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The Two Versions of Radulphus Brito's *Questions on Porphyry*

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1 Introduction: State of the Art

In the 1970s, Heinrich Roos undertook the study of the philosophical commentaries of Radulphus Brito and in particular of his question commentaries on the *Logica vetus* (Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Aristotle's *Categories*, *De interpretatione* and the anonymous *Liber sex principiorum*). What appeared clear from his first publications and editions of texts¹ was that these commentaries, like other commentaries by Brito,² are handed down in at least two rather different versions; furthermore, one of them is unfortunately contaminated by the interventions (only partially marked as such in the only manuscript that carries it) of another author, a mysterious Hytpibbius, who may have been a pupil, but certainly was an emulator of the great Breton master, active at the Faculty of Arts in Paris between the last decade of the 13th and the first decades of the 14th.³

The relationship between these two versions has not yet been well clarified, as we will see shortly, but the common perception is that version II

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¹ See Roos 1974 and 1978.

² See Fauser 1974 (edition of Brito's commentary on the third book of Aristotle's *De anima*).

³ Cf. Marmo 2018. On Brito's biography, see Courtenay 2005; for a list of his works, see Deuffic 2002; Mora-Márquez and Costa 2018.

("*Porph. II*" in Roos 1974), witnessed by a Nürnberg ms (**N**),⁴ although contaminated, was produced later than the more widespread version I ("*Porph. I*", or standard version), which is handed down by almost a dozen mss and a late 15th-century edition.⁵ Let us first review the arguments that led to this common perception. Roos (1974) correctly identified Brito as the polemical target of a question on *genus* by Bartholomew of Bruges (published in Pattin 1968), and also provided the first critical edition of a question of Brito's commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*: q. 13 of *Porph. I*. In the same article Roos offered several comparisons between *Porph. I* and

⁴ Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. V.21 (dated 1317; for a description, see D'Alverny 1968, 338; Neske 1997).

⁵ The mss are the following: Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royal "Albert I^{er}" 2910 (3540– 47) (Br, 15th cent.: it contains a complete collection of Brito's commentariess on Aristotelian logic, together with questions on complementary works such as Boethius' Liber Divisionum or the anonymous Liber sex principiorum, and on mathematical writings; the most recent description is in Pattin 1978, 74–76, but see also Ebbesen and Marmo 2024, 9); London, British Library, Harley 7357 (L, 15th cent.; see a very short description in Catalogue of the Harleian Manuscripts in the British Museum, [London] 1808, vol. III, 527); Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, C 161 Inf. (M, begin. of 14th cent.: it contains the questions on Porhyry and a good deal of those on the *Categories*, wrongly ascribed to a master Petrus de Firmo); Osimo, Biblioteca dell'Istituto Campana, 18.L.38 (39) (O, begin. of 14th sec.; description in Panzica 2021, 251-61); Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, XX.457 (Pd, 14th cent.; description in Abate and Luisetto 1975, vol. 2, 388–89); Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, 697 (P, 14th cent.; description in Martin 1886, 43); Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2350 (S, first half of 14th cent.; description in Lilao Franca and Castrillo Gonzáles 2002, 729–31: like Br, this ms also contains a complete collection of Brito's commentaries on Aristotelian logic); Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, lat. 2141 (V1, 15th cent.; description in Maier 1961, 46-53); Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, lat. 3042 (V2, 14th cent.); Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, lat. 3043 (V3, 15th cent.); Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, lat. 3044 (V4, 15th cent.) (on these vatican mss, see also Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981, 276-77). To this version can be also traced back the 1499 edition: Rodulphi Britonis, Quaestiones subtilissime super arte veteri, Venetiis per Joh. Rubeum et Albertinum fratres. All the quotations from this version will be to the pages of this edition (from now on ed).

Porph. II, from which he concluded that the second, longer and more complex version was probably meant to supersede the first one.⁶ Porph. II, as found in ms N, would therefore combine being a revised edition with having been reworked by a subsequent writer (Hytpibbius). Roos suggested that Bartholomew of Bruges' criticisms might have been what motivated Brito to revise his text so as to present a clearer formulation of his point of view.⁷ A little further on in the same article, Roos (1974, 330) also refers to a discussion on the same topic in Brito's his Questiones super Topica Aristotelis, which he characterizes as a youthful work, dated to 1295.8 Jan Pinborg, a pupil of Roos, despite being more hesitant as regards the priority of Porph. I with respect to Porph. II,9 is actually the person most responsible for its currency among scholars: in the introduction to his edition of both versions of Brito's qq. 5-8 on Porphyry (Pinborg 1980, 57-8), he distinguishes between a longer B version, which presents at least two additional questions (published in Roos 1978) and normally offers an "augmented" text, and an A version with shorter and fewer questions. Pinborg admits, however, that it is not always possible to determine whether an additional textual element is to be attributed to Brito or his emulator Hytpibbius (Pinborg 1980, 57). Finally, while continuing to call the two versions A and B (of which he gives a synoptic edition of qq. 5–8, which makes mutual comparison easier), he concludes that unfortunately "I have not been able to construct a clear argument concerning their mutual relations" (ibid., 58) and that, as there are no clear signs of an evolution in one

⁶ Cf. Roos 1974, 329–30, with reference to pp. 340.178–341.190 of his edition.

⁷ Roos makes this point a little further (1974, 333–34), where he underlines that the distinction between *intentio generis in concreto* vs. *in abstracto* in **N** is clearer than in *Porph. I.*

⁸ It is actually 1296, as indicated by the colophon of Brito's questions on Aristotle's *Topics* in the ms Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA 4° 276, f. 131rb: "date anno domini M°CC°LXXXXV° dominica Reminiscere". Since Paris used the so called 'Easter style' of chronology till 1470, this datation must be interpreted as February 18th, 1296 (the second Sunday of Lent) (cf. Ebbesen and Marmo 2024, 30, n. 55).

⁹ See, for instance, Pinborg 1975, 79, n. 122, where he maintains that the relationships between the two versions have not yet been determined.

direction or the other, a precise answer must await further research. Finally, Sten Ebbesen and Jan Pinborg, in an article published the following year (Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981–82, 274–75) dedicated to the bizarre fate of Brito's prologues to various series of logical questions, seem to welcome with greater determination the thesis of the priority of the A version over B:¹⁰ the argument implicitly adopted, here too, is that the longest version corresponds to the most recent. To my knowledge, there are no other arguments in support of this thesis.

In what follows I intend to question this assumption, showing that: (i) the main argument of the greater length of B does not apply to all the questions of this version that have a corresponding question in A, but only to a part of it and that therefore the 'classical' assumption must be placed methodologically in brackets (at least, for now, in relation to the questions on Porphyry) (§ 3); and (ii) there are good reasons to think that the chronological relationship should be reversed, i.e. that the B version is earlier than A. Therefore, I will dedicate §§ 4.1–5 to the comparison between some questions taken from both versions. But first, let us examine the extension of the contamination from B to A (§ 2), also taking into account the questions on the *Categories* and *De interpretatione*.

2 The Extent of the Contamination

One limitation of the analyses of the relationships between the two versions mentioned above—and the one that probably motivated the caution shown, in particular, by Pinborg (1980)—was that the comparison between the two versions of the questions on the *Ars vetus* was conducted only on the opening questions of Brito's commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on the *De interpretatione*, without considering those two works in their totality and completely neglecting the questions on the *Categories*. This, as a side effect, resulted in an over-estimation of the value of one witness of the A version to the detriment of others. But let us proceed in order.

¹⁰ They refer again to Roos 1974 repeating that version B given by N offers an "augmented" text, also underlining that it has a couple of questions that are not present in version A.

2.1 Contamination in the Quest. sup. Porph.

Pinborg's edition of qq. 5–8 on Porphyry, together with the working edition of excerpts of some questions on the *De int.*,¹¹ represented a great step forward in the study of the logic of Radulphus Brito. In the following years, unfortunately-also due to the premature death of the great Danish scholar-only a few scholars followed him on this path, editing some isolated questions or even entire logical works.¹² What resulted from Pinborg's studies was that Br, despite being a rather late witness, when it did not report the B version, seemed to be a good guide for the restitution of the A version, given the general correctness of the text offered. Unfortunately, Br's contamination is not limited to the opening questions on Porphyry and De int., but it is much more extensive. As for the questions on Porphyry, Br offers (at least partially) the B version not only in some arguments of qq. 5, 6 and 7 (as noted by Pinborg 1980), but also-and much more extensively-in qq. 12, 14, 19 and 22. Other mss, in addition to those used by Pinborg in his partial edition (i.e. Br, Pd and S) are involved in the contamination: V_2 , for example, in qq. 1 and 2 on Porphyry presents arguments taken from the B version added by a later hand in the margins, and in q. 3 such additional material occurs in the body of the text (maybe the collation of all questions—yet to be completed—will show that other qq. will also be involved). Furthermore, the contaminated questions can be usefully collated with the B version reported by N, so as to be able to distinguish-at least hypothetically-the contribution of Hytpibbius from that of Brito. Another witness of the B version-that I discovered by chance in a Leipzig ms-may offer a further considerable contribution, but

¹¹ Pinborg 1971, 275–81 (qq. 3 e 4 of the A version, based on mss **P**, V_1 e V_3 ; ms **Br**, although taken into consideration presents the B version; excerpts from this version of the same questions can also be read in Marmo 1994, 66–67, nn. 122 e 123; 68, n. 128; 7273, n. 136, transcribed from ms **Br**).

¹² See Green-Pedersen 1973; Green-Pedersen and Pinborg 1978; Ebbesen 1978; McMahon 1981; Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981, 1981–82; Green-Pedeersen 1984; Ebbesen 1986, 1987, 1993; Rossi 1995; Ebbesen 1998, 2000; Andrews 2001; Dijs 2003; de Rijk 2005, App. E, 643–93; Wilson 2016; Rossi 2017; Marmo and Bellucci 2023, App. A, 401–4, and H, 441–44; Ebbesen and Marmo 2024.

while it contains all the questions on *Cat.* and *De int.*, it only has the last three of the questions on Porphyry.¹³

2.1 The Contamination in the Quest. sup. Pred. and sup. Periherm.

As regards the questions on *Cat.*, the contamination almost exclusively occurs in mss different from those exhibiting B-to-A contamination in the questions on Porphyry. In fact, ms **Pd** is the only one that is in both groups, and as for the questions on *Cat.*, its contamination is limited to q. 1. The latter also holds for **M**, where a secondary hand has misattributed the commentary on *Cat.* to a *magister Petrus de Firmo.*¹⁴ Two Vatican codices, **V**₁ and **V**₃, present extensive contamination: in **V**₁ it concerns qq. 9–12; in **V**₃ qq. 1–12. Ms Le, however, presents the questions on *Cat.* in the B version without Hytpibbius' interpolations, and therefore provides a key to understanding the relationships between the two works and authors.

As for the commentary on *De int.*, in addition to **Br** (already identified by Pinborg 1971), **V**₃ must be added. Both present contamination in the first four questions. The Leipzig ms (Le). which also in this case presents the 'pure' B version, presents some interesting features even at a first superficial examination: what appears at first glance is that from q. 11 to q. 25 the differences between the two versions are smaller. A more detailed study of the two sets of questions must be left for future work(s). For now, we may conclude that as regards the whole set of commentaries on the *Ars vetus* the relationship between the A and the B versions is much more complex than a simple temporal priority of A over B as proposed by Roos.

3 A Merely Quantitative Comparison

From my transcriptions, collations and working editions of the two versions of the commentary on Porphyry I have made an approximate count

¹³ Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1427 (Le, dated 1302), 16ra–vb (the qq. on Porphyry); ff. 1ra–8ra (the qq. on *Cat.*); and ff. 9ra–15vb (the qq. on *De int.*).

¹⁴ **M** 130r: "Incipiunt questiones super libro Predicamentorum magistri Petri de Firmo bene disputate" (*add. a.m. in mg. sup.*).

of the words used in each question. This allows us to establish a quantitative comparison between them: even though it remains of a purely indicative and provisional nature, it does allow us to get an idea of the differences between the two versions, and thus has some heuristic value. The comparison is summarized in Table 1: I have highlighted the longer texts in bold; for the B version I tried not to consider the additions made by Hytpibbius (H)—but this is far from simple; finally, in the numbering of the questions, I do not follow the one proposed in Marmo 2018a (Appendix A), but I keep the same number when the same question is discussed in both versions.

| Questions | Α | В | Questions | Α | В |
|-----------|------|------|-----------|------|------|
| 1 | 1916 | 2469 | 18 | 1710 | 2614 |
| 2 | 1856 | 1539 | 19 | 627 | 1761 |
| 3 | 1201 | 1845 | 20 | 1626 | 495 |
| 4 | 2210 | 2370 | 21 | 3028 | 2970 |
| 5 | 2822 | 3390 | 22 | 2593 | 2715 |
| 6 | 1052 | 1505 | 23 | 1006 | 1487 |
| 7 | 2256 | 1505 | 24 | 562 | 610 |
| 8 | 1355 | 1143 | 25 | 370 | 868 |
| 9 | 486 | 559 | 26 | 530 | 1034 |
| 10 | 1340 | 1264 | 27 | 1595 | 1024 |
| 11 | 1899 | 1558 | 28 | 1204 | 1536 |
| 12 | 443 | 1041 | 29 | 367 | 641 |
| 13 | 2484 | 2098 | 30 | 1157 | 1868 |
| 14 | 1173 | 1225 | 31 | 488 | 469 |
| 15 | 1215 | 1549 | 32 | 1239 | 599 |
| 16 | 469 | 770 | 33 | 1623 | 1535 |
| 17 | 1932 | 2370 | | | |

Table 1: A quantitative comparison (a word count)

As one can see from these figures—approximate though they may be the text of the B version in most cases (20 out of 33) is longer than that of the A version, but in a bit more than a third of the questions (13 out of 33) it is the other way round.¹⁵ The size of the questions in the A and B versions therefore is no obvious clue to their chronological relationship. I therefore propose to abandon the use of such epithets as 'augmented' or 'shortened', which implicitly indicate one or the other as prior, and to use more neutral phrases, such as 'longer/more extended' and 'shorter', which do not imply any evaluation under this respect.

As the assumption of the priority of A version was based on the greater quantity of text in the B version we must now try to explore different paths, analyzing the quality of the argumentation and trying to identify cases of evolution of the author's thought from one version to the other. I shall try to carry out such an examination, looking at the material with a fresh eye, not misdirected by any bias.

4 A Comparative Analysis of Some Questions

In this comparative analysis of the differences between the two versions, I shall examine four pairs of questions on Porphyry's *Isagoge*: qq. 1A and 1B (on the scientific status of logic) (§ 4.1); 12A and 12B (on genus as the principle of its species) (§ 4.2); 13A and 13B (on the genus with only one species) (§ 4.3); and 14A and 14B (on the species with a single individual) (§ 4.4), most of them *inedita*. I shall conclude this section with a shorter comparison between various sets of questions, suggesting a thought evolution (on the meaning of concrete accidental terms—CATs—and of the term *individuum*), also trying to explain why the B version presents some more questions ascribable to Brito than the A version (§ 4.5).¹⁶

¹⁵ A more in-depth examination of the qq. might lead to a marked reduction in the word count of the B version questions ascribable to Brito.

¹⁶ Question 1A has been published in Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981, xii–xv (based on the collation of **Br L O** and **V**₄); and also in de Rijk 2005, App. E, 659–664 (based only on **Br** and **V**₄); q. 13A was edited by Roos 1974, 335–42 (based on **Br, P M e Pd, + ed**). All the other questions are unpublished, and in particular all the questions of the B version: for qq. 1A and 14A I shall use a complete collation of the witnesses, for qq. 12A and 13A only the collation of three mss (**M**, **O** and **V**₄); for q. 1B, I shall use a collation of the three witnesses (**N**, **Pd** and **S**), for q. 12B and 14B, two mss (**N** and **Br**); for 13B, only **N**.

4.1 Logic as a Science and as a Method

As was customary, the opening question of Radulphus Brito's commentaries on the *Ars vetus* is dedicated to the scientific status of the discipline to which the commented books belong, and is repeated almost identically in the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* (cf. Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981, xii). As Ebbesen and Pinborg (1981) pointed out, the B version is quite different from the A version, and they only published the latter, as it alone fits the bill to be the text attacked by Bartholomew of Bruges in his *sophisma* about the object of logic, the edition and analysis of which was the theme of their study.

Question 1B as a whole is longer than 1A, but it may be interesting to make a comparison between the various portions of the two texts (which follow a fairly canonical scheme: \$1. arguments in favour of a solution, positive or negative; \$2. arguments against it; \$3. determination of the question; \$Ad 1. replies to the arguments advanced in \$1.), in order to see in which passages version B is more extensive, and possibly try to explain why. Section 1. presents four arguments whose quantitative comparison gives the following results:

| §§ | Α | В |
|-----------|-----|-----|
| 1.1 | 60 | 61 |
| 1.2 | 136 | 136 |
| 1.3 | 41 | 59 |
| 1.4 | 306 | 339 |

| Table 2. Word | count in | section | 1 |
|---------------|----------|---------|---|
|---------------|----------|---------|---|

There are no major differences, except in the third ($\S1.3$) and fourth arguments (\$1.4) against the thesis that logic is a science (*Arguitur quod non*). In \$1.3A the author provides a very brief justification of the truth of the major premise,¹⁷ leaving more space for the justification of the minor,

¹⁷ "*1.3* Item, omnis scientia est ex propriis; loyca non est ex propriis; ergo etc. Maior patet ex primo Posteriorum. Minor apparet, quia loyca est ex communibus, sicut apparet in principio libri Topicorum, ubi dicitur quod ad omnium methodorum principia viam habet." (ed a4.va; cf. Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981, xii).

while in §1.3B all the space is taken up by an argument that presents an expanded major premise, while any justification of the minor is completely lacking.¹⁸ In §1.4, an *ad impossibile* argument that leads to an infinite regress between logic as a science and as a method (*modus sciendi*), the differences essentially derive from the greater prolixity of the B version. A double terminological and conceptual change should be underlined in §1.2: in §1.2A Brito speaks of the *subjectum* of logic and identifies it with the syllogism,¹⁹ while in §1.2B the term *objectum* is preferred, and second intentions are indicated as the subject-matter of logic;²⁰ furthermore, in the second justification of the minor (§1.2.2), in the A version Brito speaks of the relationship between a *virtus* and its object,²¹ while in the B version the relationship between a *potentia* and the respective object is dealt

¹⁸ "*1.3* Item, omnis scientia procedit ex propriis principiis, quia sicut patet primo Posteriorum, scientia est effectus conclusionis demonstrationis; conclusio autem demonstrationis procedit ex veris et propriis; ergo omnis scientia procedit ex veris et propriis; sed logica non procedit ex propriis, sed magis ex communibus, quia logica est de secundis intentionibus communibus applicabilibus primis ad quolibet genus entis; ergo etc." (**N** 58vb).

¹⁹ "*1.2* Item, subiectum cuiuslibet scientie debet esse intelligibile; sed subiectum loyce non est intelligibile; ergo loyca non est scientia. Maior de se manifesta est. Minor probatur dupliciter. *1.2.1* Primo sic: quod non est sensibile, non est intelligibile, quia intellectus noster dependet ex sensatis; modo, *sillogismus, qui est subiectum loyce*, non est sensibile, quia nullus videt sillogismum nec alio sensu sentit; ergo subiectum loyce non est intelligibile." (**ed** a4.va; cf. Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981, xii).

²⁰ "1.2.1 Item, omnis scientia debet habere subiectum intelligibile; sed subiectum logices non est intelligibile; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia omnis scientia est habitus intellectus, ideo oportet quod eius subiectum sive obiectum, *ut melius dicam*, sit intelligibile. Minor declaratur, quia *obiectum logices sunt intentiones secunde*; tales autem intentiones secunde non sunt intelligibiles, quia nichil intelligitur quod non cadit sub sensu; sed intentiones secunde de quibus considerat logica non cadunt sub sensu, quia non sunt sensibiles, et illud quod est intelligibile est sensibile; ergo intentiones secunde de quibus est logica non possunt intelligi." (N 58vb).

²¹ "*1.2.2* Hoc apparet ex alio, quia obiectum alicuius *virtutis* debet precedere illam virtutem; modo, entia loycalia non precedunt intellectum, immo sequuntur ipsum; ergo etc." (ed a4.va; cf. Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981, xii).

with.²² Regarding the first discrepancy (subiectum/obiectum; syllogism/ second intentions), it is sufficient to remember that the discussion on this topic is expressly developed in qq. 3A and 3B (u. syllogismus sit subjectum logicae) and there Brito always speaks of subjectum logicae, never mentioning its obiectum (in both versions); furthermore, Brito's solution gives space both to syllogism, the subject-matter of logic communitate attributionis, and second intentions (or entia rationis), its subject-matter communitate praedicationis.²³ The preference for the term objectum, expressed in §1.2.1B, might therefore be ascribed to the mysterious Hytpibbius (ut melius dicam might be considered H's voice), rather than to Brito himself. This terminological change, however, does not provide any indication about the priority of A over B, or vice versa. The same holds for the second divergence: the second term (potentia) is used by Brito in a psychological context to refer to the faculties of the soul,²⁴ while the first (virtus) is used to indicate (in the same context) what the faculties are capable of (growth, perception, imagination, understanding).²⁵ The fact that in qq. 1A and 1B Brito uses either one or the other does not seem relevant for our problem.

In the third section (the second is very short and presents no significant differences) the following differences in extension can be observed:

| § § | Α | В |
|------------|-----|-----|
| 3.1 | 18 | 9 |
| 3.2 | 43 | 81 |
| 3.3 | 104 | 249 |

Table 3. Word count in section 3

²² "1.2.2 Et confirmatur ratio, quia obiectum debet precedere *potentiam* cuius est obiectum; modo, intentiones secunde de quibus est logica /S 2va/ non precedunt intellectum, immo sequuntur ipsum, quia causantur ab intellectu, quia causatum posterius est causa; ergo secunde intentiones non possunt esse intelligibiles ab intellectu." (N 58vb).

²³ See de Rijk 2005, 670–71 (q. 3A); and N 60ra (q. 3B).

²⁴ Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones super libros De anima*, II, from q. 9 (*u. potentiae animae sint aliquid additum supra essentiam animae*), to q. 13 (*u. potentiae distinguantur per actus et actus per obiecta*), in de Boer 2012, 340–53.

²⁵ Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. De anima*, II, q. 19 (*u. sensus sit virtus passiva*), ms Città del Vaticano, BAV, Pal. Lat. 1059, 16va; q. 44 (*u. phantasia sit virtus sensitiva*), 23rb.

| §§ | A (ed a4.va) | B (N 59ra) |
|-----|---|---|
| 3.1 | Ad istam questionem propter metum istarum rationum aliqui dixerunt quod loyca est modus sciendi et non scientia. | Ad istam questionem dico quod logica est scientia. |
| 3.2 | Et <i>dico breviter</i> quod loyca est scientia, quia sicut apparet primo Posteriorum scientia est habitus conclusionis demon- strationis, quia scire est ef- fectus demonstrationis; ergo scientia est / P 2ra / habitus con- clusionis demonstrationis in qua demonstratur propria pas- sio de subiecto per propria principia illius subiecti. | Et ratio huius est quia scientia est cognitio sive habitus conclusionis demonstrationis in qua concluduntur proprie passiones sive proprietates alicuius scibilis de ipso et de partibus eius, per propria principia illius scibilis, ut patet ex intentione Philosophi primo Posteriorum, ubi dicit quod scire est /S 2vb/ rem per causam cognoscere et quo- niam illius est causa et quoniam impossi- bile est aliter se habere; sed logica est co- gnitio omnium entium logicalium per pro- pria principia et proprias causas ipsorum; ergo logica est scientia. |
| 3.3 | Tunc arguitur: omnis cognitio alicuius effectus / V_1 65va/ ha- bita per propria principia et causas ipsius est scientia, sicut apparet per diffinitionem ipsius scientie, datam primo Posterio- rum, qua dicitur scire est rem per causam cognoscere et quo- niam illius est causa et quo- niam impossibile est aliter se habere; | Vel aliter potest deduci ista ratio sic: quia omnis cognitio tradita de aliquo scibili per sua principia propria et immediata, probans de ipso aliquam proprietatem per illa eadem principia, omnis talis cognitio est scientia; sed logica est huiusmodi: est enim cognitio scibilium logicalium per sua pro- pria principia; ergo logica est scientia. Ma- ior probatur, quia scientia est effectus con- clusionis demonstrationis, ut patet primo Posteriorum; sed in conclusione demonstra- tionis traditur cognitio alicuius scibilis per sua propria principia et ibi probatur sua propria passio de ipso scibili; ergo etc. |

Let us compare the two versions in Table 4:²⁶

²⁶ Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 1A, ed a4.va (cf. Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981, xiii); q. 1BA, N 58vb–59ra.

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| §§ | A (ed a4.va) | B (N 59ra) |
|-----------|--|---|
| | modo, ipsa loyca est talis co- gnitio: est enim habitus quo co- gnoscimus entia loycalia et passiones suas per propria prin- cipia sua, sicut passiones sillo- gismi de sillogismo per propria principia sillogismi, et passio- nes predicamenti de predica- mento, et passiones sillogismi dyalectici de ipso per propria eius principia, sicut apparet in- ducendo /L 1vb/ in quolibet ente loycali; ergo loyca est scientia. | Minor declaratur, scilicet quod logica sit cognitio alicuius passionis data per sua pro- pria principia, et quia logica in libro Pri- orum tradit cognitionem sillogismi per sua propria principia, ostendendo ex quibus ter- minis et propositionibus et ex quot habet esse sillogismus et ostendendo quot sunt figure in quibus sillogismus habet esse, probando etiam proprietates sillogismi per ista principia, sicut quod sillogismus sit ex ambabus affirmativis vel altera affirmativa et altera negativa, et quod in prima figura minore existente negativa et maiore partic- ulari non sequitur conclusio, et sic de aliis, ut patet in libro Priorum. Item, in libro Per- ihermeneias traditur cognitio enunciationis per sua propria principia, sicut quod habet esse ex subiecto et predicato, et sic de aliis, quod sit affirmativa et negativa, probando passiones de ipsa, scilicet veritatem et falsi- tatem, et probando oppositiones enuncia- tionum, et quomodo in quibuslibet opposi- tionibus se habent enunciationes in veritate et falsitate, et eodem modo posset declarari in omnibus entibus logicalibus, ut patet dis- currendo per omnes libros logicales; ergo etc. |

Table 4. Textual comparison

The initial statement (§3.1) is slightly longer in A, since Brito also reports the opinion of someone who, due to the fear caused by the previous arguments, prefers to deny logic the status of a science, attributing to it only

that of a method (*modus sciendi*);²⁷ in §3. *I*B only the thesis to be demonstrated is asserted and there is no polemical reference to other authors. The difference between the two *determinationes* (§3.2) lies, first, in the choice, expressed in $\S3.2A$, to give only a brief assertion of the author's position (dico breviter) and, secondly, in the exposition, in the B version, of an alternative argument to the one proposed (§3.3B: Vel aliter potest deduci ista ratio sic) which fundamentally corresponds to the core argument of the A version and develops the same argument (what characteristics does a science have-major premise-and in which sense does logic share these characteristics-minor premise), but puts a greater emphasis on justifying the premises. The obligatory reference for the characteristics of science are the Posterior Analytics (A.2 71b9-12 and 20-24); in order to justify the minor, however, Brito reviews some cases of properties (passiones) demonstrated through their own principles: for the syllogism, for example the Prior Analytics demonstrates how many terms and propositions it must be made up of, which figures there are, and for the proposition (enunciatio) which elements it is made up of (subject and predicate), which species it has (affirmation and negation) and which oppositional relationships hold between them; finally, the argument concludes that this can be proven for all logical entities, as will be evident from an inspection of all the books of the Organon. Differently from the B version, the A version appears (intentionally, as said above) more concise, first proposing the general principle (major premise, even if it is not called so) and then the argument based on it, which applies to logic and to its objects the characteristics of science: the exemplification is provided in this case only in form of a list that includes the syllogism, the categories and the dialectical syllogism. The impression, which will be strengthened by examining the reply to the last argument (§Ad 1.4A, below), is that in the A version Brito has made the argument more streamlined and direct, without the repetitions and the various examples of B (§§3.1B and 3.2B). This could be interpreted as a

²⁷ The reading *metum* (suggested by two vatican mss, $V_2 e V_4$, and by ed) is preferable to *motum* (chosen by Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981, maybe because it is suggested by **Br**). Cf. also de Rijk 2005, 661.

revision move, justified by the intention of preparing a version for circulation, such as the A or standard version, but it may be too early to advance any hypotheses.

The last section of the question is devoted to the reply to the arguments presented in $\$1.^{28}$ The quantitative comparison provides the following data:

| § § | Α | В |
|------------|-----|-----|
| Ad 1.1 | 182 | 211 |
| Ad 1.2 | 304 | 277 |
| Ad 1.3 | 90 | 98 |
| Ad 1.4 | 543 | 868 |

While the first (\$Ad 1.1) and the third reply (\$Ad 1.3) roughly repeat the same arguments in A and B, the other two present two opposite differences: \$Ad 1.2A is a little longer than \$Ad 1.2B and \$Ad 1.4A is significantly shorter than \$Ad 1.4B. Let us look at the texts:

²⁸ Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 1A, ed a4i.ra–b (cfr. Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981, xiii–xiv); q. 1B, N 59ra–b.

| §§ | A (ed a4i.ra–b) | B (N 59ra) |
|-----------|--|--|
| Ad 1.2.1a | Ad aliam, cum dicitur "subiec- tum cuiuslibet scientie debet esse intelligibile", concedatur; et cum dicitur "subiectum loyce non est intelligibile", falsum est; et cum dicitur "quod non est sensibile, ergo non est intelligibile", dicitur quod aliquid esse intelligibile potest dupliciter intelligi: vel pri- mario vel secundario; modo, il- lud quod est intelligibile prima- rio oportet quod sit sensibile vel per se vel per sua accidentia, si- cut sunt substantie, quia <i>nulla</i> <i>substantia est per se sensibilis,</i> <i>sed per sua accidentia</i> , sicut per dimensiones suas et qualitates sensibiles ut albedo et nigredo, et similia; | Ad aliam. Cum dicitur "omnis scien- tia debet habere subiectum intelligi- bile", concedatur; et cum dicitur "su- biectum logices non est intelligibile", falsum est; et ad probationem, cum dicitur "subiectum logice sunt inten- tiones secunde", concedatur; et tu dicis "iste non sunt intelligibiles", falsum est; et cum probatur "intelligi- bile est sensibile", verum est secun- dum se vel secundum sua accidentia aliqua, sicut <i>homo non est sensibilis</i> <i>secundum se, sed secundum sui ali- qua accidentia</i> , prout habet esse in tali materia sic complexionata, scili- cet calida vel frigida, etc.; et sic secundum aliqua accidentia eius, et hoc de illo quod est primo intelligi- bile; |
| Ad 1.2.1a | sed illud quod est intelligibile /M 138vb/ secundario, scilicet ex in- tellectione alterius non oportet quod sit sensibile, sicut privatio / V_2 4r/ est intelligibilis /L 2ra/ per habitum; et ideo non oportet quod privatio sit sensibilis; modo, secunde intentiones de quibus est loyca intelliguntur per intellectiones rerum super quas fundantur; ideo non oportet quod ille sint sensibiles. | illud enim quod est intelligibile secundario, ita quod non est intelligi- bile primo et per se, sed ex intellec- tione alterius, non oportet quod tale sit sensibile, sicut privationes, quia non sunt intelligibiles primo, sed so- lum per intellectionem sui habitus habent intelligi, ideo privationes non sunt sensibiles; et sic de multis aliis. Modo, intentiones secunde de quibus est logica non sunt intelligibiles primo, sed ex intellectione suorum obiectorum supra que fundantur; ideo non sunt sensibiles. |

| § § | A (ed a4i.ra–b) | B (N 59ra) |
|------------|---|--|
| Ad 1.2.1b | Et si dicas: omne /ed a4i.rb/ quod intelligitur dependet a sensu, li- cet non oporteat quod sit sensi- bile, ideo intentiones secunde, si intelligantur, oportet quod de- pendeant ex sensu; dico quod omne quod intellegitur dependet ex sensu et ideo concedo quod cognitio istarum intentionum de- pendet ex sensu, / Br 36 r/ quia dependet ex cognitione rerum super quas fundantur, et cognitio istarum rerum modo dependet ex sensu; et ideo dico de primo ad ultimum <i>cognitio intentionum</i> <i>loycalium dependet ex sensu</i> . | Vel dicendum quod <i>intentiones se- cunde sunt sensibiles indirecte, quia</i> <i>dependent ex sensibilibus</i> ; et sic indi- recte sunt sensibiles: sumuntur enim ex modis essendi rei qui sunt noti per sensum. |

Table 6. Textual comparison

The first part of the second reply (§*Ad 1.2.1a*), relating to the unintelligibility of second intentions (B) or of the syllogism (A), offers the more relevant difference: after a first reply on which both substantially agree, the A version offers an objection and its solution that correspond to an alternative answer in B; furthermore, A reaches a clearer conclusion (the knowledge of secondary intentions depends on sensitive knowledge) compared to what is claimed in B.²⁹ Here again, a motivation for the rewriting of B in A might have been the need for a more effective and clearly expressed position, which is accompanied by a broader generalization than what is claimed in B (*human beings* can not be perceived in themselves, but only through their accidents), i.e., no *substance* can be perceived in itself, if not through its accidents.³⁰

Let us see the reply to \$1.4:

²⁹ See the words in italics in §§*Ad 1.2.1b*A and B in Table 6.

³⁰ See the words in italics in $\S Ad 1.2.1aA$ and B in Table 6.

| § § | A (ed a4i.rb) | B (N 59ra–b) |
|------------|---|--|
| Ad 1.4a | Ad aliam, cum dicitur "omnis scien- tia habetur /L 2rb/ per modum sciendi", concedo; et cum dicitur "loyca non habetur per aliquem mo- dum sciendi", falsum est; et cum dicitur "ille modus sciendi per quem habetur loyca aut est notus aut igno- tus" etc., dico quod est notus; et cum dicitur "aut per loycam aut per aliam scientiam", dico quod iste modus sciendi per quam habetur loyca est notus per loycam: iste enim modus sciendi per quem habetur loyca aut est demonstratio vel divisio vel dif- finitio; unde modus sciendi in quoli- bet libro loycali est demonstratio, que est nota per librum Posteriorum. | Ad aliam. Cum dicitur "omnis sci- entia habetur per aliquem modum sciendi"; concedatur; et cum dici- tur "logica non habetur per ali- quem modum sciendi", falsum est; et cum probatur, "quia tunc ille modus sciendi per quem logica haberetur aut esset notus aut igno- tus", dico quod est notus; et tu que- res "per quam scientiam est notus, quia aut est notus per logicam aut per aliam", dico quod per logicam, puta per scientiam libri Posterio- rum. |
| Ad 1.4b | Et tu queres: quomodo ergo modus sciendi in libro Posteriorum erit no- tus? Dico quod modus sciendi ibi est aliqua demonstratio particularis, sicut ista: 'omnis sillogismus faciens scire est ex primis, veris, immediatis et causis conclusionis; omnis de- monstratio est sillogismus ex primis faciens scire; ergo etc.'; modo, ista demonstratio particularis per librum Posteriorum est nota isto modo: quia ista demonstratio est quedam de- monstratio particularis, continens ta- men terminos generales omni de- monstrationi; modo, ista demonstra- tio potest considerari ut continet ter- minos generales omni demonstra- tioni, et ut est particularis, et sic est instrumentum sciendi demonstratio- nem in communi; potest autem ista demonstratio considerari non ut est | Et tu probas: non est notus per lo- gicam, quia si esset notus per logi- cam, tunc idem esset notius et ignotius, quia modus ille sciendi ex quo habetur per logicam est igno- tior logica, et ex quo logica habetur per ipsum / S 3rb // Pd 3ra / est notior logica, et sic ille modus sciendi est notior et ignotior, quod est inconveniens. Dico preintelli- gendo quod proprie particulare non scitur, verbi gratia modus sciendi qui est instrumentum in Posteriori- bus est quedam particularis de- monstratio, quia omne quod habet rationem instrumenti est particu- lare, sicut iste processus 'omnis demostratio faciens scire est ex propriis, veris et immediatis, no- tioribus causisque conclusionis; |

| § § | A (ed a4i.rb) | B (N 59ra–b) |
|------------|---|--|
| | particularis, sed ut convenit in ra- tione et quiditate demonstrationis, ut est demonstratio, cum aliis demon- strationibus, et sic ista demonstratio est nota in hoc quod alie demonstra- tiones sunt note, unde in hoc quod illa demonstratio notificat demon- strationem /P 2rb/ in communi, noti- ficat se ipsam, in quantum convenit cum aliis demonstrationibus /L 2va/ in ratione demonstrationis in com- muni; quia notificata demonstratione in communi, notificatur quelibet de- monstratio particularis (et illa est quedam demonstratio particularis); | sed omnis demonstratio est proces- sus faciens scire; ergo etc.'; ista demonstratio est particularis, sed termini sunt in ipsa communes ad omnem demonstrationem, et ita est instrumentum demonstrandi pas- sionem / N 59rb / que est ex propriis et veris etc., de demonstratione in communi; et quia ista demonstratio que est sicut instrumentum est par- ticularis; ideo in quantum est in- strumentum proprie non habet sciri; tamen quia ista particularis demonstratio communicat cum aliis demonstrationibus in specie, in communi isto scilicet quod est demonstratio, ideo sic in quantum communicat cum aliis demonstra- tionibus in sua specie, scilicet in isto communi quod est demonstra- tio, sic scitur; |
| Ad 1.4b | et sic illa demonstratio particularis notificat se ipsam; sed alio et alio modo est notificata et notificans, quia notificans est in quantum est quedam /ed a4i.vb/ demonstratio par- ticularis continens terminos genera- les omni demonstrationi, et est noti- ficata in quantum est demonstratio demonstrationis in communi et illud non est inconveniens; sed quantum ad hoc quod est inferre conclusio- nem de necessitate, habet cognosci per librum Priorum; quantum autem ad veritatem propositionum, habet cognosci per se ipsam, quia per suos terminos; et propositiones /Br 36v/ | et sic demonstratio que est instru- mentum particulare notificat demonstrationem in communi; et ideo in quantum communicat cum aliis in specie demonstrationis in communi, sic scientia libri Posteri- orum que est de demonstratione in communi notificat illam demon- strationem particularem que est quidam modus sive instrumentum sciendi demonstrationem in com- muni; et sic intelligendum est de aliis modis sciendi in aliis libris logice: sic ergo modus sciendi in quantum est quoddam instrumen- tum notificat logicam, sed in quan- tum communicat cum aliis modis |

| §§ | A (ed a4i.rb) | B (N 59ra–b) |
|-----------|---|---|
| | ex quibus constitutitur sunt imme- diate, sicut illa est immediata et nota per se:' omnis sillogismus faciens scire est ex primis et veris 'etc.; ideo illa est nota per se ipsam, cognitis terminis suis; et hoc quantum ad ve- ritatem, que non potest per aliud probari. Et minor, qua dicitur 'de- monstratio est sillogismus faciens scire', est immediata, quia ibi predi- catur diffinitio de diffinito. | sciendi in specie, logica notificat ipsum sic demonstratum de demonstratione particulari in libro Posteriorum que est demonstratio quedam, ut dictum est, verbi gratia Socrates est quoddam particulare et ideo, in quantum est particulare, ista propria passio que est 'risibile' non habet sciri de ipso, quia nul- lum particulare scitur proprie, sed scitur de ipso in quantum com- municat cum aliis in specie hu- mana, cum sit de numero homi- num; et sic est in proposito. Modo, non est inconveniens unum et idem esse notificans et notificatum in logica diversis respectibus; ideo etc. |
| Ad 1.4c | | Aliter potest dici ad illam ra- tionem, quod ille modus sciendi per quem logica docetur et scitur per logicam sive cognoscitur, ut magis proprie dicatur, quia particu- lare proprie non scitur, et iste mo- dus sciendi est quidam modus sciendi particularis |
| Ad 1.4d | Eodem /O 2ra/ modo etiam intelligo de isto modo sciendi qui est diffini- tio, quia diffinitio est nota per diffi- nitionem diffinitionis; sed diffinitio diffinitionis est nota per se ipsam, quia diffinitio diffinitionis est qua dicitur' diffinitio est oratio quid est esse rei significans', in quantum continet terminos generales omni diffinitioni notificat diffinitionem in communi, et quia ista est quedam | Iuxta quod intelligendum quod iste modus sciendi est demonstratio vel divisio vel diffinitio: si diffinitio, erit quedam diffinitio particularis, et tunc erit nobis notum quod hec particularis diffinitio erit diffinitio, et faciens scire per hoc quod scitur quod sibi competit diffinitio dif- finitionis, que est indicare essen- tiam sui diffiniti explicite, et dif- |

| §§ | A (ed a4i.rb) | B (N 59ra–b) |
|-----------|---|---|
| | diffinitio sicut alie particulares diffi- nitiones et est eiusdem rationis cum illis in quantum diffinitio, et illa no- tificat se ipsam ut convenit cum aliis /L 2vb/ diffinitionibus in ratione dif- finitionis. Et istud est rationale in entibus secundum intellectum, sicut intellectus potest reflecti supra se, quod illa diffinitio particularis sit notificans in quantum /V ₃ 5v/ conti- net terminos communes cuilibet dif- finitioni et notificata in quantum convenit in ratione diffinitionis in communi; et sic valet etc. | finitio diffinitionis est quedam par- ticularis diffinitio; continet tamen terminos communes omni diffini- tioni et erit nota per se; isto modo, quia hec diffinitio notificat diffini- tionem in communi, ita quod dif- finitio in communi ad omnem dif- finitionem notificatur per eam ut est quedam particularis diffinitio, quia sic habet rationem instru- menti; sed ista particularis diffini- tio notificat in quantum communi- cat cum aliis diffinitionibus et ra- tione diffinitionis; et sic aliter et aliter notificat se et diffinitionem in communi. |
| Ad 1.4e | | Similiter dico de demonstratione, quia demonstratio est quidam mo- dus sciendi in logica, ut notum est in libro Posteriorum, qui docet omnem demonstrationem per demonstrationem et diffinitionem demonstrationis; /S 3va/ et illa de- monstratio est particularis qua uti- tur /Pd 3rb/ in libro Posteriorum si- cut est ista: 'omnis sillogismus fa- ciens scire est ex propriis etc.; om- nis demonstratio est sillogismus fa- ciens scire; ergo etc.' Ista erit nota <non> quantum ad hoc quod sit demonstratio, quia sibi competit diffinitio demonstrationis, sed in quantum est bonus sillogismus concludens ex necessitate, sicut scitur ex libro Priorum, ex quo sci- tur quis est bonus sillogismus, et quis servat formam sillogismi et</non> |

MARMO

| §§ | A (ed a4i.rb) | B (N 59ra-b) |
|--------------|---------------|--|
| <u>\$</u> \$ | A (ed a4i.rb) | B (N 59ra–b) quis non; sed quantum ad verita- tem propositionum istius demon- strationis erit nota hec demonstra- tio per se, quia propositiones sue sunt immediate, et propositio im- mediata est per suos terminos nota et non per aliud; sed quantum ad hoc quod sciamus passiones de- monstrationis inesse huic demon- strationi erit nota per se, quia hec est demonstratio particularis, et ut sic non inerit sibi aliqua passio de- monstrationis, sed in quantum par- ticipat naturam demonstrationis in communi, sicut risibile non inest Socrati in quantum Socrates, sed in quantum homo; et cum ita ut parti- cularis est habens terminos com- munes omni demonstrationi notifi- cat proprietates demonstra- tionis, ideo proprietates demonstra- tionis, ideo proprietates demonstra- tionis scimus de ipsa in quantum convenit cum aliis in ratione demonstrationis et sic de aliis par- ticularibus demonstrationibus, et hoc per se ipsam ut particularis est. Et sic diversimode sumpta notificat se et demonstratione in com- muni, quia ut est quedam particula- |
| | | ris demonstratio continens termi- nos generales omni demonstrationi |
| | | notificat se ut convenit cum aliis in |
| | | ratione demonstrationis. |

Table 7. Textual comparison

The reply to the fourth argument ($\S Ad 1.4$) could present the same dynamics and motivations for rewriting (from B to A), although it does not go in an expansive sense, but rather, like the previous case ($\S3.3$), in the direction of streamlining the text, avoiding the excess of repetitions. In this case, the two texts run parallel to each other until the Posterior Analytics is mentioned as the source of knowledge about demonstration; after that each text follows its proper argumentative path. In the A version Brito gives the floor to a hypothetical interlocutor (tu queres) who asks the crucial question: "But how do you get to know the demonstrative method in the Posterior Analytics?" In his reply the master tries to show how even from a single particular demonstration one can come to know what it has in common with all the other demonstrations (since they all make use of the same general terms), so that it becomes a tool by which to master all demonstration in general. After dealing with demonstration, A's text applies the same argumentative strategy to definition, and then it closes the question. The B version proceeds in a decidedly more tortuous way: having summarized the conclusion of $\S1.4$ (it is inconvenient for the same thing to be known and unknown at the same time), it advances the presupposition that, taking 'knowledge' in a strict sense, what is particular is unknowable, (this point is repeated several times while, on the contrary, remaining completely implicit in A) and proposes the solution already seen in A, regarding demonstration, reaching the conclusion that it is not inconvenient for the same thing to be simultaneously known (notificata) and to act as an instrument of knowledge (notificans) in different respects. He then proposes an alternative answer (in which he reiterates the unknowability of the particular), and goes on to apply the same argumentative steps used in relation to demonstration to definition. At this point, the question could be closed (as in A), but it is not: a last paragraph, which largely repeats what has already been said, wraps up the question in the B version by dealing again with demonstration, and clarifying with reference to syllogistics the role of the Prior Analytics in this process.

It seems reasonable to me to suppose that the resumption of the theme of demonstration, already discussed in B, could have been considered by Brito as a defect: the A version contains both the reflection on how a particular proof can make proof in general known, and the indication of the role of the *Prior Analytics* (and syllogistics) in the penultimate paragraph,³¹ making the text better articulated and avoiding unnecessary repetition. It could therefore be a reworking that goes from B to A, which, as already suggested, would be justified if Brito was preparing a version of the questions for dissemination. The greater length of the B version is not, therefore, incompatible with the hypothesis that A is a revision of B rather than vice versa.

4.2 Whether a Genus is the Principle of its Species (qq. 12A e 12B)

The rather short question 12 discusses a problem raised by a passage of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, where the genus is said to be the principle of its subordinate species.³² The question is also briefly discussed in various other commentaries on the same text of the same period.³³ The structure of the discussion is the same in the two versions, their dimensions however are quite different: q. 12B is in fact more than double the length of 12A. Comparing the arguments *quod non* (§1.) and *in oppositum* (§2.) of the two versions in Table 8, one can see how, again, the A version is shorter:

³¹ See the text of Ad 1.4bA in Table 7.

³² Porphyry, *Isag.* 2.12 Busse.

³³ Cf. Anonymus Basileensis, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 11, in Marmo 2021, 305–8; Durandus (different from Durandus of Auvergne, see Tabarroni 1994), *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 14, ms München, Staatsbibliothek, Clm 18917, pp. 6b; Simon of Faversham, *Questiones super libro Porphyrii*, q. 13, ed. P. Mazzarella, Padova, Cedam, 1957, 39–40; Durandus of Auvergne, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 8, ms Palermo, Bibl. Comunale, 2 Qq D 142, 5ra; John Duns Scotus, *Quaest. sup. Porph.*, q. 20, in Ioannis Duns Scoti *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge et Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, eds. R. Andrews et al., St Bonaventure (NY), The Franciscan Institute, 1999, 127–29; and, after Brito, Hugo de Traiecto, *Quest. sup. Porph.* q. 8, ms Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1363, 74va–75ra.

RADULPHUS BRITO'S QUESTIONS ON PORPHYRY

| § | A (ed c1.va–b) | B (N 64vb; Br 48r) |
|--------------------------|--|---|
| 1.1A // 1.2B | Quia principium non predicatur de principato predicatione di- cente 'hoc est hoc'; sed genus predicatur de specie predicatione dicente 'hoc est hoc', ut dicendo 'homo est animal'; ideo etc. Maior apparet, quia principium et causa sunt aliud a causato, et per consequens non predicantur de ipso. Minor de se patet. | Item, principium non verificatur per se in recto de principiatis predicatione dicente 'hoc est hoc'; sed genus verificatur per se de speciebus in recto predicatione dicente 'hoc est hoc'; ergo non potest esse princip- ium earum. Maior patet in omnibus per in- ductionem, ut de materia et forma: cum enim caro et anima sint principium homi- nis, male diceretur 'homo est caro' vel 'homo est anima' vel 'cultellus est ferrum'; sed homo est ex corpore et anima, et cultel- lus ex ferro. Minor patet de se, quia dicitur 'bos est animal'; ergo etc. |
| 1.2A // 1.1B | Item, illud quod est idem essen- tialiter cum specie non est prin- cipium eius, quia idem non est principium sui ipsius; modo ge- nus est idem essentialiter cum specie; ergo non est principium suarum specierum. | Quia quod est idem in essentia cum aliquo non est eius principium; sed genus est es- sentialiter idem cum suis speciebus; ergo non est principium ipsarum. Maior patet, quia principium et principiatum debent dif- ferre, quia causa et principium idem <sunt>, ut dicitur quinto Metaphysice; sed causa est ad cuius esse sequitur aliud, ita quod effectus est aliud a sua causa. Minor patet, quia superius est idem cum inferiori, cum sit de essentia sua.</sunt> |
| 2.1A // 2.1– 2B | Oppositum arguitur, quia quod ponitur in diffinitione alicuius est principium ipsius; modo ge- nus ponitur in diffinitione spe- ciei; ergo est principium suarum specierum. Maior patet, quia dif- finitio /ed c1.vb/ includit princi- pia rei; minor patet de se. | In oppositum est Porphyrius, qui dicit quod genus est principium suarum specierum. Et arguitur ratione, quia unumquodque dif- finitur ex suis principiis diffinitur; sed spe- cies diffinitur per genus; ergo genus est principium suarum specierum. Maior patet, quia diffinitio exprimit partes rei, ut dicitur septimo Metaphysice, ubi dicitur quod par- tes diffinitionis sunt partes rei; ergo videtur quod genus sit pars diffinitionis, cum pona- tur in diffinitione speciei, et per consequens est principium reale. |

MARMO

| § | A (ed c1.va–b) | B (N 64vb; Br 48r) |
|-------------|--|----------------------------------|
| 2.1.1 -2 | Et si dicatur: verum est quod ge- nus est principium suarum spe- cierum quantum ad diffinitionem et non quantum ad rem; contra: quia partes diffinitionis sunt partes rei; ergo oportet quod ge- nus sit pars realis ipsius speciei. | |
| | | |

Table 8. Textual comparison

The A version, in particular, is shorter in its justification of the major premise and does without exemplifications (which however are taken up in the *determinatio*). A similar thing happens with the other preliminary argument ($\S1.2$). In the arguments *in oppositum* ($\S2.$) we find the first relevant divergences: the A version ignores the authoritative reference to Porphyry in $\S2.1B$, and lets the rational argument of $\S2.2B$ be followed by an objection and a reply. There are also differences in the *determinatio* ($\S3.$):³⁴ in the A version (again more succinct) its two main points are followed by a *notandum* that is almost completely missing in the B version:

Est tamen notandum quod aliqui volunt quod genus non solum est principium intellectus diffinitionis speciei, immo est etiam principium intellectus speciei, ita quod intellectus speciei, ut volunt—et hoc ponitur communi-

³⁴ I omit another *notandum* which is only in **N** and is probably to be attributed to Hytpibbius, as it takes up a distinction between two meanings of *principium* which seems to be taken from the commentary of Simon of Faversham: "notandum, secundum Philosophum quinto Metaphysice, duplex est principium: quoddam est principium reale ut ex quo res realiter componitur, sicut materia et forma; aliud est principium rationis sive cognitionis, sicut superius in linea predicamentali est principium cognoscendi suum inferius." Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 13, 39.

ter—, sit aggregatus ex intellectu generis et intellectu differentie. Istud tamen non credo, immo /**O 5va**/ credo quod intellectus speciei sit eque simplex sicut intellectus generis vel differentie.³⁵ *Et de hoc alias videbitur*.³⁶

The B version, within the first argument in support of the second point of the *determinatio* (§3.2.1B), affirms:

Minor declaratur, quia species dicit intellectum compositum ex intellectu generis et differentie, ut aliqui dicunt aut dicit simplicem intellectum in se continentem virtute intellectum generis et differentie, sicut compositum virtute continet elementa: sic *dicunt* quod species est essentia simplex, virtute mixtum. Semper tamen hoc est certum, quod genus cum differentia perficit speciem et eius diffinitionem (...).³⁷

In the B version, Radulphus Brito seems not to have yet taken a position on the problem of the simplicity or composition of the concept of species (intellectus speciei), adopting at most the model of the virtual presence of the elements in a mixture (and probably referring it to others: *dicunt*); a clearer position emerges instead in the A version which refers to a subsequent discussion. This suggests, again and more decisively, the chronological priority of B over A, not on the basis of the relative dimensions of their questions, but rather of a theoretical development not yet seen on the horizon in the B version, but which the author will present in a near future (Et de hoc alias videbitur), as he says in the A version, once he has developed his own position. The question on the simplicity or composition of the concept of species is in fact discussed in three works all of which are, probably later than both versions of the question on Porphyry: q. 9 on Physics I, q. 8 on Aristotle's Topics VI and, what is probably Brito's last discussion of the matter, q. 35 on Posterior Analytics I. In those texts no mention is made of the virtual presence of the elements in the mixture as

³⁵ This passage is also present in **Br** (48v), which—as previously mentioned—picks from both versions very freely: the fact that it is missing in **N** is, in my opinion, very important, as will be clearer a little further on.

³⁶ Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 12A, ed c1.vb (italics are mine).

³⁷ Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 12B, N 65ra; Br 48v (italics are mine).

an explanatory model, but rather Brito opts for the thesis of the simplicity of the concept of species (equal to that of all simple concepts, such as those of genus and difference), like in the A version. In all these questions Brito addresses a crucial node of the theory: how to derive two simple concepts, the species and the specific difference, from the same *apparens* or *modus essendi*, which for the human species consists in the operation of *intelligere* or *ratiocinari*.³⁸ There is no space here to develop the analysis of his discussion; however, as I will try to show in what follows, this is not the only point on which the A version appears to have advanced further than B in the direction of positions developed in other later works.

4.3 A Genus with Only One Species (qq. 13A e 13B) and the Meaning of Terms such as 'Animal'

Questions 13A and 13B are dedicated to a topic addressed in many other commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* from the second half of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th: whether a genus can be preserved (ontologically, conceptually and semantically) in the (hypothetical) case that only one of its species exists; or, according to a different formulation, whether a genus necessarily requires the existence of multiple subordinate species.³⁹ The two versions are (again) quite different: as Roos (1974, 329)

³⁸ See Radulphus Brito, *Questiones super libros Physicorum*, I.9, mss Firenze, BNC, Conv. Soppr. 1.E.252, ff. 4vb–5rb; Città del Vaticano, BAV, Lat. 3061, ff. 67rb–vb; *Questiones super Topica Aristotelis*, VI.8, mss Paris, BNdF, Lat. 11132, ff. 47rb–48ra; **Br** 268r–269v; **S** 238va–239va; *Questiones super libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, mss Paris, BNdF, Lat 14705, ff. 82va–83ra; **Br** 404vb–407ra; **S** 73rb–74rb. I hope to be able to write something about this in the near future.

³⁹ See Martin of Dacia, *Quaestiones super Porphyrium*, q. 18, ed. H. Roos, Hauniae, GEC Gad, 1961, 143; Peter of Auvergne, *Quaest. sup. Porph.*, q. 12, in Tinè 1997, 294; Anonymus Matritensis, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 16, ms Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España, 1565, 15vb–16ra; Anonymus Basileensis, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 12, in Marmo 2021, 309–11; Durandus (different from Durandus of Auvergne), *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 13, ms München, Staatsbibliothek, Clm 18917, pp. 6a–b; Simon of Faversham, *Questio*-

pointed out, the B version contains an explicit reference to a subsequent question that is to discuss the problem of the meaning of genus, i.e., of generic terms such as 'animal', and such a question only appears in the B version, not in A^{40} Whether this is sufficient to hold that the B version is later than the A version is a point to which I shall return in a while (§ 4.5). First, let us make a detailed comparison between the two versions of q. 13.

Stripped of Hytpibbius' interpolations, q. 13B is a little shorter than q. 13A: (2098 words vs. 2484), Why is this?

In §1, the A version, in addition to the three arguments of the B version, offers a fourth one,⁴¹ and §2.A also has an argument of its own that refers to a passage in Aristotle's *Topics* IV (128a13–19), and thus offers Brito an opportunity to resume the discussion later in the context of questions on that book.⁴² In both cases the two texts of A could represent an addition over a previous version of the text. The *determinatio* (§3.) follows the same scheme in both versions, being divided into three points (although **N** presents an evident gap in their enumeration).⁴³ Concerning the second point (the meaning of generic terms such as 'animal'), B limits itself to two paragraphs (§§3.2.1–2, about 260 words), whereas this point is much

nes super libro Porphyrii, q. 20, ed. P. Mazzarella, Padova, Cedam, 1957, 38–40; Durandus of Auvergne, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 9, ms Palermo, Bibl. Comunale, 2 Qq D 142, 5rb; Gentilis of Cingoli, *Quest. sup. Porph.* q. 8, ms Palermo, Bibl. Com., 2 Qq D 142, 76vb; John Duns Scotus, *Quaest. sup. Porph.*, q. 18, 113–19; and, after Brito, Bartholomew of Bruges, *Quaestio utrum genus possit salvari in una species*, in Pattin 1968, 139–150; Hugo de Traiecto, *Quest. sup. Porph.* q. 10, ms Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1363, 75va–76ra. As indicated by Roos (1974, 328–32) Radulphus Brito discusses the same problem in his *Questiones super Topica Aristotelis*, IV.8 (see also Pinborg 1975, 85) and in his *Sophisma "Homo est animal"*, ms Paris, BNdF, Nouv. Acq. Lat. 1374, 96vb–98ra.

⁴⁰ The question was published as q. 25 in Roos 1978, 55–61.

⁴¹ Cf. Roos 1974, 335.

⁴² Cf. Roos 1974, 336.

⁴³ Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 13B, N 66ra: "Hec tria declarantur per ordinem: primo primum, scilicet quod genus quantum ad rationem potest salvari in unica specie, <***> quia supposito quod genus <non> significet suas species, sed significet aliquid quod est principium rationis a quo sumitur intellectus et ratio generis—et de hoc magis videbitur quando queretur de hoc— <***>." The internal reference is to the question published as q. 25 in Roos 1978, 55–61.

more developed in the A version (about 630 words). The reason why A accords greater space to the second point may be that, as opposed to the B version, it has no question dedicated specifically to the problem of the so-called *significatum generis*, and so Brito felt the need to give a more indepth account of it in qu. 13A.⁴⁴ Although missed by Roos (1974), the A version actually also contains a reference to a question about the *significatum generis* due to be treated in another context. To find the reference we need to jump to the beginning of the questions on the *De specie* chapter. The introduction to q. 15A in fact says:

Consequenter queritur circa capitulum de specie, quia adhuc illa /L 19rb/ que essent querenda circa genus essent de significato generis et *de hoc autem videbitur alias*, primo igitur queratur, quia dicitur in littera quod species predicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid, [queratur] utrum species possit predicari de individuo per se.⁴⁵

Once again, the reference seems to be to Brito's questions on Aristotle's *Physics* and *Topics*, where the question about the *significatum generis* is actually part of a series of questions that develop the two presuppositions referred to in the question discussed in the B version: *Quest. sup. Phys.* VII, q. 11 (*u. genus sit unum secundum suam formam in diversis speciebus*), q. 12 (*u. genus sit unum secundum rationem*), q. 13 (*quid est quod genus significat, vel illa multa que sunt in re vel illud unum secundum rationem*);⁴⁶ *Quest. sup. Top. Ar.* IV, q. 2 (*u. genus sit aliquid unum in re*),

⁴⁴ The same happens in Brito's *Sophisma* (referred to above, n. 39), which devotes a short digression to this issue (see references in Ebbesen and Marmo 2024, 30 and 34–35).

⁴⁵ Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 15A, ed c4.vb; italics are mine. The text quoted is based on a collation of L 19ra–b, M 142vb, P 7va and Pd 11ra. V₁ 75vb (which usually joins this group) has lost the passage due to a homeoteleuton. Another group of mss (O 6rb; S 9vb; V₂ 11vb; V₄ 22v) has the verb in the past tense ("de hoc *fuit visum* alias"); two other mss omit any reference (Br 51r and V₃ 17v). For a discussion on this passage and its variants, see Ebbesen and Marmo 2024, 35–42. I hope to write something about it in the near future.

⁴⁶ Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Phys.* VII.11–13, mss Firenze, BNC, Conv. Soppr. 1.E.252, ff. 52va–54ra; Città del Vaticano, BAV, Lat. 3061, ff. 119va–120vb.

q. 3 (*u. genus sit aliquid unum secundum rationem*), q. 4 (*u. genus significet unum secundum rationem vel utrum significet multas species*).⁴⁷ The relevant fact is that before referring to the discussions present elsewhere, Brito affirms that at that point, before moving on to discussing the species, it would have been necessary to deal with the question of *significatum generis*; he therefore makes an implicit reference to an organization of the matter that he knows very well—because it is the one he himself adopted in a maybe previous version of his questions on Porphyry (i.e., the B version)—but which is not traditional.⁴⁸ This reference to the question of the *significatum generis*, in my opinion, strengthens the plausibility of the hypothesis of the chronological priority of the B version over A, which the previous reference to the *Quest. sup. Top. Ar.* of q. 12A had already suggested.

4.4 A Species with Only One Individual (qq. 14A e 14B)

The problem addressed in q. 14, in both versions, is an oft-recurring theme in the commentaries on Porphyry from the second half of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th, that is, whether a species can be preserved even by the existence of a single individual (on the hypothesis that some-

⁴⁷ Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Top. Arist.* IV.2–4, mss Paris, BNdF, Lat. 11132 f. 39va–41rb; **S** 229va–231va; **Br** 254va–257va. The two assumptions that Brito uses in the B version in support of his *determinatio* correspond to the two initial question of both series: 1) from an ontological point of view, genus has no being and no unity (*genus realiter non est aliquid unum*); 2) a genus, however, is a unique concept, and derives its unity from the ways of being on which the concept (as *modus intelligendi*) depends (perceive and move, *sentire et moveri*) (cf. Roos 1978, 57). As shown in Ebbesen and Marmo 2024, 30–35, Radulphus Brito changes idea on this matter from his *Quest. on the Boethius' Liber divisionum* (q. 5Br)—where a more traditional (and simple) position is adopted—and his *Quest. on Porphyry* in the B version (= q. 25 in Roos 1978).

⁴⁸ Brito is the only logician, to my knowledge, who proposes this question among the 13th century commentators on Porphyry that I could take into consideration (see n. 39. above).

how all other individuals of that same species cease to exist) or, in an alternative formulation, if a species requires a plurality of individuals.⁴⁹ The problem probably has its roots in the logical discussions of the first half of the 13th century, concerning universally quantified species terms, that is, whether for anything to be correctly predicated of a universally quantified species it is required that the species is instanced in at least three individuals; that discussion, in turn, was occasioned by Porphyry's definition of *species specialissima* as that which is predicated of several things differing in number.⁵⁰ The two questions that Radulphus Brito devotes to the problem are nearly the same size (A: 1173 words; B: 1225).

The first two arguments *quod non* are almost identical (apart from some additions that, occurring only in **N**, are probably attributable to Hytpibbius), but in the following ones an interesting divergence occurs: the A version puts forward four arguments, the last two of which are not in **N**, whereas **N** adds three completely different ones. It is worth noting the behavior of **Br** in this regard:⁵¹ while for the first two arguments it comes closest to **N**, it completely ignores the existence of the three arguments peculiar to **N** (which are therefore attributable to Hytpibbius) and therefore follows the standard version, at least up to the beginning of the *determina-tio*. This suggests that the copyist of **Br** had both versions at his elbows,

⁴⁹ See Simon of Faversham, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 26, 46–49; Durandus of Auvergne (ms Palermo, Bibl. Comunale, 2 Qq D 142, f. 6vb–7ra); the Anonymus Basileensis (q. 14, in Marmo 2021, 314–17); and, after Brito, Hugo de Traiecto (q. 13, ms Le₂ = Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 1363, f. 77ra–)—the last one is particularly interesting, since he knows and criticizes Brito's commentary. See also Peter of Saint Amour, *Sententia supra librum Porphyrii*, ms Paris, BNdF, Nouv. Acq. Lat. 1374, f. 4va.

⁵⁰ See for instance Braakhuis 1977, 124, with reference to William of Sherwood and Roger Bacon, who discuss of the right use of the universal quantifier *omnis* and distribution with reference to both species and genera. The problem continued to be discussed in the second half of the 13th c. in *sophismata* with the title OMNIS PHOENIX EST; see list in Ebbesen and Goubier 2010, vol. 2, 362–70.

⁵¹ In particular for some corrections made to the text common to the two versions (**Br**/**N**: "species est unum in multis et dicitur (*add. s.l.* **Br**) de multis... universale est unum in multis et dicitur (*add. s.l.* **Br**) de multis"; A: "species est unum in multis et de multis... universale est unum in multis et de multis").

and in particular the B version without Hytpibbius' manipulations, and that he chose what to transcribe now from one, now from the other, in a very free way. This also strongly suggests that choosing **Br** as *dux* in any edition of Brito's logical works might be a bad move: it cannot be trusted.⁵²

In short, the A version presents two extra arguments over and above the B version: these may well be additions to an earlier version of the text. The first, in particular, is an argument also present in other commentaries that focuses on the parallelism between the relationship that exists between a *genus* and its *species*, on the one hand, and a *species* and its individuals, on the other: just as the *genus* cannot be preserved in a single *species*, the same holds for the *species* with respect to its individuals.⁵³ Unfortunately, due to a probable authorial oversight, there is no reply to this argument in the witnesses of the A version.⁵⁴ As well as in other commentaries, the

⁵² Ms **Br** was probably produced for use in a 15th-century school that followed *via Thomae*, and some effort seems to have gone into *editing* the constituing texts as opposed to merely copying them from exemplars.

⁵³ "Item, solet argui sic: sicut se habet genus ad speciem, ita se habet species ad individuum; modo genus non potest salvari in unica specie; ergo species non poterit salvari in uno individuo." (ed c4.ra). Cf. Anonymus Basileensis, *Quest. sup.Porph.*, q. 14, § 1.1, in Marmo 2021, 314; and Hugo de Traiecto, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 13: "Quia sicut se habet genus ad species, ita se habet species ad individua; sed genus non potest salvari in unica specie, ut dictum est superius; quare etc." (Le₂ 77ra).

⁵⁴ All manuscripts agree on this *lacuna*. The same argument, however, is used in the corresponding question of the commentary on Aristotle's *Topics* (IV.8) and finds this reply: "*Ad 1.4* Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'sicut se habet species ad individuum ita genus ad speciem', est ut sic, est ut non: in hoc est simile quod sicut unum est superius respectu alterius, ita aliud respectu alterius; sed in alio est dissimile, quia genus dividitur per differentias formales in species, sed sic non est de specie, quia dividitur per differentias materiales; ideo non fuit simile." (ms. Paris, BNdF, Lat. 11132, f. 44ra; **S** 234vb–235ra; **Br** 262rb–263ra). Cf. Hugo de Traiecto, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 13, probably inspired by Brito: "Quando dicitur 'sicut se habet genus ad species, sic species ad individua', dico quod est simile et dissimile: simile est in hoc quod sicut unum est superius ad inferius sic et aliud; sed dissimile est in alio, ut dictum fuit prius, quia genus dividitur per duas differentias formales quas impossibile est salvari in unica specie, sed sic non est de specie, quia species non dividitur per duas differentias formales, sed accidentales; et ideo non oportet." (Le₂ 77va). On this debate and its ontological, cognitive and semantic implications, see Marmo 2022.

second additional argument is based on Porphyry's definition of *genus*. The two arguments *in oppositum* in the two versions also match each other: the first cites the exceptional examples of the moon and the sun (classical instances of species with a single individual, together with the phoenix); the second is a reference to the chapter of the *Posterior Analytics* (A.5) in which Aristotle identifies an error that consists in attributing a property to an individual instead of the universal, when that universal has only one individual, like the sun or the world.

The *determinatio* is then divided into two parts. This happens in both versions. In the A version it consists of two §§, the first of which offers the solution in a compact and unitary way, while the second establishes a premise for the reply to the initial arguments (*quod non*). In the B version it consists of two arguments, each followed by a confirmation (*Et confirmatur*), the two arguments corresponding exactly to the content of the solution in the A version, while there is nothing to match the two confirmations; we can, however, be certain that they are not the work of Hytpibbius, for they are also attested by **Br**.⁵⁵ If one compares the single argument in the A version with the two in the B version (see Table 9), one notices the same phenomenon seen above when comparing qq. 1A and 1B: the two distinct arguments in B are found united in a single one that takes into account both the ontological aspect (*intellectus*), which in B are instead separate.

⁵⁵ To Hytpibbius, however, can be attributed two further arguments, not attested by **Br** and maybe added to complete the *determinatio* (**N** 66va–b).

| §§ | A (ed c4.ra–b) | B (N 66va) |
|---------------------------|--|---|
| 3.1aA // 3.1.1 B | Quia in illo salvatur species in quo salvatur quicquid pertinet ad eius essentiam et totus eius intel- lectus, quia non sunt plura ibi in specie quam ista; modo tota es- sentia speciei et totus eius intel- lectus salvatur in unico individuo; ideo etc. /L 20va/ Maior patet de se. Minor declaratur accipiendo exemplum in homine, quia quic- quid importat 'homo' salvatur in Socrate, quia 'homo' importat ag- gregatum ex materia et forma pertinente ad speciem; modo, So- crates omnia ista includit: includit enim materiam, sicut carnes et ossa, et etiam formam humanam que est anima humana. | Et probatur, quia in illo potest salvari spe- cies in quo potest salvari materia et forma \que/ pertinent ad illam speciem; sed in unico individuo salvatur materia et forma \que/ pertinent ad speciem; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia cum ex materia et forma salvetur essentia alicuius rei in quo illa salvatur et ipsa res. Minor ostenditur: in Socrate enim, dato quod non sit ali- quod aliud individuum sub homine nisi Socrates, in eo salvaretur materia et forma pertinens ad hominem qui est spe- cies, quia Socrates habet carnes et ossa, que sunt materia hominis, et habet ani- mam humanam que est forma eius. () (<i>a confirmation follows, based on a passage</i> <i>from Themistius' preface to his paraphrase</i> <i>of the</i> De anima, <i>often cited by Brito</i>) |
| 3.1bA // 3.2.1 B | Et totus intellectus hominis in- cluditur in Socrate: sive enim in- tellectus hominis sit simplex sive aggregatus ex intellectu ge//neris et differentie, sicut ex ratiocinari et sentire, totum istud includitur in Socrate; et sic de quolibet alio individuo respectu sue speciei. | Item, (idem arguitur alia ratione sic, et est sumpta ex predictis quasi quantum ad unum eius membrorum, quia <i>add</i> . N , pro- bably <i>H</i>) illud cuius tota essentia et intel- lectus potest salvari in aliquo, illud potest in eodem salvari; sed tota essentia et in- tellectus speciei salvatur in unico indivi- duo; ideo etc. Maior patet de se. Minor declaratur, quia quidquid pertinet ad esse hominis sicut materia et forma hominis potest salvari in Socrate, ut patet ex dic- tis, et etiam intellectus hominis salvatur in Socrate, quia illa ex quibus sumitur in- tellectus hominis, sicut sentire et ratioci- nari, salva <n>tur in Socrate: Socrates enim per se sentit et ratiocinatur, ut de se patet; sed ex istis sumitur ratio et intellec- tus hominis; ideo etc. (<i>a confirmation fol- lows, based on Avicenna's</i> Logic)</n> |

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Table 9: Textual comparison

The text has probably undergone a reworking that goes in the direction of a more compact and less verbose rewriting.

The section containg replies to the arguments *quod non*—save for the third, which is missing—mirrors the order of the first section. The replies to the arguments common to A and B (§§1.1 and 1.2) are quite similar, as is the final digression which starts from an objection concerning the exceptions of the sun and the moon: these entities, although having the possibility (*potentia*) of existing in many individuals, do actually only exist in one individual and therefore render that possibility useless (*frustra est potentia que non reducitur ad actum*); this leads on to the question how we can know that the moon and the sun are universals when they only have a single individual. Again, A's treatment of these two points is more succinct than that of the B version (here witnessed only by N) (A: 460 words, B: 508).

What can be concluded from this further comparison? Certainly, the fact that A presents two additional arguments (in §1.), unknown to Hytpibbius, suggests the priority of B over A, although the treatment of the other arguments is generally more concise in A than in B. A further minimal detail, moreover, might confirm the posteriority of the A version with respect to B. The second argument *quod non* in N in fact says: "Item, de ratione totius est habere plures partes; sed species est quoddam totum; ideo debet habere plura individua, et sic non ergo potest salvari in unico individuo"; the A version instead includes the expression *plura individua* as an alternative to a reading more consistent with the argument (concerning whole and parts): "ergo debet habere plures partes *sive plura individua*".⁵⁶ This may again suggest that when producing the A version Brito felt a need to improve the formulation of the argument he had used in B.

4.5 CATs, the Uni(ci)ty of Substantial Forms and the Two or Three Additional Questions in the B Version

As mentioned above, there are other points on which Brito changed his mind, taking a different position in the two versions or developing a new

⁵⁶ N 66va; ed c4.rb.

position with respect to a particular issue. The first, and best known, concerns the meaning of concrete accidental terms (CATs), on which Brito, in many passages of the commentaries on the *Ars vetus* (in particular the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*), refrains from taking a position.⁵⁷ His theory is in fact fully developed only in his *Quest. sup. Top. Arist.* III.1–2, which is thus probably to be considered later than both versions of the questions on the *Ars vetus.* In this case, however, no differences are found between the two versions.⁵⁸

A second problem is that of the meaning of the term *individuum*, discussed in qq. 20A and 20B. Here an argumentative development is seen in the A version, where Brito makes clearer the need for a position in favour of the unity/unicity of the substantial form, essential to account for the semantic function of the terms that fall under the same category, from *substantia* (supreme genus) to *Socrates* (individual).⁵⁹ This position, fully accepted in the *Quest. sup. Top. Arist.*, occasions a significant evolution between the B and the A version. And this also applies to a (bizarre) additional question of the B version. Unlike what Roos (1978) claims, in N

⁵⁷ See, for instance, Radulphus Brito, *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 11A: "de hoc ad presens non curo, utrum scilicet intentio concreta dicat aggregatum ex re et intentione vel solam intentionem in habitudine ad rem, et universaliter de quolibet termino accidentali concreto utrum dicat solam formam in habitudine ad subiectum vel totum aggregatum ex subiecto et accidente." (ed b4iv.va; cf. de Rijk 2005, 680).

⁵⁸ On CATs, in general, see Ebbesen 1988; the two questions on Aristotle's *Topics* are published in Ebbesen 1986, 92–94 and 95–103. In *Quest. sup. Porph.* q. 20A, Brito holds a position which is very close to the one adopted in his commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*, that is, CATs signify the subject/substrate and their form, *utrumque sub ratione propria*: "sicut autem non est in hoc quod est 'homo albus', quia 'homo albus' dicit hominem et album utrumque sub ratione propria." (ed d1.vb). In the B version the argumentation (*ad impossibile*) is less developed and does not use the example of *homo albus*; the whole argumentation in support of his position is actualy the following: "Dico quod individuum quantum ad esse reale includit aliquod accidens, sed ipsum in suo significato non includit, quia species per se predicatur de individuum de suo significato includeret aliquod accidens, tunc species per se in primo modo dicendi per se non predicaretur de ipso; ergo etc." (N 71rb).

⁵⁹ On this point, see Marmo (forthcoming).

there are not only two additional questions that would characterize the B version with respect to A, but three: in addition to those on the meaning of genus (q. 25 Roos) and on the possibility of knowing a genus through knowing a real apparens or modus essendi (q. 44 Roos),⁶⁰ another one also stands out as at least partially authentic: the one relating to the unity/plurality of substantial forms (*u. sit dare gradus in formis*) which comes immediately before the last one published by Roos (1974). As I have previously pointed out (Marmo 2018, 196-98), the structure of this question is decidedly anomalous: first of all, because it does not offer any determinatio, which suggests that at the time he composed the B version Brito had not yet decided which position to take.⁶¹ First, the quod sic arguments are listed (seven), then the quod non arguments (four) and, skipping the expected determinatio, the text proceeds to replying to the first series of arguments. Then the same structure is repeated, with more arguments for the negative part (five, plus the repetition of the first four) and replies to the arguments quod non. The most likely hypothesis is that Brito drafted the first series of arguments and replies,⁶² and that Hytpibbius added (with extensive repetitions) further arguments to the first series, as a sort of exercise. Such a complex question could not be circulated further and thus it is quite understandable that it is completely missing from the A version. But why were the other two (qq. 25 and 44 Roos) eliminated, assuming that the A version is later than B?

As regards q. 25 (Roos), the one on the meaning of the genus, its absence is justified by Brito's decision, suggested by the passage from the beginning of q. 15A on Porphyry quoted above, to move the discussion

⁶⁰ Roos 1974, 62–64.

⁶¹ This feature would make it chronologically closer to the last version of Brito's *Quaest. sup. lib. Div.* (q. 5Br: *u. genus significet plures naturas vel unam*, in Ebbesen and Marmo 2024, 93–96), where he leaves open both options, with a preference for the plurality o forms ("quia tutius est... ponere plures formas substantiales in eodem composito, sicut faciunt ponentes gradus in formis", p. 95)

⁶² The fact that the replies are only directed against the affirmative answer may indicate the beginning of a rethinking with respect to what was opted for in his *Quaest. sup. lib. Div.* in the Br-version (see previous footnote).

from the questions on Porphyry to elsewhere in order to put it in a broader context, and, in fact, the topic is dealt with at several points both in his *Quest. sup. Phys.* and in his *Quest. sup. Top. Arist.*⁶³

As regards q. 44 (Roos), the one about the possibility of knowing the *genus* on the basis of its *apparens*, two facts seem relevant to me: (i) the discussion on this topic is resumed, in a broader and more articulated way in his *Quest. sup. De an.* I.8, under a slightly different title: *u. accidentia ducant in cognitionem substantiarum*;⁶⁴ (ii) in this same *quaestio* reference is made to the position the author once held (*istam viam alias tenui*),⁶⁵ where *ista via* is exactly the view held in q. 44 (Roos). So, in this case, a change of opinion motivates the elimination of the question from the standard version (A) of *Quest. sup. Porph.* together with the need to broaden the discussion by examining other positions alternative to 'Brito's own (*primam viam magis credo esse veram*).⁶⁶ The relationship between the B version and the questions on the *De anima*, therefore, is clear: the latter are more recent; the chronological relationship between the questions, though.⁶⁷

5 Conclusions

From what has been said above, some conclusions can be drawn:

1. Quantitative criteria (relative length) are not useful to establish whether one version of Brito's *Quest. sup Porph*. precedes the other: the B version is not always the longer, but only in less than two thirds of the

⁶³ See Ebbesen and Marmo 2024, 29–42.

⁶⁴ Cf. de Boer 2012, 299–306.

⁶⁵ de Boer 2012, 303.

⁶⁶ de Boer 2012, 305.

⁶⁷ In at least one case the questions on the *De anima* refer specifically to logic (*logica vetus*): cf. *Quest. sup. De an.*, I.6, in de Boer 2012, 286 ("de hoc alibi super logicam plenius est discussum", concerning *secundae intentiones*); in other cases (q. I.7, 295–96) the reference is implicit but certain, being the principle of individuation under discussion (cf. *Quest. sup. Porph.*, q. 21A, ed d2.va–d3.vb; q. 21B, N 70rb–71rb).

questions.

- 2. In about a third of the questions, the A version has a longer text.
- 3. When the A version has the shorter text, this becomes explicable once a detailed comparison of the argumentation in the two versions is performed.
- 4. However, evaluating the significance of difference in length between the A and B versions is not simple. For one thing, it is sometimes very difficult to distinguish Hytpibbius' contribution from Brito's in B, and for another, in A Brito declaredly strove to make the argumentation terser and more effective.
- 5. Yet, in some cases, the A version actually adds arguments and articulations, often in the shape of polemics against other positions, that evince a broadening of views and greater maturity as compared to the B version.
- 6. The A version, consequently, is very likely later than the B version and was meant to supplant it. Furthermore, both precede Brito's *Quest. sup. Phys.* and *Quest. sup. Top. Arist.*, while only the B version certainly precedes his *Quest. sup. De an.* I;
- 7. The need for a thorough revision of *Quest. sup. Porph.* likely emerged not only because the author had changed his mind on a number of points, but also because he probably wished to release his work for public dissemination. In the latter respect he was quite successful, the A version obtaining a notable diffusion, in particular in Italy.

These are of course provisional conclusions, although in my opinion highly plausible. They may be confirmed or falsified through a thorough examination of the witnesses and a detailed comparison of the questions in both versions which I hope to be able to present in the near future in the context of a critical edition of both versions of Brito's *Questiones super libro Porphyrii*.

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Abbreviations

AHDLMA = Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge CIMAGL = Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin

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