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Hugh Eterian and Aristotle: An Alberician in Constantinople

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This article examines the quotations of Aristotle, Porphyry, and Boethius found in Hugh Eterian's *De sancto et immortali Deo* and the accompanying commentary, *Compendiosa expositio in libro de spiritu sancto magistri Hugonis*, both recently edited in 2020 by Pietro Podolak and Anna Zago. Hugh's work is a defense of the Latin church's position on the *filioque* against the Greek objections and it was composed while he resided in Constantinople in the 1160s and 1170s. He mastered Greek, and the aim of the article is to see to which extent he relied on extant Latin translations of Greek philosophical works. After an introduction, the main findings are presented (§1), and, finally, §2 offers a detailed discussion of the evidence.

Introduction

The Pisan Hugh Eterian (Hugo Eterianus) is known to have studied under "some Alberic,"¹ who can hardly be anyone but the famous Alberic of Paris, before going to Constantinople where in the 1160s and 1170s he wrote an extensive treatise defending the Latin church's *filioque* against the Greek attacks on it.

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¹ According to Hugh of Honau. See Hugh Eterian, *Epistolae de sancto et immortali Deo, Compendiosa expositio, Fragmenta graeca quae extant*, ed. Pietro Podolak and Anna Zago, (Brepols: Turnhout 2020), xii. In the introduction to their edition Podolak and Zago discuss the evidence for Hugh's life and conclude that *De sancto et immortali Deo* received the final touch in 1176 or 1177.

In that work, he endorses in passing one of Alberic's pet theses: *Contraries are not predicated simultaneously of the same thing*.¹

As opposed to most anti-Greek treatises about the procession of the Holy Spirit, Hugh's was written by a man whose use of authoritative Greek texts was not limited to such as were available in Latin translation; he mastered Ancient Greek so well that he was able to consult untranslated Greek texts in their original language. Moreover, a Greek version of his treatise is known to have existed, quite probably produced by himself or at least with himself involved in the production.²

Hugh's work, entitled *De sancto et immortali deo* (henceforward *De sancto*) and an accompanying anonymous commentary have recently been edited by Pietro Podolak and Anna Zago in *Corpus Christianorum*. In 2022 Dr Podolak was so kind as to mail me a copy of the edition as well as an article of his about it.³

In their edition Podolak and Zago have made great efforts to identify *loci Aristotelici* referred to or tacitly used in the two works. In the article Podolak points out that Hugh cites *De caelo* of which no Greco-Latin translation is known to have existed in the 12th century.

Those publications made me curious to see whether a little more could be said about Hugh and his Aristotle. Did he consult the texts in Greek or did he use existing Latin translations? And, if the latter, which ones? I decided to investigate the matter.

¹ Hugo Eterian, *De sancto* 3.12, 208: "nam priuatio in eo quod priuatio semper contra naturam est et relatiua quidem, licet ad aliud et ad aliud, de eodem praedicantur, contraria uero nequaquam, ut ex diffinitione eorum patens est." For Alberic's views on this point, see Sten Ebbesen, "Alberic of Paris on Aristotle's *Sophistici elenchi*," in *Twelfth-Century Logic and Metaphysics: Alberic of Paris and his Contemporaries*, edited by Heine Hansen, Enrico Donato, and Boaz Faraday Schuman (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).

² About the Greek translation, see the introduction to Podolak and Zago's *Epistolae*. The few surviving fragments are printed at the end of the volume.

³ Pietro Podolak, "Il *De sancto et immortali Deo* di Ugo Eteriano: filosofia medievale o pensiero bizantino?" in *Contra Latinos et aduersus Graecos: The Separation between Rome and Constantinople from the Ninth to the Fifteenth Centuries*, edited by Alessandra Bucossi and Anna Calia (Leuven: Peeters, 2020), 255–70.

The authorship of the commentary on *De sancto* is uncertain. Podolak and Zago mention that in 1952 Antoine Dondaine had proposed to attribute it to Hugh himself, but they think this is improbable because occasionally it disagrees with the text it comments on.¹ I do not think this is a decisive argument, and the commentator shared one rare quality with Hugh: he knew Greek, and both, while quoting Latin translations of Aristotle when available, were able to quote also works that only existed in Greek. Besides, Hugh and his commentator share a couple of peculiarities in their rendition of Greek terms.² In the following I shall assume that they are, indeed, one and the same man, but the results of my investigation would not be substantially different if I had treated them as two persons.

1 Findings

My examination of the evidence yielded some interesting results, the documentation for which will be presented in part 2 of this article.

My analysis of Hugh's quotations showed that in the case of the *Organon* he relied on Latin translations rather than on the original Greek texts, although he may on occasion have consulted Greek scholia. This leads to the surprising conclusion that Hugh almost certainly had with him in Constantinople a complete *Organon* in Latin, including the *Posterior Analytics*, which had not yet become a standard item in Western schools. Moreover, the *Ars vetus* part of his *Organon* included, as one would expect, Porphyry's *Isagoge* in Boethius' translation, and possibly Boethius' *On Topical Differences* as well. It even seems possible that Hugh had carried with him to Constantinople Boethius' second commentary on Porphyry.

As I have shown elsewhere, the information we have about Alberic's treatment in of *petitio principii* in the *Sophistici Elenchi* makes it clear that—surprisingly—he completely ignored the relevant chapter in the *Prior Analytics* (2.16) and—even more surprisingly—the one in the *Topics*

¹ Introduction to *Compendiosa expositio*, xxxiii–xxxiv.

² *in eo quod* for *ἡ* and *potestas* for *δύναμις*.

(8.13).¹ As there is no sign of his having had any acquaintance with the *Posterior Analytics*, the all but inescapable conclusion is that Alberic's knowledge of the *Ars nova* was limited to the *Sophistici Elenchi*.

By contrast, *De sancto* contains irrefutable evidence that Hugh knew his Latin *Topics* and *Posterior Analytics*, and he had also at least *some* acquaintance with the Latin *Prior Analytics*. So, with or without the help of another master, he had widened his horizon beyond Alberic's, quite apart from his learning Greek, a feat that he may have accomplished only after having moved to Constantinople, although it cannot be excluded that he had learned it in Pisa in the 1150s or early '60s, because at that time his compatriot, the famous translator Burgundio, probably resided there after having been in Constantinople in the 1130s.

De sancto contains three verbatim quotations of Boethius' translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge* and the commentary one as well. *De sancto* also contains several more or less precise quotations of the *Categories* and there are a couple in the commentary. Unsurprisingly, they show that Hugh's text of the *Categories* was of the type Minio-Paluello dubbed *editio vulgata* (or *composita*), though with some readings derived from *translatio Boethii*. Neither *De sancto* nor the commentary refers explicitly to the *Peri hermeneias*, but one imprecise reference to 'The Philosopher' does, in fact, paraphrase a passage from that work and appears also to show influence from Boethius' second commentary on it.

Hugh's quotations of the *Sophistical Refutations* are not very precise, but there can be little doubt that the translation he used was the Boethian one. For the *Prior Analytics* there is one unacknowledged quotation in *De sancto* and one with explicit attribution in the commentary. The latter agrees with the Chartres rather than the Florence variant of the Boethian text, whereas there is no difference between the Chartres and the Florence text in the former case.

One of Hugh's *Organon* translations was slightly unusual. His *Topics* appears to have been a copy of Boethius' translation with variants from the fragmentarily preserved anonymous one—unless, indeed, the anonymous

¹ Ebbesen, "Alberic of Paris on Aristotle's *Sophistici elenchi*."

translator was none other than Hugh himself, a possibility suggested by their shared use of *familiaris* instead of *proprius* to render the Greek *oἰκεῖος*.

Finally, and most remarkably, Hugh's Latin *Posterior Analytics* was *translatio Ioannis*, not the much more widely diffused one by James of Venice. According to Minio-Paluello,¹ John's translation, which is preserved in only one manuscript, was a revision of James' rather than a completely new work, and must then have been produced some time between ca. 1125 and 1159, the *terminus post quem* being the approximate date of James' translation, the *terminus ante quem* being the date of John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon* in which it is quoted and referred to as a newer work than James'. The identity of John the translator remains an unsolved riddle.²

A reference to a comment by Alexander on book 1 of the *Posterior Analytics* indicates that Hugh had access also to a Greek commentary or—alternatively—to a Greek manuscript with marginal scholia. There can be little doubt that the Alexander in case is the ancient scholar Alexander of Aphrodisias. Hugh's information about what he said about a certain passage in the *Posteriora* is almost certainly correct, so Hugh's text must count as a fragment of Alexander's now lost commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*.

Among Aristotle's non-logical works Hugh refers to *Physics*, *De caelo*, *De anima* and the *Metaphysics*. Only an Arabo-Latin translation of *De caelo* is known to have existed in the 12th century, and Hugh's quotations do not agree with it, so whether he used the text directly or indirectly, his source must have been Greek.

As for the *Physics*, *De anima* and the *Metaphysics*, it is conceivable that Hugh had access to James of Venice's translations, but the agreements between his quotations and James' Latin being of a rather trivial sort it is

¹ *Aristoteles Latinus* (varying publishers, 1961–), 4:xlvi.

² See David Bloch, *John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), 38–43.

equally possible that he consulted those works in Greek or used Greek intermediary sources.

As regards the *Physics*, *De sancto* also contains an unacknowledged loan from John Philoponus' commentary, which supports the notion that Hugh consulted Aristotle's text in Greek— an extract from Philoponus' work placed as a scholium in the margin of a manuscript of the *Physics* is the most likely source of the loan.

As regards the *Metaphysics*, the phrasing of the one quote in *De sancto* is closer to Hugh's own habits than to James', and in the commentary there is a quotation of book XI, a book that was not included in James' translation.

All, in all, then, I think it is most probable that Hugh consulted the *Physics*, *De anima* and the *Metaphysics* in Greek. He would not have been taught any of the three texts in Alberic's or in any other Western school, and so did not necessarily possess them, whereas we may assume that he had acquired manuscripts of the *Ars vetus* and at least parts of the *Ars nova* in his student days.

When learned men travel books travel. Burgundio of Pisa famously brought several valuable Greek manuscripts with him from Constantinople to the West. Hugh Eterian took Latin manuscripts to the Bosphorus.

2 Documentation

Below I present and discuss in detail the quotations on which my conclusions build.¹

¹ The original Greek of Aristotelian passages are quoted from the electronic *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, which means that they reproduce the Oxford editions by Minio-Paluello and Ross. The Latin translations of Aristotle and Porphyry are quoted from the editions in *Aristoteles Latinus* (henceforth: AL). Sometimes I have used the printed editions directly, sometimes the online *Aristoteles Latinus Database*. For the Greek commentators and Porphyry, I use the editions in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (henceforth: CAG). As for Boethius, I have used the following editions. For the second commentary on Porphyry (henceforth: *Comm. Intr. ed. 2^a*), I have used the edition in *In*

2.1 *Ars vetus*

2.1.1 *Isagoge (Intr.)*

1) *Compendiosa expositio* 1.66, 281: Sciendum ergo quod, quemadmodum apud Porphyrium generis significatio una est uniuscuiusque generationis principium uel ab eo ipso qui genuit uel a loco in quo quis genitus est, ita ...

The edition refers to *Intr.* 1.22–2.10, but this should be narrowed down to:

Porph., *Intr.*, CAG 4.1:1.23–2.1: λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πάλιν γένος ἢ ἐκάστου τῆς γενέσεως ἀρχὴ εἴτε ἀπὸ τοῦ τεκόντος εἴτε ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ τις γέγονεν.

Again, in another sense we call a genus the origin of anyone's birth, whether from his progenitor or from the place in which he was born (trans. Barnes).¹

Trl. Boethii: Dicitur autem et aliter rursus genus quod est uniuscuiusque generationis principium vel ab eo qui genuit vel a loco in quo quis genitus est.

Save for an extra *ipso*, *uniuscuiusque*, *genitus est* faithfully reproduces the Boethian translation.

Isagogen Porphyrii commenta, ed. Samuel Brandt (Vienna: Academia Litterarum Caesarea Vindobonensis, 1906); for the second commentary on Aristotle's *Perihermeneias* (henceforth: *Int. ed. 2^a*), I have used *Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*, ed. C. Meiser, vol. 2 (Teubner: Leipzig, 1880); for *De topicis differentiis* (henceforth: *De top. diff.*), I have used the edition in D. Z. Nikitas, *Boethius' De topicis differentiis und die byzantinische Rezeption dieses Werkes* (Athens: Academy of Athens, 1990).

¹ When I use other people's translations of Greek texts, this is acknowledged, as here. Lack of acknowledgment means that the translation is my own work.

2) *De sancto* 2.9, 112: Etenim Tantalus Agamemnonis proauus dicitur mediante Pelope atque Atreo; quoniam Agamemnon eius dicitur nepos: qua de causa idem Pelopides censetur et Tantalides.

The edition refers to:

Porph., *Intr.*, CAG 4.1:5.23–6.3: τὰ δὴ πρὸ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἄχρι τοῦ γενικωτάτου ἀνιόντα γένη τε λέγεται καὶ εἶδη καὶ ὑπάλληλα γένη ὡς ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων Ἀτρείδης καὶ Πελοπίδης καὶ Τανταλίδης καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον Διός.

The items before the most special, ascending as far as the most general, are said to be genera and species and subaltern genera, as Agamemnon is an Atreid and a Peolopid and a Tantalid and, finally, of Zeus. (trans. Barnes)

Trl. Boethii: ea vero quae sunt ante specialissima usque ad generalissimum ascendentia et genera dicuntur et species et subalterna genera, ut Agamemnon Atrides et Pelopides et Tantalides et, ultimum, Iovis.

There can be little doubt that Hugh had this passage in mind, but only the underlined words are the same, and they do not reveal whether Hugh consulted the Greek or the Latin text.

3) *De sancto* 2.19, 158: participatione enim speciei, ut philosophus dicit, plures homines unus; nam Socrates et Alcibiades duo cum sint reducti ad hominem angustantur et fiunt specie unus, collectiuum uero et adunatium quod commune;

The edition refers to *Intr.* 6.21–23. This can be narrowed down to:

Porph., *Intr.*, CAG 4.1:6.21: τῇ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εἶδους μετουσίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι εἷς
because by their participation in the species the several humans are one

Trl. Boethii: participatione enim speciei plures homines unus

Hugh quotes Boethius' translation *verbatim*, following its word order with *participatione* before *speciei*, where the Greek text has *μετουσία* after *τοῦ εἶδους*.

The edition further refers the reader to Boethius' commentary:

Boethius, *Comm. Intr. ed. 2^a*, 229–230: Sed in hoc convenienti utitur exemplo dicens quoniam *participatione speciei*, id est hominis, Cato, Plato et Cicero *pluresque reliqui homines unus*, id est milia hominum in eo quod sunt homines, unus homo est; at vero unus homo, qui specialis est, si ad hominum multitudinem qui sub ipso sunt consideretur, plures fiunt. ita et plures homines in speciali homine unus est et specialis unus in pluribus infinitus sic igitur quod singulare quidem est, diuisium est, quod vero commune, quoniam multorum unum est, ut genus ac species, collectium atque adunatium.

The correspondance with Boethius' formulation at the end of the quote is so close that Hugh must either have had Boethius' text in front of him, or have had an extract from it added in the margin of his copy of the *Isagoge*.

4) *De sancto* 3.2, 171: cum differentia tripliciter dicatur, communiter, proprie ac magis proprie, sola quae magis propria¹ dicitur hoc ab illo dissecando aliud facit [...] Hinc² est quod uidetur diuinas abinuicem

¹ *magis propria*, though understandable, looks like it might be a scribal error for *magis proprie*.

² The edition has: "Hinc est quod uidetur diuinas abinuicem differre personas, differentia quae dicitur proprie alteratum et non aliud fantum faciente." I have changed

differre personas differentia quae dicitur proprie, alteratum et non aliud tantum faciente

Porph., *Intr.*, CAG 4.1:8.8–19: Διαφορὰ δὲ κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως καὶ ἰδιαίτατα λεγέσθω. [...] καθόλου μὲν οὖν πᾶσα διαφορὰ ἑτεροῖον ποιεῖ προσγινομένη τινί· ἀλλ’ αἱ μὲν κοινῶς καὶ ἰδίως ἄλλοῖον ποιοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰδιαίτατα ἄλλο.

Let differences be so called commonly, properly and most properly. [...] In general, every difference, when it is added to something, makes that item diversified, but while common and proper differences make it otherlike, most proper differences make it other. (trans. Barnes)

Trl. Boethii: Differentia vero communiter et proprie et magis proprie dicatur [...] Universaliter ergo omnis differentia alteratum facit cuilibet adveniens; sed ea quae est communiter et proprie alteratum facit, illa autem quae est magis proprie aliud.

Hugh quotes the beginning of the chapter about differentia almost *verbatim* and paraphrases the following passage about the two first sorts of differentia making something “otherlike” (*ἄλλοῖον*, *alteratum*), only the last making it something ‘other’ (*ἄλλο*, *aliud*).

5) *De sancto* 2.11, 117: praedicamentum ad aliquid quasi propago a philosophis in nouem praedicamentis nuncupatur, in quibus attenditur ut leue accidens, eo quod in pluribus saepe adsit absitque preter aliquam subiecti mutationem uel etiam alterationem aliquam.

The edition contains no reference to Porphyry, but the passage contains an echo of:

the punctuation, because the sense is “Hence it is that the divine persons seem to differ by the difference that is called so ‘properly,’ which just makes something otherlike but not other.”

Porph., *Intr.*, CAG 4.1:12.24–25: Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὁ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς.

Accidents are items which come and go without the destruction of their subjects. (trans. Barnes)

Trl. Boethii: Accidens vero est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem

Hugh is likely to have known the Porphyrian definition of accident by heart, and since he paraphrases the text rather than quote it *verbatim* the passage does not prove that he had the Latin text available in Constantinople. On the other hand, his use of the Boethian *adest et abest* for *γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται*, and not least *praeter* for *χωρὶς* shows dependence on the translation rather than on the Greek original.

6) *De sancto* 1.13, 45: sicut dicit Porphyrius, commune esse proprii et inseparabilis accidentis quod praeter ea numquam consistent illa in quibus considerantur.

The edition refers to Porph., *Intr.*, 21.20–22.3. More precisely, Hugh quotes:

Porph., *Intr.*, CAG 4.1:21.21–22: Κοινὸν δὲ τῷ ἰδίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀχωρίστῳ συμβεβηκότι τὸ ἄνευ αὐτῶν μὴ ὑποστῆναι ἐκεῖνα, ἐφ’ ὧν θεωρεῖται

Common to properties and inseparable accidents is the fact that without them the items on which they are observed do not subsist. (trans. Barnes)

Trl. Boethii: Commune autem proprii et inseparabilis accidentis est quod praeter ea numquam consistent illa in quibus considerantur

Hugh follows Boethius' translation to the letter, including the unexpected rendition of $\mu\eta$ as *numquam*.

2.1.2 *Categoriae* (Cat.)

L. Minio-Paluello in AL 1.1–5 distinguished two fundamental types of text, *Translatio Boethii* and *Editio composita*, the latter being a mixture of the former and a lost translation, that may possibly have been a first draft by Boethius himself. Most medieval manuscripts present some version of the *composita*, and in so far it merits its other name: *vulgata*. But there were no water-tight partitions between the two texts, so, in fact, the majority of the manuscripts offer “textus multis variisque modis e duobus editionibus conflatos”, as Minio-Paluello put it.¹ Hugh's manuscript seems to have been no different.

1) *De sancto* 1.13, 45: sicut dicitur in subiecto non esse omni substantiae commune est, primis scilicet et secundis

The edition does not mark this as a quotation of the *Categories*, but in fact it quotes:

Arist., *Cat.* 5.3a7–10: Κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρώτη οὐσία οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν. τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φανερόν μὲν καὶ οὕτως ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.

It is a characteristic common to every substance not to be in a subject. For a primary substance is neither said of a subject nor in a subject. As for secondary substances, it is obvious at once that they are not in a subject. (trans. Ackrill)

¹ AL 1:xxii.

Trl. Boethii: Commune est autem omni substantiae in subiecto non esse. Prima enim substantia nec de subiecto dicitur nec in subiecto est; secundae vero substantiae sic quoque manifestum est quoniam non sunt in subiecto.

Ed. composita: Commune est autem omni substantiae in subiecto non esse. Principalis namque substantia neque de subiecto dicitur neque in subiecto est, secundarum vero substantiarum constat quidem etiam sic quia nulla est in subiecto.

As Hugh does not quote quite *verbatim* it is impossible to see whether his MS of the *Categories* at this point followed the genuine Boethian translation or the *composita*. He has reduced Aristotle's explanation of why primary and secondary substances are not in a subject to *primis sc. et secundis*, added as a gloss on *omni substantiae*.

2.1) *De sancto* 2.8, 104: Continuum quidem, quod de solis magnitudinibus dicitur, est, ut philosophi perhibent, cuius partes ad communem terminum copulantur.

2.2) *Compendiosa expositio* 3.14, 313: Quia communem terminum habet {*sc. continua quantitas*} ad quem copulantur particulae, ut in *Categoriis* legitur.

As for 2.1, the edition reasonably refer to *Cat.* 6.5a1–6, whereas for 2.2 the reference given is to 6.4b25–26 with the addition “cfr. editionem compositam 4b35–5a1.”

In fact, in *Categories* ch. 6 Aristotle makes it the characteristic of discrete quantities that their parts (*μέρη*) do not do not join together (*συνάπτει*) at any common boundary. Between 4b20 and 5a26 there are 21 occurrences of forms of *μέριον* and 15 of forms of *συνάπτειν*. In *translatio Boethii* the two terms are consistently rendered *pars* and *coniungi*. In *editio composita (vulgata)* the same words are rendered *particula* and *copulari*

except for one instance of *partibus* for *μορίων* at 4b22 (*suis partibus constat*) and one of *conectantur* for *συνάπτεται* at 5a26.

CE follows the *editio composita* closely, *De sancto* has *partes* like Boethius, but *copulantur* like the *composita*. At another place, in *De sancto* 3.2, 170, where Hugh does not directly quote the *Categories*, but uses its distinction between discrete and continuous quantity, he says that:

discreta quantitas secundum passionem atque collectionem considerata suas particulas actu exhibet intellectui et non potestate

but a little later says that:

continua quantitas ... est diuisibilis in semper diuisibilia cuius partes non ut discretae actu sed potestate accipiendae sunt.

He thus seems to have been equally accustomed to using *partes* and *particulae* when talking about discrete and continuous quantities.

3) *De sancto* 3.2, 173: Ut Aristoteles docet sic dicens: “Ab habitu in privationem fit permutatio, a privatione uero in habitum impossibile est: neque enim caecus factus rursus vidit, neque cum esset caluus comam iterum resumpsit, neque cum esset sine dentibus dentes ei iterum pullulauerunt.

The edition identifies the text referred to as *Cat.* 10.13a31–36. This can be narrowed down to:

Arist., *Cat.* 10.13a32–36: ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἔξωθεν ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν γίγνεται μεταβολή, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἔξιν ἀδύνατον· οὐτε γὰρ τυφλὸς γενόμενός τις πάλιν ἔβλεψεν, οὔτε φαλακρὸς ὢν κομήτης ἐγένετο, οὔτε νωδὸς ὢν ὀδόντας ἔφυσεν.

For change occurs from possession to privation but from privation to possession is impossible; one who has gone blind does not recover sight nor does a bald man regain his hair nor does a toothless man grow new ones. (trans. Ackrill)

Trl. Boethii: ab habitu enim ad privationem fit permutatio, a privatione vero ad habitum impossibile est; neque enim factus aliquis caecus rursus vidit, nec calvus rursus crinitus factus est, nec edentulus dentes creavit.

Ed. composita: ab habitu in privationem fit mutatio, a privatione vero in habitum impossibile est; neque enim caecus factus rursus vidit, neque cum esset calvus rursus comatus factus est, neque cum esset sine dentibus dentes ei iterum orti sunt.

Hugh's text is closest to the composite edition, but he has *permutatio* like *trl. Boethii* and replaces *rursus comatus factus est* with *comam iterum resumpsit* and *orti sunt* with *pullulaverunt*.

4) *De sancto* 1.12, 125: Nam cum duo sint, ut Aristoteles dicit, statim sequitur unum esse, uno uero existente non necesse est duo esse.

The edition identifies the text referred to as *Cat.* 14a30–35. In fact, it can be narrowed down to:

Arist., *Cat.* 12.14a31–32: δεῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἐνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι

because if there are two it follows at once that there is one whereas if there is one there are not necessarily two (trans. Ackrill)

Trl. Boethii: cum enim duo sint, consequitur mox unum esse, cum vero sit unum non est necesse duo esse

Ed. composita: duobus enim existentibus, mox consequens est unum esse, uno autem existente, non necessarium est duo esse

Here Hugh mostly follows Boethius in the first part of the quotation with some minor changes (*nam* for *enim*, *statim sequitur* for *consequitur mox*) but in the second part he agrees with the *editio composita* in having *uno ... existente* instead of *cum ... sit unum*.

5) *Compendiosa expositio* 3.26, 317: omne quod motum habet aut secundum generationem et corruptionem aut secundum augmentum et diminutionem aut secundum alterationem habet aut secundum loci mutationem

The edition refers the reader to *Metaph.* 12.1.1069b9–15, *Ph.* 3.1.201a9–15, and—with a prefixed “cfr.”—further to *Cat.* 14.15a13–14 and *GC* 1.4.319b32–320a2. The really relevant passage is:

Arist., *Cat.* 14.15a13–14: Κινήσεως δέ ἐστιν εἶδη ἕξ· γένεσις, φθορά, αὐξήσις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή.

There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place. (trans. Ackrill)

Trl. Boethii: Motus vero sunt species sex: generatio, corruptio, crementum, diminutio, commutatio, secundum locum translatio.

Ed. composita: Motus autem sunt species sex: generatio, corruptio, augmentum, diminutio, alteratio, secundum locum mutatio.

CE clearly reflects the composite text, with which it shares *augmentum*, *alteratio* and *mutatio* against Boethius' *crementum*, *commutatio*, *translatio*.

6) *De sancto* 3.10, 198: Habere igitur multa significat, ut Aristoteles in *Categoriis* producit: de corpore praedicatur et incorporeo.

The edition identifies the passage referred to as *Cat.* 5.15b17–32, but Aristotle says nothing about *habere* being predicated of both things corporeal and incorporeal. In fact, all Hugh invokes his authority for is the statement that *habere* signifies several things, i.e. only the following sentence is relevant:

Arist., *Cat.* 15.15b17: Τὸ ἔχειν κατὰ πλείονας τρόπους λέγεται

Having is spoken of in a number of ways (trans. Ackrill)

Trl. Boethii: Habere secundum plures modos dicitur

Ed. composita: Habere autem multis dicitur modis

Hugh's quotation is too imprecise to show which of the two translations he used.

7) *De sancto* 3.2, 171: omnis priuatio quae propria differentia dicitur, dum suo inest susceptibili, oppositum tantummodo ab ipso excludit, ut caluitium capillatum esse, caecitas uisum habere, aliorum uero nihil secundum se circumscribit

The edition refers to *Cat.* 10.12a26–b25, which is correct, but the following two passages are particularly relevant:

Arist., *Cat.* 10.12b1–5: ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐστερηῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις· ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός· ὡς γὰρ ἡ τυφλότης τῇ ὄψει ἀντίκειται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τῷ ὄψιν ἔχειν ἀντίκειται. [...] 13a32–36 ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἕξεως ἐπὶ

τὴν στέρησιν γίνεται μεταβολή, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς στέρησεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἔξιν
ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ τυφλὸς γενόμενός τις πάλιν ἔβλεπεν, οὔτε
φαλακρὸς ὢν κομήτης ἐγένετο

These do, however, seem to be opposed—being deprived and having a possession—as privation and possession are. For the manner of opposition is the same. For as blindness is opposed to sight so also is being blind opposed to having sight. [...] For change occurs from possession to privation but from privation to possession is impossible; one who has gone blind does not recover sight nor does a bald man regain his hair nor does a toothless man grow new ones. (trans. Ackrill)

Ed. composita: Opposita autem etiam haec videntur, id est privari et habitum habere, tamquam privatio et habitus; modus enim oppositionis idem est; nam sicut caecitas visui opposita est, sic caecum esse ad visum habere oppositum est. [...] et ab habitu in privationem fit mutatio, a privatione vero in habitum impossibile est; neque enim caecus factus rursus vidit, neque cum esset calvus rursus comatus factus est

Trl. Boethii here lacks a counterpart of *nam–oppositum est* in the first extract. But it has a complete text of the second extract, which runs:

ab habitu enim ad privationem fit permutatio, a privatione vero ad habitum impossibile est; neque enim factus aliquis caecus rursus vidit, nec calvus rursus crinitus factus est

Evidently, Hugh's *caluitium capillatum esse* reflects the *composita*'s *calvus rursus comatus factus est*.

8) *De sancto* 1.6 23: Verendum est ne de diuino disputantes igni comparemur niuique, quorum alterum, ut philosophus perhibet, urit nesciens quare, alterum uero infrigidat causam non animadvertens.

The edition refers to *Cat.* 10.13a20, which, however, only says that fire is naturally hot. *Int.* 13.22b36–23a3 yields a much closer match, so the passage will be treated under “*Ars vetus* 3, *Peri hermeneias*”, below.

9) *De sancto* 3.12, 205: huius propositionis fides ab Aristotelica inuestigatione trahitur dicente: “Si quod secundum contradictionem alicui opponitur, non dicitur multipliciter nec oppositum, ut non uidere uidere opponitur; dicitur autem non uidere multipliciter— uno quidem modo non habere uisum, alio uero non uti uisu—; quare necessarium et uidere multipliciter dici. Vtrique enim eorum quod non uidet opponitur quid, ut ei quod non habet uisum habere, ei uero quod non utitur uisu uti.”

The edition, after a correct reference to the *Topics*, adds “cf. Arist. *Cat.* 13a26–13b 35”, which is not really relevant. The passage will be treated in the section about the *Topics*, below.

10) *De sancto* 1.48, 301: Contraria fiunt ex contrariis sed non ut ex materiali causa: nam ex sanitate non fit aegritudo neque nigredo ex albedine ut ex ligno lectulus

The edition refers with an “e.g.” to *Cat.* 10.13a31–36, but the similarity is extremely slight. Aristotle exemplifies change with that from health to illness in *Ph.* 5.2.225b27, 5.5.229a14; *Metaph.* 11.12.1068a26. Change from white to black is mentioned in *Cat.* 5.4a32; *Ph.* 5.2.225b18, 7.1.242b36–37; *Metaph.* 11.12.1068a18–19. Aristotle also repeatedly uses a bed (κλίνη) and wood (ξύλον) as examples of a thing and its material cause: *Ph.* 1.7.191a9, 7.3.245b11; *GC* 2.9.335b33; *GA* 1.18.724a24, 1.21.729b17, *Metaph.* 1.3.984a24, 8.4.1044a26–27. However, none of these passages is particularly close to Hugh’s text, and only *Metaph.* 11.12 shares two of the three examples with it. The changes from health to illness

and from white to black are examples that Hugh could, presumably, have invented himself even if he did not have Aristotle's authority for them, but the wood-and-bed example requires the assumption of a literary source. Unless he owed it to an intermediary, Hugh probably had it from either the *Physics* or the *Metaphysics*, for, as we shall see below, he had some acquaintance with those works.

2.1.3 *Peri hermeneias* (Int.)

No *verbatim* quotation has been located, but one reference to “The Philosopher” does, in fact, refer to *Int.*:

De sancto 1.6, 23: Verendum est ne de diuino disputantes igni comparemur niuique, quorum alterum, ut philosophus perhibet, urit nesciens quare, alterum uero infrigidat causam non animadvertens.

The edition proposes to identify the source as *Cat.* 10.13a20, which does, in fact, mention fire and snow, but says nothing about their acting unconsciously:

Cat. 10.12b35–38: ἔτι δὲ καὶ τούτων ἦν τι ἀνὰ μέσον ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ δεκτικῷ, εἰ μὴ οἷς φύσει τὸ ἐν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι καὶ τῇ χιόνι τὸ λευκῇ

Moreover, there was something intermediate in just those cases where it was not necessary for one or the other to belong to a thing capable of receiving them—except for things to which the one belongs by nature, as being hot belongs to fire and being white to snow. (trans. Ackrill)

Trl. Boethii: erat etiam istorum medietas, quorum non necesse esset alterum inesse eorum susceptibili, nisi forte aliquibus naturaliter contigerit unum ipsorum inesse, ut igni calidum esse et niui album

Ed. composita: horum autem erat aliquid medium, quorum non erat necessarium alterum esse susceptibili, praeter quibus naturaliter unum inest, ut igni calidum esse et nivi candidum

The characterisation of the actions of fire and snow as unconscious comes from:

Int. 13.22b36–23a3: φανερόν δὴ ὅτι οὐ πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν ἢ εἶναι ἢ βαδίζειν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύναται, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἐφ’ ὧν οὐκ ἀληθές· πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ κατὰ λόγον δυνατῶν, οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμαντικὸν καὶ ἔχει δύνάμιν ἄλογον, – αἱ μὲν οὖν μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις αἱ αὐταὶ πλειόνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, αἱ δ’ ἄλογοι οὐ πᾶσαι, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ πῦρ οὐ δυνατόν θερμαίνειν καὶ μὴ, οὐδ’ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐνεργεῖ ἀεί

Well now, it is evident that not everything capable either of being or of walking is capable of the opposites also. There are cases of which this is not true. Firstly, with things capable non-rationally; fire, for example, can heat and has an irrational capability. While the same rational capabilities are capabilities for more than one thing, for contraries, not all irrational capabilities are like this. Fire, as has been said, is not capable of heating and of not heating, and similarly with everything else that is actualized all the time. (trans. Ackrill)

Trl. Boethii: Manifestum est autem quoniam non omne possibile vel esse vel ambulare et opposita valet, sed est in quibus non sit verum; et primum quidem in his quae non secundum rationem possunt, ut ignis calfactibilis et habet vim inrationabilem (ergo secundum rationem potestates ipsae eadem plurimorum etiam contrariorum sunt; inrationabiles vero non omnes, sed, quemadmodum dictum est, ignem non esse possibile calefacere et non, vel quaecumque alia semper agunt

This passage only mentions fire, not snow, but the two are found together in Boethius’ second commentary on the *Peri hermeneias*:

Boethius, *Int. ed.* 2^a, 236, ed. Meiser: Aristoteles enim hanc habet opinionem de his quae semper esse necesse est. ea enim putat nullam habere ad contraria cognationem: ut nix quoniam semper est frigida numquam calori coniuncta est. ignis quoque numquam frigori cognatus est, idcirco quod semper in frigoris contrarietate versatur id est in calore. [...] 413: alia vero quae numquam ante potestate fuit sed semper

actu, a quando res ipsa fuit quae aliquid potestate esse diceretur, ad unam rem tantum apta est, ut ignis numquam fuit potestate calidus, ut postea actu calidus sentiretur, nec nix ante frigida potestate, post actu, sed a quando fuit ignis actu calidus fuit, a quando nix actu frigida. quocirca hae potentiae non sunt aptae ad utraque. neque enim ignis frigus incutere nec nix calidum quicquam possit efficere.

Whereas Aristotle in the *Categories* passage mentions the heat of fire and the *whiteness* of snow, the two passages from Boethius agree with Hugh in contrasting innate heat of fire and *coldness* of snow. Admittedly, those two passages are comments on earlier parts of the *Peri hermeneias* than the one in which the power of fire is characterised as *ἄλογος/irrationalis*, yet, it does not take much ingenuity to see that the cold snow could be relevant in ch. 13.

2.1.4 Boethius, *De topicis differentiis* (*Top. diff.*)

The editors have identified one probable tacit loan from Boethius' *De topicis differentiis*:

De sancto 3.15, 222: Regula enim est quae dicit: "Si quod minus uidetur inesse inerit, et quod magis"

The apparatus refers to several texts, but clearly the following about the *locus a minore* is the important one:

Boethius, *Top. diff.* 2.8.8 (PL 64:1191A): Maxima propositio: "si id quod minus videtur inesse inest, et id quod magis videtur inesse inerit."

Hugh's *regula* is another way of saying *maxima propositio*. He will have known several of the Boethian maxims by heart, so his quoting this one is no proof he had a copy of *Top. diff.* with him in Constantinople, but since it is a text he is sure to have been taught in his youth he must have owned one, and if his *Ars Vetus* was bound together, it will have travelled with him to the East together with the rest of the corpus.

2.2 *Ars nova*

2.2.1 *Analytica Priora (APr.)*

1) *Compendiosa expositio* 3.10, 313: nam disciplina per demonstrationem fit; disciplina est quae circa ea quae semper similiter se habent uersatur, ut geometria, astronomia, arithmetica, musica: demonstratio uera et familiaria subiecto, prima et per se nota sine interrogatione colligit; ait Aristoteles demonstratorem in per se notorum firmitate confidentem non interrogare, sed assumere

This passage contains (a) one unacknowledged loan, (b) one probable unacknowledged loan, and (c) one imprecise quotation.

(a) disciplina est quae circa ea quae semper similiter se habent uersatur

This corresponds precisely to

Ioannes Philoponus, *APr.*, CAG 13.2:154.9:¹ αἱ γὰρ ἐπιστήμαι περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα ἀναστρέφονται

The various types of scientific knowledge are concerned with such things as are always in the same state

and is very close to

David, *Prolegomena philosophiae*, CAG 18.2:45: ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα καταγίνεται

Scientific knowledge is occupied with such things as are always in the same state

¹ Repeated *verbatim* in Sophonias, *APr.*, CAG 23.3:18.13–14. But Sophonias is not a possible source since he lived long after Hugh.

Compendiosa expositio's *versatur*, which matches ἀναστρέφονται, makes it virtually certain that the source is Philoponus, which anyway is the more probable, as his commentary on the *Prior Analytics* was clearly more diffused in Byzantium than David's *Prolegomena*.¹

Notice that *disciplina* here renders ἐπιστήμη as in *translatio Ioannis* of the *Posterior Analytics* used by Hugh in *De sancto* (see below). In the *Prior Analytics* and the *Topics* both Boethius and the anonymous 12th-century translator sometimes use *disciplina* and sometimes *scientia*.²

(b) demonstratio uera et familiaria subiecto, prima et per se nota [...] colligit

The reason why this is likely to be a quotation is the phrase *familiaria subiecto*, which must render οἰκεῖα τοῦ ὑποκειμένου or οἰκεῖα τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ. Compare:

Ioannes Philoponus, *APo.*, CAG 13.3:11.6–13: Ἐτι καὶ τοῦτο προστίθησι τοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης δεδειγμένοις, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρκει (εἰς) τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀποδείξιν τὸ ἀληθεῖς τε καὶ ἀμέσους λαβεῖν προτάσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεῖ οἰκείας τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀποδεικτοῦ εἶναι τὰς. [...] οὐ μὴν οἰκεῖος ὁ μέσος ὅρος τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ

He further adds this to what has been shown about scientific knowledge that to produce a demonstration it does not suffice to assume true and immediate premisses, they must also be proper to the matter to be demonstrated [...] but the middle term is not proper to the matter.

Philoponus's remarks occur in a scholium on:

¹ For other Byzantine variants of the characterization of ἐπιστήμη and their Aristotelian sources, see Sten Ebbesen, *Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi. A Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies*, 3 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 3:164–165.

² See the Greek-Latin indices in AL 3 and 5. In AL 5:xlvi, Minio-Paluello persuasively argues that one and the same man was responsible for the anonymous translations of *APr.* and *Top.*

Arist., *APo.* 1.2.71b19–23: εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἔθεμεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσονται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου.

Since having scientific knowledge is such as we have assumed, demonstrative knowledge must also proceed from premisses which are true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to and causative of the conclusion. On these conditions only will the principles be proper to the fact which is to be proved. (trans. Tredennick, modified)

Text b) mentions four requirements to the premisses of a demonstration; they must be *vera*, *familiaria subiecto*, *prima* and *per se nota*. Three of these are mentioned in the Aristotelian text, and the fourth, that they be *familiaria subiecto*, which is an interpretation of the last sentence in the Aristotelian passage, is mentioned by Philoponus. Hence, b) probably relies on a Greek scholium on either this passage of the *Posterior Analytics* or on the one in the *Prior Analytics* quoted in c). The combination of *vera* and *familiaria subiecto* also occurs in *De sancto* (but not in the passage on which *Compendiosa expositio* 3.10 is a comment):

De sancto 1.3, 18: Et alii quamplures tamquam ex ueris et subiecto familiaribus idem colligunt minime probabiliter.

And several others (in the Greek camp) argue in a totally unconvincing way for the same conclusion pretending to be using premisses that are both true and proper to the subject.

The use of *familiaris* rather than *proprius* for *οἰκεῖος* is remarkable. Among the known Aristotelian translators from the 12th century it seems that only the anonymous translator of the *Prior Analytics* and the *Topics* uses it.¹

¹ See the Greek-Latin indices in AL 3 and 5.

(c) demonstratorem [...] non interrogare, sed assumere

The edition refers to *APr.* 1.1.24a22-25. The reference can be narrowed down to:

Arist., *APr.* 1.1.24a24: οὐ γὰρ ἐρωτᾷ ἀλλὰ λαμβάνει ὁ ἀποδεικνύων

Someone who is demonstrating does not ask, he assumes

The text in *Compendiosa expositio* agrees with that of the *recensio Carnotensis* of Boethius' translation:

rec. Flor. non enim interrogat sed sumit qui demonstrat.

rec. Carn. non enim interrogat sed assumit qui demonstrat.

Unfortunately, the relevant part of the *Translatio anonyma* has not been preserved, the extant text starting at 1.2.25a20. In the preserved part the *anonyma* mostly uses *accipere* for *λαμβάνειν*, but also sometimes *sumere* or *assumere*, without following either of the Boethian versions in the distribution of the latter two,¹ so it is anyone's guess what it may have read at 1.1.24a24.

2) *De sancto* 1.4, 18: Non enim est ex ueris falsum syllogizare

The edition does not mark this as a quotation. Hugh's text does, however, reproduce

Arist., *APr.* 2.2.53b7–8: ἐξ ἀληθῶν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος συλλογίσασθαι

¹ See the index in AL 3:457.

Now, from true premisses it is not possible to deduce a falsehood

Trl. Boethii, rec. Carn. & Flor.: Ex veris ergo non est falsum syllogizare

2.2.2 *Analytica Posteriora (APo.)*

1) *De sancto* 1.4, 19: non enim ex alio genere ad aliud est transire quae demonstrantur

The edition refers to *APo.* 1.6.75a38. The correct reference is:

Arist., *APo.* 1.7.75a38: Οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους μεταβάντα δεῖξαι

Hence, it is not possible to prove something by passing from one genus to another (trans. Tredennick, modified)

Trl. Iacobi: Non ergo est ex alio genere descendentem demonstrare

Trl. Ioannis: Non ergo est ex alio genere transeuntem monstrare

Hugh's choice of *transire* shows that he is using *trl. Ioannis*, not the much more widely diffused one by James of Venice.

2) *De sancto* 1.4, 19: At uero infinitatem huiusmodi Aristoteles in Analyticis ad finitum reducit dicendo sic: "Ex quibus quidem demonstratio, conveniens est eadem esse; quorum autem genus diuersum, quemadmodum arithmeticae ac geometriae, non est arithmetica demonstrationem coaptare in iis quae magnitudinibus accidunt nisi magnitudines numeri sint."

The edition correctly identifies the Aristotelian passage as:

Arist., *APo.* 1.7.75b2–6: ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἐνδέχεται τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι· ὧν δὲ τὸ γένος ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἀριθμητικῆς καὶ γεωμετρίας, οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐφαρμόσαι ἐπὶ τὰ τοῖς μεγέθεσι συμβεβηκότα, εἰ μὴ τὰ μεγέθη ἀριθμοὶ εἴσι·

The basis of the demonstration may be the same, but in the case of disciplines that belong to different genera, like arithmetic and geometry, it is not possible to apply an arithmetic demonstration to the properties of magnitudes unless those magnitudes are numbers.

Trl. Iacobi: Ex quibus quidem igitur demonstratio fit contingit eadem esse; quorum autem genus alterum est, sicut arithmetice et geometrie, non est arithmetica demonstrationem convenire in magnitudinibus accidentia, nisi magnitudines numeri sint;

Trl. Ioannis: Ex quibus igitur est demonstratio contingit eadem esse, quorum autem genus alterum, sicut arithmetice et geometrie, non est arithmetica demonstrationem aptare ad magnitudinibus accidentia nisi magnitudines numeri sint;

The use of *coaptare* to render *ἐφαρμόσαι* shows that the translation used by Hugh was *trl. Ioannis*.

3) *De sancto* 1.4, 19, continuation of 2): “Nam eiusdem generis necesse extrema et media esse ... ideo ex geometria non est ostendere, quoniam contrariorum una disciplina”

The edition gives the *locus* as 1.7.75b10–12. The correct identification is:

Arist., *APo.* 1.7.75b10–13: ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀνάγκη τὰ ἄκρα καὶ τὰ μέσα εἶναι. [...] διὰ τοῦτο τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ οὐκ ἔστι δεῖξαι ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη

Because the extreme terms and the middle ones must belong to the same genus [...] hence one cannot prove by means of geometry that opposites fall under one branch of scientific knowledge

Trl. Iacobi: ex eodem enim genere necesse est ultima et media esse. [...] Propter hoc geometrie non est monstrare quod contrariorum eadem sit scientia

Trl. Ioannis: etenim ex eodem genere necesse est extrema et media esse. [...] Propter hoc geometrie non est monstrare quod contrariorum una disciplina

The readings *extrema* and *disciplina* identify the translation used as John's.

4) *De sancto* 1.4, 19, continuation of 3): “Quare manifestum– inquit– quoniam non est demonstrare unumquodque simpliciter, sed ex uniuscuiusque principiis”

The edition refers to:

Arist., *Apo.* 1.9.75b37–38: Ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ὅτι ἕκαστον ἀποδείξαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστου ἀρχῶν

Since it is obvious that in each case one cannot provide a demonstration except on the basis of the principles relevant to each case

which in the two translations runs as follows:

Trl. Iacobi: Quoniam autem manifestum est quod unumquodque demonstrare non est sed aut ex unoquoque principiorum

Trl. Ioannis: Quoniam autem manifestum quod unumquodque demonstrare non est nisi ex uniuscuiusque principiis

But there is an even closer match which includes the word *simpliciter*:

Arist., *APo.* 1.9.76a13–15: ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδείξαι ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστου ἀρχῶν.

Thus, these facts too make it clear that one cannot in each case provide an unqualified demonstration except on the basis of the principles relevant to each case.

Trl. Iacobi: Quare ex his manifestum est quod non sit demonstrare unumquodque simpliciter, sed secundum quod ex uniuscuiusque principiis est.

Trl. Ioannis: Quare ex istis manifestum quod non est demonstrare unumquodque simpliciter nisi ex uniuscuiusque principiis.

Hugh’s *sed ex uniuscuiusque principiis* is closer to John’s *nisi ex uniuscuiusque principiis* than to James’ *sed secundum quod ex uniuscuiusque principiis est*.

5) *De sancto* 1.4, 19, continuation of 4): “Dico autem principia in unoquoque genere ea quae quoniam sunt non conuenit demonstrare.”

The edition correctly refers to:

Arist., *APo.* 1.10.76a31–32: Λέγω δ’ ἀρχὰς ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει ταύτας ἃς ὅτι ἔστι μὴ ἐνδέχεται δεῖξαι.

I call principles in each genus those about which it is not possible to prove that they exist.

Trl. Iacobi: Dico autem principia in unoquoque genere illa, quae cum sint non contingit demonstrare.

Trl. Ioannis: Dico autem principia in unoquoque genere ista que quod sint non contingit monstrare.

The differences between the two translations are minimal (*illa que cum sint/ista que quod sint*), but Hugh's *ea quae quoniam sunt* matches John's best, *quod* and *quoniam* both meaning "that."

6) *De sancto* 1.4, 19, continuation of 5): Alexander uero super idem capitulum dicit: "Non communiter amplius sumit, sed adicit, si de numeris dicit, numeros (inquit enim: 'si de aequalibus numeris aequales auferantur': generis enim adiectione quod commune est proprium facit), quod si de magnitudinibus magnitudines et in aliis simpliciter." Maxima enim propositio est quae dicit: "In demonstrationibus ex eodem genere necesse est omnes terminos esse": non enim ex alio genere ad aliud est transire quae demonstrantur.

The editor has included the final part, *Maxima-demonstrantur*, in the quotation marks, indicating that he thinks it is part of the quote from Alexander. This is hardly right. But even relieved of that final part, the passage is a bit difficult because it is not well connected to the preceding text. The editor seems to have been in doubt about how to interpret it, suggesting in the apparatus that perhaps *si de numeris dicit* should be emended into *si de numeris demit*. However, this conjecture must be rejected, for—as the editor himself signals—what "Alexander" said must have been similar to:

Themistius, *APo.*, CAG 5.1:18.29–19.2: πῶς οὖν λέγομεν εἶναι κοινά τινα ἀξιώματα, οἷον ἂν ἀπὸ ἴσων ἴσα, καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν; ἢ οὐδὲ τούτοις ὡς κοινοῖς χρῶνται, ἀλλ' ἐκάστη προσοικειοῦται αὐτὰ τῇ τῆς ὕλης οἰκείᾳ προσθήκῃ, γεωμετρία μὲν ἂν ἀπὸ ἴσων μεγεθῶν, ἀριθμητικὴ δὲ ἂν ἀπὸ ἀριθμῶν.

How, then, do we say that certain axioms are common, e.g., “if equals <are subtracted> from equals” and “about everything either the affirmation of the negation”? In fact, <the various branches of knowledge> do not use these as common ones, but each one makes them proper to itself by adding the appropriate matter, geometry <saying> “if from equal magnitudes” and arithmetic “if from numbers.”

This means that “Alexander’s” point must have been that in a demonstration one does not use such axioms as “If equals are subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal” in their general form but in a variant that narrows them down to the relevant branch of knowledge only. Consequently, the Latin must be interpreted as follows:

He no longer takes <the axiom> in a general way, but if he is speaking about numbers he adds “numbers” and says “if from equal numbers equals are subtracted,” for by adding the genus he transforms the common into something proper <to a particular branch of science>, and if <he is speaking about> magnitudes <he adds> “magnitudes,” and so on.

The “he” who no longer takes the axiom in a general way must be the person who produces a demonstrative syllogism. The “genus” is a term like “numbers” that shows which sort of equals he is talking about, and thus which branch (*genus*) of knowledge the demonstration belongs in.

Themistius’ remark occurs in his paraphrase of *APo.* 1.7, and Alexander’s comment presumably occurred in the same context. Hugh’s *in eodem capitulo* might suggest a location near the beginning of 1.10, but his *capitulum* is probably the whole discussion in chapters 7–10 of more and less general axioms.

There is a similar passage in Philoponus’ commentary on *APo.* 1.7:

Ioannes Philoponus, *APo.*, CAG 13.3:98–99: καὶ νῦν μὲν οὕτως ὁλοσχερέστερόν φησιν, ὅτι δυνατόν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀξιώμασιν ἐπὶ διαφόρων ἐπιστημῶν χρήσασθαι· προῖόν μέντοι διαρθρώσει τὸν λόγον καὶ δείξει ὅτι οὐδὲ ἀξιώμασι τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρήσονται αἱ διαφοροὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. λέγων γὰρ ὁ γεωμέτρης, ὅτι τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις

ἐστὶν ἴσα, οὐχ ἀπλῶς πᾶν ἴσον παραλήψεται ἀλλὰ τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ μεγέθει ἴσα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς τοὺς [ἐν] τῷ αὐτῷ ἀριθμῷ ἴσους ἀριθμοὺς καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἴσους ἐρεῖ.

And now he says broadly that it is possible to use the same axioms in several branches of knowledge, but later on he will refine his argument and show that the several branches of knowledge will not use the same axioms. For when the geometer says that those that are equal to the same are equal to each other, he will not include just anything that is equal but <only> such things as are equal to the same magnitude, and similarly the arithmetician will say that those numbers that are equal to the same number are also equal to each other.

However, whereas Philoponus' example of a too general axiom is "Those that are equal to the same are equal to each other," Hugh's Alexander agrees with Themistius in using "If equals are subtracted from equals, the remainders will be equal." Hence Hugh's "Alexander" is not very likely to be a reference to the commentary that James of Venice translated into Latin and that Westerners generally attributed to Alexander, for fragments of that work reveal it to have been identical with or very similar to Philoponus'.¹ Hugh's Alexander may, indeed, be the real Alexander of Aphrodisias, as suggested in Podolak's apparatus. If so, is just remotely possible that Hugh's source was James of Venice's own commentary on *APo.*, about which very little is known,² but which may have included information of Greek origin that did not come from Philoponus. Much more likely, however, Hugh had his information from a Greek source—a scholium in a Greek manuscript of the *Posterior Analytics* seems a good guess; a complete copy of Alexander's commentary on *APo.* was probably

¹ See Sten Ebbesen, "Fragments of 'Alexander's' Commentaries on *Analytica Posteriora* and *Sophistici Elenchi*," in Sten Ebbesen, *Greek-Latin Philosophical Interaction: Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen. Volume 1* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 187–98.

² See Sten Ebbesen, "Jacobus Veneticus on the *Posterior Analytics* and some early 13th century Oxford Masters on the *Elenchi*," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec Et Latin* 21 (1977): 1–9.

no longer available in 12th-century Byzantium.¹ Anyway, the similarity to Themistius' paraphrase makes it highly probable that Hugh has, in fact, saved a fragment of the lost work.

2.2.3 *Topica* (Top.)

1) *De sancto* I.11, 35: Quaerendum est quomodo dicatur unum: nam unum multipliciter dicitur apud diuinam Scripturam, similiter et apud philosophos, ueluti genere, specie, numero; [...] unum quoque numero multipliciter dicitur: aut enim ut continuum, ut unum dixerim corpus totius continuitate, quod quidem plura est in partibus, unum toto; aut quod natura diuidi non potest, ut punctum et unitas; aut quae rationem habent eandem nominibus differentia ut tunica et uestis.

The edition refers, *exempli gratia*, to Arist., *Metaph.* 3.2.1005a7 and 4.10.1018a35–36. The former passage contains the phrase *πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἓν* “one is said in many ways”, but nothing about being one in species, genus or number. The latter says that *τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται* “being is said in many ways” and in the following lines Aristotle talks about items that are different in species, but does not mention difference in genus or number. The appearance of *tunica/vestis* as an example of numerical onness might make one think of *Metaph.* 4.4.1006b25–27: “τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ εἶναι ἓν, τὸ ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, εἰ ὁ λόγος εἷς” “for this is what being one is: to have one definition like ‘cloak’ and ‘mantle’,” and the appearance of a continuous entity as one type of what is numerically one might suggest influence from *Metaph.* 10.1.1052a34–36 “λέγεται μὲν οὖν τὸ ἓν τοσαυταχῶς, τό τε συνεχὲς φύσει καὶ τὸ ὅλον,

¹ Paul Moraux in *Le commentaire d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise aux “Seconds Analytiques” d’Aristote* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1979) argued that Alexander’s commentary had survived in its entirety until the early 12th century, but the evidence only suffices to show that at least extracts were available. See Sten Ebbesen, “[Review of] F. de Haas, M. Leunissen and M. Martijn, eds., ‘Interpreting Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* in Late Antiquity and Beyond’,” *Aestimatio* 9 (2012): 355–66, at 361–63.

καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ καθόλου,” “now, one is said in so many ways: both what is by nature continuous, what is a whole, what is a singular and what is a universal” but there can be little doubt that the passage Hugh was (mainly) thinking of was the following from the *Topics*:

Arist., *Top.* 1.7.103a6–14: Πρῶτον δὲ πάντων περὶ ταυτοῦ διοριστέον ποσαχῶς λέγεται. δόξειε δ’ ἂν τὸ ταυτὸν ὡς τύπῳ λαβεῖν τριχῇ διαιρεῖσθαι. ἢ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἢ εἶδει ἢ γένει τὸ ταυτὸν εἰώθαμεν προσαγορεύειν· ἀριθμῷ μὲν ὧν ὀνόματα πλείω τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἓν, οἷον λῶπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον· εἶδει δὲ ὅσα πλείω ὄντα ἀδιάφορα κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἐστὶ, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα τῷ εἶδει λέγεται ταῦτα ὅσα ὑπὸ ταυτὸ εἶδος ἐστὶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ γένει ταῦτα ὅσα ὑπὸ ταυτὸ γένος ἐστίν, οἷον ἵππος ἀνθρώπῳ. [...] 103a23–31: μάλιστα δ’ ὁμολογουμένως τὸ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ταυτὸν παρὰ πᾶσι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. εἴωθε δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδίδοσθαι πλεοναχῶς· κυριώτατα μὲν καὶ πρώτως ὅταν ὀνόματι ἢ ὄρῳ τὸ ταυτὸν ἀποδοθῇ, καθάπερ ἱμάτιον λωπίῳ καὶ ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν ἀνθρώπῳ· δεύτερον δ’ ὅταν τῷ ἰδίῳ, καθάπερ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ τῇ φύσει ἄνω φερόμενον πυρί· τρίτον δ’ ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, οἷον τὸ κατήμενον ἢ τὸ μουσικὸν Σωκράτει·

First of all we must determine in how many ways “the same” is said. Broadly speaking, “the same” would seem to come in three variants, for customarily we either call things the same numerically, specifically, or generically. Numerically, when there are several names but one thing, like “cloak” and “mantle.” Specifically, when there are several things that do not differ in respect of their species; thus one man <is specifically the same> as another man and one horse as another horse – for such things are said to be specifically the same as fall under the same species. Similarly, those things are generically the same that fall under the same genus; thus a horse <is generically the same> as a man. [...] But in particular everybody seems to agree that “the same” is said about what is numerically one, yet this too is commonly applied in three ways. Most properly and primarily “the same” is applied to a name or a definition, like “a cloak <is the same> as a mantle” and “a pedestrian two-footed animal <is the same> as a man.” Secondarily it is applied to

a distinctive property, like “what is receptive to knowledge <is the same> as a man” and “what is naturally carried upwards <is the same> as fire.” Thirdly, when one starts from an accidental property, like “that which is sitting (or: is musical) <is the same> as Socrates.”

Trl. Boethii: Primum autem omnium de eodem determinandum quotiens dicatur. Videbitur autem idem, ut figuraliter sit sumere, tripliciter dividi. Aut enim numero aut specie aut genere idem solemus appellare, numero quidem quorum nomina plura res autem una, ut tunica et vestis; specie autem quae cum sint plura indifferentia secundum speciem sunt, ut homo homini et equus equo; nam huiusmodi specie dicuntur eadem, quaecumque sub eadem specie sunt. Similiter autem et genere eadem quaecumque sub eodem sunt genere, ut equus homini. [...] Maxime autem indubitanter quod unum est numero idem ab omnibus videtur dici. Solet autem et hoc assignari multipliciter; proprie autem et primum quando nomine vel diffinitione idem assignatum fuerit, ut vestis tunicae et animal gressibile bipes homini; secundo autem quando proprio, ut disciplinae susceptibilis homini et quod natura sursum fertur igni; tertium vero quando ab accidente, ut sedens vel musicum Socrati.

Trl. anonyma: Primum autem omnium de eodem determinandum quotiens dicitur. Videbitur autem ut figuraliter accipiatur tripliciter dividi. Aut enim numero aut specie aut genere idem consuevimus appellare, numero quidem quorum nomina plura res vero una, ut vestis indumentum; specie autem quaecumque plura existentia indifferentia secundum speciem sunt, quemadmodum homo ab homine et equus ab equo; huiusmodi enim specie dicuntur eadem, quaecumque sub eadem specie. Similiter autem et genere eadem dicuntur quaecumque sub eodem genere sunt, velut equus cum homine. [...] Maxime vero fatemur quod una numero eadem ab omnibus videtur dici. Consuetudo vero fuit et hoc assignari multipliciter, proprie quidem et principaliter quando nomine vel termino idem assignatum est, quemadmodum vestimentum indumento et animal gressibile bipes homini; secundo vero quando proprio, quemadmodum discipline susceptibile homini et quod natura sursum fertur igni; tertio vero quando ab accidenti, velut sedentem aut musicum Socrati.

Hugh's substitution of *unum* for *idem* is immaterial and is even prepared in the Aristotelian text when it is said that *unum numero* is what is most commonly taken to be *idem*. The passage from the *Topics* neatly presents the three types of identity/unity and it contains the *tunica/vestis* example. Hugh's use of the words *tunica* and *vestis* is in agreement with Boethius' translation; the anonymous one has *vestimentum* and *indumentum*.

2) *De sancto* 3.12, 205: huius propositionis fides ab Aristotelica inuestigatione trahitur dicente: “Si quod secundum contradictionem alicui opponitur, non dicitur multipliciter nec oppositum, ut non uidere uidere opponitur; dicitur autem non uidere multipliciter—uno quidem modo non habere uisum, alio uero non uti uisu—; quare necessarium et uidere multipliciter dici. Vtrique enim eorum quod non uidet opponitur quid, ut ei quod non habet uisum habere, ei uero quod non utitur uisu uti.”

The edition correctly¹ refers to:

Arist., *Top.* 1.15.106b13–20: Πάλιν ἐπὶ τοῦ κατ' ἀντίφασιν ἀντικειμένου σκοπεῖν εἰ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ τοῦτ' ἀντικείμενον πλεοναχῶς ῥηθήσεται. οἷον τὸ μὴ βλέπειν πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, ἐν μὲν τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, ἐν δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ ὄψει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο πλεοναχῶς, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ βλέπειν πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι· ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ τῷ μὴ βλέπειν ἀντικείσεται τι, οἷον τῷ μὲν μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν τὸ ἔχειν, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ ὄψει τὸ ἐνεργεῖν.

Again, in the case of the contradictory opposite, look and see if it is said in several ways. For if this is said in several ways, then its opposite will also be said in several ways. E.g., “not to be seeing” is said in several ways: one is not to possess sight, another not to be active with one's sight. Since this is said in several ways, “to be seeing” must also be said

¹ An additional reference to *Cat.* 13a26–b35 is, however, really irrelevant.

in several ways, because each of the two “not to be seeing” will have an opposite: “not to possess sight” will have the opposite “to possess sight” and “not to be active with one’s sight” will have the opposite “be active with one’s sight.”

Trl Boethii: Rursum in eo quod secundum contradictionem opponitur considerandum si multipliciter dicitur. Nam si hoc multipliciter dicitur, et quod huic contradictorie opponitur multipliciter dicetur, ut non videre multipliciter dicitur, unum quidem non habere visum, alterum autem non uti visu. Si autem hoc multipliciter, necessarium et videre multipliciter dici; utrique enim non videre opponitur quid, ut ei quidem quod est non habere visum habere, illi autem quod est non uti visu uti.

Trl. anonyma: Rursus in secundum contradictionem opposito considerare si multipliciter dicitur. Si enim hoc multipliciter dicitur, et huic contraiacens multipliciter dicitur, velut non videre multipliciter dicitur, unum quidem non habere visum, unum vero non operari visu. Si vero hoc multipliciter, necessarium et videre multipliciter dici; utrique enim non videre contraiacet aliquid, velut non habere quidem visum habere, operari vero visu operari.

At the underlined words Hugh’s text agrees with Boethius’ translation against the anonymous one.

3) *De sancto* 3.12, 206: Aequivoca non sunt comparabilia, ut “alba uox,” “alba tunica,” “acutus humor,” et “acuta uox.” Haec enim non similiter “alba” uel “acuta” neque magis alterum.

The edition correctly refers to:

Top. 1.15.107b13–16: Ἐτι εἰ μὴ συμβλητὰ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ ὁμοίως, οἷον λευκὴ φωνὴ καὶ λευκὸν ἱμάτιον, καὶ ὁξὺς χυμὸς καὶ ὁξεῖα φωνή· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐθ’ ὁμοίως λέγεται λευκὰ ἢ ὁξεῖα, οὔτε μᾶλλον θάτερον. ὥσθ’ ὁμώνυμον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ὁξύ.

Moreover, if the items cannot be compared as more or less or equally, as is the case with a white sound and a white mantle, or a sharp flavour and a sharp sound. For about these one does not say that they are equally white or sharp or that one is more so than the other. Hence “white” and “sharp” are equivocals.

Trl. Boethii: Amplius si non comparabilia sint secundum magis vel similiter, ut alba vox et alba vestis et acutus humor et acuta vox; haec enim neque similiter dicuntur alba vel acuta, neque magis alterum. Quare aequivocum album vel acutum.

Trl. anonyma: Amplius si non comparata secundum maius aut similiter, velut alba vox et alba vestis et acutus humor et acuta vox; hec enim neque similiter dicuntur alba vel acuta, neque magis alterum. Quare equivocum album et acutum.

Hugh quotes most of the passage *verbatim*. He follows Boethius in having *comparabilia* where the anonymous translator has *comparata*.

4) *De sancto* 3.21, 257: Et attendendum quod “proprium” duobus modis dicitur, per se ac secundum aliud, ut philosophus perhibet: per se hominis est proprium animal mansuetum natura, quod aliorum separatium est omnium, ad aliud uero proprium est, ut bipes equi respectu proprium est hominis et imperare corporis respectu animae proprium, sicut seruire corporis proprium ad animal relati.

The edition gives the reference as *Top.* 5.128b14–21, but more precisely the passage referred to is:

Arist., *Top.* 5.1 128b16–25: Ἀποδίδεται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἢ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ αἰεί, ἢ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ποτέ, οἷον καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῆλον ἢ μερον φύσει, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ οἷον ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν προστακτικὸν τὸ δ’ ὑπηρετικόν ἐστίν, αἰεὶ δὲ οἷον θεοῦ τὸ ζῆλον ἀθάνατον, ποτέ δ’ οἷον

τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦ πρὸς ἕτερον ἰδίου ἀποδιδομένου ἢ δύο προβλήματα ἢ τέτταρα. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀποδῶ τοῦ δ' ἀρνήσῃται ταῦτ' οὗτο, δύο μόνον προβλήματα γίνονται, καθάπερ τὸ ἀνθρώπου πρὸς ἵππον ἴδιον ὅτι δίπουν ἐστίν.

Any distinctive property is either assigned in itself and always or in relation to something else and sometimes. E.g., *in itself* of man “a naturally civilised animal,” *in relation to something else* of the soul in relation to the body “that one is in command and the other subservient,” *always* of god “immortal living being,” *sometimes* of some particular man “that he is walking in the sports centre.” From the distinctive property that is assigned in relation to something else two or four problems arise, because if someone assigns it to one thing and denies the very same of another, only two problems arise, e.g., <if he says> that the distinctive property of man in relation to horse is to be a biped.

Trl. Boethii: Assignatur autem proprium aut per se et semper aut ad aliud et quandoque, ut per se quidem hominis animal mansuetum natura, ad aliud autem ut animae ad corpus, quoniam hoc quidem imperativum illud autem ministrativum est, semper autem ut dei animal immortale; quandoque autem ut alicuius hominis ambulare in theatro. Est autem proprium quod ad alterum assignatum est aut duo problemata aut quatuor. Nam si de hoc quidem assignatum fuerit de illo vero negatum idem ipsum, duo tantum problemata fiunt, velut hominis ad equum proprium quoniam bipes est.

Trl. anonyma Assignatur autem proprium aut secundum se et semper aut ad alterum et aliquando, velut secundum se quidem hominis animal mansuetum natura, ad alterum vero ut anime ad corpus, quod hoc quidem imperans hoc vero serviens est, semper autem ut dei animal immortale; aliquando vero velut alicuius hominis ambulare in teatro. Est autem ad alterum proprium assignatum aut due questiones aut quatuor. Si enim de hoc quidem assignet de hoc vero neget hoc ipsum, due tantum questiones fiunt, quemadmodum hominis ad equum proprium quod bipes est.

Hugh paraphrases the text, so it is difficult to see which translation he follows; his *secundum aliud* matches Boethius' twice repeated *ad aliud* better than the anonymous's consistent use of *ad alterum* for *πρὸς ἕτερον*, but his *servire* is closer to *serviens* in the anonymous translation than to Boethius' *ministrativum*, and this is the most significant agreement—anyone could change *ad alterum* to *ad aliud*, but Hugh would hardly have used *servire* if his source had *ministrativum*. He is not likely to have possessed copies of both translations, yet it is a little hard to believe that he did not have Boethius', as this was the *textus receptus* and seems to have been his basis in quotes 1) and 2). A probable solution to the problem is that his *Topics* was Boethius' with some variants from the anonymous translation, whether adopted in the main text or added between the lines or in the margins.¹

2.2.4 *Sophistici Elenchi* (SE)

1) *De sancto* 2.12, 122: Hoc quidem et alia plura uir hic complicat ut uideatur arguens, maxime enim, ut Aristoteles dicit, uolunt uideri arguentes.

The edition wrongly refers the reader to *EN* 7.2.1146a20–25 and *SE* 14.171b30–35. The correct reference is:

Arist., *SE* 3.165b18 μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ προαιροῦνται φαίνεσθαι ἐλέγχοντες.

Because first and foremost they intend to appear to refute

Trl. Boethii: 165b18: Nam maxime uolunt uideri redarguentes.

The quotation agrees with Boethius' translation except that, strangely, it has *arguentes* for *redarguentes*. Theoretically, Hugh's Latin text might

¹ For Boethian mss with such variants, see AL 5: xliii.

have been taken from James of Venice's lost translation, which was probably a revised version of Boethius' rather than a completely new work, but there is no strong reason to assume this.

2) *De sancto* 1.17, 61: Quae fallacia, si de iis quae apud nos sunt exemplum sumatur, apertissima est hoc modo: si pater, in eo quod desipit, filium demonstrat insipientem, nulla certe uidetur necessitas fatui filii generationem inferre ne fiat paternae detrimentum fatuitatis; puto in figura dictionis huiusmodi peccatum obuolui eo quod non idem eadem exponatur interpretatione.

Podolak compares this passage to passages in the *Summa Sophisticorum Elencorum* and *Tractatus de dissimilitudine argumentorum*, both of them works by pupils of Alberic of Paris, it seems.¹ One might add also *Glose Sophisticorum Elencorum*, whose author was perhaps not a pupil of Alberic's, but certainly was aware of and to some degree influenced by Alberic's exegesis of the *Elenchi*.² With one voice the authors say:

Summa SE, LM 1:328 = *Tr. de dis. arg.*, LM 1:477: fiunt autem paralogismi secundum figuram dictionis, ut ait Aristoteles in Elencis, quando non-idem ut idem interpretamur.

Glose SE, LM 1:212: Fiunt sophismata secundum figuram dictionis quando non idem ut idem interpretamur.

which is similar to the underlined part of Hugh's text. However, Hugh's explanation of what is wrong in the fallacy of *figura dictionis* is no closer to those texts than to their source:

¹ Podolak, "Il *De sancto*," 263.

² All three texts were published by L.M. de Rijk in the first volume of his *Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic*, 2 vols (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962–1967) (henceforth: LM).

Arist., *SE* 4.166b10–11: Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως συμβαίνουσιν ὅταν τὸ μὴ ταὐτὸ ὡσαύτως ἐρμηνεύηται.

Trl. Boethii: Quae autem sunt secundum figuram dictionis accidunt quando non idem similiter interpretatur.

3.1) *De sancto* 1.9, 32: ignorantia certe elenchi hic est, cum non ex iis quae data sunt ex syllogistica necessitate ἐπιχείρησις (id est argumentatio) conficiatur.

3.2) *De sancto* 3.5, 189: Quicunque uero huic repugnat dogmati metuere uidetur quod ab haeresiarchis profanarumque nouitatum inuentoribus commentum est hoc modo argumenta concinnantibus, imo elenchorum ignorantias.

3.2 just shows that Hugh knew there was such a thing as *ignorantia elenchi*, but 3.1 is more interesting. Aristotle first mentions the fallacy of *ignorantia elenchi* (ἐλέγχου ἄγνοια) at *SE* 4.166b24 in a list of fallacies *extra dictionem*. In the next chapter a description follows, which does not, however, use the expression *ignorantia elenchi*:

Arist., *SE* 5.167a21–25, *trl. Boethii*: Qui autem secundum quod non determinatur quid est syllogismus aut quid elenchus, secundum diminutionem fiunt rationis; nam elenchus est contradictio eiusdem et unius, non nominis sed rei et nominis non sinonimi sed eiusdem, ex his quae data sunt ex necessitate, non connumerato quod erat in principio, secundum idem et ad idem et similiter et in eodem tempore.

Finally, at *SE* 6.168a17–23 Aristotle says:

Trl. Boethii: Aut ergo sic dividendum apparentes syllogismos et elenchos, aut omnes reducendum in elenchi ignorantiam his qui hanc principium faciunt; est enim omnes resolvere dictos modos in elenchi

diffinitionem. Primum quidem si immodificati; oportet enim ex his quae posita sunt accidere conclusionem, ut dicatur ex necessitate sed non videatur.

3.1 thus shows that Hugh was familiar with the doctrine of *ignorantia elenchi* presented in the *Sophistici Elenchi*. His *ex his quae data sunt ex syllogistica necessitate* directly quotes *SE* 167a25 as translated by Boethius, but with the precision that the necessity involved is syllogistic necessity, as could be deduced from *SE* 168a21–23. There is no reason to assume an intermediary source between the *Sophistici elenchi* and Aristotelian text and *De sancto*.

Podolak. compares 3.1 and 3.2 with passages in the Alberician works *Glose in Aristotilis Sophisticos Elencos* and *Summa Sophisticorum Elencorum* as well as the so-called *Fallacie Parvipontane*, but there are no specific similarities between those texts and Hugh's.¹

2.3 Natural philosophy

2.3.1 Physics (Ph.)

Most of the places listed in the index to the edition are not really informative about Hugh's acquaintance with the *Physics*. Thus in *De sancto* 1.13 he lists the four Aristotelian causes, attributing the fourfold division to *primi philosophi*. As the editors correctly note, the division may be found in *Metaph.* 4.3, *Metaph.* 5.2 and *Ph.* 2.3, but there is no sign that Hugh had any particular passage in mind.

Two passages in *De sancto* deserve our attention:

1) *De sancto* 3.18, 239: Quod iterum per definitionem temporis ab Aristotele in Physicis assignatam demonstratur: ait ergo tempus esse numerum motus secundum prius et posterius non huius uel illius motus, sed primi in eo quod motus

¹ Podolak, "Il *De sancto*," 261f.

The edition refers to *Ph.* 4.11.219b1–3 and 5.3.227b20–228a19. The latter is not really relevant, but the former is:

Arist., *Ph.* 4.11.219b1–2 τοῦτο γάρ ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

For this is what time is: the number of movement with respect to earlier and later

Trl. vetus (Iacobi): hoc enim est tempus: numerus motus secundum prius et posterius.

Aristotle repeats his definition of time a little later:

Arist., *Ph.* 4.11.220a24–26: ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, καὶ συνεχῆς (συνεχοῦς γάρ), φανερόν.

That time, then, is the number of movement with respect to earlier and later and is continuous, since it is <the number> of something continuous, is evident.

Trl. vetus (Iacobi): Quod quidem igitur tempus numerus motus secundum prius et posterius sit et continuum (continui namque), manifestum est.

Hugh's formulation agrees with James' translation, but this may not be significant. If Hugh had access to the Greek text, he could easily have produced a translation that just happened to coincide with James'.

2) *De sancto* 1.4, 20: non sunt duo semen et fructus nisi ratione, quemadmodum ascensio et descensio, uia scilicet Thebis Athenas et Athenis Thebas: unum est enim in his uiae spatium deorsum sursum et

sursum deorsum, at uero diuersa ratio; equidem hinc incipienti ascensio, hinc uero descensio est.

The editors refer the reader to *Ph.* 3.3.202b13–16, which should be narrowed down to:

Arist., *Ph.* 3.3.202b13–14: ὥς ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ Θήβηθεν Ἀθήναζε καὶ ἡ Ἀθήνηθεν εἰς Θήβας.

like the road from Thebes to Athens and the one from Athens to Thebes

Trl. vetus (Iacobi): sicut via a Thebis Athenas et ab Athenis Thebas.

Hugh's *Thebis Athenas et Athenis Thebas* is passably close to James' translation, but one notices the absence of the twice repeated preposition *a(b)*.¹ In fact, the five-word quote of Aristotle is part of a longer quote from another text, everything from *ratione* til the end, being a direct translation of a passage in Philoponus' commentary on the *Physics*. Here is the the passage in its original context:

Ioannes Philoponus, in *Ph.*, CAG 13:373: οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἡ δίδαξις, ἢ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ διδασκάλου μαθάνειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μάθησις. ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑποκειμένῳ τὰ αὐτά, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐ τὰ αὐτά, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνάβασις καὶ ἡ κατάβασις, καὶ ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ Θήβηθεν Ἀθήναζε καὶ ἡ Ἀθήνηθεν Θήβαζε. μία γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἡ διάστασις, ἡ κάτωθεν ἄνω καὶ ἡ ἄνωθεν κάτω, ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ἕτερος· ἐνθεν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχομένῳ ἀνάβασις, ἐνθεν δὲ κατάβασις. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιούντος καὶ πάσχοντος μία μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τοῦδε ἀρχομένων ποίησις λέγεται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦδε πάθησις, καὶ ἐκ τοῦδε μὲν μάθησις, ἐκ τοῦδε δὲ δίδαξις.

For teaching is just that someone learns from his teacher, and similarly with learning. They have the same subject but different definitions, like

¹ The apparatus in AL 7.1:107 moreover shows that several mss have *ad Athenas* and *ad Thebas* instead of the simple *Athenas* and *Thebas*.

an ascent and a descent or the road from Thebes to Athens and the one from Athens to Thebes. For the distance is the same one in the two cases, from below to above and from above to below. In the same way, then, in the case of an agent and a patient, there is one activity shared by the two, but when one starts from the former it is called “action,” when from the latter “passion,” and when from the former “learning,” when from the latter “teaching.”

Either, then, Hugh had access to a copy of Philoponus’ *Physics* commentary or he had access to a Greek manuscript of the *Physics* that contained scholia extracted from Philoponus’ work. While I cannot exclude the possibility that he may have known James’ translation, I think probability favours the view that Hugh read the *Physics* in Greek.

2.3.2 *De caelo* (*Cael.*)

1) *De sancto* 2.1, 76: Nam sic genita necessario anteit tempus, cum sub aliquo tempore sortita sint existentiam, ut Aristoteles dicit, qui sane ingenitum secundum hoc dicit mundum, quod ipsum non praecesserit tempus; genitum uero rursus, ut quod suam existentiam a diuina causa susceperit, sicut idem in libro *De caelo* ait: “Caelum quidem mouet quod non mouetur, neque fit melius illo existens”.

The reference to *De caelo* is explicit, but the quote does not really match the place indicated in the edition (1.9.279a30–35). I have not been able to identify a suitable passage in *De caelo*.

The following three quotations are close enough to the Greek text to allow for an analysis. There are three medieval Latin translations of *De caelo*:

- An Arabo-Latin one by Gerard of Cremona, who died in 1187 but presumably began his career as a translator several decades earlier. Thus, while it is unknown when he translated *De caelo*, he may

have done so early enough for it to be possible for Hugh to obtain a copy.¹

- Another Arabo-Latin one by Michael Scot from about the 1220s, and so irrelevant for the present purpose.
- A Greco-Latin one s by William of Moerbeke, and so a century later than Hugh. However, it just might be that Moerbeke's was really a revision of an older one, 'trl. X', that Hugh knew but no traces of which have so far been discovered. For this reason I shall include it in the examination of Hugh's quotations.

2) *De sancto* 2.12, 126: ut Aristoteles asseuerat: "Corpus—inquit—solum magnitudinum perfectum est; solum enim definitur tribus, quod quidem omnia esse dicitur" eo quod principium habeat et medium atque finem.

The edition refers to:

Arist., *Cael.* 1.1.268a22–24 τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὃν εἴη τῶν μεγεθῶν τέλειον· μόνον γὰρ ὥρισται τοῖς τρισίν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ πᾶν.

body alone will be perfect among the magnitudes, for it is the only one to be delimited by the three <dimensions>, and that means it is "all."

Trl. Gerardi (Hossfeld, 5–6): corpus solum est completum et completius omni magnitudine; quod est, quia corpus solum terminat tres dimensiones.

Trl. Guillelmi: corpus utique erit magnitudinum perfecta; solum enim determinatum est tribus, hoc autem est omne.

¹ Gerard's translation is available in the shape of a series of footnotes in Alberti Magni *Opera omnia*, V.1 *De caelo et mundo*, ed. P. Hossfeld (Aschendorff: Münster, 1971).

Hugh's text is a fairly literal translation of the Greek and a far cry from Gerard's paraphrasing rendition. Its similarity to William's version is not striking either, so this passage rather discourages the assumption of a *trl.* *X*.

3) *De sancto* 3.2, 172–73: “attendendum quod priuatio dicitur multipliciter: nam absentia formae in eo quod aptum est habere illam priuatio dicitur, secundum quam significationem dicitur ab Aristotele omne quod aliquo modo fit ex contrariis fieri, id est ex oppositis, et in contraria, id est opposita, corrumpi.”

The edition refers to Arist., *Cael.* 1.3.270a12–18, which can be narrowed down to:

Arist., *Cael.* 1.3.270a14–17; διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι μὲν ἅπαν τὸ γινόμενον ἐξ ἐναντίου τε καὶ ὑποκειμένου τινός, καὶ φθείρεσθαι ὡσαύτως ὑποκειμένου τέ τινος καὶ ὑπ' ἐναντίου καὶ εἰς ἐναντίον

because everything that comes to be comes to be out of its opposite, while there is some substrate, and likewise is destroyed, while there is a substrate, by its opposite and <is turned> into its opposite

Trl. Gerardi (Hossfeld, 19): quia omne generatum non est generatum nisi ex aliquo ente fabricato, quod est ei contrarium, et omnis quod cadit sub corruptione, non fit corruptio nisi ex aliquo ente fabricato, quod est ei contrarium, et redit apud corruptionem suam ad contrarium suum

Trl. Guillelmi: propter fieri quidem omne generabile ex contrario et subiecto quodam, et corrumpi similiter supposito quodam et a contrario et in contrarium

Hugh's terse summary of the passage is again a far cry from Gerard's expansive rendition. Moreover, Hugh's *in contraria* mimicks the Greek εἰς ἐναντίον closer than Gerard's *ad contrarium suum*, and whereas Hugh renders ἅπαν τὸ γινόμενον as *omne quod fit*, Gerard offers *omne*

generatum and William uses *omne generabile*. Hence, use of Gerard's translation is not plausible and dependence on a hypothetical *trl. X* does not seem likely either.

4) *De sancto* 1.15, 53: Praeterea, ut Aristoteles dicit: “Nulla potestas praeteriti est, sed praesentis aut futuri”

The edition refers to:

Arist., *Cael.* 1.12.283b13–14: οὐδεμία γὰρ δύναμις τοῦ γεγονέναι ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι.

for no potentiality is a potentiality to have happened, but it is a potentiality to be happening or to be about to happen

Trl. Gerardi (Hossfeld, 101): non est potentia in tempore praeterito, sed in tempore in quo dicitur nunc, in tempore futuro adveniente post nunc

Trl. Guillelmi: neque una enim virtus eius quod est factum esse est, sed eius quod esse aut futurum esse.

Gerard's *in tempore praeterito* and *in tempore futuro* correspond to Hugh's of *praeteriti* and *futuri* for τοῦ γεγονέναι and τοῦ ἔσεσθαι, but otherwise the two translations are very different with Hugh's correctly preserving the original's genitive construction as opposed to the *in tempore* found in Gerard's. Hugh's translation is also strikingly different from Moerbeke's. Hugh renders δύναμις as *potestas*, while Moerbeke uses *virtus*; Hugh renders τοῦ γεγονέναι and τοῦ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι as *praeteriti* and *praesentis aut futuri*, while Moerbeke says *eius quod est factum esse*, *eius quod esse* aut *futurum esse*.

I conclude: Hugh did not use Gerard's Arabo-Latin *De caelo*, and we can safely dismiss the hypothetical *trl. X*. In all likelihood, Hugh had consulted *De caelo* in Greek.

2.3.3 *De anima (de An.)*

1) *De sancto* 1.12, 41 Verum haec omnia et quecumque horum similia sunt ad compositum Aristoteles retulit in libro De anima dicendo sic: “Sentire et amare aut odire non sunt mentis passiones, sed habentis illam in eo quod illam habet.”

The edition correctly refers the reader to:

Arist., *de An.* 1.4.408b25–27: τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ τοῦδὲ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ᾧ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει.

reasoning, however, and loving or hating, are not its passions, but the one's who has it *qua* having it

Trl Iacobi: Intelligere autem et amare aut odire non sunt illius passiones, sed huius habentis illud secundum quod illud habet.

It is difficult to tell whether Hugh depends on James. His translation is slightly paraphrasing in that he replaces the pronoun *ἐκείνου* with what he takes it to represent, i.e. *mentis*, and consequently writes *illam* for the two following instances of *ἐκεῖνο*, so this deviation from James' translation proves nothing. It is not obvious why, if he used James, he would replace *intelligere* with *sentire*, but equally, if he used the Greek directly, his choice of *sentire* to render *διανοεῖσθαι* “reasoning” is surprising. The strongest argument for thinking that Hugh has used the Greek text directly is his *in eo quod* for ᾧ instead of James' *secundum quod*, as the former

formula (ultimately borrowed from Boethius)¹ recurs in other places in *De sancto*; thus:

De sancto 1.17, 61: pater, in eo quod desipit, filium demonstrat insipientem.

De sancto 3.12, 208: nam priuatio in eo quod priuatio semper contra naturam est.

De sancto 3.18, 239: Quod iterum per definitionem temporis ab Aristotele in *Physicis* assignatam demonstratur: ait ergo tempus esse numerum motus secundum prius et posterius non huius uel illius motus, sed primi in eo quod motus.

In last of the three passages *non huius vel illius motus, sed primi in eo quod motus* is not part of the quotation of Aristotle, but a clarifying addition by Hugh himself.

Besides, *in eo quod* also occurs in *Compendiosa expositio*, and again in an exegetic comment added to a quotation, this time from *Metaphysics* 11:

CE 3.50, 324: Motus ab Aristotele sic definitur: “Motus est eius rei quae potestate consummatio in eo quod huiusmodi, id est in eo quod potestate.

For more about the passage from *Compendiosa expositio*, see below.

2) *De sancto* 2.6, 99: ut philosophus dicit: “Non enim contingit opinantem quibus uidetur non credere.”

¹ Boethius uses *in eo quod* for η in the *Topics* (see the Greek-Latin index in AL 5), and the formula occurs numerous times in his commentary on the *Categories*.

The editors refer to 3.3.228a20–21 (*sic!*– for “228” read “428”), and specifically to *translatio Iacobi*.

Arist., *de An.* 3.3.428a20–21: οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν.

for it is not possible for somebody who entertains an opinion not to believe in that about which it is an opinion

Trl. Iacobi: Non enim contingit opinantem de quibus videtur, non credere.

It certainly looks as if Hugh used James, but notice the absence in Hugh of James’ *de*, which has no match in the Greek.

The evidence, then, is indecisive as to whether Hugh consulted *De anima* in James’ translation or in the original Greek.

2.4 Metaphysics (*Metaph.*)

1) *De sancto* 2.1, 76: Et rursus in Metaphysicis circa principium: “Deus quidem uidetur causarum omnibus esse principium aliquod.”

The edition refers to:

Arist., *Metaph.* 1.2.983a8–9: ὁ τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τῶν αἰτίων πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις.

everybody thinks that God is among the causes and some sort of principle

Trl. vetustissima (Iacobi): deus que enim videtur causarum omnibus inesse et principium quoddam.

Trl. vetus: deus enim et causarum esse et omnibus princeps esse videtur.

Hugh's wording is pretty close to that of the *vetustissima*; his *quidem* may well be a misreading of *que enim*, he has *videtur* in the same position as the *vetustissima* and the same word order in the rest of the sentence, only with *esse* instead of *inesse* and *aliquod* instead of *quoddam*. But an independent translation by Hugh himself cannot be excluded.

2) *Compendiosa expositio* 3.50, 324: Motus ab Aristotele sic definitur: "Motus est eius rei quae potestate consummatio in eo quod huiusmodi, id est in eo quod potestate. Nam in motu, id est conflatione statuae, fabrica, constructione domus, anuli et aliorum similium quae innumera sunt, imperfecta est donec quies ueniat, perfectio scilicet consummationis: ante quietem namque non adest consummatio."¹

The edition identifies the passage referred to as *Metaph.* 11.9, which seems right, but only the initial

Motus est eius rei quae potestate consummatio in eo quod huiusmodi.

is an almost literal quotation:

Arist, *Metaph.* 11.9.1065b16: τὴν τοῦ δυνάμει ἢ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνέργειαν λέγω κίνησιν.

I call the actuality of the potential *qua* such movement

Book 11 was not available in Latin before Moerbeke translated it a century after the composition of *Compendiosa expositio*. He rendered the line:

eius quod in potentia in quantum tale est actum dico motum

¹ At this point the edition actually spells *consumatio*, but I assume it is a typing error.

Presumably, the translation of this bit from the *Metaphysics* was done by the author of *Compendiosa expositio* himself. His use of *consummatio* for *ἐνέργεια* is remarkable; it is not found in James' or any other relevant translator's works, and it looks like an attempt to render *ἐντελέχεια* rather than *ἐνέργεια* (the word *ἐντελέχεια* actually occurs immediately before the passage quoted, and several times in the sequel). The choice of *potestate* for *δυνάμει* instead of *potentia* or *virtute* agrees with Hugh's choice in his quotation 4) of *De caelo* (see above), but is less remarkable; James of Venice in his translation of the *Physics* vacillates between using *potentia* and *potestas* for *δύναμις*.¹

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¹ See the index in AL 7.1–2:40.

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