solis IIII pedes<sup>1</sup> habentibus; quod dicit DE SOLIS IIII PEDES HABENTIBUS (22.20–21) intelligendum est secundum naturam, non secundum actum; sed et equus tamen IIII pedes haberet ut minus<sup>2</sup> de eo praedicaretur quadrupes secundum naturam.

TRANSL.: “Quadruped” (22.20). <Porphyry> shows, starting from the difference with an argument *a parte*, that difference is predicated of fewer things than genus, since ‘quadruped’ is predicated only of animals that have four feet. When he says “only of animals that have four feet” (22.20–21), <it> has to be understood according to nature, not according to act; but even if a horse had three feet only, we would call it ‘quadruped’ according to nature.

COMMENTARY: The addition preserved in S is a quite simple extension of the previous lines. The number of elements to which the predicable can be applied becomes less when one moves from genus to difference, to proprium and accident. For the question on the nature of an amputee, see Martin 2003.

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<sup>1</sup>•pedes] *correx*i, pedis S

<sup>2</sup>•sed et – minus] sed et<si> equus tantum tres pedes haberet, non minus *vel aliquid simile intelligendum puto*; et<si> equus tantum tres pedes haberet vel minus *mavult Girard*

p. 182, 19 secundum hoc quod est species] |S p. 94b ll. 38–39| *add.* quod<sup>1</sup> ideo dicimus quia eadem res quae est species aliter considerata quam sit potest considerari ut generalissimum.

TRANSL.: We say this because the same thing which is a species, when considered in a different way than it is, can be considered as a summum genus.

p. 183, 20–24 de specie – definitione vel ratione] |S pp. 94b l. 49 – 95a l. 2| Videndum est quod Porphyrius hic largius accipit ‘praedicari univoce’ quam Aristoteles in *Categoriis*: Aristoteles enim ibi accipit ‘praedicari univoce’<sup>2</sup>, hoc est nomine tali et definitione quae denotet primam substantiam ex suo proprio esse, Porphyrius vero accipit ‘praedicari univoce’, hoc est nomine et qualibet ratione.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: Porphyry here understands ‘to be predicated in a univocal way’ in a broader sense than Aristotle in his *Categories*; according to Aristotle ‘to be predicated in a univocal way’ means being predicated with a name and a definition that indicates the first substance from its proper being; Porphyry, on the other hand, understands ‘being predicated in an univocal way’ as <being predicated> with a name and any definition.

COMMENTARY: At p. 183, 10–19, the published text of P3 is affected by a twofold redaction, where **O** and **A** (followed by **S**) agree against the innovative version of **P** (*Isag.* 24.17–19: *commune autem et univoce praedicari genus de propriis speciebus et proprium quorum est proprium*). The *adnotator* draws a comparison between the *Isagoge* and Aristotle’s text (*Cat.* 1, 1a 6–7): συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν το τε ὄνομα καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός; transl. Boethii: *univoca vero dicuntur quorum et nomen commune est et secundum nomen eadem substantiae*

<sup>1</sup>quod] *corr.* Girard, quia S

<sup>2</sup>quam Aristoteles – praedicari univoce] *supra lineam add.* S

*ratio, ut animal homo atque bos.* This comparison of the different meanings of Aristotle's and Porphyry's text has several parallels: see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus, Isag.* (p. 100, 31–34): *commune est autem. Videtur Porphyrius largius hic accipere 'praedicari univoce' quam <Aristoteles> in Substantia, ubi scilicet ait de subiectis non praedicari univoce; Glossae in Categorias* (p. 52, 8–11): *scilicet dat eis praedicari univoce, quod est idem cum praedicari nomine et ratione. Sed hic largius accipit rationem, quia hic accipit rationem, id est diffinitionem vel sibi aequipollentem vel compositam ex ipsa.*

In this case, too, the most interesting similarity can be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 15ra): *sed nota Aristotelem strictius accipere praedicari univoce quam Porphyrius. Ille enim vult praedicari univoce de aliis, quae ex substantiali essentia eorum notantur, ut genera et formae substantiales; Porphyrius vero dicit praedicari univoce, quaecumque praedicantur de aliis nomine et ratione, qualicumque modo non attendens, sive notentur ex eorum substantiali essentia sive non.*

Text. It is worthy to note that the printed text of P3 (p. 183, 21–24) seems to be affected by a gap: after *Porphyrius hic largius accipit praedicari univoce* there is no second term for the comparison. **S**, on the other hand, seems to be the only one preserving the mention of Aristotle and of the *Categories*, which could fill the gap of P3. It is also remarkable that the section of text *quam Aristoteles – praedicari univoce* is preserved in **S** between the lines: in the model this section was most probably *in interlineo* or in the margin.

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p. 189, 12 illarum participant etc] |**S p. 95b ll. 20–23**| *add.* COMMUNE<sup>1</sup> dicit speciem et differentiam PARTICIPARI<sup>2</sup> AEQUALITER (27.10); falsum esse videtur, quod species (ut albedo) praedicatur cum magis et cum minus, [in]<sup>3</sup> differentia (ut calor) similiter. Et ideo determinandum est: in

<sup>1</sup>•commune] *correx*i, quod *S*

<sup>2</sup>•participari] *correx*i, praedicari *S*; *cf. etiam 24.14*

<sup>3</sup>•in] *seclusi*

quantum est species non convenit suis inferioribus cum magis et cum minus, nec differentia de illis quibus substantialis differentia.

TRANSL.: Porphyry says: it is “common” to differences and species “to be equally participated” (27.10); but it seems to be false, because species (for instance whiteness) is predicated with more and less, as well as difference (for instance heat). So, we have to conclude: <a species>, inasmuch as it is a species, does not happen to its inferiors with more or less, and a difference <does not happen with more or less> to the elements of which it is substantial difference.

COMMENTARY: At pp. 189–193 the published text of P3 is affected by a twofold redaction: **O** and **A** (followed by **S**) agree against the innovative version of **P** (which offers a shorter version of the text). This unpublished fragment of text in **S** is added to the commentary on *Isag.* 27.10 (cf. *In Isag.*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 325, 9 – 326, 10: difference and species are participated in in the same way). In this case, too, a parallel can be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 15ra–b): *infert a simili propter idem, quia datae sunt differentiae commune inter genus et cetera, quia fuit propositum, ergo dandae sunt inter cetera propter idem. Et prius ostendit inter speciem |15rb| et differentiam hoc commune, scilicet quod aequaliter conveniunt eis quae eis participant, species scilicet rebus inferioribus eiusdem naturae, differentiae illis quae substantialiter constituunt. Et hoc ostendit in partibus*; see also Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus, Isag.* (p. 102, 33–35): *aequaliter participari, id est non praedicari cum magis et cum minus*; Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus, Isag.* (p. 71, 2–37).

Text. The content of this annotation seems to be similar to the text of both **O** and **A**. If we do not want to change its meaning, we have to put a colon after *aequaliter*. To render the first sentence syntactical the word *quod* should be corrected into *commune*, as in the *Isagoge*.

The reading of **S**, *praedicari aequaliter* (another quotation from the *Isagoge*, p. 24, 14), is clearly wrong: as in the printed text of P3, equal participation is the subject matter of these lines. The correction *participari aequaliter* is needed.

## COLLATION

Additions to the standard text of P3 are marked with the abbreviation *add.*; since the text is printed above, just the presence of such additions is highlighted here. In cases where the square bracket is not followed by *add.*, we are in the presence of a variant reading affecting the printed text of P3 for the words or lines indicated before the square brackets. On the other hand, the siglum *om.* indicates words or lines omitted by S.

When the same word occurs twice on the same line, superscript numbers are used to indicate which word is meant. “p. 95, 3 est<sup>2</sup>”, for example, refers to the second ‘est’ on the third line of p. 95.

The superscript <sup>a.c./p.c.</sup> after the siglum of the manuscript indicates words that are exhibited by the manuscript *ante correctionem* or *post correctionem*.

Where the printed text of P3 is affected by two different versions, I always indicate with which one the text of S agrees.

[S p. 77a] p. 60, 4 praedicamentorum cognitionem] *add.* S || p. 60, 7 tamen] tamen rebus AS || p. 60, 7 eis omnibus] omnibus eis S || p. 60, 8 vel] *om.* S || p. 60, 9–13 sic et – aliae partes] *om.* S || pp. 60, 14 – 61, 7 dicitur etiam Porphyrius – esse ipsius rei] *om.* S || p. 61, 9 his] eis S || p. 61, 10 proprietatum] proprietates S || p. 61, 13 quod generalitatem suscipiunt] *add.* S || p. 61, 14 de eis] de accidentibus S || p. 61, 17 nullum] nullum et S || p. 61, 18 quod] *om.* S || p. 61, 20 concesserit] occiserit S || p. 61, 21 supradatam] supradictam S || p. 61, 22 Porphyrius] *om.* S || pp. 61, 25 – 62, 23 quorundam tamen – modis acceptae] *om.* S || p. 62, 24 est quod] *om.* S || p. 62, 25 spargitur] spargit S || p. 62, 26 harum quinque] quinque harum S || p. 62, 28 conclusionis] conditione S || p. 63, 2 omnes] sunt S || p. 63, 5 speciem] species S || p. 63, 5 praedicari speciebus] speciebus praedicari S || p. 63, 9 cognoscantur] cognoscitur S || p. 63, 9–10 uniuscuiusque] cuiusque S || p. 63, 10 modis] *spatio vacuo relicto om.* S || p. 63, 12 praenoscenta] praecognoscenta S || p. 63, 12 specierum] species S || p. 63, 13 quomodo] quae S || p. 63, 15 ad quae nisi] atque S || p. 63, 18 sunt differentiae] diversae sunt S || p. 63, 18 praedictis ignoratis] praedicti signatoris S || p. 63, 22 sit idem] idem est S || p. 63, 25 aggreditur] agi dicatur S || p. 64, 2 disputabitur] disputatur S || p. 64, 2 ignorabitur] ignoratur S [S p. 77b] p. 64, 6 differentiarum] differentia sunt S || p. 64, 9 esse] esset S || p. 64, 9 probant] probat S || p. 64, 12–18 quomodo vero – substantialis definitio] S = OA || p. 64, 14–15 potest cognosci] cognosci potest S || p. 64, 19 ea] ea definitio S || p. 64, 20 substantialibus differentiis] substantiali differentia S || p. 64, 22 Sophronici alia] Sophronitidis S || p. 64,

23 mortale alia] mortalia S || p. 64, 22 hominis] *om.* S || p. 64, 24 animal] ab S || p. 64, 25 differentiae utilis est] *add.* S || p. 65, 2 factam] facta S || p. 65, 4 sit natura priorum] natura proprietatis S || pp. 65, 6 – 68, 4 ad divisionem – proficiat ostendamus] S = OA || p. 65, 8 scientiam] sententiam S || p. 65, 13 quae] quod S || p. 65, 16 se] se divisio S || p. 65, 17 autem] *om.* S || p. 65, 22 in] et S || p. 65, 25 quas] quam S || p. 65, 26 loco specierum] specierum loco S || p. 66, 4 enim] *om.* S || p. 66, 6 illa] ista S || p. 66, 7 definiuntur] definiuntur S || p. 66, 8 significata illo] significantia illius S || p. 66, 8–9 una eius] *om.* S || p. 66, 10 ea univoca et generalis] univoca et S | **S p. 78a** | p. 66, 17 et] *om.* S || p. 66, 21 aequivoca] equoca S || p. 66, 27 igitur] *om.* S || p. 66, 32 sit quid univocum] univocum sit S || p. 67, 10 si generis natura] si si genero S || p. 67, 12 ignorabit] *om.* S || p. 67, 13 generis haec] haec generis S || p. 67, 13 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 67, 14 speciei suae] suae speciei S || p. 67, 15–16 nulli suae parti] suae nulli parti S || p. 67, 19 igitur] *om.* S || p. 67, 22 divisione] diffinitione S || p. 67, 28 et] quod S || p. 67, 34 putabitur] putatur S || p. 68, 12 et] atque S || p. 68, 14–28 est enim – logicae supponatur] *om.* S || p. 68, 29–31 videndum est – dialecticae supponatur] S = OA || p. 68, 32 scientia] scientiae S || p. 68, 33 in] *om.* S || p. 68, 34 invenire] inveniri S || p. 69, 3 sit tenenda] tenenda sit S || p. 69, 5 ad] *om.* S || p. 69, 7 docemur invenire] inveni S || p. 69, 10–12 notandum est – est notitia] *om.* S || p. 69, 13 autem] *om.* S || p. 69, 15 praeparare vel] *om.* S || p. 69, 18–33 titulus dicitur – se purgat] *om.* S | **S p. 78b** | p. 70, 3 quendam] quando S || p. 70, 5 quaestionibus] *om.* S || pp. 70, 7 – 73, 33 littera sic – mox de generibus] S = OA || p. 70, 10 et] *om.* S || p. 70, 13 subdit] subiungit S || p. 70, 14 velut] *om.* S || p. 70, 15 ita] *om.* S || p. 71, 15 id] hoc S || p. 71, 30 omnibus] rebus S || p. 71, 33 id] hoc S || p. 71, 37 id] hoc S || p. 72, 1 Aristoteles] *om.* S || p. 72, 2 assignationem] signationem S || p. 73, 16 aggressurum] aggredi S || p. 73, 17 quaestiones] *om.* S || p. 73, 19 positurus] posita S || p. 74, 2 si eas] sileas S || p. 74, 4 executionem] obscuritates S || p. 74, 5 his] eis S || p. 74, 6 tamen] tunc S || p. 74, 8 quidem] *om.* S || p. 74, 10 an] aut S || p. 74, 10 quodsi] quae S || p. 74, 10–11 constiterit] constituerit S || p. 74, 11 corporea an incorporea] incorporea an coporea S || p. 74, 13 et incorporeum – accipiendum est] Ams (?) hic accipiendus est sensibile incorporeum S || p. 74, 13 differentiis] differentia S || p. 74, 14 sensibile vero dicimus] *om.* S || p. 74, 15 insensibile vero] insensibili S || p. 74, 16 et soli cogitationi] soli S || p. 74, 16 haec] *om.* S || p. 74, 17 omne] omne esse S || p. 74, 17 excludetur] excluditur S || p. 74, 20–24 duae quippe – et anima] S = AP || p. 74, 22 incorporalitate perdurant] corporalitate perducet S || p. 74, 23–25 in corporibus – extra corpora] incorporea quo (?) cum corpore et extra corpus esse possunt S || p. 75, 1 alia] animalia S || p. 75, 1–2 esse tamen – sint incorporea] *om.* S || p. 75, 2 ita] ita sita S || p. 75, 3 illis] aliis S || p. 75, 7 autem] *om.* S | **S p. 79a** | p. 75, 11 enim] *om.* S || p. 75, 12 assumptio] assumit S || p. 75, 12 uno eodemque] eodem S || p. 75, 15 totum genus] genus totum S || p. 75, 15–16 unum scilicet numero] scilicet numero unum S || p. 75, 17 in hoc – numero] *om.* S || p. 75, 18–19 omne enim – numero est] *om.* S || p. 75, 19 convenit dici] dici convenit S || pp. 75, 20 – 76, 6 item probat – non commune] *om.* S || p. 76, 7 esse dicantur] ipse dicantur Boethio S || p. 76, 8 sed] *om.* S || p. 76, 10 vi unius – includat vi] generis includebat vi sui nominis

quod S || p. 76, 11 praedicatur] dicitur S || p. 76, 12 omnia] enim S || p. 76, 14 secundum] *om.* S || p. 76, 15 ita quoque] itaque S || p. 76, 16 est] *om.* S || p. 76, 17 dicta est] est dicta S || p. 76, 24 capiuntur] capiantur S || p. 76, 25 aut] *om.* S || p. 76, 25 fiat] fiat aut S || p. 76, 25 sese res] res sese S || p. 76, 26 et] sed S || p. 76, 26 venit ita] venit ex re S || p. 77, 1 venit] *om.* S || p. 77, 2 habet] habent S || p. 77, 2 in] *om.* S || p. 77, 5 vanum] novum S || p. 77, 6 intellectus] *om.* S || p. 77, 6 aliqua] *om.* S || p. 77, 8 et cetera] ceterasque S || p. 77, 9 quin omnis sit] qui nomini S || p. 77, 10 cura] ratio S || p. 77, 12 has] hae S || p. 77, 12 consentiens] conscientiae S || p. 77, 14 intellectibus] *om.* S || p. 77, 15 est] *om.* S || p. 77, 18–20 quoniam cum – unquam erit] *om.* S || p. 77, 20–21 in intellectu concipiat] accipiat S || p. 77, 21 se] sese S || p. 77, 24 et] etiam S || p. 77, 24 disiunctas considerare] considerare disiunctas S || p. 77, 25 tamen quod] etiam S || p. 77, 25 quod] quia S || p. 78, 1 autem] *om.* S || p. 78, 3 separatam] separatas S || p. 78, 4 esse suum habentes] suum habentis esse S || p. 78, 6 dividere composita] composita dividere S [S p. 79b] p. 78, 8 in] *om.* S || p. 78, 10 subiecti] subiectis S || p. 78, 11 sese] esse S || p. 78, 14 suum esse nisi in corpore habere] esse suum habere nisi in corpore S || p. 78, 19 suum esse] esse suum S || p. 78, 19 et] *om.* S || p. 78, 20 de] *om.* S || p. 78, 21 esse] rem S || p. 78, 22 Boethius] *om.* S || p. 78, 23 posse] possit S || p. 78, 26 ipso] *om.* S || p. 79, 1 in puritate – res est] *om.* S || p. 79, 3 videor] videtur S || p. 79, 6 constituo] constituimus S || p. 79, 6 meus] vester S || p. 79, 6 separare a corpore] a corpore separare S || p. 79, 8 intellectus iste] iste intellectus S || p. 79, 9 semper] *om.* S || p. 79, 11 eius naturam] naturam eius S || p. 79, 18–19 cum illa – est individuo] quae in illa est et individuo S || p. 79, 19 universalem eam] eam universalem S || p. 79, 20 illa] illa natura S || p. 79, 22 eis per quae existit] *om.* S || p. 79, 23–24 et ideo – puram universalem] *om.* S || p. 79, 25 intelligere eam] eam intelligere S || p. 80, 3 considerare quam scilicet] consideratione sed in quam S || p. 80, 8 hoc] *om.* S || p. 80, 11 intelligi] *om.* S || p. 80, 12 esse tantum] tantum esse S || p. 80, 14 sunt autem] sed haec S || p. 80, 17 sunt eorum] eorum sunt S || p. 80, 17 vel] *om.* S || p. 80, 19 humanitatis] humanitate S || p. 80, 19–20 quae nisi – non potest] *om.* S [S p. 80a] p. 80, 21 in earum individuus] earum individuas S || p. 80, 24 omnium] *om.* S || p. 80, 24 numero] tantummodo S || p. 80, 24 cogitatione] collectione S || p. 80, 26 collecta] collecto S || p. 80, 26 aliud est] est aliud S || p. 81, 2 quod] nisi substantiale quod S || p. 81, 3 singularis] in singulis S || p. 81, 4 vero] *om.* S || p. 81, 4 eodemque] eodem S || p. 81, 7 insint] *om.* S || p. 81, 10 eodem quoque] eodemque S || p. 81, 15 speciem] species S || p. 81, 20 genera] *om.* S || p. 81, 22 universalia vel] *om.* S || p. 81, 23 autem] *om.* S || p. 81, 23 subsistentia] per subsistentia S || p. 82, 1 dicit ipse Boethius] ipse Boethius dicit S || p. 82, 2 vero] *om.* S || p. 82, 5–10 quod hic – considerata sunt] *om.* S || p. 82, 12 ab istis] *om.* S || p. 82, 13 illud sive] istud suum S || p. 82, 14 id est habeant esse] *om.* S || p. 82, 15 et] *om.* S || p. 82, 15 utrumque] *om.* S || p. 82, 16 subsistunt] *om.* S || p. 82, 17 nudis] undis S || p. 82, 18 verborum] *om.* S || p. 82, 18–19 dicere recusabo] recusabo dicere S || p. 82, 19–20 sive incorporalia] *om.* S || p. 82, 20 incorporea cum sint] cum sint incorporea S || p. 82, 21 tantum posita sint] sint posita tantum S || p. 82, 24 autem] haec S || p. 82, 24–25 est huiusmodi negotium] huiusmodi negotium est S || pp. 84, 26 – 83, 5 vel possumus – non

est] *om.* S || p. 83, 8 subnixus] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 83, 9 id] hoc S || p. 83, 10 id] hoc S || p. 83, 11 scilicet in quantum haec sunt] *om.* S || p. 83, 12 illud quod] *om.* S || p. 83, 12 verisimile] simile S || p. 83, 13 inter] contra S || p. 83, 13 id est] hoc S || p. 83, 16 id est antiquorum] *om.* S |S p. 80b| p. 83, 17 mediocritatem tractatus] tractatus mediocritatem S || p. 83, 23 expositionum] expositione S || p. 83, 25 et] *om.* S || p. 84, 1 aliis] *om.* S || p. 84, 4 infra] intra S || p. 84, 6 incohandum] *om.* S || p. 84, 7 illa semper] semper illa S || p. 84, 8–9 non perimantur – vero peremptis] *om.* S || p. 84, 12 genus] *om.* S || p. 84, 13–16 est etiam – in quale] *om.* S || p. 84, 17 tractatum generis] generis tractatum S || p. 84, 18 hic de specie] ibi S || p. 84, 18 praeponat] ponat de specie quae id est (?) S || p. 84, 20 multiplicis significationis] multiplicitate significatione S || p. 84, 22 significatione] significatione quare S || p. 85, 3 generis] *om.* S || p. 85, 5 de qua] quodquod (?) S || p. 85, 6 significationes] generis significationes S || p. 85, 7 species] speciei S || p. 85, 7 quod ideo] per omnino S || p. 85, 6 et] *om.* S || p. 85, 7 quod ideo] per omnino S || p. 85, 8 principium et collectionem] collectionem et principium S || p. 85, 11 continuatio litterae] litterae continuatio S || p. 85, 12 id] hoc S || p. 85, 14 multiplicem significationem] *add.* S || p. 85, 15–20 genus enim – supponitur species] S = OA || p. 85, 18 tres] *om.* S || p. 85, 18 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 86, 10 patre supremo] supremo patre S || p. 86, 10 ad] eidem S || p. 86, 12 id est] hoc est S || p. 86, 13 se] *om.* S || p. 86, 15 id est] scilicet S || p. 86, 15 et] *om.* S || p. 86, 16 est] *om.* S || p. 86, 17 supradictam] supradicta S || p. 86, 18 habitudine] altitudine S || p. 86, 21–22 et ita – se invicem] *om.* S || p. 86, 23 romanorum] romanae S || p. 86, 24 ut] *om.* S || p. 86, 28 id] hoc S |S p. 81a| p. 86, 30 inter hanc significationem] *om.* S || p. 87, 2 eius] *om.* S || p. 87, 5 principia] principalia S || p. 87, 5 unumquodque] unamquamque rem S || p. 87, 6 causa dicitur] *om.* S || p. 87, 7 pater filii] huius libri Porphyrius philosophus S || p. 87, 8 pugnae victoria] pugnae victoriae S || p. 87, 10 quoniam] quoniam enim S || p. 87, 10 in tempore] secundum tempus S || p. 87, 11 eum] accidentalem S || p. 87, 12 acciderit] accidentale S || p. 87, 14 utilia esse] esse utilia S || p. 87, 17 dicitur genus] genus dicitur S || p. 87, 17 generationis] nominis S || p. 87, 19 hoc] id S || pp. 87, 21 – 88, 10 sic enim – a partibus] S = OA || p. 88, 1 quod genuit] *om.* S || p. 88, 8 illi] illius S || p. 88, 9–10 eodem argumento] argumento eodem S || p. 88, 11 quia] et S || p. 88, 13–14 dicimus Pindarum esse Thebanum] Pindari dicimus Thebanum esse S || p. 88, 14 dicimus quod] quod dicimus S || p. 88, 15 sunt] *om.* S || p. 88, 15 Platonis] Platonis sunt S || p. 88, 17 locusque in quo quis] locoque in quoquo S || p. 88, 17 esse diversa] diversa esse S || p. 88, 18–19 enumerans unam] genus unum S || p. 88, 21 sub una] *om.* S || p. 89, 1 generationis] generis S || p. 89, 1 et pater] pater est principium ex se generatorum S || p. 89, 3 principium scilicet] principia S || p. 89, 3 et ideo dicit] vero S || p. 89, 5 quam – pater principium] *om.* S || p. 89, 8–11 locus a – pater et] *om.* S || p. 89, 11 indefinita] infinita S || p. 89, 13 si aliqua – cui] alii significationi S || p. 89, 15 collectionem] collectionis S || p. 89, 17 principio] principia S || p. 89, 17 et melior est collectione] *om.* S || p. 89, 18–19 generis significatio] significatio generis S || p. 89, 21–23 vere significatio – a parte] *om.* S || p. 89, 24 cecropidae] cicopidinae S || p. 90, 1 quidem] quam (?) S || p. 90, 4 in] *om.* S || p. 90, 5 impositum] *om.* S || p. 90, 6–9



appellatum est – a Romulo] *om.* S [S p. 81b] p. 90, 10–13 namque dividentes – sic dicens] S = OA || p. 90, 18 collectionem] illam collectionem S || p. 90, 18 ab] *om.* S || p. 90, 18 collectionem<sup>2</sup>] *om.* S || p. 90, 20–25 aliter autem – usus est] S = OA || p. 90, 22 monstrare intendit] ostendit S || p. 90, 24 cuiusque] quaeque S || p. 90, 25 usus] utilis S || p. 90, 27 ad similitudinem] *om.* S || p. 91, 1 multorum] *om.* S || p. 91, 4 rursus aliter dicitur genus] dicitur genus dicitur S || p. 91, 5 praedicamenti] praedicati S || p. 91, 7–8 scilicet principii et collectionis] *om.* S || p. 91, 9–10 vel aliter – illis simile] *om.* S || p. 91, 11–15 et enim – collectionis] S = OA || p. 91, 13 genus dicitur] dicitur genus S || p. 91, 15 principii et collectionis] collectionis et principii S || p. 91, 27–28 id est materiale] *om.* S || p. 92, 1–2 id est philosophicum] *om.* S || p. 92, 4 contenta] continentia S || p. 92, 5 cum genus dicatur] *om.* S || p. 92, 6–8 quandoquidem – modis genus] S = OA || p. 92, 16 cum] *om.* S || p. 92, 17–20 sciendum est – probat praecedentem] *om.* S || p. 92, 23 scire videmur] est scite videmus S || p. 92, 24 agnoscimus] cognoscimus S || p. 92, 25 quam maxime] *om.* S || p. 93, 1 philosophi] illi philosophi S || p. 93, 1 genus esse dicentes] dicentes genus esse S || p. 93, 3 definientes] deficientes S || p. 93, 3 in eo quod] quantum S || p. 93, 4 eius] *om.* S || p. 93, 6 omne genus haberet genus] genus omne genus haberi S || p. 93, 7 genus ergo] generis igitur S || p. 93, 9 fit] fit; agitur etiam de ea praedicatione ut idem de eodem praedicatur S || p. 93, 11 vel individuus] *om.* S || p. 93, 11 individuo] suo individuo S || p. 93, 13 de ea] *om.* S || p. 93, 13 praedicatur] *om.* S || p. 93, 15 duabus] duobus S || p. 93, 16 in hac descriptione generis] *add.* S || p. 93, 17–21 item dicendum – species specialissimae] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || p. 93, 17 praedicantur] *om.* S || p. 93, 21 item] *om.* S || p. 93, 22 de speciebus] praedicantur S || p. 93, 22 quid] quid ut genera S || p. 93, 22 quale – et accidentia] *om.* S || p. 93, 24 tres] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 94, 2 sit] *om.* S || p. 94, 2 his] eis S || p. 94, 4 vero] nunc S || p. 94, 5 id est potest praedicari] *om.* S || p. 94, 5 rebus] *om.* S || p. 94, 7 et] hominibus S<sup>a.c.</sup> || p. 94, 8 de] *om.* S [S p. 82a] p. 94, 10 scilicet in] *om.* S || p. 94, 11 mortalitatem] in S || p. 94, 14 accidentibus] accidentalibus S || p. 94, 14 albedini] albedini specialitati S || p. 94, 16 ea] ea excludatur et ut S || p. 94, 17 et<sup>1</sup>] *om.* S || p. 94, 19 eis] his S || p. 94, 22 de quibus] *om.* S || p. 95, 1 ubi] *om.* S || p. 95, 3 est<sup>2</sup>] *om.* S || p. 95, 3 sedens est Socrates] *add.* S || p. 95, 4–7 item individua – sunt diversa] *om.* S || p. 95, 8 opponitur] opponitur quidem S || p. 95, 8 substantiali] *om.* S || p. 95, 9 praedicatur] praedicetur S || p. 95, 10 dicitur enim] vero hic S || p. 95, 10 et dialecticus est homo] *om.* S || p. 95, 11–12 in qua – de accidentibus] *om.* S || p. 95, 13–19 item obicitur – animal praedicetur] *om.* S || p. 95, 21 suscipit] recipit S || p. 95, 23 definitur] diffiniatur S || p. 95, 23 est cum eo] cum suo finito S || p. 95, 24–25 id est omne genus] *om.* S || p. 95, 29 autem] vero S || p. 95, 30 praedicabitur] praedicatur S || p. 95, 31 pluribus] pluribus et S || p. 96, 1 specialissima species] species specialissima S || p. 96, 1 qualitatis vel] *om.* S || p. 96, 2 animal est] est animal S || p. 96, 4 egressus] transgressus S || p. 96, 5 vel vocibus gratia significatorum] *om.* S || p. 96, 5 de<sup>1</sup>] *om.* S || p. 96, 5 de<sup>2</sup>] *om.* S || p. 96, 5 et – ceteris] *om.* S || p. 96, 8 suscipit] recipit S || p. 96, 12 huic opponitur definitioni] opponatur S || p. 96, 14 est de] *om.* S || p. 96, 15 non] vero S || p. 96, 16 quia animal secundum] animal enim S || p. 96, 19 secundum] *om.* S || p. 96, 19

sic] *om.* S || p. 96, 21 illa] *om.* S || p. 96, 21 e converso] ex conversa S || p. 96, 22 obiciatur] dicatur S || p. 96, 25 genus est] est genus S || p. 96, 26 etc est – omne significativum] *om.* S || p. 96, 27 arbor] *om.* S || p. 97, 1 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 97, 1 de pluribus] *om.* S || p. 97, 2 omne] *om.* S | **S p. 82b** | p. 97, 3 vel arbor] *om.* S || p. 97, 4 invenitur] invenerit S || p. 97, 5 est vel] *om.* S || p. 97, 7 dicit Boethius] Boethius dicit S || p. 97, 7 quae] quod S || p. 97, 8–9 ut dicamus – quid praedicatur] sit quod praedicatur de pluribus de ps (?) et S || p. 97, 11 hac] ea S || p. 97, 13 in quibus] in quibus in quibus S || p. 97, 13 fallit] fallit S || p. 97, 15 illi] *om.* S || p. 97, 15 per idem si de aliquo] quod id si cum aliquo S || p. 97, 18 praedicabitur] praedicatur S || p. 97, 19 de pluribus] *om.* S || p. 97, 21 ego] *om.* S || p. 97, 22 propositionis] *om.* S || p. 97, 22 fundamentum] *om.* S || p. 97, 24 describitur] describatur S || p. 98, 2 res] ius S || p. 98, 3 propositum] tractatus S || p. 98, 4 demonstratur] ostenditur S || p. 98, 6 aequivoco] aequivoca S || p. 98, ut] non S || p. 98, 8 eorum] earum S || p. 98, 8–9 aequivocum] *om.* S || p. 98, 10 re] *om.* S || p. 98, 10–11 canis respondetur] respondetur canis S || p. 98, 11 quae est] scilicet S || p. 98, 11–12 vox esse canis recte] recte canis esse S || p. 98, 12–13 individualis – esse] alia esse poterit S || p. 98, 13 illa] *om.* S || p. 98, 13–15 nec etiam – materialis est] *om.* S || p. 98, 15 in quid – de illis] de illis in quid praedicetur S || p. 98, 16 nec in quantum] *om.* S || p. 98, 17 neque aliquo alio modo] *om.* S || p. 98, 17 de illis] *om.* S || p. 98, 19 ut homo – istarum interrogantium] *om.* S || p. 98, 20 etiam] haec S || p. 98, 20 definitiones] *om.* S || p. 98, 21 ut genus] *om.* S || p. 98, 23 ut genus] *om.* S || p. 98, 23 est] *om.* S || p. 99, 1 id est – vocibus agere] scilicet gratia generis S || p. 99, 4 differentibus] de differentibus S || p. 99, 9–10 ac si – quia eorum] *om.* S || p. 99, 11–12 praedicantur alia – solo praedicantur] praedixit S || p. 99, 11 individua dico] *om.* S || p. 99, 13 quemadmodum] ut S || p. 99, 14 individualia] individua S || p. 99, 14–15 ut haec – solo praedicantur] *om.* S || p. 99, 16 communiter] convenienter S || p. 99, 18–23 sciendum – de pluribus] *om.* S, *sed cf. quae ms. addidit post p. 101, 12* || p. 100, 4 nullum] ei ullum S || p. 100, 7 alia] alia quae S || p. 100, 9 adducitur hic] apponitur S || p. 100, 9 individuorum] duorum S, *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 100, 10–18 alii vero – notanda est] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S | **S p. 83a** | p. 100, 20 genus] vel genus S || p. 100, 20 fundamento] fundamento suo S || p. 100, 21 nisi] ubi S || p. 100, 23 contrarius Porphyrius Aristoteli] Porphyrius Aristoteli contrarius esse S || p. 100, 23–24 individuum substantiae] substantiae individua S || p. 101, 3 Porphyrius] *om.* S || p. 101, 4 etiam] ita S || p. 101, 6–18 hic opponitur – ad genus] S = A || p. 101, 7 intellectum] intellectus S || p. 101, 7 sic] eodem modo S || p. 101, 8 esse] omne S || p. 101, 8 ita] sic S || p. 101, 10 adiacet pluribus quare] *om.* S || p. 101, 10 non est individuum] *add.* S || p. 101, 11 videtur] est S || p. 101, 11 animalis generalitas] generalitas animalis S || p. 101, 12 sed tamen – sit universale] *add.* S || p. 101, 14 et] sed et S || p. 101, 15–16 non in quantum – generalitatis] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || p. 101, 19 quidem ut animal] *om.* S || p. 101, 22–23 sic dicens – animal etc] S = OA || pp. 101, 24 – 103, 16 ab his – verba Boethii] *om.* S || p. 103, 19 hoc] quod S || p. 103, 22 unius] *om.* S || p. 103, 24 numerando] numerando tantum S || p. 104, 1 in] *om.* S || p. 104, 3 id] hoc S || p. 104, 4–7 continuatio genera – est individuis] *om.* S || p. 104, 8–12 homo enim – differentibus numero] S = OA || p. 104, 24–

26 continuatio – proprium praedicatur] *om.* S || p. 104, 29 communiter] *om.* S || p. 104, 29 et] vel S || p. 104, 32–33 continuatio – etiam differentia] *om.* S || p. 105, 1–10 interrogantibus enim – in quale] S = OA || p. 105, 3 accidentia] accidens S || p. 105, 3 praedicantur in quale] *add.* S || p. 105, 9 accidentia] accidens S || p. 106, 1 locus] illo S | **S p. 83b** | p. 106, 11 generis dicta descriptio] *om.* S || p. 106, 14–27 species autem – singulis persequitur] S = OA || p. 106, 15 superior] per superior S || p. 106, 16 omnem] omnem dicta descriptio S || p. 106, 18 genus] omne genus S || p. 106, 21–22 uno enim – aliud ignorabitur] *om.* S || p. 106, 23 et diversa] *om.* S || p. 106, 25–26 in proemio proposuit] imposuit S || p. 106, 27 persequitur] prosequitur S || p. 107, 1–3 et primum – dubitari potest] S = OA || p. 107, 2 specie] genere S || p. 107, 7 speciem continet cum] continens est et S || p. 107, 8 informant] in formarum S || p. 107, 8 autem] enim S || p. 107, 8 id quod] quod de S || p. 107, 12–16 huic respondendum – invicem sumunt] S = OA || p. 107, 16 ad] a S || p. 107, 25 est] *om.* S || p. 108, 1 adiunctus] et iunctus S || p. 108, 1 factus] *om.* S || p. 108, 3 distinxit] distinxerit S || p. 108, 4 ponit] ponit eius S || p. 108, 5 eius] *om.* S || p. 108, 6 prolixitate confunderet] *add.* S || p. 108, 7 vocari] *om.* S || p. 108, 8–9 figuram vel – dicit uniuscuiusque] *om.* S || p. 108, 10 individui est] individua S || p. 108, 14 forma] de forma S || p. 108, 14 compositio] de compositione S || p. 108, 15 uniuscuiusque individui] *add.* S || p. 108, 16 Priami] primum S || p. 108, 18 quae est sub] *om.* S || p. 108, 24 principaliter dicitur] principaliter vel quae sit universalis res S || p. 109, 3–6 et quia – pro forma] *om.* S || p. 109, 6 esse] *om.* S || p. 109, 8 genus] *om.* S || p. 109, 10 praedicatur] *om.* S || p. 109, 13 obici] dici S || p. 109, 14 apposuisset nomen speciei] nominasset speciem S || p. 109, 19 esse] id est S || p. 109, 21 diximus] diximus eam S || p. 109, 23 generis nomen] nomen generis S | **S p. 84a** | p. 110, 6 ideo] idcirco S || p. 110, 9 iure] ipse S || p. 110, 9 nomine] *om.* S || p. 110, 10 est genus] genus est S || p. 110, 11 id est quia sunt relativa] *om.* S || p. 110, 12 uti utrisque] utriusque unius S || p. 110, 13–17 id est – quod definitur] *om.* S || p. 110, 19–25 hoc videtur – ad aliquid] *om.* S || p. 110, 26 et sic] *om.* S || p. 110, 27 sunt relativa] relativa sunt S || p. 110, 28 illud quod] illa res quae S || p. 111, 2 subintelligendum est] *om.* S || p. 111, 2–3 Boethius dicit] dicit Boethius S || p. 111, 5 duabus descriptionibus speciei] duobus speciei descriptionibus S || p. 111, 7 describunt] sic describunt S || p. 111, 13 quae] *om.* S || p. 111, 14 scilicet secundum] secundum scilicet S || p. 111, 14–15 in quale] quales S || p. 111, 17 virtus tamen] tamen virtus S || p. 111, 17 accidentia] accidentia et excludit omnia accidentia S || p. 111, 19 addit] subdit S || p. 111, 24–25 quidem definitionibus speciem] speciem definitionibus S || p. 111, 25 omni] eam S || p. 112, 1 tres] *om.* S || p. 112, 2 id est competit] *om.* S || p. 112, 3–4 ista definitio – scilicet definitiones] *om.* S || p. 112, 6–7 id est – planum autem] et S || p. 112, 9 quid] quid etiam S || p. 112, 11–12 ac si – specie sed] *om.* S || p. 112, 12 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 112, 12 esse] *om.* S || p. 112, 13–21 non specialissima – accipiunt duo praedicamenta] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || pp. 112, 23 – 116, 5 quid autem – asinus etc] S = OA || p. 112, 23–24 sit generalissimum] generalissimum sit S || p. 113, 3–4 sit superveniens genus] superveniens genus est S | **S p. 84b** | p. 113, 3 sit superveniens genus] *add.* S || p. 113, 5 est illa] illa est species S || p. 113, 6 item] *om.* S || p. 113, 7 et] *om.* S || p. 113, 10

et ad aliud] *om.* S || p. 113, 33 uno] quoque S || p. 114, 3 hac] *om.* S || p. 114, 4 ostendit] *om.* S || p. 114, 7–8 generalissimum ibi – quid specialissimum] ibi generalissimum S || p. 114, 14–16 homo aliud – Plato et ceteri] omne scilicet animal homo homo animal (*spatium vacuum reliquit*) animal Plato etc. || p. 114, 18 substantia] *om.* S || p. 114, 20 ea] eadem S || p. 114, 20 substantiis] corporeis substantiis et incorporeis S || p. 114, 22 hoc] *om.* S || p. 114, 25 conficitur ex anima et corpore] ex utroque conficitur S || p. 114, 26 corporeus] est corporeum S || p. 114, 26–27 incorporeus est] incorporeum S || p. 114, 29 quia] *om.* S || p. 114, 32–33 et vere non est vivens] *om.* S || p. 115, 3 vivat] vivet S || p. 115, 4 <non>] non est tale vivens quod S || p. 115, 5 numquam] aliquando S || p. 115, 6 aliquando] numquam S || p. 115, 6 morietur<sup>2</sup>] morietur sed aliquando morietur S || p. 115, 8 tunc] *om.* S || p. 115, 12 eius partibus] partibus eius S || p. 115, 15 erit mortua] mortua erit S || p. 115, 23 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 115, 24 homo] *om.* S || p. 115, 27–28 interior qui est specie] scilicet anima S || p. 115, 30–31 corpori supponitur] supponitur corpori S || p. 116, 4 animal] *om.* S || p. 116, 13 ut] *om.* S || p. 116, 15 formam] formam quantum partes non nisi in quantitate S || p. 116, 15–16 in differentia ait] ait in differentia S || p. 116, 16 non habet partes] partes non habet S || p. 116, 19 individua composita] composita individua S || p. 116, 20 partes hoc] *om.* S || p. 116, 20–21 eius substantialibus] substantialibus eius S || p. 116, 21 inde habemus] modo habent S (?) || p. 116, 22 aliis] *om.* S || p. 116, 23 naturam corpoream et incorpoream] corpoream et incorpoream naturam S || p. 116, 24 animae] animae vel corporis S || p. 116, 24–28 animae rationalis dicatur – individua etc] *aliam et ampliorem versionem textus praebet* S | **S p. 85a** | p. 117, 1 a quibusdam] *om.* S || p. 117, 3 individua – ante hoc] *om.* S || p. 117, 6 supponuntur] supponitur S || p. 117, 6 supposita sunt] suppositum est S || p. 117, 7 inferiorum sunt supposita] subpositum est S || p. 117, 7 dicat] *om.* S || p. 117, 8–9 supponi homini – homine fundatur] sub homine ponat sequitur inconueniens S || p. 117, 12 mortuis fundatur – mortuae dicuntur] viventibus consideratur S || p. 117, 13–23 huic quaestioni – corporis supponitur] S = OA || p. 117, 14 sic] *om.* S || p. 117, 17 corporis] corporis animati S<sup>ac.</sup> || p. 117, 18 semper uni] uni semper S || p. 117, 19 eo] corpore S || p. 117, 20 cum] dum S || p. 117, 21 in eo] subponitur S || p. 117, 22 inanimati] animati S || p. 117, 23 supponitur] *om.* S || pp. 118, 20 – 120, 11 opponitur etiam – individua generum] S = OA || p. 118, 23–24 et irrationalitas fundantur] fundatur S || p. 118, 24–25 et si – inanimali] *om.* S || p. 118, 28 secunda substantia] substantia secunda S || p. 118, 30 secundae substantiae] *add.* S || p. 118, 33 videretur] videtur S || p. 119, 2 enim] *om.* S || p. 119, 8 in illa secunda substantia] *add.* S || p. 119, 14 dicunt] dictum S || p. 119, 20 substantiae] substantia S || p. 119, 22–24 substantiales differentias – accidentia concedunt] *bis scripsit* S || p. 119, 24 rationalitatem] rationalitatem quidem S || p. 119, 27–28 natura rei] rei natura S || p. 119, 31 secundum] fundatur secundum S || pp. 119, 34 – 120, 11 nota enim – individua generum] *om.* S || p. 120, 13 se] sub se S || p. 120, 18 est] *om.* S || p. 120, 18 species] *om.* S || p. 120, 22 ibi] sic S || p. 120, 23 illud quod] autem S (*difficile lectu*) || p. 120, 24 se] sub se S || p. 120, 24–25 per contrarium] *om.* S || p. 121, 1–2 generalissimum est – genus generalissimum] est generalissimum sic S || p. 121, 4–7 ponit tria – relationem generalissimi] *om.* S | **S p. 85b** | p. 121, 12–16 quare

haec – duas habitudines] S = OA || p. 121, 28 quasi dicat – unam tantum] *om.* S || p. 122, 1–7 quod ostendit – posteriora sunt] S = OA || p. 122, 3 habitudinem tantum] tantum habitudinem S || p. 122, 4–5 specialissimum eam – ad superiora] *om.* S || p. 122, 6 et] ad S || p. 122, 8 hic] *om.* S || p. 122, 9 duas] duas, unam S || p. 122, 10 sed] quod S || p. 122, 13 nullam habet habitudinem] habitudinem nullam S || p. 122, 14 individuum] individua S || p. 122, 14 alio modo] *om.* S || p. 122, 16 sunt] sunt in mediae quae S || p. 122, 17 genera] genera dicuntur S || p. 122, 19–26 rursus dicitur – ad inferiora] S = AP || p. 122, 24 suum] suum substantiale S || p. 122, 26 ad inferiora] *add.* S || p. 123, 3 id] hoc S || p. 123, 8 genera] et genera S || p. 123, 12 repetit] repetetur S || p. 123, 14 ultimo gradu per medios] ultima gradu per medias S || p. 123, 17 Atreus] Atreus vero S || p. 123, 17 filius<sup>1</sup>] *om.* S || p. 123, 17 filius<sup>2</sup> – in generibus] *om.* S || p. 123, 20 animatum] *om.* S || p. 123, 20 <est> corpus corpus est] *om.* S || pp. 123, 22 – 124, 5 quem ascensum – filius Iovis] S = OA || p. 124, 9 reducuntur] reducerentur S || p. 124, 10 unum] unum principium S || p. 124, 10–11 reducerentur – genus] *om.* S || p. 124, 12 continuatur et legitur] legitur et continuatur S || p. 124, 14 patrem] *add.* S | **S p. 86a** | p. 124, 16 et] cum S || p. 124, 18–22 neque enim – genus omnium] S = OA || p. 124, 18 commune] communis S || p. 124, 19 parte] patre S || p. 125, 2 convenit] praedicatur S || p. 125, 3–11 sed videtur – omnibus convenit] *om.* S || p. 125, 14 est genus] genus est S || p. 125, 18 dicit] dixit S || p. 125, 19 decem prima] prima decem S || p. 125, 21 auctoritate auctoritatem S || p. 125, 25 et legitur] *om.* S || p. 126, 4 commune] *om.* S || p. 126, 5 ens esset] *om.* S || p. 126, 5 non] et non S || p. 126, 7 convenire] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 126, 10 vero] *om.* S || p. 126, 10 genera] *om.* S || p. 126, 10 entis est] *om.* S || p. 126, 13 quod est ens] *add.* S || p. 126, 14–19 iterum alia – animal corpori] *om.* S || p. 126, 21 et] *om.* S || pp. 126, 25 – 127, 6 huic sententiae – refugiunt numerum] *om.* S || p. 127, 7 ergo] genus S || p. 127, 8 quiescere ibi] ibi quiescere S || p. 127, 9 autem] *om.* S || p. 127, 10–11 hoc iubet quod] *om.* S | **S p. 86b** | p. 127, 13 descendantem] dividendem S || p. 127, 18 post] postea S || p. 127, 18 informo] in forma S || p. 127, 22 causam quia] quod S || p. 128, 5 multas] diversas S || p. 128, 5–6 quae vocantur – praedicantur vel] quod illud quod unum est in multa dividunt S || p. 128, 7 dividendo] dividenda S || p. 128, 8 rationalitas enim et] ut S || p. 128, 9–14 possumus etiam – descendantibus etc] *om.* S || pp. 128, 15 – 129, 11 ascendentibus vero – remotas differentias] S = OA || p. 128, 17 subaudi] *om.* S || p. 128, 25 fit semper] semper fit S || p. 128, 27 homo sunt] homines S || p. 129, 2 descensio] descendantia S || p. 129, 10 redigendo] redigo S || p. 129, 13 colligant per – quod suppletur] suppletur per species et per genera S || p. 129, 14 collectiva multorum] multorum collectiva S || p. 129, 15–19 et ne – sua species] S = OA || p. 130, 2–3 speciem scilicet] semper S || p. 130, 3 dividunt] dividere S || p. 130, 3 hominem] homo enim S || p. 130, 6 sic] *om.* S || p. 130, 10 ille] *om.* S || p. 130, 12–23 sicut enim – multorum est] S = OA || p. 130, 13 sua] *om.* S || p. 130, 18 duplici] triplici S || p. 130, 24 autem] *om.* S || p. 130, 26 semper] *om.* S | **S p. 87a** | p. 131, 5 superior eo iudicetur] *add.* S || p. 131, 8 utrumque sit] *add.* S || p. 131, 8 id est – habeat utrumque] *om.* S || p. 131, 9 assignato uno] uno assignato S || p. 131, 11–14 et quod – plures species] S = OA || p. 131, 12 uno genere] genere eodem S || p. 131, 13 divisio]

diverso S || p. 131, 14 sit in plures species] in plures species sit S || p. 131, 22 illud] istud S || p. 131, 23 semper praedicantur de suis inferioribus] de inferioribus semper praedicantur S || p. 131, 24 de superioribus praedicatur] praedicatur de superioribus S || p. 132, 1 sic] *om.* S || p. 132, 3 contento] contempto S || p. 132, 4–9 hic obicitur – specie praedicari] *om.* S || p. 132, 10 autem] *om. spatio vacuo relicto* S || p. 132, 14–15 maioris et minoris] minoris et maioris S || p. 132, 17–18 genus illius speciei praedicatur et] praedicatur genus illius speciei ad S || p. 132, 19 id est – usque exclusivum] *om.* S || p. 132, 20–25 quod ostendit – socratem etc] S = OA || p. 132, 25 verum est Socratem] *add.* S || p. 132, 21 esse] esse animal S || p. 132, 22 autem] vero S || p. 132, 31 omnibus suis] suis omnibus S || pp. 132, 31 – 133, 3 maxima propositio – de Socrate] *om.* S || p. 133, 6 praedicari tantum] tantum praedicari S || p. 133, 7 genus vero generalissimum] generalissimum vero S || p. 133, 10 speciebus et generibus] generibus et speciebus S || p. 133, 11 quia de – dicitur generalissimum] dicitur generalissimum de omnibus suppositis S || p. 133, 13–14 specialissimae speciei – in praedicatione specialissimi] quod est ante generalissimum et in praedicatione specialissimae speciei S || p. 133, 15 autem] *om.* S || p. 133, 20 solis individuis] solo individuo S || p. 133, 21 unum] *om.* S || p. 133, 23 si Socrates] sit ei solus filius S || p. 133, 25 est] dicitur S || p. 134, 3 erunt] *om.* S || p. 134, 4 erunt] *om.* S || p. 134, 7 numquam] numquam eadem S || p. 134, 7 individuo] *om.* S || p. 134, 8 autem] *om.* S || p. 134, 10 autem] *om.* S || p. 134, 11 erunt] esse S || p. 134, 11–12 et quia – magis autem] magis S || p. 134, 13 possum] *om.* S || p. 134, 15 individuum] individuus S || **S p. 87b** p. 134, 18 continetur sub specie] sub specie continetur S || p. 134, 21 est] est est S || p. 134, 23 id est – totum dicitur] *om.* S || p. 134, 23 totum] *om.* S || p. 134, 25 explicit de specie] *om.* S || p. 135, incipit de differentia] *om.* S || p. 135, 4–15 cur autem – accidens collocari] S = OA || p. 135, 7 illud] *om.* S || p. 135, 8 ordine tractatus] tractatus ordine S || p. 135, 11 differentiae] *post speciem (l. 10) coll.* S || p. 135, 12 est] *om.* S || p. 135, 17 solius] *om.* S || p. 135, 24 esse] *om.* S || p. 135, 24 magis propriam] *add.* S || **S p. 88a ll. 12–45** = pp. 136, 1 – 137, 20 tribus modis – propria differentia || pp. 137, 21 – 138, 2 hic etiam – diversis modis] *om.* S || **S p. 87b ll. 43–46** = p. 138, 2–6 unde ait – scilicet infinitatem || **S pp. 87b l. 46 – 88a l. 1.** = p. 138, 6–10 secundum autem – generis in species || **S pp. 88a l. 45 – 88b l. 2** = p. 138, 11–15 (*aliam versionem textus praebet S, cf. editionem*) || p. 136, 2–3 ab alia distat] distat ab alia S || p. 136, 4 quoniam] quod S || p. 136, 7 et idem] idemque S || p. 136, 17 differentiarum] has differentiarum S || p. 136, 19 vocat] vocans S || p. 136, 20 separabile] ad separabile S || p. 136, 22 nuncupatae] nuncupare S || p. 136, 23 sed leviter – leviterque recedunt] et tamen separabilia accidentia S || p. 137, 1 autem propriae differentiae dicuntur] dicuntur propriae differentiae S || p. 137, 14 accidens] accidens est S || p. 137, 16 calor] calca S || p. 137, 17 differentia] differentia differentia S || p. 137, 18 opposita hoc modo esse] hoc modo esse opposita S || p. 138, 4 quidem] *om.* S || p. 138, 4 id est] Boethius S || p. 138, 5 hanc scilicet] *om.* S || p. 138, 7–10 secundum autem – in species] *om.* S || p. 138, 16 supradictis modis] modis supradictis S || p. 138, 17 dicere] differre S || p. 138, 18 est communis] communis est S || p. 138, 19 autem] vero S || p. 138, 20 altero] alio S || p. 138, 22 levi] *om.* S || p. 138, 23

id] *om.* S || p. 138, 23 ipso] ipso differat S || p. 138, 23 autem] vero S || p. 138, 24 vel ab alio – differt] idem a se ipso differt vel ab alio S || p. 138, 26 vir] *om.* S || p. 138, 27 quiescente] discendente S || p. 139, 4 differentiam pueritiam] pueritiam differentiam S || p. 139, 5 differentiam] differentiam esse S || p. 139, 6 vir existens] existens vir S || p. 139, 7 hoc ideo determinamus] modo sic determinatur S || p. 139, 9 Socratis viri et si] viri Socratis et haec S || p. 139, 9 Socratis viri<sup>2</sup>] viri Socratis S || p. 139, 11 Socrates] *om.* S || p. 139, 12 iam] non S || p. 139, 15–22 dicens proprie – curvitas etc] S = OA || p. 139, 15 autem] vero S || p. 139, 16–17 altero] alio S || p. 139, 19 autem] *om.* S || p. 139, 21 nasi] vasi S || p. 140, 2 facit subiectum suum rationale] subiectum suum rationale facit S || p. 140, 3 esse] *om.* S || p. 140, 4 etiam postquam] *om.* S || p. 140, 6 cuilibet] quilibet S || p. 140, 7 alteratum] alteratum; hic ostendit differentiarum officia S || p. 140, 10 faciunt alteratum] alteratum faciunt S || p. 140, 10 rem] *om.* S || p. 140, 10 ut] non S || p. 140, 12 intra] inter S || p. 140, 17 est effectum] effectum est S || pp. 140, 22 – 141, 3 illatio vero – facit alteratum] S = OA || p. 140, 22 illatio] illud S || p. 140, 24 propria] propria differentia S || p. 141, 11 proprie] propria S || p. 141, 11 substantiali esse] *add.* S || p. 141, 12 est] *om.* S || **S p. 89a**] p. 141, 14 quam equum esse] *om.* S || p. 141, 15 homo ab illo] ab alio S || p. 141, 17 attinet] continet S || p. 141, 19–20 sed dupliciter – vero simpliciter] *om.* S || pp. 141, 24 – 142, 9 differentiarum ergo – sub disiunctione] S = OA || p. 142, 1 sunt] sunt communes S<sup>a.c.</sup> || p. 142, 4 quidem] *om.* S || p. 142, 10 quidem differentiae] differentiae quidem S || p. 142, 10 specifica] differentiae specifica hoc est S || p. 142, 14–18 animali enim – speciem animalis] S = OA || p. 142, 19 a] ad S || p. 142, 20 ita] *om.* S || p. 142, 23 a quiescente] ad quiescentem S || p. 142, 29 et] et ad S || p. 143, 1 formant] formam S || p. 143, 1 speciei] *om.* S || p. 143, 2 quod] quae S || p. 143, 6–17 illatio vero – sunt substantiales] S = OA || p. 143, 6 illatio] illud S || p. 143, 11 a] in S || p. 143, 17 scilicet sunt] id est S || p. 143, 22 autem eas] vero has S || p. 143, 23 alteratio sola] sola alteratio S || p. 143, 27 dicens] *om.* S || p. 144, 2 differentias] *om.* S || p. 144, 3 differentias secuit] secuit differentias S || p. 144, 6 autem est tertia divisio] divisio tertia S || p. 144, 6–7 alias inseparabiles] *om.* S || p. 144, 9 id est] scilicet S || p. 144, 11 facit hoc modo] hoc modo facit S || p. 144, 11 sunt] *om.* S || p. 144, 12 ut] non S || p. 144, 14 et quicquid – dicitur esse] *om.* S || p. 144, 15–20 quoniam igitur – hominem rationalitas] S = OA || p. 144, 21 ideo] idcirco S || p. 144, 22 adveniunt] advenient S || **S p. 89b**] p. 145, 2 dictum] dicendum S || p. 145, 4 *post* alias inseparabiles] *ll. 15–18* quandoquidem differentiae – magis propria *transp.* S || p. 145, 5 quia] quod S || p. 145, 6 ad inferiora sunt] sunt ad inferiora S || p. 145, 7 suis] *om.* S || p. 145, 10 volumus facere] facere volumus S || p. 145, 10 omnes] omnes aliae S || p. 145, 11 dividenda] individua S || p. 145, 12 a] *om.* S || p. 145, 14 in commento esse aequivoca] esse aequivoca in commento S || p. 145, 15–18 aliter etiam – potes sic] *om.* S || p. 145, 15–18 quandoquidem differentiae – magis propria] *post p. 145, 4* alias inseparabiles *transp.* S || p. 145, 22–25 et quod – quiescere etc] S = OA || p. 146, 1 iterum] *om.* S || p. 146, 3 separabilis] separabiles S || p. 146, 4 si] *male legitur* S || p. 146, 4 autem] vero S || p. 146, 5 in eodem est] eodem modo S || p. 146, 7 subdivisionem inseparabilium] inseparabilium subdivisionem S || p. 146, 12 perceptibilitatem] perceptibilem S || p. 146,

14–16 non sunt – differentiam tamen] *om.* S || p. 146, 17–19 hanc scientiam – substantialiter hominis] substantialiter scientiam S || p. 146, 20 sunt] *om.* S || p. 146, 22 divisionem] *om.* S || p. 146, 24 differentias] differentia S || p. 146, 25 hanc scilicet] hac solum S || p. 147, 1 secundum substantiam monstrant] *om.* S || p. 147, 3 suis subiectis] subiectis suis S || p. 147, 4 albius] albius est S || p. 147, 4 intensione – magis apparentem] id est magis apparentem id est intensionem S || p. 147, 6–12 sic autem – expositum est] S = OA || p. 147, 6 autem] *om.* S || p. 147, 19 per accidens] per accidens per accidens S || p. 148, 1 per se] *om.* S || p. 148, 5 esse] *om.* S |S p. 90a| p. 148, 10 definitionem] divisionem S || p. 148, 14–16 ut materiale – suscipiens est] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || p. 148, 19 aquilum autem et simum] *om.* S, *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 148, 21 ita est ac si diceretur] tantum valet ac si dicitur S || p. 148, 22 illo] illo et ideo additur aliquo modo rubrior per inferiora S || p. 148, 22–23 bene potest – et minus] dici possit S || p. 148, 25 quod differentiarum] differentiae S || p. 148, 27 sunt] *om.* S || p. 148, 28 aliae] aliae per accidens S<sup>a.c.</sup> || p. 149, 3 subsequentibus] sequentibus S || p. 149, 5 vero] *om.* S || p. 149, 6 non ab eis] ab eis non S || p. 149, 6 non ab eis continentur] *add.* S || p. 149, 9 considerentur tres species differentiae] tres species differentiae considerentur S || p. 149, 10 differentiarum] differentiarum quaedam S || p. 149, 11 illae vero inseparabiles] aliae vero in se S || p. 149, 12 est] *om.* S || p. 149, 13 sunt aliae sunt] aliae S || p. 149, 14 dividimus genera] genera dividimus S || p. 149, 15 ipsa genera] genera ipsa S || p. 149, 16–17 nota quod – specie etc] *om.* S || p. 149, 18–21 est enim – constituunt animal] S = OA || p. 149, 22 hic] *om.* S || p. 149, 25 quidem] quidem quae S || p. 150, 3 aliae] a se S || p. 150, 4 sunt completivae] completivae sunt S || p. 150, 5–6 et hoc – specierum ostendit] quod S || p. 150, 8 item] tunc S || p. 150, 10 sive corporis] *om.* S || p. 150, 11 vel supremae – non sufficienter] *om.* S || p. 150, 12–18 quoniam ergo – specificae vocantur] S = OA || p. 150, 14–16 aliquo modo – sunt divisivae] aliquo modo sunt divisivae, aliquo modo acceptae S || p. 150, 17 differentiae omnes] omnes differentiae S || p. 150, 20 divisivae] consitutivae S || p. 150, 20–21 est opus] opus est S || p. 150, 21 generum] *om.* S || p. 150, 21 specierum] *om.* S || p. 150, 22 sunt secundum accidens] secundum accidens est S || p. 150, 26 et vocantur specificae] *om.* S || p. 150, 27 species a genere] et cetera S || p. 151, 2 quibusdam] *om.* S || p. 151, 2 ratione] *om.* S || p. 151, 5 genus habet] habet genus S || p. 151, 5 etiam species eius] et eius species S || p. 151, 6 ad minus] *om.* S |S p. 90b| p. 151, 13 superat] separat S || p. 151, 14 igitur] ergo S || p. 151, 15 suum genus] genus suum S || p. 151, 19 suum genus] genus suum S || p. 151, 20 et ea parte generis] *om.* S || p. 151, 22 a suo genere id est] *om.* S || p. 151, 22 rationalitatem] rationalitate S || p. 151, 23 mortalitatem] mortalitate S || p. 151, 26 homo plus habet] habet plus S || p. 151, 26 habeta] habet S || p. 152, 1 ea] eam S || p. 152, 2 acceptum] *om.* S || p. 152, 2 id] hoc S || p. 152, 7–11 secundum aliam – unam affirmationem] *om.* S || p. 152, 12 autem] *om.* S || p. 152, 13–14 sumens principium – in eodem] *om.* S || p. 152, 15 definitione] definitione quidam S || p. 152, 16 eidem] in eodem S || p. 152, 18 generibus] generis S || p. 152, 19 genera] gens S || p. 152, 20 eas non habent] non habent eas S || p. 152, 25 autem inter] vero in S || p. 153, 1 bina] duo S || p. 153, 2 solet] *om.* S || p. 153, 2 nigra] esse nigra dicitur S ||



pp. 153, 10 – 154, 34 hae autem – falsum est] S = OA || p. 153, 12 habent] habeant S || p. 153, 19–20 possunt esse] esse possunt S || p. 153, 21 fundato] considerato S || p. 153, 23 habeant] habent S || p. 153, 23 species] species et S || p. 153, 25 sustentet] substantiarum S || p. 154, 5 eas ut] casum S || p. 154, 9–10 specificatum est – quod genus] species ergo S || p. 154, 18 est differentia] differentia est S || p. 154, 20 suo] solo S || p. 154, 22 est] *om.* S || p. 154, 23 cum] et S || p. 154, 30 est ei] ei est S || p. 154, 31 species] genus S || p. 154, 32 autem] vero S [S p. 91a] p. 154, 36 universalitate sua] in sua multitudine S || p. 155, 1 si] *om.* S || p. 155, 4 contrarietatis] contrarietas S || p. 155, 5 esse in eodem] in eodem esse S || p. 155, 6–28 soluta illa – in simplicitate] *om.* S || p. 155, 31 ab] *om.* S || p. 155, 32 cum] *om.* S || p. 155, 34 dicat] *om.* S || p. 155, 34 autem] *om.* S || p. 156, 2 habere] habet S || p. 156, 5 enim] *om.* S || p. 156, 8 sic] *om.* S || p. 156, 8 id] hoc S || p. 156, 10 quod fieri non potest] *add.* S || p. 156, 13 distributum] distribuitur S || p. 156, 17 habet] habent S || p. 156, 17–24 id est – se habent] *om.* S || p. 156, 25–26 actu vero – sua puritate] S = OA || p. 156, 25 nullam] non illam S || p. 156, 29–30 fit aliquid] aliquis S || pp. 156, 31 – 157, 2 habent differentias – habent differentias] plus habere etiam S || p. 157, 4 substantialem] substantialem differentiam S || p. 157, 9 et] quod S || p. 157, 10 excludere accidentia] facere eam definitionem substantialis differentiae S || p. 157, 11–12 nec tamen – differentiae adaptatur] et de exclusionem scilicet accidentium inter haec diffinitio non substantiali differentiae non videtur competere S || p. 157, 13–19 de solo – perceptibile disciplinae] *in marg. add.* S || p. 157, 13 praedicatur] videtur praedicari S || pp. 157, 16 – 158, 6 rationale enim – dicere animal] S = OA || p. 157, 26 et] enim et S || p. 158, 1–2 homo sed non praedicatur] sed non S || p. 158, 4 in littera probat] quod probat in littera S || p. 158, 5 quod in quid praedicatur] *om.* S || p. 158, 6 enim] homo enim S || p. 158, 6 interrogatis] interrogans S || p. 158, 6 homo] *om.* S || p. 158, 10 utrumque probat] probat utrumque S || p. 158, 12 parte] parte vel ab effectu S || p. 158, 12 eam] ipsam speciem S || p. 158, 15 ex aere] *om.* S, *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 158, 15–17 et ex – sua differentia] et figura S [S p. 91b] p. 158, 20 consistere] constitutionem S || p. 158, 22 et formae] formaeque S || p. 158, 23 statuae Achillis] Achillis statuae S || p. 158, 23–24 aes quidem est] est quidem S || p. 158, 26 quod est] est quod est S || p. 158, 26 hominis] *om.* S || p. 159, 3 ita] ut S || p. 159, 4–5 in statua est] est in statua S || p. 159, 8 et] *om.* S || p. 159, 8 genus vel] *om.* S || p. 159, 9 differentiam vel] *om.* S || p. 159, 9 vel rationalitatem] *add.* S || p. 159, 13 id] hoc S || p. 159, 14 autem] vero S || p. 159, 16 proportionaliter] portio S, *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 159, 16 id est – proportionali similitudine] *om.* S || p. 159, 17 autem] vero S || p. 159, 21 homo habet animal ut] *om.* S || p. 159, 24–26 hic notandum – esset substantia] *om.* S || p. 159, 29 apta] aptat S || pp. 159, 29 – 160, 1 id est – id est separanda] *om.* S || p. 160, 1–6 nota quod – est inconueniens] *om.* S || p. 160, 12 differentiae] *om.* S || p. 160, 14 laxa] lapsa S || p. 160, 22–23 nos et irrationalia id – nos ab illis] cetera S || p. 160, 24–30 rationales enim – et dii] S = OA || p. 161, 1 interius] intentius S || p. 161, 2 esse substantialem differentiam] eam substantiam differentiam S || p. 161, 4 nunc] vero S || p. 161, 4 diligentius] diligentius S || p. 161, 7 differentia<sup>1</sup>] differentia est S || p. 161, 7 quae] quae in S || p. 161, 8 iuncta] coniuncta S || p. 161, 9 id]

hoc S || p. 161, 10 cuiusque] uniuscuiusque S || p. 161, 10–11 nihil enim – definitionem dabit] *om.* S || p. 161, 12 continuatur et] *om.* S || p. 161, 14 speculantes] perscrutantes S | **S p. 92a** | p. 161, 16 id] hoc S || p. 161, 17 illam] illa S || p. 161, 19–22 sciendum est – unam descriptionem] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || p. 161, 24 suum] *spatium vacuum reliquit* S || p. 162, 2 est pars eius] pars est eius S || p. 162, 3 esse ipsius speciei] *add.* S || p. 162, 4–10 neque enim – substantialis differentia] S = OA || p. 162, 14 animalium] omnia linum S || p. 162, 15 aptum] *om.* S || p. 162, 17 id] hoc S || p. 162, 18 nec pars eius definitionis] *bis scripsit* S || p. 162, 20 a pari] S = A || pp. 162, 21 – 163, 4 erunt igitur – sit praedicantur] S = OA || p. 162, 24 ipsam] illam S || p. 162, 25 conducunt] concludit S || p. 163, 5 sunt] sunt quae S || p. 163, 8 non] etiam S || p. 163, 10 accipiuntur] accipiuntur S || p. 163, 10 speciebus praedicantur] praedicantur speciebus S || p. 163, 13 incipit de proprio] *om.* S || p. 163, 14 proprium] proprium S || p. 163, 14 generis] generis naturae S || p. 163, 17 et] *om.* S || p. 163, 22 homini] *om.* S || p. 163, 22 quod convenit] *om.* S || p. 163, 23 quod omni et soli] soli et omni S || p. 163, 24 in senectute canescere] canescere in senectute S || p. 164, 1 in iuventute pubescere] *add.* S || **S p. 92b ll. 22–31** = p. 164, 1–18 || p. 164, 2 et semper] *om.* S || p. 164, 3 genus] genus et S || p. 164, 4 sed] *om.* S || p. 164, 4 id] hoc S || p. 164, 5–6 dividunt – modis] *om.* S || p. 164, 6 est proprium] proprium est S || p. 164, 7 soli] soli et cum S || p. 164, 8 speciei scilicet speciei non] scilicet non speciei S || p. 164, 9 universalitate sua] sua universalitate S || p. 164, 10 id<sup>1</sup>] et S || p. 164, 10 omni] in sua universalitate S || p. 164, 11 sed] et S || p. 164, 12–15 nota quod – inest homini] *om.* S || p. 164, 16 acceptae similiter] similiter acceptae S || p. 164, 16 in] *om.* S || p. 164, 18 homini] *om.* S || p. 164, 19–21 hic obicitur – ad senectutem] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || **S p. 92b ll. 9–22** = pp. 164, 21 – 165, 13 item falsum – ut proprius || p. 164, 24 mors etenim] mox enim S || p. 164, 24–25 alia casualis – naturalis casualis] alia naturalis, alia casualis; casualis est illa S || p. 165, 1 extrinsecae] *om.* S || p. 165, 2 solet contingere] contingere solet S || p. 165, 5 iterum] ita non S || p. 165, 9 et quarundam – rationale mortale] *om.* S || p. 165, 12 corpori] *om.* S || p. 165, 12 semper] semper ut S || p. 165, 13 non est] *om.* S || p. 165, 13 ut] cuius est S || p. 165, 14 nam et] illam S || p. 165, 15 quando] quia S || p. 165, 16 quod] pro S || p. 165, 20 hic] *om.* S || p. 165, 20 quidam] *om.* S || p. 165, 20 est] *om.* S || p. 165, 21 risibilis] risi S || p. 165, 21 dicit] *om.* S || p. 165, 21 concedere] concedere quoniam sequitur S || p. 165, 22 quia si] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || p. 165, 25 tunc] quare S || pp. 165, 25 – 166, 2 quia de – est risibile] *om.* S || p. 166, 2 tunc est homo] *om.* S || p. 166, 2 a quibusdam] *om.* S || p. 166, 6–19 alii dicunt – nihil concludet] *om.* S || p. 166, 20 propria] *om.* S || p. 166, 21 vel ultima proprii] *om.* S || p. 166, 23 convertantur] convertuntur S || p. 166, 25 proprie propria] pro patri (?) S || p. 166, 25–26 suis speciebus] speciebus suis S || p. 166, 26 possint] *om.* S || p. 166, 26 species] in speciebus esse S || p. 166, 26 esse] *om.* S || p. 166, 28 solvitur] dicitur S || p. 166, 29 proprie] *om.* S || p. 166, 29 separantur] separentur S || p. 166, 30 ea] *om.* S | **S p. 93a** | p. 167, 1 posterius sit] sit posterius S || p. 167, 2 alio ratione] alia ratione S || pp. 167, 5 – 168, 4 quod sic – separari est] *om.* S = OA || p. 168, 5 remanente specie] specie remanente S || p. 168, 7 possunt] non possunt S || p. 168, 8

subiecta sua] sua subiecta S || p. 168, 11 de<sup>1</sup>] et S || p. 168, 11 de<sup>2</sup>] et S || p. 168, 12 de<sup>1</sup>] *om.* S || p. 168, 13 adest et – corruptionem] est adest et cetera S || p. 168, 14–16 restrictius accipit – Porphyrius vero] *om.* S || p. 168, 16–17 illud – est] accidens tantum quod S || p. 168, 20 id] hoc S || p. 168, 20 quod adesse] et esse S || p. 168, 21 fundamento] subiecto S || p. 169, 1 autem] *om.* S || p. 169, 2 esse] *om.* S || p. 169, 5 videretur sibi ipsi] sibi ipsi videretur esse S || p. 169, 5 omne] *om.* S || p. 169, 7 hic] *om.* S || p. 169, 10 dormire] *om.* S || p. 169, 11 separabilia – sic] sunt separabilia sic dicens S || p. 169, 12 accidens est nigrum] est accidens *spatio vacuo relicto* S || p. 169, 12 accidit] accidit et accidit S || p. 169, 13–14 inseparabiliter – repugnaret] in quo repugnavit S || p. 169, 16 autem] *om.* S || p. 169, 17 descriptioni] descriptionem S || p. 169, 20–22 praeter subiecti – dum est] S = OA || p. 169, 29 iterum] *om.* S || p. 169, 30 determinatorum] *om.* S || p. 170, 3 est] tamen est S || p. 170, 4 id] hoc S || p. 170, 6 igitur] igitur determinatis S || p. 170, 6–7 de genere – accidenti] tractavit speciem differentiam proprio accidenti S || p. 170, 8 communitates et differentias] differentias et communitates S || p. 170, 9 cetera] omnia S || p. 170, 10 proposita sunt] posita S || p. 170, 11 proposita] posita S || p. 170, 11 genere] genere accidente S || p. 170, 14 singulorum] singulorum et S || p. 170, 15 eorum ostendit] ostendit omnium S [S p. 93b] p. 170, 17 habeat] habeant S || p. 170, 19 proprium de specie et de individu] suis S || p. 170, 19 vero] autem et de pluribus S || p. 170, 20 ipse determinat] determinat ipse S || pp. 171, 1 – 172, 16 videndum vero – sententia libri] *om.* S || p. 172, 17 et<sup>1</sup>] *om.* S || p. 172, 17 et<sup>2</sup>] *om.* S || p. 172, 19 dicens] dicturus S || p. 172, 19–23 et vere – rerum cognitio] *om.* S || pp. 172, 26 – 173, 18 et quoniam – suum genus] *om.* S || p. 172, 26 et] *om.* S || p. 172, 26 inter] *om.* S || p. 172, 27 proposita] *om.* S || p. 173, 9 continentia specierum] specierum continentia S || p. 173, 13 et] *om.* S || p. 173, 16 de eo] *om.* S || p. 173, 19 secundam generis] secundum genus S || p. 173, 21 illis] eadem S || p. 173, 23 ita quod – sint divisivae] *om.* S || p. 173, 24 his] eis S || p. 173, 28 quod] *om.* S || p. 173, 28 uti] ita S || p. 174, 1 est aliud] aliud est S || p. 174, 1 aliud<sup>2</sup>] aliud est S || p. 174, 4 uti ratione] ratione uti S || p. 174, 6 demonstratum] demonstrandum S || p. 174, 6 est] *om.* S || p. 174, 7 etiam] *om.* S || p. 174, 11–14 dixit quod – praedicatione] *om.* S || p. 174, 16 specie] speciebus S || p. 174, 17 praedicantur] *om.* S || p. 174, 18 autem] hoc est perpetuo S || p. 174, 18 tertiam] et S || p. 174, 20 sunt] *om.* S || p. 174, 22 quemadmodum] quemadmodum enim si non sit S || p. 174, 22 a] in S || p. 174, 22 quod] *om.* S || p. 174, 24 et] *om.* S || p. 175, 2 est] esse S || p. 175, 3 differentia] differentiam S || p. 175, 4 et] ei S || p. 175, 5 constitutivis] constantis S || p. 175, 5 de pluribus praedicari] praedicari de pluribus S || p. 175, 6 eisdem] eius S || p. 175, 7 praedicatur] dicitur S || p. 175, 7 est] *om.* S || p. 175, 8 contentis] contemptis S || p. 175, 10 quam<sup>1</sup>] *om.* S || p. 175, 10 quam<sup>2</sup>] *om.* S || p. 175, 11 praedicatur] praedicetur S || p. 175, 11 quam accidens praedicetur] *add.* S [S p. 94a] p. 175, 12–13 oportet autem – autem etc] *om.* S || p. 175, 17 quae] quae sunt S || p. 175, 17 sub eodem sunt] sunt sub eo S || p. 175, 18 segregantur] disgregantur S || p. 175, 20–21 nullam in se actu habeat] nullam actu in se habet S || p. 175, 27 continere] continet S || p. 176, 5 enim] *om.* S || p. 176, 5 hic] hic idem rationale S || p. 176, 7 et] *om.* S || p. 176, 7 quod] quia S || p. 176, 9 irrationale] rationale S || p. 176, 9 suo quodam]

quodam suo S || p. 176, 13 necessario] necessario et secundum actum et secundum naturam S || p. 176, 16 potest] potest scilicet sic determinat S || p. 176, 18 volunt] *om.* S || p. 176, 20 litteram] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 176, 23 peremptis] peremptas S || p. 176, 24 quod] qua S || p. 176, 24 remaneat] remaneat potest S || p. 176, 25 est] est genus S || p. 177, 2 remanere potest] remaneat S || p. 177, 3 Porphyrius explicat] exemplificat S || p. 177, 4 hoc scilicet quod] scilicet hoc S || p. 177, 5–6 ab eis aufertur] auferatur S || p. 177, 6 auferunt] *om.* S || p. 177, 13–22 sic probatur – dicit Boethius] *om.* S || p. 177, 24 aliam ostendit] ostendit aliam S || p. 177, 27–28 est genus] genus est S || p. 178, 1 genus quidem] quidem genus unum est S || p. 178, 4 unaquaeque] una S || p. 178, 5 habet genera] genera habet S || p. 178, 6 habet] *om.* S || p. 178, 8 simile] consimile S || p. 178, 8 est generis – distantia] discretio generis et differentiae S || p. 178, 9 habet] *om.* S || pp. 178, 13 – 181, 8 genus autem – ut differentia] S = OA || p. 178, 14 differentia] distantia S || p. 178, 16 ostendit communitatem] communionem dat S || p. 178, 23 ut] *om.* S | **S p. 94b** | p. 179, 2 autem] haec S || p. 179, 4 eadem res sit et] eadem sit res S || p. 179, 7 non] ut S || p. 179, 10 autem est] est his S || p. 179, 16 praedicantur] dicuntur S || p. 179, 16 esse eis] eis esse S || p. 179, 18 sicut genus est totum] et genus totum est S || p. 179, 24 autem eo] quidem hoc S || p. 179, 25–26 communitatibus] communibus S || p. 179, 27 discrepatione] discretionem S || p. 179, 28 genus a specie dicit] dicit genus a specie S || p. 179, 29 genus] *om.* S || p. 179, 31 talis est ratio] ratio est S || p. 179, 31 genus in se] in se genus S || p. 180, 2–3 et contractum] tractum S || p. 180, 8 cuius] quae S || p. 180, 9 arriperit] corripuerit S || p. 180, 14 ipsa non contineatur] non continetur S || p. 180, 16 species ... auferat] specie ... auferatur S || p. 180, 23 genera] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 180, 26 est] *om.* S || p. 180, 32 id] hoc S || p. 181, 1 sunt naturaliter] naturaliter sunt S || p. 181, 3 simul] similiter S || p. 181, 10 speciem] species S || p. 181, 11 sua] suae S || p. 181, 12 quodam modo] quomodo S || p. 181, 13 forma] formae S || pp. 181, 15 – 183, 19 et genera – proprii praedicatur] S = OA || p. 181, 16 in] etiam S || p. 181, 19 definitione] differentia S || p. 181, 23–24 praedicantur – genere] de suo genere praedicantur S || p. 181, 25 genera] genera habundant S || p. 181, 28 supervadunt] superna *spatio vacuo relicto* S || p. 181, 31 pluralitate] *om.* S || p. 182, 1 genus] genus est S || p. 182, 3 et] *om.* S || p. 182, 9–10 suae substantiae] substantiae suae S || p. 182, 11 tenet] teneat S || p. 182, 13 species] species vero S || p. 182, 13 una] *om.* S || p. 182, 15 neque] neque species fit umquam generalissimum S || p. 182, 19 secundum hoc quod est species] *add.* S || p. 182, 25 differentiis] distantis S || p. 182, 26 et] *om.* S || p. 182, 29–30 hoc ostendit] hos S || p. 182, 31–33 eodem modo – ad speciem] quod S || p. 183, 1–19 et aequaliter – proprii praedicatur] S = OA || p. 183, 5 et] et cum S || p. 183, 8 dicens] *om.* S || p. 183, 9 bos] asinus (?) S || p. 183, 13 genus] *om.* S || p. 183, 19 definitio proprii praedicari] *add.* S || p. 183, 20–24 de specie – vel ratione] *om.* S | **S p. 95a** | pp. 183, 25 – 186, 26 differt autem – dicit niger] S = OA || p. 183, 25 differt] distent S || p. 183, 29 prius est proprio] est prius proprio S || p. 183, 31 enim] *om.* S || p. 183, 31–32 differentiis divisivis] divisivis differentiis S || p. 183, 32 differentiae autem] *om.* S || p. 184, 6 genus est prius] prius est genus S || p. 184, 8 id] hoc S || p. 184, 11 speciebus praedicatur] praedicatur speciebus S

|| p. 184, 26 inter] in S || p. 184, 28 semper] semper et S || p. 184, 29 inest] convenit S ||  
 p. 184, 30 est genus] genus est S || p. 185, 2 in hoc ostendit] ostendit in hoc S || p. 185, 5–  
 7 species propria – quorum sunt] *om.* S || p. 185, 12 communitatem] communionem S ||  
 p. 185, 14 communitatem] communionem S || p. 185, 17 seu<sup>1</sup>] sive S || p. 185, 17 seu<sup>2</sup>]  
 sive S || p. 185, 22 hanc] in hoc S || p. 185, 26 etiam] *om.* S || p. 185, 28 sunt] *om.* S ||  
 p. 185, 32 accidenti] antecedenti S || p. 186, 1 quidem] participantur S || p. 186, 2  
 accidentia] accidentia in hoc S || p. 186, 3 in hoc] *om.* S || p. 186, 3–6 ea quae – aequaliter  
 participant] *om.* S || p. 186, 7 sic] ibi S || p. 186, 9 quidem] *om.* S || p. 186, 12 in] *om.* S ||  
 p. 186, 12 id] hoc S || p. 186, 14 sunt naturaliter] naturaliter sunt S || p. 186, 16 sunt] sunt  
 naturaliter in S || p. 186, 18 genera quidem] *om.* S || p. 186, 18–19 et in hoc etiam] et etiam  
 in hoc S || p. 186, 19–20 de eis] et in his S || p. 186, 24 praedicantur] dicuntur S || p. 186,  
 27 ostendit] *om.* S || p. 186, 27 et] atque S || p. 186, 28–30 quandoquidem dictum –  
 partibus quatuor] *om.* S || p. 186, 30 et dicit] dicens S || p. 186, 31 vero] *om.* S || p. 187, 1  
 erunt] erit S || p. 187, 1–2 differentiae – erunt] *om.* S || p. 187, 3 sunt quattuor] quattuor  
 sunt S || p. 187, 3 differentiae] differentiae accidentis S<sup>a.c.</sup> || p. 187, 6 sedecim] XIII S ||  
 p. 187, 6 quae] *om.* S || p. 187, 8 Porphyrius] ad consequentia S || p. 187, 10 et] *om.* S ||  
 p. 187, 11 decem] de esse S || p. 187, 13 noluit] velut S || p. 187, 14 et] *om.* S || p. 187, 16  
 differentiae] *om.* S || p. 187, 17 noluit] nolui S || p. 187, 19 iterum] *om.* S || p. 187, 20  
 differentia] differentiae vero S | **S p. 95b** | p. 187, 21 decem vero] vero decem S || p. 187,  
 23 superantur] separantur S || p. 187, 23 istae] ille S || p. 187, 24 tantum sunt tres] sunt  
 tantum tres S || p. 187, 24 tertiae] tertii S || p. 188, 1 ibi] ille S || p. 188, 5 a differentia] ad  
 differentiam S || p. 188, 5 sunt differentiae] differentiae sunt S || p. 188, 7 ab] *om.* S ||  
 p. 188, 8–9 sunt – locus] quattuor sunt differentiae S || p. 188, 10 ergo] genus S || p. 188,  
 11 ergo relinquitur] genus reliquum est S || p. 188, 12 differentia] *om.* S || p. 188, 13–15  
 reliquum est – ab accidenti] *om.* S || p. 188, 17 quo] quo species et differentia S || p. 188,  
 18 accidenti] accidente S || p. 188, 21 generis] generibus S || p. 188, 22 ergo] genus S ||  
 p. 188, 23 reliqua] propria reliqua S || p. 188, 23 demonstravimus] demonstratum est S ||  
 pp. 189, 1 – 193, 7 commune ergo – suo subiecto] S = OA || p. 189, 1 ergo] genus est S ||  
 p. 189, 2 a simili infert] infert a simili S || p. 189, 5 sit] fuit S || p. 189, 7 et] *om.* S || p. 189,  
 11 eis] *om.* S || p. 189, 15 et] *om.* S || p. 189, 20 differentiae] differentiae est S || p. 189,  
 22–23 inter eadem ostendit] ostendit inter eadem S || p. 189, 28 homo] homo velut qualitas  
 S || p. 190, 3 praedicatur] praedicaretur S || p. 190, 8–9 id est formarum qualitibus] *om.*  
 S || p. 190, 15 quidem] quidem in pluribus speciebus S || p. 190, 16 iterum] tamen S ||  
 p. 190, 19 vero] *om.* S || p. 190, 26–27 enim ablatum] sublatum S || p. 190, 30  
 disconveniunt et differentia] et differentia dissentiunt S || p. 191, 6 dicentes equum et  
 asinum] equum et asinum dicentes S || p. 191, 7 mulus] nullus S || p. 191, 10 equae] equum  
 S || p. 191, 12 individui muli] individuum S || p. 191, 13 duas] versas S || p. 191, 14 mulus]  
*om.* S || p. 191, 25 individuo] individuum S || p. 191, 26 et] *om.* S || p. 191, 28 equae]  
 equum S || p. 191, 28 id] hoc S || p. 191, 29 individuo] individuum S | **S p. 96a** | p. 191, 34  
 mulus] nullus S || p. 191, 35 speciei nunquam] numquam speciei S || p. 192, 3 sunt  
 species] species sunt S || p. 192, in] *om.* S || p. 192, 9 prosequitur] persequitur S || p. 192,

18–19 et differentia et proprium] proprium et differentia S || p. 192, 19 suo] *om.* S || p. 192, 22 subiecto suo] suo subiecto S || p. 192, 23–24 subiecto suo] suo subiecto S || p. 192, 26 subiecto suo] suo subiecto S || p. 192, 26 et] *om.* S || p. 192, 26 subiectum] *om.* S || p. 192, 27 curtatum] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 192, 33 est] *om.* S || p. 193, 7 semper adest suo subiecto] subiecto suo semper adest S || p. 193, 12 conversim] conversi S || p. 193, 15 est communitas] communitas est S || p. 193, 16 differentiam] differentias S || p. 193, 16–17 omnibus suis subiectis] suis omnibus substantiis S || p. 193, 18 omnibus] omnibus hominibus S || p. 193, 19 differunt autem] differt quidem S || p. 193, 22–23 vero continent quodam modo] quodammodo vero continet S || p. 193, 23 album] albedo S || p. 193, 24 quodam vero modo] quodammodo vero S || p. 193, 26 etiam – accidentium] plurimorum accidentium susceptibilis est S || p. 193, 28 aliquo modo continetur] *om.* S || p. 193, 28–29 rationabilitas] rationalitas S || p. 193, 29 continet quidem] quidem continet S || p. 193, 30 solam hanc] hanc solam S || p. 194, 1 de aliquo substantialiter] substantialiter de aliquo S || p. 194, 3 contineatur] continentur S || p. 194, 4 suis] *om.* S || p. 194, 5 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 194, 6–7 suscipere contraria – contrarias differentias] contrarias differentias suscipere S || p. 194, 8–9 rationalitatem et irrationalitatem] rationaliter et irrationaliter S || p. 194, 9 exponitur id est] id exponitur scilicet S || p. 194, 12 intensibilis] insensibilis S || p. 194, 12 in hoc] *om.* S || p. 194, 13 non] vero S || p. 194, 14 vero] *om.* S || p. 194, 15 quidem sunt] sunt quidem S || p. 194, 15–16 est differentia eorum] eorum est differentia S || p. 194, 17 id] hoc S || p. 194, 18 sua] *om.* S || p. 194, 18 faciunt] perficiunt S || p. 194, 19 perficiunt <aliam rem individualem>] *suppl. Iwakuma*, perficiunt alium individuum S || p. 194, 20 scilicet] hoc est S || p. 194, 20 in] *om.* S || p. 194, 21 perficiant] perficiunt S [S p. 96b] p. 194, 22 et] *om.* S || p. 194, 25 autem] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 194, 25 speciei et proprii] proprii et speciei S || p. 194, 26 praedicantur converso modo] converso modo praedicantur S || p. 194, 27 sic] ibi S || p. 194, 28 praedicativa] cathedra (?) S || p. 194, 30 <quod>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet* S || p. 194, 31 sit] sic fit S || p. 194, 32 sic] *om.* S || p. 194, 33 sed] sed sit S || p. 194, 34 species] species aequaliter S || p. 194, 35 ea supervadat] supervadit S || p. 195, 1 proprio] proprio (*spatio vacuo relicto*) ostendit S || p. 195, 2 dicit] *om.* S || p. 195, 3 propria] proprium S || p. 195, 5 queunt] nequeunt S || p. 195, 7 speciei] ipsa speciei S || p. 195, 11 actus] actu S || p. 195, 11 species enim semper] semper enim species S || p. 195, 12 aliquando actu] actu aliquando S || p. 195, 1 sic] ibi S || p. 195, 14 homo] *supra lineam praebet* S, ti *in linea* || p. 195, 15 est eodem modo actualiter] homo actualiter est eodem modo S || p. 195, 16 non quod] numquam S || p. 195, 16–17 actualiter semper – ei risibilitas convenit] risibilitas semper ei actualiter S || p. 195, 17 homo est] est homo S || p. 195, 18 species] species actualiter S || p. 195, 22 semper cum] cum aliquo S || p. 195, 23 dicuntur] dictum est S || p. 195, 25 aliquo] aliquo suo S || p. 195, 25 legere vel cum ambulare] legit vel cum disputat vel cum ambulat S || p. 195, 26 vero] *om.* S || p. 195, 29 differentiam] distantiam S || p. 195, 30 sunt] *om.* S || p. 195, 30 differentes] differentes sunt S || p. 195, 31 sunt] est S || p. 195, 36 differentiam] distantiam S || p. 195, 36 et genus] *om.* S || p. 195, 36 <de>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet* S || p. 196, 1 est species] species est S || p. 196, 2 sed] *om.* S || p. 196, 3 individua – substantia]

individualis substantia S || p. 196, 3–4 proxima sibi participant] sibi proxima participat S  
 || p. 196, 4 <et>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet* S || p. 196, 5 species] in hoc quod species S ||  
 p. 196, 5 prius] *om.* S || p. 196, 5 accidentia] individua S || p. 196, 6 accidentia] accidentia  
 vero S || p. 196, 8 quidem] quidem participatio S || p. 196, 10 alio] alio Aethiope S ||  
 p. 196, 12 a se] a se invicem S || p. 196, 14 accidenti] accidenti et S || p. 196, 14 tantum]  
*om.* S || p. 196, 15 proprium differt] differant proprium S || p. 196, 17 commune] commune  
 is est S || p. 196, 18 quia] quod S || p. 196, 18 <in>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet* S || p. 196,  
 19 etiam] *om.* S || p. 196, 20 quia] quod S || p. 196, 22 differunt autem] *om.* S || p. 196, 23  
 uni soli] universali S || p. 196, 25 <proprium>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet* S || p. 196, 26  
 uni soli] universali S || p. 196, 26 de ea – conversim] conversi de ea praedicantur S ||  
 p. 196, 27 est] est particulariter S || p. 196, 28 etiam ea] inter in hoc S || p. 196, 30 enim]  
 haec S || p. 196, 30 sed] sed nunc S || p. 196, 31 sufficiunt] sufficient S.