

Three Versions of an Essay Entitled *On Syllogism* Attributed to either Neilos Kabasilas or Nikolaos Chamaetos Kabasilas*

Nikos Agiotis

1 Introduction

1.1 A (Very Short) Tale of Two Scholars

Neilos Kabasilas (ca. 1300 – 1363) and Nikolaos Chamaetos Kabasilas (1319/1323 – after 1391) were two of the most eminent scholars of fourteenth-century Byzantium. Both belonged to the anti-Latin faction. Neilos is known to have been a renowned theologian familiar with Thomas Aquinas' works and also as an ardent adherent of Gregorios Palamas (perhaps after 1341). Towards the end of his life Neilos succeeded Palamas as Archbishop of Thessaloniki, holding the post from 1361 to 1363. Nikolaos was born in Thessaloniki, was Neilos' nephew and received his education from his uncle whom he followed to Constantinople. Nikolaos showed a strong interest in the study of Aristotelian philosophy and, in particular, in Thomism. Although a competent theologian and a candidate for the patriarchal throne at Constantinople (1353), he did not follow a career as a prelate and avoided explicitly opposing Palamas, nor was he as openly hostile to the Latins as his uncle. Yet, he seems to have been greatly devoted to his uncle, for he took the latter's last name in addition to his patronymic Chamaetos.¹

*I am grateful to Professor Sten Ebbesen for his valuable corrections and comments.

¹There is extensive literature on both scholars. On the life and works of Neilos Kabasilas see *PLP*, n. 10102; Mantzanas 2016; Kapriev 2019. On Nikolaos Chamaetos Kabasilas see *PLP*, n. 30539; Kapriev 2011; Demetracopoulos 2019; Theodoropoulou 2019; Hadjiafxenti 2021, pp. 6–18.

1.2 An Essay on Syllogism

The text on Aristotelian logic that I examine in this paper (hereafter OS), principally deals with the content of the first three treatises of the *Organon* and it is transmitted in three versions (hereafter OS I, II, III). The versions of OS do not exhibit any originality. As is the case with other similar Byzantine opuscula,¹ they were written with an exclusively didactic purpose in mind, namely to serve as an introduction to the elementary study of Aristotelian syllogistic. However OS I–III provide us with the opportunity of witnessing a compilation of a Byzantine compendium of logic ‘in the making’. The structures of each of the OS versions are as follows (the numbering of chapters, sections etc. follows the numbering of the edited texts in the second part of this article):

OS I Five chapters roughly corresponding to the content of:

1. Porphyry’s *Introduction* (Busse 1887, pp. 1.18–13.5).
2. *Cat.* 4.
3. *Int.* 1–6.
4. *APr.* I 1–2.
5. *APr.* I 1, 4–6. This final chapter includes sections on:
 - 5.1 The moods of the three figures of the categorical syllogisms.
 - 5.2 The complete or perfect nature of the first figure and the methods for the completion or perfection of the other two figures by reduction to the first.

¹See, for instance, the *Συνοπτικὸν σύνταγμα φιλοσοφίας* by the so-called *Anonymus Heiberg* (Heiberg 1929, pp. 1–50; see Ebbesen 1981, pp. 264–265; Barnes 2002, pp. 98–100, 98–100), the *Epitome logica* by Nikephoros Blemmydes (Wegelin 1605; see Ebbesen 1981, p. 330) and the *Synopsis of Syllogisms* which has been transmitted anonymously as a rule. However, the latter work is in some cases ascribed to either Georgios Choïroboskos or Michael Psellos (Moore 2005, pp. 248–249; see also below p. 36 n. 15), whereas John Philoponos or Leon Magentenos are mentioned in a few codices as the authors of the section on the hypothetical syllogisms. I am currently preparing a critical edition of this text. On compendia and other literary genres used by Aristotelian scholarship in Byzantium see Trizio 2017, pp. 405–411.

5.3 Metatheoretical remarks on the properties of each figure.

5.4 Guidelines on finding the kind and the mood of a categorical syllogism.

OS II This incomplete version includes:

1. A short introductory note followed by four chapters roughly corresponding to the content of:
 2. *Cat.* 4
 3. *Int.* 1–6
 4. *APr.* I 2
 5. *APr.* I 4–5. This final chapter includes two sections on:
 - 5.1 The moods of the first syllogistical figure.
 - 5.2 The moods of the second syllogistical figure.

OS III The final version includes:

1. An introductory note followed by four chapters covering:
 2. *Cat.* 4
 3. *Int.* 1–6
 4. *APr.* I 2
 5. The syllogisms.
 - 5.1 A section on the categorical syllogisms in *APr.* I 4–6 comprising:
 - 5.1.1 A presentation of the three figures:
 - 5.1.1.1 The moods of the first figure and their diagrammatic representations.
 - 5.1.1.2 The moods of the second figure, their reductions to the first figure and their corresponding diagrams.

- 5.1.1.3 The moods of the third figure, their reductions to the first figure and their corresponding diagrams.
- 5.1.2 Metatheoretical remarks on the properties of each figure.
- 5.1.3 Guidelines for finding the kind and mood of a categorical syllogism.
- 5.2 A section on the hypothetical syllogisms.

Table 1 (p. 5) offers a comparative as well as quantitative overview of the three OS versions presenting their sections along with each's respective word count. The quantitative information, as well as further pertinent qualitative aspects, hint at a change of teaching objectives. The author's focus changes gradually from a general examination of the first three treatises of the *Organon* towards a more syllogism-oriented study. The introductory notes of OS II and III, which highlight the syllogism as the main subject of the essay, have probably replaced the section on Porphyry's *Introduction* present in OS I. The sections on *Int.* in OS II and III appear significantly reduced when compared with their respective passage in OS I. Furthermore, differences in OS III mainly relate to four aspects. Firstly, the chapter on categorical syllogisms has been increased. Secondly, the presentation of imperfect syllogisms has been made more coherent; the respective sections comprise both the presentation of the mood and its proof. In contrast, in OS I proofs are only mentioned after the introduction to the fourteen valid moods, while OS II is incomplete and does not transmit these sections. Thirdly, additional indirect proofs have been inserted.¹ Fourthly, a chapter on the hypothetical syllogisms has been added. As a final observation, OS II seems to be an early draft of OS III rather than a fragment of an in-its-own-right intermediary OS version.

1.3 In the Realm of Conjecture: The Author or the Authors of the OS Versions

The authorship of the OS versions appears to be less clear than their textual evolution. Common kinship, the same last name (and perhaps first name too),² as well as shared intellectual interests could well have lead to erro-

¹See below OS III, nn. 14, 16, 18, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31.

²Older scholarship has suggested that Neilos' secular name must have also been Nikolaos based upon a misinterpreted passage in Ioannes VI Kantakouzenos' *Historiae*

Content	OS I	OS II	OS III
Introductory note	–	24	54
On Porphyry's <i>Introduction</i>	446	–	–
On <i>Cat.</i> 4*	139*	118*	156*
On <i>Int.</i> 1–6*	860*	654*	690*
On <i>APr.</i> I 2*	71*	81*	56*
On the first two figures of the categorical syllogisms*	347*	396*	665*
On the third figure of the categorical syllogisms and on the proofs of imperfect syllogisms	1176	–	1242
On the properties of the syllogistical figures	83	–	118
On finding the figure and the mood of a categorical syllogism	192	–	303
On hypothetical syllogisms	–	–	459
Subtotal*	1417*	1249*	1567*
Total	3314	1273	3743

Table 1: Comparative and quantitative overview of the OS versions. References and numbers with an asterisk (*) concern sections transmitted by all three versions.

neous attribution.¹ OS I is preserved in a single codex and attributed to Nikolaos.² OS II has been transmitted incomplete in two codices. In one of them the text was copied with the later addition of the name of Niko-

(Schopen 1832, p. 275.5–6). This view is rejected by modern research since the text in question is an indication of the candidacy of the younger Kabasilas for the patriarchal throne (*PLP*, n. 30539). However, this does not exclude the possibility that both the religious and the secular name of Neilos began with the same letter, as continues to be usual in the Orthodox Church.

¹It seems that this would not be the only pertinent incident; according to Demetropoulos 2019, p. 187, Nikolaos' *Against Gregoras' Nonsense* is sometimes ascribed to Neilos. However, I was not able to find the source of this information. The text is edited in Garzya 1954, pp. 524–532.

²See below section 1.4.1.

laos, whereas in the other witness there is no mention of the author.¹ OS III was copied in six manuscripts and later translated into Latin. It seems that the common ancestor of the witnesses to OS III ascribed this text to Neilos Kabasilas.²

To be sure, Neilos would have been perfectly capable of penning all three versions of OS. After all, the essay was a school text and he was a teacher. He was familiar with logic too. Even a cross-reading of the introduction to his treatise *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* gives an idea of how well he was acquainted with the Aristotelian syllogistic.³

Some sort of shared authorship or collaboration between uncle and nephew should not be excluded either. It is attested that Neilos interfered in the writing of one of his nephew's works, which Nikolaos was then 'convinced' to revise.⁴ It would not be out of the question that Neilos interfered again in the case of OS whose final version was then 'published' under Neilos' name. There is absolutely no reason to reject the validity of the information provided by the only witness of OS I that Nikolaos was indeed the author of this text. Similarly, Neilos could be the redactor of both OS II and III as is suggested by the close content similarities between these two versions⁵ and by the explicit ascription of OS III to him. I think, however, that Nikolaos should be considered as the main, if not the sole, contributor in the writing of OS. I shall try to highlight some points that are in favour of the latter hypothesis.

Nikolaos withdrew from the political and ecclesiastical scene after 1354 and it would not have been unheard of or unexpected from a man with his prominence to have become a teacher. Moreover, when one compares Neilos' pro-Palamite agenda and his subsequent hostile stance against secular learning (he wrote only theological treatises) with Nikolaos' appreciation of Aristotelian philosophy and, in particular, logic,⁶ then the latter appears to be a more suitable candidate for the authorship of OS. In this regard, the

¹See below section 1.4.2.

²See below section 1.4.3.

³Beside the several syllogisms that are discussed in this treatise, see also the following citations to the *Analytics*: Candal 1945, §§ 20.6, 24.3, 37.7, 39.11, 49.9.

⁴Kotzabassi 2003, p. 192.

⁵See p. 4. The earlier of the two copies of OS II has been transmitted anonymously; see below section 1.4.2.

⁶For a selection of philosophically interesting works by Nikolaos Kabasilas see Demetracopoulos 2019, p. 187.

content of Nikolaos' two opuscula *Question on the Value of Reason*¹ and *Against Things Said by the Accursed Pyrrho in Regard to Whether There is a Criterion of Truth*² is very telling. The purpose of the former work is to “test the typical and real validity” of Gregorios Palamas' arguments concerning secular wisdom after forming them into syllogisms.³ In the second treatise Nikolaos examines the validity of the sceptical arguments.⁴ The first step towards these goals, however, would have been to study the elements that make up a syllogism, namely terms and propositions, and then the theory of syllogism itself. These subjects are examined in Aristotle's *Cat., Int.* and *APr. I* respectively and constitute (beside some variations including Porphyry's *Introduction* and *SE*) the standard logical course at Byzantium.⁵ *Cat., Int.* and *APr. I* are also the core content of all three versions of OS.

Furthermore, and with regard to cited non-secular or theological sources, we should mention two quotations from orations 19 and 42 by Gregory of Nazianzus (also known as Gregory the Theologian) that are introduced as examples in OS I and II.⁶ A third passage employed in orations 38 and 45 by Gregory is used for the formation of two categorical syllogisms and their diagrammatic representation in two of the manuscripts of OS III. In the latter case, however, both diagrams are only indirectly related to the content of OS III.⁷ Gregory was, of course, a very popular author in Byzantium and several Byzantine scholars cited his works or penned texts dedicated to him.⁸ Nevertheless, it was Nikolaos, not Neilos, who authored an encomium of the Cappadocian Fathers (Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus),⁹ and excerpts from Gregory of Nazianzus' orations are the only theological source mentioned in OS.

The scarcely represented tradition of OS I and OS II, as well as the older witnesses of the apparently wider disseminated OS III may be dated – albeit

¹Demetracopoulos 1998, pp. 55–57. See also p. 64 n. 4.

²Demetracopoulos 1999, pp. 18–20. See also p. 64 n. 3.

³Demetracopoulos 1998, pp. 62–63; on the relation between Nikolaos' text and Palamas' *Triads* see also Polemis 1993.

⁴Demetracopoulos 1999, p. 308.

⁵Ebbesen 1981, p. 257; Barnes 2002, pp. 99–100; Erismann 2017, pp. 363–364.

⁶See below OS I, vv. 63, 64–65; OS II, vv. 26–27.

⁷See diagrams 29, 30 in the edition of OS III and on p. 65 the relevant n. 34.

⁸See, for instance, Linardos 2005, pp. 55–76.

⁹Hadjiafxenti 2021, pp. 149–155.

very roughly – to the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century. From these palaeographical findings we may infer that (a) the intervening period of time between the first and the final version of OS would not have been a long one; (b) scholars reasonably showed most interest in the final text. If one were to accept that Neilos is the author of OS, then one would also be forced to admit that almost three or four decades after his death (d. 1363) a sudden disinterest in OS I and OS II set in, but within a short period of time, or perhaps almost simultaneously, interest increased in the final version of OS. In other words, if Neilos were the author of all three versions of OS, then the latter work followed (probably) decades after Neilos' death a reception pattern rather more expected of works of living authors. While this possibility cannot of course be dismissed, I find it much more probable that Nikolaos, who was still active in 1391, authored all three versions of OS and that the completed task, namely OS III, received the attention of readers during Nikolaos' final years or not long after his death.

An additional element in support of Nikolaos' authorship may be the unproven hypothesis that the codex Meteor. Barlaam 202 should be considered as Nikolaos' autograph.¹ The hypothesis is based on the fact that besides the anonymously transmitted excerpt from OS II it contains a large number of that scholar's works and it may, at least partially, be dated to the fourteenth century.² Although this argument appears to be weak, in fact recent research has shown that sections of the codex might be an autograph by Nikolaos³ who seems to have been prone to revising his texts, resulting in the creation of multiple versions of some of them.⁴ Be that as it may,

¹Without detecting that codices Vind. Theol. gr. 210 and Meteor. Barlaam 202 actually transmit two versions of the same text (OS I and an excerpt of OS II respectively), John A. Demetracopoulos initially ascribed both texts to Nikolaos because of their "Cabasilian" content (Demetracopoulos 1998, p. 60 n. 21). In his monograph on Nikolaos' *Contra Pyrrhonem*, the author seems (on grounds of similarity of content once more) to be in favour of the excerpt's authenticity, but he is uncertain about the authorship of OS I (Demetracopoulos 1999, pp. 49, 168 nn. 99–100). In a recent publication Demetracopoulos simply mentions that OS I was probably written by Neilos Kabasilas (Demetracopoulos 2019, p. 187).

²See below section 1.4.2.

³On the dating of the codex to the fourteenth century see Laurent 1936, pp. 188, 199; Kotzabassi 2003, pp. 189 n. 9, 190 n. 13, 193–194; on the dating of Meteor. Barlaam 202 to the fifteenth century see the description of G. A. Papadimitriou in Sofianos 1984, p. 305.

⁴See, for instance, Ševčenko 1960; Kotzabassi 2003, pp. 190–194.

another interesting feature of Meteor. Barlaam 202 is a text that was copied under the title *Headings of the Chapters of Aristotle's Book the Organon*. The latter paratext is actually a 'table of contents' comprising thirty-three headings (ἐπιγραφαί) which seems to be a draft or to refer to the chapters of a logical compendium rather¹ than to the treatises of the *Organon*. This compendium – if ever written – must have been more extensive than OS III;² its headings, as generic and typical as they are, hint at respective passages in OS, particularly in OS III.³ In addition, there exists one further short, anonymous text on the difference between demonstrative (δεικτική) and circular proof (διάλληλος δεῖξις) in Meteor. Barlaam 202, f. 177v. This may be attributed to Nikolaos.⁴

1.4 The Textual Tradition of OS

1.4.1 OS I

The earliest version of OS is found in Vind. Theol. gr. 210, ff. 398v–407r (= T), a codex that is dated to around 1400 and principally transmits the treatises of Nikolaos Kabasilas (ff. 1r–166v). The rest of the codex (ff. 167r–398r) contains various theological texts that relate mostly to topics addressed during the Hesychast controversy.⁵ Scribe d, in Hunger's description,⁶ is responsible for the addition of the title and the attribution of OS I to Nikolaos, as well as for some of the corrections in T. The latter copyist was probably contemporary with the main scribe of T.

¹The text has been edited in Papageorgiou 1985, p. 229. This publication is hard to find and in addition the printed text contains several errors. A new edition may be found in the Appendix of this article. Titles 1–5 refer to introductory themes; titles 6–8 relate to the content of *Cat.*; titles 9–32 apparently pertain to *APr.*; title 33 concerns the content of *SE*.

²See also Demetracopoulos 1999, pp. 41, 163–165 n. 77. The author attributes the headings to Nikolaos and considers them to be a draft of an epitome which the latter was perhaps planning to write. In a recent publication, however, Demetracopoulos deems that this list of titles was probably written by Neilos (Demetracopoulos 2019, p. 187, 187).

³See Title 31 (p. 69) and the edited text in OS III, vv. 5–6, 292–293.

⁴Demetracopoulos 1999, pp. 48, 167–168 n. 95.

⁵Hunger and Lackner 1992, pp. 44–50; Diktyon, n. 71877.

⁶Hunger and Lackner 1992, p. 49.

1.4.2 OS II

There are two manuscripts transmitting parts of OS II:

- Meteor. Barlaam 202, f. 2rv (= M)
- Vat. gr. 1852, ff. 366r–368v (= D)

The codex from Barlaam Monastery contains, with only a few exceptions, works by Nikolaos. It comprises four codicologically and paleographically distinct units, namely the folia of four different codices that were merged together. M is an anonymously copied fragment of OS II (vv. 80 κατά]φασις – 134) belonging to the first of the aforementioned codicological units.¹ The dating of the hands in the codex to either the fourteenth or to the fifteenth century is a controversial subject that is in need of further examination.² I incline towards dating the scribe of M to the fourteenth century. On the other hand, D is a miscellany with rhetorical, logical, mathematical, astronomical, astrological, theological and ethical content.³ The scribe is Isidoros (1380/90 – 1463), Metropolitan of Kiev and later Cardinal and titular Latin Patriarch of Constantinople.⁴ A quantitative comparison between OS II and the other two versions shows that D transmits in all probability less than half of OS II (see Table 1 on p. 5).

Dependence of M on D can be excluded. There are errors in D that are not found in M which, albeit more fragmentary, transmits overall better readings than D.

- 91 θατέρου M : θάτερον D
- 92 κατηγορηται M : κατηγορειται D
- 96 πρώτου M : τρόπου D
- 108 καὶ – καταφατικῆς M : om. D ex homoeoteleuto

Besides these erroneous readings, D transmits several spelling errors and a couple of trivial omissions (initial letters that the scribe probably wished to supplement later but never did).

There are also the following conjunctive errors:

¹Sofianos 1984, pp. 300–301.

²On the content, date and paleographical features of the codex see p. 8 and, especially, p. 8 n. 3. See also *PLP*, n. 41097. I am thankful to Father Barlaam for providing digital copies of the manuscript's folia.

³Canart 1970, p. 336; Diktyon, n. 68481.

⁴*PLP*, n. 8300; *RGK* 3, n. 258.

- 112 οὐδεις – λίθος conieci : πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἄρα οὐσία
MD
- 129–130 τὸ λευκὸν – οὐ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ conieci : ὁ (ὁ
om. D) Αἰθίοψ οὐδενὶ λευκῶ· ὁ ἄνθρωπος τινὶ λευκῶ·
ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα οὐ παντὶ Αἰθίοπι MD

I would not exclude the possibility that M and D depend on a now lost manuscript. However, I would consider it more likely that M was the template of D before the mutilation of the former.

1.4.3 OS III

The tradition of the final version of OS includes the following manuscripts.

- Ambr. A 185 sup., ff. 214r–218v (= G). OS III was copied by Michael Lygizos who was active as a scribe during the seventh and the eight decades of the fifteenth century in Crete.¹ The Ambrosianus contains also the commentaries by Simplicius and John Philoponus on Aristotle’s *De anima* and *APr.* respectively.²
- Par. gr. 2489, ff. 80r–88r [1r–9r] (= C). This codex is a miscellany comprising ten paleographically as well as codicologically distinct sections or units with mathematical, poetical, historical, epistolographical, rhetorical, philosophical, astronomical and logical content (14th – 17th centuries).³ In the middle of f. 88r (9r), right after the end of the section of OS III, there is a bilingual title in Greek and Latin in the hand of Manouel Chrysoloras (ca. 1350 – 1415).⁴ According to recent paleographical research, this group of twenty-nine sections, of which C is one, belonged to Chrysoloras.⁵ This fact should also provide the *terminus ante quem* for manuscript C. The *terminus post quem* is given by the quire’s watermarks which may be dated to the end of the fourteenth century.⁶

¹Martinelli Tempesta 2013, pp. 108, 133, 140; *RGK* 3, n. 465; *ACMGE* 2, n. 38.

²Martini and Bassi 1906, pp. 90–91; Diktyon, n. 42274.

³Omont 1888(a), pp. 268–269; Diktyon, n. 52121; see also the detailed online description of the codex in Weddigen 2016.

⁴Zorzi 2002, p. 115; *PLP*, n. 31165.

⁵Zorzi 2002, pp. 107–109; on this list of manuscripts see also Rollo 2002.

⁶Weddigen 2016.

- Par. gr. 2762, ff. 285r–292v (= P). Beside OS III, the codex includes rhetorical, theological, mathematical, ecclesiastical, lexicographical content copied by a single (anonymous) scribe. From the manuscript’s watermarks we may infer that it was copied in the first third of the fifteenth century.¹
- Rom. Ang. 30, ff. 197r–203v (= F). The codex contains portions of Porphyry’s *Introduction*, *Cat.*, *Int.* and *APr.* I 1–7, as well as commentaries on these texts; it was copied almost in its entirety by Joseph Philagrios during the last decade of the fourteenth century in Crete (according to his notes on ff. 117v and 138v, Philagrios included his own commentaries on *Cat.* and *Int.* in 1393 and 1395 respectively). OS III is the work of an anonymous contemporary scribe and its watermarks are similar to patterns dated to 1387.² It seems that the respective quire suffered hardships before it was bound into the codex, since there are two cases of text loss (between ff. 199 and 200; 201 and 202; see p. 14). The missing text hints at a lost bifolium, which in turn means that the quire containing OS III was certainly not a quadrifolium.³
- Vat. gr. 1735, ff. 211v–218r (= V). The codex comprises four thematic sections; one section is devoted to works with theological, liturgical and hagiographical content, a second to rhetoric, a third to *Int.* and a collection of logical compendia on the *Organon* as well as minor essays on relevant issues, and a final fourth section to a collection of works on Aristotle’s natural philosophy. The manuscript should be dated to the middle of the sixteenth century based upon the watermarks of its folia.⁴
- Vat. Reg. gr. 116, ff. 83r–86v (= R). The codex contains Por-

¹Omont 1888(b), p. 37; Diktyon, n. 52398; Cariou 2013.

²Reinsch 1967; Papazoglou 2008, pp. 140–182.

³Cf. Reinsch 1967: “... 1 × 8 - 1 (Blatt 8 fehlt) (203) ...”. If – besides the lost bifolium – the last leaf of the quire is also missing, as suggested by Reinsch, and if the correct place of f. 203 is between ff. 201 and 202, then there are the following possibilities for the quire: (a) it was a senifolium missing leaves 4, 11 and 12; (b) it was a quadrifolium missing its second leaf (after f. 199 and before the missing bifolium) and had a bifolium (ff. 197–198) attached before its first leaf (f. 199); (c) the previous quadrifolium had two loose folia (ff. 197, 198) attached to its first leaf (f. 199).

⁴Gianneli 1961, pp. 129–136; Diktyon, n. 68364.

phyry's *Introduction* and the treatises of the *Organon*, as well as respective commentaries, compendia, individual scholia and paratextual material.¹ OS III was copied by an anonymous collaborator of the Metropolitan of Selymbria Philotheos (1362–1389).²

- A Latin translation of OS III (= s) published by Giovanni Battista Rasario (Lyon 1547) along with other commentaries on Aristotle's *Organon* translated into Latin.³

Manuscripts C P There are common errors in C and P that suggest the existence of a common ancestor, the now lost manuscript *β*:

15–16 ποιὸν – μέλανες om. ex homoeoarcho
 235 τῶν F G R V : τῶ C P
 330 οἷος F G R V : οἶον C P
 336 ὁ¹ om. C P

Both manuscripts transmit separative errors, although C was very carefully copied. It contains comparatively few errors and is the most complete witness in regard to both text and diagrams. Here follow errors in C which are not to be found in P:

12 β' supra ποσόν et α' supra ποιόν add. (scilicet ποιόν, ποσόν) C
 72 post οὐ πᾶς add. καὶ C
 78 καὶ ἡ P F G R V : ἡ δὲ C
 79 ἐναντίως δηλονότι P, F G i.m. R V : ὑπεναντίως C
 (ὑπ- in textu, -εναντίως i.m.)
 176 πάλιν om. C
 181 τῶ² P F G R V : τῶν C
 187 μόνον P F G R V : μόνου C
 239 καὶ om. C

¹Stevenson 1888, pp. 81–83; Agiotis 2021, pp. LVII–LVIII; Diktyon, n. 66286.

²PLP, n. 29896; Gioffreda 2020, p. 179; Pausillo 2022, pp. 333–334.

³See Rasario 1547, pp. 262–270.2 for OS III; an anonymous essay on Porphyry's *Introduction* and the *Organon* was printed right after OS III (Rasario 1547, pp. 270.3–278) giving, thus, the impression that both texts formed a single work. The Greek template of the same anonymous work was also copied after OS III in Ambr. A 185 sup., ff. 218v–223r).

262 post δευτέρου add. σχήματος C
 264 post ἴδια add. δὲ C
 320 τίθεμεν P F G R V : τίθενται C

Unlike C, the probably younger P exhibits many errors; its scribe tried to ‘improve’ the text. Of the many errors in P I only record those that belong to the *saut du même au même* type:

62 Σωκράτης – ἀπόφασις om. P ex homoeoarcho
 75–76 ἡ δὲ – ἀποφατική om. P ex homoeoteleuto
 131 λέγω – τῷ om. P ex homoeoteleuto
 231–232 ἀντιστραφείσης – τῶν Γ om. P ex homoeoteleuto
 241 τὸ B – A² om. P ex homoeoteleuto

The Text in F G s F G and s exhibit the following conjunctive error:

41 ἦ – τινος om. F G s ex homoeoteleuto

F lacks two relatively large chunks of the text that are transmitted by both G and s (vv. 110–155 συνάγων – συμπέρασμα; 241–277 καὶ οὐδενὶ – μέσος). The older F is the ancestor of both G and s. The Greek text in G and s was copied before the loss of text had taken place in F. Among the common errors of F and G, several are clearly due to conjectures in the former manuscript:

29 post ἀπὸ add. τοῦ F G
 83 προστιθέμενον τὸ C P R V : προστιθεμένου τοῦ F G
 83–84 ἀρνητικὸν C P R V : ἀρνητικῆς F a.c. : ἀρνητικοῦ
 F p.c., G
 165 δὴ C P, F a.c. R V : δὲ F p.c. G
 175 B² C P R V : A F G (this error was corrected in s)

F does not transmit the following conjunctive errors present in G and s:

58 τὰς δὲ – θατέρου om. G s ex homoeoteleuto
 79–80 ἡ δὲ – ἀποφατικὴν om. G s ex homoeoteleuto (see
 also the critical apparatus on v. 79 ἐναντίως δηλονότι)
 227 τὸ B ἄρα – ἀδύνατον om. G s ex homoeoarcho
 329 ἦ φυτὸν – ζώοφυτον om. G s ex homoeoteleuto

Moreover, diagrams 13–16 (concerning the moods of the second figure and their proofs) and 23–28 (visualizing the moods of the third figure and their proofs) were omitted in both G and s.

Besides transpositions of text, Rasario introduced some syntactic adaptations in his translation:

35 ὁ προστακτικός, ὁ ἐρωτηματικός C P F G R V : interrogationes, iussus s

48 εἰς κατηγορούμενον καὶ ὑποκείμενον C P F G RV : in subiectum et praedicatum s

231 ὁ γ'ος C P F G R V : Nunc ad Tertium convertat oratio nostra s

238 ὁ δ'ος C P F G R V : consequens est ut Quartum quoque approbemus ac primum s

245 ὁ ε'ος C P G R V : De quinto nunc dicendum est s : deest in F

267 καὶ ἀποφατικά καὶ καταφατικά C P G R V : vel aientes vel negantes s : deest in F

296 εἶρηται C P F G R V : multa dicta sunt nobis s

299 Οἶον C P F G R V : ut hoc exemplo perspicium et planum fiat s

Finally, there are two interesting variants with regard to G F s. The first of them concerns the title of OS III:

C = Τοῦ ἁγιωτάτου καὶ μακαρίου πατρὸς ἡμῶν Νείλου, ἀρχιεπισκόπου Θεσσαλονίκης· περὶ συλλογισμοῦ

P = Τοῦ μακαριωτάτου Θεσσαλονίκης τοῦ Καβάσιλα σύνοψις περὶ συλλογισμοῦ

F = ... σύνοψις π...αλύειν αὐτούς¹

G = Νείλου σύνοψις περὶ συλλογισμῶν

s = Nili De Ratiocinationibus, liber

R = Περὶ συλλογισμοῦ

V = Ἐτέρου τινὸς σπουδαίου ἐπιτομή, εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὀργάνου πραγματεῖαν

¹Parazoglou 2008, p. 163 reads Τοῦ [ἁγίου] πατρὸς ἡμῶν Νείλου ἀρχιεπισκόπου Θεσσαλονίκης σύνοψις περὶ συλλογισμῶν [πῶς δεῖ] ἀναλύειν αὐτούς. See also p. 64 n. 1.

It seems that part of the title was already erased in F when the scribe of G was completing his task. In all likelihood he could read a little more than what the reader of F may discern with the naked eye today. The reading in s is the Latin translation of what the copyist of G was able to read in Greek in F.

The next variant is the following:

79 ἐναντίως δηλονότι P R V, F G i.m. : om. s : ὑπεναντίως
(ὑπ- in textu, -εναντίως i.m.) C

The variant was in all probability copied in the margins of F and G, but was omitted altogether in s.

Manuscripts R V With regard to the last two text witnesses of OS III there are conjunctive errors in R and V, and also errors in V that are clearly due to the errors in R (see below the readings in vv. 167, 313).

47 δὲ C P F G : γὰρ R V
52 τὰ om. R V
53 οἶον om. R V
54 δὴ om. R V
101 μὲν οὖν C P F G : γοῦν R V
167 οὐδενὶ ἄρα C P F G : cancel. R : om. V
173 ἔσται τὸ A τινὶ τῷ Γ om. R V ex homoeoteleuto
255 τὸ B ἄρα παντὶ τῷ A om. R V ex homoeoteleuto
309 ὅδε ὁ C P F G : ὁ δὲ R V
313 ante ἐστὶ add. οὐκ R i.m., V in textu

A dependance of R on V can be excluded. This is because V is younger than R and the few errors or additions in R (see vv. 96, 182, and vv. 107, 143, 191 respectively) that are not transmitted in V could have easily been corrected or omitted in V. Furthermore, V has its own separative errors that are not, of course, to be found in R.

12–13 κείσθαι, ἔχειν C P F G R : ἔχειν, κείσθαι V
18 ἄ χρόνον C P F G R : ἄχρονον V
74 οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λούεται om. V ex homoeoteleuto
89 τρίπος C P F G R : τρίτος V

- 127 λαβεῖν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου C P G R : τοῦ ὑποκειμένου
λαβεῖν V : deest in F
279 συλλογισμὸς C P F G R : συλλογιστικὸς V
334 ἀνάγεται τὸν τρόπον C P F G R : τὸν τρόπον ἀνάγεται V

Contamination or Manuscript α There are traces of possible contamination in the descendants of manuscript β . Let us first examine a common variant between the older descendant of β , namely C, as well as R.

- 132 οὐκ ἔστιν C, R s.l., V : om. G P : deest in F

The omission of οὐκ ἔστιν is a conjunctive error due to haplography which is reproduced in both G and the younger descendant of β , that is P. It would be reasonable to assume that the error occurred in F and (at least *in textu*) in β , thus in the archetype as well. Nevertheless, the correct reading was copied *in textu* in C and supplemented *supra lineam* in R (and then *in textu* in the descendant of the latter manuscript V). In my opinion, there are four explanations that may explain the occurrence of the correct reading in C and R:

1. οὐκ ἔστιν was supplemented in C and R independently. This explanation seems to me, however, less probable than the following three.
2. οὐκ ἔστιν stood *supra lineam* in both β and R, and thus in the archetype too.
3. οὐκ ἔστιν was a successful conjecture in R, that was then directly adopted by C.


The fourth explanation – and in my opinion the most probable – is a partial combination of the second and the third explanations which is related to the following common variants between P and R/V:

- 20 περὶ οὐσίαν C F G R : περιουσίαν P V
33 οἷοι C F G R : οἷον P V
120 ἄψυχον P V : ζῶον *in textu*, ἄψυχον s.l. R : ζῶον C
G : deest in F
163–164 τὸν β'ον τρόπον C F G R : τοῦ β'ου τρόπου P V

V is younger than P, and both P and R transmit two peculiar diagrams (29 and 30 in the edition) before and after the chapter on the hypothetical syllogisms, respectively. These diagrams are not found in the descendant of R, namely V. It is therefore reasonable to assume that all the six variants (text and both diagrams) shared by P and R/V are due to a lost member of the lineage between R and V, namely α . The erroneous variants could have easily been corrected in C. The assumption for the existence of α brings us to the already mentioned fourth explanation with regard to the occurrence of οὐκ ἔστιν in C:

4. The reading was a successful conjecture in R. The reading was transmitted *supra lineam* first in α and then in β , whose scribe occasionally consulted α . Afterwards, οὐκ ἔστιν was transmitted *in textu* in C, but not at all in P.]

The presentation of the genealogy of OS III may then be concluded by the following *stemma codicum*.



1.5 Editorial Conventions

All three versions of OS have been divided into sections and titles (in Latin) introduced in order to highlight the structure of the text and thus facilitate

its better understanding. The latter paratextual material is not, of course, included in the line numbering of the text. Spelling errors that do not render a different meaning and errors of accentuation have been tacitly corrected, but not registered in the apparatus criticus. Iota subscripts have been inserted. Cardinal and ordinal numbers have been supplied as words rather than Greek numerals. The punctuation has been standardized.

In regard to the critical edition of the fragmentary OS II, D has been employed for the text not transmitted by M; the remainder of the edited text is based on M.

The text in β F and R has been used for the edition of OS III. The text of β can be reconstructed where C and P agree, or where C or P agrees with F/G and/or R. Readings of C or P are noted in the critical apparatus (a) in cases where these two manuscripts agree neither with each other nor with F/G or R, or (b) when they offer plausible or interesting conjectures. This criterion applies in the cases of the other two *codices descripti*, G and V, too. G has been employed in the place of F for passages not transmitted by the latter manuscript.

The edited text is followed by an apparatus of manuscripts (in OS II and OS III), a critical apparatus, an apparatus of sources (in OS I and OS II) and an apparatus of diagrams.

*Overspecified*¹ versions of the syllogistic diagrams have been employed. I have used colors (see “other conventions” below) in order to denote my additions and / or deletions of diagrammatic material and associated wording. Variant readings of terms, letters and quantifiers are registered in the corresponding note to the apparatus of diagrams, after being marked by means of superscripted exponents in the diagram.

In regard to composite second or third figure diagrams that include at least one direct or indirect proof, I have opted for the presentation of the different readings in groups:

- Different readings in the wording of the diagram of the to-be-proved

¹Namely, versions including all relevant diagrammatic elements and wording (terms, letters, quantifiers etc.) according to the respective passages in the text of the edition. An alternative presentation would have been to have used *underspecified* diagrams which would have included only the absolutely necessary geometrical features and text for their visualization (e.g. by avoiding repetition of quantifiers, curved lines for the presentation of conclusion-conversions etc.). On the terms *overspecification* and *underspecification* in regard to diagrams see Acerbi 2017, pp. 244–246. On the implications of these terms on the visualization of syllogistic diagrams see Agiotis 2022, pp. 79–80.

syllogism are printed after the indication *Mod.* (= *modus*).

- Different readings in the wording of the diagram of the direct proof are introduced after the indication *Prob.* (= *probatio*).
- Different readings in the wording of the diagram of an indirect proof through the opposite (contradictory or contrary) of the major premise of the to-be-proved syllogism are placed after the indication *Imp. Ma.* (= *ductio per impossibile ex opposito maioris*).
- Different readings in the wording of the diagram of an indirect proof through the opposite (contradictory or contrary) of the minor premise of the to-be-proved syllogism are noted after the indication *Imp. Mi.* (= *ductio per impossibile ex opposito minoris*).

Finally, the edition of each one of the three versions of OS is followed by their respective notes. Unless indicated otherwise, all cross-references in the notes concern the respective version of OS.

Abbreviations, *Signa*, Editions and Other Conventions

a.c. = ante correctionem

add. = addidit, addiderunt

cancel. = cancellavit

cf. = confer

Cod. = apparatus of manuscripts

Crit. = critical apparatus

Diagr. = apparatus of diagrams

diagr. = diagramma

eras. = erasit

Font. = apparatus of sources

gl. = glossa

iter. = iteravit

om. = omiserit / omiserunt

p.c. = post correctionem

s.l. = supra lineam

suppl. = supplevit

v., vv. = versus, versus

< > = additions introduced in the text by the editor

{ } = deletions introduced in the text by the editor
|= folio change in OS I or change in regard to the text
witnesses transmitting OS II / OS III
... = illegible passage

Ar. Nu. = Wilson 2007, pp. 132–202
Gr. Naz. Or. 19 = Migne 1857, cols. 1043–1064
Gr. Naz. Or. 42 = Bernardi 1992, pp. 48–115
Hom. Il. = West 1998
Hom. Od. = West 2017

blue = deletions of diagrammatic elements and / or respective wording in the diagrams by the editor
red = additions of diagrammatic elements and / or respective wording in the diagrams by the editor

2 Edited Texts

2.1 OS I

1 Τοῦ σοφωτάτου κυροῦ Νικολάου τοῦ Καβάσιλα, Περί συλλογισμοῦ f. 398v

1. De praedicabilibus¹

Ἄτομόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν ἀριθμῶ· οἷον «ὄδε ὁ ἄνθρωπος» καὶ «ὄδε ὁ ἵππος»
3 καὶ «τόδε τὸ δένδρον».

Εἶδος ἐστὶν οὔτινος ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐφαρμόζει πολλοῖς ἀτόμοις ὁμοφύεσιν·
5 οἷον «ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος»· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὀρισμὸς ἐφαρμόζει πολ-
λοῖς ἀτόμοις ὁμοφύεσιν· ἐφαρμόζει γὰρ τῷ Σακράτει, τῷ Πλάτωνι καὶ τοῖς
7 ἄλλοις κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώποις· ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ καθόλου ἵππος καὶ ἡ καθόλου
ἐλαῖα.

9 Γένος ἐστὶν οὗ ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐφαρμόζει πολλοῖς εἶδεσιν· οἷον «τὸ ζῷον»·
ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ζῷου ὀρισμὸς ἐφαρμόζει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τῷ ἵππῳ, τῷ βοί, τῷ κυνί,
11 ἄτινά εἰσιν εἶδη.

Γένος γενικώτατόν ἐστιν ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο γένος, οὔτινος ὁ ὀρι-
13 σμὸς <μὲν> κατὰ πολλῶν γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, κατ' αὐτοῦ δὲ
οὐδενὸς ὀρισμὸς ἄλλου κατηγορεῖται· οἷον «ἡ οὐσία»· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀρισμὸς
15 αὐτῆς κατὰ πολλῶν γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται (καὶ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τοῦ
σώματος, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ζῷου καὶ τοῦ ἀψύχου,
17 ἄτινα γένη εἰσὶ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δέ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ κυνός καὶ τοῦ
βοός, καὶ πάντων, ὅσα εἰσὶν οὐσίαι), κατ' αὐτῆς δὲ ἄλλου τινὸς ὀρισμὸς
19 οὐ κατηγορεῖται. Διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο γένος ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν καθο-
λικώτερον αὐτῆς· καθολικώτερον γὰρ ἐστὶ τί τινος, ὅταν ὁ ὀρισμὸς αὐτοῦ
21 κατ' ἐκείνου κατηγορηθῆται, οὐκέτι δὲ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν· οἷον τὸ ζῷον καθολι-
κώτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμὸς τοῦ ζῷου κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
23 κατηγορεῖται, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὀρισμὸς οὐ κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ ζῷου.

Γένος μὲν οὖν γενικώτατόν ἐστιν οὗ οὐδὲν καθολικώτερον, | εἶδος δὲ f. 399r
25 εἰδικώτατον οὗ <ὁ> ὀρισμὸς ἀτόμοις πολλοῖς ἐφαρμόζει μόνον, οὐ μέντοι
καὶ εἶδεσιν· οἷον «ὁ ἄνθρωπος»· ὁ γὰρ ὀρισμὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τῶν
27 μερικῶν ἀνθρώπων μόνον κατηγορεῖται.

Τὰ δὲ καλούμενα γένη καὶ εἶδη ὑπάλληλά εἰσιν ὧν ὁ ὀρισμὸς μὲν πολ-
29 λοῖς εἶδεσιν ἐφαρμόζει, γενικώτατα δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἄλλο γένος
καθολικώτερον αὐτῶν, ὃ ἐστὶν τὸ γενικώτατον· οἷον τὸ σῶμα καθολικώ-
31 τερον μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ ζῷου, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἔχει καθολικώτερον ἑαυτοῦ· καὶ

Crit. 1 Τοῦ σοφωτάτου – συλλογισμοῦ suppl. T² || 13 μὲν addidi || 25 ὁ addidi

εἶδος μὲν λέγεται πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν, γένος δὲ πρὸς τὸ ζῶον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
τὸ ζῶον πρὸς μὲν τὸ σῶμα εἶδος ἐστὶ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον γένος. 33

Ἴδιόν ἐστιν ὃ μόνῳ ἐνὶ εἴδει πρόσεστι καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
τὸ γελαστικόν, ὃ καὶ κυρίως ἴδιον λέγεται. 35

Διαφορὰ ἐστὶν ἧ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων τὰ εἶδη τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος·
οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἵππου· διαφέρουσι γὰρ ἀλλήλων τῷ λογικῷ καὶ τῷ 37
ἀλόγῳ· τούτων γὰρ ἐκάτερον διαφορὰ λέγεται.

Συμβεβηκός ἐστιν ὃ ἐν τινὶ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ εἶναι ἔχον οὐ παραλαμβάνε- 39
ται ἐν τῷ ὀρίσμῳ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου· οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ σώματι σχῆμα καὶ χρῶμα
ἢ τὸ καθῆσθαι ἢ τὸ ἴστασθαι. Τῶν δὲ συμβεβηκῶτων τὰ μὲν γίνονται καὶ 41
ἀπογίνονται, τὰ δὲ ἀχώριστά εἰσιν· ἢ γὰρ σιμότης ἢ <ἢ> γριπότης ἢ τοῦ
κόρακος τὸ μέλαν ἢ τὸ τῆς χιόνης λευκόν οὐ χωρίζονται τῶν ὑποκειμένων. 43

1. De praedicamentis²

Δέκα εἰσὶ τὰ γενικώτατα γένη, εἰς ἃ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀνάγονται· οὐσία, 45
ἢ τις πᾶσα οὐσίαν περιέχει (οἷον «ἄνθρωπον», «βοῦν», «κύνα», «λίθον»,
«δένδρον»)· ποσὸν ὑφ' ὃ πάντα τὰ ἀριθμούμενα καὶ μετρούμενα (οἷον 47
f. 399v «ἀριθμός», «χρόνος», «γραμμὴ», «ἐπιφάνεια», | «σῶμα»)· ποιὸν ὃ πάντα
περιέχει τὰ ποιὰ (ποιὸν δὲ ἐστὶ, καθ' ὃ τι τοιόνδε τι λέγεται· οἷον «σῶμα
λευκόν» ἢ «λόγος ἀγαθός» ἢ «ξύλον εὐθύ»)· πρὸς τι δὲ εἰς ὃ ἀνάγονται 49
πάντα τὰ πρὸς ἄλλο λεγόμενα (οἷον «πατήρ», «υἱός»· «δοῦλος», «δεσπό-
της»)· ποῦ δὲ πάντα περιέχει τὰ ἐν τόπῳ, καθόσον ἐν τόπῳ εἰσὶν (οἷον 51
«ἐν ἀγορᾷ», «ἐν οἰκίᾳ»)· πότε τὰ ἐν χρόνῳ (οἷον «χθές», «πέρυσσι»)· κεί-
σθαι τὰ θέσιν ἔχοντα (οἷον «καθῆσθαι», «ἴστασθαι»)· ἔχειν τὸ ὑποδέχεσθαι 53
(<οἷον> τὸ «ὠπλίσθαι», τὸ «ἐνδεδύσθαι») καὶ ὄλως πᾶσαν οὐσίαν περι-
οῦσίαν περίθεσιν· ποιεῖν ὃ περιέχει πᾶσαν ἐνέργειαν (οἷον τὸ «τέμνειν», τὸ 55
«γράφειν», τὸ «καίειν»)· πάσχειν (<οἷον> τὸ «τέμνεσθαι», τὸ «καίεσθαι»).

3. De enuntiatione

Πᾶσα δὲ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ τινος ἐν τὴν τούτων τῶν ὄντων δηλοῖ. Καὶ 57
μόνη μὲν ἐκάστη καθ' ἑαυτὴν λεγομένη σημαίνει μὲν τι, λόγος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν
οὐδὲ διάνοιαν ἀπαρτίζει. Συμπλεκόμενα δὲ πῶς δύνανται καὶ λόγον εἶναι 59
καὶ διάνοιαν ἀπαρτίζειν· οἷον ὁ «ἄνθρωπος» σημαίνει μὲν τινα οὐσίαν καὶ
τὸ «τρέχει» σημαίνει ποιεῖν τι, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς ἐκάτερον οὐκ ἔστι λόγος· συμ- 61
πλεκόμενα δὲ, οἷον «ὁ ἄνθρωπος τρέχει», λόγον ἐποίησεν. Τῶν δὲ λόγων
ὁ μὲν εὐκτικὸς ἐστὶν (οἷον ὡς ἀπόλοιο ἢ κακία), ὁ δὲ προστακτικὸς (ὡς τὸ 63

Crit. 40 τὸ suppl. T² s.l. || 42 ἢ addidi || 59 λόγον conieci : λόγος T

Font. 63 Gr. Naz. Or. 19 col. 1060C 1; OS II vv. 26–27

ἴθι νῦν κατάβηθι), ὁ δὲ ἐρωτηματικός (ὡς τὸ πᾶς τὰ τῆς ἐκδημίας ὑμῖν ἔχει
 65 τῆς ἡμετέρας;), ὁ δὲ κλητικός (ὡς τὸ δεῦρο, ᾧ Σώκρατες), ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικός
 (ὡς τὸ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη).³ Τῶν δὴ πέντε τούτων λόγων οὐδεὶς ἢ
 67 ἀληθεύει ἢ ψεύδεται, μόνος δὲ ὁ ἀποφαντικός· ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ θεωρεῖται τὸ
 ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος.

69 Οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἀποφαντικός λόγος | διαιρεῖται εἰς κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν. f. 400r
 Καὶ ἀπόφασις μὲν ἐστίν, ὅταν χωρίζωμέν τι ἀπὸ τινος (οἷον «ὁ Σωκράτης
 71 οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθός»· χωρίζομεν γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ Σωκράτους), κατάφασις
 73 δὲ ἐστίν, ὅταν συνάπτωμέν τι τινί (οἷον «ὁ Σωκράτης ἀγαθός»· συνάπτο-
 75 μεν γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ Σωκράτει). Πᾶς δὲ λόγος ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων
 σύγκειται. Τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τὰ μὲν ὠρισμένα λέγονται, τὰ δὲ
 77 ἀόριστα· ὠρισμένα μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα λέγονται ὅσα δηλοῦσιν ὠρι-
 σμένως ἔν τι (οἷον «ἄνθρωπος» ἢ «τρέχει»), ἀόριστα δὲ ὅσα ἀόριστον ἔχει
 79 τὴν σημασίαν (οἷον «οὐκ ἄνθρωπος», «οὐχ ἵππος», «οὐ τρέχει»· ταῦτα γὰρ
 οὐ μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ ἐκεῖνο σημαίνει). Τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀποφαντικῷ λόγῳ ὀνό-
 81 ματων καὶ ῥημάτων τὰ μὲν κατηγορούμενα λέγονται, τὰ δὲ ὑποκείμενα·
 καὶ ὑποκείμενον μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ οὗ ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον, κατηγορούμενον
 83 δὲ ὁ λέγομεν περὶ ἐκείνου (οἷον «ὁ Σωκράτης ἀγαθός»· ὁ μὲν «Σωκράτης»
 ὑποκείμενον λέγεται· περὶ αὐτοῦ γὰρ ὁ λόγος· τὸ δὲ «ἀγαθός» κατηγορού-
 85 μενον· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγομεν περὶ ἐκείνου). Πᾶς δὲ λόγος ἀποφαντικός ἢ ἐξ
 ὑποκειμένου καὶ κατηγορουμένου σύγκειται μόνον ἢ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ
 87 κατηγορουμένου καὶ τρίτου προσκατηγορουμένου· προσκατηγορούμενον
 δὲ λέγεται τὸ «ἐστίν» (οἷον ὁ «Σωκράτης» ὑποκείμενον, τὸ «ἀγαθός» κα-
 89 τηγορούμενον, τὸ «ἐστὶ» προσκατηγορούμενον). Συμπλέκονται δὲ τῷ ἀπο-
 φαντικῷ λόγῳ καὶ οἱ λεγόμενοι τρόποι, οὓς καὶ ὕλας καλοῦσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ τὸ
 91 «ἀνάγκη», τὸ «ἀδύνατον», τὸ «ἐνδέχεται», τὸ «κύπάρχει» (οἷον «ἐνδέχεται
 τὸν Σωκράτην λουθῆναι» ἢ «ἀνάγκη | ἀναπνεῖν»). Συμπλέκονται δὲ καὶ οἱ f. 400v
 λεγόμενοι προσδιορισμοί, ὁ «πᾶς», ὁ «οὐδεὶς», ὁ «τίς», ὁ «οὐ πᾶς»· καὶ ὁ
 μὲν «πᾶς» καθόλου καταφατικός λέγεται, ὁ δὲ «οὐδεὶς» καθόλου ἀποφατι-
 93 κός, ὁ δὲ «τίς» μερικὸς καταφατικός καὶ ὁ «οὐ πᾶς» μερικὸς ἀποφατικός.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἀποφαντικοῖς λόγοις καὶ καταφάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἀποφά-
 95 σεις, ἰστέον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα ἀπόφασις πάσης καταφάσεως ἀπόφασις λέγεται·
 τῆς γὰρ «ὁ Σωκράτης λούεται» καταφάσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόφασις ἢ «ὁ Πλά-
 97 των οὐ λούεται», ἀλλ' ἢ «<ὁ> Σωκράτης οὐ λούεται», δηλονότι ἢ ἔχουσα

Crit. 73 τὸ conieci : τῷ T || 97 ὁ addidi

Font. 64 cf. Hom. Od. ψ 20; OS II v. 26 || 64–65 Gr. Naz. Or. 42 sec. 1.5–6 ||
 65 cf. Ar. Nu. v. 866 || 66 Hom. Il. B 204

τὸ αὐτὸ κατηγορούμενον καὶ ὑποκείμενον· τῇ γὰρ καταφάσει προστιθέμε-
 νον τὸ «οὐ» ποιεῖ τὴν αὐτῆς ἀπόφασιν. Προστίθεται δὲ αἰεὶ τὸ «οὐ» ἐν τοῖς 99
 κατηγορουμένοις, ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις δὲ οὐδέποτε· καὶ γὰρ οὐ γίνεται
 ἀπόφασις προστιθεμένου τοῦ «οὐ» τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ὑποκει- 101
 μένου καὶ κατηγορουμένου μόνον συγκέοιτο ἢ κατάφασις, προστιθεμένου
 τοῦ «οὐ» τῷ κατηγορουμένῳ ἢ ἀπόφασις γίνεται· εἰ δὲ καὶ προσκατηγο- 103
 ρούμενον, τῷ προσκατηγορουμένῳ· εἰ δὲ καὶ προσδιορισμὸς, τῷ προσδιο-
 ρισμῷ (καὶ γὰρ τῆς «πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκὸν» καταφάσεως ἀπόφασις ἢ «οὐ 105
 πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκὸν», τῆς δὲ «τίς ἄνθρωπος λευκὸν» ἢ «οὐδεὶς ἄνθρω-
 πος λευκὸν»· τὸ γὰρ «οὐ τίς» ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ «οὐδεὶς»)· εἰ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλ- 107
 λοις καὶ τρόπος εἶη προσκείμενος τῇ καταφάσει, τὰ ἄλλα παραλιπόντες τῷ
 τρόπῳ προσθήσομεν τὸ «οὐ» καὶ ποιήσομεν τὴν ἀπόφασιν (οἷον τῆς «ἐνδέ- 109
 χεται πάντα ἄνθρωπον λουόμενον εἶναι» καταφάσεως, εἰ θελήσομεν ἀπό-
 φασιν εἰπεῖν, οὔτε τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ | προσθήσομεν τὸ «οὐ», τῷ «ἀνθρώπῳ», 111
 οὔτε τῷ κατηγορουμένῳ, τῷ «λουόμενῳ», οὔτε τῷ προσκατηγορουμένῳ,
 τῷ «εἶναι», οὔτε τῷ προσδιορισμῷ, τῷ «πάντα», ἀλλὰ τῷ τρόπῳ, τῷ «ἐνδέ- 113
 χεται», συνάψομεν τὸ «οὐ» καὶ οὕτω ποιήσομεν τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ἥτις ἐστὶν
 «οὐκ ἐνδέχεται πάντα ἄνθρωπον λουόμενον εἶναι»). Εἰ δὲ τὸ «οὐ» προσθή- 115
 σομεν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἢ τῷ κατηγορουμένῳ ὄντος προσκατηγορουμένου ἢ
 τῷ προσκατηγορουμένῳ ὄντος προσδιορισμοῦ ἢ τῷ προσδιορισμῷ ὄντος 117
 καὶ τρόπου, οὐ ποιήσομεν ἀπόφασιν· τὸ γὰρ «οὐ» ὡς ἐν μέρος λόγου μετὰ
 τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται καὶ ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἀπόφασις, ἀλλὰ κα- 119
 τάφασις ἐξ ἀορίστου ὑποκειμένου ἢ κατηγορουμένου· ὡς γὰρ ἀορίστον
 ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα τὸ τοιοῦτον κατηγορούμενον καὶ ὑποκείμενον παραλαμβάνε- 121
 νεται.
 Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν καταφάσεων καὶ ἀποφάσεων αἰ μὲν ἀπλαῖ λέγονται, 123
 αἰ δὲ οὐχ ἀπλαῖ. Καὶ ἀπλαῖ μὲν αἰ ἔχουσαι ὠρισμένα ὑποκείμενα καὶ κα-
 τηγορούμενα, οὐχ ἀπλαῖ δὲ αἰ ἔχουσαι ἀόριστα, αἰ καὶ ἐκ μεταθέσεως⁴ λέ- 125
 γονται. Καὶ ἀπλαῖ μὲν «ἄνθρωπος λούεται», «ἄνθρωπος οὐ λούεται»· «ἄν-
 θρωπος λουόμενός ἐστιν», «ἄνθρωπος λουόμενος οὐκ ἔστιν»· «πᾶς ἄνθρω- 127
 πος λουόμενός ἐστιν», «οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λουόμενός ἐστιν»· «ἐνδέχεται
 πάντα ἄνθρωπον λουόμενον εἶναι», «οὐκ ἐνδέχεται πάντα ἄνθρωπον λου- 129
 ὄμενον εἶναι». Αἰ δὲ ἐκ μεταθέσεως· «οὐκ ἄνθρωπος λούεται» κατάφασις
 ἐξ ἀορίστου ὑποκειμένου· ταύτης ἀπόφασις «οὐκ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λούεται»· 131
 «ἄνθρωπος οὐ λουόμενός ἐστι» κατάφασις ἐξ ἀορίστου κατηγορουμένου·
 | ταύτης ἀπόφασις «ἄνθρωπος οὐ λουόμενος οὐκ ἔστι»· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 133
Crit. 102 συγκέοιτο] -oi- suppl. T² || 112 οὔτε¹ iter. et cancel. T || λουομένῳ
 conieci : λουόμενον T

ὁμοίως ταῖς ἀπλαῖς. Ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ συζυγία τῆς καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως
 135 καλεῖται ἀντίθεσις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν προσδιορισμῶν ὁ μὲν καθόλου κατα-
 φατικός, ὁ «πᾶς», καὶ ὁ καθόλου ἀποφατικός, ὁ «οὐδεὶς», οὐκ ἀντίκεινται
 137 ἀντιφατικῶς, ἀλλὰ ἐναντίως ἔχειν λέγονται· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μερικὸς κατα-
 φατικός πρὸς τὸν μερικὸν ἀποφατικόν· ὁ δὲ μερικὸς ἀποφατικός πρὸς τὸν
 139 καθόλου καταφατικὸν ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντίκειται· <ὁμοίως δὲ> καὶ ὁ καθόλου
 ἀποφατικός πρὸς τὸν μερικὸν καταφατικόν.⁵

4. De conversione propositionum⁶

141 Γίνεται δὲ ἐν ταῖς καταφάσεσι καὶ ἀποφάσεσι καὶ ἀντιστροφή. Ἔστι δὲ
 ἀντιστροφή τὸ ποιῆσαι τὸ κατηγορούμενον ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμε-
 143 νον κατηγορούμενον (οἷον τῆς «Σωκράτης γελαστικὸν» ἀντιστρεφούσης
 ἔσται ἡ «τὸ γελαστικὸν Σωκράτης»). Ἀντιστρεφουσῶν δὲ τῶν καταφάσεων
 145 καὶ ἀποφάσεων καὶ οἱ ἐν αὐταῖς προσδιορισμοὶ ἀντιστρέφουσι· καὶ ὁ μὲν
 καθόλου καταφατικός εἰς τὸν μερικὸν καταφατικὸν ἀντιστρέφει, ὁ δὲ με-
 147 ρικὸς καταφατικός εἰς ἑαυτόν, ὁ δὲ καθόλου ἀποφατικός εἰς ἑαυτόν, ὁ δὲ
 μερικὸς ἀποφατικός οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει.

5. De syllogismo et eius figuris

149 Τὰ δὲ ἐν τοῖς καταφάσεσι καὶ ἀποφάσεσι κατηγορούμενα καὶ ὑποκεί-
 μενα μέρη γενόμενα συλλογισμοῦ ὄροι καλοῦνται καὶ αἱ ἐκ τούτων συγ-
 151 κείμεναι καταφάσεις καὶ ἀποφάσεις προτάσεις λέγονται. Συλλογισμὸς δὲ
 ἔστιν, ὅταν δύο λόγων ἀποφαντικῶν ἢ καὶ πλειόνων συναφθέντων ἕτερος
 153 ἐκ τῶν συναφθέντων ἐπισυμβαίνει· οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ «ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεικίνητον» ἀπο-
 φαντικοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ «τὸ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον», ἄλλος | λόγος ἐπισυμ- f. 402r
 155 βαίνει, τὸ «ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον», καὶ τὸ ὅλον συλλογισμὸς καλεῖται. Καὶ οἱ
 συναφθέντες λόγοι, τὸ «ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεικίνητον» καὶ <τὸ> «τὸ ἀεικίνητον ἀθά-
 157 νατον», προτάσεις εἰσὶ· τὰ δὲ κατηγορούμενα καὶ ὑποκείμενα, «ἡ ψυχὴ»,
 «τὸ ἀεικίνητον», «τὸ ἀθάνατον», ὄροι λέγονται· ὁ δὲ ἐπισυμβαίνων λό-
 159 γος, τὸ «ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον», καλεῖται συμπέρασμα. Τοῦ δὲ συμπεράσματος
 τὸ μὲν κατηγορούμενον μείζων ὄρος καλεῖται, τὸ δὲ ὑποκείμενον ἔσχατος
 161 ὄρος, ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς μέσος. Καὶ ὅταν μὲν ὁ μείζων τῷ μέσῳ συναφθῇ («τὸ ἀει-
 κίνητον ἀθάνατον») μείζων πρότασις λέγεται· ὅταν δὲ ὁ μέσος τῷ ἐσχάτῳ
 163 («ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεικίνητον»), ἐλάττων πρότασις λέγεται. Τούτου τοῦ συλλογι-
 σμοῦ τρία εἰσὶ σχήματα· πρῶτον, δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον.


5.1. De modis trium figurarum

5.1.1. De modis figurae primae

Crit. 135 ἀντίθεσις conieci : ἀντίφασις T || 139 ὁμοίως δὲ addidi || 150 ai T
 s.l. || 156 τὸ addidi


Ὅταν μὲν οὖν τρεῖς ὅροι οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὥστε τὸν μέσον ὑποκεῖσθαι μὲν τῷ μείζονι ἄκρῳ, κατηγορεῖσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, τότε τὸ πρῶτον γίνεται σχῆμα. Τούτου τοῦ σχήματος τρόποι εἰσὶ τέσσαρες. 165 167

Πρῶτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς προτάσεως καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καθόλου καταφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα.⁷ οἷον 169




Diagr. 1

Δεύτερος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς προτάσεως καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα.⁸ οἷον 171




Diagr. 2

Τρίτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς προτάσεως καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς μερικὸν καταφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα.⁹ | οἷον 173



Diagr. 3

Τέταρτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς προτάσεως καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς μερικὸν ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα.¹⁰ οἷον 175




Diagr. 4

5.1.2. De modis figurae secundae

Ὅταν δὲ τρεῖς ὅροι οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὥστε τῶν ἄκρων ἀμφοτέρων τὸν μέσον κατηγορεῖσθαι, τότε τὸ δεύτερον γίνεται σχῆμα. Τοῦτου τρόποι τέσσαρες. 177

Πρῶτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου <ἀποφατι>κῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα.¹¹ οἷον 179



Diagr. 5

Δεύτερος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα.¹² οἷον 181

Crit. 165 Ὅταν] Ὅ- supplevi : deest in T || 179–180 μείζονος – καταφατικῆς] –ζονος καθόλου – κατα- T i.m. ext. et int. || 179 ἀποφατικῆς] ἀποφατι- supplevi : deest in T



Diagr. 6

183

Τρίτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς μερικῶν ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπεράσμα·¹³ οἷον




Diagr. 7

185

Τέταρτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς ἀποφατικῆς μερικῆς ἀποφατικῆς μερικῶν ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπεράσμα·¹⁴ οἷον

187



Diagr. 8

5.1.3. De modis figurae tertiae¹⁵

189 Ὅταν δὲ τρεῖς ὅροι οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὥστε τὸν μέσον ἀμφοτέρους ὑποκεῖσθαι τοῖς ἄκροις | τότε τὸ τρίτον γίνεται σχῆμα. Τούτου f. 403r τρόποι ἕξι.


191 Πρῶτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς μερικῶν καταφατικῶν συνάγων συμπεράσμα·¹⁶ οἷον



Diagr. 9

193


Δεύτερος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς μερικῶν ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπεράσμα·¹⁷ οἷον



Diagr. 10

195


Τρίτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς μερικῶν καταφατικῶν συνάγων συμπεράσμα·¹⁸ οἷον



Diagr. 11

Τέταρτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς μερικῶν ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπεράσμα.¹⁹ οἷον


197



Diagr. 12

Πέμπτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς μερικῶν καταφατικῶν συνάγων συμπεράσμα.²⁰ οἷον


199



Diagr. 13

Ἐκτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος μερικῆς ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς μερικῶν ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπεράσμα.²¹ οἷον

201



Diagr. 14

5.2. De probatione syllogismorum²²

f. 403v

Δεικτέον δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον | ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκτεθέντων ὄρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσης ὕλης ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων προτάσεων τὰ τοιαῦτα συνάγονται συμπεράσματα· οἷον ἐκ δύο καθόλου καταφατικῶν ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι καθόλου καταφατικῶν καὶ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικῶν· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως.

203

205

207

5.2.1. De modis figurae primae²³

Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον σχῆμα αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ φανερόν.²⁴ ἐκκείσθω γὰρ ἀντὶ παντὸς ὄρου τὰ A, B, Γ καὶ ἔστω τὸ μὲν A κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ B, τὸ δὲ B κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ (κατὰ παντὸς δὲ ἐστὶν, ὅταν μηδὲν ἢ μέρος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, καθ' οὗ τὸ ἕτερον οὐ λεχθήσεται· τουτέστιν, εἰ τὸ A κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ B, ἔσται κατὰ πάντων τῶν μερῶν τοῦ B). Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὸ B κατὰ παντὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ Γ, μέρος ἄρα τοῦ B τὸ Γ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ A κατὰ παντὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ B, ἦγουν


209

211

213


κατὰ πάντων τῶν μερῶν τοῦ Β, εἴη ἂν κατὰ παντός τοῦ Γ· μέρος γὰρ τὸ Γ
 215 τοῦ Β· τὸ Α ἄρα κατὰ παντός τοῦ Γ.

Diagr. 15




Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ δεύτερος τρόπος φανερός ἐστιν αὐτόθεν.²⁵ εἰ γὰρ τὸ
 217 Β κατὰ παντός τοῦ Γ, μέρος ἐστὶ τὸ Γ τοῦ Β· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ Α κατ' οὐδενὸς τῶν
 μερῶν τοῦ Β, τὸ Α ἄρα κατ' οὐδενὸς τοῦ Γ.

Diagr. 16




Καὶ ὁ τρίτος· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ Β κατὰ τινος τῶν Γ, τὸ ἄρα τῶν Γ μέρος τοῦ
 Β· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ Α κατὰ πάντων τῶν μερῶν τοῦ Β, εἴη καὶ | κατ' ἐκείνου τοῦ f. 404r
 221 μέρους τοῦ Γ, ὃ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ Β· τὸ Α ἄρα τινὶ τῶν Γ.

Diagr. 17



Καὶ ὁ τέταρτος· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ Β κατὰ τινος τῶν Γ, τὸ ἄρα τῶν Γ μέρος τοῦ
 223 Β· τὸ δὲ Α κατ' οὐδενὸς τῶν μερῶν τοῦ Β· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ Α κατὰ πάντων τῶν Γ μέρος τοῦ Β,
 225 τὸ Α ἄρα κατὰ τινος τῶν μερῶν τοῦ Γ οὐ κατηγορηθήσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται
 κατὰ παντός τοῦ Γ.


Diagr. 18




5.2.2. De reductione modi figurae secundae ad modos figurae primae

Δεικτέον δὴ τὸ δεύτερον σχῆμα διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος ἀντιστρέφου-
 227 φούσης μιᾶς τῶν προτάσεων.²⁶ Ἐστω γὰρ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ Β οὐδενὶ
 τῷ Α· λέγω ὅτι τὸ Α ἔσται οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Α, καὶ τὸ Α
 229 οὐδενὶ τῷ Β (ὁ γὰρ «οὐδεὶς» εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀντιστρέφει)· εἰ τοίνυν τὸ Α οὐδενὶ
 τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἔσται τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ διὰ τὸν δεύτερον τρόπον
 231 τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος· εἰ ἄρα τὸ Β οὐδενὶ μὲν τῷ Α, παντὶ δὲ τῷ Γ, ἔσται
 τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ.²⁷

Diagr. 19




Δεικτέον τὸν δεύτερον τρόπον. Ἐπει γὰρ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ, καὶ τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ Β· εἰ τοίνυν τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Α, ἔσται τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ Α διὰ τὸν δεύτερον τρόπον | τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος· εἰ δὲ τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ Α, ἔσται καὶ τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ. Εἰ ἄρα τὸ Β οὐδενὶ μὲν τῷ Γ, παντὶ δὲ τῷ Α, ἔσται τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ.²⁸



Diagr. 20


Δεικτέον τὸν τρίτον. Ἐπει γὰρ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Α, ἔσται καὶ τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β· εἰ τοίνυν τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, ἔσται τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ διὰ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος.²⁹



Diagr. 21

Δεικτέον τὸν τέταρτον διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν δι' ἀντιστροφῆς εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα ἀναγαγεῖν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττων πρότασις οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει, ἢ δὲ μείζων, εἰ ἀντιστραφεῖ, ἔσται μερική (ὁ γὰρ «πᾶς» εἰς τὸν «τις» ἀντιστρέφει) καὶ οὕτως ἀλλότριον ἔσται τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος, ὅπερ αἰετὴν μείζονα πρότασιν ἔχει καθόλου. Δεικτέον τοίνυν αὐτὸ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου. Λέγω γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Α, τὸ δὲ Β οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἔσται τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔσται τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ (ἐπὶ παντὸς γὰρ ἢ ἢ κατάφασις ἢ ἢ | ἀπόφασις)· εἰ τοίνυν τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Α, τὸ δὲ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἔσται τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὐ παντί· ἢ ἀντίφασις, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· ψεῦδος ἄρα τὸ Α παντὶ εἶναι τῷ Γ. Εἰ δὲ ἢ κατάφασις ψεῦδος, ἢ ἀπόφασις ἀληθής· τὸ Α ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ.³⁰


Crit. 239 δὲ iter. et cancel. T || 247 Εἰ δὲ μὴ – τῷ Γ suppl. T² i.l.



Diagr. 22


5.2.3. De reductione modi figurae tertiae ad modos figurae primae

Δεικτέον καὶ τὸ τρίτον σχῆμα· δεικτέον τὸν πρῶτον τρόπον. Ἐστω γὰρ
 253 τὸ A παντὶ τῶ B, τὸ δὲ Γ παντὶ τῶ B, λέγω ὅτι ἔσται καὶ τὸ A τινὶ τῶ Γ. Ἐπεὶ
 γὰρ τὸ Γ παντὶ ἐστὶ τῶ B, ἔσται καὶ τὸ B τινὶ τῶ Γ (ὁ γὰρ «πᾶς» εἰς τὸν «τις»
 255 ἀντιστρέφει)· εἰ τοίνυν τὸ A παντὶ τῶ B, τὸ δὲ B τινὶ τῶ Γ, ἔσται τὸ A τινὶ
 τῶ Γ διὰ τὸν τρίτον τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος.³¹




Diagr. 23

Δεικτέον τὸν δεύτερον τρόπον. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ Γ παντὶ <τῶ> B, ἔσται καὶ
 257 τὸ B τινὶ τῶ Γ· εἰ τοίνυν τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῶ B, τὸ δὲ B τινὶ τῶ Γ, ἔσται τὸ A οὐ
 259 παντὶ τῶ Γ διὰ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος.³²



Diagr. 24


Δεικτέον τὸν τρίτον τρόπον. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ Γ | τινὶ τῶ B, ἔσται καὶ τὸ B τινὶ f. 405v
 261 τῶ Γ· εἰ δὲ τὸ A παντὶ τῶ B, τὸ δὲ B τινὶ τῶ Γ, ἔσται καὶ τὸ A τινὶ τῶ Γ διὰ
 τὸν τρίτον τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος.³³



Diagr. 25


Δεικτέον τὸν τέταρτον. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ Γ τινὶ τῶ B, ἔσται καὶ τὸ B τινὶ τῶ
Crit. 257 τῶ addidi

Γ (ὁ γὰρ «τις» εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀντιστρέφει)· εἰ δὴ τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, ἔσται τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ διὰ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος.³⁴ 265




Diagr. 26

Δεικτέον τὸν πέμπτον. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β, ἔσται καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Α· εἰ δὴ τὸ Γ παντὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Α, ἔσται τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Α διὰ τὸν τρίτον τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος. <εἰ δὲ τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Α, ἔσται καὶ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Γ. Εἰ ἄρα τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Γ παντὶ τῷ Β, ἔσται τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Γ.>³⁵ 267
269
271



Diagr. 27

f. 406r Δεικτέον τὸν ἕκτον διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ δυνατόν ἀναγαγεῖν εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς. | Ἐστω τοίνυν τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Γ παντὶ τῷ Β· λέγω ὅτι τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ, ἔσται τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ (ἐπὶ παντός γὰρ ἢ ἡ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις)· εἰ τοίνυν τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ παντὶ τῷ Β, ἔσται τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β, ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὐ παντί· ἢ ἀντίφασις, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· ψεῦδος ἄρα τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ. Εἰ δὲ ἡ κατάφασις ψευδῆς, ἀληθῆς ἢ ἀπόφασις· τὸ Α ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ.³⁶ 273
275
277



Diagr. 28

5.3. De propriis figurae syllogismorum³⁷

Ἴδια τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος τὸ τὸν μέσον ὄρον καὶ ὑποκείμενον ἔχειν καὶ κατηγορούμενον· τὸ συνάγειν πᾶν εἶδος συμπεράσματος, καθόλου καὶ

Crit. 269–271 εἰ δὲ τὸ Γ – τινὶ τῷ Γ addidi

281 μερικόν, καταφατικόν καὶ ἀποφατικόν· τὸ τὴν μείζονα ἔχειν ἀεὶ καθόλου,
 τὴν δὲ ἐλάττονα καταφατικὴν. Ἰδία τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ ἔχειν τὸν μέσον ὄρον
 283 ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων κατηγορούμενον· τὸ συνάγειν ἀεὶ ἀποφατικά, καὶ
 μερικὰ καὶ καθόλου· τὸ ἔχειν τὴν μείζονα ἀεὶ καθόλου, τὴν δὲ ἐλάττονα
 285 ἀνομοιοσχήμονα. Ἰδία τοῦ τρίτου τὸ ἔχειν τὸν μέσον ὑποκείμενον ἀμφο-
 τέροις τοῖς ἄκροις· τὸ συνάγειν ἀεὶ μερικά, καὶ καταφατικά καὶ ἀποφατικά.

5.4. De analysi syllogismorum

287 | Ἀναλύσομεν δὲ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις καὶ ταῖς διαλέξεσι συλλογισμοὺς f. 406v
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.³⁸ ληπτέον πρῶτον τὸ συμπέρασμα· συμπέρασμα δὲ
 289 ἐστὶν ὃ προκείμενόν ἐστιν ἀποδειχθῆναι. Τούτου δὲ ληφθέντος ζητήσομεν
 τὸ κατηγορούμενον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ <τὸ> ὑποκείμενον, τουτέστι τὸν μείζονα
 291 ὄρον καὶ τὸν ἔσχατον. Τούτων δὲ ληφθέντων καταλείπεται ὁ μέσος ὄρος, ὅς
 ἐστὶν ἢ αἰτία, δι' ἧς κατασκευάζεται τὸ συμπέρασμα. Ληφθέντων δὲ τῶν
 293 ὄρων εἰλημμένοι ἔσονται αἱ προτάσεις, ἢ τε μείζων καὶ ἢ ἐλάττων. Εἶτα
 θεωρήσομεν τὰ κατηγορούμενα καὶ <τὰ> ὑποκείμενα ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν προ-
 295 τάσεων, καὶ ἔσται φανερὸς ὁ μέσος ὄρος, εἰ καὶ ὑπόκειται καὶ κατηγορεῖται
 (ὅ ἐστὶ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος), εἰ κατηγορεῖται μόνον (ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ δευ-
 297 τέρου), εἰ ὑπόκειται μόνον (ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ τρίτου). Γνωσθέντος δὲ εἰς ποῖον
 ἀνάγεται σχῆμα ὁ προκείμενος συλλογισμὸς ῥαδίως ὁ τρόπος ληφθήσεται,
 299 δηλονότι εἰς τίνα τρόπον τοῦ εὐρεθέντος σχήματος ἀνάγεται. <Εἶτα> θεω-
 ρήσομεν τὰς προτάσεις, πῶς ἔχουσι περὶ τὸ καταφατικὸν καὶ ἀποφατικόν,
 301 καὶ μερικόν καὶ καθόλου· φέρε γὰρ εἰπεῖν, εἰ εὐρεθείη τοῦ πρώτου σχήμα-
 τος ὁ συλλογισμὸς, εἰ μὲν ἄμφω εἶεν αἱ προτάσεις καθόλου καταφατικά, ὁ
 303 πρῶτος ἔσται τρόπος· εἰ δὲ ἢ μὲν μείζων καθόλου ἀποφατική, ἢ δὲ ἐλάττων f. 407r
 καθόλου καταφατική, ἔσται ὁ δεύτερος τρόπος· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως.

Crit. 290 τὸ addidi || 294 τὰ addidi || 299 Εἶτα addidi || 299–300 θεωρήσομεν conieci : θεωρήσασι T

Notes

- 1** Unlike OS II and OS III, OS I has no introductory note which would declare the “purpose” or “aim” (σκοπός) of the treatise. This may indicate a loss of text. However, chapter 1 in OS I deals with two groups of definitions of terms in Porphyry’s *Introduction*: (a) the – as traditionally called – *πέντε φωναί* or predicables (genus, species, difference, property, accident [γένος, εἶδος, διαφορά, ἴδιον, συμβεβηκός]); (b) related terms (individual, most general genus, lowest species, subordinate genus and species [ἄτομον, γένος γενικότατον, εἶδος ειδικότατον, γένος / εἶδος ὑπάλληλον]). Why would a section including definitions of the latter terms be expected in a work on syllogisms? Proofs concern syllogisms, definitions belong to the principles of proofs, and one has to know what genus or species is in order to form a definition in the first place (Busse 1887, p. 1.5–6). In this regard, it is reasonable to assume that a brief presentation of important terms in Porphyry’s *Introduction* could be employed as an introduction to OS I. On the other hand, OS II and OS III do not refer to Porphyry’s pentad. Perhaps the author of OS deemed that the content of the *Introduction* was redundant for his syllogism-focussed purposes as presented in the introductory notes of OS II and OS III. After all, genera in Porphyry’s text concern Aristotle’s ten types of predication (Busse 1887, p. 6.5–7) which are indeed discussed in all three versions of OS (OS I–III, chapter 2 respectively). Ioannes Italos expresses an opinion in favour of the equivalence between the so-called predicables and predicaments. According to Italos, Porphyry’s *five voices* should eventually be considered as Aristotle’s ten types of predication. The only difference is that Porphyry presents them in a formal manner (λογικῶς), whereas Aristotle examines them according to the principles of the subject matter of *Cat.* (φυσικῶς); see Joannou 1956, pp. 38, 39. On the distinction between λογικῶς and φυσικῶς arguments see Zingano 2017, pp. 9–11.
- 2** An adaptation of the famous list “of things said without any combination” (τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων) in *Cat.* 4, 1b26 – 2a4.
- 3** 62–66 Τῶν δὲ λόγων – πολυκοιρανίη] The classical fivefold division of sentences into wishes, commands, questions, vocations and assertions is attested (in a different order) in Ammonius’ commentary on *Int.* (Busse 1897, p. 2.9–23). Cf. OS II, n. 3; OS III, n. 5.
- 4** 125 ἐκ μεταθέσεως] On this use of the term “transposition” (μετάθεσις) see Busse 1897, p. 161.9–32.
- 5** 135–140 διὰ τοῦτο – τὸν μερικὸν καταφατικόν] Besides referring to what is already mentioned in *Int.* 7, 17b16–26 concerning the two types of opposition between two propositions, namely contraries (πᾶς – οὐδεῖς) and contradictories (οὐ πᾶς - πᾶς and οὐδεῖς - τίς), the author of OS I seems to consider subcontraries (τίς - οὐ πᾶς) as contraries. Subalternates (πᾶς - τίς and οὐδεῖς - οὐ πᾶς) are not mentioned at all. The terminology for the latter two types of opposition (ὑπεναντία, ὑπάλληλοι) is attested for the first time by Alexander (Wallies 1883, pp. 45.14–46.1). All four types are diagrammatically represented by means of the so-called *square of opposition*. On the latter diagram see Busse 1897, p. 93.10–18; O’Meadhra 2012; Parsons 2021.
- 6** Conversion (*APr.* I 2) is of imperative importance in order to prove directly eight of

the incomplete or imperfect moods in the second and in the third figure. The proof or completion or perfection of these moods is accomplished after converting one of the two premises and subsequently inferring a conclusion in the first figure. Conversion can occur *simpliciter* or *per accidens*. In a simple conversion subject and predicate of universal negative and particular affirmative premises can be interchanged without affecting the truth value of the premises. In an accidental conversion subject and predicate in universal affirmative premises can be interchanged, but the latter do not preserve their truth value since they are turned to particular affirmative premises. Universal negative premises can be both simply and accidentally converted. Particular negative premises cannot be converted at all.

BAROCO and BOCARDO can be proved only indirectly, namely “through an impossibility” (διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου) or by *ecthesis*; see below nn. 30, 36, and *APr*: I 6, 28b20–21. In the former kind of indirect proof, the contradiction (or the contrary) of the conclusion is employed as a premise together with one of the premises of the to-be-proved or perfected syllogism. The new inference contradicts the other one of the initial premises, therefore the assumption that the conclusion is false leads to a contradiction. The second method of indirect proof, namely *ecthesis*, is not mentioned in any of the OS versions. It entails the introduction of a term in addition to the three terms of the to-be-proved syllogism – *ecthesis* is not clearly described by Aristotle. On the latter method see Smith 1982; Smith 1989, pp. xxiii–xxv; Ierodiakonou 2002, pp. 150–151.

7 BARBARA (*APr*: I 4, 25b37–39).

8 CELARENT (*APr*: I 4, 25b40–26a2).

9 DARII (*APr*: I 4, 26a23–25).

10 FERIO (*APr*: I 4, 26a25–27).

11 CESARE (*APr*: I 5, 27a5–6).

12 CAMESTRES (*APr*: I 5, 27a9–10).

13 FESTINO (*APr*: I 5, 27a32–33).

14 BAROCO (*APr*: I 5, 27a37–38).

15 There are three rankings of third-figure moods beside the one in OS (both I and III; the section on the third figure is missing from OS II). The first is the traditional order of moods presented by Aristotle himself in *APr*: I 6 (DARAPTI, FELAPTON, DISAMIS, DATISI, BOCARDO, FERISON). The second one is the order suggested by Alexander who by following Theophrastus deems that DATISI should precede DISAMIS, whereas BOCARDO should be placed after FERISON (Barnes et al. 1991, p. 170 n. 21; according to the latter publication, Boethius’ *De syllogismo categorico* belongs to the sources mentioning the Theophrastian ranking in Alexander’s commentary. Boethius, however, follows Aristotle’s ranking; see Thomsen Thörnqvist 2008, pp. 64.11–69.7, 74.13–75.12, 88.1–95.1). In addition to criteria with regard to quantity and quality of the premises, Alexander also takes into account the number of the steps needed for the proof of each mood as well as the kind of the proof itself (Wallies 1883, pp. 95.25–97.9). Galen suggests a third variant by following the Aristotelian order of the moods until DATISI, but placing FERISON before BOCARDO

(Kalbfleisch 1896, § 10). This occurs in this manner apparently because the latter mood cannot be reduced to the first figure by means of direct proof. In all three versions of OS, DISAMIS is placed after DATISI and BOCARDO is considered as the last mood of the third figure; FERISON, however, is introduced between DATISI and DISAMIS. The criterion for this order or ranking must be solely the quality and quantity of premises; the kind of proof is irrelevant. There are then three groups of moods: (a) moods with universal premises (DARAPTI and FELAPTON; the former is placed first, because it is formed by two universal affirmative premises); (b) moods with universal major and particular minor premises (DATISI and FERISON; the former is then placed first, because it has an affirmative major premise); (c) moods with particular major and universal minor premises (DISAMIS and BOCARDO; the former is then placed first, because it has a particular affirmative major premise). It seems that OS is not the only Byzantine source in favour of this ranking. It is employed in the so-called *Anonymus Heiberg* (Heiberg 1929, pp. 23.26–24.29), in the *Synopsis of Syllogisms* (Trincavelli 1536, pp. XXXXIIr-XXXXIIIv.18, see also above p. 2 n. 1), in the essay *On Syllogisms* by Ioannes Italos (Joannou 1956, p. 78), in Manuel Holobolos' Greek adaptation of Latin mnemonics (Bydén 2004, p. 151 n. 71), in Nikephoros Blemmydes' *Epitome logica* (Wegelin 1605, pp. 238–242, 250–252), and in the anonymously transmitted short treatise on the properties and moods of the three syllogistical figures in Mon. 222, f. 90v and Vat. gr. 2173, ff. 155v–156r.

Note on Italos' ranking cited above: After mentioning DARAPTI and FELAPTON in his essay, Italos explicitly claims that “ὁ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τρίτος τρίτος ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ τέταρτος ἐκεῖσε ὁ ἐν τούτῳ τέταρτος”; however, “πέμπτον ... καὶ ἕκτον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πρώτῳ καὶ μέσῳ σχήματι εὐρεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ μόνῳ”. It is clear that the references to the first-figure moods concern the quality and quantity of their premises. Therefore DATISI and FERISON should be the third and the fourth moods respectively. On the other hand, the vague citation of the fifth and the sixth moods indicates that DISAMIS and BOCARDO should be in exactly this order, since the latter mood is proved indirectly and the kind of proof (as well as the number of conversions in the cases of direct proofs) is a criterion for the ranking of third-figure syllogisms in Italos' essay.

16 DARAPTI (*APr.* I 6, 28a18–19).

17 FELAPTON (*APr.* I 6, 28a26–28).

18 DATISI (*APr.* I 6, 28b12–13).

19 FERISON (*APr.* I 6, 28b33–34).

20 DISAMIS (*APr.* I 6, 28b7–11).

21 BOCARDO (*APr.* I 6, 28b17–19).

22 There is a formal difference between the current section and the previous one with regard to the presentation of moods. In section 5.2 letters have replaced terms in the examples. Aristotle employs sets of three letters in order to declare the terms in each syllogistic figure *APr.* I 4–6; ΑΒΓ for the terms of the first figure (major – middle – minor); ΜΝΞ for the terms of the second figure (middle – major – minor); ΠΡΣ for the terms of the third figure (major – minor – middle). In the chapters after the

end of the presentation of his assertoric logic, however, he uses ABΓ for all three figures. Recent research suggests that either the chapters on modal syllogisms are a later addition (Striker 2009, pp. xv–xvi, 108) or that Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic – unlike modal syllogistic – must have been stylistically revised (Acerbi 2020, p. 31 n. 8); see also (Agiotis 2022, pp. 43–45). Whatever the case may be, the triplet ABΓ has been used for all three figures in OS I and III.

- 23** On the moods of the first figure see above nn. 7, 8, 9, 10.
- 24** Aristotle divides syllogisms into “complete” / “perfect” (τέλειοι) and “incomplete” / “imperfect” (ἀτελείς) ones. The former are those formed in the first figure and require “nothing beyond the things posited for the necessity to be evident”. The latter, on the other hand, are formed in the second and in the third figures and require “one or more things that are indeed necessary because of the terms laid down” (*APr.* I 1, 24b22–26). Aristotle goes on to say that “it is evident too that all imperfect syllogisms are perfected through the first figure” (*APr.* I 7, 29a30–31; for the Aristotelian quotes above, I have employed the English translation of *APr.* in Striker 2009). However, Aristotle formulates a theorem which implies that BARBARA and CELARENT suffice in proving the validity of all other moods (*APr.* I 7, 29b8–15). In OS I the introduction of “by itself” (αὐτόθεν) for the presentation of BARBARA and CELARENT (see v. 216) could hint to the latter theorem.
- 25** 216 αὐτόθεν] See above n. 24.
- 26** The author seems not to be taking into account the fact that direct proof and proof by conversion do not apply in all cases of second figure moods; BAROCO is proved indirectly. Nonetheless, the latter mood and its proper proof are examined below; see 30.
- 27** 227–232 Ἐστω γὰρ τὸ Β – τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ] CESARE followed by its proof through CELARENT (*APr.* I 5, 27a6–9).
- 28** 233–237 Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ Β – τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ] CAMESTRES preceded by its proof through CELARENT (*APr.* I 5, 27a10–13). The presentation of the proof is very concise. The transposition of premises and the final step to complete the formal proof of CAMESTRES, that is to say the conversion of the conclusion in CELARENT (τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ), are not mentioned. See also below n. 35.
- 29** The proof of FESTINO by means of FERIO (*APr.* I 5, 27a33–36).
- 30** 246–251 εἰ τὸ Β – τὸ Α ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῶ Γ] BAROCO followed by its proof through BARBARA (*APr.* I 5, 27a38–b3).
- 31** 252–256 δεικτέον – τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος] DARAPTI followed by its proof through DARI (*APr.* I 6, 28a19–22).
- 32** The proof of FELAPTON by means of FERIO (*APr.* I 6, 28a28–29).
- 33** The proof of DATISI by means of DARI (*APr.* I 6, 28b13–14).
- 34** The proof of FERISON by means of FERIO (*APr.* I 6, 28b34–35).
- 35** The proof of DISAMIS by means of DARI (*APr.* I 6, 28b9–11). The presentation of the proof is condensed. The transposition of premises as well as the final step to

complete the formal proof of DISAMIS, namely the conversion of the conclusion in DARI (τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Γ), are not mentioned. See also above n. 28.

- 36** BOCARDO followed by its proof through BARBARA (*APr.* I 6, 28b19–20).
- 37** The source of OS I with regard to the properties of the three syllogistical figures must be Philoponus' commentary on *APr.* I. At any rate, the arrangement of properties in OS I takes into account (a) the position of the middle term (Wallies 1905, p. 65.1–4); (b) the quantity and / or quality of the conclusion (Wallies 1905, p. 65.23–29); and (c) the quantity and / or quality of the premises (Wallies 1905, p. 70.7–8, 11–12). In the latter case, the properties of the third figure (Wallies 1905, p. 70.20–22) are omitted, but they have been supplemented in OS III (see OS III, n. 33). A similar listing, which does not mention the position of the middle term, is included in a work belonging to the *dubia* attributed to Michael Psellos (Duffy and O'Meara 1992, opusc. 52.542–549).
- 38** 'To analyse a syllogism' in this passage (and also in OS III, subsection 5.1.3) means to reduce a syllogism to its elements or to determine the essential features of any syllogism. On the different meanings given to the term *analysis* by Aristotle and / or his commentators see Ierodiakonou and Agiotis 2019, pp. 131–140.

2.2 OS II

1 Νικολάου τοῦ Καβάσιλα, Περί συλλογισμῶν

1. Prooemium¹

2 Σκοπός ἐστὶ τῷ συντάγματι διδάξαι τὸ εἶδος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, μέθο-
3 δον δοῦναι, δι' ἧς δυνησόμεθα ἀναλύειν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις ἢ ἐν ταῖς
διαλέξεσι συλλογισμούς.

2. De praedicamentis²

5 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ συλλογισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστὶ, ῥητέον ἂν εἴη περὶ τοῦ λόγου.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ λόγος ἀπὸ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται πολλῶν, ῥητέον περὶ ὀνομά-
7 των πρότερον· λέγω δὲ τῶν λέξεων, αἱ σημαίνουσί τι. Τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων
ἢ καὶ ῥημάτων τὰ μὲν οὐσίαν σημαίνει (οἷον «ἄνθρωπος»), τὰ δὲ ποσόν
9 (οἷον «δίπηχυ»), τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι (οἷον «πατήρ», «υἱός»), τὰ δὲ ποιόν (οἷον
«λευκόν», «μέλαν»), τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν (οἷον «τέμνειν», «καίειν»), τὰ δὲ πάσχειν
11 (οἷον «τέμνεσθαι», «καίεσθαι»), τὰ δὲ ποῦ (οἷον «ἐν ἀγορᾷ»), τὰ δὲ πότε
(οἷον «χθές», «πέρυσσι»), τὰ δὲ κεῖσθαι (οἷον «κάθηται», «ἵσταται»), τὰ δὲ
13 ἔχειν (οἷον «ὑποδέδεται», «ῥπλισται»). Τούτων οὐδὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ λεγόμε-
15 νον διάνοιαν ἀπαρτίζει, ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἑτέρου συμπλεκόμενον (οἷον «ἄνθρω-
πος ῥπλισται» ἢ «ἵσταται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀγορᾷ»).

3. De enuntiatione

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ νοήματα εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, καθόσον δεικνύουσι τὴν
17 αὐτῆς διάθεσιν, ὡς ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὰ νοήματα. Ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο
εἰσὶ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ μὲν λογικόν, τὸ δὲ ὀρεκτικόν, εἶεν ἂν καὶ τὰ
19 νοήματα τὰ μὲν τοῦ λογικοῦ, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ· ὥστε, ὅταν τὰ νοήματα
τῶν λόγων δημοσιεύονται, οἱ λόγοι τότε διχῶς γίνονται· ἢ γὰρ τὸ λογικόν
21 δηλοῦσι, τουτέστι τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ τὴν ὄρεξιν. Ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος ὁ
δηλῶν τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ψευδῆς καὶ καλεῖται ἀπο-
23 φαντικός· ἢ γὰρ γνῶσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν, ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τοῖς
πράγμασι, ἢ ψευδῆς, ὅταν μὴ ἀκολουθῇ. Ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ δηλῶν τὴν ὄρεξιν
25 τῆς ψυχῆς οὔτε ἀλήθειαν οὔτε ψεῦδος σημαίνει· οὗτος δὲ τριχῶς γίνεται·
ἢ γὰρ προστακτικός ἐστὶν (οἷον ἴθι νῦν κατὰβηθι) ἢ εὐκτικός (οἷον ὡς ἀπό-
27 λοιτο ἢ κακία) ἢ ἐρωτηματικός (οἷον τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν;). πάντες γὰρ

Cod. D

Crit. 1 rasura supra Νικολάου – συλλογισμῶν habet D

Font. 26 cf. Hom. Od. ψ 20; OS I v. 64 || 26–27 Gr. Naz. Or. 19 col. 1060C 1;
OS I v. 63 || 27 Hom. Od. α 170

οὔτοι οἱ λόγοι τὴν ὄρεξιν τῆς ψυχῆς δηλοῦσι καὶ οὔτε ἀληθεύουσιν οὔτε
 ψεύδονται.³ 29

Ἐπει δὲ ὁ συλλογισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀλήθειαν ζητεῖ (τέλος γὰρ
 ἔχει ὁ συλλογισμὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν), εἴη ἂν ὁ συλλογισμὸς λόγος ἀποφαντι- 31
 κός· ἐπεὶ δὲ τότε εὐρίσκεται ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὅταν ἡ ἀλήθεια εὐρεθῆ, ὅπερ ζη-
 τεῖ ὁ συλλογισμὸς. Τότε συλλογισμὸς γίνεται ὁ ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος, ὅταν 33
 μετ' αἰτίας λέγεται, δι' ἧς ἡ ἀλήθεια εὐρίσκεται (οἷον «ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος»·
 καὶ γὰρ ἐφίεται φύσει τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι)· ὥστε εἴη ἂν ὁ συλλογισμὸς λόγος 35
 ἀποφαντικὸς μετὰ αἰτίας εἰρημένος, δι' ἧς ἡ ἀλήθεια εὐρίσκεται. Οὗτος
 δὲ ὁ ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος διαιρεῖται εἰς κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν. Καὶ ἀπό- 37
 φασις μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ διαιρῶν τι ἀπὸ τινος (οἷον «ὁ Σωκράτης οὐκ
 ἔστιν ἀγαθός»), κατάφασις δὲ ὁ συνάπτων τί τινι (οἷον «ὁ Σωκράτης ἀγαθός 39
 ἐστὶν»). Ἐκατέρω δὲ τούτων, ἢ τε κατάφασις καὶ <ἢ> ἀπόφασις, διαιρεῖται
 εἰς κατηγορούμενον καὶ ὑποκείμενον· καὶ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστὶ περὶ οὗ ὁ λό- 41
 γος (οἷον «ὁ Σωκράτης»), κατηγορούμενον δὲ ὃ λέγομεν περὶ ἐκείνου (οἷον
 τὸ «ἀγαθός»). Πᾶς δὲ λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς ἢ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ κατηγορου- 43
 μένου σύγκεται μόνον, ἢ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ κατηγορουμένου καὶ τρί-
 του προσκατηγορουμένου (προσκατηγορούμενον δὲ λέγεται τὸ «ἐστίν»· 45
 οἷον «ὁ Σωκράτης ἀγαθός ἐστίν»), ἢ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ κατηγορουμέ-
 νου καὶ προσκατηγορουμένου καὶ ἔτι τρόπου. Τρόποι δὲ εἰσι τέσσαρες· 47
 τὸ «ἀνάγκη», τὸ «ἐνδέχεται», τὸ «ὑπάρχειν», τὸ «ἀδύνατον» (οἷον «ὁ Σω-
 κράτης ἐνδέχεται λελουμένος εἶναι»· τὸ «Σωκράτης» ὑποκείμενον, τὸ «λε- 49
 λουμένος» κατηγορούμενον, προσκατηγορούμενον τὸ «εἶναι», τρόπος τὸ
 «ἐνδέχεται»). 51

Τῆ καταφάσει δὲ προστιθέμενον τὸ «οὔ» ποιεῖ τὴν ἀπόφασιν· προσ-
 τίθεται δὲ τὸ «οὔ» οὐ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, ἀλλ' ἐνὶ τῶν κατηγορουμένων. Εἰ 53
 μὲν οὖν ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ κατηγορουμένου εἴη μόνον ἢ πρότασις, τῷ
 κατηγορουμένῳ συνάπτοντες ποιήσομεν τὴν ἀπόφασιν· εἰ δὲ καὶ προσκα- 55
 τηγορούμενον, τῷ προσκατηγορουμένῳ· εἰ δὲ τρόπος, τῷ τρόπῳ· ἀεὶ γάρ,
 εἰ προστεθῆ, ποιήσεις τὴν ἀπόφασιν μετὰ τοῦ «οὔ». 57

Τῶν δὲ κατηγορουμένων καὶ ὑποκειμένων τὰ μὲν ὠρισμένα εἰσὶν ὑπο-
 κείμενα καὶ κατηγορούμενα, τὰ δὲ ἀόριστα. Ἀόριστα μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ὑπο- 59
 κείμενα καὶ κατηγορούμενα <μετὰ> τοῦ «οὔ» (οἷον «οὐ Σωκράτης», «οὐκ
 ἀγαθός»), ὠρισμένα δὲ τὰ χωρὶς τοῦ «οὔ» (οἷον «Σωκράτης» καὶ «ἀγα- 61
 θός»). Ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ κατάφασις μετὰ τῆς ἀποφάσεως καλεῖται ἀντίφασις·

Cod. D

Crit. 34 εὐρίσκηται D a.c. || 40 ἢ addidi || 57 ποιήσεις conieci : ποιήσει D ||
 60 μετὰ addidi

63 οἷον «Σωκράτης ἀγαθός», ταύτης ἀπόφασις «Σωκράτης οὐκ ἀγαθός»· «Σω-
 65 κράτης ἀγαθός ἐστι», ταύτης ἀπόφασις «Σωκράτης ἀγαθός οὐκ ἔστι»· πά-
 67 λιν «Σωκράτης ἐνδέχεται ἀγαθός εἶναι», ταύτης ἀπόφασις «Σωκράτης οὐκ
 69 ἐνδέχεται ἀγαθός εἶναι»· αἱ τοιαῦται οὖν συζυγίαι ἀντιφάσεις λέγονται.
 71 Συμπλέκονται δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις καὶ προσδιορισμοὶ οἱ δηλοῦντες
 73 πῶς κατηγορεῖται τὸ κατηγορούμενον τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ· καθόλου ἢ μερι-
 75 κῶς, καταφατικῶς ἢ ἀποφατικῶς (οἷον «πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λογικόν», «οὐδεὶς
 77 ἄνθρωπος ἄλογον», «τίς ἄνθρωπος φιλόσοφον», «οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος φιλό-
 79 σοφον»). Τεσσάρων δὲ ὄντων τῶν προσδιορισμῶν (καθόλου καταφατικοῦ
 τοῦ «πᾶς», καθόλου ἀποφατικοῦ τοῦ «οὐδεὶς», μερικοῦ καταφατικοῦ τοῦ
 «τίς», μερικοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τοῦ «οὐ πᾶς»), ὁ μὲν καθόλου ἀποφατικὸς πρὸς
 τὸν μερικὸν καταφατικὸν λέγεται ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀντιφατικῶς, ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ
 καθόλου καταφατικὸς πρὸς τὸν μερικὸν ἀποφατικόν· ὁ δὲ καθόλου κα-
 καταφατικὸς πρὸς τὸν καθόλου ἀποφατικὸν οὐ λέγεται ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀντιφα-
 τικῶς, ἀλλὰ ἐναντίως· ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ μερικὸς καταφατικὸς πρὸς τὸν μερι-
 κὸν ἀποφατικόν.⁴ Αὕτη δὲ ἡ ἀντίφασις ἐπὶ παντὸς διαιρεῖ τὸ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ
 ψεῦδος· καὶ εἰ ἀληθὴς ἢ κατάφασις, ψευδὴς ἢ ἀπόφασις· καὶ εἰ ἀληθὴς ἢ
 ἀπόφασις, ψευδὴς ἢ κατάφασις ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

4. De conversione propositionum⁵

81 Ἰστέον ὅτι ἀντιστροφή ἐστὶ τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ κατηγορούμενον ὑποκείμε-
 83 νον καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον κατηγορούμενον (οἷον «ὁ ἄνθρωπος γελαστικόν»·
 85 ταύτην ἀντιστρέφοντες ἐροῦμεν τὸ «γελαστικὸν ἄνθρωπος»). Τῶν προτά-
 σεων δὲ ἀντιστρεφουσῶν, τῶν ἐχουσῶν προσδιορισμούς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς
 87 προσδιορισμοὺς ἀντιστρέφειν· καὶ ὁ μὲν καθόλου καταφατικὸς, {ὁ «πᾶς»},
 εἰς τὸν μερικὸν καταφατικὸν ἀντιστρέφει, ὁ δὲ μερικὸς καταφατικὸς εἰς
 89 ἑαυτὸν καὶ ὁ καθόλου ἀποφατικὸς εἰς ἑαυτόν· ὁ δὲ μερικὸς ἀποφατικὸς
 οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει. Καλοῦνται δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα ὅροι ἐν τῷ συλ-
 λογισμῷ, οἵτινες συμπλεκόμενοι ποιοῦσι τὰς προτάσεις.

5. De tribus figuris syllogismorum

Τούτων εἰρημένων, ὅταν μὲν τρεῖς ὅροι οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
 91 ὥστε τὸν ἕνα ὑποκεῖσθαι μὲν τῷ ἑτέρῳ, κατηγορεῖσθαι δὲ θατέρου, τότε
 τὸ πρῶτον γίνεται σχῆμα· ὅταν δὲ ἀμφοτέρων κατηγορηται, τότε γίνεται
 93 τὸ δεῦτερον σχῆμα· ὅταν δὲ ὑποκέηται ἀμφοτέροις, τότε τὸ τρίτον γίνεται
 σχῆμα.

Cod. 63–80] D || 80–94] M


Crit. 85 ὁ πᾶς seclusi || 87 καὶ ὁ – εἰς ἑαυτόν M s.l.

5.1. De modis figurae primae

Ῥητέον περὶ τοῦ πρώτου (οἷον «ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, τὸ ζῶν οὐσία, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα οὐσία»)⁶ τούτου, τοῦ πρώτου, τέσσαρές εἰσι τρόποι.⁷ 95


Πρῶτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς προτάσεως καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καθόλου καταφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα. Συμπέρασμα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἀποδείκνυσιν ὁ συλλογιζόμενος, ὃ δὴ καὶ πρόκειται δεῖξαι (οἷον «ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα οὐσία»). Τοῦ δὲ συμπεράσματος ὁ μὲν κατηγορούμενος ὄρος μείζων καλεῖται (οἷον «ἡ οὐσία»), ὁ δὲ ὑποκείμενος ἔσχατος, ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τῶν τριῶν ὄρων τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ μέσος (οἷον «τὸ ζῶν»). Συναπτόμενοι δὲ οἱ ὄροι τὰς προτάσεις ποιοῦσι· καὶ ὅταν μὲν ὁ μείζων τῷ μέσῳ συναφθῆ, ἡ μείζων γίνεται (οἷον «τὸ ζῶν οὐσία»)· ὅταν δὲ ὁ μέσος τῷ ἐσχάτῳ, γίνεται ἡ ἐλάττων (οἷον «ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν»)⁸. 101 103 105

Πρῶτος τοίνυν τρόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος <τὸ> «πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, πᾶν ζῶν οὐσία, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἄρα οὐσία»· καὶ ἐστὶν ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καθόλου καταφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα. 107 109




Diagr. 1

Δεύτερος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, οὐδὲν ζῶν λίθος, οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος ἄρα λίθος»)⁹. 111



Diagr. 2

Τρίτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς μερικὸν καταφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὶ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λογικόν, τὶ ζῶν ἄρα λογικόν»)¹⁰. 113 115



Diagr. 3

Τέταρτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς μερικὸν ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὶ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος, οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος ἄλογον, οὐ πᾶν ζῶν ἄρα ἄλογον»)¹⁰. 117

Cod.

M

Crit. 106 τὸ addidi || 112 οὐδεὶς – λίθος conieci : πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἄρα οὐσία M (cf. v. 106)




5.2. De modis figurae secundae

119 Τοῦ δευτέρου τρόποι τέσσαρες.¹¹

121 Πρῶτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου κα-
122 ταφατικῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ ἔμψυχον
123 κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου, κατ' οὐδενὸς δὲ λίθου, ὁ λίθος ἄρα κατ' οὐδενὸς
ἀνθρώπου»).



125 Δεύτερος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου
126 ἀποφατικῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ λογικὸν
127 κατ' οὐδενὸς ἵππου, τὸ λογικὸν κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου, ὁ ἵππος ἄρα κατ'
οὐδενὸς ἀνθρώπου»).




129 Τρίτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς κατα-
φατικῆς μερικὸν ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ λευκὸν οὐ-
δενὶ Αἰθίοπι, τὸ λευκὸν τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁ Αἰθίοψ ἄρα οὐ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ»).



131 Τέταρτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς
132 ἀποφατικῆς μερικὸν ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «ὁ ἄνθρωπος
133 κατὰ παντὸς φιλοσόφου, ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατ' οὐ παντὸς λευκοῦ, ὁ φιλόσοφος
ἄρα κατ' οὐ παντὸς λευκοῦ»).

Cod. M

Crit. 129–130 τὸ λευκὸν οὐδενὶ – οὐ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ conieci cum diagr. 7 : ὁ Αἰθίοψ οὐδενὶ λευκῷ, ὁ ἄνθρωπος τινὶ λευκῷ, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα οὐ παντὶ Αἰθίοπι M



Diagr. 8

Notes

- 1** It is reasonable to assume that OS II did not include any section on hypothetical syllogisms, since there is no reference to them in the introductory note; cf. OS III, v. 4 and section 5.2. However, there is no reference to the content of chapters 2 and 3 either. See also OS I, n. 1.
- 2** See OS I, n. 2.
- 3** 17–27 Ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο – ἀνδρῶν] cf. OS I, n. 3; OS III, n. 5. The relation between types of sentences and soul’s two faculties is presented in Ammonius’ commentary on *Int.* (Busse 1897, p. 5.1–15), but it should belong “to one of his immediate forerunners” (Schenkeveld 1984, p. 298). The wording in OS II is slightly different than the one used by Ammonius, since the former text distinguishes between logical and appetitive parts (λογικόν / ὀρεκτικόν) of the soul, whereas Ammonius mentions cognitive and vital (γνωστικαί / ζωτικαί) or appetitive faculties (ὀρεκτικαὶ δυνάμεις). Surprisingly, only imperative, optative and interrogative sentences are mentioned with regard to the latter group of faculties; the vocative type is missing.
- 4** 71–78 Τεσσάρων δὲ ὄντων – ἀποφατικόν] See OS I, n. 5.
- 5** See OS I, chapter 4.
- 6** 95–96 ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν – ἄρα οὐσία] The example concerns the general arrangement or the order of terms in a first figure. As they stand, the propositions in the example are “indeterminate” (ἀδιόριστοι; *APr.* I 1, 24a 17), that is to say they lack information on their quantity and are, thus, equivalent to particular propositions. According to Aristotle’s commentators, valid categorical syllogisms must include at least one universal premise (Barnes 1990, pp. 85–88). However, there were logicians, like *Anonymus Heiberg*, who included indeterminate propositions in their exposition of valid moods (Barnes 2002, pp. 100–108). A similar presentation of terms in the three figures by means of indeterminate propositions may be found in Blemmydes’ *Epitome logica* too (Wegelin 1605, pp. 225–226).
- 7** 96 τούτου – τρόποι] On the four moods of the first syllogistic figure, see also OS I, nn. 7, 8, 9, 10.
- 8** 98–105 Συμπέρασμα – ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν] This passage is a rather sloppy rehashing of the material in OS I. It is in fact an excerpt from the introductory text on the categorical syllogisms in OS I (vv. 151–155) which has been reformulated and then rather unfittingly transposed into its current place in OS II. This, however, is not the only peculiarity in section 5 (see also n. 6). In *APr.*, as well as in the respective Greek commentary tradition, the predicate term *usually* precedes the subject term. The parts of a categorical proposition are then presented in the following order: predicate term, copula, quantifier, and finally subject term (for instance τὸ ζῶν ὑπάρχει παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ). Moreover, the major premise *usually* precedes the minor one (on both issues see Rose 1966). Indeed, the references to constituent propositions of syllogisms, as well as the respective diagrams of sections 5.1–2 in OS II (and OS I) exhibit the traditional order of premises and terms. However, this is not the case in most of the adherent examples in these two sections. In all moods of first-figure examples, as

well as in the examples of CESARE and CAMESTRES the minor premise is stated first, whereas the predicate term is mentioned first in CESARE, CAMESTRES and BAROCO. In addition, there are examples which either infer an erroneous conclusion (see below n. 9), or are not in accordance with the wording in the respective diagram (see n. 10), or exhibit the terms of the propositions in the false order (see below n. 12). The overall clear-cut structure of OS I and OS III, however, as well as the formal presentation of syllogisms and diagrams in both versions reveal a rather careful arrangement of the material. In this respect, both the transposed passage and the erroneous or not-traditionally-formulated examples in OS II could be held as indicators of poor editing or – more plausibly in my opinion – as shortcomings of an intermediary draft rather, than a version of OS in its own right. The peculiarities of OS II then might be considered as unfortunate insertions of short notes which were copied in the margins of the model of D and/or M, and then better adapted or corrected in OS III.

- 9** 112 οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος ἄρα λίθος] The conclusion in both D and M is erroneous; see apparatus criticus and above n. 8.
- 10** 117–118 τὶ ζῷον – ἄρα ἄλογον] The wording in the respective diagram is different; see n. 8.
- 11** On the four moods of the second syllogistic figure, see also OS I, nn. 11, 12, 13, 14.
- 12** 129–130 τὸ λευκὸν – οὐ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ] The terms of the example were erroneously placed in the reversed order in both D and M; see apparatus criticus and above n. 8.

2.3 OS III

1 Τοῦ ἁγίου πατρὸς ἡμῶν Νείλου, ἀρχιεπισκόπου Θεσσαλονίκης, Σύνοψις
περὶ συλλογισμοῦ¹

1. Prooemium²

3 Σκοπὸς ἐστὶ τῷ συντάγματι διδάξαι περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ
τοῦ τε κατηγορικοῦ καὶ <τοῦ> ὑποθετικοῦ, μέθοδον δοῦναι, δι' ἧς δυνηθη-
5 σόμεθα ἀναλύειν τοὺς τε ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τῶν παλαιῶν κειμένους συλλο-
γισμοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς διαλέξεσι παρὰ τῶν προσδιαλεγομένων προβαλ-
7 λομένους, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φωρᾶν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς διαλέξεσι παραλογιζομένους³
παρὰ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ.

2. De praedicamentis

9 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ μὲν συλλογισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τῶν
ὀνομάτων τῶν ὄντων καὶ γινομένων συνίσταται, δεῖ πρότερον περὶ τῶν
11 ὄντων ὀλίγα καθόλου προδιαλαβεῖν. Δέκα δὴ γένη τῶν ὄντων εἰσίν, εἰς ἃ
πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀνάγονται· οὐσία, ποσόν, ποιόν, πρὸς τι, ποῦ, πότε, κείσθαι,
13 ἔχειν, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν. Οὐσία μὲν καλεῖται τὸ μὴ ἔν τι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτὸ
ὄν (οἶον «λίθος», «ἄνθρωπος»)· ποσὸν δέ, καθ' ὃ μετροῦνται ἢ ἀριθμοῦν-
15 ται τὰ μετρούμενα (οἶον «μῆκος» καὶ «ἀριθμός»)· ποιὸν δέ, καθ' ὃ ποιό-
τινες λέγονται (<οἶον> «λευκοὶ» {τυχὸν} ἢ «μέλανες»)· πρὸς τι δέ, ἃ σχέ-
17 σιν τινὰ δηλοῦσιν (οἶον «πατήρ», «υἱός»· «δοῦλος», «δεσπότης»)· ποῦ δέ,
ἃ τόπον δηλοῦσιν (οἶον «ἐν ἀγορᾷ», «ἐν οἰκίᾳ»)· πότε δέ, ἃ χρόνον (οἶον
19 «χθές», «αὔριον», «σήμερον»)· κείσθαι δέ, ἃ θέσιν τινὰ δηλοῖ (οἶον «κά-
θηται», «ἵσταται», «ἀνάκειται»)· ἔχειν, ὃ δηλοῖ οὐσίας περὶ οὐσίαν περιθε-
21 σιν (οἶον «ὑποδέδεται», «ὠπλίσταται», «ἐνδέδεται»)· ποιεῖν δέ, ὃ ἐνέργειαν
(οἶον «τέμνειν», «καίειν»)· πάσχειν δέ, ὃ πάθος δηλοῖ (οἶον «τέμνεσθαι»,
23 «καίεσθαι»).

3. De enuntiatione

Cod. β F R

Crit. 1–2 Τοῦ ἁγίου – συλλογισμοῦ conieci : Τοῦ ἁγιωτάτου καὶ μακαρίου πατρὸς
ἡμῶν Νείλου, ἀρχιεπισκόπου Θεσσαλονίκης, Περὶ συλλογισμοῦ C : Τοῦ μακαρι-
ωτάτου Θεσσαλονίκης τοῦ Καβάσιλα Σύνοψις περὶ συλλογισμοῦ P : ... Σύνοψις
π...αλύειν αὐτοῦς F (Τοῦ [ἁγίου] πατρὸς ἡμῶν Νείλου, ἀρχιεπισκόπου Θεσσα-
λονίκης, Σύνοψις περὶ συλλογισμῶν, [πῶς δεῖ] ἀναλύειν αὐτοῦς legit Papazoglou
2008, 163) : Νείλου Σύνοψις περὶ συλλογισμῶν G : Περὶ συλλογισμοῦ R || 4
τοῦ addidi || 15–16 ποιόν – «μέλανες» om. β fortasse ex homoeoarcho || 16
οἶον addidi || τυχὸν seclusi

Τούτων οὐδὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ λεγόμενον διάνοιάν τινα δύναται δηλοῦν, συμπλεκόμενα δὲ ἀπαρτίζουσιν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ νοήματα διαθέσεις τινές εἰσι 25 τῆς ψυχῆς, διατίθεται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὰ ἴδια μέρη, ἀνάγκη κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ νοήματα διαιρεῖσθαι. Μέρη δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τό τε λογικόν ἐστι 27 καὶ τὸ παθητικόν,⁴ ὥστε καὶ τὰ νοήματα τὰ μὲν ἀνάγκη γινώσιν τινὰ καὶ κρίσιν ἐμφαίνειν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ 29 νόημα ἐπιθυμίαν τινὰ ἐμφαίνει τῆς ψυχῆς· αἰεὶ γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν τῆς ἀντι- λυπήσεως ὁ θυμούμενος κινεῖται. Ὡστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους εἰκόνας ὄντας τῶν 31 νοημάτων ἀνάγκη τοῦτον διηρησθαι τὸν τρόπον· καὶ τοὺς μὲν τοῦ λογικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς γνώσεως εἰκόνας εἶναι· οἷοι οἱ ἀποφαντικοί, οἵτινες ἢ 33 ἀλήθειαν ἢ ψεῦδος δηλοῦσιν· τοὺς δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ψυχῆς δηλωτικούς εἶναι, ὥσπερ ὁ εὐκτικός, ὁ προστακτικός, ὁ ἐρωτηματικός καὶ ὁ κλητικός· 35 τούτων γὰρ οὐδεὶς οὔτε ἀλήθειαν οὔτε ψεῦδος δηλοῖ, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς, τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.⁵ Ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς λόγος ὢν εἰς τὸν ἀποφαντι- 37 κὸν ἀνάγεται λόγον· ἔστι γὰρ συλλογισμὸς λόγος ἀποφαντικός μετὰ αἰτίας εἰρημένος (οἷον «ὁ Σωκράτης τιμῆς ἄξιός, διότι σοφός»).

Οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἀποφαντικός λόγος διαιρεῖται εἰς κατηγορικὸν καὶ ὑποθετι- 41 κὸν· καὶ κατηγορικὸς μὲν ὁ δηλῶν τι κατὰ τινος ἢ τι ἀπὸ τινος, ἤτοι ὁ διαι- ρούμενος εἰς κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν (οἷον «ὁ Σωκράτης δίκαιός ἐστιν» ἢ «οὐκ ἐστιν»)· ὑποθετικός δὲ ὁ μετὰ ὑποθέσεως προαγόμενος (οἷον «εἰ 43 ὁ Σωκράτης δίκαιός ἐστιν» ἢ «οὐκ ἐστιν»). Ἔστι δὲ κατάφασις μὲν, ὅταν λέγωμέν τι τινὶ προσεῖναι (οἷον «ὁ ἄνθρωπος λογικόν»· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ λο- 45 γικὸν προσεῖναι τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ)· ἀπόφασις δέ, ὅταν λέγωμέν τι τινὶ μὴ προσ- εῖναι (οἷον «ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐστὶ λογικόν»). Διαιρεῖται δὲ ἡ κατάφασις καὶ 47 ἢ ἀπόφασις εἰς κατηγορούμενον καὶ ὑποκείμενον· καὶ κατηγορούμενον μὲν ἐστὶν ὃ λέγομεν προσεῖναι τινὶ ἢ μὴ προσεῖναι, ὑποκείμενον δὲ ὅτινι λέ- 49 γομεν προσεῖναι ἢ μὴ προσεῖναι (οἷον «ὁ Σωκράτης» μὲν ὑποκείμενον, τὸ «ἀγαθός» δὲ κατηγορούμενον). Οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἔχοντα τὰ κατηγορούμενα 51 καὶ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ὠρισμένα κατηγορούμενα καὶ ὠρισμένα ὑποκείμενα λέ- γονται, προστεθέντος δὲ τοῦ «οὖ» (οἷον «οὖ Σωκράτης», «οὐκ ἀγαθός») 53 ἀόριστα καλοῦνται κατηγορούμενα καὶ ἀόριστα ὑποκείμενα. Οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἀποφαντικός λόγος μέρος γενόμενος συλλογισμοῦ πρότασις καλεῖται, τὰ δὲ 55 κατηγορούμενα καὶ ὑποκείμενα ὅροι· ὥστε τῶν προτάσεων τὰς μὲν εἶναι ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ κατηγορουμένου ὠρισμένων, τὰς δὲ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου 57

Cod. β F R

Crit. 29 post ἀπὸ add. τοῦ F || 34 post τοὺς δὲ lac. 10 fere litt. in F || 41 ἢ – τινος om. F ex homoeoteleuto || 47 δὲ β F : γὰρ R || 50 post ὑποκείμενον add. τὸ R || 52 τὰ om. R || 53 οἷον om. R || 54 δὴ om. R

καὶ κατηγορουμένου ἀορίστων, τὰς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὲν ὠρισμένου, θατέρου δὲ
59 ἀορίστου.

Ἔστι δὲ πάσης ἀποφάσεως κατάφασις καὶ πάσης καταφάσεως ἀπόφα-
61 σις. Γίνεται δὲ ἡ ἀπόφασις προστιθεμένου τῆ καταφάσει τοῦ «οὐ» ἀρνητι-
κοῦ (οἷον· «Σωκράτης δίκαιος» κατάφασις, ταύτης ἀπόφασις «Σωκράτης
63 οὐ δίκαιος»). Πᾶσα δὲ πρότασις ἢ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ κατηγορουμένου
ἐστὶν ἢ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ κατηγορουμένου καὶ τρίτου προσκατηγορου-
65 μένου (οἷον «Σωκράτης δίκαιός ἐστί»· τὸ γὰρ «ἐστι» προσκατηγορούμενον
καλεῖται). Συμπλέκονται δὲ ταῖς προτάσεσι καὶ αἱ λεγόμεναι ὕλαι· ἡ ἀναγ-
67 καία, ἡ ἐνδεχομένη, ἡ ἀδύνατος (οἷον «τὸν Σωκράτην ἐνδέχεται βαδίζειν»
ἢ «ἀνάγκη ἀναπνεῖν» ἢ «ἀδύνατον ἵπτασθαι»). Συμπλέκονται δὲ καὶ οἱ λε-
69 γόμενοι προσδιορισμοί, οἱ δεικνῦντες πῶς πρόσεστι τὸ κατηγορούμενον
τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἢ πῶς οὐ πρόσεστι, καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς, οἷτινες τέσσαρες
71 εἰσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· καθόλου ἀποφατικὸς ὁ «οὐδεὶς», καθόλου καταφατικὸς
ὁ «πᾶς», μερικὸς ἀποφατικὸς ὁ «οὐ πᾶς», μερικὸς καταφατικὸς ὁ «τίς»
73 (οἷον «οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος ἵπταται», «πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἀναπνεῖ», «τίς ἄνθρω-
πος λούεται», «οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λούεται»). Καλεῖται δὲ ἡ μὲν ἔχουσα τὸν
75 «πᾶς» προσδιορισμὸν καθόλου καταφατική, ἢ δὲ ἔχουσα τὸν «οὐδεὶς» κα-
θόλου ἀποφατική, ἢ δὲ ἔχουσα τὸν «τίς» μερικὴ καταφατική, ἢ δὲ ἔχουσα
77 τὸν «οὐ πᾶς» μερικὴ ἀποφατική. Λέγονται δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι ἡ μὲν καθόλου
καταφατικὴ πρὸς τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ἐναντίως καὶ ἡ μερικὴ κατα-
79 φατικὴ πρὸς τὴν μερικὴν ἀποφατικὴν ἐναντίως δηλονότι.⁶ ἢ δὲ καθόλου
καταφατικὴ πρὸς τὴν μερικὴν ἀποφατικὴν καὶ ἡ μερικὴ καταφατικὴ πρὸς
81 τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν λέγονται ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀντιφατικῶς, ὡς τὴν ἐτέ-
ραν ἀνάγκη ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης, ἦντινα συζυγίαν καὶ
83 ἀντίφασιν καλοῦσιν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆ καταφάσει προστιθέμενον τὸ «οὐ» ἀρνη-
τικὸν τὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιεῖ, διοριστέον ἐν ποίῳ ὄρω προστιθέμενον τὸ «οὐ»
85 τὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιήσει. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ κατηγορουμένου μό-
νον εἴη ἡ κατάφασις, τῷ κατηγορουμένῳ συνάψαντες ποιήσομεν τὴν ἀπό-
87 φασιν· εἰ δὲ καὶ προσκατηγορούμενον, τῷ προσκατηγορουμένῳ· εἰ δὲ καὶ
προσδιορισμὸς (οἷον ὁ «πᾶς» ἢ ὁ «τίς»), τῷ προσδιορισμῷ (οἷον «οὐδεὶς» ἢ
89 «οὐ πᾶς»)· εἰ δὲ καὶ τρόπος πρόσεστι τῆ καταφάσει (οἷον «ἐνδέχεται πάντα
ἄνθρωπον λούεσθαι»), τῷ τρόπῳ συνάψαντες τὸ «οὐ» ποιήσομεν τὴν ἀπό-
91 φασιν (οἷον «οὐκ ἐνδέχεται πάντα ἄνθρωπον λουθῆναι»).

Cod. β F R

Crit. 66 καλεῖται β, F p.c. R : λέγεται F a.c. || 79 ἐναντίως δηλονότι F i.m. || 83
προστιθέμενον τὸ β R : προστιθεμένου τοῦ F || 83–84 ἀρνητικὸν β R : ἀρνητικῆς
F a.c. : ἀρνητικοῦ F p.c.

4. De conversione propositionum

Ἰστέον δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι ἀντιστρέφειν λέγομεν τὰς προτάσεις, ὅταν τὸ
κατηγορούμενον ποιήσωμεν ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον κατηγορού- 93
μενον (οἷον «οὐδὲν ζῷον ἄψυχον» καὶ «οὐδὲν ἄψυχον ζῷον»). Οὐ πᾶς δὲ
προσδιορισμὸς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀντιστρέφει, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν «οὐδείς» εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ 95
ὁ «τίς» εἰς ἑαυτόν, ὁ δὲ «πᾶς» εἰς τὸν «τίς», ὁ δὲ «οὐ πᾶς» οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει.

5. De syllogismis

5.1. De syllogismis categoricis


5.1.1. De tribus figuris syllogismorum categoricorum

Τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ὅταν ὅροι τρεῖς οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, 97
ὥστε τὸν ἕνα ὑποκεῖσθαι μὲν τῶν λοιπῶν δύο θατέρω, κατηγορεῖσθαι δὲ
τοῦ λοιποῦ, τότε τὸ πρῶτον γίνεται σχῆμα (οἷον «ἡ οὐσία παντὶ ζῷω, τὸ 99
ζῷον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἡ οὐσία παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ»)· τούτου τέσσαρές εἰσι τρό-
ποι. Συμπέρασμα μὲν οὖν καλεῖται τὸ συναγόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ 101
(οἷον «ἡ οὐσία παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ»), μείζων δὲ ὅρος τὸ κατηγορούμενον ἐν
τῷ συμπεράσματι (οἷον «ἡ οὐσία»), ἔσχατος δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον (οἷον «ὁ 103
ἄνθρωπος»), μέσος δὲ ὁ λοιπός (οἷον «τὸ ζῷον»). Καὶ μείζων μὲν πρότασις
ἐστὶν ἡ συναφή τοῦ μείζονος ὅρου μετὰ τοῦ μέσου, ἐλάττων δὲ ἡ συναφή 105
τοῦ μέσου μετὰ τοῦ ἐσχάτου.⁷

5.1.1.1. De modis figurae primae⁸

| {γράμματα ἔγραψε γραφίδι τεχνικός}⁹ 107

| Τῶν δὲ τρόπων τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος πρῶτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου
καταφατικῆς προτάσεως καὶ ἐλάττωνος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καθόλου κα- 109
ταφατικὸν | συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «ἡ οὐσία παντὶ ζῷω, τὸ ζῷον παντὶ
ἀνθρώπῳ, ἡ οὐσία παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ»). 111




Diagr. 1

Δεύτερος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττωνος καθόλου

Cod. 92–106] β F R || 107] β G R || 108–110] β F R || 110–112] β G R


Crit. 96 litteras rubricatas supra ἀντιστρέφει legere non potui in R || 101 μὲν
οὖν β F : γοῦν R || 107 γράμματα – τεχνικός ut gl. seclusi : infra diagr. 5 β G
i.m. : post diagr. 9 R i.m. || supra γράμματα artificium memoriae π π π add. R ||
supra ἔγραψε artificium memoriae οὐδ π οὐδ add. R || supra γραφίδι artificium
memoriae π τ τ add. R || supra τεχνικός artificium memoriae οὐδ τ οὐ π add. R ||
109 καταφατικῆς² β, F p.c. R : ἀποφατικῆς F a.c.

- 113 καταφατικῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ ἄψυχον οὐδενὶ ζῳῷ, τὸ ζῳὸν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ ἄψυχον οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ»).




Diagr. 2

- 115 Τρίτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς μερικῶν καταφατικῶν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ ἔμψυχον παντὶ ζῳῷ, τὸ ζῳὸν τινὶ λευκῷ, τὸ ἔμψυχον ἄρα τινὶ λευκῷ»).



Diagr. 3


- 119 Τέταρτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς μερικῶν ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ ἄψυχον οὐδενὶ ζῳῷ, τὸ ζῳὸν τινὶ λευκῷ, τὸ ἄψυχον ἄρα οὐ παντὶ λευκῷ»).



Diagr. 4

- 121 Ὅτι δὲ οὕτως ἐχουσῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, τῶν προτάσεων τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰ συμπεράσματα, οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῶνδε τῶν ὄρων τῶν προτεθέντων,
123 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων δῆλον ἐκείθεν· ἔστω δὴ ἀντὶ παντὸς ὄρου τὰ Α, Β, Γ.¹⁰
125 δεῖξομεν δὴ ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ «πᾶς πᾶς» τὸ «πᾶς» συναγόμενον ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀπὸ
127 δὲ τοῦ «οὐδεὶς πᾶς» τὸ «οὐδεὶς», ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ «πᾶς τις» τὸ «τίς», ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ
129 «οὐδεὶς τις» τὸ «οὐ πᾶς». Ἐκεῖνο δὲ πρότερον εἰλήφθω, ὅτι λέγεται κατὰ
127 παντός τι τινὶ ὑπάρχειν, ὅταν οὐδὲν μέρος ἦ λαβεῖν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, καθ'
129 οὗ θάτερον οὐ λεχθήσεται· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οὐδενὶ λέγεται τι τινὶ ὑπάρχειν,
129 ὅταν οὐδὲν μέρος ἦ λαβεῖν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, καθ' οὗ θάτερον λεχθήσεται.

- Δεδείχθω δὴ τὸ πρῶτον. Καὶ ἔστω τὸ Α μὲν παντὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ
131 τῷ Γ· λέγω ὅτι τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β (παντὶ δὲ λέγω
133 τῷ Β, τουτέστιν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν μέρος τοῦ Β, οὗ οὐ κατηγορεῖται τὸ Α),
133 μέρος δὲ τοῦ Β τὸ Γ, τὸ Α ἄρα κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ.




Diagr. 5

Cod. β G R


Crit. 113 ἀποφατικῶν β R : ἀποφαντικῶν G || 117 ἄρα om. G || 120 ἄψυχον P : ζῳὸν C G : ζῳὸν in textu, ἄψυχον R s.l. || 127 ὑπάρχειν β R : ὑπάρχον G || 131 λέγω¹ G : λέγ¹ C R : om. P (λέγω – τῷ Γ om. P ex homoeoteleuto) || δὲ G s.l. || λέγω² P G : λέγ² C R || 132 οὐκ ἔστιν C R (R s.l.) || 133 τοῦ¹ iter. G

Δεδείχθω τὸ δεύτερον. Ἐπεὶ τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β, οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι μέρος τοῦ Β, οὗ τὸ Α κατηγορηθήσεται· μέρος δὲ τοῦ Β τὸ Γ, τὸ Α ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ. 135




Diagr. 6

Δεδείχθω τὸ τρίτον. Ἐπεὶ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β, κατὰ πάντων ἄρα τῶν μερῶν τοῦ Β· μέρος δὲ τοῦ Β τὶ τῶν Γ, τὸ Α ἄρα κατὰ τινος τῶν μερῶν τοῦ Γ, τὸ Α ἄρα τινὶ τῶν Γ. 137
139



Diagr. 7

Δεδείχθω τὸ τέταρτον. Ἐπεὶ τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β, κατ' οὐδενὸς ἄρα τῶν μερῶν τοῦ Β· μέρος δὲ τοῦ Β τὶ τῶν Γ, τὸ Α ἄρα οὐ κατηγορηθήσεται κατὰ πάντων τῶν μερῶν τοῦ Γ, τὸ Α ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ. 141



Diagr. 8


5.1.1.2. De figura secunda¹¹

5.1.1.2.1. Modi figurae secundae

{ἔγραψε κάτεχε μέτριον ἄχολον}¹² 143

Ὅταν δὲ ὅροι τρεῖς οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὥστε τὸν ἕνα ἀμφοτέρων τῶν λοιπῶν κατηγορεῖσθαι, τότε τὸ δεύτερον γίνεται σχῆμα (οἷον «τὸ ἄψυχον οὐδενὶ ζῶν, τὸ ἄψυχον παντὶ λίθῳ, τὸ ζῶν οὐδενὶ λίθῳ»). Τούτου τρόποι τέσσαρες. 145
147

Πρῶτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ ἄψυχον οὐδενὶ ζῶν, τὸ ἄψυχον παντὶ λίθῳ, τὸ ζῶν οὐδενὶ λίθῳ»). 149




Diagr. 9

Cod. β G R


Crit. 134 οὐδενὶ β R : οὐδεὶς G || 142 τῷ β R : τὸ G || 143 ἔγραψε – ἄχολον ut gl. seclusi : in textu V : post diagr. 11 C i.m. : infra diagr. 12 G i.m. : infra diagr. 14 P i.m. : post diagr. 16 R i.m. || supra ἔγραψε artificium memoriae οὐδ π οὐδ add. R || supra κάτεχε artificium memoriae π οὐδ οὐδ add. R || supra μέτριον artificium memoriae οὐδ τ οὐ π add. R || supra ἄχολον artificium memoriae π οὐ π οὐ π add. R || 146 τὸ¹ β R : τὶ G

- 151 Δεύτερος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου
 153 ἀποφατικῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ λευκὸν
 πάση χιόνι, τὸ λευκὸν οὐδενὶ κόρακι, ἢ χιὼν οὐδενὶ κόρακι»).




Diagr. 10

- Τρίτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς κα-
 155 ταφατικῆς μερικῶν ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπέρασμα | (οἷον «τὸ λευκὸν
 οὐδενὶ κόρακι, τὸ λευκὸν τινὶ σώματι, ὁ κόραξ οὐ παντὶ σώματι»).



Diagr. 11

- 157 Τέταρτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς
 ἀποφατικῆς μερικῶν ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ λευκὸν
 159 πάση χιόνι, τὸ λευκὸν οὐ παντὶ σώματι, ἢ χιὼν οὐ παντὶ σώματι»).



Diagr. 12

5.1.1.2.2. De reductione modi figurae secundae ad modos figurae primae


- Δεδείχθω δὴ τὸ δεύτερον σχῆμα ἀναγόμενον εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα διὰ
 161 τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς ἀντιστροφούσης μιᾶς τῶν προτάσεων.

- Δεδείχθω δὴ τὸ πρῶτον. Ἐπεὶ τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῷ B, ἔσται καὶ τὸ B οὐδενὶ
 163 τῷ A· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ A παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ B ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ διὰ τὸν δεύτερον
 τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος.¹³ Δεδείχθω καὶ ἑτέρως διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον
 165 λεγομένης ἀπαγωγῆς· εἰ γὰρ μὴ τὸ B οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ, ἔσται τινί· εἰ δὴ τὸ A
 οὐδενὶ τῷ B, τὸ δὲ B τινὶ τῷ Γ, ἔσται τὸ A οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντί,
 167 ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ B τινὶ τῷ Γ, οὐδενὶ ἄρα. Πάλιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ A παντὶ
 τῷ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ τινὶ τῷ B, ἔσται τὸ A τινὶ τῷ B, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.¹⁴

Cod. 151–155] β G R || 155–168] β F R

Crit. 160 post δὴ add. καὶ P F R : seclusi cum C || 165 γὰρ R s.l. || δὴ β, F a.c.
 R : δὲ F p.c. || 167 οὐδενὶ ἄρα cancel. R

Diagr. 11 deest in F



Diagr. 13


Δεδείχθω τὸ δεύτερον. Ἐπεὶ τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ, ἔσται καὶ τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῶ A· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ A παντὶ τῶ B, τὸ Γ ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῶ B· εἰ δὲ τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῶ B, καὶ τὸ B οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ.¹⁵ Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· εἰ γὰρ τὸ B οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔσται τινί· ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὸ A παντὶ τῶ B, τὸ δὲ B τινὶ τῶ Γ, ἔσται τὸ A τινὶ τῶ Γ διὰ τὸν τρίτον τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος. Πάλιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ τινὶ τῶν B, ἔσται τὸ A οὐ παντὶ τῶ B, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ B τινὶ τῶ Γ, τὸ B ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ.¹⁶

169

171

173

175



Diagr. 14

Πάλιν δεδειχθῶ τὸ τρίτον. Ἐπεὶ τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῶ B, ἔσται καὶ τὸ B οὐδενὶ τῶ A· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ A τινὶ τῶ Γ, τὸ B ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῶ Γ διὰ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος.¹⁷ Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· εἰ τὸ B οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ παντὶ τῶ Γ, ἔσται παντί· εἰ δὴ τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῶ B, τὸ δὲ B παντὶ τῶ Γ, ἔσται τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ διὰ τὸν δεύτερον τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ. Καὶ πάλιν ἐπεὶ τὸ A τινὶ τῶ Γ, ἔσται καὶ τὸ Γ τινὶ τῶν A· εἰ δὴ τὸ B παντὶ τῶ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ τινὶ τῶν A, ἔσται τὸ B τινὶ τῶν A <καὶ τὸ A τινὶ τῶν B>, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ B παντὶ τῶ Γ.¹⁸

177

179


181

183

Cod. β F R


Crit. 173 ἔσται τὸ – τῶ Γ om. R ex homoeoteleuto || 175 B² β R : A F || 181 οὐδενὶ P : παντὶ C F R || 182 Γ¹ β, F p.c. R : A F a.c. || B β F : B^{ov} R || 183 καὶ τὸ – A addidi

Diagr. 13 *Imp. Ma.*] τ¹ om. β F



Diagr. 15

185 Τὸν δὲ τέταρτον τρόπον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδείξει κατ' εὐθείαν οὐκ ἀντι-
 187 στρεφούσης τῆς ἐλάττονος προτάσεως, τῆς μερικῆς ἀποφατικῆς, ἀλλὰ διὰ
 189 τοῦ ἀδυνάτου μόνον δειχθήσεται. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ τὸ Β οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἔσται
 παντί· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔσται
 τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ, ὑπόκειται δὲ οὐ παντί, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· τὸ Β ἄρα οὐ παντὶ
 τῷ Γ.¹⁹




Diagr. 16

5.1.1.3. De figura tertia 5.1.1.3.1. Modi figurae tertiae²⁰

191 {ἅπασι σθεναρὸς ἀσπίδι φέριστος ἰσάκις ὀμαλός}²¹
 193 Ὅταν δὲ τρεῖς ὄροι οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὥστε τὸν ἓνα ἀμφο-
 195 τέρους ὑποκεῖσθαι τοῖς ἄκροις, τότε τὸ τρίτον γίνεται σχῆμα καὶ τούτου δὲ
 197 ἄρα φιλόσοφον· ἢ} «τὸ ζῶον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ λογικὸν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ,
 τὸ ζῶον ἄρα τινὶ λογικῷ»).

Cod. β F R

Crit. 191 ἅπασι – ὀμαλός ut gl. seclusi in textu V : infra diagr. 17 F i.m. : post diagr. 20 C i.m. : post diagr. 25 R i.m. : infra diagr. 28 P i.m. || supra ἅπασι artificium memoriae π π τ add. R || supra σθεναρὸς artificium memoriae οὐδ π οὐ π add. R || supra ἀσπίδι artificium memoriae π τ τ add. R || supra φέριστος artificium memoriae οὐδ τ οὐ π add. R || supra ἰσάκις artificium memoriae τ π τ add. R || supra ὀμαλός artificium memoriae οὐ π οὐ π add. R || 193 τούτου] α R : τού- e τρό- corr. F || 196–197 ὁ Σωκράτης – ἢ ut gl. seclusi




Diagr. 17

Δεύτερος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς μερικὸν ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ ἄλογον οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ ζῶον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ ἄλογον οὐ παντὶ ζῴῳ»).

199


201



Diagr. 18

Τρίτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς μερικὸν καταφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ λογικὸν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ λευκὸν τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ λογικὸν τινὶ λευκῷ»).

203




Diagr. 19

Τέταρτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς μερικὸν ἀποφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ ἄλογον οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ λευκὸν τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ ἄλογον οὐ παντὶ λευκῷ»).

205

207




Diagr. 20

Πέμπτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος μερικῆς καταφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς μερικὸν καταφατικὸν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ φιλόσοφον τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ λογικὸν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ φιλόσοφον ἄρα τινὶ λογικῷ»).

209

211




Diagr. 21

Cod. β F R

Crit. 205 post ἀποφατικῆς add. προτάσεως β R

Diagr. 21 λογικόν F : ζῶον β R

Ἐκτος ὁ ἐκ μείζονος μερικῆς ἀποφατικῆς καὶ ἐλάττονος καθόλου κα-
 213 ταφατικῆς μερικῶν ἀποφατικῶν συνάγων συμπέρασμα (οἷον «τὸ λευκὸν οὐ
 παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ ζῶον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ λευκὸν οὐ παντὶ ζῴῳ»).




Diagr. 22

5.1.1.3.2. De reductione modi figurae tertiae ad modos figurae primae

215 Ἀποδείκνυνται δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἀναγόμενοι εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα διὰ τῆς
 ἀντιστροφῆς.

217 Δεδείχθω τὸ πρῶτον. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ Β παντὶ Α, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ Α τινὶ Γ
 ἀντιστραφεῖσθαι τῆς προτάσεως, ἔσται τὸ Β τινὶ Γ διὰ τὸν τρίτον τρόπον
 219 τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος.²² Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· εἰ γὰρ μὴ τὸ Β τινὶ Γ, ἔσται
 οὐδενί· εἰ τοίνυν τὸ Β οὐδενὶ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ παντὶ Α, ἔσται τὸ Β οὐδενὶ Α, ὅπερ
 221 ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ, τινὶ ἄρα. Πάλιν, εἰ τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ Β,
 τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Α, ἔσται τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ Α, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· τὸ Β ἄρα τινὶ
 223 τῶν Γ.²³




Diagr. 23

Ὁ δεύτερος. Ἐπεὶ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῶν Α, τὸ δὲ Α τινὶ τῶν Γ ἀντιστραφεῖσθαι
 225 τῆς προτάσεως, ἔσται τὸ Β οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ διὰ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον τοῦ
 πρώτου σχήματος.²⁴ Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· εἰ γὰρ μὴ παντὶ, ἔσται τὸ Β
 227 παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ παντὶ τῷ Α, τὸ Β ἄρα παντὶ τῷ Α, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον, τὸ Β
 ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ. Πάλιν, εἰ τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῶν Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἔσται
 229 τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῶν Γ <καὶ τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῶν Α>, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· τὸ Β ἄρα οὐ
 παντὶ τῷ Γ.²⁵

Cod. β F R

Crit. 217 post παντὶ add. τῷ β || 229 καὶ τὸ Γ – Α addidi

Diagr. 23 *Mod.*] *diagr. fig. tertiae* β F, R p.c. : *diagr. fig. secundae* R a.c. || τ β
 R : om. F || *Prob.*] τ¹ om. P F



Diagr. 24


Ὁ τρίτος. Ἐπει τὸ B παντὶ τῷ A, τὸ δὲ A τινὶ τῶν Γ ἀντιστραφείσης
 τῆς προτάσεως, ἔσται τὸ B τινὶ τῶν Γ διὰ τὸν τρίτον τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου
 σχήματος.²⁶ Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· εἰ γὰρ δυνατόν, ἔστω τὸ B οὐδενὶ τῷ
 Γ, ἦν δὲ καὶ τὸ Γ τινὶ τῶν A, τὸ B ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῶν A, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ
 ἄρα τὸ B οὐδενὶ τῶν Γ, τινὶ ἄρα. Πάλιν ἐπει τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ B, τὸ δὲ B παντὶ
 τῷ A, ἔσται τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ A, ἀλλὰ καὶ τινί, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· τὸ B ἄρα τινὶ
 τῶν Γ.²⁷

231

233

235

237



Diagr. 25

Ὁ τέταρτος. Ἐπει τὸ B οὐδενὶ τῶν A, τὸ δὲ A τινὶ τῶν Γ ἀντιστραφείσης
 τῆς προτάσεως, ἔσται καὶ τὸ B οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ διὰ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον
 τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος.²⁸ Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· εἰ γὰρ δυνατόν, ἔστω τὸ
 B παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ Γ τινὶ τῶν A· τὸ B ἄρα τινὶ τῶν A, ἀλλὰ | καὶ
 οὐδενί, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· τὸ B ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ. Πάλιν, ἐπει τὸ A οὐδενὶ
 τῷ B ἀντιστραφείσης τῆς προτάσεως καὶ τὸ B παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἔσται τὸ A οὐδενὶ
 τῷ Γ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τινί, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· τὸ B ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ.²⁹


239

241

243


Cod. 231–241] β F R || 241–244] β G R

Crit. 235 τῶν F R : τῷ β




Diagr. 26

245 Ὁ πέμπτος. Ἐπεὶ τὸ Γ παντὶ τῶν Α, τὸ δὲ Α τινὶ τῶν Β, ἔσται καὶ τὸ Γ
 247 τινὶ τῶν Β διὰ τὸν τρίτον τρόπον τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος· εἰ γὰρ τὸ Γ τινὶ
 249 τῶν Β, ἔσται καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῶν Γ.³⁰ Διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ
 251 τῶν Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ παντὶ τῶν Α, ἔσται τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῶν Α, ἀλλὰ καὶ τινί, ὅπερ
 ἀδύνατον· τὸ Β ἄρα τινὶ τῶν Γ. Πάλιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῶν Β, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ
 τῶν Α, ἔσται τὸ Γ οὐ παντὶ τῶν Α, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντί, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· τὸ Β
 ἄρα τινὶ τῶν Γ.³¹



Diagr. 27

253 Ὁ δὲ ἔκτος κατ' εὐθείαν μὲν οὐ δύναται δεῖκνυσθαι διὰ τῆς ἀντιστρο-
 255 φῆς ἀναγόμενος εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα, δείκνυται δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· εἰ
 γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται τὸ Β οὐ παντὶ τῶν Γ, ἔσται παντί· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ Γ παντὶ τῶν
 Α, τὸ Β ἄρα παντὶ τῶν Α, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐ παντί, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· τὸ Β ἄρα οὐ
 παντὶ τῶν Γ.³²



Diagr. 28

Cod. β G R

Crit. 255 τὸ Β – τῶν Α om. R ex homoeoteleuto

Diagr. 26 om. G R || 27 om. G || *Prob.*] τ¹ conieci : οὐ π β R || 28 om. G

5.1.2. De proprietatibus figurae syllogismorum categoricorum

Ἴδια δὲ τοῦ μὲν πρώτου σχήματος τὸ τὸν μέσον ὄρον ὑποκεῖσθαι μὲν 257
 τῷ μείζονι ἄκρω, κατηγορεῖσθαι δὲ θατέρου καὶ τὸ συνάγειν ἀεὶ καὶ καθό-
 λου καὶ μερικά, καὶ καταφατικά καὶ ἀποφατικά· τὸ τὴν ἐλάττονα πρότασιν 259
 ἀεὶ καταφατικὴν ἔχειν, καὶ ἢ καθόλου ἢ μερικὴν, τὴν δὲ μείζονα ἀεὶ κα-
 θόλου, ἢ καταφατικὴν ἢ ἀποφατικὴν, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἄλλα δύο τελειοῦν. Ἴδια 261
 δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ τὸν μέσον ἀμφοτέρων κατηγορεῖσθαι· τὸ συνάγειν ἀεὶ
 ἀποφατικά, ἢ μερικὰ ἢ καθόλου· τὸ ἔχειν τὴν μείζονα ἀεὶ καθόλου, τὴν 263
 δὲ ἐλάττονα ἀνομοιοσχίμονα, ἢ καθόλου ἢ μερικὴν. Ἴδια τοῦ τρίτου τὸ
 τὸν μέσον ἀμφοτέροις ὑποκείμενον ἔχειν· τὸ <ἔχειν> τὴν ἐλάττονα ἀεὶ κα- 265
 ταφατικὴν, {τὸ} τὴν μείζονα καὶ μερικὴν καὶ καθόλου· τὸ συνάγειν ἀεὶ
 μερικά, καὶ ἀποφατικά καὶ καταφατικά.³³ 267

5.1.3. De analysi syllogismorum categoricorum

Δυνησόμεθα δὲ ἀναλύειν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις συλλογισμοὺς ἢ τοὺς ἐν 269
 ταῖς διαλέξεσιν οὕτως· πρῶτον ζητήσομεν εἰ συλλογισμὸς ἐστίν· ἔσται δε,
 εἰ λόγος εἶη ἀποφαντικὸς μετὰ αἰτίας εἰρημένος. Εἶτα ληψόμεθα τὸ συμ- 271
 πέρασμα, ὅπερ ἀποδείκνυσιν ὁ ἀποδεικνύς· εἶτα θεωρήσομεν εἰ συνάπτε-
 ται τὸ κατηγορούμενον τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἢ διαιρεῖται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τουτέστιν 273
 εἰ καταφατικὸν ἢ ἀποφατικὸν ἐστίν. Καί, εἰ καταφατικόν, πρόδηλον ὅτι ὁ
 συλλογισμὸς οὐκ ἐστίν ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι· καὶ εἰ μὲν καθόλου, φανερόν 275
 ὅτι τοῦ πρώτου καὶ ὁ πρῶτος τρόπος· εἰ δὲ μερικόν, ἢ αὐτοῦ ἢ τοῦ τρί-
 του σχήματος. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ληφθέντων ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι τοῦ μείζονος ὄρου 277
 καὶ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ὁ μέσος | εἰλημμένος ἐστί, θεωρητέον εἰ
 ὑπόκειται ὁ μέσος τῷ ἐσχάτῳ ἢ κατηγορεῖται αὐτοῦ· καὶ εἰ μὲν κατηγορεῖ- 279
 ται ὁ μέσος, ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἔσται τρίτος τρόπος τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος· εἰ
 δὲ κατηγορεῖται αὐτοῦ ὁ ἐσχατος, ἔσται τοῦ τρίτου· καὶ θεωρήσομεν τὰς 281
 προτάσεις καί, εἰ μὲν ἄμφω καθόλου καταφατικά, ὁ πρῶτος τρόπος ἔσται
 τοῦ τρίτου· εἰ δὲ ἢ μὲν μείζων καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἐλάττων μερικὴ, ἔσται ὁ τρί- 283
 τος τρόπος τοῦ τρίτου· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, ὁ πέμπτος τρόπος τοῦ τρίτου.
 Εἰ δὲ ἀποφατικὸν εἶη τὸ συμπέρασμα, εἰ μὲν καὶ καθόλου, οὐκ ἔσται τοῦ 285
 τρίτου οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ ἢ τοῦ πρώτου ἢ τοῦ δευτέρου· εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος
 ὄρος κατηγορεῖται μόνον, τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ ἢ ὁ πρῶτος τρόπος ἢ ὁ δεύτε-


Cod. 257–277] β G R || 277–286] β F R

Crit. 257 δὲ τοῦ om. G || 262 τὸν μέσον β R : τῶν μέσων G || 265 ἔχειν addidi
 || 266 τὸ¹ seclusi || 269 ζητήσομεν β R : ζητήσωμεν G || 276 ληφθέντων conieci
 : ληφθέντος β G : ληφθέντες R || 282 δ' β F, δὲ R || 285 ἀλλὰ β R, ἀλλ' F

287 ρος (τοῦτο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προτάσεων φανήσεται)· εἰ δὲ καὶ κατηγορεῖται καὶ
 289 ὑπόκειται, τοῦ πρώτου καὶ ὁ δεύτερος τρόπος· εἰ δὲ μερικὸν εἶη τὸ συμπέ-
 291 ρασμα, τὸ μὲν σχῆμα πάλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ὅρου, τὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀπὸ τῶν
 293 προτάσεων ληψόμεθα. Οὕτω δὲ ἀναλύειν ἐθισθέντες τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς
 καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαλέξεσιν ἐτοιμῶς ἕξομεν διαγινώσκειν τὰ σχήματα· οὕτω δὲ
 ἐστὶν εἰδέναι τοὺς νόθους τῶν συλλογισμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑγειῶν καὶ <ἐν τοῖς
 βιβλίοις τῶν παλαιῶν> κειμένων διακρίνειν· καὶ οὕτω τοὺς κατὰ τὸ εἶδος
 τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ παραλογιζομένουσ φωράσομεν.



Diagr. 29



Diagr. 30

295 5.2. Περὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν συλλογισμῶν³⁵
 Ἐπεὶ δέ, καθὼς εἴρηται, ὁ ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος εἰς τὸν κατηγορικὸν δι-
 297 αιρεῖται καὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν, εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τῶν κατηγορικῶν συλλογι-
 299 σμῶν, ρητέον ἂν εἶη λοιπὸν καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν. Πᾶς τοίνυν ὑποθε-
 301 τικὸς ἡγούμενον ἔχει τι καὶ ἐπόμενον, πρόσληψιν καὶ συμπέρασμα. Οἷον·
 ὑποθετικὸς συλλογισμὸς ἐστὶν «εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ ζῷον ἐστὶν· ἀλλὰ
 303 μὴν ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ ζῷον ἄρα ἐστίν»· ἡγούμενόν ἐστὶ τὸ «εἰ ἄνθρω-
 πός ἐστιν», ἐπόμενον «καὶ ζῷον ἐστίν»· «ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν», τοῦτο
 πρόσληψις· συμπέρασμα «καὶ ζῷον ἄρα ἐστίν».

Τῶν δὲ ὑποθετικῶν τρόποι τέσσαρες· πρῶτος ὁ τινὸς ὄντος τί ἐστὶ ση-
 305 μαίνων· δεύτερος <ὁ> τινὸς ὄντος τί οὐκ ἔστι· τρίτος <ὁ> τινὸς μὴ ὄντος τί

Cod. β F R

Crit. 287 τοῦτο καὶ conieci : καὶ τοῦτο ω || 290 Οὕτω conieci : τούτω ω || 291 οὕτω conieci : τούτω ω || 292–293 ἐν – παλαιῶν addidi (cf. v. 5) || 295 τῶν – συλλογισμῶν eras. F || 304 τινὸς conieci : τίνος ω || 305 ὁ addidi || τινὸς¹ conieci : τίνος ω || ὁ addidi || τινὸς² conieci : τίνος ω

Diagr. 29 seclusi cum F C || ἦν conieci : ἔστιν β R || post Θεός add. ὄντα R || 30 seclusi cum F C || ἀεὶ ὧν conieci : ὄντα β R

ἐστιν· τέταρτος <ό> τινὸς μὴ ὄντος τί οὐκ ἔστι. Παράδειγμα τοῦ πρώτου·
 «εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ ζῶν ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῶν ἄρα 307
 ἐστί»· τοῦ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ὑποκειμένου εἶναι συνάγεται τὸ ζῶν εἶναι. Πα-
 ράδειγμα τοῦ δευτέρου· «ὅδε ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἢ ἄρτιός ἐστιν ἢ περιττός· ἀλλὰ 309
 μὴν ἄρτιος, οὐκ ἄρα περιττός»· τὸ γὰρ ὑποκεῖσθαι ἄρτιον εἶναι ἀναιρεῖ
 τὸ περιττὸν εἶναι. Παράδειγμα τοῦ τρίτου· «τόδε τὸ ποσὸν ἢ διωρισμένον 311
 ἐστίν ἢ συνεχές· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἔστι διωρισμένον, συνεχές ἄρα ἐστί». Πα-
 ράδειγμα τοῦ τετάρτου· «εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ ζῶν ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῶν 313
 οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα»· τῷ γὰρ ὑποτιθέναι μὴ εἶναι ζῶν δείκνυσι
 μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον. 315

Ἔστι δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐνὶ ἡγουμένῳ καὶ ἐνὶ ἐπομένῳ ὑποθεμένοις τὴν πρόσ-
 ληψιν ἐπενεγκεῖν καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ δυνατὸν ὑποθέσθαι 317
 καθεξῆς ἡγούμενα καὶ ἐπόμενα, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν πρόσληψιν ἐπενεγκεῖν
 καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα. Καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς δύναται γίνεσθαι· ἢ γὰρ ἐνὶ ἡγουμένῳ 319
 πολλὰ τίθεμεν ἐπόμενα μετὰ διαζευκτικοῦ καὶ οὕτως ἐπάγοντες τὴν πρόσ-
 ληψιν συμπεραίνομεν, ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπομένῳ ἄλλο τίθεμεν ἐπόμενον καὶ 321
 ἐκείνῳ ἕτερον καὶ τούτῳ ἄλλο, μέχρις οὗ πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον ἔλθωμεν
 καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν πρόσληψιν εἰσάγοντες συμπεραίνομεν· ὅς δὴ συλλο- 323
 γισμὸς ἐξ ὅλων ὑποθέσεων συνεστῶς ἐστι. Καὶ <ό> ἐκ διαζευκτικοῦ μὲν
 ἐστίν οἶον· «τόδε τὸ ἔμψυχον ἢ ζῶν ἐστίν ἢ ζωόφυτον ἢ φυτόν· ἀλλὰ 325
 μὴν οὔτε ζῶν ἐστίν οὔτε ζωόφυτον, φυτόν ἄρα» κατὰ τὸν τρίτον τρόπον
 τῶν ὑποθετικῶν· δείκνυσι γὰρ τινῶν μὴ ὄντων τί ἐστι· τοῦτον δὲ δυνατὸν 327
 καὶ κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον τρόπον προάγεσθαι· οἶον «τόδε τὸ ἔμψυχον ἢ ζῶν
 ἐστίν ἢ ζωόφυτον ἢ φυτόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν φυτόν, οὐκ ἄρα ζῶν ἢ ζωόφυτον». 329
 Ὁ δ' ἐξ ὅλων ὑποθέσεων συνεστῶς ἐστίν οἶος· «εἰ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθός, ἀνταπό-
 δοσις ἔσται τῶν βεβιωμένων· εἰ ἀνταπόδοσις ἔσται τῶν βεβιωμένων, ἔσται 331
 ἢ ψυχὴ μετὰ θάνατον· εἰ ἔσται ἢ ψυχὴ μετὰ θάνατον, ἀθάνατός ἐστιν· εἰ
 ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθός, ἀθάνατος ἢ ψυχὴ· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθός, ἢ ψυχὴ ἄρα 333
 ἀθάνατος»· οὗτος δὲ εἰς τὸν πρῶτον ἀνάγεται τρόπον· δείκνυσι γὰρ τινὸς
 ὄντος τί ἐστι· τὸν τοιοῦτον δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς λοιποὺς τρεῖς τρό- 335
 πους προαγαγεῖν. Ὡστε καὶ ὁ ἐκ διαζευκτικοῦ ὑποθετικὸς καὶ ὁ ἐξ ὅλων
 ὑποθέσεων συνεστῶς εἰς τοὺς εἰρημένους τέσσαρας ἀνάγονται τρόπους. 337

Cod. β F R

Crit. 306 ὁ addidi || τινὸς conieci : τίνος ω || 309 ὅδε ὁ β F : ὁ δὲ R || 312–313
 Παράδειγμα om. β R || 313 ante ἐστι add. οὐκ R i.m. || 316 ἐνὶ ἡγουμένῳ ...
 ἐνὶ ἐπομένῳ conieci : ἐν ἡγούμενον ... ἐν ἐπόμενον ω || ὑποθεμένοις conieci :
 ὑποθέμενον C F R : ὑποτιθέμενον P || 322 ἄλλο β F : ἄλλον R || 324 ὁ addidi
 || 327 τινῶν R : τίνων β F || 330 οἶος F R : οἶον β || 334 τινὸς conieci : τίνος ω
 || 336 ὁ¹ om. β

Notes

- 1** If the deciphering of the title in F by Papazoglou is correct (see also p. 15 n. 1), then the agreement between β and F is a proof that the archetype contained the reference to the exegetical genre of the text (Σύνοψις). The readings of both G and s confirm at any rate the variant read by Papazoglou. The singular form Περὶ συλλογισμοῦ in the title should be preferred, because of the agreement between β and R. The archetype must have included information on the author's identity too, as it may be inferred once more by the agreement between β and F. I have opted for τοῦ ... πατρὸς ἡμῶν Νείλου, ἀρχιεπισκόπου Θεσσαλονίκης, because it is transmitted by both F and one of the descendants of β , namely the earlier C. In regard to the clerical capacity of Neilos Kabasilas as Archbishop of Thessaloniki, C transmits a variant which seems to be a compilation of the respective readings in F and P. I have opted for the *lectio brevior* (reconstructed by Papazoglou) in the earlier of the latter two codices, namely F.
- 2** See OS I, n. 1; OS II, n. 1.
- 3** Παραλογιζόμενοι could be an allusion to Pyrrho's fallacies as presented in Nikolaos Kabasilas' *Contra Pyrrhonem*; see Demetracopoulos 1999, pp. 18.22, 40–41 and above p. 6.
- 4** 27–28 Μέρη – παθητικόν] A discussion on the division of the soul into rational (λογικόν) and passive (παθητικόν) parts is discussed in *Quaestio de rationis valore*, another work by Nikolaos Kabasilas; see Demetracopoulos 1998, pp. 57.66–77 and above p. 6.
- 5** 32–37 καὶ τοὺς μὲν τοῦ λογικοῦ – τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν] On the connection between the five kinds of sentences and the faculties of the soul (λογικόν / γνωστικόν vs. παθητικόν / ὀρεκτικόν) see also OS I, n. 3; OS II, n. 3.
- 6** 78–79 καὶ ἡ μερική – ἐναντίως δηλονότι] See OS I, n. 5.
- 7** 101–106 Συμπέρασμα – ἐσχάτου] See OS II, n. 8.
- 8** On the four moods of the first syllogistic figure see also OS I, nn. 7, 8, 9, 10.
- 9** The mnemonics are not included in any of the two previous versions of OS. Since there is no explicit mention of or indirect hint to them in OS III and they are not necessary for understanding the text (in the way the diagrams are), I have decided to exclude them. On the use of the mnemonics in Byzantium see Agiotis 2022, pp. 66–72.
- 10** 123 A, B, Γ] See OS I, n. 22.
- 11** On the four moods of the second syllogistic figure, see also OS I, nn. 11, 12, 13, 14.
- 12** See above n. 9.
- 13** 162–164 Ἐπεὶ τὸ A – πρώτου σχήματος] See OS I, n. 27.
- 14** 164–168 Δεδείχθω – ἀδύνατον] Two indirect proofs of CELARENT through contradiction of the minor (FERIO) and then the major (DARII) premise.
- 15** 169–171 Ἐπεὶ τὸ A – τὸ B οὐδενὶ τῶν Γ] See OS I, n. 28.

- 16** 171–175 *Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου – τὸ Β ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ*] Two indirect proofs of CAMESTRES through contradiction of the minor (DARII) and then the major (FERIO) premise.
- 17** 176–178 *Ἐπεὶ τὸ Α – τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος*] See OS I, n. 29.
- 18** 178–184 *Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου – τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ*] Two indirect proofs of FESTINO through contradiction of the minor (CELARENT) and then the major (DARII) premise.
- 19** 187–190 *Εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β – τὸ Β ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ*] See OS I, n. 30.
- 20** On the six moods of the third syllogistic figure, see also OS I, nn. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.
- 21** See above n. 9.
- 22** 217–219 *Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ Β – τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος*] See OS I, n. 31.
- 23** 219–223 *Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου – τὸ Β ἄρα τινὶ τῶν Γ*] Two indirect proofs of DARA-PTI through the contraries of the major (CELARENT) and then the minor (CELARENT) premise.
- 24** 224–226 *Ἐπεὶ τὸ Β – τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος*] See OS I, n. 32.
- 25** 226–230 *Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου – τὸ Β ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ*] Two indirect proofs of FELAPTON through the contraries of the major (BARBARA) and then the minor (CELARENT) premise.
- 26** 231–233 *Ἐπεὶ τὸ Β – τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος*] See OS I, n. 33.
- 27** 233–237 *Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου – τὸ Β ἄρα τινὶ τῶν Γ*] Two indirect proofs of DATISI through contradiction of the major (FERIO) and then the minor (CELARENT) premise.
- 28** 238–240 *Ἐπεὶ τὸ Β – τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος*] See OS I, n. 34.
- 29** 240–244 *Καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου – τὸ Β ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ*] Two indirect proofs of FERISON through contradiction of the major (DARII) and then minor (CELARENT) premise.
- 30** 245–247 *Ἐπεὶ τὸ Γ – τὸ Β τινὶ τῶν Γ*] See OS I, n. 35.
- 31** 247–251 *Διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου – τὸ Β ἄρα τινὶ τῶν Γ*] Two indirect proofs of DIS-AMIS through contradiction of the major (CELARENT) and then the minor (FERIO) premise.
- 32** 253–256 *εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται – τὸ Β ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ*] See OS I, n. 36.
- 33** 264–267 *Ἴδια τοῦ τρίτου – καταφατικά*] The properties of the first two figures concern the relative position of the middle term and the quality and quantity of the conclusion and then the premises. With regard to the third figure, however, the premises are mentioned before the conclusion; perhaps the reference to the conclusions of the third figure is a later addition (see OS I, n. 37).
- 34** *Diagr. 29, 30*] The diagrams seem to be later additions. They must have been inserted in the outer or inner margin of the archetype of OS III. In R they were transmitted after the end of the section on the categorical syllogisms, whereas in P (and in all probability in β too) after the end of OS III. Their position in R is more fitting, since

the wording suggests the adaptation of a passage from two orations by Gregory of Nazianzus into diagrammatic versions of the moods CAMESTRES and BARBARA. The excerpt is the following (I have changed the punctuation):

Θεὸς ἦν μὲν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται, μᾶλλον δὲ «ἔστιν» αἰεὶ· τὸ γὰρ «ἦν» καὶ «ἔσται» τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνου τμήματα καὶ τῆς ῥευστῆς φύσεως, ὁ δὲ ὢν αἰεὶ· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ὀνομάζει ... (Moreschini 1990, § 7.1–4).

The adaptation of the Greek text in the diagrammatic forms of categorical syllogisms entails the theses or the to-be-drawn conclusions that “no god is past and future” and “every god is timeless”. The valid deduction (CAMESTRES) leading to the first conclusion is then:

(Premise 1) All past and all future are time segments perceived by us humans
 (Premise 2) No god is time segments perceived by us humans
 (Conclusion) No god is past and future

Similarly, the second deduction (BARBARA) should be formed as follows:

(Premise 1) Every god is an eternal being
 (Premise 2) Every eternal being is timeless
 (Conclusion) Every god is timeless

The latter deduction, however, falls into the category of *extra dictionem* fallacies, namely the *petitio principii* (τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι), since “eternal” and “timeless” mean the same thing. Both arguments may be a hint to the remark made in OS III: It is useful to know the difference between valid and invalid syllogisms, because such knowledge could be of use in regard to the critical assessment of syllogisms in the works of previous scholars (vv. 4–6, 291–293).

35 John Philoponus’ commentary on *APr*. I must be the source of the section on the hypothetical syllogisms. In his commentary, Philoponus claims that “generally speaking, every syllogism proves either what is, or what is not the case; or what is the case, if something is or is not; or what is not the case, if something is or is not” (Wallies 1905, p. 243.12–13: καθόλου πᾶς συλλογισμὸς ἢ τὸ ἔστιν ἢ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι δείκνυσιν, ἢ τίνος ὄντος τί ἔστιν ἢ τί οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ τίνος μὴ ὄντος τί ἔστιν ἢ τί οὐκ ἔστιν). The author of OS III suggests that there are four moods of hypothetical syllogisms echoing the introductory remark by Philoponus and gives examples for each one of them:

1. If A, then B; but A; therefore B (vv. 307–308)
2. A or B; but B; therefore not A (vv. 309–310)
3. A or B; but not A; therefore B (vv. 311–312)
4. If A, then B; but not B, therefore not A (vv. 313–314)

It seems that the criterion for this classification was the quality of the “additional assumption” (πρόσληψις) and the conclusion. The author of OS III goes on to suggest that a second grouping of hypothetical syllogisms is possible (vv. 316–337). This additional division concerns syllogisms “by means of a disjunction” (ἐκ διαζευκτικοῦ)

and “wholly hypothetical” syllogisms (ἐξ ὅλων ὑποθέσεων). The former may be reduced to the second and the third moods mentioned above, whereas the latter may be reduced not only to the first mood, but also to the other three as well.

The author of OS III, however, has an erroneous understanding of what is claimed by Philoponus (see the detailed presentation of Philoponus’ text in Ierodiakonou 1996, pp. 99–102). Philoponus deems that hypothetical syllogisms may be reduced to one of the three figures, since the antecedent is actually the conclusion of a categorical syllogism (Wallies 1905, p. 242.10–13). He then mentions three kinds of hypothetical syllogisms: (a) a group of four types of “wholly hypothetical” (δι’ ὅλων ὑποθετικοί) syllogisms with “at least” three constituent conditional propositions (Wallies 1905, p. 243.11–36); (b) two types of hypothetical syllogisms (“in accordance with a consequence” [κατ’ ἀκολουθίαν]; “in accordance with a disjunction” [κατὰ διάζευξιν]) whose “additional assumption” is a categorical premise (Wallies 1905, pp. 244.3–246.14); (c) reductions to the impossible (Wallies 1905, pp. 246.15–247.32).

Moreover, the author of OS III seems to take into account only the first two groups of hypothetical syllogisms in Philoponus’ text, while suggesting the reduction of both “wholly hypothetical” and “by means of disjunction” syllogisms to the four moods mentioned at the beginning of the section. However, the latter moods correspond to four out of five types of hypothetical syllogisms with a categorical premise in Philoponus’ commentary. Interestingly enough, the omitted fifth type is related to the elements of the Stoic tradition in Philoponus’ commentary (Wallies 1905, p. 245.20–24; Ierodiakonou 1996, pp. 98–99, 101). Disjunction or conjunction seem to be insignificant for the initial classification of the four moods in OS III. The remark that “wholly hypothetical” syllogisms may be reduced to all four moods (vv. 336–337) is erroneous – only their “reduction” to the first and fourth moods would be possible – unless one regards the reference to the four moods as a hint to the four types of “wholly hypothetical” syllogisms in Philoponus’ text (Wallies 1905, p. 243.23–32). However, the example concerning “wholly hypothetical” syllogisms in OS III is peculiar, since it has the following general form: If A, then B; if B, then C; if C, then D; therefore if A, then D; but A; therefore D (vv. 330–334). This form suggests a “wholly hypothetical” preliminary syllogism inferring a conditional proposition (therefore if A, then D) which then serves as the premise of a syllogism belonging to group “b” in Philoponus’ classification above.

Appendix

Meteor. Barlaam 202, ff. 64r, vv. 3–23; 64v, vv. 1–16 (punctuation and spelling have been normalized; | = change of line; || = change of folio).

Ἐπιγραφαὶ τῶν κεφαλαίων | τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους βίβλου, τοῦ Ὀργάνου

1. | Εἰ ἔστι φιλοσοφία
2. Τί ἐστὶν ἡ φιλοσοφία
3. | Εἰ ὑπό τι μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἡ λογικὴ ἀνάγεται | πραγματεία
4. Τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῆς λογικῆς
5. | Ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν *Κατηγοριῶν* ἄρχεσθαι | τὴν λογικὴν πραγματείαν
6. Περὶ τῶν *Κατη|γοριῶν*
7. Διὰ τί ὀνομάζονται *Κατηγορίαι*
8. | Τί ἐστὶ κατηγορούμενον καὶ τί ὑποκείμενον
9. | Τί ἐστὶ λόγος
10. Ποσαχῶς ὁ λόγος
11. Τί ἐστὶ πρό|τασις
12. Τί ἐστὶ κατάφασις
13. Τί ἀπόφασις
14. | Τί ἐστὶ προσδιορισμὸς καὶ πόσοι προσδιορισ|μοί
15. Τί ἐστὶν ἀντίφασις
16. Τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἐναντίως | ἀντικεῖσθαι τὰς προτάσεις καὶ τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀν|τιφατικῶς
17. Πόσοι <οἱ>¹ τρόποι
18. Τί ἐστὶν ἡ μετὰ | τρόπου πρότασις

¹οἱ addidi

19. Τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον καὶ | τί προσκατηγορούμενον
20. Τί ἐστιν ὄνομα καὶ | τί ἀόριστον ὄνομα
21. Τί ἀόριστον κατηγορούμενον | καὶ τί ἀόριστον ὑποκείμενον
22. Τίνες αἱ ἐκ τούτων | προτάσεις
23. Ποῦ δεῖ τιθέναι τι
24. Τί ὄρος
25. Ἀρ|νητικὸν «οὐ», ἐν αἷς τῶν προτάσεων ἢ προσκατη||γορούμενόν ἐστιν ἢ τρόπος
26. Τίς ἐστι τῶν | λόγων ὁ διαιρῶν τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος
27. | Τί ἐστι συλλογισμὸς
28. Περὶ τοῦ πρώτου σχή||ματος· ἀπόδειξις ἐκάστου τῶν τρόπων, καὶ | κατ' εὐθείαν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου
29. Περὶ | τοῦ δευτέρου· ὅπως δεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ πρῶτον | ἀνάγειν σχῆμα
30. Περὶ τοῦ τρίτου· | ὅπως δεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ πιστοῦσθαι ἀναγόμενον¹ | εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς
31. | Πῶς ῥάστα γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναλύειν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς | παλαιοῖς συλλογισμοῦς
32. Ὅπως ἂν γένοιτο | μὴ ἀπατᾶσθαι παρὰ τῶν προσδιαλεγο|μένων
33. Ὅτι διχῶς τὸ παραλογίζεσθαι· | ἢ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα, ὅταν ἔξω τῶν κειμένων | γίνηται σχημάτων, ἢ παρὰ τὴν ὕλην, ὅταν | ψευδεῖς ᾧσιν αἱ εἰλημμένα προτάσεις

¹ἀναγόμενον copieci : ἀνάγοντα M

Abbreviations

- ACMGE 2* Felipe G. Hernández Muñoz ed. (2004–), *Álbum de copistas de manuscritos griegos en España*, vol. 2: *Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid*, URL: <http://webs.ucm.es/info/copistas/copista.html?num=143> (visited on 12/21/2021).
- Diktyon *Pinakes* (2022), URL: <https://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/> (visited on 01/22/2022).
- PLP* Erich Trapp, Rainer Walther, Hans-Veit Beyer, Katja Sturm-Schnabl, Ewald Kislinger, Sokrates Kaplaneres, and Ioannis Leontiadis eds. (1976–1996), *Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit*, Vienna, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1553/0x000487df>, (visited on 12/21/2021).
- RGK 3* Ernst Gamillscheg (1997), *Repertorium der griechischen Kopisten 800–1600*, vol. 3: *Handschriften aus Bibliotheken Roms mit dem Vatikan*, in collab. with Dieter Harlfinger and Paolo Eleuteri, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Byzantinistik, Vienna.

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